





Effigies Iohannis Locke
Ex Archetypo, quod in Musaeo Alexandri Greekie Chirurgi adservatur expressa.



Effigies Iohannis Locke
Ex Archetypo, quod in Musaeo Alexandri Greekie Chirurgi adservatur expressa.



Siste Viator.

Hic juxta situs est,

JOHANNES LOCKE

*Si qualis fuerit rogas, mediocritate suâ
contentum se vixisse respondet. Literis
innutritus eousq; tantum profecit, ut
veritati unice liaret hoc ex scriptis
illius discere; quæ quod de eo reliquum
est, majori fide tibi exhibebunt; quam
epitaphii suspecta elogia, virtutes si quas
habuit, minores sane quam quas sibi
laudi tibi in exemplum proponeret Vitia
una sepeliantur. Morum exemplum si
queras, in Evangelio habes, vitiorum
utinam nusquam, mortalitatis certe
(quod profit) hic et ubiq;.*

Natum Anno Dom. 1632. Aug. 29^o

Mortuum Anno Dom. 1704. Oct. 28^o

memorat hæc tabula brevi et
ipsa interitura.

THE
WORKS
OF
JOHN LOCKE Esq;


In Three Volumes.

The CONTENTS of which follow in the next Leaf.

With ALPHABETICAL TABLES.

VOL. I.

The Second Edition.



LONDON,
Printed for A. CHURCHILL, and A. MANSHIP, and sold
by W. TAYLOR in *Pater-noster-Row*. M.DCC.XXII.

THE
WORKS

OF

JOHN LOCKE

IN A LETTER

TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PARLIAMENT


AND THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE

VOL. I.

BY JOHN LOCKE

LONDON

Printed by A. MILLAR, in Strand, near St. Martin's Church.
MDCCLXXII.



The Contents of the Three Volumes.

V O L. I.

AN Essay concerning Human Understanding. In Four Books.

A Letter to the Right Reverend *Edward* Lord Bishop of *Worcester*, concerning some Passages relating to *Mr. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding*, in a late Discourse of his Lordship's, in Vindication of the Trinity.

Mr. Locke's Reply to the Right Reverend the Bishop of *Worcester's* Answer to his Letter.

Mr. Locke's Reply to the Bishop of *Worcester's* Answer to his Second Letter.

V O L. II.

SOME Considerations of the Consequences of the lowering of Interest, and raising the Value of Money. In a Letter sent to a Member of Parliament. 1691.

Short Observations on a Printed Paper, entitled, *For encouraging the coining Silver Money in England, and after, for keeping it here.*

Further Observations concerning raising the Value of Money. Wherein *Mr. Lowndes's* Arguments for it, in his late Report concerning *An Essay for the Amendment of the Silver Coin*, are particularly examin'd.

Two Treatises of Government. In the Former, the false Principles and Foundation of *Sir Robert Filmer*, and his Followers, are detected and overthrown: The Latter, is an Essay concerning the true Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government.

- A Letter concerning Toleration.
 A Second Letter concerning Toleration.
 A Third Letter for Toleration : To the Author of the Third
 Letter concerning Toleration:
 The Reasonableness of Christianity, as deliver'd in the Scrip-
 tures.
 A Vindication of *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, from
 Mr. *Edwards's* Reflections.
 A Second Vindication of *The Reasonableness of Christianity*.
-

V O L. III.

- S**O M E Thoughts concerning Education.
 A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. *Paul* to the *Galatians*, I. and II. *Corinthians*, *Romans*, and *Ephesians*.
 To which is prefix'd, An Essay for the Understanding of
 St. *Paul's* Epistles, by consulting St. *Paul* himself.
 Posthumous Works, viz.
 I. Of the Conduct of the Understanding.
 II. An Examination of *P. Malebranche's* Opinion of *Seeing all things in God*.
 III. A Discourse of Miracles.
 IV. Part of a Fourth Letter for Toleration.
 V. Memoirs relating to the Life of *Anthony*, first Earl
 of *Shaftesbury*.
 VI. A new Method of a Common-Place-Book; written
 originally in *French*, and translated into *English*.
 Some familiar Letters between Mr. *Locke* and several of his
 Friends.



T O T H E
R E A D E R.



THOU hast here a Compleat Collection of
the several Works of Mr. JOHN LOCKE,
which were publish'd in his Life-time,
either with or without his Name to them.
And that thou mayst be assur'd that the Latter are
truly his, I think it proper to transcribe the following
Clause out of his last Will and Testament: "Whereas
" the Reverend Dr. Hudson, Library-Keeper of the
" Bodleian Library in the University of Oxford,
" writ to me some time since, desiring of me, for the
" said Library, the Books whereof I was the Author;
" I did, in return to the honour done me therein, pre-
" sent to the said Library All the Books that were
" publish'd under my Name; which tho' accepted with
" honourable mention of me, yet were not understood
" to answer the Request made me, it being suppos'd
" that there were other Treatises whereof I was the
" Author, which have been publish'd without my
" Name to them. In compliance therefore with what
" was desir'd in the utmost Extent of it, and in ac-
" knowledgment of the Honour done me, in thinking
" my Writings worthy to be placed among the Works
" of the Learned in that August Repository; I do here-
[a] " by

TO the READER.

“ by further give to the Publick Library of
“ the University of Oxford, these following
“ Books; that is to say: Three Letters concern-
“ ing Toleration: Two Treatises of Government,
“ (whereof Mr. Churchill has publish'd several
“ Editions, but all very incorrect) The Reasonable-
“ ness of Christianity, as deliver'd in the Scrip-
“ tures. A Vindication of the Reasonableness of
“ Christianity from Mr. Edwards's Reflections:
“ And, A Second Vindication of the Reasonable-
“ ness of Christianity. These are all the Books,
“ whereof I am the Author, which have been pub-
“ lished without my Name to them.” }

To these Books publish'd by Mr. LOCKE in his Life-time, are added these following, which have been printed since his Death, viz. His Paraphrase on St. Paul's Epistles to the Galatians, Corinthians, Romans, and Ephesians: To which is prefix'd, An Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles, by consulting St. Paul himself. His Posthumous Works: and Some familiar Letters between him and his Friends.

As to this Edition of all his Works together, I have this to advertise the Reader, That most of them are printed from Copies corrected and enlarg'd under Mr. LOCKE's own Hand; and in particular, That the Two Treatises of Government were never till now publish'd from a Copy corrected by himself.



AN
ESSAY

CONCERNING
Human Understanding.

In Four BOOKS.

ECCLES. XI. 5.

*As thou knowest not what is the Way of the Spirit, nor how the
Bones do grow in the Womb of her that is with Child: Even
so thou knowest not the Works of God, who maketh all things.*

*Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam
ista effutientem nauseare, atque ipsum sibi displicere! Cic. de
Nat. Deor. lib. 1.*

ESSAYS

CONCERNING

Human Understanding.

In Four Books.

BOOK XI.

As thou knowest not what is the Way of the Spirit, nor how the
Bones do grow in the Womb of her that is with Child: Even
so thou knowest not the Ways of God, who maketh all things.

Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam
esse effrauentem nescire, atque ipsam sibi displicere! Cic. de
Nat. Deor. lib. 1.



To the Right Honourable

T H O M A S

Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery,

Baron *Herbert* of *Cardiff*, Lord *Ross* of *Kendal*,
Par, *Fitzhugh*, *Marmion*, *St. Quintin*, and
Shurland; Lord-President of his Majesty's
most Honourable Privy-Council, and Lord-
Lieutenant of the County of *Wilts*, and of
South-Wales.

My LORD,



HIS Treatise, which is grown up under
your Lordship's Eye, and has ventur'd into
the World by your Order, does now, by a
natural kind of Right, come to your Lord-
ship for that Protection, which you several
Years since promis'd it. 'Tis not that I think any Name,
how great soever, set at the beginning of a Book, will be
able to cover the Faults are to be found in it. Things in
Print must stand and fall by their own Worth, or the Rea-
der's Fancy. But there being nothing more to be desir'd
for Truth, than a fair unprejudic'd Hearing, no body is
more likely to procure me that, than your Lordship; who
are allow'd to have got so intimate an Acquaintance with
her, in her more retir'd Recesses. Your Lordship is known
to have so far advanc'd your Speculations in the most ab-
stract and general Knowledg of Things, beyond the ordi-
nary Reach, or common Methods, that your Allowance
and Approbation of the Design of this Treatise, will at
least preserve it from being condemn'd without reading;
and

and will prevail to have those Parts a little weigh'd, which might otherwise, perhaps, be thought to deserve no Consideration, for being somewhat out of the common Road. The Imputation of Novelty is a terrible Charge amongst those, who judg of Mens Heads, as they do of their Perukes, by the Fashion; and can allow none to be right, but the receiv'd Doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet carry'd it by Vote any where at its first Appearance: New Opinions are always suspected, and usually oppos'd, without any other Reason, but because they are not already common. But Truth, like Gold, is not the less so, for being newly brought out of the Mine. 'Tis Trial and Examination must give it Price, and not any antick Fashion: And tho' it be not yet current by the publick Stamp; yet it may, for all that, be as old as Nature, and is certainly not the less genuine. Your Lordship can give great and convincing Instances of this, whenever you please to oblige the Publick with some of those large and comprehensive Discoveries you have made of Truths, hitherto unknown, unless to some few, to whom your Lordship has been pleas'd not wholly to conceal them. This alone were a sufficient Reason, were there no other, why I should dedicate this *Essay* to your Lordship; and its having some little Correspondence with some Parts of that nobler and vast System of the Sciences your Lordship has made so new, exact, and instructive a Draught of, I think it Glory enough, if your Lordship permit me to boast, that here and there I have fallen into some Thoughts not wholly different from your's. If your Lordship think fit, that, by your Encouragement, this should appear in the World, I hope it may be a Reason, some time or other, to lead your Lordship farther; and you will allow me to say, that you here give the World an Earnest of something, that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their Expectation. This, my Lord, shews what a Present I here make to your Lordship; just such as the poor Man does to his rich and great Neighbour, by whom the Basket of Flowers, or Fruit, is not ill taken, tho' he has more plenty of his own Growth, and in much greater Perfection. Worthless Things receive a Value, when they are made the Offerings of Respect, Esteem and Gratitude: These you have given me so mighty and peculiar Reasons to have, in the highest degree,

The Epistle Dedicatory.

degree, for your Lordship, that if they can add a Price to what they go along with, proportionable to their own Greatness, I can with Confidence brag, I here make your Lordship the richest Present you ever receiv'd. This I am sure, I am under the greatest Obligation to seek all Occasions to acknowledg a long Train of Favours, I have receiv'd from your Lordship; Favours, tho' great and important in themselves, yet made much more so by the Forwardness, Concern, and Kindness, and other obliging Circumstances, that never fail'd to accompany them. To all this, you are pleas'd to add that which gives yet more Weight and Relish to all the rest: You vouchsafe to continue me in some Degrees of your Esteem, and allow me a Place in your good Thoughts; I had almost said, Friendship. This, my Lord, your Words and Actions so constantly shew on all Occasions, even to others when I am absent, that it is not Vanity in me to mention what every body knows: But it would be want of good Manners, not to acknowledg what so many are Witnesses of, and every day tell me, I am indebted to your Lordship for. I wish they could as easily assist my Gratitude, as they convince me of the great and growing Engagements it has to your Lordship. This, I am sure, I should write of the *Understanding* without having any, if I were not extremely sensible of them, and did not lay hold on this Opportunity to testify to the World, how much I am oblig'd to be, and how much I am,

Dorset-Court, 24th
of May, 1689.


My L O R D,

Your Lordship's

Most Humble, and

Most Obedient Servant,

JOHN LOCKE.



THE
EPISTLE
TO THE
READER.

READER;

I Here put into thy hands, what has been the Diversion of some of my idle and heavy Hours: If it has the good luck to prove so of any of thine, and thou hast but half so much Pleasure in reading, as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy Money, as I do my Pains, ill bestow'd. Mistake not this, for a Commendation of my Work; nor conclude, because I was pleas'd with the doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it now it is done. He that hawks at Larks and Sparrows, has no less Sport, tho' a much less considerable Quarry, than he that flies at nobler Game: And he is little acquainted with the Subject of this Treatise, the UNDERSTANDING, who does not know, that as it is the most elevated Faculty of the Soul, so it is employ'd with a greater and more constant Delight, than any of the other. Its Searches after Truth, are a sort of Hawking and Hunting, wherein the very Pursuit makes a great part of the Pleasure. Every step the Mind takes in its Progress towards Knowledge, makes some Discovery, is not only new, but the best too, for the time at least.

For the Understanding, like the Eye, judging of Objects only by its own Sight, cannot but be pleas'd with what it discovers, having less Regret for what has escap'd it, because it is unknown. Thus he who has rais'd himself above the Alms-Basket, and not content to live lazily on Scraps of begg'd Opinions, sets his own Thoughts on work, to find and follow Truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miss the Hunter's Satisfaction: every moment of his Pursuit will reward his Pains with some Delight, and he will have reason to think his time not ill spent, even when he cannot much boast of any great Acquisition.

This

The Epistle to the Reader.

vii

This, Reader, is the Entertainment of those, who let loose their own Thoughts, and follow them in writing; which thou oughtest not to envy them, since they afford thee an Opportunity of the like Diversion, if thou wilt make use of thy own Thoughts in reading. 'Tis to them, if they are thy own, that I refer my self: But if they are taken upon Trust from others, 'tis no great matter what they are; they not following Truth, but some meaner Consideration. And 'tis not worth while to be concern'd, what he says or thinks, who says or thinks only as he is directed by another. If thou judgest for thy self, I know thou wilt judg candidly; and then I shall not be harmed or offended, whatever be thy Censure. For tho' it be certain, that there is nothing in this Treatise, of the Truth whereof I am not fully persuaded; yet I consider my self as liable to Mistakes, as I can think thee; and know, that this Book must stand or fall with thee, not by any Opinion I have of it, but thy own. If thou findest little in it new or instructive to thee, thou art not to blame me for it. It was not meant for those that had already master'd this Subject, and made a thorow Acquaintance with their own Understandings; but for my own Information, and the Satisfaction of a few Friends, who acknowledg'd themselves not to have sufficiently consider'd it. Were it fit to trouble thee with the History of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber, and discoursing on a Subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the Difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled our selves, without coming any nearer a Resolution of those Doubts which perplex'd us, it came into my Thoughts, that we took a wrong Course; and that before we set our selves upon Enquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see what Objects our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with. This I propos'd to the Company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this should be our first Enquiry. Some hasty and undigested Thoughts, on a Subject I had never before consider'd, which I set down against our next Meeting, gave the first Entrance into this Discourse; which having been thus begun by Chance, was continu'd by Intreaty; written by incoherent Parcels; and, after long Intervals of Neglect, resumed again, as my Humour or Occasions permitted; and at last, in a Retirement, where an Attendance on my Health gave me Leisure, it was brought into that Order thou now seest it.

This discontinu'd way of writing, may have occasion'd, besides others, two contrary Faults, viz. That too little and too much may be said in it. If thou findest any thing wanting, I shall be glad that what I have writ gives thee any Desire that I should have gone farther: If it seems too much to thee, thou must blame the Subject; for when I first put Pen to Paper, I thought all I should have to say on this matter, would have been contain'd in one Sheet of Paper; but the farther I went, the larger Prospect I had: new Discoveries led me still on, and so it grew insensibly to the Bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower Compass than it is; and that some Parts of it might be contracted: The way it has been writ in, by Catches, and many long Intervals of Interruption, being apt to cause some Repetitions. But to confess the Truth, I am now too lazy, or too busy to make it shorter.

I am not ignorant how little I herein consult my own Reputation, when I knowingly let it go with a Fault, so apt to disgust the most judicious, who are always the nicest Readers. But they who know Sloth is apt to content it self with any Excuse, will pardon me, if mine has prevail'd on me, where, I think, I have a very good one. I will not therefore alledg in my Defence, that
the

The Epistle to the Reader.

the same Notion having different Respects, may be convenient or necessary to prove or illustrate several Parts of the same Discourse; and that so it has happen'd in many Parts of this: But waving that, I shall frankly avow, that I have sometimes dwelt long upon the same Argument, and express'd it different ways, with a quite different Design. I pretend not to publish this Essay for the Information of Men of large Thoughts and quick Apprehensions; to such Masters of Knowledge, I profess my self a Scholar, and therefore warn them before-hand not to expect any thing here, but what being spun out of my own coarse Thoughts, is fitted to Men of my own size; to whom, perhaps, it will not be unacceptable, that I have taken some pains to make plain and familiar to their Thoughts some Truths, which establish'd Prejudice, or the Abstractness of the Ideas themselves, might render difficult. Some Objects had need be turn'd on every side; and when the Notion is new, as I confess some of these are to me, or out of the ordinary Road, as I suspect they will appear to others, 'tis not one simple View of it, that will gain it Admittance into every Understanding, or fix it there with a clear and lasting Impression. There are few, I believe, who have not observ'd in themselves or others, that what in one way of proposing was very obscure, another way of expressing it has made very clear and intelligible: tho' afterward the Mind found little difference in the Phrases, and wonder'd why one fail'd to be understood more than the other. But every thing does not hit alike upon every Man's Imagination. We have our Understandings no less different than our Palates; and he that thinks the same Truth shall be equally relish'd by every one in the same Dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of Cookery: The Meat may be the same, and the Nourishment good, yet every one not be able to receive it with that Seasoning; and it must be dress'd another way, if you will have it go down with some, even of strong Constitutions. The truth is, those who advis'd me to publish it, advis'd me, for this reason, to publish it as it is: And since I have been brought to let it go abroad, I desire it should be understood by whoever gives himself the Pains to read it. I have so little Affection to be in Print, that if I were not flatter'd, this Essay might be of some use to others, as I think it has been to me; I should have confin'd it to the View of some Friends, who gave the first Occasion to it. My appearing therefore in Print, being on purpose to be as useful as I may, I think it necessary to make what I have to say, as easy and intelligible to all sorts of Readers, as I can. And I had much rather the Speculative and Quick-sighted should complain of my being in some parts tedious, than that any one, not accusom'd to abstract Speculations, or prepossess'd with different Notions, should mistake, or not comprehend my Meaning.

It will possibly be censur'd as a great piece of Vanity or Insolence in me, to pretend to instruct this our knowing Age; it amounting to little less, when I own, that I publish this Essay with hopes it may be useful to others. But if it may be permitted to speak freely of those, who with a feign'd Modesty condemn as useless, what they themselves write, methinks it savours much more of Vanity or Insolence, to publish a Book for any other End; and he fails very much of that Respect he owes the Publick, who prints, and consequently expects Men should read that, wherein he intends not they should meet with any thing of use to themselves or others: And should nothing else be found allowable in this Treatise, yet my Design will not cease to be so; and the Goodness of my Intention ought to be some Excuse for the Worthlessness of my Present. 'Tis that chiefly which secures me from the Fear of Censure, which I expect not to escape more than better Writers. Mens Principles, Notions and Relishes are so different, that it is hard to find a Book which pleases

ses or displeases all Men. I acknowledg the Age we live in is not the least knowing, and therefore not the most easy to be satisfy'd. If I have not the good Luck to please, yet no body ought to be offended with me. I plainly tell all my Readers, except half a dozen, this Treatise was not at first intended for them; and therefore they need not be at the trouble to be of that number. But yet if any one thinks fit to be angry, and rail at it, he may do it securely: For I shall find some better way of spending my Time, than in such kind of Conversation. I shall always have the Satisfaction to have aim'd sincerely at Truth and Usefulness, tho' in one of the meanest ways. The Commonwealth of Learning is not at this time without Master-Builders, whose mighty Designs, in advancing the Sciences, will leave lasting Monuments to the Admiration of Posterity: But every one must not hope to be a Boyle, or a Sydenham; and in an Age that produces such Masters, as the Great — Huygenius, and the Incomparable Mr. Newton, with some other of that strain; 'tis Ambition enough to be employ'd as an Under-Labourer in clearing Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish that lies in the way to Knowledge: which certainly had been very much more advanc'd in the World, if the Endeavours of ingenious and industrious Men had not been much cumber'd with the learned, but frivolous Use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible Terms introduc'd into the Sciences, and there made an Art of, to that degree, that Philosophy, which is nothing but the true Knowledge of Things, was thought unfit, or incapable to be brought into well-bred Company, and polite Conversation. Vague and insignificant Forms of Speech, and Abuse of Language, have so long pass'd for Mysteries of Science; and hard or misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by Prescription, such a Right to be mistaken for deep Learning, and height of Speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade, either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the Covers of Ignorance, and Hindrance of true Knowledge. To break in upon the Sanctuary of Vanity and Ignorance, will be, I suppose, some Service to Human Understanding: Tho' so few are apt to think, they deceive or are deceiv'd in the use of Words; or that the Language of the Sect they are of, has any Faults in it, which ought to be examin'd or corrected; that I hope I shall be pardon'd, if I have in the third Book dwelt long on this Subject; and endeavour'd to make it so plain, that neither the Inveterateness of the Mischief, nor the Prevalency of the Fashion, shall be any Excuse for those, who will not take care about the meaning of their own words, and will not suffer the Significancy of their Expressions to be enquir'd into.

I have been told, that a short Epitome of this Treatise, which was printed 1688. was by some condemn'd without reading, because innate Ideas were deny'd in it; they too hastily concluding, that if innate Ideas were not suppos'd, there would be little left, either of the Notion or Proof of Spirits. If any one take the like Offence at the Entrance of this Treatise, I shall desire him to read it thorow; and then I hope he will be convinc'd, that the taking away false Foundations, is not to the Prejudice, but Advantage of Truth; which is never injur'd or endanger'd so much, as when mix'd with, or built on Falshood. In the Second Edition I added as followeth:

The Bookseller will not forgive me, if I say nothing of this Second Edition, which he has promis'd, by the Correctness of it, shall make amends for the many Faults committed in the former. He desires too, that it should be know, that it has one whole new Chapter concerning Identity, and many Additions and Amendments in other places. These I must inform my Reader are not all new Matter, but most of them either farther Confirmation of what I had said, or Explications, to prevent others being mistaken in the Sense of

The Epistle to the Reader.

what was formerly printed, and not any Variation in me from it: I must only except the Alterations I have made in Book II. chap. 21.

What I had there writ concerning Liberty and the Will, I thought deserv'd as accurate a View as I was capable of: Those Subjects having, in all Ages, exercis'd the learned part of the World with Questions and Difficulties, that have not a little perplex'd Morality and Divinity; those Parts of Knowledge, that Men are most concern'd to be clear in. Upon a closer Inspection into the working of Mens Minds, and a stricter Examination of those Motives and Views they are turn'd by, I have found Reason somewhat to alter the Thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the last Determination to the Will in all voluntary Actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledg to the World, with as much Freedom and Readiness, as I at first publish'd what then seem'd to me to be right, thinking my self more concern'd to quit and renounce any Opinion of my own, than oppose that of another, when Truth appears against it. For 'tis Truth alone I seek, and that will always be welcome to me, when or from whence soever it comes.

But what Forwardness soever I have to resign any Opinion I have, or to recede from any thing I have writ, upon the first Evidence of any Error in it; yet this I must own, that I have not had the good Luck to receive any Light from those Exceptions I have met with in Print against any part of my Book; nor have, from any thing has been urg'd against it, found Reason to alter my Sense, in any of the Points have been question'd. Whether the Subject I have in hand requires often more Thought and Attention, than cursory Readers, at least such as are prepossess'd, are willing to allow; or whether any Obscurity in my Expressions casts a Cloud over it, and these Notions are made difficult to others Apprehension in my way of treating them: So it is, that my Meaning, I find, is often mistaken, and I have not the good Luck to be every where rightly understood. There are so many Instances of this, that I think it Justice to my Reader and my self, to conclude, that either my Book is plainly enough written to be rightly understood by those, who peruse it with that Attention and Indifferency, which every one, who will give himself the Pains to read, ought to imploy in reading; or else that I have writ mine so obscurely, that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Which ever of these be that Truth, 'tis my self only am affected thereby, and therefore I shall be far from troubling my Reader with what I think might be said, in answer to those several Objections I have met with, to Passages here and there of my Book. Since I persuade my self, that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concern'd, whether they are true or false, will be able to see, that what is said, is either not well founded, or else not contrary to my Doctrine, when I and my Opposer come both to be well understood.

If any, careful that none of their good Thoughts should be lost, have publish'd their Censures of my Essay; with this Honour done to it, that they will not suffer it to be an Essay, I leave it to the Publick to value the Obligation they have to their critical Pens, and shall not waste my Reader's Time in so idle or ill-natur'd an Employment of mine, as to lessen the Satisfaction any one has in himself, or gives to others in so hasty a Confutation of what I have written.

The Booksellers preparing for the fourth Edition of my Essay, gave me Notice of it, that I might, if I had leisure, make any Additions or Alterations I should think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertise the Reader, that besides several Corrections I had made here and there, there was one Alteration which it was necessary to mention, because it ran thro' the whole Book,

The Epistle to the Reader.

xi

Book, and is of Consequence to be rightly understood. What I thereupon said, was this.

Clear and distinct Ideas are Terms, which tho' familiar and frequent in Mens mouths, I have reason to think every one who uses, does not perfectly understand. And possibly 'tis but here and there one, who gives himself the trouble to consider them so far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by them: I have therefore in most places chose to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and distinct, as more likely to direct Mens Thoughts to my Meaning in this matter. By those Denominations, I mean some Object in the Mind, and consequently determined, i. e. such as it is there seen and perceiv'd to be. This, I think, may fitly be call'd a determinate or determined Idea, when such as it is at any time objectively in the Mind, and so determined there, it is annex'd, and without Variation determin'd to a Name or articulate Sound, which is to be steddily the Sign of that very same Object of the Mind, or determinate Idea.

To explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, when apply'd to a simple Idea, I mean that simple Appearance which the Mind has in its view, or perceives in it self, when that Idea is said to be in it: By determined, when apply'd to a complex Idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate Number of certain simple or less complex Ideas, join'd in such a Proportion and Situation, as the Mind has before its view, and sees in it self when that Idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a Man gives a Name to it. I say should be; because it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is so careful of his Language, as to use no Word, till he views in his Mind the precise determined Idea, which he resolves to make it the Sign of. The want of this, is the Cause of no small Obscurity and Confusion in Mens Thoughts and Discourses.

I know there are not Words enough in any Language, to answer all the Variety of Ideas, that enter into Mens Discourses and Reasonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uses any Term, he may have in his Mind a determin'd Idea, which he makes it the Sign of, and to which he should keep it steddily annex'd, during that present Discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct Ideas: 'Tis plain his are not so; and therefore there can be expected nothing but Obscurity and Confusion, where such Terms are made use of, which have not such a precise Determination.

Upon this Ground I have thought determin'd Ideas a way of speaking less liable to mistake, than clear and distinct: And where Men have got such determin'd Ideas of all that they reason, enquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their Doubts and Disputes at an end. The greatest part of the Questions and Controversies that perplex Mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain Use of Words, or (which is the same) indetermin'd Ideas, which they are made to stand for; I have made choice of these Terms to signify, 1. Some immediate Object of the Mind, which it perceives and has before it, distinct from the Sound it uses as a Sign of it. 2. That this Idea, thus determin'd, i. e. which the Mind has in it self, and knows, and sees there, be determin'd without any Change to that Name, and that Name determin'd to that precise Idea. If Men had such determin'd Ideas in their Enquiries and Discourses, they would both discern how far their own Enquiries and Discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the Disputes and Wranglings they have with others.

Besides

The Epistle to the Reader.

Besides this, the Bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the Reader, that there is an Addition of two Chapters wholly new; the one of the Association of Ideas, the other of Enthusiasm. These, with some other larger Additions never before printed, he has engag'd to print by themselves after the same manner, and for the same purpose, as was done when this Essay had the second Impression.





THE CONTENTS.

BOOK I. *Of Innate Notions.*

CHAP. I.

The Introduction.

SECT.

1. *An Enquiry into the Understanding, pleasant and useful.*
2. *Design.*
3. *Method.*
4. *Useful to know the Extent of our Comprehension.*
5. *Our Capacity proportion'd to our State and Concerns, to discover things useful to us.*
6. *Knowing the Extent of our Capacities, will hinder us from useless Curiosity, Scepticism, and Idleness.*
7. *Occasion of this Essay.*
8. *What Idea stands for.*

CHAP. II.

No innate speculative Principles.

SECT.

1. *The Way shewn how we come by any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate.*
2. *General Assent, the great Argument.*
3. *Universal Consent, proves nothing innate.*
4. *What is, is ; and, It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be ; not universally assented to.*
5. *Not on the Mind naturally imprinted, because not known to Children, Ideots, &c.*
- 6, 7. *That Men know them when they come to the Use of Reason, answer'd.*
8. *If Reason discover'd them, that would not prove them innate.*

Vol. I.

9-11. *'Tis false, that Reason discovers them.*

12. *The coming to the Use of Reason, not the time we come to know these Maxims.*

13. *By this, they are not distinguish'd from other knowable Truths.*

14. *If coming to the Use of Reason, were the time of their Discovery, it would not prove them innate.*

15, 16. *The Steps by which the Mind attains several Truths.*

17. *Assenting as soon as propos'd and understood, proves them not innate.*

18. *If such an Assent be a Mark of Innate, then that One and Two are equal to Three ; that Sweetness is not Bitterness ; and a thousand the like, must be innate.*

19. *Such less general Propositions known before these universal Maxims.*

20. *One and One equal to Two, &c. not general nor useful, answer'd.*

21. *These Maxims not being known sometimes till propos'd, proves them not innate.*

22. *Implicitly known before proposing, signifies, that the Mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.*

23. *The Argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a false Supposition of no precedent teaching.*

24. *Not innate, because not universally assented to.*

25. *These Maxims not the first known.*

26. *And so not innate.*

27. *Not innate, because they appear least, where what is innate shews it self clearest.*

28. *Recapitulation.*

d

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

No Innate Practical Principles.
SECT.

1. No moral Principles so clear and so generally receiv'd, as the fore-mention'd speculative Maxims.
2. Faith and Justice not own'd as Principles by all Men.
3. Obj. Tho' Men deny them in their Practice, yet they admit them in their Thoughts, answer'd.
4. Moral Rules need a Proof, ergo, not innate.
5. Instance in keeping Compacts.
6. Virtue generally approv'd, not because innate, but because profitable.
7. Mens Actions convince us, that the Rule of Virtue is not their internal Principle.
8. Conscience no Proof of any innate moral Rule.
9. Instances of Enormities practis'd without Remorse.
10. Men have contrary practical Principles.
- 11-13. Whole Nations reject several moral Rules.
14. Those who maintain innate practical Principles, tell us not what they are.
- 15-19. Lord Herbert's innate Principles examin'd.
20. Obj. Innate Principles may be corrupted, answer'd.
21. Contrary Principles in the World.
- 22-26. How Men commonly come by their Principles.
27. Principles must be examin'd.

CHAP. IV.

Other Considerations about innate Principles, both speculative and practical.
SECT.

1. Principles not innate, unless their Ideas be innate.
- 2,3. Ideas, especially those belonging to Principles, not born with Children.
- 4,5. Identity, an Idea not innate.
6. Whole and Part, not innate Ideas.
7. Idea of Worship not innate.
- 8-11. Idea of GOD, not innate.
12. Suitable to GOD's Goodness, that all Men should have an Idea of him, therefore naturally imprinted by him; answer'd.
- 13-16. Ideas of GOD, various in different Men.
17. If the Idea of GOD be not innate, no other can be suppos'd innate.
18. Idea of Substance, not innate.
19. No Propositions can be innate, since no Ideas are innate.
20. No Ideas are remember'd till after they have been introduc'd.
21. Principles not innate, because of little Use, or little Certainty.
22. Difference of Mens Discoveries depends upon the different Application of their Faculties.
23. Men must think and know for themselves.
24. Whence the Opinion of innate Principles.
25. Conclusion.

BOOK II.

Of Ideas.

CHAP. I.

Of Ideas in general.

SECT.

1. Idea is the Object of Thinking.
2. All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflection.
3. The Objects of Sensation, one Source of Ideas.
4. The Operations of our Minds, the other Source of them.
5. All our Ideas are of the one or the other of these.
6. Observable in Children.
7. Men are differently furnish'd with these, according to the different Objects they converse with.
8. Ideas of Reflection later, because they need Attention.
9. The Soul begins to have Ideas, when it begins to perceive.
10. The Soul thinks not always; for this wants Proofs.
11. It is not always conscious of it.
12. If a sleeping Man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking Man are two Persons.
13. Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they think.
14. That Men dream without remembering it, in vain urg'd.
15. Upon this Hypothesis, the Thoughts of a sleeping Man ought to be most rational.
16. On

The CONTENTS.

XV

16. On this Hypothesis the Soul must have Ideas not deriv'd from Sensation or Reflection, of which there is no Appearance.

17. If I think when I know it not, no body else can know it.

18. How knows any one that the Soul always thinks? For if it be not a self-evident Proposition, it needs Proof.

19. That a Man should be busy in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable.

20-24. No Ideas but from Sensation or Reflection, evident, if we observe Children.

25. In the Reception of simple Ideas, the Understanding is most of all passive.

CHAP. II.

Of Simple Ideas.

SECT.

1. Uncompounded Appearances.

2,3. The Mind can neither make nor destroy them.

CHAP. III.

Of Ideas of one Sense.

SECT.

1. As Colours of Seeing, Sounds of Hearing.

2. Few simple Ideas have Names.

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

SECT.

1. We receive this Idea from Touch.

2. Solidity fills Space.

3. Distinct from Space.

4. From Hardness.

5. On Solidity depends Impulse, Resistance, and Protrusion.

6. What it is.

CHAP. V.

Of simple Ideas by more than one Sense.

CHAP. VI.

Of simple Ideas of Reflection.

SECT.

1. Are the Operations of the Mind about its other Ideas?

2. The Idea of Perception, and Idea of Willing, we have from the Reflection.

CHAP. VII.

Of simple Ideas, both of Sensation and Reflection.

SECT.

1-6. Pleasure and Pain.

7. Existence and Unity.

8. Power.

9. Succession.

10. Simple Ideas, the Materials of all our Knowledge.

CHAP. VIII.

Other Considerations concerning simple Ideas.

SECT. *

1-6. Positive Ideas from privative Causes.

7-8. Ideas in the Mind, Qualities in Bodies.

9-10. Primary and Secondary Qualities.

11,12. How primary Qualities produce their Ideas.

13,14. How secondary.

15-23. Ideas of primary Qualities, are Resemblances; of secondary, not.

24,25. Reason of our Mistake in this.

26. Secondary Qualities twofold; first, Immediately perceivable; secondly, Mediate perceivable.

CHAP. IX.

Of Perception.

SECT.

1. It is the first simple Idea of Reflection.

2-4. Perception is only when the Mind receives the Impression.

5,6. Children, tho' they have Ideas in the Womb, have none innate.

7. Which Ideas first, are not evident.

8-10. Ideas of Sensation often chang'd by the Judgment.

11-14. Perception puts the difference between Animals and inferior Beings.

15. Perception, the Inlet of Knowledge.

CHAP. X.

Of Retention.

SECT.

1. Contemplation.

2. Memory.

3. Attention, Repetition, Pleasure, and Pain, fix Ideas.

4,5. Ideas fade in the Memory.

6. Constantly repeated Ideas can scarce be lost.

7. In

The CONTENTS.

7. *In remembering, the Mind is often active.*
8. *Two Defects in the Memory, Oblivion and Slowness.*
10. *Brutes have Memory.*
22. *Motion proves a Vacuum.*
23. *The Ideas of Space and Body distinct.*
- 24, 25. *Extension being inseparable from Body, proves it not the same.*
26. *Ideas of Space and Solidity distinct.*
27. *Men differ little in clear simple Ideas.*

C H A P. XI.

Of Discerning, &c.

SECT.

1. *No Knowledge without it.*
2. *The difference of Wit and Judgment.*
3. *Clearness alone hinders Confusion.*
4. *Comparing.*
5. *Brutes compare but imperfectly.*
6. *Compounding.*
7. *Brutes compound but little.*
8. *Naming.*
9. *Abstraction.*
- 10, 11. *Brutes abstract not.*
- 12, 13. *Ideots and Mad-men.*
14. *Method.*
15. *These are the Beginnings of Human Knowledge.*
16. *Appeal to Experience.*
17. *Dark Room.*

C H A P. XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

SECT.

1. *Made by the Mind out of simple ones.*
2. *Made voluntarily.*
3. *Are either Modes, Substances, or Relations.*
4. *Modes.*
5. *Simple and mixed Modes.*
6. *Substances single or collective.*
7. *Relation.*
8. *The abstrusest Ideas from the two Sources.*

C H A P. XIII.

Of Space, and its simple Modes.

SECT.

1. *Simple Modes.*
2. *Idea of Space.*
3. *Space and Extension.*
4. *Immensify.*
- 5, 6. *Figure.*
- 7-10. *Place.*
- 11-14. *Extension and Body not the same.*
- 15-17. *Substance which we know not, no Proof against Space without Body.*
- 18, 19. *Substance and Accidents of little use in Philosophy.*
20. *A Vacuum beyond the utmost Bounds of Body.*
21. *The Power of Annihilation, proves a Vacuum.*

C H A P. XIV.

Of Duration.

SECT.

1. *Duration is fleeting Extension.*
- 2-4. *Its Idea from Reflection on the Train of our Ideas.*
5. *The Idea of Duration, applicable to things whilst we sleep.*
- 6-8. *The Idea of Succession, not from Motion.*
- 9-11. *The Train of Ideas has a certain Degree of Quickness.*
12. *This Train, the Measure of other Successions.*
- 13-15. *The Mind cannot fix long on one invariable Idea.*
16. *Ideas, however made, include no Sense of Motion.*
17. *Time is Duration set out by Measures.*
18. *A good Measure of Time must divide its whole Duration into equal Periods.*
19. *The Revolutions of the Sun and Moon, the properest Measures of Time.*
20. *But not by their Motion, but periodical Appearances.*
21. *No two parts of Duration can be certainly known to be equal.*
22. *Time not the Measure of Motion.*
23. *Minutes, Hours, and Years, not necessary Measures of Duration.*
24. *The Measure of Time two ways apply'd.*
- 25-27. *Our Measure of Time applicable to Duration before Time.*
- 28-31. *Eternity.*

C H A P. XV.

Of Duration and Expansion consider'd together.

SECT.

1. *Both capable of greater and less.*
2. *Expansion not bounded by Matter.*
3. *Nor Duration by Motion.*
4. *Why Men more easily admit infinite Duration, than infinite Expansion.*
5. *Time to Duration, is as Place to Expansion.*
6. *Time and Place are taken for so much of either, as are set out by the Existence and Motion of Bodies.*

7. Some-

7. Sometimes for so much of either as we design by Measures taken from the Bulk or Motion of Bodies.
8. They belong to all Beings.
9. All the Parts of Extension, are Extension; and all the Parts of Duration, are Duration.
10. Their Parts inseparable.
11. Duration is as a Line, Expansion as a Solid.
12. Duration has never two Parts together, Expansion all together.

C H A P. XVI.

Of Number.

SECT.

1. Number, the simplest and most universal Idea.
2. Its Modes made by Addition.
3. Each Mode distinct.
4. Therefore Demonstrations in Numbers, the most precise.
- 5, 6. Names necessary to Numbers.
7. Why Children number not earlier.
8. Number measures all Measurables.

C H A P. XVII.

Of Infinity.

SECT.

1. Infinity in its original Intention, attributed to Space, Duration, and Number.
- 2, 3. How we come by the Idea of Infinity.
4. Our Idea of Space boundless.
5. And so of Duration.
6. Why other Ideas are not capable of Infinity.
7. Difference between Infinity of Space, and Space infinite.
8. We have no Idea of infinite Space.
9. Number affords us the clearest Idea of Infinity.
- 10, 11. Our different Conception of the Infinity of Number, Duration, and Expansion.
12. Infinite Divisibility.
- 13, 14. } No positive Idea of Infinite.
- 17, 18. }
- 15, 16. } What is positive, what negative
19. } in our Idea of Infinite.
20. Some think they have a positive Idea of Eternity, and not Space.
21. Suppos'd positive Ideas of Infinity, Cause of Mistakes.
22. All these Ideas from Sensation and Reflection.

C H A P. XVIII.

Of other simple Modes.

SECT.

- 1, 2. Modes of Motion.
3. Modes of Sounds.
4. Modes of Tastes.
7. Modes of Colours.
8. Why some Modes have, and others have not Names.

C H A P. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

SECT.

- 1, 2. Sensation, Remembrance, Contemplation, &c.
3. The various Attention of the Mind in Thinking.
4. Hence probable that Thinking is the Action, not Essence of the Soul.

C H A P. XX.

Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain.

SECT.

1. Pleasure and Pain simple Ideas.
2. Good and Evil what.
3. Our Passions mov'd by Good and Evil.
4. Love.
5. Hatred.
6. Desire.
7. Joy.
8. Sorrow.
9. Hope.
10. Fear.
11. Despair.
12. Anger.
13. Envy.
14. What Passions all Men have.
- 15, 16. Pleasure and Pain what.
17. Shame.
18. The Instances to shew how our Ideas of the Passion are got from Sensation and Reflection.

C H A P. XXI.

Of Power.

SECT.

1. This Idea how got.
2. Power active and passive.
3. Power includes Relatives.
4. The clearest Idea of active Power, had from Spirit.
5. Will and Understanding two Powers.
6. Faculties.
7. Whence the Ideas of Liberty and Necessity.
8. Liberty what.
9. Supposes Understanding and Will.
10. Belongs not to Volition.

11. *Voluntary oppos'd to involuntary, not to necessary.*
12. *Liberty what.*
13. *Necessity what.*
- 14-20. *Liberty belongs not to the Will.*
21. *But to the Agent or Man.*
- 22-24. *In respect of Wiling, a Man is not free.*
- 25, 26, } *The Will determin'd by some-*
27. } *thing without it.*
28. *Volition what.*
29. *What determines the Will.*
30. *Will and Desire must not be confounded.*
31. *Uneasiness determines the Will.*
32. *Desire is Uneasiness.*
33. *The Uneasiness of Desire determines the Will*
34. *This the Spring of Action.*
35. *The greatest positive Good determines not the Will, but Uneasiness.*
36. *Because the Removal of Uneasiness is the first step to Happiness.*
37. *Because Uneasiness alone is present.*
38. *Because all who allow the Joys of Heaven possible, pursue them not. But a great Uneasiness is never neglected.*
39. *Desire accompanies all Uneasiness.*
40. *The most pressing Uneasiness naturally determines the will.*
41. *All desire Happiness.*
42. *Happiness what.*
43. *What Good is desir'd, what not.*
44. *Why the greatest Good is not always desir'd.*
45. *Why not being desir'd, it moves not the Will.*
46. *Due Consideration raises Desire.*
47. *The Power to suspend the Prosecution of any Desire, makes way for Consideration.*
48. *To be determin'd by our own Judgment, is no Restraint to Liberty.*
49. *The freest Agents are so determin'd.*
50. *A constant Determination to a Pursuit of Happiness, no Abridgment of Liberty.*
51. *The Necessity of pursuing true Happiness, the Foundation of all Liberty.*
52. *The Reason of it.*
53. *Government of our Passions, the right Improvement of Liberty.*
- 54, 55. *How Men come to pursue different Courses.*
56. *How Men come to chuse ill.*
57. *First, From bodily Pains. Secondly, From wrong Desires arising from wrong Judgment.*
- 58, 59. *Our Judgment of present Good or Evil, always right.*
60. *From a wrong Judgment of what*

makes a necessary part of their Happiness.

61, 62. *A more particular Account of wrong Judgments.*

63. *In comparing present and future.*

64, 65. *Causes of this.*

66. *In considering Consequences of Actions.*

67. *Causes of this.*

68. *Wrong Judgment of what is necessary to our Happiness.*

69. *We can change the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness in things.*

70, 71, } *Preference of Vice to Virtue, a*

72, 73. } *manifest wrong Judgment.*

CHAP. XXII.

Of mixed Modes.

SECT.

1. *Mixed Modes, what.*
2. *Made by the Mind.*
3. *Sometimes got by the Explication of their Names.*
4. *The Name ties the Parts of the mixed Modes into one Idea.*
5. *The Cause of making mixed Modes.*
6. *Why Words in one Language have none answering in another.*
7. *And Languages change.*
8. *Mixed Modes, where they exist.*
9. *How we get the Ideas of mix'd Modes.*
10. *Motion, Thinking, and Power, have been most modify'd.*
11. *Several Words seeming to signify Action, signify but the Effect.*
12. *Mix'd Modes, made also of other Ideas.*

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the complex Ideas of Substances.

SECT.

1. *Ideas of Substances how made.*
2. *Our Idea of Substance in general.*
- 3-6. *Of the sorts of Substances.*
4. *No clear Ideas of Substance in general.*
5. *As clear an Idea of Spirit as Body.*
7. *Powers a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances.*
8. *And why.*
9. *Three sorts of Ideas make our complex ones of Substances.*
- 10, 11. *The now secondary Qualities of Bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute Parts.*
12. *Our Faculties of Discovery suited to our State.*
13. *Conjecture about Spirits.*
14. *Complex Ideas of Substances.*

15. *Idea*

15. Idea of Spiritual Substances, as clear as of bodily Substances.
16. No Idea of abstract Substance.
17. The Cohesion of solid Parts, and Impulse, the primary Ideas of Body.
18. Thinking and Motivity, the primary Ideas of Spirit.
- 19-21. Spirits capable of Motion.
22. Idea of Soul and Body compar'd.
- 23-27. Cohesion of solid Parts in Body, as hard to be conceiv'd, as Thinking in a Soul.
- 28, 29. Communication of Motion by Impulse, or by Thought, equally intelligible.
30. Ideas of Body and Spirit compar'd.
31. The Notion of Spirit involves no more difficulty in it than that of Body.
32. We know nothing beyond our simple Ideas.
- 33-35. Idea of God.
36. No Ideas in our complex one of Spirits, but those got from Sensation or Reflection.
37. Recapitulation.

C H A P. XXIV.

Of collective Ideas of Substances.

SECT.

1. One Idea.
2. Made by the Power of composing in the Mind.
3. All artificial things are collective Ideas.

C H A P. XXV.

Of Relation.

SECT.

1. Relation, what.
2. Relations without correlative Terms, not easily perceiv'd.
3. Some seemingly absolute Terms contain Relations.
4. Relation different from the things related.
5. Change of Relation may be without any Change in the Subject.
6. Relation only betwixt two things.
7. All things capable of Relation.
8. The Ideas of Relation clearer often than of the Subjects related.
9. Relations all terminate in simple Ideas.
10. Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominat'd, are relative.
11. Conclusion.

C H A P. XXVI.

Of Cause, of Effect, and other Relations.

SECT.

1. Whence their Ideas got.
2. Creation, Generation, making Alteration.

- 3, 4. Relations of Time.
5. Relations of Place and Extension.
6. Absolute Terms often stand for Relations.

C H A P. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diversity.

SECT.

1. Wherein Identity consists.
2. Identity of Substances, Identity of Modes.
3. Principium Individuationis.
4. Identity of Vegetables.
5. Identity of Animals.
6. Identity of Man.
7. Identity suited to the Idea.
8. Same Man.
9. Personal Identity.
10. Consciousness makes personal Identity.
11. Personal Identity in change of Substances.
12. Whether in the Change of thinking Substances.
16. Consciousness makes the same Person.
17. Self depends on Consciousness.
18. Object of Reward and Punishment.
21. Difference between Identity of Man and Person.
23. Consciousness alone makes Self.
26. Person a forensic Term.
28. The difficulty from ill Use of Names.
29. Continu'd Existence makes Identity.

C H A P. XXVIII.

Of other Relations.

SECT.

1. Proportional.
2. Natural.
3. Instituted.
4. Moral.
5. Moral Good and Evil.
6. Moral Rules.
7. Laws.
8. Divine Law, the Measure of Sin and Duty.
9. Civil Law, the Measure of Crimes and Innocence.
- 10, 11. Philosophical Law, the Measure of Virtue and Vice.
12. Its Inforcements, Commendation, and Discredit.
13. These three Laws, the Rules of moral Good and Evil.
- 14, 15. Morality is the Relation of Actions to the Rules.
16. The Denominations of Actions often mislead us.
17. Relations innumerable.
18. All Relations terminate in simple Ideas.

19. We

19. We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) Notion of the Relation, as of its Foundation.
20. The Notion of the Relation is the same, whether the Rule any Action is compar'd to, be true or false.

C H A P. XXIX.

Of Clear and Distinct, Obscure and Confused Ideas.

SECT.

1. Ideas, some clear and some distinct, others obscure and confused.
2. Clear and obscure, explain'd by Sight.
3. Causes of Obscurity.
4. Distinct and confused, what.
5. Objection.
6. Confusion of Ideas, is in reference to their Names.
7. Defaults which make Confusion, First, complex Ideas made up of too few simple ones.
8. Secondly, Or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together.
9. Thirdly, Or are mutable or undetermin'd.
10. Confusion without reference to Names, hardly conceivable.
11. Confusion concerns always two Ideas.
12. Causes of Confusion.
13. Complex Ideas may be distinct in one part, and confused in another.
14. This, if not heeded, causes Confusion in our Arguings.
15. Instances in Eternity.
- 16, 17. — Divisibility of Matter.

C H A P. XXX.

Of Real and Fantastical Ideas.

SECT.

1. Real Ideas are conformable to their Archetypes.
2. Simple Ideas all real.
3. Complex Ideas are voluntary Combinations.
4. Mixed Modes made of consistent Ideas, are real.
5. Ideas of Substances are real, when they agree with the Existence of things.

C H A P. XXXI.

Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

SECT.

1. Adequate Ideas are such as perfectly represent their Archetypes.
2. Simple Ideas all adequate.
3. Modes are all adequate.

- 4, 5. Modes in reference to settled Names, may be inadequate.

- 6, 7. Ideas of Substances, as refer'd to real Essences, not adequate.

- 8-11. Ideas of Substances, as Collections of their Qualities, are all inadequate.

12. Simple Ideas $\epsilon\kappa\lambda\upsilon\pi\alpha$, and adequate.

13. Ideas of Substances are $\epsilon\kappa\lambda\upsilon\pi\alpha$, inadequate.

14. Ideas of Modes and Relations are Archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.

C H A P. XXXII.

Of true and false Ideas.

SECT.

1. Truth and Falshood properly belongs to Propositions.
2. Metaphysical Truth contains a tacit Proposition.
3. No Idea as an Appearance in the Mind true or false.
4. Ideas refer'd to any thing, may be true or false.
5. Other Mens Ideas, real Existence, and supposed real Essences, are what Men usually refer their Ideas to.
- 6-8. The Cause of such References.
9. Simple Ideas may be false in reference to others of the same name, but are least liable to be so.
10. Ideas of mix'd Modes most liable to be false in this sense.
11. Or at least to be thought false.
12. And why.
13. As refer'd to real Existences, none of our Ideas can be false, but those of Substances.
- 14-16. First, Simple Ideas in this sense not false, and why.
15. Tho' one Man's Idea of Blue should be different from another's.
17. Secondly, Modes not false.
18. Thirdly, Ideas of Substances, when false.
19. Truth or Falshood always supposes Affirmation or Negation.
20. Ideas in themselves never true nor false.
21. But are false, First, when judg'd agreeable to another Man's Idea without being so.
22. Secondly, When judg'd to agree to real Existence, when they do not.
23. Thirdly, When judg'd adequate, without being so.
24. Fourthly, When judg'd to represent the real Essence.
26. Ideas when false.
25. More properly to be call'd right or wrong.
27. Conclusion.

C H A P.

The CONTENTS.

xxi

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Association of Ideas.

SECT.

1. Something unreasonable in most Men.
2. Not wholly from Self-love.
3. Nor from Education.
4. A Degree of Madness.
5. From a wrong Connection of Ideas.

6. This Connection how made.
- 7, 8. Some Antipathies an Effect of it.
9. A great Cause of Errors.
- 10-12. Instances.
13. Why Time cures some Disorders in the Mind, which Reason cannot.
- 14-16. Farther Instances of the Effects of the Association of Ideas.
17. Its Influence on intellectual Habits.
18. Observable in different Sects.

BOOK III.

Of Words.

CHAP. I.

Of Words, or Language in general.

SECT.

1. Man fitted to form articulate Sounds.
2. To make them Signs of Ideas.
- 3, 4. To make general Signs.
5. Words ultimately deriv'd from such as signify sensible Ideas.
6. Distribution.

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

SECT.

1. Words are sensible Signs necessary for Communication.
- 2, 3. Words are the sensible Signs of his Ideas who uses them.
4. Words often secretly refer'd, First, to the Ideas in other Mens Minds.
5. Secondly, To the Reality of things.
6. Words by Use readily excite Ideas.
7. Words often used without Signification.
8. Their Signification perfectly arbitrary.

CHAP. III.

Of general Terms.

SECT.

1. The greatest part of Words general.
2. For every particular thing to have a Name, is impossible.
- 3, 4. And useless.
5. What things have proper Names.
- 6, 8. How general Words are made.
9. General Natures are nothing but abstract Ideas.
10. Why the Genus is ordinarily made use of in Definitions.
11. General and Universal are Crea-

Vol. I.

tures of the Understanding.

12. Abstract Ideas are the Essences of the Genera and Species.
13. They are the Workmanship of the Understanding, but have their Foundation in the Similitude of things.
14. Each distinct abstract Idea, is a distinct Essence.
15. Real and nominal Essence.
16. Constant Connection between the Name and nominal Essence.
17. Supposition, that Species are distinguish'd by their real Essences, useless.
18. Real and nominal Essence, the same in simple Ideas and Modes, different in Substances.
19. Essences ingenerable and incorruptible.
20. Recapitulation.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of simple Ideas.

SECT.

1. Names of simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each something peculiar.
2. First, Names of simple Ideas and Substances, intimate real Existence.
3. Secondly, Names of simple Ideas and Modes, signify always both real and nominal Essence.
4. Thirdly Names of simple Ideas undefinable.
5. If all were definable, 'twould be a Process in infinitum.
6. What a Definition is.
7. Simple Ideas, why undefinable.
- 8, 9. Instances. Motion.
10. Light.
11. Simple Ideas why undefinable, farther explain'd.

f

12, 13!

- 12,13. *The contrary shew'd in complex Ideas, by Instances of a Statue and Rainbow.*
 14. *The Names of complex Ideas, when to be made intelligible by Words.*
 15. *Fourthly, Names of simple Ideas least doubtful.*
 16. *Fifthly, Simple Ideas have few Ascents in linea prædicamentali.*
 17. *Sixthly, Names of simple Ideas stand for Ideas not at all arbitrary.*

C H A P. V.

Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations.

SECT.

1. *They stand for abstract Ideas, as other general Names.*
 2. *First, the Ideas they stand for, are made by the Understanding.*
 3. *Secondly, Made arbitrarily, and without Patterns.*
 4. *How this is done.*
 5. *Evidently arbitrary, in that the Idea is often before the Existence.*
 6. *Instances, Murder, Incest, Stabbing.*
 7. *But still subservient to the End of Language.*
 8. *Whereof the intranslatable Words of divers Languages are a Proof.*
 9. *This shews Species to be made for Communication.*
 10,11. *In mixed Modes, 'tis the Name that ties the Combination together, and makes it a Species.*
 12. *For the Originals of mix'd Modes, we look no farther than the Mind, which also shews them to be the Workmanship of the Understanding.*
 13. *Their being made by the Understanding without Patterns, shews the reason why they are so compounded.*
 14. *Names of mix'd Modes stand always for their real Essences.*
 15. *Why their Names are usually got before their Ideas.*
 16. *Reason of my being so large on this Subject.*

C H A P. VI.

Of the Names of Substances.

SECT.

1. *The common Names of Substances stand for sorts.*
 2. *The Essence of each sort, is the abstract Idea.*
 3. *The nominal and real Essence different.*
 4-6. *Nothing essential to Individuals.*

7,8. *The nominal Essence bounds the Species.*

9. *Not the real Essence which we know not.*

10. *Not substantial Forms which we know less.*

11. *That the nominal Essence is that whereby we distinguish Species, farther evident from Spirits.*

12. *Whereof there are probably numberless Species.*

13. *The nominal Essence that of the Species, prov'd from Water and Ice.*

14-18. *Difficulties against a certain Number of real Essences.*

19. *Our nominal Essences of Substances, not perfect Collections of Properties.*

21. *But such a Collection as our Name stands for.*

22. *Our abstract Ideas are to us the Measures of Species: Instances in that of Man.*

23. *Species not distinguish'd by Generation.*

24. *Not by substantial Forms.*

25. *The specifick Essences are made by the Mind.*

26. *Therefore very various and uncertain.*

27. *But not so arbitrarily as mix'd Modes.*

28. *Tho' very imperfect.*

29. *Which yet serves for common Converse.*

30. *But makes several Essences signify'd by the same Name.*

31. *The more general our Ideas are, the more incomplete and partial they are.*

32. *This all accommodated to the End of Speech.*

33. *Instance in Cassuaries.*

34. *Men make the Species; instance, Gold.*

35. *Tho' Nature make the Similitude.*

36. *And continues it in the Races of things.*

37. *Each abstract Idea is an Essence.*

38. *Genera and Species, in order to naming; instance, Watch.*

39. *Species of artificial things, less confused than natural.*

40. *Artificial things of distinct Species.*

41. *Substances alone have proper Names.*

42. *Difficulty to treat of Words with Words.*

43,44. *Instance of mix'd Modes in Kineah and Niouph.*

45,46. *Instance of Substances in Zahab.*

47. *Their Ideas perfect, and therefore various.*

48. *Therefore to fix their Species, a real Essence is suppos'd.*

49. *Which*

49. Which Supposition is of no use.
50. Conclusion.

CHAP. VII.

Of Particles.

SECT.

1. Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together.
2. In them consists the Art of well speaking.
- 3, 4. They shew what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.
5. Instance in But.
6. This matter but lightly touch'd here.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.

SECT.

1. Abstract Terms not predicable one of another, and why.
2. They shew the difference of our Ideas.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

SECT.

1. Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts.
2. Any Words will serve for recording.
3. Communication by Words, Civil or Philosophical.
4. The Imperfection of Words, is the Doubtfulness of their Signification.
5. Causes of their Imperfection.
6. The Names of mix'd Modes doubtful: First, Because the Ideas they stand for, are so complex.
7. Secondly, Because they have no Standards.
8. Propriety not a sufficient Remedy.
9. The way of learning these Names contributes also to their Doubtfulness.
10. Hence unavoidable Obscurity in ancient Authors.
12. Names of Substances refer'd, First, to real Essences that cannot be known.
- 13, 14. Secondly, To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.
15. With this Imperfection they may serve for Civil, but not well for Philosophical Use.
16. Instance, Liquor of Nerves.
17. Instance, Gold.
18. The Names of simple Ideas the least doubtful.
19. And next to them simple Modes.
20. The most doubtful, are the Names of very compounded mixed Modes and Substances.

21. Why this Imperfection charg'd upon Words.
- 22, 23. This should teach us Moderation in imposing our own Sense of old Authors.

CHAP. X.

Of the Abuse of Words.

SECT.

1. Abuse of Words.
- 2, 3. First, Words without any, or without clear Ideas.
4. Occasion'd by learning Names before the Ideas they belong to.
5. Secondly, Unsteady Application of them.
6. Thirdly, Affected Obscurity by wrong Application.
7. Logick and Dispute has much contributed to this.
8. Calling it Subtily.
9. This Learning very little benefits Society.
10. But destroys the Instruments of Knowledge and Communication.
11. As useful as to confound the Sound of the Letters.
12. This Art has perplex'd Religion and Justice.
13. And ought not to pass for Learning.
14. Fourthly, Taking them for things.
15. Instance in Matter.
16. This makes Errors lasting.
17. Fifthly, Setting them for what they cannot signify.
18. V. g. putting them for the real Essences of Substances.
19. Hence we think every Change of our Idea in Substances, not to change the Species.
20. The Cause of this Abuse, a Supposition of Nature's working always regularly.
21. This Abuse contains two false Suppositions.
22. Sixthly, A Supposition, that Words have a certain and evident Signification.
23. The Ends of Language: First, To convey our Ideas.
24. Secondly, To do it with Quickness.
25. Thirdly, Therewith to convey the Knowledge of things.
- 26-31. How Mens words fail in all these.
32. How in Substances.
33. How in Modes and Relations.
34. Seventhly, Figurative Speech also an Abuse of Language.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.

SECT.

1. *They are worth seeking.*
2. *Are not easy.*
3. *But yet necessary to Philosophy.*
4. *Misuse of Words, the Cause of great Errors.*
5. *Obstinacy.*
6. *And Wrangling.*
7. *Instance, Bat and Bird.*
8. *First, Remedy, to use no Word without an Idea.*
9. *Secondly, To have distinct Ideas annex'd to them in Modes.*
10. *And distinct and conformable in Substances.*
11. *Thirdly, Propriety.*
12. *Fourthly, To make known their Meaning.*
13. *And that three ways.*

14. *First, In simple Ideas by synonymous Terms or Shewing.*

15. *Secondly, in mix'd Modes by Definition.*

16. *Morality capable of Demonstration.*

17. *Definitions can make moral Discourses clear.*

18. *And is the only way.*

19. *Thirdly, In Substances, by shewing and defining.*

20, 21. *Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances, are best got by shewing.*

22. *The Ideas of their Powers best by Definition.*

23. *A Reflection on the Knowledge of Spirits.*

24. *Ideas also of Substances must be conformable to things.*

25. *Not easy to be made so.*

26. *Fifthly, By Constancy in their Signification.*

27. *When the Variation is to be explain'd.*

BOOK IV.

Of Knowledge and Opinion.

CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in general.

SECT.

1. *Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas.*
2. *Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas.*
3. *This Agreement fourfold.*
4. *First, Of Identity or Diversity.*
5. *Secondly, Relation.*
6. *Thirdly, Of Co-existence.*
7. *Fourthly, Of real Existence.*
8. *Knowledge actual or habitual.*
9. *Habitual Knowledge twofold.*

CHAP. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

SECT.

1. *Intuitive.*
2. *Demonstrative.*
3. *Depends on Proofs.*
4. *But not so easy.*
5. *Not without precedent Doubt.*
6. *Not so clear.*
7. *Each Step must have intuitive Evidence.*
8. *Hence the Mistake ex præcognitis & præconcessis.*

9. *Demonstration not limited to Quantity.*

10-13. *Why it has been so thought.*

14. *Sensitive Knowledge of particular Existence.*

15. *Knowledge not always clear, where the Ideas are so.*

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Human Knowledge.

SECT.

1. *First, No farther than we have Ideas.*

2. *Secondly, No farther than we can perceive the Agreement or Disagreement.*

3. *Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledge extends it self not to all the Relations of all our Ideas.*

4. *Fourthly, Nor demonstrative Knowledge.*

5. *Fifthly, Sensitive Knowledge narrower than either.*

6. *Sixthly, our Knowledge therefore narrower than our Ideas.*

7. *How far our Knowledge reaches.*

8. *First, Our Knowledge of Identity and Diversity, as far as our Ideas.*

9. *Secondly, Of Co-existence a very little way.*

10. *Because the Connection between most simple Ideas is unknown.*

11. *Espe-*

The CONTENTS.

XXV

11. Especially of secondary Qualities.
- 12-14. And farther, because all Connection between any secondary and primary Qualities is undiscoverable.
15. Of Repugnancy to co-exist larger.
16. Of the Co-existence of Powers a very little way.
17. Of Spirits yet narrower.
18. Thirdly, Of other Relations, it is not easy to say how far. Morality capable of Demonstration.
19. Two Things have made moral Ideas thought incapable of Demonstration. Their Complexedness and want of sensible Representations.
20. Remedies of those Difficulties.
21. Fourthly, Of real Existence, we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own, demonstrative of God's, sensible of some few other things.
22. Our Ignorance great.
23. First, One Cause of its want of Ideas, either such as we have no Conception of, or such as particularly we have not.
24. Because of their Remoteness, or,
25. Because of their Minuteness.
26. Hence no Science of Bodies.
27. Much less of Spirits.
28. Secondly, Want of a discoverable Connection between Ideas we have.
29. Instances.
30. Thirdly, Want of tracing our Ideas.
31. Extent in respect of Universality.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Reality of our Knowledge.

SECT.

1. Objection, Knowledge placed in Ideas, may be all bare Vision.
- 2, 3. Answer, Not so, where Ideas agree with Things.
4. As, First, All simple Ideas do.
5. Secondly, All complex Ideas excepted.
6. Hence the Reality of mathematical Knowledge.
7. And of moral.
8. Existence not requir'd to make it real.
9. Nor will it be less true or certain, because moral Ideas are of our own making and naming.
10. Mis-naming disturbs not the Certainty of the Knowledge.
11. Ideas of Substances have their Archetypes without us.
12. So far as they agree with those, so far our Knowledge concerning them is real.
13. In our Inquiries about Substances, we must consider Ideas, and not confine

Vol. I.

- our Thoughts to Names or Species supposed set out by Names.
- 14-17. Objection against a Changeling being something between Man and Beast, answer'd.
18. Recapitulation.

C H A P. V.

Of Truth in general.

SECT.

1. What Truth is.
2. A right joining, or separating of Signs; i.e. Ideas or Words.
3. Which make mental or verbal Propositions.
4. Mental Propositions are very hard to be treated of.
5. Being nothing but the joining, or separating Ideas without Words.
6. When mental Propositions contain real Truth, and when verbal.
7. Objection against verbal Truth, that it may be thus all chimerical.
8. Answered, real Truth is about Ideas agreeing to Things.
9. Falshood is the joining of Names otherwise than their Ideas agree.
10. General Propositions to be treated of more at large.
11. Moral and metaphysical Truth.

C H A P. VI.

Of universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

SECT.

1. Treating of Words, necessary to Knowledge.
2. General Truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal Propositions.
3. Certainty two-fold, of Truth, and of Knowledge.
4. No Proposition can be known to be true, where the Essence of each Species mentioned, is not known.
5. This more particularly concerns Substances.
6. The Truth of few universal Propositions concerning Substances, is to be known.
7. Because Co-existence of Ideas in few Cases to be known.
- 8, 9. Instance in Gold.
10. As far as any such Co-existence can be known, so far universal Propositions may be certain. But this will go but a little way, because,
- 11, 12. The Qualities which make our complex Ideas of Substances, depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceiv'd Causes.

8

13. Judg-

13. Judgment may reach farther, but that is not Knowledge.
14. What is requisite for our Knowledge of Substances.
15. Whilst our Ideas of Substances contain not their real Constitutions, we can make but few general certain Propositions concerning them.
16. Wherein lies the general Certainty of Propositions.

CHAP. VII. Of Maxims.

SECT.

1. They are self-evident.
2. Wherein that Self-evidence consists.
3. Self-evidence not peculiar to receiv'd Axioms.
4. First, As to Identity and Diversity, all Propositions are equally self-evident.
5. Secondly, In Co-existence we have few self-evident Propositions.
6. Thirdly, In other Relations we may have.
7. Fourthly, Concerning real Existence, we have none.
8. These Axioms do not much influence our other Knowledge.
- 9, 10. Because they are not the Truths the first known.
11. What Use these general Maxims have.
12. Maxims, if care be not taken in the Use of Words, may prove Contradictions.
13. Instance in Vacuum.
14. They prove not the Existence of things without us.
15. Their Application dangerous about complex Ideas.
- 16-18. Instance in Man.
19. Little Use of these Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and distinct Ideas.
20. Their Use dangerous, where our Ideas are confused.

CHAP. VIII. Of Trifling Propositions.

SECT.

1. Some Propositions bring no Increase to our Knowledge.
- 2, 3. As, First, Identical Propositions.
4. Secondly, When a part of any complex Idea is predicated of the whole.
5. As part of the Definition of the defined.
6. Instance, Man and Palfry.
7. For this teaches but the Signification of Words.
8. But no real Knowledge.

9. General Propositions concerning Substances, are often trifling.
10. And why.
11. Thirdly, Using Words variously, is trifling with them.
12. Marks of verbal Propositions. First, Predication in abstract.
13. Secondly, A part of the Definition predicated of any Term.

CHAP. IX.

Of our Knowledge of Existence.

SECT.

1. General certain Propositions concern not Existence.
2. A threefold Knowledge of Existence.
3. Our Knowledge of our own Existence, is intuitive.

CHAP. X.

Of the Existence of a GOD.

SECT.

1. We are capable of knowing certainly, that there is a GOD.
2. Man knows, that he himself is.
3. He knows also, that nothing can not produce a Being, therefore something Eternal.
4. That eternal Being must be most powerful.
5. And most knowing.
6. And therefore GOD.
7. Our Idea of a most perfect Being, not the sole Proof of a GOD.
8. Something from Eternity.
9. Two sorts of Beings, Cogitative and Incogitative.
10. Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogitative.
- 11, 12. Therefore there has been an eternal Wisdom.
13. Whether material or no.
14. Not material, First, because every Particle of Matter is not cogitative.
15. Secondly, One Particle alone of Matter cannot be cogitative.
16. Thirdly, A System of incogitative Matter cannot be cogitative.
17. Whether in Motion, or at Rest.
- 18, 19. Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.

SECT.

1. Is to be had only by Sensation.
2. Instance, Whiteness of this Paper.
3. This, tho' not so certain as Demonstration, yet may be call'd Knowledge, and proves the Existence of things without us.
4. First,

4. First, Because we cannot have them but by the Inlet of the Senses.
5. Because an Idea from actual Sensation, and another from Memory, are very distinct Perceptions.
6. Thirdly, Pleasure or Pain, which accompanies actual Sensation, accompanies not the returning of those Ideas without the external Objects.
7. Fourthly, Our Senses assist one another's Testimony of the Existence of outward things.
8. This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs.
9. But reaches no farther than actual Sensation.
10. Folly to expect Demonstration in every thing.
11. Past Existence is known by Memory.
12. The Existence of Spirits not knowable.
13. Particular Propositions concerning Existence, are knowable.
14. And general Propositions concerning abstract Ideas.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

SECT.

1. Knowledge is not from Maxims.
2. The Occasion of that Opinion.
3. But from the comparing clear and distinct Ideas.
4. Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles.
5. This no certain way to Truth.
6. But to compare clear compleat Ideas under steady Names.
7. The true Method of advancing Knowledge, is by considering our abstract Ideas.
8. By which, Morality also may be made clearer.
9. But Knowledge of Bodies is to be improved only by Experience.
10. This may procure us Convenience, not Science.
11. We are fitted for moral Knowledge, and natural Improvements.
12. But must beware of Hypotheses and wrong Principles.
13. The true Use of Hypotheses.
14. Clear and distinct Ideas with settled Names, and the finding of those which shew their Agreement or Disagreement, are the ways to enlarge our Knowledge.
15. Mathematicks an Instance of it.

CHAP. XIII.

Some other Considerations concerning our Knowledge.

SECT.

1. Our Knowledge partly necessary, partly voluntary.
2. The Application voluntary; but we know as things are, not as we please.
3. Instances in Number.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgment.

SECT.

1. Our Knowledge being short, we want something else.
2. What Use to be made of this twilight Estate.
3. Judgment supplies the want of Knowledge.
4. Judgment is the presuming Things to be so, without perceiving it.

CHAP. XV.

Of Probability.

SECT.

1. Probability is the Appearance of Agreement upon fallible Proofs.
2. It is to supply the want of Knowledge.
3. Being that which makes us presume Things to be true, before we know them to be so.
4. The Grounds of Probability are two; Conformity with our own Experience, or the Testimony of others Experience.
5. In this all the Agreements, pro and con, ought to be examined, before we come to a Judgment.
6. They being capable of great Variety.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Degrees of Assent.

SECT.

1. Our Assent ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability.
2. These cannot always be all actually in view, and then we must content our selves with the Remembrance that we once saw ground for such a Degree of Assent.
3. The ill Consequence of this, if our former Judgment were not rightly made.
4. The right Use of it, is mutual Charity and Forbearance.
5. Probability is either of Matter of Fact or Speculation.
6. The concurrent Experience of all other Men with our's, produces Assurance approaching to Knowledge.
7. Unquestionable Testimony and Experience for the most part produce Confidence.
8. Fair

8. Fair Testimony, and the Nature of the thing indifferent, produces also confident Belief.
9. Experience and Testimonies clashing, infinitely vary the Degrees of Probability.
10. Traditional Testimonies, the farther remov'd, the less their Proof.
11. Yet History is of great use.
12. In thing which Sense cannot discover, Analogy is the great Rule of Probability.
13. One Case where contrary Experience lessens not the Testimony.
14. The bare Testimony of Revelation is the highest Certainty.

C H A P. XVII.

Of Reason.

SECT.

1. Various Significations of the word Reason.
2. Wherein Reasoning consists.
3. Its four parts.
4. Syllogism not the great Instrument of Reason.
5. Helps little in Demonstration, less in Probability.
6. Serves not to increase our Knowledge, but fence with it.
7. Other Helps should be sought.
8. We reason about Particulars.
9. First, Reason fails us for want of Ideas.
10. Secondly, Because of obscure and imperfect Ideas.
11. Thirdly, For want of intermediate Ideas.
12. Fourthly, Because of wrong Principles.
13. Fifthly, Because of doubtful Terms.
14. Our highest Degree of Knowledge is intuitive without reasoning.
15. The next is Demonstration by reasoning.
16. To supply the Narrowness of this, we have nothing but Judgment upon probable Reasoning.
17. Intuition, Demonstration, Judgment.
18. Consequences of Words, and Consequences of Ideas.
19. Four sorts of Arguments: First, Ad Verendum.
20. Secondly, Ad Ignorantiam.
21. Thirdly, Ad Hominem.
22. Fourthly, Ad Judicium.
23. Above, contrary, and according to Reason.
24. Reason and Faith not opposite.

C H A P. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces.

SECT.

1. Necessary to know their Boundaries.
2. Faith and Reason, what, as contra-distinguish'd.
3. No new simple Idea can be convey'd by traditional Revelation.
4. Traditional Revelation may make us know Propositions knowable also by Reason, but not with the same Certainty that Reason doth.
5. Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear Evidence of Reason.

6. Traditional Revelation much less.

7. Things above Reason.

8. Or not contrary to Reason, if reveal'd, are Matter of Faith.

9. Revelation, in Matters where Reason cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearken'd to.

10. In Matters where Reason can afford certain Knowledge, that is to be hearken'd to.

11. If the Boundaries be not set between Faith and Reason, no Enthusiasm, or Extravagancy in Religion, can be contradicted.

C H A P. XIX.

Of Enthusiasm.

SECT.

1. Love of Truth necessary.
2. A Forwardness to dictate, whence.
3. Force of Enthusiasm.
4. Reason and Revelation.
5. Rise of Enthusiasm.
- 6, 7. Enthusiasm.
- 8, 9. Enthusiasm mistaken for seeing and feeling.
10. Enthusiasm how to be discover'd.
11. Enthusiasm fails of Evidence, that the Proposition is from GOD.
12. Firmness of Persuasion, no Proof that any Proposition is from GOD.
13. Light in the Mind, what.
14. Revelation must be judg'd by Reason.
15. Belief no Proof of Revelation.

C H A P. XX.

Of wrong Assent, or Error.

SECT.

1. Causes of Error.
2. First, Want of Proofs.
3. Obj. What shall become of those who want them, answer'd.
4. People hinder'd from Inquiry.
5. Secondly, Want of Skill to use them.
6. Thirdly, Want of Will to use them.
7. Fourthly, Wrong Measures of Probability; whereof,
- 8-10. First, Doubtful Propositions taken for Principles.
11. Secondly, Receiv'd Hypotheses.
12. Thirdly, Predominant Passions.
13. The Means of evading Probabilities, 1st, Suppos'd Fallacy.
14. 2dly, Suppos'd Arguments for the contrary.
15. What Probabilities determine the Assent.
16. Where it is in our power to suspend it.
17. Fourthly, Authority.
18. Men not in so many Errors as is imagin'd.

C H A P. XXI.

Division of the Sciences.

SECT.

1. Three sorts.
2. First, Physica.
3. Secondly, Practica.
4. Thirdly, Σημαντικη.
5. This is the first Division of the Objects of Knowledge.

OF



O F

Human Understanding.

BOOK I. CHAP. I.

Introduction.

§. 1.



INCE it is the *Understanding* that sets Man above the rest of sensible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even for its Nobleness, worth our Labour to enquire into. The Understanding, like the Eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive all other Things, takes no notice of itself: And it requires Art and Pains to set it a distance, and make it its own Object. But whatever be the Difficulties that lie in

An Inquiry into the Understanding, pleasant and useful.

the way of this Enquiry; whatever it be that keeps us so much in the Dark to our selves; sure I am, that all the Light we can let in upon our own Minds, all the Acquaintance we can make with our own Understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great Advantage, in directing our Thoughts in the search of other Things.

§. 2. This therefore, being my *Purpose* to enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of Human Knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion and Assent: I shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind, or trouble my self to examine, wherein its Essence consists, or by what Motions of our Spirits, or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have any Sensation by our Organs, or any *Ideas* in our Understandings; and whether those *Ideas* do in their Formation, any, or all of them, depend on Matter or no. These are Speculations, which however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way, in the Design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present Purpose, to consider the discerning Faculties of a Man, as they are employ'd about the Objects which they have to do with: And I shall imagine I have not wholly misemploy'd my self in the Thoughts I shall have on this Occasion, if in this historical, plain Method, I can give any account of the Ways whereby our Understandings come to attain those Notions of Things we have, and can set down any Measures of the Certainty of our Knowledge, or the Grounds of those Persuasions which are to be found amongst Men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted somewhere or other with such Assurance and Confidence, that he that shall take a view of the Opinions of Mankind, observe their Opposition, and at the same time consider the Fondness and Devotion wherewith they are embrac'd, the Resolution and Eagerness wherewith they are maintain'd; may perhaps have Reason to suspect, that either there is no such Thing as Truth at

Design.

all; or that Mankind hath no sufficient Means to attain a certain Knowledge of it.

Method.

§. 3. It is therefore worth while to search out the *Bounds* between Opinion and Knowledge; and examine by what Measures, in things whereof we have no certain Knowledge, we ought to regulate our Assent, and moderate our Persuasions. In order whereunto, I shall pursue this following Method.

First, I shall enquire into the *Original* of those *Ideas*, Notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a Man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his Mind; and the Ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnish'd with them.

Secondly, I shall endeavour to shew, what Knowledge the Understanding hath by those *Ideas*; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.

Thirdly, I shall make some Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds of *Faith* or *Opinion*; whereby I mean that Assent which we give to any Proposition as true, of whose Truth yet we have no certain Knowledge: And here we shall have occasion to examine the Reasons and Degrees of Assent.

*Useful to know
the extent of
our Compre-
hension.*

§. 4. If by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Understanding, I can discover the Powers thereof; *how far* they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us; I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy Mind of Man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its Comprehension; to stop, when it is at the utmost extent of its Tether; and to sit down in a quiet Ignorance of those Things, which, upon Examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our Capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of Affectation of an universal Knowledge, to raise Questions, and perplex our selves and others with Disputes about Things, to which our Understandings are not suited; and of which we cannot frame in our Minds any clear or distinct Perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happen'd) we have not any Notions at all. If we can find out, how far the Understanding can extend its view; how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty; and in what Cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content our selves with what is attainable by us in this State.

*Our Capacity
suited to our
State and
Concerns.*

§. 5. For tho' the *Comprehension* of our Understandings comes exceeding short of the vast extent of Things; yet we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our Being, for that Portion and Degree of Knowledge he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of the Inhabitants of this our Mansion. Men have reason to be well satisfy'd with what God hath thought fit for them, since he has given them (as St. Peter says) πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν, whatsoever is necessary for the Conveniences of Life, and Information of Virtue; and has put within the reach of their Discovery, the comfortable Provision for this Life, and the Way that leads to a better. How short soever their Knowledge may come of an universal or perfect Comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great Concernments, that they have Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own Duties. Men may find Matter sufficient to busy their Heads, and employ their Hands with Variety, Delight, and Satisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own Constitution, and throw away the Blessings their Hands are fill'd with, because they are not big enough to grasp every thing. We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our Minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of Use to us; for of that they are very capable: And it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish Peevishness, if we undervalue the Advantages of our Knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the Ends for which it was given us, because there are some Things that are set out of the reach of it. It will be no Excuse to an idle and untoward Servant, who would not attend his Business by Candle-light, to plead that he had not broad Sun-shine. The Candle that is set-up in us, shines bright enough for all our Purposes. The Discoveries we can make with this, ought to satisfy us: And we shall then use our Understandings right, when we entertain all Objects in that Way and Proportion that they are suited to our Faculties; and upon those Grounds they are capable of being propos'd to us; and not peremptorily, or intemperately require Demonstration, and demand Certainty, where Probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our Concernments. If we will dis-
believe

believe every thing, because we cannot certainly know all things; we shall do much-what as wisely as he, who would not use his Legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no Wings to fly.

§. 6. When we know our own *Strength*, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of Success: And when we have well survey'd the *Powers* of our own Minds, and made some Estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclin'd either to sit still, and not set our Thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing any thing; or on the other side, question every thing, and disclaim all Knowledge, because some Things are not to be understood. 'Tis of great Use to the Sailor to know the length of his Line, tho' he cannot with it fathom all the Depths of the Ocean. 'Tis well he knows that it is long enough to reach the Bottom at such Places as are necessary to direct his Voyage, and caution him against running upon Shoals that may ruin him. Our Business here is not to know all Things, but those which concern our Conduct. If we can find out those Measures, whereby a Rational Creature, put in that State which Man is in this World, may, and ought to govern his Opinions and Actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that some other things escape our Knowledge.

Knowledge of our Capacity, a Cure of Scepticism and Idleness.

§. 7. This was that which gave the first Rise to this *Essay* concerning the Understanding. For I thought that the first Step towards satisfying several Enquiries the Mind of Man was very apt to run into, was, to take a Survey of our own Understandings, examine our own Powers, and see to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for Satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of Truths that most concern'd us, whilst we let loose our Thoughts into the vast Ocean of *Being*; as if all that boundless Extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our Understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its Decisions, or that escap'd its Comprehension. Thus Men extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into those Depths where they can find no sure footing; 'tis no wonder that they raise Questions, and multiply Disputes, which never coming to any clear Resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their Doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect Scepticism. Whereas were the Capacities of our Understandings well consider'd, the Extent of our Knowledge once discover'd, and the Horizon found, which sets the Bounds between the enlighten'd and dark Parts of Things, between what is, and what is not comprehensible by us; Men would perhaps with less Scruple, acquiesce in the avow'd Ignorance of the one, and employ their Thoughts and Discourse with more Advantage and Satisfaction in the other.

Occasion of this Essay.

§. 8. Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the Occasion of this Enquiry into Human Understanding. But before I proceed on to what I have thought on this Subject, I must here in the entrance beg pardon of my Reader for the frequent use of the word *Idea*, which he will find in the following Treatise. It being that Term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding, when a Man thinks, I have us'd it to express whatever is meant by *Phantasm*, *Notion*, *Species*, or whatever it is which the Mind can be employ'd about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it.

What Idea stands for.

I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such *Ideas* in Mens Minds; every one is conscious of them in himself, and Mens Words and Actions will satisfy him, that they are in others.

Our first Enquiry then shall be, How they come into the Mind.

CHAP. II.

No Innate Principles in the Mind.

§. 1. **I**T is an establish'd Opinion amongst some Men, That there are in the Understanding certain *Innate Principles*; some primary Notions, *Κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*, Characters, as it were stamp'd upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being, and brings into the World with it. It would be

The way shown how we come by any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it not be Innate.

be sufficient to convince unprejudic'd Readers of the Falseness of this Supposition, if I should only shew (as I hope I shall in the following Parts of this Discourse) how Men, barely by the use of their Natural Faculties, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without the help of any Innate Impressions; and may arrive at Certainty, without any such Original Notions or Principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose, the *Ideas* of Colours Innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes, from External Objects: And no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several Truths to the Impressions of Nature, and Innate Characters, when we may observe in our selves Faculties, fit to attain as easy and certain Knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the Mind.

But because a Man is not permitted without Censure to follow his own Thoughts in the search of Truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common Road; I shall set down the Reasons that made me doubt of the Truth of that Opinion, as an Excuse for my Mistake, if I be in one: which I leave to be consider'd by those, who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace Truth wherever they find it.

General Assent the great Argument.

§. 2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain Principles both *Speculative* and *Practical* (for they speak of both) universally agreed upon by all Mankind; which therefore they argue, must needs be constant Impressions, which the Souls of Men receive in their first Beings, and which they bring into the World with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent Faculties.

Universal Consent proves nothing Innate.

§. 3. This Argument, drawn from *Universal Consent*, has this Misfortune in it, that if it were true in Matter of Fact, That there were certain Truths, wherein all Mankind agreed, it would not prove them Innate, if there can be any other way shewn, how Men may come to that Universal Agreement in the things they do consent in; which I presume may be done.

What is, is; and 'tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, not universally assented to.

§. 4. But, which is worse, this Argument of Universal Consent, which is made use of to prove Innate Principles, seems to me a Demonstration that there are none such; because there are none to which all Mankind give an universal Assent. I shall begin with the *Speculative*, and instance in those magnify'd Principles of Demonstration: *Whatsoever is, is*; and *'tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*; which of all others, I think, have the most allow'd Title to Innate. These have so settled a Reputation of Maxims universally receiv'd, that 'twill, no doubt, be thought strange, if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these Propositions are so far from having an Universal Assent, that there are a great Part of Mankind, to whom they are not so much as known.

Not on the Mind naturally imprinted, because not known to Children, Idiots, &c.

§. 5. For, first 'tis evident, that all *Children* and *Idiots* have not the least Apprehension or Thought of them; and the want of that is enough to destroy that Universal Assent, which must needs be the necessary Concomitant of all Innate Truths: It seeming to me near a Contradiction, to say, that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul, which it perceives or understands not; Imprinting, if it signify any thing, being nothing else, but the making certain Truths to be perceiv'd. For to imprint any thing on the Mind, without the Mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore *Children* and *Idiots* have Souls, have Minds, with those Impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these Truths, which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such Impressions. For if they are not Notions naturally imprinted, how can they be Innate? And if they are Notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a Notion is imprinted on the Mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the Mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this Impression nothing. No Proposition can be said to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may; then by the same Reason, all Propositions that are true, and the Mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the Mind, and to be imprinted: Since if any one can be said to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the Mind is of all Truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus Truths

Truths may be imprinted on the Mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know: For a Man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many Truths, which his Mind was capable of knowing, and that with Certainty. So that if the Capacity of knowing be the natural Impression contended for, all the Truths a Man ever comes to know, will, by this Account, be every one of them Innate; and this great Point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny Innate Principles. For no body, I think, ever deny'd, that the Mind was capable of knowing several Truths. The Capacity, they say, is Innate, the Knowledge acquir'd. But then to what end such Contest for certain Innate Maxims? If Truths can be imprinted on the Understanding without being perceiv'd, I can see no difference there can be between any Truths the Mind is capable of knowing, in respect of their Original: They must all be Innate, or all Adventitious: In vain shall a Man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of Innate Notions in the Understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of Truths) mean such Truths to be in the Understanding, as it never perceiv'd, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these Words (*to be in the Understanding*) have any Propriety, they signify to be understood. So that, to be in the Understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the Mind, and never to be perceiv'd, is all one as to say, any thing is, and is not, in the Mind or Understanding. If therefore these two Propositions, *Whatsoever is, is*; and *'tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, are by Nature imprinted, Children cannot be ignorant of them; Infants, and All that have Souls, must necessarily have them in their Understandings, know the Truth of them, and assent to it.

§. 6. To avoid this, 'tis usually answer'd, That all Men know and assent to them, *when they come to the Use of Reason*; and this is enough to prove them Innate. I answer,

§. 7. Doubtful Expressions, that have scarce any Signification, go for clear Reasons, to those, who being pre-possess'd, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say. For to apply this Answer with any tolerable Sense to our present Purpose, it must signify one of these two things; either, That as soon as Men come to the use of Reason, these suppos'd native Inscriptions come to be known, and observ'd by them: or else, That the Use and Exercise of Men's Reasons assists them in the Discovery of these Principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

That Men know them when they come to the use of Reason, answer'd.

§. 8. If they mean that by the *Use of Reason* Men may discover these Principles; and that this is sufficient to prove them Innate; their way of arguing will stand thus, (*viz.*) That whatever Truths Reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted on the Mind: since that universal Assent, which is made the Mark of them, amounts to no more but this; That by the Use of Reason we are capable to come to a certain Knowledge of, and Assent to them: and by this means there will be no difference between the Maxims of the Mathematicians, and Theorems they deduce from them. All must be equally allow'd Innate, they being all Discoveries made by the Use of Reason, and Truths that a rational Creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his Thoughts rightly that way.

If Reason discover'd them, that would not prove them Innate.

§. 9. But how can these Men think the *Use of Reason* necessary to discover Principles that are suppos'd Innate, when Reason (if we may believe them) is nothing else, but the Faculty of deducing unknown Truths from Principles or Propositions that are already known? That certainly can never be thought Innate, which we have need of Reason to discover, unless, as I have said, we will have all the certain Truths, that Reason ever teaches us, to be Innate. We may as well think the Use of Reason necessary to make our Eyes discover visible Objects, as that there should be need of Reason, or the Exercise thereof, to make the Understanding see what is originally engraven in it, and cannot be in the Understanding, before it be perceiv'd by it. So that to make Reason discover those Truths thus imprinted, is to say, that the Use of Reason discovers to a Man what he knew before; and if Men have those Innate impress'd Truths originally, and before the use of Reason, and yet are always ignorant of them till they come to the Use of Reason, 'tis in effect to say, that Men know, and know them not at the same time.

'Tis false that Reason discovers them.

§. 10. 'Twill here perhaps be said, That Mathematical Demonstrations, and other Truths that are not innate, are not assented to, as soon as propos'd, wherein they are distinguish'd from these Maxims, and other Innate Truths. I shall have occasion to speak of Assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow that these Maxims, and Mathematical Demonstrations are in this different; That the one has need of Reason using of Proofs, to make them out, and to gain our Assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embrac'd and assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, that it lays open the Weakness of this Subterfuge, which requires the *Use of Reason* for the Discovery of these general Truths: Since it must be confess'd, that in their Discovery there is no Use made of Reasoning at all. And I think those who give this Answer, will not be forward to affirm, That the Knowledge of this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be*, is a Deduction of our Reason. For this would be to destroy that Bounty of Nature they seem so fond of, whilst they make the Knowledge of those Principles to depend on the Labour of our Thoughts. For all Reasoning is Search, and casting about, and requires Pains and Application. And how can it with any tolerable sense be suppos'd, that what was imprinted by Nature, as the Foundation and Guide of our Reason, should need the Use of Reason to discover it?

§. 11. Those who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the Operations of the Understanding, will find that this ready Assent of the Mind to some Truths, depends not, either on native Inscription, or the *Use of Reason*; but on a Faculty of the Mind quite distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter. Reason therefore having nothing to do in procuring our Assent to these Maxims, if by saying, that *Men know and assent to them, when they come to the Use of Reason*, be meant, That the Use of Reason assists us in the Knowledge of these Maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be Innate.

The coming to
the Use of
Reason, not
the time we
come to know
these Max-
ims.

§. 12. If by knowing and assenting to them, *when we come to the Use of Reason*, be meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the Mind; and that as soon as Children come to the Use of Reason, they come also to know and assent to these Maxims; this also is false and frivolous. First, It is false: Because it is evident, these Maxims are not in the Mind so early as the Use of Reason: And therefore the coming to the Use of Reason is falsely assign'd, as the Time of their Discovery. How many Instances of the Use of Reason, may we observe in Children, long time before they have any knowledge of this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*? And a great part of illiterate People, and Savages, pass many Years, even of their rational Age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general Propositions. I grant, Men come not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract Truths, which are thought Innate, till they come to the Use of Reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, because till after they come to the Use of Reason, those general abstract Ideas are not fram'd in the Mind, about which those general Maxims are, which are mistaken for Innate Principles, but are indeed Discoveries made, and Verities introduc'd, and brought into the Mind by the same Way, and discover'd by the same Steps, as several other Propositions, which no body was ever so extravagant as to suppose Innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this Discourse. I allow therefore a Necessity, that Men should come to the Use of Reason, before they get the Knowledge of those general Truths; but deny, that Men's coming to the Use of Reason is the time of their Discovery.

By this, they
are not distin-
guish'd from
other know-
able Truths.

§. 13. In the mean time it is observable, that this Saying, that Men know, and assent to these Maxims, *when they come to the Use of Reason*, amounts, in reality of Fact, to no more but this, That they are never known, nor taken notice of, before the Use of Reason, but may possibly be assented to some time after, during a Man's Life; but when, is uncertain: And so may all other knowable Truths, as well as these which therefore have no Advantage, nor Distinction from others, by this Note of being known when we come to the Use of Reason; nor are thereby prov'd to be Innate, but quite the contrary.

§. 14. But, *Secondly*, Were it true, that the precise time of their being known, and assented to, were, when Men come to the *Use of Reason*; neither would that prove them Innate. This Way of arguing is so frivolous, as the Supposition of it self is false. For by what kind of Logick will it appear, that any Notion is originally by Nature imprinted in the Mind in its first Constitution, because it comes first to be observ'd, and assented to, when a Faculty of the Mind, which has quite a distinct Province, begins to exert it self? And therefore, the coming to the Use of Speech, if it were suppos'd the time that these Maxims are first assented to (which it may be with as much Truth, as the time when Men come to the Use of Reason) would be as good a Proof that they were Innate, as to say, they are Innate because Men assent to them, when they come to the Use of Reason. I agree then with these Men of Innate Principles, that there is no Knowledge of these general and self-evident Maxims in the Mind, till it comes to the Exercise of Reason: But I deny that the coming to the Use of Reason is the precise time when they are first taken notice of; and if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them Innate. All that can with any Truth be meant by this Proposition, That Men assent to them *when they come to the Use of Reason*, is no more but this, That the making of general abstract *Ideas*, and the understanding of general Names, being a Concomitant of the rational Faculty, and growing-up with it, Children commonly get not those general *Ideas*, nor learn the Names that stand for them, till having for a good while exercis'd their Reason about familiar and more particular *Ideas*, they are by their ordinary Discourse and Actions with others, acknowledg'd to be capable of rational Conversation. If assenting to these Maxims, when Men come to the Use of Reason, can be true in any other sense, I desire it may be shewn; or at least, how in this, or any other sense it proves them Innate.

If coming to the Use of Reason were the time of their Discovery, it would not prove them Innate.

§. 15. The Senses at first let-in particular *Ideas*, and furnish the yet empty Cabinet: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodg'd in the Memory, and Names got to them. Afterwards the Mind proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the Use of general Names. In this manner the Mind comes to be furnish'd with *Ideas* and Language, the Materials about which to exercise its discursive Faculty: And the Use of Reason becomes daily more visible, as these Materials that give it Employment increase. But tho' the having of general *Ideas*, and the Use of general Words and Reason usually grow together; yet, I see not, how this any way proves them Innate. The Knowledge of some Truths, I confess, is very early in the Mind; but in a way that shews them not to be Innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about *Ideas*, not Innate, but Acquir'd: it being about those first, which are imprinted by external Things, with which Infants have earliest to do, which make the most frequent Impressions on their Senses. In *Ideas* thus got, the Mind discovers, That some agree, and others differ, probably as soon as it has any Use of Memory; as soon as it is able to retain and receive distinct *Ideas*. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain it does so long before it has the Use of Words, or comes to that which we commonly call the *Use of Reason*. For a Child knows as certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the *Ideas* of Sweet and Bitter (*i. e.* That Sweet is not Bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) That Wormwood and Sugar-plumbs are not the same thing.

The Steps by which the Mind attains several Truths.

§. 16. A Child knows not that Three and Four are equal to Seven, till he comes to be able to count to Seven, and has got the Name and *Idea* of Equality: and then upon explaining those Words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the Truth of that Proposition. But neither does he then readily assent, because it is an Innate Truth, nor was his Assent wanting till then, because he wanted the *Use of Reason*; but the Truth of it appears to him, as soon as he has settled in his Mind the clear and distinct *Ideas* that these Names stand for: And then he knows the Truth of that Proposition, upon the same grounds, and by the same means, that he knew before, That a Rod and Cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same grounds also, that he may come to know afterwards, That 'tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; as shall be more fully shewn hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general *Ideas* about which those Maxims are; or to know the Signification of those

those

those general Terms that stand for them; or to put together in his Mind the *Ideas* they stand for: the later also will it be before he comes to assent to those Maxims, whose Terms, with the *Ideas* they stand for, being no more Innate than those of a Cat or a Weasel, he must stay till Time and Observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a Capacity to know the Truth of these Maxims upon the first occasion that shall make him put together those *Ideas* in his Mind, and observe, whether they agree or disagree, according as is express'd in those Propositions. And therefore it is, that a Man knows that Eighteen and Nineteen are equal to Thirty Seven, by the same Self-evidence that he knows One and Two to be equal to Three: Yet a Child knows this not so soon as the other, not for Want of the Use of Reason, but because the *Ideas* the Words Eighteen, Nineteen, and Thirty Seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those which are signify'd by One, Two, and Three.

Assenting, as soon as propos'd and understood, proves them not Innate.

§. 17. This Evasion therefore of general Assent, when Men come to the use of Reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those suppos'd Innate, and other Truths that are afterwards acquir'd and learnt; Men have endeavour'd to secure an universal Assent to those they call Maxims, by saying, they are generally *assented to as soon as propos'd*, and the Terms they are propos'd in, understood: Seeing all Men, even Children, as soon as they hear and understand the Terms, assent to these Propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove them Innate. For since Men never fail, after they have once understood the Words, to acknowledg them for undoubted Truths, they would infer, That certainly these Propositions were first lodg'd in the Understanding; which, without any teaching, the Mind at the very first Proposal immediately closes with, and assents to, and after that never doubts again.

If such an Assent be a Mark of Innate, then that One and Two are equal to Three; that Sweetness is not Bitterness; and a Thousand the like, must be Innate.

§. 18. In answer to this, I demand whether ready Assent given to a Proposition upon first Hearing, and understanding the Terms, be a certain Mark of an Innate Principle? If it be not, such a general Assent is in vain urg'd as a Proof of them: If it be said, that it is a Mark of Innate, they must then allow all such Propositions to be Innate, which are generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stor'd with Innate Principles. For upon the same Ground (*viz.*) of Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, That Men would have those Maxims pass for Innate, they must also admit several Propositions about Numbers, to be Innate: And thus, *That One and Two are equal to Three; that Two and Two are equal to Four; and a multitude of other the like Propositions in Numbers*, that every body assents to at first hearing, and understanding the Terms, must have a place amongst these Innate Axioms. Nor is this the Prerogative of Numbers alone, and Propositions made about several of them; but even Natural Philosophy, and all the other Sciences afford Propositions, which are sure to meet with Assent as soon as they are understood. *That two Bodies cannot be in the same Place*, is a Truth that no body any more sticks at, than at this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; That White is not Black; That a Square is not a Circle; That Yellowness is not Sweetness*: These, and a Million of other such Propositions, as many at least as we have distinct *Ideas* of, every Man in his Wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the Names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If these Men will be true to their own Rule, and have Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, to be a Mark of Innate, they must allow not only as many Innate Propositions as Men have distinct *Ideas*; but as many as Men can make Propositions wherein different *Ideas* are denied one of another. Since every Proposition, wherein one different *Idea* is denied of another, will as certainly find Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, as this general one, *It is impossible for the same to be, and not to be; or that which is the Foundation of it, and is the easier understood of the two, The same is not different*: By which account they will have Legions of Innate Propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other. But since no Proposition can be Innate, unless the *Ideas*, about which it is, be Innate; this will be to suppose all our *Ideas* of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Figure, &c. Innate; than which there cannot be any thing more opposite to Reason and Experience. Universal and ready Assent upon hearing and understanding the Terms, is (I grant) a Mark of Self-Evidence; but Self-evidence depending not on Innate Impressions, but on something else

Chap. 2. *No Innate Principles in the Mind.*

9

else (as we shall shew hereafter) belongs to several Propositions, which no body was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be Innate.

§. 19. Nor let it be said, that those more particular self-evident Propositions which are assented to at first hearing, as *that One and Two are equal to Three; that Green is not Red, &c.* are receiv'd as the Consequences of those more universal Propositions, which are look'd on as Innate Principles: since any one who will but take the pains to observe what passes in the Understanding, will certainly find, that these and the like less general Propositions, are certainly known and firmly assented to, by those who are utterly ignorant of those more general Maxims; and so, being earlier in the Mind than those (as they are call'd) first Principles, cannot owe to them the Assent, wherewith they are received at first hearing.

Such less general Propositions known before these universal Maxims.

§. 20. If it be said that these Propositions, viz. *Two and Two are equal to Four; Red is not Blue, &c.* are not general Maxims, nor of any great use: I answer, That makes nothing to the Argument of universal Assent, upon Hearing and Understanding. For if that be the certain Mark of Innate, whatever Proposition can be found, that receives general Assent as soon as heard and understood, that must be admitted for an Innate Proposition, as well as this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;* they being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this Maxim more remote from being Innate; those general and abstract Ideas being more strangers to our first Apprehensions, than those of more particular self-evident Propositions; and therefore 'tis longer before they are admitted and assented to by the growing Understanding. And as to the usefulness of these magnify'd Maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally conceiv'd, when it comes to its due place to be more fully consider'd.

One and One equal to Two, &c. not general nor useful, answer'd.

§. 21. But we have not yet done with *Assenting to Propositions at first hearing and understanding their Terms;* 'tis fit we first take notice, that this, instead of being a Mark that they are Innate, is a proof of the contrary: Since it supposes, that several who understand and know other things, are ignorant of these Principles till they are propos'd to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these Truths till he hears them from others. For if they were Innate, what need they be propos'd in order to gaining Assent; when by being in the Understanding, by a natural and original Impression (if there were any such) they could not but be known before? Or doth the proposing them, print them clearer in the Mind than Nature did? If so, then the Consequence will be, That a Man knows them better after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it will follow, that these Principles may be made more evident to us by others teaching, than Nature has made them by Impression: which will ill agree with the Opinion of Innate Principles, and give but little Authority to them; but on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the Foundations of all our other Knowledge, as they are pretended to be. This cannot be deny'd, that Men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident Truths, upon their being propos'd: But it is clear, that whosoever does so, finds in himself, that he then begins to know a Proposition, which he knew not before, and which from thenceforth he never questions; not because it was Innate, but because the consideration of the Nature of the things contain'd in those Words, would not suffer him to think otherwise; how, or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is assented to at first hearing and understanding the Terms, must pass for an Innate Principle, every well-grounded Observation drawn from Particulars into a general Rule, must be Innate. When yet it is certain, that not all, but only sagacious Heads light at first on these Observations, and reduce them into general Propositions; not Innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular Instances. These, when observing Men have made them, unobserving Men, when they are propos'd to them, cannot refuse their Assent to.

These Maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not Innate.

§. 22. If it be said, the Understanding hath an *implicit Knowledge* of these Principles, but not an explicit, before this first hearing, (as they must, who will say, That they are in the Understanding before they are known) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a Principle imprinted on the Understanding implicitly; unless it be this, That the Mind is capable of under-

Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the Mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.

standing and assenting firmly to such Propositions. And thus all Mathematical Demonstrations, as well as first Principles, must be receiv'd as native Impressions on the Mind; which I fear they will scarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonstrate a Proposition, than assent to it when demonstrated. And few Mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the Diagrams they have drawn, were but Copies of those Innate Characters which Nature had ingraven upon their Minds.

The Argument of Assenting on first hearing, is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching.

§. 23. There is, I fear, this farther weakness in the foregoing Argument, which would persuade us, that therefore those Maxims are to be thought Innate, which Men admit at first hearing, because they assent to Propositions which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any Argument or Demonstration, but a bare Explication or Understanding of the Terms. Under which there seems to me to lie this fallacy, That Men are supposed not to be taught, nor to learn any thing *de novo*; when in truth they are taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For first it is evident, they have learned the Terms and their Signification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquir'd Knowledge in the Case: The *Ideas* themselves, about which the Proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their Names, but got afterwards. So that in all Propositions that are assented to, at first hearing; the Terms of the Proposition, their standing for such *Ideas*, and the *Ideas* themselves that they stand for, being neither of them Innate; I would fain know what there is remaining in such Propositions that is Innate. For I would gladly have any one name that Proposition, whose Terms or *Ideas* were either of them Innate. We by degrees get *Ideas* and Names, and learn their appropriated Connexion one with another; and then to Propositions made in such Terms, whose Signification we have learnt, and wherein the Agreement or Disagreement we can perceive in our *Ideas*, when put together, is express'd, we at first hearing assent: tho' to other Propositions in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning *Ideas*, not so soon or so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of assenting. For tho' a Child quickly assents to this Proposition, *That an Apple is not Fire*, when by familiar Acquaintance, he has got the *Ideas* of those two different things distinctly imprinted on his Mind, and has learnt that the Names *Apple* and *Fire* stand for them; yet it will be some Years after, perhaps, before the same Child will assent to this Proposition; *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*. Because that tho', perhaps, the Words are as easy to be learnt; yet the Signification of them being more large, comprehensive, and abstract, than of the Names annex'd to those sensible Things the Child hath to do with; it is longer before he learns their precise meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his Mind those general *Ideas* they stand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any Child assent to a Proposition made up of such general Terms; but as soon as ever he has got those *Ideas*, and learnt their Names, he forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of the foremention'd Propositions: and with both for the same Reason, (*viz.*) because he finds the *Ideas* he has in his Mind to agree or disagree, according as the Words standing for them, are affirm'd, or denied one of another in the Proposition. But if Propositions be brought to him in Words, which stand for *Ideas* he has not yet in his Mind; to such Propositions, however evidently true or false in themselves, he affords neither assent nor dissent, but is ignorant. For Words being but empty Sounds any farther than they are signs of our *Ideas*, we cannot but assent to them, as they correspond to those *Ideas* we have, but no farther than that. But the shewing by what steps and ways Knowledge comes into our Minds, and the grounds of several degrees of Assent, being the business of the following Discourse, it may suffice to have only touch'd on it here, as one Reason, that made me doubt of those Innate Principles.

Not Innate, because not universally assented to.

§. 24. To conclude this Argument of *Universal Consent*, I agree with these Defenders of Innate Principles, that if they are *Innate*, they must needs have *universal Assent*. For that a Truth should be Innate and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a Man to know a Truth, and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then by these Mens own Confession, they cannot be Innate; since they are not assented to by those who understand not the Terms, nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard, nor thought

thought of those Propositions; which, I think, is at least one half of Mankind. But were the number far less, it would be enough to destroy *universal Assent*, and thereby shew these Propositions not to be Innate, if Children alone were ignorant of them.

§. 25. But that I may not be accused, to argue from the Thoughts of Infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude, from what passes in their Understandings, before they express it; I say next, that these two general Propositions are not the Truths that *first possess the Minds* of Children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious Notions; which if they were Innate, they must needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when Children begin to think; and their Words and Actions do assure us that they do so. When therefore they are capable of Thought, of Knowledge, of Assent, can it rationally be suppos'd, they can be ignorant of those Notions that Nature has imprinted, were there any such? Can it be imagin'd, with any appearance of Reason, that they perceive the Impressions from things without; and be at the same time ignorant of those Characters which Nature it self has taken care to stamp within? Can they receive and assent to adventitious Notion, and be ignorant of those which are suppos'd woven into the very Principles of their Being, and imprinted there in indelible Characters, to be the Foundation and Guide of all their acquir'd Knowledge, and future Reasonings? This would be to make Nature take pains to no purpose, or at least to write very ill; since its Characters could not be read by those Eyes which saw other things very well; and those are very ill supposed the clearest parts of Truth and the Foundations of all our Knowledge, which are not first known, and without which the undoubted Knowledge of several other Things may be had. The Child certainly knows that the *Nurse* that feeds it, is neither the *Cat* it plays with, nor the *Blackmoor* it is afraid of; that the *Wormseed* or *Mustard* it refuses, is not the *Apple* or *Sugar* it cries for; this it is certainly and undoubtedly assur'd of: But will any one say, it is by virtue of this Principle, that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, that it so firmly assents to these, and other parts of its Knowledge? Or that the Child has any Notion or Apprehension of that Proposition at an Age, wherein yet 'tis plain, it knows a great many other Truths? He that will say, Children join these general abstract Speculations with their *Sneaking-Bottles* and their *Rattles*, may, perhaps with justice, be thought to have more Passion and Zeal for his Opinion, but less Sincerity and Truth than one of that Age.

§. 26. Tho' therefore there be several general Propositions, that meet with constant and ready Assent, as soon as propos'd to Men grown up, who have attained the use of more general and abstract *Ideas*, and Names standing for them; yet they not being to be found in those of tender Years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to universal Assent of intelligent Persons, and so by no means can be suppos'd Innate; it being impossible that any Truth which is Innate (if there were any such) should be unknown, at least to any one who knows any thing else. Since, if they are Innate Truths, they must be Innate Thoughts; there being nothing a Truth in the Mind that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any Innate Truths, they must necessarily be the first of any thought on, the first that appear there.

§. 27. That the general Maxims we are discoursing of are not known to Children, Idiots, and a great part of Mankind, we have already sufficiently proved; whereby it is evident they have not an universal Assent, nor are general Impressions. But there is this farther Argument in it against their being Innate; that these Characters, if they were native and original Impressions, should appear fairest and clearest in those Persons in whom, yet we find no foot-steps of them: And 'tis, in my Opinion, a strong Presumption that they are not Innate, since they are least known to those, in whom, if they were Innate, they must needs exert themselves with most Force and Vigour. For Children, Idiots, Savages, and illiterate People, being of all others the least corrupted by Custom or borrow'd Opinions; Learning and Education having not cast their native Thoughts into new Moulds, nor by super-inducing foreign and studied Doctrines, confounded those fair Characters Nature had written there: one might reasonably imagine, that in their Minds these Innate Notions should lie open fairly to every one's

view, as 'tis certain the Thoughts of Children do. It might very well be expected, that these Principles should be perfectly known to Naturals; which being stamp'd immediately on the Soul (as these Men suppose) can have no dependence on the Constitutions, or Organs of the Body, the only confess'd difference between them and others. One would think, according to these Mens Principles, That all these native Beams of Light (were there any such) should in those who have no Reserves, no Arts of Concealment, shine out in their full lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of Pleasure, and abhorrence of Pain. But alas! amongst *Children*, *Idiots*, *Savages*, and the grossly *Illiterate*, what general Maxims are to be found? What universal Principles of Knowledge? Their Notions are few and narrow, borrow'd only from those Objects they have had most to do with, and which have made upon their Senses the frequentest and strongest Impressions. A Child knows his Nurse and his Cradle, and by degrees the Play-things of a little more advanc'd Age: And a young Savage has, perhaps, his Head fill'd with Love and Hunting, according to the fashion of his Tribe. But he that from a Child untaught, or a wild Inhabitant of the Woods, will expect these abstract Maxims and reputed Principles of Sciences; will, I fear, find himself mistaken. Such kind of general Propositions are seldom mention'd in the Huts of *Indians*, much less are they to be found in the Thoughts of *Children*, or any Impressions of them on the Minds of *Naturals*. They are the Language and Business of the Schools and Academies of learned Nations, accusom'd to that sort of Conversation or Learning, where Disputes are frequent: these Maxims being suited to artificial Argumentation, and useful for Conviction; but not much conducing to the discovery of Truth, or advancement of Knowledge. But of their small use for the improvement of Knowledge, I shall have occasion to speak more at large, *l. 4. c. 7.*

Recapitulati-
on.

§. 28. I know not how absurd this may seem to the Masters of Demonstration: And probably, it will hardly down with any body at first hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with Prejudice, and the forbearance of Censure, till I have been heard out in the Sequel of this Discourse, being very willing to submit to better Judgments. And since I impartially search after Truth, I shall not be sorry to be convinc'd that I have been too fond of my own Notions: which I confess we are all apt to be, when Application and Study have warm'd our Heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground, to think these two famed speculative Maxims Innate, since they are not universally assented to; and the Assent they so generally find, is no other than what several Propositions, not allow'd to be Innate, equally partake in with them: And since the Assent that is given them is produc'd another way, and comes not from natural Inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following Discourse. And if *these first Principles of Knowledge and Science are found not to be Innate, no other speculative Maxims can (I suppose) with better Right pretend to be so.*

C H A P. III.

No Innate Practical Principles:

No moral
Principles so
clear and so
generally re-
ceiv'd, as the
fore-menti-
on'd specula-
tive Maxims.

§. 1. IF those speculative Maxims, whereof we discours'd in the foregoing Chapter, have not an actual universal Assent from all Mankind, as we there prov'd, it is much more visible concerning *Practical Principles*, that they come short of an universal Reception: And I think it will be hard to instance any one moral Rule, which can pretend to so general and ready an Assent, as, *What is, is*; or to be so manifest a Truth as this, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be.* Whereby it is evident, that they are farther remov'd from a title to be Innate: and the doubt of their being native Impressions on the Mind, is stronger against these moral Principles than the other. Not that it brings their truth at all in question. They are equally true, tho' not equally evident. Those speculative Maxims carry their own Evidence with them: But moral

moral Principles require Reasoning and Discourse, and some Exercise of the Mind, to discover the Certainty of their Truth. They lie not open as natural Characters engraven on the Mind; which, if any such were, they must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own light be certain and known to every body. But this is no derogation to their Truth and Certainty, no more than it is to the Truth or Certainty of the three Angles of a Triangle being equal to two right ones; because it is not so evident, as, *The Whole is bigger than a Part*; nor so apt to be assented to at first hearing. It may suffice, that these moral Rules are capable of Demonstration: And therefore it is our own fault, if we come not to a certain knowledge of them. But the Ignorance wherein many Men are of them, and the Slowness of Assent wherewith others receive them, are manifest proofs, that they are not Innate, and such as offer themselves to their view without searching.

§. 2. Whether there be any such moral Principles, wherein all Men do agree, I appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the History of Mankind, and look'd abroad beyond the Smoak of their own Chimneys. Where is that practical Truth, that is universally receiv'd without doubt or question, as it must be if Innate? *Justice*, and keeping of Contracts, is that which *most Men seem to agree in*. This is a Principle, which is thought to extend it self to the Dens of Thieves, and the Confederacies of the greatest Villains; and they who have gone farthest towards the putting off of Humanity it self, keep Faith and Rules of Justice one with another. I grant that Out-laws themselves do this one amongst another; but 'tis without receiving these as the Innate Laws of Nature. They practise them as Rules of Convenience within their own Communities: But it is impossible to conceive, that he embraces Justice as a practical Principle, who acts fairly with his Fellow-Highway-men; and at the same time plunders or kills the next honest Man he meets with. Justice and Truth are the common Ties of Society; and therefore, even Out-laws, and Robbers, who break with all the World besides, must keep Faith and Rules of Equity amongst themselves, or else they cannot hold together. But will any one say, That those that live by Fraud and Rapine, have Innate Principles of Truth and Justice, which they allow and assent to?

§. 3. Perhaps it will be urg'd, That the *tacit Assent of their Minds agrees to* *Object. Tho' what their Practice contradicts*. I answer, *First*, I have always thought the Actions of Men the best Interpreters of their Thoughts. But since it is certain, that most Mens Practice, and some Mens open Professions, have either question'd or deny'd these Principles, it is impossible to establish an Universal Consent (tho' we should look for it only amongst grown Men) without which, it is impossible to conclude them Innate. *Secondly*, 'Tis very strange and unreasonable, to suppose Innate Practical Principles, that terminate only in Contemplation. Practical Principles deriv'd from Nature, are there for Operation, and must produce Conformity of Action, not barely speculative Assent to their Truth; or else they are in vain distinguish'd from speculative Maxims. Nature, I confess, has put into Man a Desire of Happiness, and an Aversion to Misery: These indeed are Innate Practical Principles, which (as Practical Principles ought) do continue constantly to operate and influence all our Actions, without ceasing. These may be observ'd in all Persons and all Ages, steady and universal; but these are Inclinations of the Appetite to good, not Impressions of Truth on the Understanding. I deny not, that there are natural Tendencies imprinted on the Minds of Men; and that, from the very first instances of Sense and Perception, there are some things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; some things that they incline to, and others that they fly: But this makes nothing for Innate Characters on the Mind, which are to be the Principles of Knowledge, regulating our Practice. Such natural Impressions on the Understanding, are so far from being confirm'd hereby, that this is an argument against them; since if there were certain Characters imprinted by Nature on the Understanding, as the Principles of Knowledge, we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us, and influence our Knowledge, as we do those others on the Will and Appetite; which never cease to be the constant Springs and Motives of all our Actions, to which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us.

Moral Rules
need a Proof,
ergo not In-
nate.

§. 4. Another Reason that makes me doubt of any Innate Practical Principles, is, That I think *there cannot any one moral Rule be propos'd, whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason*: Which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd, if they were Innate, or so much as self-evident; which every Innate Principle must needs be, and not need any Proof to ascertain its Truth, nor want any Reason to gain it Approbation. He would be thought void of common Sense, who ask'd on the one side, or on the other side went to give a Reason, *Why it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*. It carries its own Light and Evidence with it, and needs no other proof: He that understands the Terms, assents to it for its own sake, or else nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But should that most unshaken Rule of Morality, and Foundation of all social Virtue, *That one should do as he would be done unto*, be propos'd to one who never heard before, but yet is of capacity to understand its meaning; might he not without any absurdity ask a reason why? And were not he that propos'd it, bound to make out the Truth and Reasonableness of it to him? Which plainly shews it not to be Innate: for if it were, it could neither want nor receive any proof; but must needs (at least, as soon as heard and understood) be receiv'd and assented to, as an unquestionable Truth, which a Man can by no means doubt of. So that the Truth of all these moral Rules plainly depends upon some other antecedent to them, and from which they must be deduc'd; which could not be, if either they were Innate, or so much as self-evident.

Instance in
keeping Com-
pacts.

§. 5. That Men should keep their Compacts, is certainly a great and undeniable Rule in Morality: But yet, if a Christian; who has the view of Happiness and Misery in another Life, be ask'd why a Man must keep his Word, he will give this as a Reason; Because God, who has the power of eternal Life and Death, requires it of us. But if an *Hobbist* be ask'd why, he will answer, Because the Publick requires it, and the *Leviathan* will punish you, if you do not. And if one of the old *Heathen* Philosophers had been ask'd, he would have answer'd; Because it was dishonest, below the Dignity of a Man, and opposite to Vertue, the highest Perfection of human Nature, to do otherwise.

Vertue gene-
rally approv'd,
not because
Innate, but
because profi-
table.

§. 6. Hence naturally flows the great variety of Opinions concerning moral Rules which are to be found amongst Men, according to the different sorts of Happiness they have a prospect of, or propose to themselves: Which could not be, if practical Principles were Innate, and imprinted in our Minds immediately by the hand of God. I grant the Existence of God is so many ways manifest, and the Obedience we owe him so congruous to the Light of Reason, that a great part of Mankind give testimony to the Law of Nature: But yet I think it must be allow'd, That several moral Rules may receive from Mankind a very general Approbation, without either knowing or admitting the true ground of Morality; which can only be the Will and Law of a God, who sees Men in the dark, has in his hand Rewards and Punishments, and power enough to call to account the proudest Offender. For God having, by an inseparable Connexion, join'd Vertue and Publick Happiness together, and made the practice thereof necessary to the preservation of Society, and visibly *beneficial* to all with whom the Vertuous Man has to do; it is no wonder, that every one should not only allow, but recommend and magnify those Rules to others, from whose observance of them he is sure to reap advantage to himself. He may, out of interest, as well as conviction, cry up that for sacred; which if once trampled on and profan'd, he himself cannot be safe nor secure. This, tho' it takes nothing from the moral and eternal Obligation which these Rules evidently have, yet it shews that the outward acknowledgment Men pay to them in their words, proves not that they are Innate Principles; nay, it proves not so much, as that Men assent to them inwardly in their own Minds, as the inviolable Rules of their own Practice: since we find that Self-Interest and the Conveniences of this Life make many Men own an outward Profession and Approbation of them, whose Actions sufficiently prove, that they very little consider the Law-giver that prescrib'd these Rules, nor the Hell he has ordain'd for the Punishment of those that transgress them.

§. 7. For if we will not in civility allow too much Sincerity to the Professions of most Men, but think their Actions to be the Interpreters of their Thoughts,

we shall find, that they have no such internal Veneration for these Rules, nor so full a Persuasion of their Certainty and Obligation. The great Principle of Morality, *To do as one would be done to*, is more commended than practis'd; but the Breach of this Rule cannot be a greater Vice than to teach others, that it is no moral Rule, nor obligatory, would be thought Madness, and contrary to that Interest Men sacrifice to, when they break it themselves. Perhaps Conscience will be urg'd as checking us for such Breaches, and so the internal Obligation and Establishment of the Rule be preserv'd.

Mens Actions convince us, that the Rule of Vertue is not their internal Principle.

§. 8. To which I answer, That I doubt not but, without being written on their Hearts, many Men may, by the same way that they come to the knowledge of other things, come to assent to several moral Rules, and be convinc'd of their Obligation. Others also may come to be of the same mind, from their Education, Company, and Customs of their Country; which Persuasion, however got, will serve to set Conscience on work, which is nothing else but our own Opinion or Judgment of the moral Rectitude or Pravity of our own Actions. And if Conscience be a proof of innate Principles, Contraries may be innate Principles; since ~~some~~ Men, with the same bent of Conscience, prosecute what others avoid.

Conscience no Proof of any innate moral Rules.

§. 9. But I cannot see how any Men should ever transgress those Moral Rules with Confidence and Serenity, were they innate, and stamp'd upon their Minds. View but an Army at the sacking of a Town, and see what Observation, or sense of Moral Principles, or what touch of Conscience for all the Outrages they do. *Robberies, Murders, Rapes*, are the Sports of Men set at liberty from Punishment and Censure. Have there not been whole Nations, and those of the most civiliz'd People, amongst whom the exposing their Children, and leaving them in the Fields to perish by Want or Wild Beasts, has been the practice, as little condemn'd or scrupled as the begetting them? Do they not still, in some Countries, put them into the same Graves with their Mothers, if they die in Child-birth; or dispatch them, if a pretended Astrologer declares them to have unhappy Stars? And are there not places where, at a certain Age, they kill or expose their Parents without any remorse at all? In a Part of *Asia* the Sick, when their Case comes to be thought desperate, are carry'd out, and laid on the Earth before they are dead, and left there, expos'd to Wind and Weather, to perish without Assistance or Pity. (a) It is familiar among the *Mengrelians*, a People professing Christianity, to bury their Children alive without scruple. (b) There are places where they eat their own Children. (c) The *Caribbes* were wont to geld their Children, on purpose to fat and eat them. (d) And *Garcilasso de la Vega* tells us of a People in *Peru*, which were wont to fat and eat the Children they got on their Female Captives, whom they kept as Concubines for that purpose; and when they were past breeding, the Mothers themselves were kill'd too and eaten. (e) The *Vertues* whereby the *Toucupinambos* believ'd they merited Paradise, were Revenge, and eating abundance of their Enemies. (f) They have not so much as a Name for God, and have no Religion, no Worship. The Saints, who are canoniz'd amongst the *Turks*, lead Lives, which one cannot with Modesty relate. A remarkable Passage to this purpose, out of the Voyage of *Baumgarten*, which is a Book not every day to be met with, I shall set down at large in the Language it is publish'd in. *Ibi* (sc. prope *Belbes in Aegypto*) *vidimus sanctum unum Saracenicum inter arenarum cumules, ita ut ex utero matris prodiit nudum sedentem. Mos est, ut didicimus, Mahometistis, ut eos qui amentes & sine ratione sunt, pro sanctis colant & venerentur. Insuper & eos qui cum diu vitam egerint inquinatissimam, voluntariam demum poenitentiam & paupertatem, sanctitate venerandos deputant. Ejusmodi verò genus hominum libertatem quandam effranem habent, domos quas volunt intrandi, edendi, bibendi, & quod majus est, concumbendi; ex quo concubitu, si proles secuta fuerit, sancta similiter habetur. His ergo hominibus, dum vivunt, magnos exhibent honores; mortuis verò vel templa vel monumenta extruunt amplissima, eosque contingere ac sepelire maxima fortunæ ducunt loco. Audivimus hæc dicta & dicenda per interpretem à Mureto nostro. Insuper sanctum illum, quem eo loci vidimus, publicitus apprimè commendari, eum esse Hominem sanctum, divinum ac integritatè præcipuum; eo quod, nec foeminarum unquam esset, nec puerorum, sed tantum modo asellarum concubitor atque mularum.* Peregr. Baumgarten, l. 2. c. 1. p. 73. More of the same kind, concerning

Instances of Enormities practis'd without remorse.

- (a) Gruber apud Thevenot, Part 4. p. 13.
- (b) Lambert apud Thevenot, p. 38.
- (c) Vossius de Nili Origine, c. 18, 19.
- (d) P. Mart. Dec. 1.
- (e) Hist. des Incas, l. 1. c. 12.
- (f) Lery, c. 16, 216, 231.

concerning these precious Saints amongst the *Turks*, may be seen in *Pietro della Valle*, in his Letter of the 25th of *January*, 1616. Where then are those innate Principles of Justice, Piety, Gratitude, Equity, Chastity? Or where is that universal Consent, that assures us there are such inbred Rules? Murders in Duels, when Fashion has made them honourable, are committed without remorse of Conscience; nay, in many places, Innocence in this case is the greatest Ignominy. And if we look abroad, to take a View of Men, as they are, we shall find that they have remorse in one place for doing or omitting that, which others, in another place, think they merit by.

Men have contrary practical Principles.

§. 10. He that will carefully peruse the History of Mankind, and look abroad into the several Tribes of Men, and with Indifferency survey their Actions, will be able to satisfy himself, that there is scarce that Principle of Morality to be nam'd, or Rule of *Vertue* to be thought on (those only excepted, that are absolutely necessary to hold Society together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct Societies) which is not, somewhere or other slighted and condemn'd by the general Fashion of *whole Societies* of Men, govern'd by practical Opinions, and Rules of Living quite opposite to others.

Whole Nations reject several moral Rules.

§. 11. Here perhaps 'twill be objected, that it is no Argument that the Rule is not known, because it is broken. I grant the Objection good, where Men, tho' they transgress, yet disown not the Law; where fear of Shame, Censure or Punishment carries the Mark of some Awe it has upon them. But it is impossible to conceive, that a *whole Nation* of Men should all publicly reject and renounce what every one of them, certainly and infallibly, knew to be a Law; for so they must, who have it naturally imprinted on their Minds. 'Tis possible Men may sometimes own Rules of Morality, which in their private Thoughts they do not believe to be true, only to keep themselves in Reputation and Esteem amongst those who are persuaded of their Obligation. But 'tis not to be imagin'd that a whole Society of Men should publicly and professedly disown, and cast off a Rule, which they could not in their own Minds but be infallibly certain was a Law; nor be ignorant that all Men they should have to do with, knew it to be such: And therefore must every one of them apprehend from others, all the Contempt and Abhorrence due to one, who professes himself void of Humanity; and one, who confounding the known and natural Measures of Right and Wrong, cannot but be look'd on as the profess'd Enemy of their Peace and Happiness. Whatever practical Principle is innate, cannot but be known to every one to be just and good. It is therefore little less than a Contradiction to suppose, that whole Nations of Men should, both in their Professions and Practice, unanimously and universally give the Lye to what, by the most invincible Evidence, every one of them knew to be true, right and good. This is enough to satisfy us, that no practical Rule, which is any where universally, and with publick Approbation or Allowance transgress'd, can be suppos'd innate. But I have something farther to add in answer to this Objection.

§. 12. The breaking of a Rule, say you, is no Argument that it is unknown. I grant it: But the generally allow'd Breach of it any where, I say, is a Proof that it is not innate. For example; let us take any of these Rules, which being the most obvious Deductions of human Reason, and conformable to the natural Inclination of the greatest part of Men, fewest People have had the impudence to deny, or inconsideration to doubt of. If any can be thought to be naturally imprinted, none, I think, can have a fairer Pretence to be innate than this; *Parents, preserve and cherish your Children*. When therefore you say, that this is an innate Rule, what do you mean? Either that it is an innate Principle, which, upon all occasions, excites and directs the Actions of all Men; or else, that it is a Truth, which all Men have imprinted on their Minds, and which therefore they know and assent to: but in neither of these Senses is it innate. First, That it is not a Principle, which influences all Mens Actions, is what I have prov'd by the Examples before-cited; nor need we seek so far as *Mingrelia* or *Peru*, to find Instances of such as neglect, abuse, nay and destroy their Children; or look on it only as the more than Brutality of some savage and barbarous Nations, when we remember that it was a familiar and uncondemn'd Practice amongst the *Greeks* and *Romans*, to expose, without pity or remorse, their

their innocent Infants. *Secondly*, That it is an innate Truth, known to all Men, is also false: For *Parents, preserve your Children*, is so far from an innate Truth, that it is no Truth at all; it being a Command, and not a Proposition, and so not capable of Truth or Falshood. To make it capable of being assented to as true, it must be reduc'd to some such Proposition as this; *It is the Duty of Parents to preserve their Children*. But what Duty is, cannot be understood without a Law; nor a Law be known or suppos'd without a Law-maker, or without Reward and Punishment: So that it is impossible that this, or any other practical Principle should be innate, *i. e.* be imprinted on the Mind as a Duty, without supposing the *Ideas* of God, of Law, of Obligation, of Punishment, of a Life after this, innate: For that Punishment follows not, in this Life, the Breach of this Rule, and consequently that it has not the force of a Law in Countries, where the generally allow'd Practice runs counter to it, is in it self evident. But these *Ideas* (which must be all of them innate, if any thing as a Duty be so) are so far from being innate, that 'tis not every studious or thinking Man, much less every one that is born, in whom they are to be found clear and distinct: And that one of them, which of all others seems most likely to be innate, is not so, (I mean the *Idea* of God) I think, in the next Chapter, will appear very evident to any considering Man.

§. 13. From what has been said, I think we may safely conclude, That *whatever practical Rule is; in any place, generally, and with Allowance broken, cannot be suppos'd innate*; it being impossible that Men should, without shame or fear, confidently and serenely break a Rule, which they could not but evidently know that God had set up, and would certainly punish the breach of (which they must, if it were innate) to a degree to make it a very ill Bargain to the Transgressor. Without such a Knowledge as this, a Man can never be certain that any thing is his Duty. Ignorance or Doubt of the Law, Hopes to escape the Knowledge or Power of the Law-maker, or the like, may make Men give way to a present Appetite: But let any one see the Fault, and the Rod by it, and with the Transgression a Fire ready to punish it; a Pleasure tempting, and the Hand of the Almighty visibly held up, and prepar'd to take Vengeance (for this must be the Case where any Duty is imprinted on the Mind) and then tell me, whether it be possible for People with such a Prospect, such a certain Knowledge as this, wantonly, and without scruple, to offend against a Law which they carry about them in indelible Characters, and that stares them in the face whilst they are breaking it? Whether Men, at the same time that they feel in themselves the imprinted Edicts of an Omnipotent Law-maker, can, with Assurance and Gaiety, slight and trample under foot his most sacred Injunctions? And lastly, whether it be possible, that whilst a Man thus openly bids defiance to this innate Law and supreme Law-giver, all the By-standers, yea even the Governors and Rulers of the People, full of the same sense both of the Law and Law-maker, should silently connive, without testifying their dislike, or laying the least blame on it? Principles of Actions indeed there are lodg'd in Mens Appetites, but these are so far from being innate moral Principles, that if they were left to their full Swing, they would carry Men to the over-turning of all Morality. Moral Laws are set as a Curb and Restraint to these exorbitant Desires, which they cannot be but by Rewards and Punishments, that will over-balance the satisfaction any one shall propose to himself in the breach of the Law. If therefore any thing be imprinted on the Minds of all Men as a Law, all Men must have a certain and unavoidable Knowledge, that certain and unavoidable Punishment will attend the breach of it: For if Men can be ignorant or doubtful of what is innate, innate Principles are insisted on and urg'd to no purpose. Truth and Certainty (the things pretended) are not at all secur'd by them; but Men are in the same uncertain floating Estate with, as without them. An evident indubitable Knowledge of unavoidable Punishment, great enough to make the Transgression very uneligible, must accompany an innate Law; unless with an innate Law, they can suppose an innate Gospel too. I would not here be mistaken, as if, because I deny an innate Law, I thought there were none but positive Laws. There is a great deal of difference between an innate Law, and a Law of Nature: between something imprinted on our Minds in their very Original, and something that we being ignorant of may attain to the knowledge of,

by the use and due application of our natural Faculties. And I think they equally forsake the Truth, who running into the contrary Extremes, either affirm an innate Law, or deny that there is a Law knowable by the Light of Nature, i. e. without the help of positive Revelation.

Those who maintain innate practical Principles, tell us not what they are.

§. 14. The difference there is amongst Men in their practical Principles, is so evident, that, I think, I need say no more to evince, that it will be impossible to find any innate moral Rules by this mark of general Assent: And 'tis enough to make one suspect, that the Supposition of such innate Principles, is but an Opinion taken up at pleasure; since those who talk so confidently of them, are so sparing to tell us which they are. This might with justice be expected from those Men who lay stress upon this Opinion: And it gives occasion to distrust either their Knowledge or Charity, who declaring, that God has imprinted on the Minds of Men the Foundations of Knowledge, and the Rules of Living, are yet so little favourable to the Information of their Neighbours, or the Quiet of Mankind, as not to point out to them which they are, in the variety Men are distracted with. But, in truth, were there any such innate Principles, there would be no need to teach them. Did Men find such innate Propositions stamp'd on their Minds, they would easily be able to distinguish them from other Truths, that they afterwards learn'd and deduc'd from them; and there would be nothing more easy than to know what, and how many they were. There could be no more doubt about their Number, than there is about the Number of our Fingers; and 'tis like then every System would be ready to give them us by Tale. But since no body that I know has ventur'd yet to give a Catalogue of them, they cannot blame those who doubt of these innate Principles; since even they, who require Men to believe that there are such innate Propositions, do not tell us what they are. 'Tis easy to foresee, that if different Men of different Sects should go about to give us a List of those innate practical Principles, they would set down only such as suited their distinct Hypotheses, and were fit to support the Doctrines of their particular Schools or Churches; a plain Evidence that there are no such innate Truths. Nay, a great part of Men are so far from finding any such innate moral Principles in themselves, that by denying freedom to Mankind, and thereby making Men no other than bare Machines, they take away not only innate, but all moral Rules whatsoever, and leave not a possibility to believe any such, to those who cannot conceive how any thing can be capable of a Law, that is not a free Agent: And upon that Ground they must necessarily reject all Principles of Vertue, who cannot put Morality and Mechanism together, which are not very easy to be reconcil'd, or made consistent.

Lord Herbert's innate Principles examin'd.

§. 15. When I had writ this, being inform'd that my Lord Herbert had, in his Books *de Veritate*, assign'd these innate Principles, I presently consulted him, hoping to find, in a Man of so great Parts, something that might satisfy me in this Point, and put an end to my Inquiry. In his Chapter *de instinctu Naturali*, p. 76. Edit. 1656. I met with these six Marks of his *Notitia Communes*. 1. *Prioritas*. 2. *Independentia*. 3. *Universalitas*. 4. *Certitudo*. 5. *Necessitas*; i. e. as he explains it, *faciunt ad hominis conservationem*. 6. *Modus conformationis*, i. e. *Assensus nullâ interpositâ morâ*. And at the latter End of his little Treatise *De Religione Laici*, he says this of these innate Principles, *Adeo ut non uniuscujusvis Religionis confinio arctentur quæ ubique vigent veritates. Sunt enim in ipsa mente cœlitus descriptæ nullisque traditionibus, sive scriptis, sive non scriptis, obnoxia*, p. 3. And *Veritates nostræ Catholicæ, quæ tanquam indubia Dei effata in foro interiori descriptæ*. Thus having given the Marks of the innate Principles or common Notions, and asserted their being imprinted on the Minds of Men by the hand of God, he proceeds to set them down, and they are these: 1. *Esse aliquod supremum Numen*. 2. *Numen illud coli debere*. 3. *Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimam esse rationem cultûs divini*. 4. *Respicendum esse à peccatis*. 5. *Dari præmium vel pœnam post hanc vitam transactam*. Tho' I allow these to be clear Truths, and such as, if rightly explain'd, a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving his Assent to; yet I think he is far from proving them innate Impressions, in *Foro interiori descriptæ*. For I must take leave to observe,

§. 16. First, That these five Propositions are either not all, or more than all, those common Notions writ on our Minds by the finger of God, if it were reasonable

sonable to believe any at all to be so written: Since there are other Propositions, which even by his own Rules have as just a pretence to such an Original, and may be as well admitted for Innate Principles, as at least some of these five he enumerates, viz. *Do as thou wouldst be done unto*; and perhaps some hundreds of others, when well consider'd.

§. 17. Secondly, That all his Marks are not to be found in each of his five Propositions, viz. his first, second, and third Marks agree perfectly to neither of them; and the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth Marks agree but ill to his third, fourth and fifth Propositions. For, besides that we are assur'd from History, of many Men, nay whole Nations, who doubt or disbelieve some or all of them; I cannot see how the third, viz. *That Vertue join'd with Piety is the best Worship of God*, can be an Innate Principle, when the name or sound, *Vertue*, is so hard to be understood; liable to so much uncertainty in its signification; and the thing it stands for, so much contended about, and difficult to be known. And therefore this can be but a very uncertain Rule of human Practice, and serve but very little to the conduct of our Lives, and is therefore very unfit to be assign'd as an Innate practical Principle.

§. 18. For let us consider this Proposition as to its meaning (for it is the Sense, and not Sound, that is, and must be the Principle or common Notion) viz. *Vertue is the best Worship of God*, i. e. is most acceptable to him; which if *Vertue* be taken, as most commonly it is, for those Actions, which, according to the different Opinions of several Countries, are accounted laudable, will be a Proposition so far from being certain, that it will not be true. If *Vertue* be taken for Actions conformable to God's Will, or to the Rule prescrib'd by God, which is the true and only measure of Vertue, when Vertue is us'd to signify what is in its own nature right and good; then this Proposition, *That Vertue is the best Worship of God*, will be most true and certain, but of very little use in human Life: since it will amount to no more but this, viz. *That God is pleas'd with the doing of what he commands*; which a Man may certainly know to be true, without knowing what it is that God doth command; and so be as far from any Rule or Principles of his Actions, as he was before: and I think very few will take a Proposition which amounts to no more than this, viz. *That God is pleas'd with the doing of what he himself commands*, for an innate moral Principle writ on the Minds of all Men (however true and certain it may be) since it teaches so little. Whosoever does so, will have reason to think hundreds of Propositions Innate Principles; since there are many, which have as good a Title as this, to be receiv'd for such, which no body yet ever put into that rank of Innate Principles.

§. 19. Nor is the fourth Proposition, (viz.) *Men must repent of their Sins*, much more instructive, till what those Actions are, that are meant by Sins, be set down: For the word *Peccata*, or *Sins*, being put, as it usually is, to signify in general ill Actions, that will draw Punishment upon the Doers; what great Principle of Morality can that be, to tell us we should be sorry, and cease to do that, which will bring mischief upon us, without knowing what those particular Actions are that will do so? Indeed, this is a very true Proposition, and fit to be inculcated on, and receiv'd by those who are suppos'd to have been taught what Actions in all kinds are *Sins*: but neither this nor the former can be imagin'd to be Innate Principles; nor to be of any use, if they were Innate, unless the particular measures and bounds of all Vertues and Vices, were engraven in mens Minds, and were Innate Principles also, which, I think, is very much to be doubted. And therefore, I imagine, it will scarce seem possible, that God should engrave Principles in mens Minds, in words of uncertain Signification, such as *Vertues* and *Sins*, which amongst different Men stand for different things: Nay, it cannot be suppos'd to be in words at all, which, being in most of these Principles very general Names, cannot be understood, but by knowing the Particulars comprehended under them. And in the practical Instances, the measures must be taken from the knowledge of the Actions themselves, and the Rules of them abstracted from Words, and antecedent to the knowledge of Names; which Rules a Man must know, what Language soever he chance to learn, whether *English* or *Japan*, or if he should learn no Language at all, or never should understand the use of Words, as happens in the

case of dumb and deaf Men. When it shall be made out, that Men ignorant of Words, or untaught by the Laws and Customs of their Country, know that it is part of the Worship of God, Not to kill another Man; Not to know more Women than one; Not to procure Abortion; Not to expose their Children; Not to take from another what is his, tho' we want it our selves, but on the contrary, relieve and supply his Wants; and whenever we have done the contrary, we ought to repent, be sorry, and resolve to do so no more: When, I say, all Men shall be prov'd actually to know, and allow all these and a thousand other such Rules, all which come under these two general Words made use of above, *viz. Virtutes & Peccata, Vertues and Sins*; there will be more reason for admitting these and the like for common Notions, and practical Principles. Yet after all, universal Consent (were there any in moral Principles) to Truths, the knowledg whereof may be attain'd otherwise, would scarce prove them to be Innate; which is all I contend for.

Obj. Innate Principles may be corrupted, answered.

§. 20. Nor will it be of much moment here to offer that very ready, but not very material Answer, (*viz.*) That the Innate Principles of Morality, may, by Education, and Custom, and the general Opinion of those, amongst whom we converse, be darken'd, and at last quite worn out of the Minds of Men. Which Assertion of theirs, if true, quite takes away the Argument of universal Consent, by which this Opinion of Innate Principles is endeavour'd to be prov'd; unless those Men will think it reasonable, that their private Persuasions, or that of their Party should pass for universal Consent; a thing not unfrequently done, when Men, presuming themselves to be the only Masters of right Reason, cast by the Votes and Opinions of the rest of Mankind, as not worthy the reckoning. And then their Argument stands thus: The Principles which all Mankind allow for true, are Innate; those that Men of right Reason admit, are the Principles allow'd by all Mankind: we and those of our mind are Men of reason; therefore we agreeing, our Principles are Innate: which is a very pretty way of arguing, and a short cut to Infallibility. For otherwise it will be very hard to understand, how there be some Principles, which all Men do acknowledg, and agree in; and yet there are none of those Principles, which are not by deprav'd Custom and ill Education, blotted out of the Minds of many Men; which is to say, That all Men admit, but yet many Men do deny, and dissent from them. And indeed the Supposition of such first Principles will serve us to very little purpose; and we shall be as much at a loss with, as without them, if they may by any human Power, such as is the Will of our Teachers or Opinions of our Companions, be alter'd or lost in us: And notwithstanding all this boast of first Principles, and Innate Light, we shall be as much in the dark and uncertainty, as if there were no such thing at all; it being all one to have no Rule, and one that will warp any way; or amongst various and contrary Rules, not to know which is the right. But concerning Innate Principles, I desire these Men to say, whether they can, or cannot, by Education and Custom, be blurr'd and blotted out: If they cannot, we must find them in all Mankind alike, and they must be clear in every body: And if they may suffer variation from adventitious Notions, we must then find them clearest and most perspicuous, nearest the Fountain, in Children and illiterate People, who have receiv'd least impression from foreign Opinions. Let them take which side they please, they will certainly find it inconsistent with visible matter of fact, and daily observation.

Contrary Principles in the World.

§. 21. I easily grant, that there are great numbers of Opinions, which, by Men of different Countries, Educations and Tempers, are receiv'd and embrac'd as first and unquestionable Principles; many whereof, both for their Absurdity, as well as Oppositions one to another, it is impossible should be true. But yet all those Propositions, how remote soever from Reason, are so sacred somewhere or other, that Men, even of good Understanding in other matters, will sooner part with their Lives, and whatever is dearest to them, than suffer themselves to doubt, or others to question the truth of them.

How Men commonly come by their Principles.

§. 22. This, however strange it may seem, is that which every day's experience confirms; and will not, perhaps, appear so wonderful, if we consider the Ways and Steps by which it is brought about; and how really it may come to pass, that Doctrines, that have been deriv'd from no better Original than the Superstition of a Nurse, or the Authority of an old Woman, may by length of

of time, and consent of Neighbours, grow up to the Dignity of Principles in Religion or Morality. For such, who are careful (as they call it) to principle Children well (and few there be who have not a set of those Principles for them, which they believe in) instil into the unwary, and as yet unprejudic'd Understanding (for white Paper receives any Characters) those Doctrines they would have them retain and profess. These being taught them as soon as they have any apprehension; and still as they grow up, confirm'd to them, either by the open Profession, or tacit Consent of all they have to do with; or at least by those of whose Wisdom, Knowledge and Piety, they have an Opinion, who never suffer those Propositions to be otherwise mention'd, but as the Basis and Foundation on which they build their Religion or Manners; come, by these means, to have the reputation of unquestionable, self-evident and innate Truths.

§. 23. To which we may add, That when *Men*, so instructed, are grown up, and reflect on their own Minds, they cannot find any thing more antient there than those Opinions which were taught them before their Memory began to keep a Register of their Actions, or date the time when any new thing appear'd to them; and therefore make no scruple to conclude, *That those Propositions, of whose Knowledge they can find in themselves no Original, were certainly the impress of God and Nature upon their Minds, and not taught them by any one else.* These they entertain and submit to, as many do to their Parents, with Veneration; not because it is natural; nor do Children do it, where they are not so taught; but because, having been always so educated, and having no remembrance of the beginning of this Respect, they think it is natural.

§. 24. This will appear very likely, and almost unavoidable to come to pass, if we consider the Nature of Mankind, and the Constitution of human Affairs; wherein *most Men cannot live without employing their time in the daily Labours of their Callings; nor be at quiet in their Minds, without some Foundation or Principles to rest their Thoughts on.* There is scarce any one so floating and superficial in his Understanding, who hath not some reverenc'd Propositions, which are to him the Principles on which he bottoms his Reasonings; and by which he judgeth of Truth and Falshood, Right and Wrong: which, some wanting skill and leisure, and others the inclination, and some being taught, that they ought not to examine; there are few to be found who are not expos'd by their Ignorance, Laziness, Education, or Preceptancy to take them upon trust.

§. 25. This is evidently the case of all Children and young Folk; and Custom, a greater Power than Nature, seldom failing to make them worship for Divine, what she hath inur'd them to bow their Minds, and submit their Understandings to, it is no wonder that grown *Men*, either perplex'd in the necessary Affairs of Life, or hot in the pursuit of Pleasures, should not seriously sit down to examine their own Tenets; especially when one of their Principles is, *That Principles ought not be question'd.* And had Men Leisure, Parts, and Will, who is there almost that dare shake the Foundations of all his past Thoughts and Actions, and endure to bring upon himself the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake and error? Who is there, hardy enough to contend with the reproach which is every where prepar'd for those who dare venture to dissent from the receiv'd Opinions of their Country or Party? And where is the Man to be found that can patiently prepare himself to bear the name of Whimsical, Sceptical, or Atheist, which he is sure to meet with, who does in the least scruple any of the common Opinions? And he will be much more afraid to question those Principles, when he shall think them, as most men do, the Standards set up by God in his Mind, to be the Rule and Touchstone of all other Opinions. And what can hinder him from thinking them Sacred, when he finds them the earliest of all his own Thoughts, and the most reverenc'd by others?

§. 26. It is easy to imagine how by these means it comes to pass, that *Men* worship the Idols that have been set up in their Minds; grow fond of the Notions they have been long acquainted with there; and stamp the Characters of Divinity upon Absurdities and Errors, become zealous Votaries to Bulls and Monkeys; and contend too, fight, and die in defence of their Opinion. *Dum solos credit habendos esse Deos, quos ipse colit.* For since the reasoning Faculties of the Soul;

Soul, which are almost constantly, tho' not always warily nor wisely employ'd, would not know how to move, for want of a foundation and footing, in most Men; who thro' Laziness or Avocation do not, or for want of time, or true helps, or for other causes, cannot penetrate into the Principles of Knowledge, and trace Truth to its Fountain and Original; 'tis natural for them, and almost unavoidable, to take up with some borrow'd Principles; which being reputed and presum'd to be the evident proofs of other things, are thought not to need any other proof themselves. Whoever shall receive any of these into his Mind, and entertain them there with the reverence usually paid to Principles, never venturing to examine them, but accustoming himself to believe them, because they are to be believ'd, may take up from his Education, and the Fashions of his Country, any Absurdity for innate Principles; and by long poring on the same Objects, so dim his Sight, as to take Monsters lodg'd in his own Brain, for the Images of the Deity, and the Workmanship of his Hands.

Principles
must be exam-
in'd.

§. 27. By this progress, how many there are who arrive at Principles, which they believe innate, may be easily observ'd, in the variety of opposite Principles held and contended for by all sorts and degrees of Men. And he that shall deny this to be the method, wherein most Men proceed to the assurance they have of the Truth and Evidence of their Principles, will perhaps find it a hard matter any other way to account for the contrary Tenets, which are firmly believ'd, confidently asserted, and which great numbers are ready at any time to seal with their Blood. And, indeed, if it be the privilege of innate Principles, to be receiv'd upon their own Authority, without examination, I know not what may not be believ'd, or how any one's Principles can be question'd. If they may, and ought to be examin'd, and try'd, I desire to know how first and innate Principles can be try'd; or at least it is reasonable to demand the Marks and Characters, whereby the genuine innate Principles may be distinguish'd from others; that so, amidst the great variety of Pretenders, I may be kept from mistakes, in so material a point as this. When this is done, I shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful Propositions; and till then I may with modesty doubt, since I fear universal Consent, which is the only one produc'd, will scarce prove a sufficient mark to direct my Choice, and assure me of any innate Principles. From what has been said, I think it past doubt, that there are no Practical Principles wherein all Men agree; and therefore none Innate.

CHAP. IV.

Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles, both Speculative and Practical.

Principles not
Innate, unless
their Ideas be
Innate.

§. 1. **H**AD those, who would persuade us that there are Innate Principles, not taken them together in gross, but consider'd separately the parts out of which those Propositions are made; they would not, perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were Innate: Since, if the Ideas which made up those Truths were not, it was impossible that the Propositions made up of them should be Innate, or our Knowledge of them be born with us. For if the Ideas be not Innate, there was a time when the Mind was without those Principles; and then they will not be Innate, but be deriv'd from some other Original. For, where the Ideas themselves are not, there can be no Knowledge, no Assent, no mental or verbal Propositions about them.

Ideas, especi-
ally those be-
longing to
Principles, not
born with
Children.

§. 2. If we will attentively consider new-born Children, we shall have little reason to think, that they bring many Ideas into the World with them. For bating perhaps some faint Ideas of Hunger, and Thirst, and Warmth, and some Pains which they may have felt in the Womb, there is not the least appearance of any settled Ideas at all in them; especially of Ideas, answering the Terms, which make up those universal Propositions, that are esteem'd Innate Principles. One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, Ideas come into their Minds; and

and that they get no more, nor no other, than what Experience; and the Observation of things that come in their way, furnish them with; which might be enough to satisfy us, that they are not original Characters, stamp'd on the Mind.

§. 3. *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, is certainly (if there be any such) an Innate Principle. But can any one think, or will any one say, that *Impossibility* and *Identity* are two Innate Ideas? Are they such as all Mankind have, and bring into the World with them? And are they those that are the first in Children, and antecedent to all acquir'd ones? If they are Innate, they must needs be so. Hath a Child an *Idea* of *Impossibility* and *Identity*, before it has of *White* or *Black*, *Sweet* or *Bitter*? And is it from the Knowledge of this Principle, that it concludes, that Wormwood rubb'd on the Nipple hath not the same taste that it used to receive from thence? Is it the actual Knowledge of *Impossibile est idem esse, & non esse*, that makes a Child distinguish between its Mother and a Stranger; or that makes it fond of the one, and fly the other? Or does the Mind regulate it self and its Assent by *Ideas*, that it never yet had? Or the Understanding draw Conclusions from Principles, which it never yet knew or understood? The names *Impossibility* and *Identity* stand for two *Ideas*, so far from being Innate, or born with us, that I think it requires great Care and Attention to form them right in our Understandings. They are so far from being brought into the World with us, so remote from the Thoughts of Infancy and Childhood; that, I believe, upon examination it will be found, that many grown Men want them.

§. 4. If *Identity* (to instance in that alone) be a native Impression, and consequently so clear and obvious to us, that we must needs know it even from our Cradles; I would gladly be resolv'd by one of Seven, or Seventy Years old, Whether a Man, being a Creature consisting of Soul and Body, be the same Man when his Body is chang'd? Whether *Euphorbus* and *Pythagoras*, having had the same Soul, were the same Man, tho' they liv'd several Ages asunder? Nay, Whether the Cock too, which had the same Soul, were not the same with both of them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear, that our *Idea* of *Sameness* is not so settled and clear, as to deserve to be thought Innate in us. For if those Innate *Ideas* are not clear and distinct, so as to be universally known, and naturally agreed on, they cannot be Subjects of universal and undoubted Truths; but will be the unavoidable Occasion of perpetual Uncertainty. For, I suppose, every one's *Idea* of *Identity* will not be the same that *Pythagoras*, and thousands others of his Followers have: And which then shall be the true? Which Innate? Or are there two different *Ideas* of *Identity*, both Innate?

§. 5. Nor let any one think, that the Questions I have here propos'd about the *Identity* of Man, are bare empty Speculations; which if they were, would be enough to shew, That there was in the Understandings of Men no Innate *Idea* of *Identity*. He that shall, with a little attention, reflect on the Resurrection, and consider that Divine Justice shall bring to Judgment, at the last Day, the very same Persons, to be happy or miserable in the other, who did well or ill in this Life; will find it perhaps not easy to resolve with himself, what makes the same Man, or wherein *Identity* consists: And will not be forward to think he, and every one, even Children themselves, have naturally a clear *Idea* of it.

§. 6. Let us examine that Principle of Mathematicks, viz. *That the Whole is bigger than a Part*. This, I take it, is reckon'd amongst innate Principles. I am sure it has as good a title as any to be thought so; which yet no body can think it to be, when he considers the *Ideas* it comprehends in it, *Whole* and *Part*, are perfectly relative: but the positive *Ideas*, to which they properly and immediately belong, are *Extension* and *Number*, of which alone *Whole* and *Part* are Relations. So that if *Whole* and *Part* are innate *Ideas*, *Extension* and *Number* must be so too; it being impossible to have an *Idea* of a Relation, without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs, and in which it is founded. Now, whether the Minds of Men have naturally imprinted on them the *Ideas* of *Extension* and *Number*, I leave to be consider'd by those, who are the Patrons of innate Principles.

Idea of Wor-
ship not In-
nate.

§. 7. That *God is to be worshipp'd*, is, without doubt, as great a Truth as any can enter into the Mind of Man, and deserves the first place amongst all practical Principles. But yet it can by no means be thought innate, unless the *Ideas* of *God* and *Worship* are innate. That the *Idea* the term *Worship* stands for, is not in the Understanding of Children, and a Character stamp'd on the Mind in its first Original, I think, will be easily granted by any one that considers how few there be amongst grown Men, who have a clear and distinct Notion of it. And, I suppose, there cannot be any thing more ridiculous, than to say that Children have this practical Principle innate, *That God is to be worshipp'd*; and yet, that they know not what that *Worship of God* is, which is their Duty. But to pass by this:

Idea of God
not Innate.

§. 8. If any *Idea* can be imagin'd innate, the *Idea of God* may, of all others, for many reasons be thought so; since it is hard to conceive, how there should be innate moral Principles, without an innate *Idea* of a *Deity*: Without a Notion of a Law-maker, it is impossible to have a Notion of a Law, and an Obligation to observe it. Besides the Atheists, taken notice of amongst the Antients, and left branded upon the Records of History, hath not Navigation discover'd, in these latter Ages, whole Nations, at the Bay of *Soldania* (a), in *Brasil* (b), in *Boranday* (c), and the *Caribbee* Islands, &c. amongst whom there was to be found no Notion of a God, no Religion? *Nicholaus del Techo*, in *litteris ex Paraquaria de Caaiguarum conversione*, has these words (d): *Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere quod Deum ad hominis animam significet, nulla sacra habet, nulla Idola*. There are Instances of Nations where uncultivated Nature has been left to it self, without the help of Letters, and Discipline, and the Improvements of Arts and Sciences. But there are others to be found, who have enjoy'd these in a very great measure; who yet, for want of a due application of their Thoughts this way, want the *Idea* and Knowledge of God. 'Twill I doubt not be a Surprise to others, as it was to me, to find the *Siamites* of this number. But for this, let them consult the King of *France's* late Envoy thither (e), who gives no better account of the *Chineses* themselves (f). And if we will not believe *La Loubere*, the Missionaries of *China*, even the Jesuits themselves, the great Encomiasts of the *Chineses*, do all to a man agree and will convince us that the Sect of the *Literati*, or *Learned*, keeping to the old Religion of *China*, and the ruling Party there, are all of them *Atheists*. Vid. *Navarette* in the Collection of Voyages, Vol. the first, and *Historia Cultus Sinensum*. And perhaps if we should, with attention, mind the Lives and Discourses of People not so far off, we should have too much reason to fear, that many in more civiliz'd Countries have no very strong and clear Impressions of a Deity upon their Minds; and that the Complaints of *Atheism*, made from the Pulpit, are not without reason. And tho' only some profligate Wretches own it too bare-facedly now; yet perhaps we should hear more than we do of it from others, did not the fear of the Magistrate's Sword, or their Neighbour's Censure, tie up Peoples Tongues: which, were the Apprehensions of Punishment or Shame taken away, would as openly proclaim their *Atheism*, as their Lives do.

§. 9. But had all Mankind, every where, a Notion of a God (whereof yet History tells us the contrary) it would not from thence follow, that the *Idea* of him was innate. For tho' no Nation were to be found without a Name, and some few dark Notions of him; yet that would not prove them to be natural Impressions on the Mind, no more than the names of Fire, or the Sun, Heat, or Number, do prove the *Ideas* they stand for, to be innate: because the Names of those things, and the *Ideas* of them, are so universally receiv'd and known amongst Mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the want of such a Name, or the absence of such a Notion out of mens Minds, any Argument against the Being of a God; any more than it would be a Proof that there was no Load-stone in the World, because a great part of Mankind had neither a Notion of any such thing, nor a Name for it; or be any shew of Argument to prove, that there are no distinct and various Species of Angels, or intelligent Beings above us, because we have no *Ideas* of such distinct Species, or Names for them: For Men, being furnish'd with Words by the common Language of their own Countries, can scarce avoid having some kind of *Ideas* of those things, whose Names, those they converse with, have occasion frequently to mention to them. And if

it

(a) Rhoe apud Thevenot, p. 2.

(b) Jo. de Lery, c. 15.

(c) Martiniere $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$

Terry $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$

Ovington, $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$

$\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$

(d) Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaiguarum

$\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$

(e) La Loubere du Roy-
aume de Si-

am, T. 1. c. 9.

sect. 15, &c.

20. sect. 22,

&c. 22. sect.

6.

(f) Ib. T. 1.

c. 20. sect. 4,

&c. 23.

it carry with it the Notion of Excellency, Greatness, or something extraordinary; if Apprehension and Concernment accompany it: if the Fear of absolute and irresistible Power set it on upon the Mind, the *Idea* is likely to sink the deeper, and spread the farther; especially, if it be such an *Idea*, as is agreeable to the common Light of Reason, and naturally deducible from every part of our Knowledge, as that of a God is. For the visible marks of extraordinary Wisdom and Power appear so plainly in all the Works of the Creation, that a rational Creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot miss the discovery of a *Deity*. And the influence that the discovery of such a Being must necessarily have on the Minds of all, that have but once heard of it, is so great, and carries such a weight of Thought and Communication with it, that it seems stranger to me, that a whole Nation of Men should be any where found so brutish, as to want the Notion of a God; than that they should be without any Notion of Numbers, or Fire.

§. 10. The Name of God being once mention'd in any part of the World, to express a superiour, powerful, wise, invisible Being, the suitableness of such a Notion to the Principles of common Reason, and the interest Men will always have to mention it often, must necessarily spread it far and wide, and continue it down to all Generations; tho' yet the general *Reception of this Name, and some imperfect and unsteady Notions convey'd thereby* to the unthinking part of Mankind, *prove not the Idea to be innate*; but only that they, who made the discovery, had made a right use of their Reason, thought maturely of the Causes of things, and trac'd them to their Original; from whom other less considering People having once receiv'd so important a Notion, it could not easily be lost again.

§. 11. This is all could be infer'd from the Notion of a *God*, were it to be found universally in all the Tribes of Mankind, and generally acknowledg'd by Men grown to maturity in all Countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine, is extended no farther than that; which, if it be sufficient to prove the *Idea of God innate*, will as well prove the *Idea of Fire innate*: since, I think, it may truly be said, That there is not a Person in the world, who has a Notion of a *God*, who has not also the *Idea of Fire*. I doubt not, but if a Colony of young Children should be placed in an Island where no Fire was, they would certainly neither have any Notion of such a thing, nor Name for it, how generally soever it were receiv'd, and known in all the World besides: and perhaps too their Apprehensions would be as far remov'd from any Name, or Notion of a God, till some one amongst them had employ'd his Thoughts to enquire into the Constitution and Causes of things, which would easily lead him to the Notion of a *God*: which having once taught to others, Reason, and the natural Propensity of their own Thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst them.

§. 12. Indeed it is urg'd, That it is *suitable to the Goodness of God, to imprint upon the Minds of Men, Characters and Notions of Himself*, and not to leave them in the dark and doubt in so grand a Concernment; and also by that means to secure to himself the Homage and Veneration due from so intelligent a Creature as Man; and therefore he has done it.

This Argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more than those who use it in this case expect from it. For if we may conclude, that *God* hath done for Men all that Men shall judge is best for them, because it is suitable to his Goodness so to do; it will prove not only that *God* has imprinted on the Minds of Men an *Idea of Himself*, but that he hath plainly stamp'd there, in fair Characters, all that Men ought to know or believe of him, all that they ought to do in obedience to his Will; and that he hath given them a Will and Affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think better for Men, than that they should in the dark grope after Knowledge, as *St. Paul* tells us all Nations did after *God*, *Acts XVII. 27.* than that their Wills should clash with their Understandings, and their Appetites cross their Duty. The *Romanists* say, 'Tis best for Men, and so suitable to the Goodness of *God*, that there should be an infallible Judge of Controversies on Earth; and therefore there is one. And I, by the same reason, say, 'Tis better for Men that every Man himself should be infallible. I leave them to consider, whether by the force of this Argument they shall think, that every Man is so.

*Suitable to
G O D's
Goodness, that
all Men should
have an Idea
of him, there-
fore naturally
imprinted by
him; an-
swer'd.*

I think it a very good Argument, to say, the infinitely wise God hath made it so: and therefore it is best. But it seems to me a little too much Confidence of our own Wisdom, to say, I think it best, and therefore God hath made it so; and in the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from such a Topick that God hath done so, when certain Experience shews us that he hath not. But the Goodness of God hath not been wanting to Men without such original Impressions of Knowledge, or *Ideas* stamp'd on the Mind: since he hath furnish'd Man with those Faculties, which will serve for the sufficient discovery of all things requisite to the End of such a Being. And I doubt not but to shew that a Man, by the right Use of his natural Abilities, may, without any innate Principles, attain the Knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. God having endu'd Man with those Faculties of Knowing which he hath, was no more oblig'd by his Goodness to implant those innate Notions in his Mind, than that having given him Reason, Hands, and Materials, he should build him Bridges, or Houses; which some People in the World, however of good Parts, do either totally want, or are but ill-provided of, as well as others are wholly without *Ideas of God*, and Principles of Morality; or at least have but very ill ones. The reason in both cases being, that they never employ'd their Parts, Faculties, and Powers, industriously that way, but contented themselves with the Opinions, Fashions, and Things of their Country, as they found them, without looking any farther. Had you or I been born at the Bay of *Soldania*, possibly our Thoughts and Notions had not exceeded those brutish ones of the *Hottentots* that inhabit there: And had the *Virginia King Apochancana* been educated in *England*, he had perhaps been as knowing a Divine, and as good a Mathematician, as any in it. The difference between him and a more improv'd *Englishman* lying barely in this, that Exercise of his Faculties was bounded within the Ways, Modes, and Notions of his own Country, and never directed to any other, or farther Enquiries: And if he had not any *Idea* of a God, it was only because he pursu'd not those Thoughts that would have led him to it.

Ideas of
GOD va-
rious in diffe-
rent Men.

§. 13. I grant, That if there were any *Ideas* to be found imprinted on the Minds of Men, we have reason to expect, it should be the Notion of his Maker, as a mark GOD set on his own Workmanship, to mind Man of his Dependence and Duty; and that herein should appear the first Instances of human Knowledge. But how late is it before any such Notion is discoverable in Children? And when we find it there, how much more does it resemble the Opinion and Notion of the Teacher, than represent the true God? He that shall observe in Children the progress whereby their Minds attain the Knowledge they have, will think that the Objects they do first and most familiarly converse with, are those that make the first impressions on their Understandings: nor will he find the least footsteps of any other. It is easy to take notice, how their Thoughts enlarge themselves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of sensible Objects, to retain the *Ideas* of them in their Memories; and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them, and several ways put them together. How by these means they come to frame in their Minds an *Idea* Men have of a Deity, I shall hereafter shew.

§. 14. Can it be thought, that the *Ideas* Men have of God, are the Characters and Marks of Himself, engraven in their Minds by his own Finger; when we see that in the same Country, under one and the same name, Men have far different, nay, often contrary and inconsistent *Ideas* and Conceptions of him? Their agreeing in a Name, or Sound, will scarce prove an innate Notion of Him.

§. 15. What true or tolerable Notion of a Deity could they have, who acknowledged and worship'd hundreds? Every Deity that they own'd above one, was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of Him, and a proof that they had no true Notion of God, where Unity, Infinity, and Eternity were excluded. To which if we add their gross Conceptions of Corporeity, express'd in their Images and Representations of their Deities; the Amours, Marriages, Copulations, Lusts, Quarrels, and other mean Qualities attributed by them to their Gods; we shall have little reason to think, that the Heathen World, i. e. the greatest part of Mankind, had such *Ideas* of God in their Minds, as he himself, out of care that they should not be mistaken about Him, was Author of. And this Universality of Consent, so much argu'd, if it prove any native

Im-

Impressions, 'twill be only this, That God imprinted on the Minds of all Men, speaking the same Language, a Name for himself, but not any *Idea*; since those People, who agreed in the Name, had at the same time far different Apprehensions about the thing signify'd. If they say, That the variety of Deities, worship'd by the Heathen World, were but figurative ways of expressing the several Attributes of that incomprehensible Being, or several Parts of his Providence: I answer, What they might be in their Original, I will not here inquire; but that they were so in the Thoughts of the Vulgar, I think no body will affirm. And he that will consult the Voyage of the Bishop of Beryte, c. 13. (not to mention other Testimonies) will find, that the Theology of the *Siamites* professedly owns a Plurality of Gods: Or, as the *Abbé de Choisy* more judiciously remarks, in his *Journal du Voyage de Siam*, 1777, it consists properly in acknowledging no God at all.

§. 15. If it be said, That wise Men of all Nations came to have true Conceptions of the Unity and Infinity of the Deity, I grant it. But then this,

First, Excludes Universality of Consent in any thing but the Name; for those wise Men being very few, perhaps one of a thousand, this Universality is very narrow.

Secondly, It seems to me plainly to prove, that the truest and best Notions Men had of God were not imprinted, but acquir'd by Thought and Meditation, and a right use of their Faculties; since the wise and considerate Men of the World, by a right and careful Employment of their Thoughts and Reason, attain'd true Notions in this as well as other things; whilst the lazy and inconsiderate part of Men, making the far greater number, took up their Notions by chance, from common Tradition and vulgar Conceptions, without much beating their Heads about them. And if it be a reason to think the Notion of God innate, because all wise Men had it, Vertue too must be thought innate, for That also wise Men have always had.

§. 16. This was evidently the Case of all *Gentilism*: Nor hath even amongst *Jews*, *Christians* and *Mahometans*, who acknowledg but one God, this Doctrine, and the Care taken in those Nations to teach Men to have true Notions of a GOD, prevail'd so far as to make Men to have the same, and true Ideas of him. How many, even amongst us, will be found, upon inquiry, to fancy him in the shape of a Man sitting in Heaven, and to have many other absurd and unfit Conceptions of him? Christians, as well as *Türks*, have had whole Sects owning and contending earnestly for it, that the Deity was corporeal, and of human Shape: And tho' we find few amongst us who profess themselves *Anthropomorphites* (tho' some I have met with that own it) yet, I believe, he that will make it his business, may find amongst the ignorant and uninstructed Christians many of that Opinion. Talk but with Country-People, almost of any Age, or young People, almost of any Condition; and you shall find, that tho' the Name of GOD be frequently in their Mouths; yet the Notions they apply this Name to are so odd, low and pitiful, that no body can imagine they were taught by a rational Man, much less that they were Characters writ by the Finger of God himself. Nor do I see how it derogates more from the Goodness of God, that he has given us Minds unfurnish'd with these Ideas of himself, than that he hath sent us into the World with Bodies uncloth'd, and that there is no Art or Skill born with us: For being fitted with Faculties to attain these, it is want of Industry and Consideration in us, and not of Bounty in him, if we have them not. 'Tis as certain that there is a God, as that the opposite Angles, made by the intersection of two strait Lines, are equal. There was never any rational Creature, that set himself sincerely to examine the Truth of these Propositions, that could fail to assent to them; tho' yet it be past doubt, that there are many Men, who having not apply'd their Thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its Extent) universal Consent, such an one I easily allow; but such an universal Consent as this proves not the *Idea* of God, no more than it does the *Idea* of such Angles, innate.

§. 17. Since then tho' the knowledg of a GOD be the most natural Discovery of human Reason, yet the *Idea* of him is not innate, as, I think, is evident from what has been said; I imagine there will scarce be any other *Idea* found, that

If the Idea of GOD be not innate, no other can be suppos'd innate.

can pretend to it: Since if God had set any Impression, any Character on the Understanding of Men, it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some clear and uniform *Idea* of himself, as far as our weak Capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an Object. But our Minds being at first void of that *Idea*, which we are most concern'd to have, it is a strong Presumption against all other innate Characters. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be inform'd by any other.

Idea of Substance not innate.

§. 18. I confess there is another *Idea*, which would be of general use for Mankind to have, as it is of general Talk, as if they had it; and that is the *Idea of Substance* which we neither have, nor can have, by *Sensation* or *Reflection*. If Nature took care to provide us any *Ideas*, we might well expect they should be such, as by our own Faculties we cannot procure to our selves: but we see, on the contrary, that since by those ways whereby other *Ideas* are brought into our Minds, this is not; we have no such clear *Idea* at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word *Substance*, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what (*i. e.* of some thing whereof we have no particular distinct positive) *Idea*, which we take to be the *Substratum*, or Support, of those *Ideas* we do know.

No Propositions can be innate, since no Ideas are innate.

§. 19. Whatever then we talk of Innate, either *Speculative* or *practical Principles*, it may, with as much probability, be said, that a Man hath 100 l. sterling in his Pocket, and yet deny'd that he hath either Penny, Shilling, Crown, or any other Coin, out of which the Sum is to be made up; as to think that certain Propositions are innate, when the *Ideas* about which they are, can by no means be suppos'd to be so. The general Reception and Assent that is given, doth not at all prove that the *Ideas* express'd in them are innate: For in many Cases, however the *Ideas* came there, the Assent to Words, expressing the Agreement or Disagreement of such *Ideas*, will necessarily follow. Every one, that hath a true *Idea* of *God* and *Worship*, will assent to this Proposition, That *God* is to be worship'd, when express'd in a Language he understands: And every rational Man, that hath not thought on it to day, may be ready to assent to this Proposition to morrow; and yet Millions of Men may be well suppos'd to want one or both of those *Ideas* to Day. For if we will allow Savages and most Country-People to have *Ideas* of *God* and *Worship* (which Conversation with them will not make one forward to believe) yet I think few Children can be suppos'd to have those *Ideas*, which therefore they must begin to have some time or other: and then they will also begin to assent to that Proposition, and make very little question of it ever after. But such an Assent upon Hearing no more proves the *Ideas* to be innate, than it does that one born blind (with Cataracts, which will be couch'd to morrow) had the innate *Ideas* of the Sun, or Light, or Saffron, or Yellow; because when his Sight is clear'd, he will certainly assent to this Proposition, That the Sun is lucid, or that Saffron is yellow: and therefore if such an Assent upon hearing cannot prove the *Ideas* innate, it can much less the Propositions made up of those *Ideas*. If they have any innate *Ideas*, I would be glad to be told what, and how many they are.

No innate Ideas in the Memory.

§. 20. To which let me add: If there be any innate *Ideas*, any *Ideas* in the Mind, which the Mind does not actually think on, they must be lodg'd in the Memory, and from thence must be brought into view by Remembrance; *i. e.* must be known, when they are remember'd, to have been Perceptions in the Mind before, unless Remembrance can be without Remembrance. For to remember is to perceive any thing with Memory, or with a Consciousness, that it was known or perceiv'd before: without this, whatever *Idea* comes into the Mind is new, and not remember'd; this Consciousness of its having been in the Mind before, being that which distinguishes Remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever *Idea* was never perceiv'd by the Mind, was never in the Mind. Whatever *Idea* is in the Mind, is either an actual Perception; or else having been an actual Perception, is so in the Mind, that by the Memory it can be made an actual Perception again. Whenever there is the actual Perception of an *Idea* without Memory, the *Idea* appears perfectly new and unknown before to the Understanding. Whenever the Memory brings any *Idea* into actual view, it is with a Consciousness, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the Mind. Whether this be not so, I appeal to every

every one's Observation: and then I desire an Instance of an *Idea* pretended to be innate, which (before any impression of it by ways hereafter to be mention'd) any one could revive and remember as an *Idea* he had formerly known, without which Consciousness of a former Perception there is no remembrance; and whatever *Idea* comes into the Mind without that Consciousness, is not remember'd, or comes not out of the Memory, nor can be said to be in the Mind before that appearance: For what is not either actually in View, or in the Memory, is in the Mind no way at all, and is all one as if it never had been there. Suppose a Child had the use of his Eyes, till he knows and distinguishes Colours; but then Cataracts shut the Windows, and he is forty or fifty Years perfectly in the dark, and in that time perfectly loses all Memory of the *Ideas* of Colours he once had. This was the Case of a blind Man I once talk'd with, who lost his Sight by the Small-Pox when he was a Child, and had no more notion of Colours than one born blind. I ask, whether any one can say this Man had then any *Ideas* of Colours in his Mind, any more than one born blind? And I think no body will say, that either of them had in his Mind any *Idea* of Colours at all. His Cataracts are couch'd, and then he has the *Ideas* (which he remembers not) of Colours, *de novo*, by his restor'd Sight convey'd to his Mind, and that without any Consciousness of a former acquaintance; and then now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this case all these *Ideas* of Colours, which when out of view can be reviv'd with a Consciousness of a former acquaintance, being thus in the Memory, are said to be in the Mind. The use I make of this, is, that whatever *Idea* being not actually in View, is in the Mind, is there only by being in the Memory; and if it be not in the Memory, it is not in the Mind; and if it be in the Memory, it cannot by the Memory be brought into actual View, without a Perception that it comes out of the Memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remember'd. If therefore there be any innate *Ideas*, they must be in the Memory, or else no where in the Mind; and if they be in the Memory, they can be reviv'd without any Impression from without; and whenever they are brought into the Mind, they are remember'd, *i. e.* they bring with them a Perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a constant and distinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the Memory, or in the Mind; that what is not in the Memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new and unknown before; and what is in the Memory, or in the Mind, whenever it is suggested by the Memory, appears not to be new, but the Mind finds it in it self, and knows it was there before. By this it may be try'd, whether there be any innate *Ideas* in the Mind, before impression from *Sensation* or *Reflection*. I would fain meet with the Man, who when he came to the use of Reason, or at any other time, remember'd any of them; And to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say, there are *Ideas* in the Mind, that are not in the Memory; I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible.

§. 21. Besides what I have already said, there is another Reason why I doubt that neither these nor any other Principles are innate. I that am fully persuaded, that the infinitely wise GOD made all things in perfect Wisdom, cannot satisfy my self why he should be suppos'd to print upon the Minds of Men some universal Principles, whereof those that are pretended innate, and concern Speculation, are of no great use; and those that concern Practice, not self-evident; and neither of them distinguishable from some other Truths not allow'd to be innate. For to what purpose should Characters be graven on the Mind by the Finger of God, which are not clearer there than those which are afterwards introduc'd, or cannot be distinguish'd from them? If any one thinks there are such innate *Ideas* and Propositions, which by their Clearness and Usefulness are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the Mind and acquir'd, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us which they are, and then every one will be a fit Judge whether they be so or no; since if there be such innate *Ideas* and Impressions, plainly different from all other Perceptions and Knowledge, every one will find it true in himself. Of the Evidence of these suppos'd innate Maxims I have spoken already; of their Usefulness I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

*Difference of
Mens Disco-
veries de-
pends upon
the different
application of
their Facul-
ties.*

§. 22. To conclude: Some *Ideas* forwardly offer themselves to all Mens Understandings; some sorts of Truths result from any *Ideas*, as soon as the Mind puts them into Propositions; other Truths require a train of *Ideas* plac'd in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention before they can be discover'd and assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate; but the truth is, *Ideas* and Notions are no more born with us than Arts and Sciences, tho' some of them indeed offer themselves to our Faculties more readily than others, and therefore are more generally receiv'd; tho' that too be according as the Organs of our Bodies and Powers of our Minds happen to be imploy'd: *God having fitted Men with Faculties and Means to discover, receive and retain Truths, according as they are imploy'd.* The great difference that is to be found in the Notions of Mankind, is from the different use they put their Faculties to; whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of Assent, by lazily enslaving their Minds to the Dictates and Dominion of others, in Doctrines which it is their Duty carefully to examine, and not blindly, with an implicit Faith, to swallow. Others, employing their Thoughts only about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of Knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other; having never let their Thoughts loose in the search of other Inquiries. Thus, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, is a Truth as certain as any thing can be, and I think more evident than many of those Propositions that go for Principles; and yet there are Millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, because they never set their Thoughts on work about such Angles: And he that certainly knows this Proposition, may yet be utterly ignorant of the Truth of other Propositions, in Mathematicks it self, which are as clear and evident as this; because, in his search of those mathematical Truths, he stop'd his Thoughts short, and went not so far. The same may happen concerning the Notions we have of the Being of a Deity; for tho' there be no Truth which a Man may more evidently make out to himself than the Existence of a God; yet he that shall content himself with things, as he finds them in this World, as they minister to his Pleasures and Passions, and not make inquiry a little farther into their Causes, Ends and admirable Contrivances, and pursue the Thoughts thereof with Diligence and Attention, may live long without any Notion of such a Being. And if any Person hath by talk put such a Notion into his Head, he may perhaps believe it; but if he hath never examin'd it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon trust, without examining the Demonstration, and may yield his Assent as a probable Opinion, but hath no knowledge of the Truth of it; which yet his Faculties, if carefully imploy'd, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only by the by, to shew how much our Knowledge depends upon the right use of those Powers Nature hath bestow'd upon us, and how little upon such innate Principles, as are in vain suppos'd to be in all Mankind for their Direction; which all Men could not but know, if they were there, or else they would be there to no purpose: And which since all Men do not know, nor can distinguish from other adventitious Truths, we may well conclude there are no such.

*Men must
think and
know for
themselves.*

§. 23. What Censure, doubting thus of innate Principles, may deserve from Men, who will be apt to call it pulling up the old Foundations of Knowledge and Certainty, I cannot tell; I persuade my self at least, that the way I have pursu'd, being conformable to Truth, lays those Foundations surer. This I am certain, I have not made it my business either to quit or follow any Authority in the ensuing Discourse: Truth has been my only Aim, and wherever that has appear'd to lead, my Thoughts have impartially follow'd, without minding whether the Footsteps of any other lay that way or no. Not that I want a due respect to other Mens Opinions; but after all, the greatest Reverence is due to Truth: and I hope it will not be thought Arrogance to say, that perhaps we should make greater progress in the Discovery of rational and contemplative Knowledge, if we sought it in the Fountain, in the Consideration of things themselves, and made use rather of our own Thoughts than other Mens to find it.


it: For I think we may as rationally hope to see with other Mens Eyes, as to know by other Mens Understandings. So much as we our selves consider and comprehend of Truth and Reason, so much we possess of real and true Knowledge. The floating of other Mens Opinions in our Brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, tho' they happen to be true. What in them was Science, is in us but Opiniatrety; whilst we give up our Assent only to Reverend Names, and do not, as they did, imploy our own Reason to *understand* those Truths which gave them Reputation. Aristotle was certainly a knowing Man; but no body ever thought him so, because he blindly embrac'd, and confidently vented the Opinions of another. And if the taking up of another's Principles, without examining them, made not him a Philosopher, I suppose it will hardly make any body else so. In the Sciences, every one has so much as he really knows and comprehends: What he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreds; which, however well in the whole piece, make no considerable addition to his stock who gathers them. Such borrow'd Wealth, like Fairy-mony, tho' it were Gold in the Hand from which he receiv'd it, will be but Leaves and Dust when it comes to use.

§. 24. When Men have found some general Propositions, that could not be doubted of as soon as understood, it was, I know, a *short and easy way to conclude them innate*. This being once receiv'd, it eas'd the Lazy from the pains of search, and stop'd the Inquiry of the Doubtful concerning all that was once Masters and Teachers, to make this the Principle of Principles, That Principles must not be question'd; for having once establish'd this Tenet, that there are innate Principles, it put their Followers upon a necessity of receiving some Doctrines as such; which was to take them off from the use of their own Reason and Judgment, and put them on believing and taking them upon trust, without farther examination: In which posture of blind Credulity, they might be more easily govern'd by, and made useful to some sort of Men, who had the Skill and Office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a small Power it gives one Man over another, to have the Authority to be the Dictator of Principles and stil'd innate. And it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be Teacher of unquestionable Truths, and to make a Man swallow that for an innate Principle, which may serve to his purpose who teacheth them; whereas had they examin'd the ways whereby Men came to the knowledg of many universal Truths, they would have found them to result in the Minds of Men from the being of things themselves, when duly consider'd; and that they were discover'd by the application of those Faculties, that were fitted by nature to receive and judg of them, when duly imploy'd about them.

Whence the Opinion of innate Principles.

§. 25. To shew how the Understanding proceeds herein, is the Design of the following Discourse; which I shall proceed to, when I have first premis'd, that hitherto, to clear my way to those Foundations which I conceive are the only true ones whereon to establish those Notions we can have of our own Knowledge, it hath been necessary for me to give an account of the Reasons I had to doubt of innate Principles. And since the Arguments which are against them do some of them rise from common receiv'd Opinions, I have been forc'd to take several things for granted, which is hardly avoidable to any one, whose Task it is to shew the falshood or improbability of any Tenet: it happening in Controversial Discourses, as it does in assaulting of Towns, where if the Ground be but firm whereon the Batteries are erected, there is no farther Inquiry of whom it is borrow'd, nor whom it belongs to, so it affords but a fit rise for the present purpose. But in the future part of this Discourse, designing to raise an Edifice uniform and consistent with it self, as far as my own Experience and Observation will assist me, I hope to erect it on such a Basis, that I shall not need to shore it up with Props and Buttresses, leaning on borrow'd or beg'd Foundations; or at least, if mine prove a Castle in the Air, I will endeavour it shall be all of a piece, and hang together. Wherein I warn the Reader not to expect undeniable cogent Demonstrations, unless I may be allow'd the Privilege, not seldom assum'd by others, to take my Principles for granted; and then, I doubt not, but I can demonstrate too. All that I shall say for the Principles I proceed on, is, that I can only appeal to Men's own unprejudic'd Experience and Observation, whether they be true or no; and this is enough for a Man who professes no more, than to lay down candidly and freely his own Conjectures, concerning a Subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other design than an unbiass'd Inquiry after Truth.

Conclusion.



BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of Ideas in general, and their Original.

Idea is the
Object of
Thinking.

§. 1. **E**VERY Man being conscious to himself that he *Thinks*, and that which his Mind is apply'd about whilst thinking, being the *Ideas* that are there, 'tis past doubt that Men have in their Minds several *Ideas*, such as are those express'd by the words, *Whiteness*, *Hardness*, *Sweetness*, *Thinking*, *Motion*, *Man*, *Elephant*, *Army*, *Drunkenness*, and others. It is in the first place then to be enquir'd, how he comes by them? I know it is a receiv'd Doctrine, that Men have native *Ideas* and original Characters stamp'd upon their Minds in their very first Being. This Opinion I have at large examin'd already; and, I suppose, what I have said in the foregoing Book will be much more easily admitted, when I have shewn whence the Understanding may get all the *Ideas* it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the Mind; for which I shall appeal to every one's own Observation and Experience.

All Ideas
come from
Sensation or
Reflection.

§. 2. Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, *White-Paper*, void of all Characters, without any *Ideas*; how comes it to be furnish'd? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the Materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *Experience*; In that all our Knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives it self. Our Observation employ'd either about *External sensible Objects*, or about the *Internal Operations* of our Minds, perceiv'd and reflected on by our selves, is that which supplies our Understandings with all the Materials of thinking. These two are the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all the *Ideas* we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

The Objects of
Sensation are
Source of
Ideas.

§. 3. First, *Our Senses*, conversant about particular sensible Objects, do convey into the Mind several distinct *Perceptions* of Things, according to those various ways wherein those Objects do affect them: And thus we come by those *Ideas* we have, of *Yellow*, *White*, *Heat*, *Cold*, *Soft*, *Hard*, *Bitter*, *Sweet*, and all those which we call sensible Qualities; which when I say the Senses convey into the Mind, I mean, they from External Objects convey into the Mind what produces there those *Perceptions*. This great source of most of the *Ideas* we have, depending wholly upon our Senses, and deriv'd by them to the Understanding, I call *SENSATION*.

The Operati-
ons of our
Minds the o-
ther Source of
them.

§. 4. Secondly, The other Fountain, from which Experience furnisheth the Understanding with *Ideas*, is the *Perception* of the *Operations* of our own Mind within us, as it is employ'd about the *Ideas* it has got; which Operations when the Soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the Understanding with another set of *Ideas*, which could not be had from Things without; and such are *Perception*, *Thinking*, *Doubting*, *Believing*, *Reasoning*, *Knowing*, *Willing*, and all the different actings of our own Minds; which we being conscious of and observing in our selves, do from these receive into our Understandings as distinct *Ideas*, as we do from Bodies affecting our Senses. This source of *Ideas* every Man has wholly in himself: and tho' it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with External Objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd

call'd Internal Sense. But as I call the other *Sensation*, so I call this *REFLECTION*, the *Ideas* it affords being such only as the Mind gets by reflecting on its own Operations within it self. By *REFLECTION* then, in the following part of this Discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations, and the manner of them; by reason whereof there come to be *Ideas* of these Operations in the Understanding. These two, I say, viz. External Material things, as the Objects of *SENSATION*; and the Operations of our own Minds within, as the Objects of *REFLECTION*; are to me the only Originals from whence all our *Ideas* take their beginnings. The term *Operations* here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the Actions of the Mind about its *Ideas*, but some sort of Passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

§. 5. The Understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any *Ideas*, which it doth not receive from one of these two. External Objects furnish the Mind with the *Ideas* of sensible Qualities, which are all those different Perceptions they produce in us: And the Mind furnishes the Understanding with *Ideas* of its own Operations. All our Ideas are of the one or other of these.

These, when we have taken a full survey of them and their several Modes, Combinations, and Relations, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of *Ideas*; and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and thorowly search into his Understanding; and then let him tell me whether all the original *Ideas* he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his *Senses*, or of the Operations of his Mind, consider'd as Objects of his *Reflection*: And how great a mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be lodg'd there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any *Idea* in his Mind, but what one of these two have imprinted; tho' perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarg'd by the Understanding, as we shall see hereafter.

§. 6. He that attentively considers the state of a Child, at his first coming into the World, will have little reason to think him stor'd with plenty of *Ideas*, that are to be the matter of his future Knowledge: 'Tis by degrees he comes to be furnish'd with them. And tho' the *Ideas* of obvious and familiar Qualities imprint themselves before the Memory begins to keep a Register of Time and Order; yet 'tis often so late before some unusual Qualities come in the way, that there are few Men that cannot recollect the beginning of their Acquaintance with them: And if it were worth while, no doubt a Child might be so order'd as to have but a very few even of the ordinary *Ideas*, till he were grown up to a Man. But all that are born into the World being surrounded with Bodies that perpetually and diversly affect them; variety of *Ideas*, whether care be taken about it or no, are imprinted on the Minds of Children. Light and Colours are busy at hand every where, when the Eye is but open; Sounds, and some tangible Qualities fail not to sollicite their proper Senses, and force an entrance to the Mind: but yet, I think, it will be granted easily, that if a Child were kept in a place where he never saw any other but Black and White till he were a Man, he would have no more *Ideas* of Scarlet or Green, than he that from his Childhood never tasted an Oyster or a Pine-Apple, has of those particular Relishes. Observable in Children.

§. 7. Men then come to be furnish'd with fewer or more simple *Ideas* from without, according as the Objects they converse with, afford greater or less variety; and from the Operations of their Minds within, according as they more or less reflect on them. For tho' he that contemplates the Operations of his Mind, cannot but have plain and clear *Ideas* of them; yet unless he turn his Thoughts that way, and considers them attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct *Ideas* of all the Operations of his Mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular *Ideas* of any Landscape, or of the Parts and Motions of a Clock, who will not turn his Eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it. The Picture or Clock may be so plac'd, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confus'd *Idea* of all the parts they are made up of, till he applies himself with attention to consider them each in particular. Men are differently furnish'd with these, according to the different Objects they converse with.

Ideas of Reflection later, because they need Attention.

§. 8. And hence we see the reason, why 'tis pretty late before most Children get *Ideas* of the Operations of their own Minds; and some have not any very clear or perfect *Ideas* of the greatest part of them all their Lives: because tho' they pass there continually, yet like floating Visions, they make not deep Impressions enough to leave in the Mind clear distinct lasting *Ideas*, till the Understanding turns inwards upon it self, *reflects* on its own *Operations*, and makes them the Object of its own Contemplation. Children, when they come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new things, which by a constant solicitation of their Senses, draw the Mind constantly to them, forward to take notice of new, and apt to be delighted with the variety of changing Objects. Thus the first Years are usually employ'd and diverted in looking abroad. Mens business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without; and so, growing up in a constant Attention to outward Sensations, seldom make any considerable Reflection on what passes within them till they come to be of riper Years; and some scarce ever at all.

The Soul begins to have Ideas, when it begins to perceive.

§. 9. To ask at what time a Man has first any *Ideas*, is to ask when he begins to perceive; having *Ideas*, and Perception, being the same thing. I know it is an Opinion, that the Soul always thinks, and that it has the actual Perception of *Ideas* in it self constantly as long as it exists; and that actual Thinking is as inseparable from the Soul, as actual Extension is from the Body: which if true, to enquire after the beginning of a Man's *Ideas*, is the same as to enquire after the beginning of his Soul. For by this account, Soul and its *Ideas*, as Body and its Extension, will begin to exist both at the same time.

The Soul thinks not always; for this wants Proofs.

§. 10. But whether the Soul be suppos'd to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or sometime after, the first Rudiments or Organization, or the beginnings of Life in the Body; I leave to be disputed by those who have better thought of that matter. I confess my self to have one of those dull Souls, that doth not perceive it self always to contemplate *Ideas*; nor can conceive it any more necessary for the Soul always to think, than for the Body always to move: the Perception of *Ideas* being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what Motion is to the Body; not its Essence, but one of its Operations. And therefore, tho' Thinking be suppos'd ever so much the proper Action of the Soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinking, always in action. That perhaps is the Privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of Things, who never stumbers nor sleeps; but is not competent to any finite Being, at least not to the Soul of Man. We know certainly by Experience that we sometimes think, and thence draw this infallible Consequence, That there is something in us that has a Power to think: But whether that Substance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no farther assur'd than Experience informs us. For to say that actual Thinking is essential to the Soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question, and not to prove it by Reason; which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident Proposition. But whether this, *That the Soul always thinks* be a self-evident Proposition, that every body assents to at first hearing, I appeal to Mankind. 'Tis doubted whether I thought all last Night or no; the Question being about a Matter of Fact, 'tis begging it to bring as a proof for it, an Hypothesis which is the very thing in dispute; by which way one may prove any thing: and 'tis but supposing that all Watches, whilst the Ballance beats, think; and 'tis sufficiently prov'd, and past doubt, that my Watch thought all last Night. But he that would not deceive himself, ought to build his Hypothesis on Matter of Fact, and make it out by sensible Experience, and not presume on Matter of Fact, because of his Hypothesis; that is, because he supposes it to be so: which way of proving amounts to this, That I must necessarily think all last Night, because another supposes I always think, tho' I my self cannot perceive that I always do so.

But Men in love with their Opinions may not only suppose what is in question, but alledg wrong Matter of Fact. How else could any one make it an Inference of mine, that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our sleep? I do not say there is no Soul in a Man, because he is not sensible of it in his sleep: But I do say, he cannot think at any time waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to any thing, but

to our Thoughts; and to them it is, and to them it will always be necessary, till we can think without being conscious of it.

§. 11. I grant that the Soul in a waking Man is never without Thought, because it is the condition of being awake: but whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole Man, Mind as well as Body, may be worth a waking Man's Consideration; it being hard to conceive, that any thing should think, and not be conscious of it. If the Soul doth think in a sleeping Man without being conscious of it, I ask, whether during such thinking it has any Pleasure or Pain, or be capable of Happiness or Misery? I am sure the Man is not, no more than the Bed or Earth he lies on. For to be Happy or Miserable without being conscious of it, seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if it be possible that the Soul can, whilst the Body is sleeping, have its Thinking, Enjoyments and Concerns, its Pleasure or Pain apart, which the Man is not conscious of nor partakes in; it is certain that *Socrates* asleep and *Socrates* awake, is not the same Person: but his Soul when he sleeps, and *Socrates* the Man, consisting of Body and Soul when he is waking, are two Persons; since waking *Socrates* has no Knowledge of, or Concernment for that Happiness or Misery of his Soul which it enjoys alone by it self whilst he sleeps, without perceiving any thing of it; no more than he has for the Happiness or Misery of a Man in the *Indies*, whom he knows not. For if we take wholly away all Consciousness of our Actions and Sensations, especially of Pleasure and Pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place personal Identity.

It is not always conscious of it.

§. 12. The Soul, during sound Sleep, thinks, say these Men. *Whilst it thinks* and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of Delight or Trouble, as well as any other Perceptions; and *it must necessarily be conscious of its own Perceptions.* But it has all this apart; the sleeping Man, 'tis plain is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us suppose then the Soul of *Castor*, while he is sleeping, retir'd from his Body; which is no impossible supposition for the Men I have here to do with, who so liberally allow Life, without a thinking Soul, to all other Animals: These Men cannot then judge it impossible, or a contradiction, that the Body should live without the Soul; nor that the Soul should subsist and think, or have Perception, even Perception of Happiness or Misery, without the Body. Let us then, as I say, suppose the Soul of *Castor* separated, during his Sleep, from his Body, to think apart. Let us suppose too, that it chuses for its Scene of Thinking the Body of another Man, *v. g.* *Pollux*, who is sleeping without a Soul: For if *Castor's* Soul can think, whilst *Castor* is asleep, what *Castor* is never conscious of, 'tis no matter what place it chuses to think in. We have here then the Bodies of two Men with only one Soul between them, which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns; and the Soul still thinking in the waking Man, whereof the sleeping Man is never conscious, has never the least Perception. I ask then, whether *Castor* and *Pollux*, thus with only one Soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one what the other is never conscious of, nor is concern'd for, are not two as distinct Persons as *Castor* and *Hercules*, or as *Socrates* and *Plato* were? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miserable? Just by the same reason they make the Soul and the Man two Persons, who make the Soul think apart what the Man is not conscious of. For I suppose no body will make Identity of Persons to consist in the Soul's being united to the very same numerical Particles of Matter; for if that be necessary to Identity, 'twill be impossible in that constant flux of the Particles of our Bodies, that any Man should be the same Person two Days, or two Moments together.

If a sleeping Man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking Man are two Persons.

§. 13. Thus, methinks, every drowsy Nod shakes their Doctrine, who teach, that the Soul is always thinking. Those at least who do at any time sleep without dreaming, can never be convinc'd, that their Thoughts are sometimes for four Hours busy without their knowing of it; and if they are taken in the very act, wak'd in the middle of that sleeping Contemplation, can give no manner of account of it.

Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they think.

§. 14. 'Twill perhaps be said, that the Soul thinks even in the soundest Sleep, but the Memory retains it not. That the Soul in a sleeping Man should be this moment busy a thinking, and the next moment in a waking Man, not remember

That Men dream without remembering it, is nor vain urg'd.

nor be able to recollect one jot of all those Thoughts, is very hard to be conceiv'd, and would need some better proof than bare Assertion to make it be believ'd. For who can without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine, That the greatest part of Men do, during all their Lives, for several hours every day, think of something, which if they were ask'd, even in the middle of these Thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of? Most Men, I think, pass a great part of their sleep without dreaming. I once knew a Man that was bred a Scholar, and had no bad Memory, who told me, he had never dream'd in his Life till he had that Fever he was then newly recover'd of, which was about the five or six and twentieth Year of his Age. I suppose the World affords more such Instances: At least every one's Acquaintance will furnish him with Examples enough of such as pass most of their Nights without dreaming.

Upon this Hypothesis the Thoughts of a sleeping Man ought to be most rational.

§. 15. *To think often, and never to retain it so much as one moment, is a very useless sort of thinking:* And the Soul, in such a state of thinking, does very little, if at all, excel that of a Looking-glass which constantly receives variety of Images, or Ideas, but retains none; they disappear and vanish, and there remain no foot-steps of them; the Looking-glass is never the better for such Ideas, nor the Soul for such Thoughts: Perhaps it will be said, that in a waking Man the Materials of the Body are employ'd, and made use of, in thinking; and that the memory of Thoughts is retain'd by the impressions that are made on the Brain, and the traces there left after such thinking; but that in the thinking of the Soul, which is not perceiv'd in a sleeping Man, there the Soul thinks apart, and making no use of the Organs of the Body, leaves no impressions on it, and consequently no memory of such Thoughts. Not to mention again the absurdity of two distinct Persons, which follows from this Supposition, I answer farther, That whatever Ideas the Mind can receive and contemplate without the help of the Body, it is reasonable to conclude, it can retain without the help of the Body too: or else the Soul, or any separate Spirit, will have but little advantage by thinking. If it has no memory of its own Thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its use, and be able to recall them upon occasion; if it cannot reflect upon what is past, and make use of its former Experiences, Reasonings, and Contemplations, to what purpose does it think? They, who make the Soul a thinking thing, at this rate, will not make it a much more noble Being than those do whom they condemn, for allowing it to be nothing but the subtlest parts of Matter. Characters drawn on Dust, that the first breath of Wind effaces; or Impressions made on a heap of Atoms, or animal Spirits, are altogether as useful, and render the Subject as noble, as the Thoughts of a Soul that perish in thinking; that once out of sight, are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themselves behind them. Nature never makes excellent things for mean or no uses: And it is hardly to be conceiv'd, that our infinitely wise Creator should make so admirable a Faculty as the power of thinking, that Faculty which comes nearest the Excellency of his own incomprehensible Being, to be so idly and uselessly employ'd, at least a fourth part of its time here, as to think constantly, without remembering any of those Thoughts, without doing any good to it self or others, or being any way useful to any other part of the Creation. If we will examine it, we shall not find, I suppose, the motion of dull and senseless Matter any where in the Universe made so little use of, and so wholly thrown away.

On this Hypothesis the Soul must have Ideas not deriv'd from Sensation or Reflection, of which there is no appearance.

§. 16. 'Tis true, we have sometimes instances of Perception, whilst we are asleep, and retain the memory of those Thoughts: But how extravagant and incoherent for the most part they are; how little conformable to the Perfection and Order of a rational Being, those who are acquainted with Dreams need not be told. This I would willingly be satisfy'd in, Whether the Soul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were separate from the Body, acts less rationally than when conjointly with it or no? If its separate Thoughts be less rational, then these Men must say, That the Soul owes the perfection of rational Thinking to the Body: If it does not, 'tis a wonder that our Dreams should be, for the most part, so frivolous and irrational; and that the Soul should retain none of its more rational Soliloquies and Meditations.

If I think when I know it not, no body else can know it.

§. 17. Those who so confidently tell us, That the Soul always actually thinks, I would they would also tell us what those Ideas are that are in the Soul of a Child

Child before, or just at the union with the Body, before it hath receiv'd any by Sensation? The *Dreams* of sleeping Men are, as I take it, all made up of the waking Man's Ideas, tho' for the most part oddly put together. 'Tis strange if the Soul has Ideas of its own, that it deriv'd not from Sensation or Reflection (as it must have, if it thought before it receiv'd any impressions from the Body) that it should never, in its private thinking (so private, that the Man himself perceives it not) retain any of them, the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make the Man glad with new discoveries. Who can find it reasonable that the Soul should, in its retirement, during sleep, have so many hours thoughts, and yet never light on any of those Ideas it borrow'd not from Sensation or Reflection; or at least preserve the memory of none but such, which being occasion'd from the Body, must needs be less natural to a Spirit? 'Tis strange the Soul should never once in a Man's whole Life recall over any of its pure native Thoughts, and those Ideas it had before it borrow'd any thing from the Body; never bring into the waking Man's view any other Ideas but what have a Tang of the Cask, and manifestly derive their original from that union. If it always thinks, and so had Ideas before it was united, or before it receiv'd any from the Body, 'tis not to be suppos'd, but that during sleep it recollects its native Ideas; and during that retirement from communicating with the Body, whilst it thinks by it self, the Ideas it is busy'd about should be, sometimes at least, those more natural and congenial ones which it had in it self, underiv'd from the Body, or its own Operations about them: which, since the waking Man never remembers, we must from this Hypothesis conclude, either that the Soul remembers something that the Man does not; or else that Memory belongs only to such Ideas as are deriv'd from the Body, or the Mind's Operations about them.

§. 18. I would be glad also to learn from these Men, who so confidently pronounce, that the human Soul, or which is all one, that a Man always thinks, how they come to know it; nay, how they come to know that themselves think, when they themselves do not perceive it? This, I am afraid, is to be sure without Proofs; and to know, without perceiving: 'Tis, I suspect, a confus'd Notion taken up to serve an Hypothesis; and none of those clear Truths that either their own Evidence forces us to admit, or common Experience makes it impudence to deny. For the most that can be said of it, is, That 'tis possible the Soul may always think, but not always retain it in memory: And, I say, it is as possible that the Soul may not always think; and much more probable that it should sometimes not think, than that it should often think, and that a long while together, and not be conscious to it self the next moment after, that it had thought.

§. 19. To suppose the Soul to think, and the Man not to perceive it, is, as has been said, to make two Persons in one Man: And if one considers well these Mens way of speaking, one should be led into a suspicion that they do so. For they who tell us that the Soul always thinks, do never, that I remember, say, That a Man always thinks. Can the Soul think, and not the Man? or a Man think, and not be conscious of it? This perhaps would be suspected of Jargon in others. If they say, the Man thinks always, but is not always conscious of it; they may as well say, his Body is extended without having Parts. For 'tis altogether as intelligible to say, that a Body is extended without Parts, as that any thing thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so. They who talk thus, may with as much reason, if it be necessary to their Hypothesis, say, That a Man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it: whereas Hunger consists in that very Sensation, as Thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks. If they say, That a Man is always conscious to himself of thinking; I ask, how they know it? Consciousness is the Perception of what passes in a Man's own Mind. Can another Man perceive that I am conscious of any thing, when I perceive it not my self? No Man's Knowledge here can go beyond his Experience. Wake a Man out of a sound Sleep, and ask him, What he was that moment thinking on? If he himself be conscious of nothing he then thought on, he must be a notable Diviner of Thoughts that can assure him that he was thinking: May he not with more reason assure him he was not asleep? This is something beyond Philosophy; and it cannot be less

How knows any one that the Soul always thinks? For if it be not a self-evident Proposition, it needs proof.

That a Man should be busy in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable.

less than Revelation that discovers to another Thoughts in my Mind, when I can find none there my self: And they must needs have a penetrating sight, who can certainly see that I think, when I cannot perceive it my self, and when I declare that I do not; and yet can see that Dogs or Elephants do not think, when they give all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us that they do so. This some may suspect to be a step beyond the *Rosencrucians*; it seeming easier to make one's self invisible to others, than to make another's Thoughts visible to me, which are not visible to himself. But, 'tis but defining the Soul to be a Substance that always thinks, and the business is done. If such definition be of any Authority, I know not what it can serve for, but to make many Men suspect, that they have no Souls at all, since they find a good part of their Lives pass away without thinking. For no Definitions, that I know, no Suppositions of any Sect, are of force enough to destroy constant Experience; and perhaps 'tis the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive; that makes so much useless dispute and noise in the World.

No Ideas but
from Sensation
or Reflection,
evident, if
we observe
Children.

§. 20. I see no reason therefore to believe, that the Soul thinks before the Senses have furnish'd it with Ideas to think on; and as those are increas'd and retain'd, so it comes, by exercise, to improve its Faculty of thinking, in the several parts of it, as well as afterwards, by compounding those Ideas, and reflecting on its own Operations; it increases its Stock, as well as Facility, in remembering, imagining, reasoning, and other modes of thinking.

§. 21. He that will suffer himself to be inform'd by observation and experience, and not make his own Hypothesis the Rule of Nature, will find few signs of a Soul accusom'd to much thinking in a new-born Child, and much fewer of any Reasoning at all. And yet it is hard to imagine, that the rational Soul should think so much, and not reason at all. And he that will consider, that Infants, newly come into the World, spend the greatest part of their time in Sleep, and are seldom awake, but when either Hunger calls for the Teat, or some Pain (the most importunate of all Sensations) or some other violent Impression upon the Body forces the Mind to perceive, and attend to it: He, I say, who considers this, will, perhaps, find reason to imagine, That a Fetus in the Mother's Womb differs not much from the State of a Vegetable; but passes the greatest part of its time without Perception or Thought, doing very little but sleep in a Place where it needs not seek for Food, and is surrounded with Liquor; always equally soft, and near of the same Temper; where the Eyes have no Light, and the Ears so shut up, are not very susceptible of Sounds; and where there is little or no variety, or change of Objects to move the Senses.

§. 22. Follow a Child from its Birth, and observe the alterations that time makes, and you shall find, as the Mind by the Senses comes more and more to be furnish'd with Ideas, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on. After some time it begins to know the Objects, which being most familiar with it, have made lasting Impressions. Thus it comes by degrees to know the Persons it daily converses with, and distinguish them from Strangers; which are Instances and Effects of its coming to retain and distinguish the Ideas the Senses convey to it. And so we may observe how the Mind, by degrees, improves in these, and advances to the exercise of those other Faculties of enlarging, compounding, and abstracting its Ideas, and of reasoning about them, and reflecting upon all these; of which I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

§. 23. If it shall be demanded then, When a Man begins to have any Ideas? I think the true Answer is, When he first has any Sensation. For since there appear not to be any Ideas in the Mind, before the Senses have convey'd any in, I conceive that Ideas in the Understanding are coeval with Sensation; which is such an Impression or Motion, made in some part of the Body, as produces some Perception in the Understanding. 'Tis about these Impressions made on our Senses by outward Objects, that the Mind seems first to employ it self in such Operations as we call Perception, Remembering, Consideration, Reasoning, &c.

The original
of all our
Knowledge.

§. 24. In time the Mind comes to reflect on its own Operations about the Ideas got by Sensation, and thereby stores it self with a new Set of Ideas, which I call Ideas of Reflection. These are the Impressions that are made on our Senses by outward Objects that are extrinsecal to the Mind; and its own Operations, proceeding

ing from Powers intrinsecal and proper to it self, which when reflected on by it self, become also Objects of its contemplation, are, as I have said, *the Original of all Knowledg*. Thus the first Capacity of human Intellect, is that the Mind is fitted to receive the Impressions made on it; either thro' the Senses by outward Objects; or by its own Operation when it *reflects* on them. This is the first step a Man makes towards the Discovery of any thing, and the ground-work whereon to build all those Notions, which ever he shall have naturally in this World. All those sublime Thoughts, which tower above the Clouds, and reach as high as Heaven it self, take their rise and footing here: In all that great Extent wherein the Mind wanders, in those remote Speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those *Ideas* which *Sense* or *Reflection* have offer'd for its Contemplation.

§. 25. In this Part the *Understanding* is merely *passive*; and whether or no it will have these Beginnings, and as it were Materials of Knowledg, is not in its own power. For the Objects of our Senses do, many of them, obtrude their particular *Ideas* upon our Minds whether we will or no: and the Operations of our Minds will not let us be without, at least some obscure Notions of them. No Man can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he thinks. These *simple Ideas*, when offer'd to the Mind, *the Understanding* can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted; nor blot them out, and make new ones it self, than a Mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or *Ideas* which the Objects set before it do therein produce. As the Bodies that surround us do diversly affect our Organs, the Mind is forced to receive the Impressions, and cannot avoid the Perception of those *Ideas* that are annex'd to them.

In the reception of simple Ideas, the Understanding is for the most part passive.

C H A P. II.

Of Simple Ideas.

§. 1. **T**HE better to understand the Nature, Manner, and Extent of our Knowledg, one thing is carefully to be observ'd concerning the *Ideas* we have; and that is, That *some* of them are *simple*, and *some* *complex*.

Uncompounded Appearances.

Tho' the Qualities that affect our Senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet 'tis plain, the *Ideas* they produce in the Mind enter by the Senses simple and unmix'd. For tho' the Sight and Touch often take in from the same Object, at the same time, different *Ideas*; as a Man sees at once Motion and Colour; the Hand feels Softness and Warmth in the same piece of Wax: Yet the *simple Ideas*, thus united in the same Subject, are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different Senses: The Coldness and Hardness which a Man feels in a piece of Ice, being as distinct *Ideas* in the Mind, as the Smell and Whiteness of a Lilly; or as the Taste of Sugar, and Smell of a Rose. And there is nothing can be plainer to a Man, than the clear and distinct Perception he has of those *simple Ideas*; which being each in it self uncompounded, contains in it nothing but *one uniform Appearance*, or Conception in the Mind, and is not distinguishable into different *Ideas*.

§. 2. These *simple Ideas*, the Materials of all our Knowledg, are suggested and furnished to the Mind only by those two Ways above-mention'd, *viz. Sensation* and *Reflection*. When the *Understanding* is once stor'd with these *simple Ideas*, it has the Power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite Variety; and so can make at pleasure new *complex Ideas*. But it is not in the power of the most exalted Wit, or enlarg'd *Understanding*, by a quickness or variety of Thought, to *invent* or *frame* one *new simple Idea* in the Mind, not taken in by the ways aforemention'd: Nor can any Force of the *Understanding* *destroy* those that are there. The Dominion of Man, in this little World of his own *Understanding*, being much-what the same as it is in the great World of visible Things; wherein his Power, however manag'd by Art and Skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the Materials that are

The Mind can neither make nor destroy them.

are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least Particle of new Matter, or destroying one Atom of what is already in being. The same Inability will every one find in himself, who shall go about to fashion in his Understanding any simple *Idea*, not receiv'd in by his Senses from external Objects, or by Reflection from the Operations of his own Mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any Taste which had never affected his Palate; or frame the *Idea* of a Scent he had never smelt: and when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind Mind hath *Ideas* of Colours, and a deaf Man true distinct Notions of Sounds.

§. 3. This is the reason why, tho' we cannot believe it impossible to God to make a Creature with other Organs, and more ways to convey into the Understanding the notice of corporeal things than those five, as they are usually counted, which he has given to Man: yet, I think, it is *not possible* for any one to imagine any other *Qualities* in Bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides Sounds, Tastes, Smells, visible and tangible Qualities. And had Mankind been made with but four Senses, the Qualities then, which are the Object of the fifth Sense, had been as far from our Notice, Imagination and Conception, as now any *belonging to a sixth, seventh, or eighth Sense*, can possibly be: which, whether yet some other Creatures, in some other parts of this vast and stupendous Universe, may not have, will be a great Presumption to deny. He that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things; but will consider the Immensity of this Fabrick, and the great Variety that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in other Mansions of it there may be other and different intelligent Beings, of whose Faculties he has as little Knowledge or Apprehension, as a Worm shut up in one Drawer of a Cabinet hath of the Senses or Understanding of a Man: such Variety and Excellency being suitable to the Wisdom and Power of the Maker. I have here follow'd the common Opinion of Man's having but five Senses; tho', perhaps, there may be justly counted more: but either Supposition serves equally to my present purpose.

C H A P. III.

Of Ideas of one Sense.

Division of Simple Ideas.

§. 1. **T**HE better to conceive the *Ideas* we receive from Sensation, it may not be amiss for us to consider them, in reference to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to our Minds, and make themselves perceivable by us.

First, then, There are some which come into our Minds by *one Sense* only.

Secondly, There are others that convey themselves into the Mind by *more Senses than one*.

Thirdly, Others that are had from *Reflection* only.

Fourthly, There are some that make themselves way, and are suggested to the Mind by *all the Ways of Sensation and Reflection*.

We shall consider them apart under these several Heads.

First, There are *some Ideas which have admittance only through one Sense*, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus Light and Colours, as White, Red, Yellow, Blue, with their several Degrees or Shades, and Mixtures, as Green, Scarlet, Purple, Sea-green, and the rest; come in only by the Eyes: All kind of Noises, Sounds and Tones, only by the Ears: The several Tastes and Smells, by the Nose and Palate. And if these Organs, or the Nerves which are the Conduits to convey them from without to their Audience in the Brain, the Mind's Presence-room (as I may so call it) are any of them so disorder'd, as not to perform their Functions, they have no Postern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into view, and be perceiv'd by the Understanding.

The most considerable of those belonging to the Touch, are Heat and Cold, and Solidity: all the rest consisting almost wholly in the sensible Configuration,

as smooth and rough; or else more or less firm adhesion of the Parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

§. 2. I think, it will be needless to enumerate all the particular *simple Ideas*, belonging to each Sense. Nor indeed is it possible, if we would; there being a great many *more* of them belonging to most of the Senses, *than we have Names for*. The variety of Smells, which are as many almost, if not more, than Species of Bodies in the World, do most of them want Names. *Sweet and Stinking* commonly serve our turn for these *Ideas*, which in Effect is little more than to call them pleasing or displeasing; tho' the Smell of a Rose and Violet, both sweet, are certainly very distinct *Ideas*. Nor are the different Tastes that by our Palates we receive *Ideas* of, much better provided with Names. Sweet, Bitter, Sour, Harsh, and Salt, are almost all the Epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of Relishes, which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of Creatures, but in the different parts of the same Plant, Fruit, or Animal. The same may be said of Colours and Sounds. I shall therefore, in the account of *simple Ideas* I am here giving, content myself to set down only such, as are most material to our present purpose, or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of, tho' they are very frequently the Ingredients of our complex *Ideas*, amongst which, I think, I may well account Solidity; which therefore I shall treat of in the next Chapter.

C H A P. IV.

Of Solidity.

§. 1. **T**HE *Idea* of Solidity we receive by our Touch; and it arises from the resistance which we find in Body, to the Entrance of any other Body into the Place it possesses, till it has left it. There is no *Idea*, which we receive more constantly from Sensation, than Solidity. Whether we move or rest, in what posture soever we are, we always feel something under us that supports us, and hinders our farther sinking downwards; and the Bodies which we daily handle, make us perceive, that whilst they remain between them, they do by an insurmountable Force hinder the approach of the parts of our Hands that press them. That which thus hinders the approach of two Bodies, when they are moving one towards another, I call Solidity. I will not dispute, whether this Acceptation of the Word *solid* be nearer to its original Signification, than that which Mathematicians use it in; it suffices, that I think the common Notion of Solidity will allow, if not justify, this Use of it; but if any one think it better to call it *Impenetrability*, he has my Consent. Only I have thought the term Solidity the more proper to express this *Idea*, not only because of its vulgar use in that Sense; but also because it carries something more of positive in it than *Impenetrability*, which is negative, and is perhaps more a Consequence of Solidity, than Solidity it self. This of all other, seems the *Idea* most intimately connected with and essential to Body, so as no where else to be found or imagin'd, but only in Matter. And tho' our Senses take no notice of it, but in Masses of Matter, of a bulk sufficient to cause a Sensation in us; yet the Mind, having once got this *Idea* from such grosser sensible Bodies, traces it farther: and considers it, as well as Figure, in the minutest Particle of Matter that can exist: and finds it inseparably inherent in Body, whatever or however modify'd.

We receive this Idea from Touch.

§. 2. This is the *Idea* belongs to Body, whereby we conceive it to fill Space. Solidity fills The *Idea* of which filling of space, is, That where we imagine any space taken up by a solid Substance, we conceive it so to possess it, that it excludes all other solid Substances; and will for ever hinder any two other Bodies, that move towards one another in a strait Line, from coming to touch one another, unless it removes from between them, in a Line not parallel to that which they move in. This *Idea* of it, the Bodies which we ordinarily handle, sufficiently furnish us with.

Solidity fills Space.

§. 3. This Resistance, whereby it keeps other Bodies out of the space which it possesses, is so great, that no Force, how great soever, can surmount it. All

Distinct from Space.

the Bodies in the World pressing a drop of Water on all Sides, will never be able to overcome the Resistance which it will make, as soft as it is, to their approaching one another, till it be remov'd out of their Way: Whereby our *Idea* of *Solidity* is *distinguish'd* both from pure *Space*, which is capable neither of Resistance nor Motion; and from the ordinary *Idea* of *Hardness*. For a Man may conceive two Bodies at a Distance, so as they may approach one another, without touching or displacing any solid Thing, till their Superficies come to meet: Whereby, I think, we have the clear *Idea* of *Space* without *Solidity*. For (not to go so far as Annihilation of any particular Body) I ask, whether a Man cannot have the *Idea* of the Motion of one single Body alone, without any other succeeding immediately into its place? I think, 'tis evident he can: The *Idea* of Motion in one Body no more including the *Idea* of Motion in another, than the *Idea* of a square Figure in one Body includes the *Idea* of a square Figure in another. I do not ask, whether Bodies do so exist, that the Motion of one Body cannot really be without the Motion of another. To determine this either Way, is to beg the Question for or against a *Vacuum*. But my Question is, Whether one cannot have the *Idea* of one Body mov'd, whilst others are at rest? And I think, this no one will deny. If so, then the Place it deserted gives us the *Idea* of pure *Space* without *Solidity*, whereinto another Body may enter, without either Resistance or Protrusion of any Thing. When the Sucker in a Pump is drawn, the space it fill'd in the Tube is certainly the same, whether any other Body follows the Motion of the Sucker or no: Nor does it imply a Contradiction, that upon the Motion of one Body, another, that is only contiguous to it, should not follow it. The Necessity of such a Motion is built only on the Supposition that the World is full, but not on the distinct *Ideas* of *Space* and *Solidity*; which are as different as Resistance and not Resistance, Protrusion and not Protrusion. And that Men have *Ideas* of *Space* without Body, their very Disputes about a *Vacuum* plainly demonstrate; as is shew'd in another place.

From Hard-
ness.

§. 4. *Solidity* is hereby also *differentiated* from *Hardness*, in that *Solidity* consists in Repletion, and so an utter Exclusion of other Bodies out of the *Space* it possesses; but *Hardness*, in a firm Cohesion of the Parts of Matter, making up Masses of a sensible bulk, so that the whole does not easily change its Figure. And indeed Hard and Soft are Names that we give to Things, only in relation to the Constitutions of our own Bodies; that being generally call'd hard by us, which will put us to Pain, sooner than change Figure by the pressure of any part of our Bodies; and that, on the contrary, soft, which changes the Situation of its parts upon an easy and unpainful touch.

But this difficulty of changing the Situation of the sensible parts amongst themselves, or of the Figure of the whole, gives no more *Solidity* to the hardest Body in the World, than to the softest; nor is an Adamant one Jot more solid than Water. For tho' the two flat Sides of two Pieces of Marble will more easily approach each other, between which there is nothing but Water or Air, than if there be a Diamond between them: Yet it is not that the parts of the Diamond are more solid than those of Water, or resist more; but because the parts of Water being more easily separable from each other, they will by a Side-Motion be more easily remov'd, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of Marble. But if they could be kept from making place, by that Side-motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of these two Pieces of Marble, as much as the Diamond; and 'twould be as impossible by any force to surmount their Resistance, as to surmount the Resistance of the Parts of a Diamond. The softest Body in the World will as invincibly resist the coming together of any two other Bodies, if it be not put out of the Way, but remain between them, as the hardest that can be found or imagin'd. He that shall fill a yielding soft Body well with Air or Water, will quickly find its Resistance: And he that thinks that nothing but Bodies that are hard can keep his Hands from approaching one another, may be pleas'd to make a trial, with the Air inclos'd in a Foot-ball. The Experiment, I have been told, was made at Florence, with a hollow Globe of Gold fill'd with Water, and exactly clos'd; which farther shews the *Solidity* of so soft a Body as Water. For the golden Globe thus fill'd being put into a Press, which was driven by the extreme force of Skrews, the

Water

Water made it self way thro' the Pores of that very close Metal ; and finding no Room for a nearer approach of its Particles within, got to the outside, where it rose like a Dew, and so fell in Drops, before the Sides of the Globe could be made to yield to the violent Compression of the Engine that squeez'd it.

§. 5. By this *Idea* of Solidity, is the Extension of Body distinguish'd from the Extension of Space : The Extension of Body being nothing but the Cohesion or Continuity of solid, separable, movable Parts ; and the Extension of Space, the Continuity of unsolid, inseparable, and immovable Parts. *Upon the Solidity of Bodies also depends their mutual Impulse, Resistance and Protrusion.* Of pure Space then, and Solidity, there are several (amongst which, I confess my self one) who persuade themselves they have clear and distinct *Ideas* : and that they can think on Space, without any thing in it that resists or is protruded by Body. This is the *Idea* of pure Space, which they think they have as clear, as any *Idea* they can have of the Extension of Body ; the *Idea* of the distance between the opposite Parts of a concave Superficies, being equally as clear without as with the *Idea* of any solid Parts between : And on the other Side they persuade themselves, That they have, distinct from that of pure Space, the *Idea* of something that fills Space, that can be protruded by the Impulse of other Bodies, or resist their Motion. If there be others that have not these two *Ideas* distinct, but confound them, and make but one of them ; I know not how Men, who have the same *Idea* under different Names, or different *Ideas* under the same Name, can in that Case talk with one another ; any more than a Man, who not being blind or deaf, has distinct *Ideas* of the Colour of Scarlet, and the Sound of a Trumpet, could discourse concerning Scarlet-Colour with the blind Man I mention in another Place, who fancy'd that the *Idea* of Scarlet was like the Sound of a Trumpet.

§. 6. If any one asks me, *What this Solidity is ?* I send him to his Senses to inform him : Let him put a Flint or a Foot-ball between his Hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a sufficient Explanation of Solidity, what it is, and wherein it consists ; I promise to tell him what it is, and wherein it consists, when he tells me what Thinking is, or wherein it consists ; or explains to me what Extension or Motion is, which perhaps seems much easier. The simple *Ideas* we have, are such as Experience reaches them us ; but if beyond that, we endeavour by Words to make them clearer in the Mind, we shall succeed no better, than if he went about to clear up the Darkness of a blind Man's Mind by talking ; and to discourse into him the *Ideas* of Light and Colours. The reason of this I shall shew in another Place.

CHAP. V.

Of Simple Ideas of divers Senses.

THE *Ideas* we get by more than one Sense, are of *Space*, or *Extension*, *Figure*, *Rest*, and *Motion* ; for these make perceivable Impressions, both on the Eyes and Touch : And we can receive and convey into our Minds the *Ideas* of the Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest of Bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having Occasion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.

CHAP. VI.

Of Simple Ideas of Reflection.

§. 1. THE Mind receiving the *Ideas*, mention'd in the foregoing Chapters, from without, when it turns its view inward upon it self, and observes its own Actions about those *Ideas* it has, takes from thence other *Ideas*, which are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation, as any of those it receiv'd from foreign Things.

The Idea of
Preception,
and Idea of
Willing, we
have from Re-
flection.

§. 2. The two great and principal Actions of the Mind, which are most frequently considered, and which are so frequent, that every one that pleases may take notice of 'em in himself, are these two :

*Preception or Thinking, and
Volition, or Willing.*

The Power of Thinking is call'd the *Understanding*, and the Power of Volition is call'd the *Will*; and these two Powers or Abilities in the Mind are denominated *Faculties*. Of some of the Modes of these simple *Ideas* of Reflection, such as are *Remembrance, Discerning, Reasoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith, &c.* I shall have Occasion to speak hereafter.

CHAP. VII.

Of Simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection.

Pleasure and
Pain.

§. 1. THERE be other simple *Ideas* which convey themselves into the Mind by all the Ways of Sensation and Reflection, viz.

Pleasure or Delight, and its opposite.

Pain or Uneasiness.

Power.

Existence.

Unity.

§. 2. *Delight or Uneasiness*, one or other of them join themselves to almost all our *Ideas*, both of Sensation and Reflection : And there is scarce any Affection of our Senses from without, any retir'd Thought of our Mind within, which is not able to produce in us *Pleasure or Pain*. By *Pleasure* and *Pain* I would be understood to signify whatsoever delights or molests us ; whether it arises from the Thoughts of our Minds, or any Thing operating on our Bodies. For whether we call it Satisfaction, Delight, Pleasure, Happiness, &c. on the one Side ; or Uneasiness, Trouble, Pain, Torment, Anguish, Misery, &c. on the other ; they are still but different Degrees of the same Thing, and belong to the *Ideas* of *Pleasure* and *Pain*, *Delight* or *Uneasiness* : Which are the Names I shall most commonly use for those two Sorts of *Ideas*.

§. 3. The infinite wise Author of our Being having given us the Power over several Parts of our Bodies, to move or keep them at rest as we think fit ; and also by the Motion of them, to move our selves and other contiguous Bodies, in which consist all the Actions of our Body : Having also given a Power to our Minds in several Instances, to chuse, among its *Ideas*, which it will think on, and to pursue the Enquiry of this or that Subject with Consideration and Attention, to excite us to these Actions of Thinking and Motion that we are capable of ; has been pleas'd to join to several Thoughts and several Sensations, a *Perception* of *Delight*. If this were wholly separated from all our outward Sensations and inward Thoughts, we should have no Reason to prefer one Thought or Action to another ; Negligence to Attention ; or Motion to Rest. And so we should neither stir our Bodies nor employ our Minds, but let our Thoughts (if I may so call it) run a-drift, without any Direction or Design ; and suffer the *Ideas* of our Minds, like unregarded Shadows, to make their appearances there, as it happen'd, without attending to them. In which state Man, however furnish'd with the Faculties of Understanding and Will, would be a very idle unactive Creature, and pass his time only in a lazy lethargick Dream. It has therefore pleas'd our Wise Creator to annex to several Objects, and to the *Ideas* which we receive from them, as also to several of our Thoughts, a concomitant Pleasure, and that in several Objects, to several Degrees ; that those Faculties which he had endow'd us with, might not remain wholly idle and unemploy'd by us.

§. 4. *Pain* has the same Efficacy and Use to set us on work that *Pleasure* has, we being as ready to employ our Faculties to avoid that, as to pursue this : Only this is worth our Consideration, that *Pain* is often produc'd by the same Objects and Ideas that produce *Pleasure* in us. This their near Conjunction, which

which makes us often feel Pain in the Sensations where we expected Pleasure; gives us new Occasion of admiring the Wisdom and Goodness of our Maker; who designing the Preservation of our Being, has annex'd Pain to the application of many Things to our Bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do, and as Advices to withdraw from them. But he not designing our Preservation barely, but the Preservation of every Part and Organ in its Perfection, hath, in many Cases, annex'd Pain to those very *Ideas* which delight us. Thus Heat, that is very agreeable to us in one Degree, by a little greater increase of it, proves no ordinary Torment; and the most pleasant of all sensible Objects, Light it self, if there be too much of it, if increas'd beyond a due Proportion to our Eyes, causes a very painful Sensation. Which is wisely and favourably so order'd by Nature, that when any Object does by the vehemency of its Operation, disorder the Instruments of Sensation, whose Structures cannot but be very nice and delicate; we might by the Pain be warn'd to withdraw before the Organ be quite put out of Order, and so be unfitted for its proper Function for the future. The Consideration of those Objects that produce it, may well persuade us that this is the end or use of Pain. For tho' great Light be insufferable to our Eyes, yet the highest Degree of Darkness does not at all disease them; because that causing no disorderly Motion in it, leaves that curious Organ unharm'd in its natural State. But yet excess of Cold as well as Heat pains us, because it is equally destructive to that Temper which is necessary to the Preservation of Life, and the exercise of the several Functions of the Body, and which consists in a moderate degree of Warmth; or if you please, a Motion of the insensible Parts of our Bodies, confin'd within certain bounds.

§. 5. Beyond all this we may find another Reason, why God hath scatter'd up and down several Degrees of Pleasure and Pain, in all the Things that environ and affect us, and blended them together in almost all that our Thoughts and Senses have to do with; that we finding Imperfection, Dissatisfaction, and want of compleat Happiness, in all the Enjoyments which the Creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the Enjoyment of him, with whom there is fulness of Joy, and at whose right Hand are Pleasures for evermore.

§. 6. Tho' what I have here said, may not perhaps make the *Ideas of Pleasure and Pain* clearer to us than our own Experience does, which is the only way that we are capable of having them; yet the Consideration of the Reason, why they are annex'd to so many other *Ideas*, serving to give us due Sentiments of the Wisdom and Goodness of the sovereign Disposer of all Things, may not be unsuitable to the main end of these Enquiries: The Knowledge and Veneration of him being the chief end of all our Thoughts, and the proper Business of all our Understandings.

§. 7. *Existence and Unity* are two other *Ideas* that are suggested to the Understanding by every Object without, and every *Idea* within. When *Ideas* are in our Minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us; which is, that they exist, or have *Existence*: And whatever we can consider as one Thing, whether a real Being or *Idea*, suggests to the Understanding the *Idea* of *Unity*.

§. 8. *Power* also is another of those simple *Ideas* which we receive from *Sensation and Reflection*. For observing in our selves, that we can at pleasure move several Parts of our Bodies which were at rest; the effects also that natural Bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our Senses, we both these Ways get the *Idea* of *Power*.

§. 9. Besides these there is another *Idea*, which tho' suggested by our Senses, yet is more constantly offer'd us by what passes in our own Minds; and that is the *Idea* of *Succession*. For if we look immediately into our selves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our *Ideas* always whilst we are awake, or have any Thought, passing in Train, one going and another coming, without intermission.

§. 10. These, if they are not all, are at least (as I think) the most considerable of those *simple Ideas* which the Mind has, and out of which is made all its other Knowledge; all which it receives only by the two foremention'd ways of *Sensation and Reflection*.

Nor

Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious Mind of Man to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the Stars, and cannot be confin'd by the Limits of the World; that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmost expansion of Matter, and makes Excursions into that incomprehensible *Inane*. I grant all this, but desire any one to assign any *simple Idea* which is not *receiv'd from one of those Inlets* before-mention'd, or any *complex Idea* not *made out of those simple ones*. Nor will it be so strange to think these few simple *Ideas* sufficient to employ the quickest Thought, or largest Capacity; and to furnish the Materials of all that various Knowledge, and more various Fancies and Opinions of all Mankind, if we consider how many Words may be made out of the various composition of twenty four Letters; or if going one step farther, we will but reflect on the Variety of Combinations may be made, with barely one of the above-mention'd *Ideas*, *viz.* Number, whose stock is inexhaustible and truly infinite: And what a large and immense Field doth Extension alone afford the Mathematicians?

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther Considerations concerning our Simple Ideas.

*Positive Ideas
from privative
Causes.*

§. 1. **C**ONCERNING the simple *Ideas* of Sensation 'tis to be consider'd, that whatsoever is so constituted in Nature as to be able, by affecting our Senses, to cause any Preception in the Mind, doth thereby produce in the Understanding a simple *Idea*; which, whatever be the external Cause of it, when it comes to be taken notice of by our discerning Faculty, it is by the Mind look'd on and consider'd there to be a real *positive Idea* in the Understanding, as much as any other whatsoever: tho' perhaps the Cause of it be but a Privation in the Subject.

§. 2. Thus the *Ideas* of Heat and Cold, Light and Darkness, White and Black, Motion and Rest, are equally clear and *positive Ideas* in the Mind; tho' perhaps some of the *Causes* which produce them are barely *Privations* in those Subjects, from whence our Senses derive those *Ideas*. These the Understanding, in its view of them, considers all as distinct *positive Ideas*, without taking notice of the *Causes* that produce them; which is an Enquiry not belonging to the *Idea*, as it is in the Understanding, but to the Nature of the Things existing without us. These are two very different things, and carefully to be distinguish'd; it being one Thing to perceive and know the *Idea* of White or Black, and quite another to examine what kind of Particles they must be, and how rang'd in the Superficies, to make any Object appear White or Black.

§. 3. A Painter or Dyer who never enquir'd into their *Causes*, hath the *Ideas* of White and Black, and other Colours, as clearly, perfectly, and distinctly in his Understanding, and perhaps more distinctly, than the Philosopher who hath busy'd himself in considering their Natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cause Positive or Privative; and the *Idea* of Black is no less *positive* in his Mind, than that of White, *however the cause* of that Colour in the external Object may be only a Privation.

§. 4. If it were the Design of my present Undertaking, to enquire into the natural *Causes* and Manner of Perception, I should offer this as a Reason *why a privative Cause might, in some Cases at least, produce a positive Idea, viz.* That all Sensation being produc'd in us only by different Degrees and Modes of Motion in our animal Spirits, variously agitated by external Objects, the abatement of any former Motion must as necessarily produce a new Sensation, as the variation or increase of it; and so introduce a new *Idea*, which depends only on a different Motion of the animal Spirits in that Organ.

§. 5. But whether this be so or no I will not here determine, but appeal to every one's own Experience, whether the Shadow of a Man, tho' it consists of nothing but the absence of Light (and the more the absence of Light is, the more discernible is the Shadow) does not, when a Man looks on it, cause as clear and positive an *Idea* in his Mind, as a Man himself, tho' cover'd over with clear

clear Sun shine? And the Picture of a Shadow is a positive thing. Indeed we have *negative Names*, which stand not directly for positive *Ideas*, but for their Absence, such as *Insipid, Silence, Nihil*, &c. which Words denote positive *Ideas*; v. g. *Taste, Sound, Being*, with a Signification of their absence.

§. 6. And thus one may truly be said to see Darkness. For supposing a Hole perfectly Dark, from whence no Light is reflected, 'tis certain one may see the Figure of it, or it may be painted; or whether the Ink I write with makes any other *Idea*, is a Question. The privative Causes I have here assign'd of positive *Ideas*, are according to the common Opinion; but in truth it will be hard to determine, whether there be really any *Ideas* from a privative Cause, till it be determin'd, *whether Rest be any more a Privation than Motion*.

Positive Ideas
from priva-
tive Causes.

§. 7. To discover the Nature of our *Ideas* the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them as they are *Ideas* or Perceptions in our Minds, and as they are modifications of Matter in the Bodies that cause such Perceptions in us; that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the Images and Resemblances of something inherent in the subject; most of those of Sensation being in the Mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the Names that stand for them are the likeness of our *Ideas*, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us.

Ideas in the
Mind, Quali-
ties in Bodies.

§. 8. Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate Object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call *Idea*; and the Power to produce any *Idea* in our Mind, I call *Quality* of the Subject wherein that Power is. Thus a Snow-ball having the Power to produce in us the *Ideas* of *White, Cold, and Round*, the Powers produce those *Ideas* in us as they are in the Snow-ball, I call *Qualities*; and as they are Sensations or Perceptions in our Understandings, I call them *Ideas*: Which *Ideas*, if I speak of sometimes, as in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those *Qualities* in the Objects which produce them in us.

§. 9. Qualities thus consider'd in Bodies are, first, such as are utterly inseparable from the Body, in what Estate soever it be; such as in all the Alterations and Changes it suffers, all the Force can be us'd upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as Sense constantly finds in every Particle of Matter which has bulk enough to be perceiv'd, and the Mind finds inseparable from every Particle of Matter, tho' less than to make it self singly be perceiv'd by our Senses. v. g. Take a Grain of Wheat, divide it into two Parts, each Part has still *Solidity, Extension, Figure, and Mobility*; divide it again, and it retains still the same *Qualities*, and so divide it on till the Parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all those *Qualities*. For Division (which is all that a Mill, or Pestle, or any other Body does upon another, in reducing it to insensible Parts) can never take away either *Solidity, Extension, Figure, or Mobility* from any Body, but only makes two or more distinct separate Masses of Matter, of that which was but one before; all of which distinct Masses, reckon'd as so many distinct Bodies, after Division make a certain Number. These I call *original* or *primary Qualities* of Body, which I think we may observe to produce simple *Ideas* in us, viz. *Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, and Number*.

Primary Qua-
lities.

§. 10. 2dly, Such *Qualities* which in truth are nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us by their *primary Qualities*, i. e. by the Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of their insensible Parts, as Colours, Sounds, Tastes, &c. these I call *Secondary Qualities*. To these might be added a third Sort, which are allow'd to be barely Powers, tho' they are as much real *Qualities* in the Subject, as those which I, to comply with the common Way of speaking, call *Qualities*, but for distinction *Secondary Qualities*. For the Power in Fire to produce a new Colour, or consistency in Wax or Clay by its *primary Qualities*, is as much a *Quality* in Fire, as the Power it has to produce in me a new *Idea* or Sensation of Warmth or Burning, which I felt not before by the same *primary Qualities*, viz. the Bulk, Texture, and Motion of its insensible Parts.

§. 11. The next Thing to be consider'd, is, how *Bodies* produce *Ideas* in us; and that is manifestly by impulse, the only Way which we can conceive Bodies operate in.

How primary
Qualities pro-
duce their I-
deas.

§. 12. If then external Objects be not united to our Minds, when they produce *Ideas* in it; and yet we perceive *these original Qualities* in such of them as singly fall under our Senses, 'tis evident that some Motion must be thence continu'd by our Nerves or animal Spirits, by some Parts of our Bodies, to the Brains, or the Seat of Sensation, there to produce in our Minds the particular *Ideas* we have of them. And since the Extension, Figure, Number and Motion of Bodies of an observable Bigness, may be perceiv'd at a Distance by the Sight, 'tis evident some singly imperceptible Bodies must come from them to the Eyes, and thereby convey to the Brain some Motion, which produces these *Ideas* which we have of them in us.

How Secondary-
13.

§. 13. After the same manner that the *Ideas* of these original Qualities are produc'd in us, we may conceive, that the *Ideas* of Secondary Qualities are also produc'd, viz. by the Operation of insensible Particles on our Senses. For it being manifest that there are Bodies, and good Store of Bodies, each whereof are so small, that we cannot, by any of our Senses, discover either their Bulk, Figure or Motion, as is evident in the Particles of the Air and Water, and other extremely smaller than those, perhaps as much smaller than the Particles of Air or Water, as the Particles of Air or Water are smaller than Pease or Hail-stones: Let us suppose at present, that the different Motions and Figures, Bulk and Number of such Particles, affecting the several Organs of our Senses, produce in us those different Sensations, which we have from the Colours and Smells of Bodies; v. g. that a Violet, by the impulse of such insensible Particles of matter of peculiar Figures and Bulks, and in different Degrees and Modifications of their Motions, causes the *Ideas* of the blue Colour, and sweet Scent of that Flower, to be produc'd in our Minds; it being no more impossible to conceive that God should annex such *Ideas* to such Motions, with which they have no similitude, than that he should annex the *Idea* of Pain to the Motion of a Piece of Steel dividing our Flesh, with which that *Idea* hath no resemblance.

§. 14. What I have said concerning Colours and Smells, may be understood also of Tastes and Sounds, and other the like sensible Qualities; which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us, and depend on those primary Qualities, viz. Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of Parts; as I have said.

Ideas of primary Qualities are Resemblances; of secondary, not.

§. 15. From whence I think it is easy to draw this Observation, That the *Ideas* of primary Qualities of Bodies are Resemblances of them, and their Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves; but the *Ideas*, produc'd in us by these Secondary Qualities, have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our *Ideas* existing in the Bodies themselves. They are in the Bodies, we denominate from them only a Power to produce those Sensations in us: And what is sweet, blue or warm in *Idea*, is but the certain Bulk, Figure and Motion of the insensible Parts in the Bodies themselves, which we call so.

§. 16. Flame is denominated hot and light; Snow, white and cold; and Manna, white and sweet, from the *Ideas* they produce in us: Which Qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those Bodies that those *Ideas* are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a Mirror; and it would by most Men be judg'd very extravagant, if one would say otherwise. And yet he that will consider that the same Fire, that at one Distance produces in us the Sensation of Warmth, does at a nearer approach produce in us the far different Sensation of Pain, ought to bethink himself what Reason he has to say, that his *Idea* of Warmth, which was produc'd in him by the Fire, is actually in the Fire; and his *Idea* of Pain, which the same Fire produc'd in him the same Way, is not in the Fire. Why is Whiteness and Coldness in Snow, and Pain not, when it produces the one and the other *Idea* in us; and can do neither, but by the Bulk, Figure, Number and Motion of its solid Parts?

§. 17. The particular Bulk, Number, Figure and Motion of the Parts of Fire, or Snow, are really in them, whether any one's Senses perceive them or no; and therefore they may be call'd real Qualities, because they really exist in those Bodies: But Light, Heat, Whiteness or Coldness, are no more really in them, than Sickness or Pain is in Manna. Take away the Sensation of them; let not the Eyes see Light, or Colours, nor the Ears hear Sounds; let the Palate not taste,

taste, nor the Nose smell; and all Colours, Tastes, Odours and Sounds, as they are such particular *Ideas*, vanish and cease, and are reduc'd to their Causes, *i.e.* Bulk, Figure and Motion of Parts.

§. 18. A piece of *Manna* of a sensible Bulk, is able to produce in us the *Idea* of a round or square Figure, and by being remov'd from one place to another, the *Idea* of Motion. This *Idea* of Motion represents it, as it really is in the *Manna* moving: A Circle or Square are the same, whether in *Idea* or Existence, in the Mind, or in the *Manna*; and this both *Motion* and *Figure* are really in the *Manna*, whether we take notice of them or no: This every body is ready to agree to. Besides, *Manna* by the Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of its Parts, has a Power to produce the Sensations of Sickness, and sometimes of acute Pains or Gripings in us. That these *Ideas* of Sickness and Pain are not in the *Manna*, but Effects of its Operations on us, and are no where when we feel them not: This also every one readily agrees to. And yet Men are hardly to be brought to think, that *Sweetness* and *Whiteness* are not really in *Manna*; which are but the Effects of the Operations of *Manna*, by the Motion, Size and Figure of its Particles on the Eyes and Palate; as the Pain and Sickness caused by *Manna*, are confessedly nothing but the Effects of its Operations on the Stomach and Guts, by the Size, Motion and Figure of its insensible Parts (for by nothing else can a Body operate, as has been prov'd:) As if it could not operate on the Eyes and Palate, and thereby produce in the Mind particular distinct *Ideas*, which in it self it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the Guts and Stomach, and thereby produce distinct *Ideas*, which in it self it has not. These *Ideas* being all Effects of the Operations of *Manna*, on several Parts of our Bodies, by the Size, Figure, Number and Motion of its Parts; why those produc'd by the Eyes and Palate should rather be thought to be really in the *Manna*, than those produc'd by the Stomach and Guts; or why the Pain and Sickness, *Ideas* that are the effects of *Manna*, should be thought to be no where when they are not felt; and yet the *Sweetness* and *Whiteness*, effects of the same *Manna* on other parts of the Body, by ways equally as unknown, should be thought to exist in the *Manna*, when they are not seen nor tasted, would need some Reason to explain.

§. 19. Let us consider the red and white Colours in *Porphyre*: Hinder Light but from striking on it, and its Colours vanish, it no longer produces any such *Ideas* in us; upon the return of Light, it produces these Appearances on us again. Can any one think any real Alterations are made in the *Porphyre*, by the presence or absence of Light; and that those *Ideas* of *Whiteness* and *Redness*, are really in *Porphyre* in the Light, when 'tis plain it has no Colour in the dark? It has, indeed, such a Configuration of Particles, both Night and Day, as are apt by the Rays of Light rebounding from some Parts of that hard Stone, to produce in us the *Idea* of *Redness*, and from others the *Idea* of *Whiteness*; but *Whiteness* or *Redness* are not in it at any time, but such a Texture, that hath the Power to produce such a Sensation in us.

Ideas of primary Qualities, are Resemblances; of secondary, not.

§. 20. Pound an Almond, and the clear white Colour will be alter'd into a dirty one, and the sweet Taste into an oily one. What real Alteration can the beating of the Pestle make in any Body, but an Alteration of the Texture of it?

§. 21. *Ideas* being thus distinguish'd and understood, we may be able to give an account how the same Water, at the same time, may produce the *Idea* of Cold by one Hand, and of Heat by the other; whereas it is impossible that the same Water, if those *Ideas* were really in it, should at the same time be both hot and cold: For if we imagine *Warmth*, as it is in our Hands, to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of Motion in the minute Particles of our Nerves, or animal Spirits, we may understand how it is possible that the same Water may, at the same time, produce the Sensation of Heat in one Hand, and Cold in the other; which yet Figure never does, that never producing the *Idea* of a Square by one Hand, which has produc'd the *Idea* of a Globe by another. But if the Sensation of Heat and Cold be nothing but the Increase or Diminution of the Motion of the minute Parts of our Bodies, caus'd by the Corpuscles of any other Body, it is easy to be understood, that if that Motion be greater in one Hand than in the other; if a Body be apply'd to the two Hands, which has, in

its minute Particles a greater motion, than in those of one of the Hands, and a less than in those of the other; it will increase the Motion of the one Hand, and lessen it in the other, and so cause the different Sensations of Heat and Cold that depend thereon.

§. 22. I have in what just goes before been engag'd in physical Enquiries a little farther than perhaps I intended. But it being necessary to make the Nature of Sensation a little understood, and to make the *difference between the Qualities in Bodies, and the Ideas produc'd by them in the Mind*, to be distinctly conceiv'd, without which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them; I hope I shall be pardon'd this little Excursion into natural Philosophy, it being necessary in our present Enquiry to distinguish the *primary*, and *real Qualities* of Bodies, which are always in them, (*viz.* Solidity, Extension, Figure, Number, and Motion, or Rest; and are sometimes perceiv'd by us, *viz.* when the Bodies they are in are big enough singly to be discern'd) from those *secondary* and *imputed Qualities*, which are but the Powers of several Combinations of those primary ones, when they operate, without being distinctly discern'd; whereby we also may come to know what *Ideas* are, and what are not Resemblances of something really existing in the Bodies we denominate from them.

Three sorts of Qualities in Bodies.

§. 23. The *Qualities* then that are in *Bodies* rightly consider'd, are of *three*

First, The *Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation* and *Motion*, or *Rest* of their solid Parts; those are in them, whether we perceive them or no; and when they are of that Size that we can discover them, we have by these an *Idea* of the thing as it is in it self, as is plain in artificial Things. These I call *primary Qualities*.

Secondly, The *Power* that is in any Body, by reason of its insensible *primary Qualities*, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our Senses, and thereby produce in us the different *Ideas* of several Colours, Sounds, Smells, Tastes, &c. These are usually call'd sensible Qualities.

Thirdly, The *Power* that is in any Body, by reason of the particular Constitution of its *primary Qualities*, to make such a change in the *Bulk, Figure, Texture*, and *Motion* of another Body, as to make it operate on our Senses differently from what it did before. Thus the Sun has a power to make Wax white, and Fire to make Lead fluid. These are usually call'd Powers.

The first of these, as has been said, I think, may be properly call'd *real original*, or *primary Qualities*, because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceiv'd or no; and upon their different Modifications it is, that the secondary Qualities depend.

The other two are only Powers to act differently upon other things, which Powers result from the different Modifications of those primary Qualities.

The first are Resemblances. The second thought Resemblances, but are not. The third neither are, nor are thought so.

§. 24. But tho' these two later sorts of *Qualities* are Powers barely, and nothing but Powers relating to several other Bodies, and resulting from the different Modifications of the original Qualities; yet they are generally otherwise thought of. For the *second Sort*, *viz.* The Powers to produce several *Ideas* in us by our Senses, are looked upon as *real Qualities*, in the Things thus affecting us: But the *third sort* are call'd, and esteem'd barely Powers, *v. g.* the *Idea* of Heat, or Light, which we receive by our Eyes, or touch from the Sun, are commonly thought *real Qualities*, existing in the Sun, and something more than mere Powers in it. But when we consider the Sun, in reference to Wax, which it melts or blanches, we look on the Whiteness and Softness produc'd in the Wax, not as Qualities in the Sun, but Effects produc'd by Powers in it: Whereas, if rightly consider'd, these Qualities of Light and Warmth, which are Perceptions in me when I am warm'd, or enlighten'd by the Sun, are no otherwise in the Sun, than the changes made in the Wax, when it is blanch'd or melted, are in the Sun. They are all of them equally Powers in the Sun, depending on its primary Qualities, whereby it is able in the one Case, so to alter the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of some of the insensible parts of my Eyes or Hands, as thereby to produce in me the *Idea* of Light or Heat; and in the other it is able so to alter the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of the insensible Parts of the Wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct *Ideas* of white and fluid.

§. 25. The reason why the one are ordinarily taken for *real Qualities*, and the other only for bare Powers, seems to be, because the *Ideas* we have of distinct Colours,

Colours, Sounds, &c. containing nothing at all in them of Bulk, Figure, or Motion, we are not apt to think them the Effects of these primary Qualities, which appear not to our Senses, to operate in their Production; and with which they have not any apparent Congruity, or conceivable Connexion. Hence it is that we are so forward to imagine, that those *Ideas* are the resemblances of something really existing in the Objects themselves: Since Sensation discovers nothing of Bulk, Figure or Motion of Parts in their Production; nor can Reason shew how Bodies, by their Bulk, Figure, and Motion should produce in the Mind the *Ideas* of Blue or Yellow, &c. But in the other case, in the Operations of Bodies, changing the Qualities one of another, we plainly discover that the Quality produc'd hath commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare Effect of Power. For tho' receiving the *Idea* of Heat, or Light from the Sun, we are apt to think 'tis a Preception and Resemblance of such a Quality in the Sun; yet when we see Wax, or a fair Face, receive change of Colour from the Sun, we cannot imagine that to be the Perception or Resemblance of any thing in the Sun, because we find not those different Colours in the Sun it self. For our Senses being able to observe a likeness or unlikeness of sensible Qualities in two different external Objects, we forwardly enough conclude the Production of any sensible Quality in any Subject, to be an Effect of bare Power, and not the Communication of any Quality, which was really in the Efficient, when we find no such sensible Quality in the thing that produc'd it. But our Senses, not being able to discover any unlikeness between the *Idea* produc'd in us, and the Quality of the Object producing it; we are apt to imagine, that our *Ideas* are resemblances of something in the Objects, and not the Effects of certain Powers plac'd in the Modification of their primary Qualities; with which primary Qualities the *Ideas* produc'd in us have no resemblance.

§. 26. To conclude, besides those before-mentioned, *primary Qualities* in Bodies, viz. Bulk, Figure, Extension, Number, and Motion of their solid Parts; all the rest whereby we take notice of Bodies, and distinguish them one from another, are nothing else but several Powers in them depending on those primary Qualities; whereby they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our Bodies, to produce several different *Ideas* in us; or else by operating on other Bodies, so to change their primary Qualities, as to render them capable of producing *Ideas* in us, different from what before they did. The former of these, I think, may be call'd *secondary Qualities, immediately perceivable*: The latter, *secondary Qualities, mediately perceivable*.

Secondary Qualities two fold; First, immediately perceivable; Secondly, mediately perceivable.

C H A P. IX.

Of Perception.

§. 1. **P**erception, as it is the first Faculty of the Mind, exercis'd about our *Ideas*; so it is the first and simplest *Idea* we have from Reflection, and is by some call'd Thinking in general. Tho' Thinking, in the propriety of the *English* Tongue, signifies that sort of Operation of the Mind about its *Ideas*, wherein the Mind is active; where it, with some degree of voluntary Attention, considers any thing. For in bare naked Perception, the Mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.

Perception the first simple Idea of Reflection.

§. 2. *What Perception is*, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, &c. or thinks, than by any discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own Mind, cannot miss it: And if he does not reflect, all the Words in the World cannot make him have any notion of it.

Is only when the Mind receives the Impression.

§. 3. This is certain, That whatever Alterations are made in the Body, if they reach not the Mind; whatever impressions are made on the outward Parts, if they are not taken notice of within; there is no Perception. Fire may burn our Bodies, with no other effect, than it does a Billet, unless the Motion be

continu'd to the Brain; and there the Sense of Heat, or *Idea* of Pain, be produc'd in the Mind, wherein consists *actual Perception*.

§. 4. How often may a Man observe in himself, that whilst his Mind is instantly employ'd in the Contemplation of some Objects, and curiously surveying some *Ideas* that are there; it takes no notice of Impressions of sounding Bodies made upon the Organ of Hearing, with the same Alteration that uses to be for the producing the *Idea* of Sound? A sufficient impulse there may be on the Organ; but it not reaching the Observation of the Mind, there follows no Perception: And tho' the Motion that uses to produce the *Idea* of Sound, be made in the Ear, yet no Sound is heard. Want of Sensation in this case, is not through any defect in the Organ, or that the Man's Ears are less affected than at other times when he does hear: but that which uses to produce the *Idea*, tho' convey'd in by the usual Organ, not being taken notice of in the Understanding, and so imprinting no *Idea* on the Mind, there follows no Sensation. *So that wherever there is Sense, or Perception, there some Idea is actually produc'd, and present in the Understanding.*

Children, tho' they have Ideas in the Womb, have none innate.

§. 5. Therefore I doubt not but *Children*, by the exercise of their Senses about Objects that affect them *in the Womb*, receive some few *Ideas* before they are born; as the unavoidable Effects, either of the Bodies that environ them, or else of those Wants or Diseases they suffer: Among which (if one may conjecture concerning Things not very capable of Examination) I think the *Ideas* of Hunger and Warmth are two; which probably are some of the first that Children have, and which they scarce ever part with again.

§. 6. But tho' it be reasonable to imagine that *Children* receive some *Ideas* before they come into the World; yet these simple *Ideas* are far from those innate Principles which some contend for, and we above have rejected. These here mention'd being the effects of Sensation, are only from some Affections of the Body, which happen to them there, and so depend on something exterior to the Mind; no otherwise differing in their manner of Production from other *Ideas* deriv'd from Sense, but only in the precedency of Time: Whereas those innate Principles are suppos'd to be quite of another nature; not coming into the Mind by any accidental Alterations in, or Operations on the Body; but, as it were, original Characters impress'd upon it, in the very first moment of its Being and Constitution.

Which Ideas first, is not evident.

§. 7. As there are some *Ideas* which we may reasonably suppose may be introduc'd into the Minds of Children in the Womb, subservient to the Necessities of their Life and Being there; so after they are born, those *Ideas* are the *earliest imprinted*, which happen to be the *sensible Qualities* which first occur to them: Amongst which, Light is not the least considerable, nor of the weakest efficacy. And how coverous the Mind is to be furnish'd with all such *Ideas* as have no pain accompanying them, may be a little guess'd, by what is observable in Children new-born, who always turn their Eyes to that part from whence the Light comes, lay them how you please. But the *Ideas* that are most familiar at first being various, according to the divers Circumstances of Childrens first entertainment in the World; the Order wherein the several *Ideas* come at first into the Mind, is very various and uncertain also; neither is it much material to know it.

Ideas of Sensation often chang'd by the Judgment.

§. 8. We are farther to consider concerning Perception, that the *Ideas* we receive by Sensation are often in grown People alter'd by the Judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our Eyes a round Globe, of any uniform Colour, v. g. Gold, Alabaster, or Jet; 'tis certain that the *Idea* thereby imprinted in our Mind, is of a flat Circle variously shadow'd, with several degrees of Light and Brightness coming to our Eyes. But we having by use been accusom'd to perceive what kind of appearance convex Bodies are wont to make in us, what Alterations are made in the Reflections of Light by the difference of the sensible Figures of Bodies; the Judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the Appearances into their Causes: So that from that which truly is variety of Shadow or Colour, collecting the Figure, it makes it pass for a mark of Figure, and frames to it self the Perception of a convex Figure and an uniform Colour; when the *Idea* we receive from thence is only a Plain variously colour'd, as is evident in painting. To which purpose I shall here insert a Problem

blem of that very ingenious and studious Promoter of real Knowledge, the Learned and Worthy Mr. Molineux, which he was pleas'd to send me in a Letter some Months since; and it is this: *Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his Touch to distinguish between a Cube and a Sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell when he felt one and t'other, which is the Cube, which the Sphere. Suppose then the Cube and Sphere plac'd on a Table, and the blind Man to be made to see: Quære, Whether by his Sight, before he touch'd them, he could now distinguish and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube? To which the acute and judicious Proposer answers: Not. For tho' he has obtain'd the Experience of, how a Globe, how a Cube affects his Touch; yet he has not yet attain'd the Experience, that what affects his Touch so or so, must affect his Sight so or so: Or that a protuberant Angle in the Cube, that press'd his Hand unequally, shall appear to his Eye as it does in the Cube.* I agree with this thinking Gentleman, whom I am proud to call my Friend, in his answer to this his Problem; and am of Opinion, that the blind Man, at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say which was the Globe, which the Cube, whilst he only saw them; tho' he could unerringly name them by his Touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference of their Figures felt. This I have set down, and leave with my Reader, as an occasion for him to consider how much he may be beholden to Experience, Improvement, and acquir'd Notions, where he thinks he has not the least use of, or help from them: And the rather, because this observing Gentleman farther adds, *That having, upon the occasion of my Book, propos'd this to divers very ingenious Men, he hardly ever met with one that at first gave the answer to it which he thinks true, till by hearing his Reasons they were convinc'd.*

§. 9. But this is not, I think, usual in any of our *Ideas*, but those receiv'd by Sight: Because Sight, the most comprehensive of all our Senses, conveying to our Minds the *Ideas* of Light and Colours, which are peculiar only to that Sense; and also the far different *Ideas* of Space, Figure, and Motion, the several varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper Object, *viz.* Light and Colours; we bring our selves by use to judg of the one by the other. This, in many Cases, by a settled habit, in things whereof we have frequent Experience, is perform'd so constantly and so quick, that we take that for the Perception of our Sensation, which is an *Idea* form'd by our Judgment; so that one, *viz.* that of Sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of it self: As a Man who reads or hears with Attention and Understanding, takes little notice of the Characters, or Sounds, but of the *Ideas* that are excited in him by them.

§. 10. Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice, if we consider how very quick the *Actions* of the Mind are perform'd: For as it self is thought to take up no Space, to have no Extension; so its *Actions* seem to require no time, but many of them seem to be crouded into an instant. I speak this in comparison to the *Actions* of the Body. Any one may easily observe this in his own Thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an instant, do our Minds with one glance see all the parts of a Demonstration, which may very well be call'd a long one, if we consider the time it will require to put it into words, and step by step shew it another? Secondly, We shall not be so much surpriz'd, that this is done in us with so little notice, if we consider how the facility which we get of doing things, by a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us without our notice. *Habits*, especially such as are begun very early, come at last to produce *Actions* in us, which often escape our Observation. How frequently do we, in a Day, cover our Eyes with our Eye-lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark? Men that by custom have got the use of a By-word, do almost in every Sentence pronounce Sounds, which tho' taken notice of by others, they themselves neither hear nor observe. And therefore 'tis not so strange, that our Mind should often change the *Idea* of its Sensation into that of its Judgment, and make one serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.

§. 11. This Faculty of Perception seems to me to be that, which puts the distinction betwixt the animal Kingdom and the inferiour parts of Nature. For how ever Vegetables have, many of them, some degrees of Motion, and upon the different Application of other Bodies to them do very briskly alter their Figures and

Perception puts the difference between Animals and inferior Beings.

and Motions, and so have obtain'd the name of sensitive Plants, from a Motion which has some resemblance to that which in Animals follows upon Sensation: yet, I suppose, it is all bare Mechanism; and no otherwise produc'd, than the turn of a wild Oat-beard, by the insinuation of the Particles of Moisture; or the shortening of a Rope, by the Affusion of Water. All which is done without any Sensation in the Subject, or the having or receiving any *Ideas*.

§. 12. *Perception*, I believe, is in some degree in all sorts of *Animals*; tho' in some, possibly, the Avenues provided by Nature for the Reception of Sensations are so few, and the Perception they are receiv'd with so obscure and dull, that it comes extremely short of the Quickness and Variety of Sensations which is in other Animals: But yet it is sufficient for, and wisely adapted to, the state and Condition of that sort of Animals, who are thus made. So that the Wisdom and Goodness of the Maker plainly appear in all the Parts of this stupendous Fabrick, and all the several Degrees and Ranks of Creatures in it.

§. 13. We may, I think, from the Make of an *Oyster*, or *Cockle*, reasonably conclude that it has not so many, nor so quick Senses, as a Man, or several other Animals; nor if it had, would it, in that State and incapacity of transferring it self from one Place to another, be better'd by them. What good would Sight and Hearing do to a Creature, that cannot move it self to, or from the Objects, wherein at a distance it perceives Good or Evil? And would not Quickness of Sensation be an Inconvenience to an Animal that must lie still, where Chance has once plac'd it; and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul Water, as it happens to come to it?

§. 14. But yet I cannot but think, there is some small dull Perception, whereby they are distinguish'd from perfect Insensibility. And that this may be so we have plain instances, even in Mankind it self. Take one, in whom decrepid old Age has blotted out the Memory of his past Knowledge, and clearly wiped out the *Ideas* his Mind was formerly stor'd with; and has, by destroying his Sight, Hearing, and Smell quite, and his Taste to a great Degree, stop'd up almost all the Passages for new ones to enter: Or, if there be some of the Inlets yet half open, the Impressions made are scarce perceiv'd, or not at all retain'd. How far such an one (notwithstanding all that is boasted of innate Principles) is in his Knowledge, and intellectual Faculties, above the Condition of a *Cockle* or an *Oyster*, I leave to be consider'd. And if a Man had pass'd sixty Years in such a State, as 'tis possible he might, as well as three Days; I wonder what difference there would have been in any intellectual Perfections, between him and the lowest degree of Animals.

*Perception the
Inlet of
Knowledge.*

§. 15. *Perception* then being the first Step and Degree towards Knowledge, and the Inlet of all the Materials of it; the fewer Senses any Man, as well as any other Creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the Impressions are that are made by them; and the duller the Faculties are that are employ'd about them, the more remote are they from that Knowledge which is to be found in some Men. But this being in great variety of Degrees (as may be perceiv'd amongst Men) cannot certainly be discover'd in the several Species of Animals, much less in their particular Individuals. It suffices me only to have remark'd here, that Perception is the first Operation of all our intellectual Faculties, and the Inlet of all Knowledge into our Minds. And I am apt too, to imagine that it is Perception in the lowest degree of it, which puts the boundaries between Animals and the inferiour Ranks of Creatures. But this I mention only as my Conjecture by the by; it being indifferent to the matter in Hand, which way the Learned shall determine of it.

CHAP. X.

Of Retention.

*Contemplati-
on.*

§. 1. **T**HE next Faculty of the Mind, whereby it makes a farther progress towards Knowledge, is that which I call *Retention*, or the keeping of those simple *Ideas*, which from Sensation or Reflection it hath receiv'd. This is done

done two ways: First, by keeping the *Idea*, which is brought into it, for some time actually in view; which is call'd *Contemplation*.

§. 2. The other way of Retention, is the Power to revive again in our Minds *Memory*, those *Ideas*, which after imprinting have disappear'd, or have been as it were laid aside out of Sight: And thus we do, when we conceive Heat or Light, Yellow or Sweet, the Object being remov'd. This is *Memory*, which is as it were the Store-house of our *Ideas*. For the narrow Mind of Man not being capable of having many *Ideas* under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary to have a Repository to lay up those *Ideas*, which at another Time it might have use of. But our *Ideas* being nothing but actual Perceptions in the Mind, which cease to be any thing when there is no Perception of them, this *laying up* of our *Ideas* in the Repository of the Memory, signifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power in many Cases to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional Perception annex'd to them, that it has had them before. And in this Sense it is, that our *Ideas* are said to be in our Memories, when indeed they are actually no where, but only there is an Ability in the Mind when it will to revive them again, and as it were paint them a-new on it self, tho' some with more, some with less difficulty; some more lively, and others more obscurely. And thus it is, by the assistance of this Faculty, that we are said to have all those *Ideas* in our Understandings, which tho' we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in sight, and make appear again, and be the Objects of our Thoughts, without the help of those sensible Qualities which first imprim'd them there.

§. 3. *Attention and Repetition help much to the fixing any Ideas in the Memory*: *Attention, Repetition, Pleasure and Pain, fix Ideas.* but those which naturally at first make the deepest and most lasting Impression, are those which are accompany'd with *Pleasure or Pain*. The great Business of the Senses being to make us take notice of what hurts or advantages the Body, it is wisely order'd by Nature (as has been shewn) that Pain should accompany the Reception of several *Ideas*; which supplying the Place of Consideration and Reasoning in Children, and acting quicker than Consideration in grown Men, makes both the Old and Young avoid painful Objects, with that haste which is necessary for their Preservation; and in both settles in the Memory a Caution for the future.

§. 4. Concerning the several *Degrees of lasting*, wherewith *Ideas* are imprinted on the *Memory*, we may observe, That some of them have been produc'd in the Understanding, by an Object affecting the Senses once only, and no more than once; others that have more than once offer'd themselves to the Senses, have yet been little taken notice of: The Mind either heedless, as in Children, or otherwise employ'd, as in Men, intent only on one thing, not setting the stamp deep into it self. And in some, where they are set on with care and repeated Impressions, either thro' the Temper of the Body, or some other default, the Memory is very weak. In all these Cases, *Ideas* in the Mind quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the Understanding, leaving no more Foot-steps or remaining Characters of themselves, than Shadows do flying over Fields of Corn; and the Mind is as void of them, as if they never had been there.

§. 5. Thus many of those *Ideas*, which were produc'd in the Minds of Children, in the beginning of their Sensation, (some of which perhaps, as of some Pleasures and Pains, were before they were born, and others in their Infancy) if in the future Course of their Lives they are not repeated again, are quite lost, without the least glimpse remaining of them. This may be observ'd in those, who by some mischance have lost their sight when they were very young, in whom the *Ideas* of Colours, having been but slightly taken notice of, and ceasing to be repeated, do quite wear out; so that some Years after there is no more Notion nor Memory of Colours left in their Minds, than in those of People born blind. The Memory in some Men, 'tis true, is very tenacious, even to a miracle: But yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our *Ideas*, even of those which are struck deepest, and in Minds the most retentive; so that if they be not sometimes renew'd by repeated Exercise of the Senses, or Reflection on those kinds of Objects which at first occasion'd them, the Print wears out; and at last there remains nothing to be seen. Thus the *Ideas*, as well as Children, of our Youth, often die before us: and our Minds represent to us those
Tombs,

Tombs, to which we are approaching; where tho' the Brass and Marble remain, yet the Inscriptions are effaced by Time, and the Imagery moulders away. *The Pictures drawn in our Minds are laid in fading Colours*; and if not sometimes refresh'd, vanish and disappear. How much the Constitution of our Bodies, and the Make of our animal Spirits are concern'd in this, and whether the Temper of the Brain make this difference, that in some it retains the Characters drawn on it like Marble, in others like Free-stone, and in others little better than Sand; I shall not here enquire: tho' it may seem probable, that the Constitution of the Body does sometimes influence the Memory; since we oftentimes find a Disease quite strip the Mind of all its *Ideas*, and the Flames of a Fever in a few Days calcine all those Images to Dust and Confusion, which seem'd to be as lasting as if grav'd in Marble.

Constantly repeated Ideas can scarce be lost.

§. 6. But concerning the *Ideas* themselves it is easy to remark, That those that are *oftenest refresh'd* (amongst which are those that are convey'd into the Mind by more ways than one) by a frequent return of the Objects or Actions that produce them, *fix themselves best in the Memory*, and remain clearest and longest there: And therefore those which are of the original Qualities of Bodies, viz. *Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest*; and those that almost constantly affect our Bodies, as *Heat and Cold*; and those which are the Affections of all kinds of Beings, as *Existence, Duration, and Number*, which almost every Object that affects our Senses, every Thought which employs our Minds, bring along with them: These, I say, and the like *Ideas*, are seldom quite lost, whilst the Mind retains any *Ideas* at all.

In remembering, the Mind is often alive.

§. 7. In this secondary Perception, as I may so call it, or viewing again the *Ideas* that are lodg'd in the Memory, the Mind is oftentimes more than barely passive; the Appearance of those dormant Pictures depending sometimes on the Will. The Mind very often sets it self on work in search of some hidden *Idea*, and turns as it were the Eye of the Soul upon it; tho' sometimes too they start up in our Minds of their own accord, and offer themselves to the Understanding; and very often are rouz'd and tumbled out of their dark Cells into open Day-light, by some turbulent and tempestuous Passions: Our Affections bringing *Ideas* to our Memory, which had otherwise lain quiet and unregarded. This farther is to be observ'd concerning *Ideas* lodg'd in the Memory, and upon occasion reviv'd by the Mind, that they are not only (as the word *revive* imports) none of them new ones; but also that the Mind takes notice of them, as of a former Impression, and renews its Acquaintance with them, as with *Ideas* it had known before. So that tho' *Ideas* formerly imprinted are not at all constantly in view, yet in Remembrance they are constantly known to be such as have been formerly imprinted; i. e. in view, and taken notice of before by the Understanding.

Two Defects in the Memory, Oblivion and Slowness.

§. 8. Memory, in an intellectual Creature, is necessary in the next Degree to Perception. It is of so great Moment, that where it is wanting, all the rest of our Faculties are in a great measure useless: And we in our Thoughts, Reasonings, and Knowledge, could not proceed beyond present Objects, were it not for the Assistance of our Memories, wherein there may be two Defects.

First, That it loses the *Idea* quite, and so far it produces perfect Ignorance. For since we can know nothing farther than we have the *Idea* of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect Ignorance.

Secondly, That it moves slowly, and retrieves not the *Ideas* that it has, and are laid up in Store, quick enough to serve the Mind upon Occasions. This, if it be to a great Degree, is *Stupidity*; and he, who thro' this default in his Memory, has not the *Ideas* that are really preserv'd there ready at hand when need and Occasion calls for them, were almost as good be without them quite, since they serve him to little purpose. The dull Man, who loses the Opportunity whilst he is seeking in his Mind for those *Ideas* that should serve his turn, is not much more happy in his Knowledge than one that is perfectly ignorant. 'Tis the business therefore of the Memory to furnish to the Mind those dormant *Ideas* which it has present Occasion for; in the having them ready at Hand on all Occasions, consists that which we call *Invention, Fancy, and Quickness of Parts*.

§. 9. These are Defects, we may observe, in the Memory of one Man compar'd with another. There is another Defect which we may conceive to be in the Memory of Man in general, compar'd with some superior created intellectual Beings,

This I deny
a man easily
loses this
easily appears
dull in some
many but
does not
learned one
- that when
he has time
to collect his
ideas - reasoning of a syllogism is a peculiar gift

Beings, which in this faculty may so far excel Man, that they may have constantly in view the whole scene of all their former Actions, wherein no one of the Thoughts they have ever had may slip out of their Sight. The Omniscience of God, who knows all things past, present, and to come, and to whom the Thoughts of Mens Hearts always lie open, may satisfy us of the possibility of this. For who can doubt but God may communicate to those glorious Spirits, his immediate Attendants, any of his Perfections, in what Proportion he pleases, as far as created finite Beings can be capable? 'Tis reported of that Prodigy of Parts, Monsieur *Pascal*, that, till the Decay of his Health had impair'd his Memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought, in any part of his rational Age. This is a privilege so little known to most Men, that it seems almost incredible to those, who, after the ordinary way, measure all others by themselves; but yet, when consider'd, may help us to enlarge our Thoughts towards greater Perfections of it in superior ranks of Spirits. For this of Mr. *Pascal* was still with a narrowness that human Minds are confin'd to here, of having great variety of *Ideas* only by succession, not all at once: Whereas the several Degrees of Angels may probably have larger views, and some of them be endow'd with Capacities able to retain together, and constantly set before them, as in one Picture, all their past Knowledge at once. This, we may conceive, would be no small advantage to the Knowledge of a thinking Man, if all his past Thoughts and Reasonings could be always present to him. And therefore we may suppose it one of those Ways, wherein the Knowledge of separate Spirits may exceedingly surpass ours.

§. 10. This faculty of laying up and retaining the *Ideas* that are brought into the Mind; several other *Animals* seem to have to a great degree, as well as Man. For to pass by other Instances, Birds learning of Tunes, and the endeavours one may observe in them to hit the Notes right, put it past doubt with me, that they have Perception, and retain *Ideas* in their Memories, and use them for Patterns. For it seems to me impossible, that they should endeavour to conform their Voices to Notes (as 'tis plain they do) of which they had no *Ideas*. For tho' I should grant Sound may mechanically cause a certain Motion of the animal Spirits, in the Brains of those Birds, whilst the Tune is actually playing; and that Motion may be continu'd on to the Muscles of the Wings, and so the Bird mechanically be driven away by certain noises, because this may tend to the Bird's preservation: Yet that can never be suppos'd a reason, why it should cause mechanically, either whilst the Tune was playing, much less after it has ceas'd, such a motion in the Organs of the Bird's Voice, as should conform it to the Notes of a foreign Sound, which Imitation can be of no use to the Bird's Preservation. But, which is more, it cannot with any appearance of Reason be suppos'd (much less prov'd) that Birds, without Sense and Memory, can approach their Notes nearer and nearer by degrees to a Tune play'd yesterday; which if they have no *Idea* of in their Memory, is now no where, nor can be a Pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated Essays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no reason why the Sound of a Pipe should leave traces in their Brains, which not at first, but by their after-endeavours, should produce the like Sounds; and why the Sounds they make themselves, should not make traces which they should follow, as well as those of the Pipe, is impossible to conceive.

Brutes have
Memory.

CHAP. XI.

Of Discerning, and other Operations of the Mind.

§. 1. **A**Nother Faculty we may take notice of in our Minds, is that of *Discerning* and distinguishing between the several *Ideas* it has. It is not enough to have a confus'd Perception of something in general: Unless the Mind had a distinct Perception of different Objects and their Qualities, it would be capable of very little Knowledge; tho' the Bodies that affect us were as busy about us as they are now, and the Mind were continually employ'd in thinking. On this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another, depends the *Evidence and Certainty*

No Knowledge
without Dis-
cerning.

Certainty of several, even very general Propositions, which have pass'd for innate Truths; because Men overlooking the true Cause why those Propositions find universal Assent, impute it wholly to native uniform Impressions: whereas it in truch *depends upon this clear discerning Faculty* of the Mind, whereby it perceives two *Ideas* to be the same, or different. But of this more hereafter.

*The difference
of Wit and
Judgment.*

§. 2. How much the imperfection of accurately discriminating *Ideas* one from another, lies either in the dulness or faults of the Organs of Sense; or want of acuteness, exercise or attention in the Understanding; or hastiness and precipitancy, natural to some Tempers, I will not here examine: It suffices to take notice, that this is one of the Operations, that the Mind may reflect on and observe in it self. It is of that consequence to its other Knowledg, that so far as this Faculty is in it self dull, or not rightly made use of for the distinguishing one thing from another; so far our Notions are confus'd, and our Reason and Judgment disturb'd or misled. If in having our *Ideas* in the Memory ready at Hand, consists quickness of Parts; in this of having them unconfus'd, and being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another, where there is but the least difference, consists, in a great measure, the exactness of Judgment, and clearness of Reason, which is to be observ'd in one Man above another. And hence perhaps may be given some reason of that common Observation, That Men, who have a great deal of Wit, and prompt Memories, have not always the clearest Judgment, or deepest Reason: For *Wit* lying most in the assemblage of *Ideas*, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the Fancy; *Judgment*, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully one from another, *Ideas* wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by Similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allusion, wherein for the most part lies that Entertainment and Pleasantry of Wit, which strikes so lively on the Fancy, and therefore is so acceptable to all People; because its Beauty appears at first Sight, and there is requir'd no labour of Thought to examine what Truth or Reason there is in it. The Mind, without looking any farther, rests satisfy'd with the agreeableness of the Picture, and the gaiety of the Fancy: And it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it by the severe Rules of Truth and good Reason; whereby it appears, that it consists in something that is not perfectly conformable to them.

*Clearness alone
binders
Confusion.*

§. 3. To the well distinguishing our *Ideas*, it chiefly contributes, they be clear and determinate: And when they are so, it will not breed any *Confusion* or Mistake about them, tho' the Senses should (as sometimes they do) convey them from the same Object differently, on different occasions, and so seem to err. For tho' a Man in a Fever should from Sugar have a bitter Taste, which at another time would produce a sweet one; yet the *Idea* of bitter in that Man's Mind, would be as clear and distinct from the *Idea* of sweet, as if he had tasted only Gall. Nor does it make any more confusion between the two *Ideas* of sweet and bitter, that the same sort of Body produces at one Time one, and at another Time another *Idea* by the Taste, than it makes a confusion in two *Ideas* of white and sweet, or white and round, that the same piece of Sugar produces them both in the Mind at the same Time. And the *Ideas* of Orange-colour and Azure, that are produced in the Mind by the same parcel of the infusion of *Lignum Nephriticum*, are no less distinct *Ideas*, than those of the same Colours, taken from two very different Bodies.

Comparing.

§. 4. The *COMPARING* them one with another, in respect of Extent, Degrees, Time, Place, or any other Circumstances, is another Operation of the Mind about its *Ideas*, and is that upon which depends all that large Tribe of *Ideas*, comprehended under *Relation*; which of how vast an Extent it is, I shall have Occasion to consider hereafter.

Brutes compare but imperfectly.

§. 5. How far Brutes partake in this Faculty, is not easy to determine, I imagine they have it not in any great degree: For tho' they probably have several *Ideas* distinct enough, yet it seems to me to be the Prerogative of human Understanding, when it has sufficiently distinguish'd any *Ideas*, so as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and so consequently two, to cast about and

and consider in what Circumstances they are capable to be compar'd: And therefore, I think, *Beasts compare* not their *Ideas* farther than some sensible Circumstances annex'd to the Objects themselves. The other power of comparing, which may be observ'd in Men, belonging to general *Ideas*, and useful only to abstract Reasonings, we may probably conjecture *Beasts* have not.

§. 6. The next Operation we may observe in the Mind about its *Ideas*, is *Compounding*; *COMPOSITION*; whereby it puts together several of those simple ones it has receiv'd from Sensation and Reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of Composition may be reckon'd also that of *ENLARGING*; wherein tho' the Composition does not so much appear as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheless a putting several *Ideas* together, tho' of the same kind. Thus by adding several Units together, we make the *Idea* of a Dozen; and putting together the repeated *Ideas* of several Perches, we frame that of Furlong.

§. 7. In this also, I suppose, *Brutes* come far short of Men: For tho' they take in, and retain together several Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as possibly the Shape, Smell and Voice of his Master make up the complex *Idea* a Dog has of him, or rather are so many distinct Marks, whereby he knows him; yet I do not think they do of themselves ever compound them, and make complex *Ideas*. And perhaps even where we think they have complex *Ideas*, 'tis only one simple one that directs them in the knowledg of several things, which possibly they distinguish less by their Sight than we imagine: For I have been credibly inform'd, that a Bitch will nurse, play with, and be fond of young Foxes, as much as, and in place of her Puppies, if you can but get them once to suck her so long, that her Milk may go thro' them. And those Animals, which have a numerous brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any knowledg of their number: for tho' they are mightily concern'd for any of their Young that are taken from them whilst they are in fight or hearing; yet if one or two of them be stolen from them in their absence, or without noise, they appear not to miss them, or to have any sense that their number is lessen'd.

§. 8. When Children have, by repeated Sensations, got *Ideas* fix'd in their Memories, they begin by degrees to learn the use of Signs. And when they have got the Skill to apply the Organs of Speech to the framing of articulate Sounds, they begin to make use of Words, to signify their *Ideas* to others. These verbal Signs they sometimes borrow from others, and sometimes make themselves, as one may observe among the new and unusual Names Children often give to things in their first use of Language.

§. 9. The use of Words then being to stand as outward Marks of our internal *Ideas*, and those *Ideas* being taken from particular things, if every particular *Idea* that we take in, should have a distinct Name, Names must be endless. To prevent this, the Mind makes the particular *Ideas*, receiv'd from particular Objects, to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the Mind such Appearances, separate from all other Existences, and the Circumstances of real Existence, as Time, Place, or any other concomitant *Ideas*. This is call'd *ABSTRACTION*, whereby *Ideas*, taken from particular Beings, become general Representatives of all of the same kind, and their Names general Names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract *Ideas*. Such precise naked Appearances in the Mind, without considering how, whence, or with what others they came there, the Understanding lays up (with Names commonly annex'd to them) as the Standards to rank real Existences into sorts, as they agree with these Patterns, and to denominate them accordingly. Thus the same Colour being observ'd to day in Chalk or Snow, which the Mind yesterday receiv'd from Milk, it considers that Appearance alone, makes it a Representative of all of that kind; and having given it the name *Whiteness*, it by that Sound signifies the same Quality, wheresoever to be imagin'd or met with: and thus Universals, whether *Ideas* or Terms, are made.

§. 10. If it may be doubted, whether *Beasts* compound and inlarge their *Ideas* that way to any degree; this, I think, I may be positive in, that the power of *Abstracting* is not at all in them; and that the having of general *Ideas*, is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt Man and *Brutes*, and is an Ex-

cellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to. For it is evident we observe no Footsteps in them, of making use of general Signs for universal *Ideas*; from which we have reason to imagine, that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general *Ideas*, since they have no use of Words, or any other general Signs.

§. 11. Nor can it be imputed to their want of fit Organs to frame articulate Sounds, that they have no use or knowledge of general Words; since many of them we find, can fashion such Sounds; and pronounce Words distinctly enough, but never with any such Application. And on the other side, Men who thro' some defect in the Organs want Words, yet fail not to express their universal *Ideas* by signs, which serve them instead of general Words; a faculty which we see Beasts come short in. And therefore I think we may suppose, that 'tis in this that the Species of *Brutes* are discriminated from Man; and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so vast a distance: For if they have any *Ideas* at all, and are not bare Machines (as some would have them) we cannot deny them to have some Reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do some of them in certain Instances reason, as that they have Sense; but it is only in particular *Ideas*, just as they received them from their Senses. They are the best of them ty'd up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of *Abstraction*.

*Idiots and
Madmen.*

§. 12. How far *Idiots* are concern'd in the want or weakness of any, or all of the foregoing Faculties, an exact Observation of their several ways of faltering would no doubt discover: For those who either perceive but dully, or retain the *Ideas* that come into their Minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little matter to think on. Those who cannot distinguish, compare and abstract, would hardly be able to understand and make use of Language; or judge or reason to any tolerable degree; but only a little and imperfectly about things present, and very familiar to their Senses. And indeed any of the foremention'd Faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce suitable defects of Mens Understandings and Knowledge.

§. 13. In fine, the defect in *Naturals* seem to proceed from want of Quickness, Activity and Motion in the intellectual Faculties, whereby they are depriv'd of Reason; whereas *Madmen*, on the other side, seem to suffer by the other Extreme: For they do not appear to me to have lost the Faculty of Reasoning; but having join'd together some *Ideas* very wrongly, they mistake them for Truths, and they err as Men do that argue right from wrong Principles. For by the violence of their Imaginations, having taken their Fancies for Realities, they make right Deductions from them. Thus you shall find a distracted Man, fancying himself a King, with a right Inference require suitable Attendance, Respect and Obedience: Others, who have thought themselves made of Glass, have us'd the Caution necessary to preserve such brittle Bodies. Hence it comes to pass that a Man, who is very sober, and of a right understanding in all other things, may in one particular be as frantick as any in *Bedlam*; if either by any sudden very strong Impression, or long fixing his Fancy upon one sort of Thoughts, incoherent *Ideas* have been cemented together so powerfully, as to remain united. But there are degrees of Madness, as of Folly; the disorderly jumbling *Ideas* together, is in some more, and some less. In short, herein seems to lie the difference between Idiots and Madmen, That Madmen put wrong *Ideas* together, and so make wrong Propositions, but argue and reason right from them; but Idiots make very few or no Propositions, and reason scarce at all.

Method.

§. 14. These, I think, are the first Faculties and Operations of the Mind, which it makes use of in Understanding; and tho' they are exercis'd about all its *Ideas* in general, yet the Instances I have hitherto given have been chiefly in simple *Ideas*: And I have subjoin'd the Explication of these Faculties of the Mind to that of simple *Ideas*, before I come to what I have to say concerning complex ones, for these following Reasons.

First, Because several of these Faculties being exercis'd at first principally about simple *Ideas*, we might, by following Nature in its ordinary Method, trace and discover them in their Rise, Progress, and gradual Improvements.

Secondly,

Secondly, Because observing the Faculties of the Mind, how they operate about simple *Ideas*, which are usually, in most Mens Minds, much more clear, precise and distinct than complex ones, we may the better examine and learn how the Mind abstracts, denominates, compares and exercises its other Operations about those which are complex, wherein we are much more liable to mistake.

Thirdly, Because these very Operations of the Mind about *Ideas*, receiv'd from Sensation, are themselves, when reflected on, another Set of *Ideas*, deriv'd from that other Source of our Knowledge which I call *Reflection*, and therefore fit to be consider'd in this place after the simple *Ideas* of Sensation. Of Compounding, Comparing, Abstracting, &c. I have but just spoken, having Occasion to treat of them more at large in other places.

§. 15. And thus I have given a short, and, I think, true *History of the first Beginnings of Human Knowledge*, whence the Mind has its first Objects, and by what steps it makes its Progress to the laying in and storing up those *Ideas*, out of which is to be fram'd all the knowledge it is capable of; wherein I must appeal to Experience and Observation, whether I am in the right: The best way to come to Truth, being to examine things as really they are, and not to conclude they are as we fancy of our selves, or have been taught by others to imagine.

These are the beginnings of human Knowledge.

§. 16. To deal truly, *this is the only way* that I can discover, whereby the *Ideas* of things are brought into the Understanding: If other Men have either innate *Ideas*, or infus'd Principles, they have reason to enjoy them; and if they are sure of it, it is impossible for others to deny them the Privilege that they have above their Neighbours. I can speak but of what I find in my self, and is agreeable to those Notions; which, if we will examine the whole course of Men in their several Ages, Countries and Educations, seem to depend on those Foundations which I have laid, and to correspond with this Method in all the Parts and Degrees thereof.

Appeal to Experience.

§. 17. I pretend not to teach, but to enquire, and therefore cannot but confess here again, That external and internal Sensation are the only Passages that I can find of Knowledge to the Understanding. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the Windows by which Light is let into this *dark Room*: For methinks the Understanding is not much unlike a Closet wholly shut from Light, with only some little opening left, to let in external visible Resemblances, or *Ideas* of things without: Would the Pictures coming into such a dark Room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the Understanding of a Man, in reference to all Objects of Sight, and the *Ideas* of them.

Dark Room.

These are my Guesses concerning the means whereby the Understanding comes to have and retain simple *Ideas*, and the Modes of them, with some other Operations about them. I proceed now to examine some of these simple *Ideas*, and their Modes, a little more particularly.

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex Ideas:

§. 1. **W**E have hitherto consider'd those *Ideas*, in the Reception whereof the Mind is only passive, which are those simple ones receiv'd from Sensation and Reflection before-mention'd, whereof the Mind cannot make one to it self, nor have any *Idea* which does not wholly consist of them. But as the Mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple *Ideas*, so it exerts several Acts of its own, whereby out of its simple *Ideas*, as the Materials and Foundations of the rest, the other are fram'd. The Acts of the Mind, wherein it exerts its Power over tis simple *Ideas*, are chiefly these three: 1. Combining several simple *Ideas* into one compound one, and thus all complex *Ideas* are made. 2. The second is bringing two *Ideas*, whether simple or complex, together, and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its *Ideas* of Relations.

Made by the Mind out of simple ones.

lations. 3. The third is separating them from all other *Ideas* that accompany them in their real Existence; this is call'd *Abstraction*: And thus all its general *Ideas* are made. This shews Man's Power, and its way of Operation, to be much-what the same in the material and intellectual World. For the Materials in both being such as he has no power over, either to make or destroy, all that Man can do is either to unite them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them. I shall here begin with the first of these in the Consideration of complex *Ideas*; and come to the other two in their due places. As simple *Ideas* are observ'd to exist in several Combinations united together, so the Mind has a power to consider several of them united together as one *Idea*; and that not only as they are united in external Objects, but as it self has join'd them. *Ideas* thus made up of several simple ones put together, I call *complex*; such as are *Beauty, Gratitude, a Man, an Army, the Universe*; which tho' complicated of various simple *Ideas*, or *complex Ideas* made up of simple ones, yet are, when the Mind pleases, consider'd each by it self as one entire Thing, and signify'd by one Name.

Made voluntarily.

§. 2. In this faculty of repeating and joining together its *Ideas*, the Mind has great power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts, infinitely beyond what *Sensation* or *Reflection* furnish'd it with; but all this still confin'd to those simple *Ideas* which it receiv'd from those two Sources, and which are the ultimate Materials of all its Compositions: For simple *Ideas* are all from things themselves, and of these the Mind can have no more, nor other than what are suggested to it. It can have no other *Ideas* of sensible Qualities than what come from without by the Senses, nor any *Ideas* of other kind of Operations of a thinking Substance, than what it finds in it self; but when it has once got these simple *Ideas*, it is not confin'd barely to Observation, and what offers it self from without: It can, by its own power, put together those *Ideas* it has, and make new complex ones, which it never receiv'd so united.

Are either Modes, Substances or Relations.

§. 3. Complex *Ideas*, however compounded and decomposed, tho' their number be infinite, and the variety endless, wherewith they fill and entertain the Thoughts of Men; yet, I think, they may be all reduc'd under these three Heads.

1. *Modes.*
2. *Substances.*
3. *Relations.*

Modes.

§. 4. First, *Modes* I call such complex *Ideas*, which however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are consider'd as Dependances on, or Affections of Substances; such are the *Ideas* signify'd by the Words *Triangle, Gratitude, Murder, &c.* And if in this I use the word *Mode* in somewhat a different sense from its ordinary signification, I beg pardon; it being unavoidable in Discourses, differing from the ordinary receiv'd Notions, either to make new Words, or to use old Words in somewhat a new Signification: The latter whereof, in our present Case, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two.

Simple and mix'd Modes.

§. 5. Of these *Modes*, there are two Sorts which deserve distinct Consideration: First, There are some which are only Variations, or different Combinations of the same simple *Idea*, without the mixture of any other, as a dozen or score; which are nothing but the *Ideas* of so many distinct Units added together: And these I call *simple Modes*, as being contain'd within the bounds of one simple *Idea*.

Secondly, There are others compounded of simple *Ideas* of several kinds, put together to make one complex one; v. g. *Beauty*, consisting of a certain Composition of Colour and Figure, causing Delight in the Beholder; *Theft*, which being the conceal'd Change of the possession of any thing, without the Consent of the Proprietor, contains, as is visible, a Combination of several *Ideas* of several kinds: And these I call *mix'd Modes*.

Substances single or collective.

§. 6. Secondly, The *Ideas* of *Substances* are such Combinations or simple *Ideas*, as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which the suppos'd or confus'd *Idea* of Substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus if to Substance be join'd the simple *Idea* of a certain dull whitish Colour, with certain degrees of Weight, Hardness, Ductility and Fusibility; we have the *Idea* of *Lead*, and a Combination of the *Ideas* of a certain

tain sort of Figure, with the Powers of Motion, Thought and Reasoning, join'd to Substance, make the ordinary *Idea* of a *Man*. Now of Substances also there are two sorts of *Ideas*, one of single Substances, as they exist separately, as of a *Man* or a *Sheep*; the other of several of those put together, as an *Army* of Men, or *Flock* of Sheep: Which *collective* *Ideas* of several *Substances* thus put together, are as much each of them one single *Idea*, as that of a *Man*, or an *Unit*.

§. 7. *Thirdly*, The last sort of complex *Ideas*, is that we call *Relation*, which consists in the Consideration and comparing one *Idea* with another. Of these several kinds we shall treat in their order.

§. 8. If we trace the progress of our Minds, and with attention observe how it repeats, adds together, and unites its simple *Ideas* receiv'd from Sensation or Reflection, it will lead us farther than at first perhaps we should have imagin'd. And I believe we shall find, if we warily observe the Originals of our Notions, that even the most *abstruse* *Ideas*, how remote soever they may seem from Sense, or from any Operation of our own Minds, are yet only such as the Understanding frames to it self, by repeating and joining together *Ideas*, that it had either from Objects of Sense, or from its own Operations about them: So that those even large and *abstract* *Ideas*, are derived from Sensation or Reflection, being no other than what the Mind, by the ordinary use of its own Faculties, imploy'd about *Ideas* receiv'd from Objects of Sense, or from the Operations it observes in it self about them, may and does attain unto. This I shall endeavour to shew in the *Ideas* we have of *Space*, *Time* and *Infinity*, and some few others, that seem the most remote from those Originals.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes, and first of the Simple Modes of Space.

§. 1. **T**H O' in the foregoing Part I have often mention'd simple *Ideas*, which are truly the Materials of all our Knowledge; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the Mind, than as distinguish'd from others more compounded, it will not be perhaps amiss to take a view of some of them again under this Consideration, and examine those different *Modifications* of the same *Idea*; which the Mind either finds in things existing, or is able to make within it self, without the help of any extrinsecal Object, or any foreign Suggestion.

Those *Modifications* of any one simple *Idea* (which, as has been said, I call *simple Modes*) are as perfectly different and distinct *Ideas* in the Mind, as those of the greatest Distance or Contrariety. For the *Idea* of *Two* is as distinct from that of *One*, as *Blueness* from *Heat*, or either of them from any Number: And yet it is made up only of that simple *Idea* of an *Unit* repeated; and Repetitions of this kind join'd together, make those distinct *simple Modes*, of a *Dozen*, a *Gross*, a *Million*.

§. 2. I shall begin with the *simple Idea* of *Space*. I have shew'd above, Chap. 4. that we get the *Idea* of *Space*, both by our Sight and Touch; which I think, is so evident, that it would be as needless to go to prove that Men perceive, by their Sight, a Distance between Bodies of different Colours, or between the Parts of the same Body, as that they see Colours themselves; nor is it less obvious, that they can do so in the dark by Feeling and Touch.

§. 3. This *Space* consider'd barely in Length between any two Beings, without considering any thing else between them, is call'd *Distance*; if consider'd in Length, Breadth and Thickness, I think it may be call'd *Capacity*. The Term *Extension* is usually apply'd to it in what manner soever consider'd.

§. 4. Each different Distance is a different Modification of *Space*; and each *Idea* of any different Distance, or *Space*, is a simple Mode of this *Idea*. Men for the Use, and by the Custom of Measuring, settle in their Minds the *Ideas* of certain stated Lengths, such as are an *Inch*, *Foot*, *Yard*, *Fathom*, *Mile*, *Diameter of the Earth*, &c. which are so many distinct *Ideas* made up only of *Space*. When any such stated Lengths or Measures of *Space* are made familiar to Mens Thoughts,

Thoughts, they can in their Minds repeat them as often as they will without mixing or joining to them the *Idea* of Body, or any thing else; and frame to themselves the *Ideas* of Long, Square, or Cubick, *Feet*, *Yards*, or *Fathoms*, here amongst the Bodies of the Universe, or else beyond the utmost Bounds of all Bodies; and by adding these still one to another, enlarge their *Idea* of Space as much as they please. This Power of repeating, or doubling any *Idea* we have of any distance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any stop or stint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the *Idea* of *Immensify*.

Figure.

§. 5. There is another Modification of this *Idea*, which is nothing but the relation which the Parts of the Termination of Extension, or circumscrib'd Space, have amongst themselves. This the Touch discovers in sensible Bodies, whose Extremities come within our reach; and the Eye takes both from Bodies and Colours, whose Boundaries are within its view: Where observing how the Extremities terminate either in streight Lines, which meet at discernible Angles, or in crooked Lines, wherein no Angles can be perceiv'd, by considering these as they relate to one another, in all Parts of the Extremities of any Body or Space, it has that *Idea* we call *Figure*, which affords to the Mind infinite Variety. For besides the vast number of different Figures, that do really exist in the coherent Masses of Matter, the Stock that the Mind has in its power, by varying the *Idea* of Space, and thereby making still new Compositions, by repeating its own *Ideas*, and joining them as it pleases, is perfectly inexhaustible: And so it can multiply Figures *in infinitum*.

Figure.

§. 6. For the Mind having a power to repeat the *Idea* of any Length directly stretch'd out, and join it to another in the same Direction, which is to double the Length of that streight Line, or else join it to another with what Inclination it thinks fit, and so make what sort of Angle it pleases; and being able also to shorten any Line it imagines, by taking from it one half, or one fourth, or what part it pleases, without being able to come to an end of any such Divisions, it can make an Angle of any Bigness: So also the Lines that are its Sides, of what Length it pleases; which joining again to other Lines of different Lengths and at different Angles, till it has wholly inclos'd any Space, it is evident, that it can multiply *Figures* both in their Shape and Capacity *in infinitum*; all which are but so many different *simple Modes of Space*.

The same that it can do with streight Lines, it can do also with crooked, or crooked and streight together; and the same it can do in Lines, it can also in Surfaces: By which we may be led into farther Thoughts of the endless Variety of *Figures*, that the Mind has a Power to make, and thereby to multiply the *simple Modes of Space*.

Place.

§. 7. Another *Idea* coming under this Head, and belonging to this Tribe, is that we call *Place*. As in simple Space, we consider the relation of Distance between any two Bodies, or Points; so in our *Idea* of *Place*, we consider the relation of Distance betwixt any Thing, and any two or more Points, which are consider'd as keeping the same distance one with another, and so consider'd as at rest: for when we find any thing at the same distance now, which it was yesterday from any two or more Points, which have not since chang'd their distance one with another, and with which we then compar'd it, we say it hath kept the same *Place*; but if it hath sensibly alter'd its distance with either of those Points, we say it hath chang'd its place: Tho' vulgarly speaking, in the common Notion of *Place*, we do not always exactly observe the distance from precise Points; but from larger Portions of sensible Objects, to which we consider the thing plac'd to bear relation, and its distance from which we have some reason to observe.

§. 8. Thus a Company of Chess-men standing on the same Squares of the Chess-board, where we left them, we say they are all in the same *Place*, or unmov'd; tho' perhaps the Chess-board hath been in the mean time carry'd out of one Room into another, because we compar'd them only to the Parts of the Chess-board, which keep the same distance one with another. The Chess-board, we also say, is in the same *Place* it was, if it remain in the same part of the Cabin, tho' perhaps the Ship, which it is in, sails all the while: And the Ship is said to be in the same *Place*, supposing it kept the same distance with the

the Parts of the neighbouring Land; tho' perhaps the Earth hath turn'd round: And so both Chets-men, and Board, and Ship, have every one *chang'd Place*, in respect of remoter Bodies, which have kept the same distance one with another. But yet the distance from certain Parts of the Board, being that which determines the Place of the Chets-men; and the distance from the fix'd Parts of the Cabin (with which we made the Comparison) being that which determined the Place of the Chets-board; and the fix'd Parts of the Earth, that by which we determin'd the Place of the Ship; these things may be said to be in the *same Place* in those respects: Tho' their distance from some other things, which in this Matter we did not consider, being vary'd, they have undoubtedly *chang'd Place* in that respect, and we our selves shall think so, when we have occasion to compare them with those other.

§. 9. But this Modification of Distance, we call *Place*, being made by Men, for their common Use, that by it they might be able to design the particular Position of things, where they had occasion for such Designation; Men consider and determine of this *Place*, by reference to those adjacent things which best serv'd to their present purpose, without considering other things, which, to another purpose, would better *determine the Place* of the same thing. Thus in the Chets-board, the Use of the *Designation* of the *Place* of each Chets-man, being determin'd only within that chequer'd piece of Wood, 'twould cross that purpose, to measure it by any thing else: But when these very Chets-men are put up in a Bag, if any one should ask where the black King is, it would be proper to *determine the Place* by the Parts of the Room it was in, and not by the Chets-board; there being another use of *designing the Place* it is now in, than when in Play it was on the Chets-board, and so must be determin'd by other Bodies. So, if any one should ask, in what place are the Verses, which report the Story of *Nisus* and *Eurialus*, 'twould be very improper to determine this *Place*, by saying, they were in such a part of the Earth, or in *Bodley's Library*: But the right Designation of the *Place* would be by the Parts of *Virgil's Works*; and the proper Answer would be, That these Verses were about the middle of the ninth Book of his *Aeneids*; and that they have been always constantly in the same place ever since *Virgil* was printed: Which is true, tho' the Book itself hath mov'd a thousand times; the use of the *Idea* of *Place* here, being to know only in what part of the Book that Story is, that so upon occasion we may know where to find it, and have recourse to it for our use.

§. 10. That our *Idea* of *Place* is nothing else but such a relative Position of any Thing, as I have before mention'd, I think is plain, and will be easily admitted, when we consider that we can have no *Idea* of the *Place* of the Universe, tho' we can of all the Parts of it; because beyond that we have not the *Idea* of any fix'd, distinct, particular Beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any Relation of Distance; but all beyond it is one uniform Space or Expansion, wherein the Mind finds no Variety, no Marks. For to say, that the World is somewhere, means no more than that it does exist: This, tho' a Phrase borrow'd from *Place*, signifying only its Existence, not Location; and when one can find out, and frame in his Mind clearly and distinctly the *Place* of the Universe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable *Inane* of infinite Space: tho' it be true, that the Word *Place* has sometimes a more confus'd Sense, and stands for that Space which any body takes up; and so the Universe is in a *Place*. The *Idea* therefore of *Place* we have by the same means that we get the *Idea* of Space, (whereof this is but a particular limited Consideration) viz. by our Sight and Touch; by either of which we receive into our Minds the *Ideas* of Extension or Distance.

§. 11. There are some that would persuade us, that *Body* and *Extension* are the same thing; who either change the Signification of Words, which I would not suspect them of, they having so severely condemn'd the Philosophy of others, because it hath been too much plac'd in the uncertain Meaning, or deceitful Obscurity of doubtful or insignificant Terms. If therefore they mean by *Body* and *Extension* the same that other People do, viz. by *Body*, something that is solid and extended, whose Parts are separable and movable different ways; and by *Extension* only the Space that lies between the Extremities of those solid coherent Parts, and which is possess'd by them: They confound very different

Extension and Body, not the same.

different *Ideas* one with another. For I appeal to every Man's own Thoughts, whether the *Idea* of Space be not as distinct from that of Solidity, as it is from the *Idea* of Scarlet-Colour? 'Tis true, Solidity cannot exist without Extension, neither can Scarlet-Colour exist without Extension; but this hinders not, but that they are distinct *Ideas*. Many *Ideas* require others as necessary to their Existence or Conception, which yet are very distinct *Ideas*. Motion can neither be, nor be conceiv'd without Space; and yet Motion is not Space, nor Space Motion: Space can exist without it, and they are very distinct *Ideas*; and so, I think, are those of Space and Solidity. Solidity is so inseparable an *Idea* from Body, that upon that depends its filling of Space, its Contact, Impulse, and Communication of Motion upon Impulse. And if it be a Reason to prove, that Spirit is different from Body, because Thinking includes not the *Idea* of Extension in it; the same Reason will be as valid, I suppose, to prove, that *Space is not Body*, because it includes not the *Idea* of Solidity in it: *Space* and *Solidity* being as distinct *Ideas*, as Thinking and Extension, and as wholly separable in the Mind one from another. *Body* then and *Extension*, 'tis evident, are two distinct *Ideas*. For,

§. 12. *First*, *Extension* includes no Solidity, nor Resistance to the Motion of *Body*, as *Body* does.

§. 13. *Secondly*, The Parts of pure Space are inseparable one from the other; so the Continuity cannot be separated, neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continu'd even so much as in Thought. To divide and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing the Parts one from another, to make two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity: And to divide mentally, is to make in the Mind two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity, and consider them as remov'd one from the other; which can only be done in things consider'd by the Mind, as capable of being separated; and by Separation, of acquiring new distinct Superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of: But neither of these ways of Separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure *Space*.

'Tis true, a Man may consider so much of such a *Space*, as is answerable or commensurate to a Foot, without considering the rest; which is indeed a partial Consideration, but not so much as mental Separation, or Division: Since a Man can no more mentally divide, without considering two Superficies separate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two Superficies disjoin'd one from the other: But a partial Consideration is not Separating. A Man may consider Light in the Sun, without its Heat; or Mobility in Body without its Extension, without thinking of their Separation. One is only a partial Consideration, terminating in one alone; and the other is a Consideration of both, as existing separately.

§. 14. *Thirdly*, The Parts of pure *Space* are immovable, which follows from their Inseparability; *Motion* being nothing but change of distance between any two Things: But this cannot be between Parts that are inseparable; which therefore must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another.

Thus the determin'd *Idea* of simple *Space* distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from *Body*; since its Parts are inseparable, immovable, and without Resistance to the Motion of *Body*.

The Definition of Extension, explains it not §. 15. If any one ask me, *What* this *Space*, I speak of, is? I will tell him, when he tells me what his *Extension* is. For to say, as is usually done, that *Extension* is to have *partes extra partes*, is to say only, that *Extension* is *Extension*: For what am I the better inform'd in the Nature of *Extension*, when I am told, that *Extension* is to have *Parts that are extended*, exterior to *Parts that are extended*, i. e. *Extension* consists of extended Parts; as if one asking, what a Fibre was? I should answer him, that it was a thing made up of several Fibres: Would he thereby be enabled to understand what a Fibre was better than he did before? Or rather, would he not have reason to think, that my Design was

Division of Bodies into Bodies and Spirits, proves not Space and Body the same.

to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him?

§. 16. Those who contend that *Space* and *Body* are the same, bring this Dilemma: Either this *Space* is something or nothing; if nothing be between two Bodies, they must necessarily touch; If it be allow'd to be something, they ask, whether

whether it be Body or Spirit? To which I answer, by another Question, Who told them, that there was, or could be nothing but solid Beings, which could not think, and thinking Beings that were not extended? Which is all they mean by the terms *Body* and *Spirit*.

§. 17. If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this *Space*, void of *Body*, be *Substance* or *Accident*; I shall readily answer, I know not; nor shall be ashamed to own my Ignorance, till they that ask, shew me a clear distinct *Idea* of *Substance*.

§. 18. I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver my self from those Fallacies which we are apt to put upon our selves, by taking Words for Things. It helps not our Ignorance, to feign a Knowledge where we have none, by making a noise with Sounds, without clear and distinct Significations. Names made at pleasure neither alter the nature of things, nor make us understand them, but as they are signs of, and stand for determin'd *Ideas*. And I desire those who lay so much stress on the Sound of these two Syllables, *Substance*, to consider whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incomprehensible *G O D*, to finite Spirit, and to Body, it be in the same sense; and whether it stands for the same *Idea*, when each of those three so different Beings are call'd *Substances*. It so, whether it will not thence follow, That God, Spirits, and Body, agreeing in the same common nature of *Substance*, differ not any otherwise, than in a bare different Modification of that *Substance*; as a Tree and a Peeble being in the same sense Body, and agreeing in the common Nature of Body, differ only in a bare Modification of that common Matter: which will be a very harsh Doctrine. If they say, That they apply it to God, finite Spirits, and Matter, in three different Significations; and that it stands for one *Idea*; when *G O D* is said to be a *Substance*; for another, when the Soul is call'd *Substance*; and for a third, when a Body is call'd so: If the name *Substance* stands for three several distinct *Ideas*, they would do well to make known those distinct *Ideas*, or at least to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so important a Notion the Confusion and Errors, that will naturally follow from the promiscuous Use of so doubtful a Term; which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct, that in ordinary use it has scarce one clear distinct Signification: And if they can thus make three distinct *Ideas* of *Substance*, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?

§. 19. They who first ran into the Notion of *Accidents*, as a sort of real Beings that needed something to inhere in, were forc'd to find out the word *Substance* to support them. Had the poor *Indian* Philosopher (who imagin'd that the Earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word *Substance*, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an Elephant to support it, and a Tortoise to support his Elephant: the word *Substance* would have done it effectually. And he that enquir'd might have taken it for as good an Answer from an *Indian* Philosopher, That *Substance*, without knowing what it is, is that which supports the Earth; as we take it for a sufficient Answer, and good Doctrine, from our *European* Philosophers, That *Substance*, without knowing what it is, is that which supports *Accidents*. So that of *Substance* we have no *Idea* of what it is, but only a confus'd obscure one of what it does.

§. 20. Whatever a learned Man may do here, an intelligent *American*, who enquir'd into the nature of Things, would scarce take it for a satisfactory Account, if desiring to learn our Architecture, he should be told, That a Pillar was a thing supported by a *Basis*, and a *Basis* something that supported a Pillar. Would not he think himself mock'd, instead of taught, with such an account as this? And a stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of Books, and the things they contain'd, if he should be told, that all learned Books consisted of Paper and Letter, and that Letters were things inhering in Paper, and Paper a thing that held forth Letters: A notable way of having clear *Ideas* of Letters and Paper! But where the *Latin* words *Inherentia* and *Substantia* put into the plain *English* ones that answer them, and were call'd *Sticking on* and *Under-propping*, they would better discover to us the very great Clearness there is in the Doctrine of *Substance* and *Accidents*, and shew of what use they are in deciding of Questions in Philosophy.

§. 21. But to return to our *Idea* of *Space*. If *Body* be not suppos'd infinite, which I think no one will affirm, I would ask, Whether if *G O D* plac'd a Man

at the extremity of corporeal Beings, he could not stretch his Hand beyond his Body? If he could, then he would put his Arm where there was before *Space* without *Body*; and if there he spread his Fingers, there would still be *Space* between them without *Body*. If he could not stretch out his Hand, it must be because of some external hindrance; (for we suppose him alive, with such a power of moving the Parts of his Body that he hath now, which is not in it self impossible, if GOD so pleas'd to have it; or at least it is not impossible for God so to move him:) And then I ask, Whether that which hinders his Hand from moving outwards, be Substance or Accident, something or Nothing? And when they have resolv'd that, they will be able to resolve themselves what that is, which is or may be between two Bodies at a distance, that is not Body, and has no Solidity. In the mean time, the Argument is at least as good, That where nothing hinders (as beyond the utmost Bounds of all Bodies) a *Body* put into motion may move on; as where there is nothing between, there two Bodies must necessarily touch: For pure *Space* between, is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual Contact; but bare *Space* in the way, is not sufficient to stop Motion. The truth is, these Men must either own that they think *Body* infinite, tho' they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm that *Space* is not *Body*. For I would fain meet with that thinking Man, that can in his Thoughts set any bounds to *Space*, more than he can to *Duration*; or by thinking hope to arrive at the end of either: And therefore, if his *Idea* of Eternity be infinite, so is his *Idea* of Immenfity; they are both finite or infinite alike.

The Power of
Annihilation
proves a Va-
cuum.

§. 22. Farther, those who assert the Impossibility of *Space* existing without *Matter*, must not only make *Body* infinite, but must also deny a power in God to annihilate any part of *Matter*. No one, I suppose, will deny that God can put an end to all Motion that is in *Matter*, and fix all the Bodies of the Universe in a perfect Quiet and Rest, and continue them so as long as he pleases. Whoever then will allow, that God can, during such a general Rest, annihilate either this Book, or the Body of him that reads it, must necessarily admit the Possibility of a *Vacuum*: For it is evident that the *Space* that was fill'd by the Parts of the annihilated Body, will still remain, and be a *Space* without *Body*. For the circumambient Bodies being in perfect Rest, are a Wall of Adamant, and in that state make it a perfect Impossibility for any other Body to get into that *Space*. And indeed the necessary Motion of one Particle of matter into the place from whence another Particle of *Matter* is removed, is but a consequence from the Supposition of Plenitude; which will therefore need some better Proof than a suppos'd *Matter* of Fact, which Experiment can never make out: our own clear and distinct *Ideas* plainly satisfying us, that there is no necessary Connection between *Space* and *Solidity*, since we can conceive the one without the other. And those who dispute for or against a *Vacuum*, do thereby confess they have distinct *Ideas* of *Vacuum* and *Plenum*, i. e. that they have an *Idea* of Extension void of *Solidity*, tho' they deny its Existence; or else they dispute about nothing at all. For they who so much alter the Signification of words, as to call *Extension* *Body*, and consequently make the whole Essence of *Body* to be nothing but pure Extension without *Solidity*, must talk absurdly whenever they speak of *Vacuum*, since it is impossible for Extension to be without Extension. For *Vacuum*, whether we affirm or deny its Existence, signifies *Space* without *Body*, whose very Existence no one can deny to be possible, who will not make *Matter* infinite, and take from God a power to annihilate any Particle of it.

Motion proves
a Vacuum.

§. 23. But not to go so far as beyond the utmost bounds of *Body* in the Universe, nor appeal to God's Omnipotency, to find a *Vacuum*, the Motion of Bodies that are in our view and neighbourhood seem to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any one so to divide a solid Body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the solid Parts to move up and down freely every way within the bounds of that Superficies, if there be not left in it a void *Space*, as big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid Body. And if where the least Particle of the Body divided is as big as a Mustard-Seed, a void *Space* equal to the bulk of a Mustard-Seed be requisite to make room for the free Motion of the parts of the divided Body within the Bounds of its Superficies, where the Particles of *Matter* are 100,000,000 less than a Mustard-Seed, there

there must also be a Space void of solid Matter, as big as 100,000,000 part of a Mustard-Seed; for if it hold in one, it will hold in the other, and so on *in infinitum*. And let this void Space be as little as it will, it destroys the Hypothesis of *Plenitude*. For if there can be a Space void of Body, equal to the smallest separate Particle of Matter now existing in nature, 'tis still Space without Body; and makes as great a difference between Space and Body, as if it were μέγα χάσμα, a Distance as wide as any in nature. And therefore, if we suppose not the void Space necessary to Motion, equal to the least parcel of the divided solid Matter, but to $\frac{1}{10}$ or $\frac{1}{10000}$ of it; the same Consequence will always follow, of Space without Matter.

§. 24. But the question being here, Whether the *Idea of Space* or *Extension* be the same with the *Idea of Body*, it is not necessary to prove the real Existence of a *Vacuum*, but the *Idea* of it; which 'tis plain Men have, when they enquire and dispute, whether there be a *Vacuum* or no. For if they had not the *Idea* of Space without Body, they could not make a question about its Existence: And if their *Idea* of Body did not include in it something more than the bare *Idea* of Space, they could have no doubt about the *Plenitude* of the World; and 'twould be as absurd to demand, whether there were Space without Body, as whether there were Space without Space, or Body without Body, since these were but different Names of the same *Idea*.

The Ideas of Space & Body distinct.

§. 25. 'Tis true, the *Idea of Extension* joins it self so inseparably with all visible and most tangible Qualities, that it suffers us to see no one, or feel very few external Objects, without taking in Impressions of Extension too. This Readiness of Extension to make it self be taken notice of so constantly with other *Ideas*, has been the occasion, I guess, that some have made the whole Essence of *Body* to consist in *Extension*; which is not much to be wonder'd at, since some have had their Minds, by their Eyes and Touch, (the busiest of all our Senses) so fill'd with the *Idea* of *Extension*, and as it were wholly possess'd with it, that they allow'd no Existence to any thing that had not *Extension*. I shall not now argue with those Men, who take the measure and possibility of all Being, only from their narrow and gross Imaginations: But having here to do only with those who conclude the Essence of *Body* to be *Extension*, because they say they cannot imagine any sensible Quality of any *Body* without *Extension*; I shall desire them to consider, That had they reflected on their *Ideas* of Tastes and Smells, as much as on those of Sight and Touch; nay, had they examin'd their *Ideas* of Hunger and Thirst, and several other Pains, they would have found, that they included in them no *Idea* of *Extension* at all; which is but an Affection of *Body*, as well as the rest, discoverable by our Senses, which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure Essences of things.

Extension being inseparable from Body, proves it not the same.

§. 26. If those *Ideas*, which are constantly join'd to all others, must therefore be concluded to be the Essence of those things, which have constantly those *Ideas* join'd to them, and are inseparable from them; then Unity is without doubt the Essence of every thing. For there is not any Object of Sensation or Reflection, which does not carry with it the *Idea* of one: But the Weakness of this kind of Argument we have already shewn sufficiently.

§. 27. To conclude, Whatever Men shall think concerning the Existence of a *Vacuum*, this is plain to me, That we have as clear an *Idea of Space* distinct from *Solidity*, as we have of *Solidity* distinct from *Motion*, or *Motion* from *Space*. We have not any two more distinct *Ideas*, and we can as easily conceive *Space* without *Solidity*, as we can conceive *Body* or *Space* without *Motion*; tho' it be ever so certain, that neither *Body* nor *Motion* can exist without *Space*. But whether any one will take *Space* to be only a Relation resulting from the Existence of other Beings at a distance, or whether they will think the words of the most knowing King Solomon, *The Heaven, and the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain thee*; or those more emphatical ones of the inspir'd Philosopher St. Paul, *In him we live, move, and have our Being*; are to be understood in a literal sense, I leave every one to consider: only our *Idea of Space* is, I think, such as I have mention'd, and distinct from that of *Body*. For whether we consider in Matter it self the distance of its coherent solid Parts, and call it, in respect of those solid Parts, *Extension*; or whether, considering it as lying between the Extremities of any *Body* in its several Dimensions, we call it *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thickness*;

Ideas of Space and Solidity distinct.

Thickness; or else considering it as lying between any two Bodies, or positive Beings, without any consideration whether there be any Matter or no between, we call it *Distance*: However named or considered, it is always the same uniform simple *Idea* of *Space*, taken from Objects about which our Senses have been conversant; whereof having settled *Ideas* in our Minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another as often as we will, and consider the *Space* or *Distance* so imagin'd, either as fill'd with solid Parts, so that another Body cannot come there, without displacing and thrusting out the Body that was there before; or else as void of Solidity, so that a Body of equal dimensions to that empty or pure *Space* may be placed in it, without the removing or expulsion of any thing that was there. But to avoid Confusion in Discourses concerning this matter, it were possibly to be wished that the name *Extension* were apply'd only to Matter, or the *Distance* of the Extremities of particular Bodies; and the term *Expansion* to *Space* in general, with or without solid Matter possessing it, so as to say *Space* is *expanded*, and *Body* *extended*. But in this, every one has his liberty; I propose it only for the more clear and distinct way of speaking.

Men differ little in clear simple Ideas.

§. 28. The knowing precisely what our Words stand for, would, I imagine, in this as well as a great many other cases, quickly end the dispute. For I am apt to think that Men, when they come to examine them, find their simple *Ideas* all generally to agree, tho' in discourse with one another, they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that Men who abstract their Thoughts, and do well examine the *Ideas* of their own Minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however, they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several Schools or Sects they have been bred up in: tho' amongst unthinking Men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own *Ideas*, and strip them not from the marks Men use for them, but confound them with Words, there must be endless Dispute, Wrangling, and Jargon; especially if they be learned bookish Men, devoted to some Sect, and accusom'd to the Language of it, and have learn'd to talk after others. But if it should happen, that any two thinking Men, should really have different *Ideas*, I do not see how they could discourse or argue one with another. Here I must not be mistaken, to think that every floating Imagination in Mens brains, is presently of that sort of *Ideas* I speak of. 'Tis not easy for the Mind to put off those confus'd Notions and Prejudices it has imbib'd from Custom, Inadvertency, and common Conversation: It requires Pains and Assiduity to examine its *Ideas*, till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones out of which they are compounded; and to see which, amongst its simple ones, have or have not a necessary Connexion and dependance one upon another. Till a Man doth this in the primary and original Notions of things, he builds upon floating and uncertain Principles, and will often find himself at a loss.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration, and its Simple Modes.

Duration is fleeting Extension.

§. 1. THERE is another sort of *Distance* or *Length*, the *Idea* whereof we get not from the permanent Parts of *Space*, but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing Parts of Succession. This we call *Duration*, the simple Modes whereof are any different Lengths of it, whereof we have distinct *Ideas*, as *Hours*, *Days*, *Years*, &c. *Time* and *Eternity*.

its Idea from Reflection on the Train of our Ideas.

§. 2. The Answer of a Great Man, to one who ask'd what *Time* was, *Si non rogas intelligo*, (which amounts to this; the more I set my self to think of it, the less I understand it) might perhaps persuade one, That *Time*, which reveals all other things, is it self not to be discovered. *Duration*, *Time*, and *Eternity*, are not without Reason thought to have something very abstruse in their nature. But however remote these may seem from our Comprehension, yet if we trace them right to their Originals, I doubt not but one of those Sources of all our Knowledge, viz. *Sensation* and *Reflection*, will be able to furnish us with these *Ideas*, as clear and distinct as many other which are thought much less obscure; and

and we shall find, that the *Idea* of Eternity it self is deriv'd from the same common Original with the rest of our *Ideas*.

§. 3. To understand Time and Eternity aright, we ought with Attention to consider what *Idea* it is we have of *Duration*, and how we came by it. 'Tis evident to any one, who will but observe what passes in his own Mind, that there is a Train of *Ideas*, which constantly succeed one another in his Understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these Appearances of several *Ideas*, one after another, in our Minds, is that which furnishes us with the *Idea* of Succession: and the Distance between any Parts of that Succession, or between the Appearance of any two *Ideas* in our Minds, is that we call *Duration*. For whilst we are thinking, or whilst we receive successively several *Ideas* in our Minds, we know that we do exist; and so we call the Existence, or the Continuation of the Existence of our selves, or any thing else commensurate to the Succession of any *Ideas* in our Minds, the *Duration* of our selves, or any such other Thing co-existing with our Thinking.

§. 4. That we have our Notion of Succession and Duration from this Original, viz. from Reflection on the Train of *Ideas* which we find to appear one after another in our own Minds, seems plain to me, in that we have no Perception of *Duration*, but by considering the Train of *Ideas* that take their Turns in our Understandings. When that Succession of *Ideas* ceases, our Perception of *Duration* ceases with it; which every one clearly experiments in himself, whilst he sleeps soundly, whether an Hour or a Day, a Month or a Year; of which *Duration* of things, whilst he sleeps or thinks not, he has no Perception at all, but it is quite lost to him; and the Moment wherein he leaves off to think, till the Moment he begins to think again, seems to him to have no Distance. And so I doubt not it would be to a waking Man, if it were possible for him to keep only one *Idea* in his Mind, without Variation and the Succession of others: And we see, that one who fixes his Thoughts very intently on one thing, so as to take but little notice of the Succession of *Ideas* that pass in his Mind, whilst he is taken up with that earnest Contemplation, lets slip out of his account a good Part of that *Duration*, and thinks that Time shorter than it is. But if Sleep commonly unites the distant Parts of *Duration*, it is because during that Time we have no Succession of *Ideas* in our Minds. For if a Man, during his Sleep, dreams, and Variety of *Ideas* make themselves perceptible in his Mind one after another; he hath then, during such a dreaming, a Sense of *Duration*, and of the Length of it; by which it is to me very clear, that Men derive their *Ideas* of *Duration* from their Reflection on the Train of the *Ideas* they observe to succeed one another in their own Understandings; without which Observation they can have no Notion of *Duration*, whatever may happen in the World.

§. 5. Indeed a Man having, from reflecting on the Succession and Number of his own Thoughts, got the Notion or *Idea* of *Duration*, he can apply that Notion to Things which exist while he does not think; as he that has got the *Idea* of Extension from Bodies by his Sight or Touch, can apply it to Distances, where no Body is seen or felt. And therefore tho' a Man has no Perception of the Length of *Duration*, which pass'd whilst he slept or thought not; yet having observ'd the Revolution of Days and Nights, and found the Length of their *Duration* to be in Appearance regular and constant, he can, upon the Supposition that that Revolution has proceeded after the same Manner, whilst he was asleep or thought not, as it used to do at other Times; he can, I say, imagine and make Allowance for the Length of *Duration*, whilst he slept. But if Adam and Eve (when they were alone in the World) instead of their ordinary Night's Sleep, had pass'd the whole twenty four Hours in one continu'd Sleep, the *Duration* of that twenty four Hours had been irrecoverably lost to them, and been for ever left out of their Account of Time.

§. 6. Thus by reflecting on the appearing of various *Ideas* one after another in our Understandings, we get the Notion of Succession; which if any one should think we did rather get from our Observation of Motion by our Senses, he will perhaps be of my Mind, when he considers that even Motion produces in his Mind an *Idea* of Succession, no otherwise than as it produces there a continu'd Train of distinguishable *Ideas*. For a Man, looking upon a Body really moving, perceives yet no Motion at all, unless that Motion produces a constant Train of successive *Ideas*:

The *Idea* of
Duration ap-
plicable to
Things whilst
we sleep.

The *Idea* of
Succession not
from Motion.

Ideas: v. g. a Man becalm'd at Sea, out of sight of Land, in a fair day, may look on the Sun, or Sea, or Ship, a whole Hour together, and perceive no Motion at all in either; tho' it be certain, that two, and perhaps all of them, have mov'd during that time a great way. But as soon as he perceives either of them to have chang'd Distance with some other Body, as soon as this Motion produces any new *Idea* in him, then he perceives that there has been Motion. But wherever a Man is with all things at rest about him, without perceiving any Motion at all; if during this Hour of Quiet he has been thinking, he will perceive the various *Ideas* of his own Thoughts in his own Mind, appearing one after another, and thereby observe and find Succession where he could observe no Motion.

§. 7. And this, I think, is the Reason, why *Motions* very slow, tho' they are constant, are not perceiv'd by us; because in their remove from one sensible part towards another, their change of Distance is so slow, that it causes no new *Ideas* in us, but a good while one after another: and so not causing a constant Train of new *Ideas* to follow one another immediately in our Minds, we have no Perception of Motion; which consisting in a constant Succession, we cannot perceive that Succession without a constant Succession of varying *Ideas* arising from it.

§. 8. On the contrary, things that move so swift as not to affect the Senses distinctly with several distinguishable Distances of their Motion, and so cause not any Train of *Ideas* in the Mind, are not also perceiv'd to move: For any thing that moves round about in a Circle, in less time than our *Ideas* are wont to succeed one another in our Minds, is not perceiv'd to move; but seems to be a perfect entire Circle of that Matter or Colour, and not a part of a Circle in Motion.

The Train of
Ideas has a
certain degree
of Quickness.

§. 9. Hence I leave it to others to judg, whether it be not probable that our *Ideas* do, whilst we are awake, succeed one another in our Minds at certain Distances, not much unlike the Images in the inside of a Lanthorn, turn'd round by the Heat of a Candle. This Appearance of theirs in Train, tho' perhaps it may be sometimes faster, and sometimes slower, yet, I guess, varies not very much in a waking Man. There seem to be certain Bounds to the Quickness and Slowness of the Succession of those *Ideas* one to another in our Minds, beyond which they can neither delay nor hasten.

§. 10. The reason I have for this odd Conjecture, is, from observing that in the Impressions made upon any of our Senses, we can but to a certain degree perceive any Succession; which if exceeding quick, the Sense of Succession is lost, even in Cases where it is evident that there is a real Succession. Let a Cannon-Bullet pass thro' a Room, and in its way take with it any Limb, or fleshy Parts of a Man; 'tis as clear as any Demonstration can be, that it must strike successively the two sides of the Room: 'Tis also evident, that it must touch one part of the Flesh first; and another after, and so in Succession: And yet I believe no body, who ever felt the Pain of such a Shot, or heard the Blow against the two distant Walls, could perceive any Succession either in the Pain or Sound of so swift a Stroke. Such a part of Duration as this, wherein we perceive no succession, is that which we may call an *instant*, and is that which takes up the time of only one *Idea* in our Minds, without the Succession of another, wherein therefore we perceive no Succession at all.

§. 11. This also happens, where the Motion is so slow, as not to supply a constant Train of fresh *Ideas* to the Senses, as fast as the Mind is capable of receiving new ones into it; and so other *Ideas* of our own Thoughts, having room to come into our Minds, between those offer'd to our senses by the moving Body, there the Sense of Motion is lost; and the Body, tho' it really moves, yet not changing perceivable Distance with some other Bodies, as fast as the *Ideas* of our own Minds do naturally follow one another in Train, the thing seems to stand still, as is evident in the Hands of Clocks and Shadows of Sun-dials, and other constant but slow Motions; where, tho' after certain Intervals, we perceive by the Change of Distance that it hath mov'd, yet the Motion it self we perceive not.

This Train the
Measure of o-
ther Succes-
sions.

§. 12. So that to me it seems, that the constant and regular Succession of *Ideas* in a waking Man, is, as it were, the Measure and Standard of all other Successions, whereof

whereof if any one either exceeds the pace of our *Ideas*, as where two Sounds, or Pains, &c. take up in their Succession the Duration of but one *Idea*, or else where any Motion or Succession is so slow, as that it keeps not pace with the *Ideas* in our Minds, or the Quickness in which they take their turns; as when any one or more *Ideas*, in their ordinary Course, come into our Mind, between those which are offer'd to the Sight by the different perceptible Distances of a Body in Motion; or between Sounds or Smells following one another, there also the Sense of a constant continu'd Succession is lost, and we perceive it not but with certain Gaps of Rest between.

§. 13. If it be so that the *Ideas* of our Minds, whilst we have any there, do constantly change and shift in a continual Succession, it would be impossible, may any one say, for a Man to think long of any one thing. By which, if it be meant, that a Man may have one self-same single *Idea* a long time alone in his Mind, without any Variation at all, I think, in matter of Fact, it is not possible; for which (not knowing how the *Ideas* of our Minds are fram'd, of what Materials they are made, whence they have their Light, and how they come to make their Appearances) I can give no other reason but Experience: And I would have any one try whether he can keep one unvary'd single *Idea* in his Mind, without any other, for any considerable time together.

The Mind cannot fix long on one invariable Idea.

§. 14. For trial, let him take any Figure, any degree of Light or Whiteness, or what other he pleases; and he will, I suppose, find it difficult to keep all other *Ideas* out of his Mind: But that some, either of another kind, or various Consideration of that *Idea* (each of which Considerations is a new *Idea*) will constantly succeed one another in his Thoughts, let him be as wary as he can.

§. 15. All that is in a Man's Power in this Case, I think is only to mind and observe what the *Ideas* are, that take their turns in his Understanding; or else to direct the sort, and call in such as he hath a desire or use of: But hinder the constant Succession of fresh ones, I think he cannot, tho' he may commonly chuse whether he will heedfully observe and consider them.

§. 16. Whether these several *Ideas* in a man's Mind be made by certain Motions, I will not here dispute; but this I am sure, that they include no *Idea* of Motion, in their Appearance; and if a Man had not the *Idea* of Motion otherwise, I think he would have none at all: which is enough to my present purpose, and sufficiently shews, that the notice we take of the *Ideas* of our own Minds, appearing there one after another, is that which gives us the *Idea* of Succession and Duration, without which we should have no such *Ideas* at all. 'Tis not then Motion, but the constant Train of *Ideas* in our Minds, whilst we are waking, that furnishes us with the *Idea* of Duration, whereof Motion no otherwise gives us any Perception, than as it causes in our Minds a constant Succession of *Ideas*, as I have before shew'd: And we have as clear an *Idea* of Succession and Duration, by the train of other *Ideas* succeeding one another in our Minds, without the *Idea* of any Motion, as by the train of *Ideas* caus'd by the uninterrupted sensible Change of Distance between two Bodies, which we have from Motion; and therefore we should as well have the *Idea* of Duration, were there no Sense of Motion at all.

Ideas, however made include no Sense of Motion.

§. 17. Having thus got the *Idea* of Duration, the next thing natural for the Mind to do, is to get some Measure of this common Duration, whereby it might judg of its different Lengths, and consider the distinct Order wherein several things exist, without which a great part of our Knowledge would be confus'd, and a great part of History be render'd very useless. This Consideration of Duration, as set out by certain Periods, and mark'd by certain Measures or Epochs, is that, I think, which most properly we call Time.

Time is Duration set out by Measures.

§. 18. In the measuring of Extension, there is nothing more requir'd but the Application of the Standard or Measure we make use of to the thing, of whose Extension we would be inform'd. But in the measuring of Duration, this cannot be done, because no two different parts of Succession can be put together to measure one another: And nothing being a Measure of Duration but Duration, as nothing is of Extension but Extension, we cannot keep by us any standing unvarying Measure of Duration, which consists in a constant fleeting Succession, as we can of certain Lengths of Extension, as Inches, Feet, Yards,

A good Measure of Time must divide its whole Duration into equal Periods.

Ec. mark'd out in permanent parcels of Matter. Nothing then could serve well for a convenient measure of Time, but what has divided the whole Length of its Duration into apparently equal Portions, by constantly repeated Periods. What Portions of Duration are not distinguish'd, or consider'd as distinguish'd and measur'd by such Periods, come not so properly under the Notion of Time, as appears by such Phrases as these, *viz. Before all Time, and when Time shall be no more.*

The Revolutions of the Sun and Moon the properest Measures of Time.

§. 19. The diurnal and annual *Revolutions of the Sun*, as having been, from the beginning of Nature, constant, regular, and universally observable by all Mankind, and suppos'd equal to one another, have been with reason *made use of for the Measure of Duration.* But the distinction of Days and Years having depended on the Motion of the Sun, it has brought this Mistake with it, that it has been thought that Motion and Duration were the Measure one of another: For Men, in the *measuring of the Length of Time*, having been accusom'd to the *Ideas* of Minutes, Hours, Days, Months, Years, &c. which they found themselves upon any mention of Time or Duration presently to think on, all which Portions of Time were measur'd out by the Motion of those heavenly Bodies; they were apt to confound Time and Motion, or at least to think that they had a necessary Connexion one with another: whereas any constant periodical Appearance, or Alteration of *Ideas* in seemingly equidistant Spaces of Duration, if constant and universally observable, would have as well distinguish'd the Intervals of Time, as those that have been made use of. For supposing the Sun, which some have taken to be a Fire, had been lighted up at the same distance of Time that it now every day comes about to the same Meridian, and then gone out again about twelve Hours after, and that in the space of an annual Revolution, it had sensibly increas'd in Brightness and Heat, and so decreas'd again; would not such regular Appearances serve to measure out the Distances of Duration to all that could observe it, as well without as with Motion? For if the Appearances were constant, universally observable, and in equidistant Periods, they would serve Mankind for Measure of Time as well, were the Motion away.

But not by their Motion but periodical Appearances.

§. 20. For the freezing of Water, or the blowing of a Plant, returning at equidistant Periods in all Parts of the Earth, would as well serve Men to reckon their Years by, as the Motions of the Sun: And in effect we see, that some People in *America* counted their Years by the coming of certain Birds amongst them at their certain Seasons, and leaving them at others. For a Fit of an Ague, the Sense of Hunger or Thirst, a Smell or a Taste, or any other *Idea* returning constantly at equidistant Periods, and making it self universally be taken notice of, *would* not fail to *measure* out the Course of Succession, and distinguish the Distances of Time. Thus we see that Men born blind count Time well enough by Years, whose Revolutions yet they cannot distinguish by Motions, that they perceive not: And I ask whether a blind Man, who distinguish'd his Years either by the Heat of Summer, or Cold of Winter; by the Smell of any Flower of the Spring, or Taste of any Fruit of the Autumn; would not have a better Measure of Time than the *Romans* had before the Reformation of their *Calendar* by *Julius Caesar*, or many other People, whose Years, notwithstanding the Motion of the Sun, which they pretend to make use of, are very irregular? And it adds no small Difficulty to Chronology, that the exact Lengths of the Years that several Nations counted by, are hard to be known, they differing very much one from another, and I think I may say all of them from the precise Motion of the Sun. And if the Sun mov'd from the Creation to the Flood constantly in the *Æquator*, and so equally dispers'd its Light and Heat to all the habitable Parts of the Earth, in days all of the same Length, without its annual Variations to the Tropicks, as a late ingenious Author supposes; I do not think it very easy to imagine, that (notwithstanding the Motion of the Sun) Men should in the *Antediluvian* World, from the beginning count by Years, or measure their Time by Periods, that had no sensible Marks very obvious to distinguish them by.

No two parts of Duration can be certainly known to be equal.

§. 21. But perhaps it will be said, without a regular Motion, such as of the Sun, or some other, how could it ever be known that such Periods were equal? To which I answer, the Equality of any other returning Appearances might be known

known by the same way that that of Days was known, or presum'd to be so at first; which was only by judging of them by the Train of *Ideas* which had pass'd in Mens Minds in the Intervals: by which Train of *Ideas* discovering inequality in the natural Days, but none in the artificial Days, the artificial Days or $\nu\chi\theta\mu\epsilon\epsilon\epsilon$ were guess'd to be equal, which was sufficient to make them serve for a Measure: Tho' exacter Search has since discover'd Inequality in the diurnal Revolutions of the Sun, and we know not whether the annual also be not unequal: These yet, by their presum'd and apparent Equality, serve as well to reckon Time by (tho' not to measure the Parts of Duration exactly) as if they could be prov'd to be exactly equal. We must therefore carefully distinguish betwixt Duration it self, and the Measures we make use of to judg of its Length. Duration in it self is to be consider'd as going on in one constant, equal, uniform Course: But none of the Measures of it, which we make use of, can be known to do so; nor can we be assur'd, that their assign'd Parts or Periods are equal in Duration one to another; for two successive Lengths of Duration, however measur'd, can never be demonstrat'd to be equal. The Motion of the Sun, which the World us'd so long and so confidently for an exact Measure of Duration, has, as I said, been found in its several parts unequal: And tho' Men have of late made use of a Pendulum, as a more steady and regular Motion than that of the Sun, or (to speak more truly) of the Earth; yet if any one should be ask'd how he certainly knows that the two successive Swings of a Pendulum are equal, it would be very hard to satisfy him that they are infallibly so: Since we cannot be sure, that the Cause of that Motion, which is unknown to us, shall always operate equally; and we are sure that the Medium in which the Pendulum moves, is not constantly the same: Either of which varying, may alter the Equality of such Periods, and thereby destroy the Certainty and Exactness of the Measure by Motion, as well as any other Periods of other Appearances; the Notion of Duration still remaining clear, tho' our Measures of it cannot any of them be demonstrat'd to be exact. Since then no two Portions of Succession can be brought together, it is impossible ever certainly to know their Equality. All that we can do for a Measure of Time, is to take such as have continual successive Appearances at seeming equidistant Periods; of which *seeming Equality we have no other Measure, but such as the Train of our own Ideas* have lodg'd in our Memories, with the Concurrence of other probable Reasons, to persuade us of their Equality.

§. 22. One thing seems strange to me, that whilst all Men manifestly measure Time by the Motion of the great and visible Bodies of the World, *Time not the Measure of Motion.* yet should be *design'd* to be the *Measure of Motion*; whereas 'tis obvious to every one who reflects ever so little on it, that to measure Motion, Space is as necessary to be consider'd as Time; and those who look a little farther, will find also the Bulk of the thing mov'd necessary to be taken into the Computation, by any one who will estimate or measure Motion, so as to judg right of it. Nor indeed does Motion any otherwise conduce to the measuring of Duration, than as it constantly brings about the Return of certain sensible *Ideas*, in seeming equidistant Periods. For, if the Motion of the Sun were as unequal as of a Ship driven by unsteady Winds, sometimes very slow, and at others irregularly very swift; or if being constantly equally swift, it yet was not circular, and produc'd not the same Appearances, it would not at all help us to measure Time, any more than the seeming unequal Motion of a Comet does.

§. 23. *Minutes, Hours, Days and Years*, are then no more necessary to Time or Duration, than Inches, Feet, Yards and Miles, mark'd out in any Matter, are to Extension: For tho' we in this part of the Universe, by the constant use of them, as of Periods set out by the Revolutions of the Sun, or as known Parts of such Periods, have fix'd the *Ideas* of such Lengths of Duration in our Minds, which we apply to all Parts of Time, whose Lengths we would consider; yet there may be other Parts of the Universe, where they no more use these Measures of our's, than in *Japan* they do our Inches, Feet or Miles; but yet something analogous to them there must be. For without some regular periodical Returns, we could not measure our selves, or signify to others the Length of any Duration, tho' at the same time the World were as full of Motion as it is now, but no part of it dispos'd into regular and apparently equidistant

distant Revolutions. But the different Measures that may be made use of for the account of Time, do not at all alter the notion of Duration, which is the thing to be measur'd; no more than the different Standards of a Foot and a Cubit alter the notion of Extension to those, who make use of those different Measures.

Our measure of Time applicable to Duration before Time.

§. 25. The Mind having once got such a Measure of Time as the annual Revolution of the Sun, can apply that Measure to Duration, wherein that Measure it self did not exist, and with which, in the reality of its Being, it had nothing to do: For should one say, That *Abraham* was born in the 2712th Year of the *Julian* Period, it is altogether as intelligible, as reckoning from the beginning of the World, tho' there were so far back no Motion of the Sun, nor any other Motion at all. For tho' the *Julian* Period be suppos'd to begin several hundred Years before there were really either Days, Nights or Years, mark'd-out by any Revolutions of the Sun; yet we reckon as right, and thereby measure Duration as well, as if really at that time the Sun had existed, and kept the same ordinary Motion it doth now. The *Idea of Duration equal to an annual Revolution of the Sun*, is as easily applicable in our Thoughts to Duration, where no Sun nor Motion was, as the *Idea* of a Foot or Yard, taken from Bodies here, can be applied in our Thoughts to Distances beyond the Confines of the World, where are no Bodies at all.

§. 26. For supposing it were 5639 Miles, or Millions of Miles, from this place to the remotest Body of the Universe (for being finite, it must be at a certain distance) as we suppose it to be 5639 Years from this time to the first Existence of any Body in the beginning of the World; we can, in our Thoughts, apply this Measure of a Year to Duration before the Creation, or beyond the Duration of Bodies or Motion, as we can this Measure of a Mile to Space beyond the utmost Bodies; and by the one measure Duration, where there was no Motion, as well as by the other measure Space in our Thoughts, where there is no Body.

§. 27. If it be objected to me here, That in this way of explaining of Time, I have beg'd what I should not, viz. That the World is neither eternal nor infinite; I answer, That to my present purpose it is not needful, in this place, to make use of Arguments, to evince the World to be finite, both in Duration and Extension; but it being at least as conceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the liberty to suppose it, as well as any one hath to suppose the contrary: And I doubt not but that every one that will go about it, may easily conceive in his Mind the beginning of Motion, tho' not of all Duration, and so may come to a stop and *non ultra* in his Consideration of Motion. So also in his Thoughts he may set Limits to Body, and the Extension belonging to it, but not to Space where no Body is; the utmost bounds of Space and Duration being beyond the reach of Thought, as well as the utmost bounds of Number are beyond the largest Comprehension of the Mind; and all for the same reason, as we shall see in another Place.

Eternity.

§. 28. By the same means therefore, and from the same Original that we come to have the *Idea* of Time, we have also that *Idea* which we call *Eternity*: viz. having got the *Idea* of Succession and Duration, by reflecting on the Train of our own *Ideas* caus'd in us either by the natural Appearances of those *Ideas* coming constantly of themselves into our waking Thoughts, or else caus'd by external Objects successively affecting our Senses; and having from the Revolutions of the Sun got the *Ideas* of certain Lengths of Duration, we can, in our Thoughts, add such Lengths of Duration to one another as often as we please, and apply them, so added, to Durations past or to come: And this we can continue to do on, without Bounds or Limits, and proceed in *infinitum*, and apply thus the Length of the annual Motion of the Sun to Duration, suppos'd before the Sun's, or any other Motion had its Being; which is no more difficult or absurd, than to apply the Notion I have of the moving of a Shadow one Hour to Day upon the Sun-Dial, to the Duration of something last Night, v. g. the burning of a Candle, which is now absolutely separate from all actual Motion: And it is as impossible for the Duration of that Flame for an Hour last Night to co-exist with any Motion that now is, or ever shall be, as for any part of Duration, that was before the beginning of the World, to co-exist with the Motion of the Sun now. But yet this hinders not, but that

having

having the *Idea* of the Length of the Motion of the Shadow on a Dial between the Marks of two Hours, I can as distinctly measure in my Thoughts the Duration of that Candle-light last night, as I can the Duration of any thing that does now exist: And it is no more than to think, that had the Sun shone then on the Dial, and mov'd after the same rate it doth now, the Shadow on the Dial would have pass'd from one Hour-line to another, whilst that Flame of the Candle lasted.

§. 29. The Notion of an Hour, Day, or Year, being only the *Idea* I have of the Length of certain periodical regular Motions, neither of which Motions do ever all at once exist, but only in the *Ideas* I have of them in my Memory deriv'd from my Senses or Reflection; I can with the same ease, and for the same reason, apply it in my Thoughts to Duration, antecedent to all manner of Motion, as well as to any thing that is but a Minute, or a Day, antecedent to the Motion, that at this very moment the Sun is in. All things past are equally and perfectly at rest; and to this way of Consideration of them are all one, whether they were before the beginning of the World, or but yesterday: *the measuring of any Duration by some Motion, depending not at all on the real Co-existence of that thing to that Motion, or any other Periods of Revolution, but the having a clear Idea of the Length of some periodical known Motion, or other Intervals of Duration in my Mind, and applying that to the Duration of the thing I would measure.*

§. 30. Hence we see, that some Men imagine the Duration of the World from its first Existence to this present Year 1689. to have been 5639 Years, or equal to 5639 annual Revolutions of the Sun, and others a great deal more; as the Egyptians of old, who, in the time of Alexander, counted 23000 Years from the Reign of the Sun; and the Chineses now, who account the World 3,269,000 Years old, or more: which longer Duration of the World, according to their Computation, tho' I should not believe to be true; yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as truly understand, and say one is longer than the other, as I understand, that Methusalem's Life was longer than Enoch's. And if the common reckoning of 5639 should be true, (as it may be as well as any other assign'd) it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the World 1000 Years older, since every one may with the same Facility imagine (I do not say believe) the World to be 50,000 Years old, as 5639; and may as well conceive the Duration of 50,000 Years, as 5639. Whereby it appears, that *to the measuring the Duration of any thing by Time, it is not requisite that that thing should be co-existent to the Motion we measure by, or any other periodical Revolution; but it suffices to this purpose, that we have the Idea of the Length of any regular periodical Appearances, which we can in our Minds apply to Duration, with which the Motion or Appearance never co-existed.*

§. 31. For as in the History of the Creation deliver'd by Moses, I can imagine that Light existed three Days before the Sun was, or had any Motion, barely by thinking, that the Duration of Light before the Sun was created, was so long as (if the Sun had mov'd then, as it doth now) would have been equal to three of his diurnal Revolutions; so by the same way I can have an *Idea* of the Chaos, or Angels being created, before there was either Light, or any continu'd Motion, a Minute, an Hour, a Day, a Year, or 1000 Years. For if I can but consider Duration equal to one Minute, before either the Being or Motion of any Body, I can add one Minute more till I come to 60; and by the same way of adding Minutes, Hours, or Years (*i. e.* such or such parts of the Sun's Revolution, or any other Period, whereof I have the *Idea*) proceed in *infinitum*, and suppose a Duration exceeding as many such Periods as I can reckon, let me add whilst I will: which I think is the Notion we have of *Eternity*, of whose Infinity we have no other Notion, than we have of the Infinity of Number, to which we can add for ever without end.

§. 32. And thus I think it is plain, that from those two Fountains of all Knowledge before-mention'd, *viz. Reflection and Sensation, we get the Ideas of Duration, and the Measures of it.*

For *First*, By observing what passes in our Minds, how our *Ideas* there in train constantly some vanish, and others begin to appear, we come by the *Idea* of *Succession*.

Secondly,

Secondly, By observing a distance in the Parts of this Succession, we get the *Idea of Duration*.

Thirdly, By Sensation observing certain Appearances, at certain regular and seeming equidistant Periods, we get the *Ideas of certain Lengths or Measures of Duration*, as Minutes, Hours, Days, Years, &c.

Fourthly, By being able to repeat those Measures of Time, or *Ideas of stated Length of Duration* in our Minds, as often as we will, we can come to *imagine Duration*, where nothing does really endure or exist; and thus we imagine to Morrow, next Year, or seven Years hence.

Fifthly, By being able to repeat any such *Idea* of any Length of Time, as of a Minute, a Year, or an Age, as often as we will in our own Thoughts, and adding them one to another, without ever coming to the end of such Addition any nearer than we can to the end of Number, to which we can always add, we come by the *Idea of Eternity*, as the future eternal Durations of our Souls, as well as the Eternity of that infinite Being, which must necessarily have always existed.

Sixthly, By considering any part of infinite Duration, as set out by periodical Measures, we come by the *Idea* of what we call *Time* in general.

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expansion, consider'd together.

Both capable
of greater and
less.

§. 1. **T**HOUGH we have in the precedent Chapters dwelt pretty long on the Considerations of Space and Duration; yet they being *Ideas* of general Concernment, that have something very abstruse and peculiar in their Nature, the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of use for their Illustration; and we may have the more clear and distinct Conception of them, by taking a view of them together. Distance or Space, in its simple abstract Conception, to avoid Confusion, I call *Expansion*, to distinguish it from *Extension*, which by some is us'd to express this distance only, as it is in the solid parts of Matter, and so includes, or at least intimates the *Idea* of Body: Whereas the *Idea* of pure Distance includes no such thing. I prefer also the word *Expansion* to *Space*, because *Space* is often apply'd to distance of fleeting successive parts, which never exist together, as well as to those which are permanent. In both these (*viz. Expansion and Duration*) the Mind has this common *Idea* of continu'd Lengths, capable of greater or less Quantities: For a Man has as clear an *Idea* of the difference of the Length of an Hour, and a Day, as of an Inch and a Foot.

Expansion not
bounded by
Matter.

§. 2. The Mind, having got the *Idea* of the Length of any part of *Expansion*, let it be a Span, or a Pace, or what Length you will, can, as has been said, repeat that *Idea*; and so adding it to the former, enlarge its *Idea of Length*, and make it equal to two Spans, or two Paces, and so as often as it will, till it equals the distance of any parts of the Earth one from another, and increase thus, till it amounts to the distance of the Sun, or remotest Star. By such a progression as this, setting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can proceed and pass beyond all those Lengths, and find nothing to stop its going on, either in, or without Body. 'Tis true, we can easily in our Thoughts come to the end of solid Extension; the Extremity and Bounds of all Body, we have no difficulty to arrive at: But when the Mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its Progress into this endless Expansion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end. Nor let any one say, That beyond the Bounds of Body, there is nothing at all, unless he will confine GOD within the Limits of Matter. Solomon, whose Understanding was fill'd and enlarg'd with Wisdom, seems to have other Thoughts, when he says, *Heaven, and the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain Thee*: And he, I think, very much magnifies to himself the Capacity of his own Understanding, who persuades himself, that he can extend his Thoughts farther than GOD exists, or imagine any Expansion where he is not.

§. 3. Just so is it in Duration. *The Mind having got, the Idea of any Length of Duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it, not only beyond its own, but beyond the Existence of all corporeal Beings, and all the Measures of Time, taken from the great Bodies of the World, and their Motions.* But yet every one easily admits, That tho' we make Duration boundless, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all Being. GOD, every one easily allows, fills Eternity; and 'tis hard to find a Reason, why any one should doubt, that he likewise fills Immenity? His infinite Being is certainly as boundless one way as another; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to Matter, to say, where there is no Body, there is nothing.

Nor Duration by Motion.

Why Men more easily admit infinite Duration, than infinite Expansion.

§. 4. Hence, I think, we may learn the Reason why every one familiarly, and without the least hesitation, speaks of, and supposes Eternity, and sticks not to ascribe Infinity to Duration; but 'tis with more doubting and reserve, that many admit, or suppose the Infinity of Space. The Reason whereof seems to me to be this, That Duration and Extension being us'd as Names of Affections belonging to other Beings, we easily conceive in GOD infinite Duration, and we cannot avoid doing so: But not attributing to him Extension, but only to Matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the Existence of Expansion without Matter; of which alone we commonly suppose it an Attribute. And therefore when Men pursue their Thoughts of Space, they are apt to stop at the Confines of Body; as if Space were there at an end too, and reach'd no farther. Or if their Ideas upon consideration carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the Limits of the Universe, imaginary Space; as if it were nothing, because there is no Body existing in it. Whereas Duration, antecedent to all Body, and to the Motions which it is measur'd by, they never term imaginary; because it is never suppos'd void of some other real Existence. And if the Names of things may at all direct our Thoughts towards the Originals of Mens Ideas (as I am apt to think they may very much) one may have occasion to think by the name Duration, that the Continuation of Existence, with a kind of Resistance to any destructive Force, and the Continuation of Solidity (which is apt to be confounded with, and if we will look into the minute anatomical parts of Matter, is little different from Hardness) were thought to have some Analogy, and gave occasion to Words, so near of kin as *Durare* and *Durum esse*. And that *Durare* is apply'd to the Idea of Hardness, as well as that of Existence, we see in *Horace, Epod. 16. ferro duravit secula*. But be that as it will, this is certain, That whoever pursues his own Thoughts, will find them sometimes launch out beyond the Extent of Body into the Infinity of Space or Expansion; the Idea whereof is distinct and separate from Body, and all other things: which may (to those who please) be a Subject of farther Meditation.

§. 5. Time in general is to Duration, as Place to Expansion. They are so much of those boundless Oceans of Eternity and Immenity, as is set out and distinguish'd from the rest, as it were by Land-marks; and so are made use of to denote the Position of finite real Beings, in respect one to another, in those uniform infinite Oceans of Duration and Space. These rightly consider'd are only Ideas of determinate Distances, from certain known Points fix'd in distinguishable sensible things, and suppos'd to keep the same distance one from another. From such Points fix'd in sensible Beings we reckon, and from them we measure our Portions of those infinite Quantities; which so consider'd, are that which we call Time and Place. For Duration and Space being in themselves uniform and boundless, the Order and Position of things, without such known settled Points, would be lost in them, and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable Confusion.

Time to Duration is as Place to Expansion.

§. 6. Time and Place taken thus for determinate distinguishable Portions of those infinite Abysses of Space and Duration, set out, or suppos'd to be distinguish'd from the rest by Marks, and known Boundaries, have each of them a two fold Acceptation.

Time and Place are taken for so much of either, as are set out by the Existence and Motion of Bodies.

First, Time in general is commonly taken for so much of infinite Duration, as is measur'd-out by, and co-existent with the Existence and Motions of the great Bodies of the Universe, as far as we know any thing of them: And in this sense, Time begins and ends with the Frame of this sensible World, as in these

these Phrases before-mention'd, *before all Time*, or *when Time shall be no more*. *Place* likewise is taken sometimes for that Portion of infinite Space, which is possess'd by, and comprehended within the material World; and is thereby distinguish'd from the rest of Expansion; tho' this may more properly be call'd *Extension*, than *Place*. Within these two are confin'd, and by the observable Parts of them are measur'd and determin'd the particular Time or Duration, and the particular Extension and Place of all corporeal Beings.

Sometimes
for so much
of either, as
we design by
Measures ta-
ken from the
Bulk or Mo-
tion of Bodies.

§. 7. Secondly, Sometimes the word *Time* is us'd in a larger Sense, and is apply'd to Parts of that infinite Duration, not that were really distinguish'd and measur'd out by this real Existence, and periodical Motions of Bodies that were appointed from the Beginning to be for Signs, and for Seasons, and for Days, and Years, and are accordingly our Measures of Time; but such other Portions too of that infinite uniform Duration, which we, upon any occasion, do suppose equal to certain Lengths of measur'd Time; and so consider them as bounded and determin'd. For if we should suppose the Creation, or Fall of the Angels, was at the Beginning of the *Julian Period*, we should speak properly enough, and should be understood, if we said, 'tis a longer time since the Creation of Angels, than the Creation of the World, by 764 Years: whereby we would mark out so much of that undistinguish'd Duration, as we suppose equal to, and would have admitted 764 annual Revolutions of the Sun, moving at the rate it now does. And thus likewise we sometimes speak of *Place*, *Distance*, or *Bulk* in the great *Inane* beyond the confines of the World, when we consider so much of that Space as is equal to, or capable to receive a Body of any assign'd Dimensions, as a Cubick-foot; or do suppose a Point in it at such a certain distance from any part of the Universe.

They belong to
all Beings.

§. 8. *Where* and *When* are Questions belonging to all finite Existences, and are by us always reckon'd from some known Parts of this sensible World, and from some certain Epochs mark'd out to us by the Motions observable in it. Without some such fix'd Parts or Periods, the Order of things would be lost to our finite Understandings, in the boundless invariable Oceans of Duration and Expansion; which comprehend in them all finite Beings, and in their full Extent belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do so often find our Thoughts at a loss, when we would consider them either abstractly in themselves, or as any way attributed to the first incomprehensible Being. But when apply'd to any particular finite Beings, the Extension of any Body is so much of that infinite Space, as the Bulk of that Body takes up. And *Place* is the Position of any Body, when consider'd at a certain distance from some other. As the *Idea* of the particular Duration of any thing is an *Idea* of that Portion of infinite Duration, which passes during the Existence of that thing; so the Time *when* the thing existed is the *Idea* of that Space of Duration which pass'd between some known and fix'd Period of Duration, and the Being of that thing. One shews the distance of the Extremities of the Bulk or Existence of the same thing, as that it is a Foot square, or lasted two Years; the other shews the distance of it in Place, or Existence from other fix'd Points of Space or Duration, as that it was in the middle of *Lincoln-Inn-Fields*, or the first Degree of *Taurus*, and in the Year of our Lord 1671. or the 1000th Year of the *Julian Period*: All which Distances we measure by preconceiv'd *Ideas* of certain Lengths of Space and Duration, as Inches, Feet, Miles, and Degrees; and in the other, Minutes, Days, and Years, &c.

All the Parts
of Extension,
are Extension;
and all the
Parts of Du-
ration, are
Duration.

§. 9. There is one thing more wherein *Space* and *Duration* have a great Conformity; and that is, tho' they are justly reckon'd amongst our *simple Ideas*, yet none of the distinct *Ideas* we have of either is without all manner of Composition*; it is the very Nature of both of them to consist of Parts: but their

Parts

* It has been objected to Mr. Locke, that if Space consists of Parts, as 'tis confess'd in this Place, he should not have reckon'd it in the number of Simple Ideas; because it seems to be inconsistent with what he says elsewhere, That a Simple Idea is uncompounded, and contains in it nothing but one uniform Appearance or Conception of the Mind, and is not distinguishable into different Ideas. 'Tis farther objected, That Mr. Locke has not given in the 11th Chapter of the 2d

Parts being all of the same kind, and without the mixture of any other *Idea* hinder them not from having a Place amongst simple *Ideas*. Could the Mind, as in Number, come to so small a part of Extension or Duration, as excluded Divisibility, that would be, as it were, the indivisible Unit, or *Idea*; by Repetition of which it would make its more enlarg'd *Ideas* of Extension and Duration. But since the Mind is not able to frame an *Idea* of any Space without Parts; instead thereof it makes use of the common Measures, which by familiar Use, in each Country, have imprinted themselves on the Memory, (as Inches and Feet; or Cubits and Parasangs; and so Seconds, Minutes, Hours, Days, and Years in Duration :) The Mind makes use, I say, of such *Ideas* as these, as simple ones; and these are the component Parts of larger *Ideas*, which the Mind, upon occasion, makes by the addition of such known Lengths which it is acquainted with. On the other Side, the ordinary smallest Measure we have of either, is look'd on as an Unit in Number, when the Mind by division would reduce them into less Fractions. Tho' on both sides, both in Addition and Division, either of Space or Duration; when the *Idea* under consideration becomes very big or very small, its precise Bulk becomes very obscure and confus'd; and it is the Number of its repeated Additions or Divisions, that alone remains clear and distinct, as will easily appear to any one who will let his Thoughts loose in the vast Expansion of Space, or Divisibility of Matter. Every Part of Duration, is Duration too; and every Part of Extension, is Extension, both of them capable of Addition or Division in *infinitum*. But the least Portions of either of them, whereof we have clear and distinct *Ideas*, may perhaps be fittest to be consider'd by us, as the simple *Ideas* of that kind, out of which our complex Modes of Space, Extension and Duration, are made up, and into which they can again be distinctly resolv'd. Such a small part in Duration may be call'd a *Moment*, and is the Time of one *Idea* in our Minds in the Train of their ordinary Succession there. The other, wanting a proper Name, I know not whether I may be allow'd to call a *sensible Point*, meaning thereby the least

Book, where he begins to speak of *simple Ideas*, an exact Definition of what he understands by the word *simple Ideas*. To these Difficulties Mr. Locke answers thus: To begin with the last, he declares, That he has not treated his Subject in an Order perfectly Scholastick, having not had much Familiarity with those sort of Books during the writing of his, and not remembering at all the Method in which they are written; and therefore his Readers ought not to expect Definitions regularly plac'd at the beginning of each new Subject. Mr. Locke contents himself to employ the principal Terms that he uses, so, that from his use of them the Reader may easily comprehend what he means by them. But with respect to the term *simple Idea*, he has had the good luck to define that in the Place cited in the Objection; and therefore there is no reason to supply that Defect. The Question then is to know, whether the *Idea* of Extension agrees with this Definition: Which will effectually agree to it, if it be understood in the Sense which Mr. Locke had principally in his view; for that Composition which he design'd to exclude in that Definition, was a Composition of different *Ideas* in the Mind, and not a Composition of the same kind in a thing whose Essence consists in having Parts of the same kind, where you can never come to a Part entirely exempted from this Composition. So that if the *Idea* of Extension consists in having *Partes extra Partes*, (as the Schools speak) 'tis always, in the Sense of Mr. Locke, a *simple Idea*; because the *Idea* of having *Partes extra Partes*, cannot be resolv'd into two other *Ideas*. For the remainder of the Objection made to Mr. Locke, with respect to the Nature of Extension, Mr. Locke was aware of it, as may be seen in §. 9. Ch. 15. of the 2d Book, where he says, That the least Portion of Space or Extension, whereof we have a clear and distinct *Idea*, may perhaps be the fittest to be consider'd by us as a *simple Idea* of that kind, out of which our complex Modes of Space and Extension are made up. So that, according to Mr. Locke, it may very fitly be call'd a *simple Idea*, since it is the least *Idea* of Space that the Mind can form to it self, and that cannot be divided by the Mind into any less, whereof it has in it self any determin'd Perception. From whence it follows, that it is to the Mind one *simple Idea*; and that is sufficient to take away this Objection: For 'tis not the design of Mr. Locke, in this place, to discourse of any thing but concerning the *Ideas* of the Mind. But if this is not sufficient to clear the Difficulty, Mr. Locke hath nothing more to add, but that if the *Idea* of Extension is so peculiar, that it cannot exactly agree with the Definition that he has given of those *simple Ideas*, so that it differs in some manner from all others of that kind, he thinks 'tis better to leave it there expos'd to this Difficulty, than to make a new Division in his favour. 'Tis enough for Mr. Locke that his Meaning can be understood. 'Tis very common to observe intelligible Discourses spoil'd by too much Subtilty in nice Divisions. We ought to put things together as well as we can, *D. & in Cause*; but after all, several things will not be bundled up together under our Terms Ways of speaking.

Particle of Matter or Space we can discern, which is ordinarily about a Minute, and to the sharpest Eyes seldom less than thirty seconds of a Circle, whereof the Eye is the Center.

*Their Parts
inseparable.*

§. 10. Expansion and Duration have this farther Agreement, that tho' they are both consider'd by us as having Parts, yet *their Parts* are not separable one from another, no, not even in Thought: tho' the Parts of Bodies from whence we take our measure of the one, and the Parts of Motion, or rather the Succession of Ideas in our Minds, from whence we take the measure of the other, may be interrupted and separated; as the one is often by Rest, and the other is by Sleep, which we call Rest too.

*Duration is as
a Line, Ex-
pansion as a
Solid.*

§. 11. But yet there is this manifest difference between them, That the Ideas of Length, which we have of Expansion, are turn'd every way, and so make Figure and Breadth, and Thickness; but Duration it but as it were the Length of one streight Line, extended in infinitum, not capable of Multiplicity, Variation, or Figure; but is one common Measure of all Existence whatsoever, wherein all things, whilst they exist, equally partake. For this present Moment is common to all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their Existence, as much as if they were all but one single Being; and we may truly say, they all exist in the same Moment of Time. Whether Angels and Spirits have any analogy to this in respect of Expansion, is beyond my Comprehension: And perhaps for us, who have Understandings and Comprehensions suited to our own Preservation, and the Ends of our own Being, but not to the Reality and Extent of all other Beings; 'tis near as hard to conceive any Existence, or to have an Idea of any real Being, with a perfect Negation of all manner of Expansion; as it is to have the Idea of any real Existence, with a perfect Negation of all manner of Duration: And therefore what Spirits have to do with Space, or how they communicate in it, we know not. All that we know, is, that Bodies do each singly possess its proper Portion of it, according to the Extent of its solid Parts; and thereby exclude all other Bodies from having any share in that particular Portion of Space, whilst it remains there.

*Duration has
never two
Parts toge-
ther, Expansi-
on all together.*

§. 12. Duration, and Time which is a part of it, is the Idea we have of *perishing Distance*, of which no two Parts exist together, but follow each other in Succession; as Expansion is the Idea of *lasting Distance*, all whose Parts exist together, and are not capable of Succession. And therefore tho' we cannot conceive any Duration without Succession, nor can put it together in our Thoughts, that any Being does now exist to-morrow, or possess at once more than the present Moment of Duration; yet we can conceive the eternal Duration of the Almighty far different from that of Man, or any other finite Being. Because Man comprehends not in his Knowledge, or Power, all past and future things: His Thoughts are but of yesterday, and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth. What is once past, he can never recal: and what is yet to come, he cannot make present. What I say of Man, I say of all finite Beings; who, tho' they may far exceed Man in Knowledge and Power, yet are no more than the meanest Creature, in comparison with God himself. Finite of any Magnitude, holds not any Proportion to Infinite. God's infinite Duration being accompany'd with infinite Knowledge, and infinite Power, he sees all things past and to come; and they are no more distant from his Knowledge, no farther remov'd from his sight than the present: They all lie under the same view; and there is nothing which he cannot make exist each Moment he pleases. For the Existence of all things depending upon his good-pleasure, all things exist every moment that he thinks fit to have them exist. To conclude, Expansion and Duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every Part of Space being in every Part of Duration, and every Part of Duration in every Part of Expansion. Such a Combination of two distinct Ideas, is, I suppose, scarce to be found in all that great Variety we do or can conceive, and may afford matter to farther Speculation.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Number.

§. 1. **A**Mongst all the *Ideas* we have, as there is none suggested to the Mind by more ways, so there is none more simple, than that of *Unity*, or *One*. It has no shadow of Variety or Composition in it; every Object our Senses are employ'd about, every *Idea* in our Understandings, every Thought of our Minds, brings this *Idea* along with it. And therefore it is the most intimate to our Thoughts, as well as it is in its agreement to all other things, the most universal *Idea* we have. For Number applies it self to Men, Angels, Actions, Thoughts, every thing that either doth exist, or can be imagin'd.

Number the simplest and most universal Idea.

§. 2. By repeating this *Idea* in our Minds, and adding the Repetitions together, we come by the complex *Ideas* of the *Modes* of it. Thus by adding one to one, we have the complex *Idea* of a Couple; by putting twelve Units together, we have the complex *Idea* of a Dozen; and of a Score, or a Million, or any other Number.

Its Modes made by Addition.

§. 3. The simple *Modes* of Number are of all other the most distinct; every the least Variation, which is an Unit, making each Combination as clearly different from that which approacheth nearest to it, as the most remote: Two being as distinct from One, as Two hundred; and the *Idea* of Two as distinct from the *Idea* of Three, as the Magnitude of the whole Earth is from that of a Mite. This is not so in other simple *Modes*, in which it is not so easy, nor perhaps possible for us to distinguish betwixt two approaching *Ideas*, which yet are really different. For who will undertake to find a difference between the White of this Paper, and that of the next degree to it; or can form distinct *Ideas* of every the least Excess in Extension?

Each Mode distinct.

§. 4. The Clearness and *Distinctness* of each *Mode* of Number from all others, even those that approach nearest, makes me apt to think that Demonstrations in Numbers, if they are not more evident and exact than in Extension, yet they are more general in their Use, and more determinate in their Application. Because the *Ideas* of Numbers are more precise and distinguishable, than in Extension, where every Equality and Excess are not so easy to be observ'd or measur'd; because our Thoughts cannot in Space arrive at any determin'd Smallness, beyond which it cannot go, as an Unit; and therefore the Quantity or Proportion of any the least Excess cannot be discover'd: which is clear otherwise in Number, where, as has been said, 91 is as distinguishable from 90, as from 9000, tho' 91 be the next immediate Excess to 90. But it is not so in Extension, where whatsoever is more than just a Foot or an Inch, is not distinguishable from the Standard of a Foot or an Inch; and in Lines which appear of an equal length, one may be longer than the other by innumerable Parts; nor can any one assign an Angle, which shall be the next biggest to a right one.

Therefore Demonstrations in Numbers the most precise.

§. 5. By the repeating, as has been said, of the *Idea* of an Unit, and joining it to another Unit, we make thereof one collective *Idea*, mark'd by the name *Two*. And whosoever can do this, and proceed on, still adding one more to the last collective *Idea* which he had of any Number, and give a name to it, may count, or have *Ideas* for several Collections of Units, distinguish'd one from another, as far as he hath a Series of Names for following Numbers, and a Memory to retain that Series, with their several Names: All Numeration being but still the adding of one Unit more, and giving to the whole together, as comprehended in one *Idea*, a new or distinct Name or Sign, whereby to know it from those before and after, and distinguish it from every smaller or greater multitude of Units. So that he that can add one to one, and so to two, and so go on with his Tale, taking still with him the distinct Names belonging to every Progression; and so again, by abstracting an Unit from each Collection, retreat and lessen them, is capable of all the *Ideas* of Numbers within the compass of his Language, or for which he hath Names, tho' not perhaps of more. For the several simple *Modes* of Numbers, being in our Minds but so many

Names necessary to Numbers.

Combinations of Units, which have no variety, nor are capable of any other difference but more or less, Names or Marks for each distinct Combination seem more necessary than in any other sort of *Ideas*. For without such Names or Marks we can hardly well make use of Numbers in reckoning, especially where the Combination is made up of any great multitude of Units; which put together without a Name or Mark, to distinguish that precise Collection, will hardly be kept from being a heap in confusion.

Names necessary to Numbers.

Histoire d'un Voiage fait en la Terre du Bresil, par Jean de Lery, c. 20. 382.

§. 6. This I think to be the reason, why some *Americans* I have spoken with, (who were otherwise of quick and rational Parts enough) could not, as we do, by any means count to 1000; nor had any distinct *Idea* of that Number, tho' they could reckon very well to 20. Because their Language being scanty, and accommodated only to the few Necessaries of a needy simple Life, unacquainted either with Trade or Mathematicks, had no words in it to stand for 1000; so that when they were discours'd with of those greater Numbers, they would shew the Hairs of their Head, to express a great multitude which they could not number: which Inability, I suppose, proceeded from their want of Names. The *Tououpinambos* had no Names for Numbers above 5; any Number beyond that, they made out by shewing their Fingers, and the Fingers of others who were present. And I doubt not but we our selves might distinctly number in words a great deal farther than we usually do, would we find out but some fit Denominations to signify them by; whereas in the way we take now to name them by Millions of Millions of Millions, &c. it is hard to go beyond eighteen, or at most four and twenty decimal Progressions, without confusion. But to shew how much distinct Names conduce to our well reckoning, or having useful *Ideas* of Numbers, let us set all these following Figures in one continu'd Line, as the Marks of one Number; v. g.

Nonillions. Octillions. Septillions. Sextillions. Quintillions. Quartillions. Trillions. Bilions. Millions. Units.
857324. 162486. 345896. 437916. 423147. 248106. 235421. 261734. 368149. 623137.

The ordinary way of naming this Number in *English*, will be the often repeating of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, (which is the Denomination of the second six Figures. In which way, it will be very hard to have any distinguishing Notions of this Number: But whether, by giving every six Figures a new and orderly Denomination, these and perhaps a great many more Figures in progression, might not easily be counted distinctly, and *Ideas* of them both got more easily to our selves, and more plainly signify'd to others, I leave it to be consider'd. This I mention only to shew how necessary distinct Names are to Numbering, without pretending to introduce new ones of my Invention.

Why Children number not earlier.

§. 7. Thus Children, either for want of Names to mark the several Progressions of Numbers, or not having yet the Faculty to collect scatter'd *Ideas* into complex ones, and range them in a regular order, and so retain them in their Memories, as is necessary to reckoning; do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it very far or steddily, till a good while after they are well furnish'd with good store of other *Ideas*: and one may often observe them discourse and reason pretty well, and have very clear Conceptions of several other things, before they can tell 20. And some, thro' the default of their Memories, who cannot retain the several Combinations of Numbers, with their Names annex'd in their distinct orders, and the dependence of so long a Train of numeral Progressions, and their relation one to another, are not able all their lifetime to reckon or regularly go over any moderate Series of Numbers. For he that will count Twenty, or have any *Idea* of that Number, must know that Nineteen went before, with the distinct Name or Sign of every one of them, as they stand mark'd in their Order; for wherever this fails, a Gap is made, the Chain breaks, and the Progress in numbering can go no farther. So that to reckon right, it is requir'd, 1. That the Mind distinguish carefully two *Ideas*, which are different one from another only by the Addition or Subtraction of one Unit. 2. That it retain in Memory the Names or Marks of the several Combinations, from an Unit to that Number; and that not confusedly, and at random, but in that exact Order, that the Numbers follow one another: in either of which, if it trips, the whole Business of Numbering will be disturb'd, and

and there will remain only the confus'd *Idea* of Multitude, but the *Ideas* necessary to distinct Numeration will not be attain'd to.

§. 8. This farther is observable in *Number*, That it is that which the Mind makes use of in *measuring all things* that by us are measurable, which principally are *Expansion and Duration*; and our *Idea* of Infinity, even when apply'd to those, seems to be nothing but the Infinity of Number. For what else are our *Ideas* of Eternity and Immensity, but the repeated Additions of certain *Ideas* of imagin'd Parts of Duration and Expansion, with the Infinity of Number, in which we can come to no end of Addition? For such an inexhaustible Stock, Number, of all other our *Ideas*, most clearly furnishes us with, as is obvious to every one. For let a Man collect into one Sum as great a Number as he pleases, this multitude, how great soever, lessens not one jot the power of adding to it, or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhaustible Stock of Number, where still there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And this endless *Addition* or *Addibility* (if any one like the word better) of Numbers, so apparent to the Mind, is that, I think, which gives us the clearest and most distinct *Idea* of Infinity: of which more in the following Chapter.

C H A P. XVII.

Of Infinity.

§. 1. **H**E that would know what kind of *Idea* it is, to which we give the name of *Infinity*, cannot do it better, than by considering to what Infinity is by the Mind more immediately attributed, and then how the Mind comes to frame it.

Finite and Infinite seem to me to be look'd upon by the Mind as the *Modes of Quantity*, and to be attributed primarily in their first Designation only to those things which have Parts, and are capable of Increase or Diminution, by the Addition or Subtraction of any the least Part: And such are the *Ideas* of Space, Duration, and Number, which we have consider'd in the foregoing Chapters. 'Tis true, that we cannot but be assur'd, That the Great GOD, of whom and from whom are all things, is incomprehensibly Infinite: But yet when we apply to that first and supreme Being our *Idea* of Infinite, in our weak and narrow Thoughts, we do it primarily in respect of his Duration and Ubiquity; and I think, more figuratively to his Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, and other Attributes, which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, &c. For when we call them Infinite, we have no other *Idea* of this Infinity, but what carries with it some Reflection on, and Intimation of that Number or Extent of the Acts or Objects of God's Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, which can never be suppos'd so great or so many, which these Attributes will not always surmount and exceed, let us multiply them in our Thoughts as far as we can, with all the Infinity of endless Number. I do not pretend to say how these Attributes are in GOD, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow Capacities. They do, without doubt, contain in them all possible Perfection: but this, I say, is our way of conceiving them, and these our *Ideas* of their Infinity.

§. 2. Finite then, and Infinite, being by the Mind look'd on as Modifications of Expansion and Duration, the next thing to be consider'd, is, *How the Mind comes by them*. As for the *Idea of Finite*, there is no great difficulty. The obvious Portions of Extension that affect our Senses, carry with them into the Mind the *Idea* of Finite: And the ordinary Periods of Succession, whereby we measure Time and Duration, as Hours, Days, and Years, are bounded Lengths. The difficulty is, how we come by those boundless *Ideas* of *Eternity* and *Immensity*, since the Objects which we converse with, come so much short of any Approach or Proportion to that Largeness.

§. 3. Every one that has any *Idea* of any stated Lengths of Space, as a Foot, finds that he can repeat that *Idea*; and joining it to the former, make the *Idea* of two Feet; and by the addition of a third, three Feet; and so on, without ever coming to an end of his Additions, whether of the same *Idea* of a Foot,

or

or if he pleases of doubling it, or any other *Idea* he has of any Length, as a Mile, or Diameter of the Earth, or of the *Orbis Magnus*: For whichsoever of these he takes, and how often soever he doubles, or any otherwise multiplies it, he finds that after he has continu'd his doubling in his Thoughts, and enlarg'd his *Idea* as much as he pleases, he has no more reason to stop, nor is one jot nearer the end of such Addition, than he was at first setting-out. The power of enlarging his *Idea* of Space by farther Additions remaining still the same, he hence takes the *Idea* of infinite Space.

Our Idea of
Space bound-
less.

§. 4. This, I think, is the way whereby the Mind gets the *Idea* of infinite Space. 'Tis a quite different Consideration, to examine, whether the Mind has the *Idea* of such a *boundless Space actually existing*, since our *Ideas* are not always Proofs of the Existence of things; but yet, since this comes here in our way, I suppose I may say, that we are apt to think, that Space in it self is actually boundless; to which Imagination, the *Idea* of Space or Expansion of it self naturally leads us. For it being consider'd by us, either as the Extension of Body, or as existing by it self, without any solid Matter taking it up, (for of such a void Space we have not only the *Idea*, but I have prov'd, as I think, from the Motion of Body, its necessary Existence) it is impossible the Mind should be ever able to find or suppose any end of it, or be stop'd any where in its progress in this Space, how far soever it extends its Thoughts. Any bounds made with Body, even Adamantine Walls, are so far from putting a stop to the Mind in its farther Progress in Space and Extension, that it rather facilitates and enlarges it; for so far as that Body reaches, so far no one can doubt of Extension: and when we are come to the utmost Extremity of Body, what is there that can there put a stop, and satisfy the Mind that it is at the end of Space, when it perceives it is not; nay, when it is satisfy'd that Body it self can move into it? For if it be necessary for the Motion of Body, that there should be an empty Space, tho' ever so little, here amongst Bodies; and if it be possible for Body to move in or thro' that empty Space; nay, it is impossible for any Particle of Matter to move but into an empty Space; the same Possibility of a Body's moving into a void Space, beyond the utmost Bounds of Body, as well as into a void Space interspers'd amongst Bodies, will always remain clear and evident: the *Idea* of empty pure Space, whether within or beyond the Confines of all Bodies, being exactly the same, differing not in nature, tho' in bulk; and there being nothing to hinder Body from moving into it. So that wherever the Mind places it self by any Thought, either amongst or remote from all Bodies, it can in this uniform *Idea* of Space no-where find any Bounds, any End; and so must necessarily conclude it, by the very Nature and *Idea* of each part of it, to be actually infinite.

And so of Du-
ration.

§. 5. As by the Power we find in our selves of repeating, as often as we will, any *Idea* of Space, we get the *Idea* of Immenity; so, by being able to repeat the *Idea* of any Length of Duration we have in our Minds, with all the endless Addition of Number, we come by the *Idea* of Eternity. For we find in our selves, we can no more come to an end of such repeated *Ideas*, than we can come to the end of Number, which every one perceives he cannot. But here again 'tis another question, quite different from our having an *Idea* of Eternity, to know whether there were any real Being, whose Duration has been eternal. And as to this, I say, he that considers something now existing, must necessarily come to something eternal. But having spoke of this in another place, I shall say here no more of it, but proceed on to some other Considerations of our *Idea* of Infinity.

Why other I-
deas are not
capable of In-
finity.

§. 6. If it be so, that our *Idea* of Infinity be got from the Power we observe in our selves, of repeating without end our own *Ideas*; it may be demanded, *Why we do not attribute Infinite to other Ideas, as well as those of Space and Duration*; since they may be as easily, and as often repeated in our Minds, as the other; and yet no body ever thinks of infinite Sweetness, or infinite Whiteness, tho' he can repeat the *Idea* of Sweet or White, as frequently as those of a Yard, or a Day? To which I answer: All the *Ideas* that are consider'd as having Parts, and are capable of Increase by the Addition of any equal or less Parts, afford us by their Repetition the *Idea* of Infinity; because with this endless Repetition, there is continu'd an Enlargement, of which there can be no end. But in other *Ideas* it is not so; for to the largest *Idea* of Extension or Duration that I at pre-
sent

sent have, the Addition of any the least part makes an Increase; but to the perfectest *Idea* I have of the whitest Whiteness, if I add another of a less or equal Whiteness (and of a whiter than I have, I cannot add the *Idea*) it makes no Increase, and enlarges not my *Idea* at all: and therefore the different *Ideas* of Whiteness, &c. are call'd Degrees. For those *Ideas* that consist of Parts, are capable of being augmented by every Addition of the least Part; but if you take the *Idea* of White, which one parcel of Snow yielded yesterday to your Sight, and another *Idea* of White from another parcel of Snow you see to day, and put them together in your Mind, they embody, as it were, and run into one, and the *Idea* of Whiteness is not at all increas'd; and if we add a less degree of Whiteness to a greater, we are so far from increasing, that we diminish it. Those *Ideas* that consist not of Parts, cannot be augmented to what proportion Men please, or be stretch'd beyond what they have receiv'd by their Senses; but Space, Duration, and Number, being capable of Increase by Repetition, leave in the Mind an *Idea* of an endless room for more: nor can we conceive any where a stop to a farther Addition or Progression, and so those *Ideas* alone lead our Minds towards the Thought of Infinity.

§. 7. Tho' our *Idea* of Infinity arise from the Contemplation of Quantity, and the endless Increase the Mind is able to make in Quantity, by the repeated Additions of what Portions thereof it pleases; yet I guess we cause great confusion in our Thoughts, when we join Infinity to any suppos'd *Idea* of Quantity the Mind can be thought to have, and so discourse or reason about an infinite Quantity, viz. an infinite Space, or an infinite Duration. For, our *Idea* of Infinity being, as I think, an endless growing *Idea*, but the *Idea* of any Quantity the Mind has, being at that time terminated in that *Idea*, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is) to join Infinity to it, is to adjust a standing Measure to a growing Bulk; and therefore I think it is not an insignificant Subtily, if I say that we are carefully to distinguish between the *Idea* of the Infinity of Space, and the *Idea* of a Space infinite: The first is nothing but a suppos'd endless Progression of the Mind, over what repeated *Ideas* of Space it pleases; but to have actually in the Mind the *Ideas* of a Space infinite, is to suppose the Mind already pass'd over, and actually to have a view of all those repeated *Ideas* of Space, which an endless Repetition can never totally represent to it; which carries in it a plain Contradiction.

Difference between Infinity of Space, and Space infinite.

§. 8. This perhaps will be a little plainer, if we consider it in Numbers. The Infinity of Numbers, to the end of whose Addition every one perceives there is no approach, easily appears to any one that reflects on it: but how clear soever this *Idea* of the Infinity of Number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the Absurdity of the actual *Idea* of an infinite Number. Whatsoever positive *Ideas* we have in our Minds of any Space, Duration, or Number, let them be ever so great, they are still finite; but when we suppose an inexhaustible Remainder, from which we remove all Bounds, and wherein we allow the Mind an endless Progression of Thought, without ever compleating the *Idea*, there we have our *Idea* of Infinity, which tho' it seems to be pretty clear when we consider nothing else in it but the Negation of an End, yet when we would frame in our Minds the *Idea* of an infinite Space or Duration, that *Idea* is very obscure and confus'd, because it is made up of two Parts, very different, if not inconsistent. For let a Man frame in his Mind an *Idea* of any Space or Number, as great as he will; 'tis plain the Mind rests and terminates in that *Idea*, which is contrary to the *Idea* of Infinity, which consists in a suppos'd endless Progression. And therefore I think it is, that we are so easily confounded, when we come to argue and reason about infinite Space or Duration, &c. Because the Parts of such an *Idea* not being perceiv'd to be, as they are, inconsistent, the one side or other always perplexes whatever Consequences we draw from the other; as an *Idea* of Motion not passing on, would perplex any one, who should argue from such an *Idea*, which is not better than an *Idea* of Motion at rest: and such another seems to me to be the *Idea* of a Space, or (which is the same thing) a Number infinite, i. e. of a Space or Number which the Mind actually has, and so views, and terminates in; and of a Space or Number, which in a constant and endless enlarging and progression, it can in Thought never attain-to. For how large soever an *Idea* of Space I have in my Mind, it

We have no Idea of infinite Space.

is

is no larger than it is that instant that I have it, tho' I be capable the next instant to double it, and so on *in infinitum*: For that alone is infinite, which has no bounds; and that the *Idea* of Infinity, in which our Thoughts can find none.

Number affords us the clearest Idea of Infinity.

§. 9. But of all other *Ideas*, it is *Number*; as I have said, which I think furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct *Idea* of Infinity we are capable of. For even in Space and Duration, when the Mind pursues the *Idea* of Infinity, it there makes use of the *Ideas* and Repetitions of Numbers, as of Millions of Millions of Miles, or Years, which are so many distinct *Ideas*, kept best by Number from running into a confus'd heap, wherein the Mind loses it self; and when it has added together as many Millions, &c. as it pleases, of known Lengths of Space or Duration, the clearest *Idea* it can get of Infinity, is the confus'd incomprehensible Remainder of endless addible Numbers, which affords no prospect of Stop or Boundary.

Our different Conception of Infinity of Number, Duration, and Expansion.

§. 10. It will perhaps give us a little farther Light into the *Idea* we have of Infinity, and discover to us that it is nothing but the Infinity of Number apply'd to determinate Parts, of which we have in our Minds the distinct *Ideas*, if we consider, that Number is not generally thought by us infinite, whereas Duration and Extension are apt to be so; which arises from hence, that in Number we are at one end as it were: For there being in Number nothing less than an Unit, we there stop, and are at an end; but in Addition or Increase of Number, we can set no Bounds: And so it is like a Line, whereof one end terminating with us, the other is extended still forwards beyond all that we can conceive; but in Space and Duration it is otherwise. For in Duration we consider it, as if this Line of Number were extended both ways to an unconceivable, undeterminate, and infinite Length; which is evident to any one that will but reflect on what Consideration he hath of Eternity; which, I suppose, he will find to be nothing else, but the turning this Infinity of Number both ways, *à parte ante*, and *à parte post*, as they speak. For when we would consider Eternity, *à parte ante*, what do we but, beginning from our selves and the present time we are in, repeat in our Minds the *Ideas* of Years, or Ages, or any other assignable Portion of Duration past, with a Prospect of proceeding in such Addition, with all the Infinity of Number? And when we would consider Eternity, *à parte post*, we just after the same rate begin from our selves, and reckon by multiply'd Periods yet to come, still extending that Line of Number, as before. And these two being put together, are that infinite Duration we call *Eternity*; which, as we turn our View either way, forwards or backwards, appears infinite, because we still turn that way the infinite End of Number, *i. e.* the Power still of adding more.

Infinite Divisibility.

§. 11. The same happens also in Space, wherein, conceiving our selves to be as it were in the Center, we do on all sides pursue those indeterminable Lines of Number; and reckoning any way from our selves, a Yard, Mile, Diameter of the Earth, or *Orbis Magnus*, by the Infinity of Number, we add others to them as often as we will; and having no more reason to set Bounds to those repeated *Ideas* than we have to set Bounds to Number, we have that indeterminable *Idea* of Immensity.

No positive Idea of Infinite.

§. 12. And since in any bulk of Matter our Thoughts can never arrive at the utmost Divisibility, therefore there is an apparent Infinity to us also in that which has the Infinity also of Number; but with this difference, that in the former Considerations of the Infinity of Space and Duration, we only use Addition of Numbers; whereas this is like the division of an Unit into its Fractions, wherein the Mind also can proceed *in infinitum*, as well as in the former Additions, it being indeed but the Addition still of new Numbers: Tho' in the Addition of the one, we can have no more the positive *Idea* of a Space infinitely great, than in the Division of the other, we can have the *Idea* of a Body infinitely little; our *Idea* of Infinity being, as I may say, a growing and fugitive *Idea*, still in a boundless Progression, that can stop no where.

§. 13. Tho' it be hard, I think, to find any one so absurd as to say, he has the positive *Idea* of an actual infinite Number; the Infinity whereof lies only in a power still of adding any Combination of Units to any former Number, and that as long and as much as one will; the like also being in the Infinity of Space and Duration, which power leaves always to the Mind room for endless

less Additions ; yet there be those, who imagine they have *positive Ideas of infinite Duration and Space*. It would, I think, be enough to destroy any such *positive Idea* of Infinite, to ask him that has it, whether he could add to it or no ; which would easily shew the mistake of such a *positive Idea*. We can, I think, have no *positive Idea* of any Space or Duration which is not made up, and commensurate to repeated numbers of Feet or Yards, or Days and Years, which are the common Measures, whereof we have the *Ideas* in our Minds, and whereby we judg of the greatness of these sort of Quantities. And therefore, since an *Idea* of infinite Space or Duration must needs be made up of infinite Parts, it can have no other Infinity than that of Number, capable still of farther Addition ; but not an actual *positive Idea* of a Number infinite. For, I think, it is evident that the Addition of finite things together (as are all Lengths, whereof we have the *positive Ideas*) can never otherwise produce the *Idea* of Infinite, than as Number does ; which, consisting of Additions of finite Units one to another, suggests the *Idea* of Infinite, only by a power we find we have of still increasing the Sum, and adding more of the same kind, without coming one jot nearer the end of such Progression.

§. 14. They who would prove their *Idea of Infinite to be positive*, seem to me to do it by a pleasant Argument, taken from the Negation of an end ; which being negative, the Negation of it is positive. He that considers that the End is, in Body, but the Extremity or Superficies of that Body, will not perhaps be forward to grant that the End is a bare Negative : And he that perceives the end of his Pen is black or white, will be apt to think that the end is something more than a pure Negation. Nor is it, when apply'd to Duration, the bare Negation of Existence, but more properly the last moment of it. But if they will have the End to be nothing but the bare Negation of Existence, I am sure they cannot deny but the Beginning is the first instant of Being, and is not by any body conceiv'd to be a bare Negation ; and therefore by their own Argument, the *Idea* of Eternal, *a parte ante*, or of a Duration without a Beginning, is but a negative *Idea*.

§. 15. The *Idea* of Infinite has, I confess, something of positive in all those things we apply to it. When we would think of infinite Space or Duration, we at first step usually make some very large *Idea*, as perhaps of Millions of Ages, or Miles, which possibly we double and multiply several times. All that we thus amass together in our Thoughts is positive, and the assemblage of a great number of *positive Ideas* of Space or Duration. But what still remains beyond this, we have no more a positive distinct Notion of, than a Mariner has of the depth of the Sea ; where having let down a large portion of his Sounding-line, he reaches no bottom : Whereby he knows the depth to be so many Fathoms, and more ; but how much that more is, he hath no distinct Notion at all : And could he always supply new Line, and find the Plummets always sink, without ever stopping, he would be something in the posture of the Mind reaching after a compleat and *positive Idea* of Infinity. In which case let this Line be 10, or 10,000 Fathoms long, it equally discovers what is beyond it ; and gives only this confus'd and comparative *Idea*, that this is not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the Mind comprehends of any Space, it has a *positive Idea* of : But in endeavouring to make it Infinite, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the *Idea* is still imperfect and incompleat. So much Space as the Mind takes a view of in its Contemplation of Greatness, is a clear Picture and positive in the Understanding : but Infinite is still greater. 1. Then, the *Idea* of *so much*, is *positive* and clear. 2. The *Idea* of *Greater* is also clear, but it is but a comparative *Idea*. 3. The *Idea* of *so much greater as cannot be comprehended* ; and this is *plain negative*, not positive. For he has no positive clear *Idea* of the largeness of any Extension, (which is that sought for in the *Idea* of Infinite) that has not a comprehensive *Idea* of the Dimensions of it : And such no body, I think, pretends to in what is Infinite. For to say a Man has a positive clear *Idea* of any Quantity, without knowing how great it is, is as reasonable as to say, he has the positive clear *Idea* of the Number of the Sands on the Sea-shore, who knows not how many they be ; but only that they are more than twenty. For just such a perfect and positive *Idea* has he of an infinite Space or Duration, who says it is larger than the Extent or Duration of 10, 100, 1000, or any

What is positive, what negative in our Idea of Infinite.

other number of Miles, or Years, whereof he has, or can have a positive *Idea*; which is all the *Idea* I think, we have of Infinite. So that what lies beyond our positive *Idea* towards Infinity, lies in Obscurity; and has the indeterminate confusion of a negative *Idea*, wherein I know I neither do nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow Capacity: And that cannot but be very far from a positive compleat *Idea*, wherein the greatest part of what I would comprehend is left out, under the indeterminate intimation of being still greater: For to say, that having in any Quantity measur'd so much, or gone so far, you are not yet at the end, is only to say, that that Quantity is greater. So that the Negation of an End in any Quantity, is in other words, only to say, that it is bigger: and a total Negation of an End is but carrying this bigger still with you, in all the progressions your Thoughts shall make in Quantity; and adding this *Idea* of still greater to all the *Ideas* you have, or can be suppos'd to have, of Quantity. Now whether such an *Idea* as that be positive, I leave any one to consider.

We have no
positive *Idea*
of an infinite
Duration.

§. 16. I ask those who say they have a positive *Idea* of Eternity, whether their *Idea* of Duration includes in it Succession, or not? If it does not, they ought to shew the Difference of their Notion of Duration, when apply'd to an eternal Being, and to a finite: since perhaps there may be others, as well as I, who will own to them their weakness of understanding in this Point; and acknowledge, that the Notion they have of Duration forces them to conceive, that whatever has Duration, is of a longer continuance to-Day than it was Yesterday. If to avoid Succession in eternal Existence, they recur to the *Punctum Stans* of the Schools, I suppose they will thereby very little mend the Matter, or help us to a more clear and positive *Idea* of infinite Duration, there being nothing more inconceivable to me than Duration without Succession. Besides that *Punctum Stans*, if it signify any thing, being not *Quantum*, finite or infinite, cannot belong to it. But if our weak apprehensions cannot separate Succession from any Duration whatsoever, our *Idea* of Eternity can be nothing but of infinite Succession of moments of Duration, wherein any thing does exist; and whether any one has, or can have a positive *Idea* of an actual infinite Number, I leave him to consider, till his infinite Number be so great that he himself can add no more to it; and as long as he can increase it, I doubt he himself will think the *Idea* he hath of it, a little too scanty for positive Infinity.

§. 17. I think it unavoidable for every considering rational Creature, that will but examine his own or any other Existence, to have the Notion of an eternal wise Being, who had no Beginning: And such an *Idea* of infinite Duration I am sure I have. But this Negation of a Beginning being but the Negation of a positive thing, scarce gives me a positive *Idea* of Infinity; which whenever I endeavour to extend my Thoughts to, I confess my self at a loss, and find I cannot attain any clear comprehension of it.

No positive
Idea of infi-
nite Space.

§. 18. He that thinks he has a positive *Idea* of infinite Space, will, when he considers it, find that he can no more have a positive *Idea* of the greatest, than he has of the least Space. For in this latter, which seems the easier of the two, and more within our Comprehension, we are capable only of a comparative *Idea* of Smallness, which will always be less than any one whereof we have the positive *Idea*. All our positive *Ideas* of any Quantity, whether great or little, have always bounds; tho' our comparative *Idea*, whereby we can always add to the one and take from the other, hath no Bounds: For that which remains either great or little, not being comprehended in that positive *Idea* which we have, lies in obscurity; and we have no other *Idea* of it, but of the Power of enlarging the one and distinguishing the other, without ceasing. A Pestle and Mortar will as soon bring any Particle of Matter to Indivisibility, as the acutest Thought of a Mathematician: And a Surveyor may as soon with his Chain measure out infinite Space, as a Philosopher by the quickest flight of Mind reach it, or by thinking comprehend it; which is to have a positive *Idea* of it. He that thinks on a Cube of an Inch Diameter, has a clear and positive *Idea* of it in his Mind, and so can frame one of $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$, and so on till he has the *Idea* in his Thoughts of something very little; but yet reaches not the *Idea* of that incomprehensible Littleness which Division can produce. What remains of Smallness, is as far from his Thoughts as when he first began; and therefore he never comes at all

all to have a clear and positive *Idea* of that Smallness, which is consequent to infinite Divisibility.

§. 19. Every one that looks towards Infinity, does, as I have said, at first glance make some very large *Idea* of that which he applies it to, let it be Space or Duration; and possibly he wearies his Thoughts, by multiplying in his Mind that first large *Idea*; But yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a clear *Idea* of what remains to make up a positive infinite, than the Country-fellow had of the Water, which was yet to come and pass the Chanel of the River where he stood:

*Rusticus expectat dum transeat amnis, at ille
Labitur, & labetur in omne volubilis ævum.*

§. 20. There are some I have met with, that put so much difference between infinite Duration and infinite Space, that they persuade themselves that they have a positive *Idea* of Eternity; but that they have not, nor can have any *Idea* of infinite Space. The reason of which mistake I suppose to be this, That finding by a due Contemplation of Causes and Effects, that it is necessary to admit some eternal Being, and so to consider the real Existence of that Being, as taking up and commensurate to their *Idea* of Eternity; but on the other side, not finding it necessary, but on the contrary, apparently absurd that Body should be infinite; they forwardly conclude, they can have no *Idea* of infinite Space, because they can have no *Idea* of infinite Matter. Which consequence, I conceive, is very ill collected; because the Existence of Matter is no ways necessary to the Existence of Space, no more than the Existence of Motion, or the Sun, is necessary to Duration, tho' Duration uses to be measur'd by it: And I doubt not but a Man may have the *Idea* of 10,000 Miles square, without any Body so big, as well as the *Idea* of 10,000 Years, without any Body so old. It seems as easy to me to have the *Idea* of Space empty of Body, as to think of the capacity of a Bushel without Corn, or the hollow of a Nutshel without a Kernel in it: It being more necessary that there should be existing a solid Body infinitely extended, because we have an *Idea* of the Infinity of Space, than it is necessary that the World should be Eternal, because we have an *Idea* of infinite Duration. And why should we think our *Idea* of infinite Space requires the real Existence of Matter to support it, when we find that we have as clear an *Idea* of infinite Duration to come, as we have of infinite Duration past? Tho', I suppose, no body thinks it conceivable, that any thing does, or has existed in that future Duration. Nor is it possible to join our *Idea* of future Duration with present or past Existence, any more than it is possible to make the *Ideas* of Yesterday, to-Day, and to-Morrow, to be the same; or bring Ages past and future together, and make them contemporary. But if these Men are of the Mind, that they have clearer *Ideas* of infinite Duration than of infinite Space; because it is past doubt, that GOD has existed from all Eternity, but there is no real Matter co-extended with infinite Space: yet those Philosophers who are of Opinion, that Infinite Space is possess'd by GOD's infinite Omnipresence, as well as infinite Duration by his eternal Existence, must be allow'd to have as clear an *Idea* of infinite Space as of infinite Duration; tho' neither of them, I think, has any positive *Idea* of Infinity in either Case. For whatsoever positive *Ideas* a Man has in his Mind of any Quantity, he can repeat it, and add it to the former as easy as he can add together the *Ideas* of two Days, or two Paces; which are positive *Ideas* of Lengths he has in his Mind, and so on as long as he pleases: Whereby if a Man had a positive *Idea* of infinite, either Duration or Space, he could add two Infinities together; nay, make one Infinite infinitely bigger than another: Absurdities too gross to be confuted.

§. 21. But yet after all this, there being Men who persuade themselves that they have clear positive comprehensive *Ideas* of Infinity, 'tis fit they enjoy their Privilege: And I should be very glad (with some others that I know, who acknowledge they have none such) to be better inform'd by their Communication. For I have been hitherto apt to think, that the great and inextricable Difficulties which perpetually involve all Discourses concerning Infinity, whether of Space, Duration, or Divisibility, have been the certain marks of a Defect in our *Ideas* of Infinity, and the disproportion the Nature thereof has to the Com-

hension of our narrow Capacities. For whilst Men talk and dispute of infinite Space or Duration, as if they had as compleat and positive *Ideas* of them, as they have of the Names they use for them, or as they have of a Yard, or an Hour, or any other determinate Quantity; it is no wonder if the incomprehensible Nature of the thing they discourse of or reason about, leads them into Perplexities and Contradictions; and their Minds be overlaid by an Object too large and mighty to be survey'd and manag'd by them.

*All these Ideas
from Sensation
and Reflection.*

§. 22. If I have dwelt pretty long on the Considerations of Duration, Space, and Number, and what arises from the Contemplation of them, Infinity; 'tis possibly no more than the Matter requires, there being few simple *Ideas*, whose Modes give more exercise to the Thoughts of Men than these do. I pretend not to treat of them in their full Latitude; it suffices to my Design, to shew how the Mind receives them, such as they are, from *Sensation* and *Reflection*; and how even the *Idea* we have of *Infinity*, how remote soever it may seem to be from any Object of Sense, or Operation of our Mind, has nevertheless, as all our other *Ideas*, its Original there. Some Mathematicians perhaps of advanc'd Speculations, may have other ways to introduce into their Minds *Ideas* of Infinity; but this hinders not, but that they themselves, as well as all other Men, got the first *Ideas* which they had of Infinity, from *Sensation* and *Reflection*, in the Method we have here set down.

C H A P. XVIII.

Of other simple Modes.

Modes of Motion.

§. 1. **T**H O' I have in the foregoing Chapters shewn, how from simple *Ideas* taken in by *Sensation*, the Mind comes to extend it self even to Infinity; which however it may, of all others, seem most remote from any sensible Perception; yet at last hath nothing in it but what is made out of simple *Ideas*, receiv'd into the Mind by the Senses, and afterwards there put together by the Faculty the Mind has to repeat its own *Ideas*: Tho' I say, these might be Instances enough of simple Modes of the simple *Ideas* of *Sensation* and suffice to shew how the Mind comes by them; yet I shall for Method's sake, tho' briefly, give an account of some few more, and then proceed to more complex *Ideas*.

§. 2. To *slide*, *roll*, *tumble*, *walk*, *creep*, *run*, *dance*, *leap*, *skip*, and abundance others that might be named, are words which are no sooner heard, but every one who understands *English*, has presently in his Mind distinct *Ideas*, which are all but the different Modifications of Motion. *Modes of Motion* answer those of Extension: *Swift* and *Slow* are two different *Ideas* of Motion, the Measures whereof are made of the distances of Time and Space put together; so they are complex *Ideas* comprehending Time and Space with Motion.

Modes of Sounds.

§. 3. The like variety have we in Sounds. Every articulate word is a different Modification of Sound: By which we see, that from the Sense of Hearing by such Modifications, the Mind may be furnish'd with distinct *Ideas* to almost an infinite number. Sounds also, besides the distinct Cries of Birds and Beasts, are modify'd by diversity of Notes of different length put together, which make that complex *Idea* call'd a *Tune*, which a Musician may have in his Mind when he hears or makes no Sound at all, by reflecting on the *Ideas* of those Sounds so put together silently in his own Fancy.

Modes of Colours.

§. 4. Those of Colours are also very various: Some we take notice of as the different Degrees, or, as they are term'd, *Shades of the same Colour*. But since we very seldom make assemblages of Colours either for Use or Delight, but Figure is taken in also and has its part in it; as in Painting, Weaving, Needle-Works, &c. those which are taken notice of, do most commonly belong to mix'd Modes, as being made-up of *Ideas* of divers kinds, viz. Figure and Colour, such as *Beauty*, *Rainbow*, &c.

Modes of Taste.

§. 5. All compounded *Tastes* and *Smells* are also Modes made up of the simple *Ideas* of those Senses. But they being such as generally we have no names for, are

are less taken notice of, and cannot be set down in writing; and therefore must be left without Enumeration to the Thoughts and Experience of my Reader.

§. 6. In general it may be observ'd, that those *simple Modes which are consider'd but as different Degrees of the same simple Idea*, tho' they are in themselves many of them very distinct *Ideas*, yet *have ordinarily no distinct names*, nor are much taken notice of as distinct *Ideas*, where the difference is but very small between them. Whether Men have neglected these Modes, and given no Names to them, as wanting Measures nicely to distinguish them; or because when they were so distinguish'd, that Knowledge would not be of general or necessary Use, I leave it to the Thoughts of others: it is sufficient to my purpose to shew, that all our simple *Ideas* come to our Minds only by Sensation and Reflection; and that when the Mind has them, it can variously repeat and compound them, and so make new complex *Ideas*. But tho' White, Red, or Sweet, &c. have not been modify'd or made into complex *Ideas*, by several Combinations so as to be named, and thereby rank'd into Species; yet some others of the simple *Ideas*, viz. those of Unity, Duration, Motion, &c. above instanc'd in, as also Power and Thinking, have been thus modify'd to a great variety of complex *Ideas*, with Names belonging to them.

§. 7. *The reason whereof*, I suppose, has been this, That the great Concernment of Men being with Men one amongst another, the knowledge of Men and their Actions, and the signifying of them to one another, was most necessary; and therefore they made *Ideas* of Actions very nicely modify'd, and gave those complex *Ideas* Names, that they might the more easily record, and discourse of those things they were daily conversant in, without long Ambages and Circumlocutions; and that the things they were continually to give and receive Information about, might be the easier and quicker understood. That this is so, and that Men in framing different complex *Ideas*, and giving them Names, have been much govern'd by the end of Speech in general, (which is a very short and expedite way of conveying their Thoughts one to another) is evident in the Names, which in several Arts have been found out, and apply'd to several complex *Ideas* of modify'd Actions belonging to their several Trades, for dispatch-sake, in their Direction or Discourses about them. Which *Ideas* are not generally fram'd in the Minds of Men, not conversant about these Operations. And thence the words that stand for them, by the greatest part of Men of the same Language, are not understood: v.g. *Colshire, Drilling, Filtration, Cohobation*, are words standing for certain complex *Ideas*, which being seldom in the Minds of any but those few whose particular Employments do at every turn suggest them to their Thoughts, those Names of them are not generally understood but by Smiths and Chymists; who having fram'd the complex *Ideas* which these words stand for, and having given Names to them, or received them from others upon hearing of these Names in communication, readily conceived those *Ideas* in their Minds; as by *Cohobation* all the simple *Ideas* of Distilling, and the pouring the Liquor distill'd from any thing, back upon the remaining Matter, and distilling it again. Thus we see that there are great varieties of simple *Ideas*, as of Tastes and Smells, which have no Names; and of Modes many more. Which either not having been generally enough observ'd, or else not being of any great use to be taken notice of in the Affairs and Converse of Men, they have not had Names given to them, and so pass not for Species. This we shall have occasion hereafter to consider more at large, when we come to speak of Words.

Why some Modes have, and others have not Names.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

§. 1. **W**HEN the Mind turns its View inwards upon it self, and contemplates its own Actions, *Thinking* is the first that occurs. In it the Mind observes a great variety of Modifications, and from thence receives distinct *Ideas*. Thus the Perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed to

Sensation, Remembrance, Contemplation, &c.

to

to any Impression on the Body, made by an external Object, being distinct from all other Modifications of *Thinking*, furnishes the Mind with a distinct *Idea*, which we call *Sensation*; which is, as it were, the actual Entrance of any *Idea* into the Understanding by the Senses. The same *Idea*, when it again recurs without the Operation of the like Object on the external Sensory, is *Remembrance*: If it be sought after by the Mind, and with Pain and Endeavour found, and brought again in view, 'tis *Recollection*; if it be held there long under attentive Consideration, 'tis *Contemplation*. When *Ideas* float in our Mind, without any Reflection or Regard of the Understanding, it is that which the French call *Reverie*, our Language has scarce a Name for it. When the *Ideas* that offer themselves (for, as I have observ'd in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a Train of *Ideas* succeeding one another in our Minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, register'd in the Memory, it is *Attention*. When the Mind with great Earnestness, and of Choice, fixes its View on any *Idea*, considers it on all sides, and will not be call'd-off by the ordinary Solicitation of other *Ideas*, it is that we call *Intention*, or *Study*: Sleep, without dreaming, is Rest from all these: And *Dreaming* it self, is the having of *Ideas* (whilst the outward Senses are stop'd, so that they receive not outward Objects with their usual Quickness) in the Mind, not suggested by any external Objects, or known Occasion, nor under any Choice or Conduct of the Understanding at all. And whether that, which we call *Extasy*, be not dreaming with the Eyes open, I leave to be examin'd.

§. 2. These are some few Instances of those various *Modes of Thinking*, which the Mind may observe in it self, and so have as distinct *Ideas* of, as it hath of *White*, and *Red*, a *Square* or a *Circle*. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this Set of *Ideas*, which are got from *Reflection*: That would be to make a Volume. It suffices to my present purpose to have shewn here, by some few Examples, of what sort these *Ideas* are, and how the Mind comes by them; especially since I shall have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of *Reasoning*, *Judging*, *Volition* and *Knowledge*, which are some of the most considerable Operations of the Mind, and *Modes of Thinking*.

The various
Attention of
the Mind in
Thinking.

§. 3. But perhaps it may not be an unpardonable Digression, nor wholly impertinent to our present Design, if we reflect here upon the different State of the Mind in Thinking, which those Instances of Attention, Reverie and Dreaming, &c. before-mention'd, naturally enough suggest. That there are *Ideas*, some or other, always present in the Mind of a waking Man, every one's Experience convinces him, tho' the Mind employs it self about them with several Degrees of Attention. Sometimes the Mind fixes it self with so much Earnestness on the Contemplation of some Objects, that it turns their *Ideas* on all sides, remarks their Relations and Circumstances, and views every part so nicely, and with such Intention, that it shuts out all other Thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary Impressions made then on the Senses, which at another season would produce very sensible Perceptions: At other times it barely observes the Train of *Ideas* that succeed in the Understanding, without directing and pursuing any of them; and at other times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint Shadows that make no Impression.

Hence 'tis probable that
Thinking is
the Action, not
Essence of the
Soul.

§. 4. This Difference of *Intention*, and *Remission* of the Mind in thinking, with a great variety of Degrees between earnest Study, and very near minding nothing at all; every one, I think, has experimented in himself. Trace it a little farther, and you find the Mind in Sleep retir'd as it were from the Senses, and out of the reach of those Motions made on the Organs of Sense, which at other times produce very vivid and sensible *Ideas*. I need not for this instance in those who sleep out whole stormy Nights, without hearing the Thunder, or seeing the Lightning, or feeling the shaking of the House, which are sensible enough to those who are waking: But in this Retirement of the Mind from the Senses, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of *Thinking*, which we call *Dreaming*; and last of all, sound Sleep closes the Scene quite, and puts an end to all Appearances. This, I think, almost every one has experience of in himself, and his own Observation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, That since the Mind can sensibly put on, at several times, several degrees of *Thinking*, and be

be sometimes even in a waking Man so remiss, as to have Thoughts dim and obscure to that degree, that they are very little remov'd from none at all; and at last, in the dark Retirements of sound Sleep, loses the Sight perfectly of all *Ideas* whatsoever: Since, I say, this is evidently so in Matter of Fact, and constant Experience, I ask whether it be not probable that *Thinking is the Action, and not the Essence of the Soul?* Since the Operations of Agents will easily admit of Intention and Remission, but the Essences of things are not conceiv'd capable of any such Variation. But this by the By.

CHAP. XX.

Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain.

§. 1. **A**MONGST the simple *Ideas*, which we receive both from *Sensation* *Pleasure and* and *Reflection*, *Pain and Pleasure* are two very considerable ones. For, as in the Body there is Sensation barely in it self, or accompany'd with *Pain or Pleasure*; so the Thought or Preception of the mind is simply so, or else accompany'd also with *Pleasure or Pain*, Delight or Trouble, call it how you please. These, like other simple *Ideas*, cannot be describ'd, nor their Names defin'd; the way of knowing them, is, as of the simple *Ideas* of the Senses, only by Experience. For to define them by the Presence of Good or Evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us, than by making us reflect on what we feel in our selves, upon the several and various Operations of Good and Evil upon our Minds, as they are differently apply'd to or consider'd by us.

§. 2. Things then are Good or Evil, only in reference to Pleasure or Pain. That we call *Good*, which is apt to cause or increase Pleasure, or diminish Pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us the Possession of any other Good, or Absence of any Evil. And on the contrary, we name that *Evil*, which is apt to produce or increase any Pain, or diminish any Pleasure in us; or else to procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good. By Pleasure and Pain, I must be understood to mean of Body or Mind, as they are commonly distinguish'd; tho' in truth they be only different Constitutions of the Mind, sometimes occasion'd by Disorder in the Body, sometimes by Thoughts of the Mind.

§. 3. *Pleasure and Pain*, and that which causes them, Good and Evil, are the Hinges on which our *Passions* turn: And if we reflect on our selves, and observe how these, under various Considerations, operate in us; what Modifications or Tempers of Mind, what internal Sensations (if I may so call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to our selves the *Ideas* of our *Passions*.

§. 4. Thus any one reflecting upon the Thought he has of the Delight, which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the *Idea* we call *Love*. For when a Man declares in Autumn, when he is eating them, or in Spring, when there are none, that he *loves* Grapes, it is no more but that the Taste of Grapes delights him; let an Alteration of Health or Constitution destroy the Delight of their Taste, and he then can be said to *love* Grapes no longer.

§. 5. On the contrary, the Thought of the Pain, which any thing present or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call *Hatred*. Were it my business here to enquire any farther than into the bare *Ideas* of our *Passions*, as they depend on different Modifications of Pleasure and Pain, I should remark, that our *Love* and *Hatred* of inanimate insensible Beings, is commonly founded on that Pleasure and Pain which we receive from their Use and Application any way to our Senses, tho' with their Destruction: But *Hatred* or *Love*, to Beings capable of Happiness or Misery, is often the Uneasiness or Delight, which we find in ourselves arising from a Consideration of their very Being or Happiness. Thus the Being and Welfare of a Man's Children or Friends, producing constant Delight in him, he is said constantly to *love* them. But it suffices to note, that our *Ideas* of *Love* and *Hatred* are but the Dispositions of the Mind, in respect of Pleasure and Pain in general, however caus'd in us.

Desire.

§. 6. The Uneasiness a Man finds in himself upon the Absence of any thing, whose present Enjoyment carries the *Idea* of Delight with it, is that we call *Desire*; which is greater or less, as that Uneasiness is more or less vehement. Where by the By, it may perhaps be of some use to remark, that the chief, if not only Spur to humane Industry and Action, is Uneasiness. For whatever Good is propos'd, if its Absence carries no Displeasure nor Pain with it, if a Man be easy and content without it, there is no Desire of it, nor Endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare *Velleity*, the term us'd to signify the lowest degree of Desire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is so little Uneasiness in the Absence of any thing, that it carries a Man no farther than some faint Wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous Use of the Means to attain it. *Desire* also is stopp'd or abated by the Opinion of the Impossibility or Unattainableness of the Good propos'd, as far as the Uneasiness is cur'd or allay'd by that Consideration. This might carry our Thoughts farther, were it seasonable in this place.

Joy.

§. 7. Joy is a delight of the Mind, from the Consideration of the present or assur'd approaching possession of a Good; and we are then possess'd of any Good, when we have it so in our power, that we can use it when we please. Thus a Man almost starv'd has Joy at the arrival of Relief, even before he has the Pleasure of using it: And a Father, in whom the very Well-being of his Children causes Delight, is always, as long as his Children are in such a State, in the possession of that Good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that Pleasure.

Sorrow.

§. 8. Sorrow is Uneasiness in the Mind, upon the thought of a Good lost, which might have been enjoy'd longer; or the Sense of a present Evil.

Hope.

§. 9. Hope is that Pleasure in the Mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a profitable future Enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him.

Fear.

§. 10. Fear is an Uneasiness of the Mind, upon the thought of future Evil likely to befall us.

Despair.

§. 11. Despair is the Thought of the Unattainableness of any Good, which works differently in Mens Minds, sometimes producing Uneasiness or Pain, sometimes Rest and Indolency.

Anger.

§. 12. Anger is Uneasiness or Discomposure of the Mind, upon the receipt of any Injury, with a present purpose of Revenge.

Envy.

§. 13. Envy is an Uneasiness of Mind, caus'd by the Consideration of a Good we desire, obtain'd by one we think should not have had it before us.

What Passions
all Men have.

§. 14. These two last, *Envy* and *Anger*, not being caus'd by Pain and Pleasure simply in themselves, but having in them some mix'd Considerations of our selves and others, are not therefore to be found in all Men, because those other Parts of valuing their Merits, or intending Revenge, is wanting in them: but all the rest terminated purely in Pain and Pleasure, are I think, to be found in all Men. For we love, desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of Pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in respect of Pain ultimately: In fine, all these Passions are mov'd by things, only as they appear to be the Causes of Pleasure and Pain, or to have Pleasure or Pain some way or other annex'd to them. Thus we extend our Hatred usually to the Subject (at least if a sensible or voluntary Agent) which has produc'd Pain in us, because the Fear it leaves is a constant Pain: But we do not so constantly love what has done us good; because Pleasure operates not so strongly on us as Pain, and because we are not so ready to have hope it will do so again. But this by the By.

Pleasure and
Pain what.

§. 15. By *Pleasure and Pain*, Delight and Uneasiness, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily Pain and Pleasure, but whatsoever *Delight* or *Uneasiness* is felt by us, whether rising from any grateful or unacceptable Sensation or Reflection.

§. 16. 'Tis farther to be consider'd, that in reference to the Passions, the removal or lessening of a Pain is consider'd, and operates as a Pleasure; and the loss or diminishing of a Pleasure, as a Pain.

Shame.

§. 17. The Passions too have most of them in most Persons Operations on the Body, and cause various Changes in it, which, not being always sensible, do not make a necessary part of the *Idea* of each Passion. For *Shame*, which is an Uneasiness

Uneasiness of the Mind upon the Thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the valu'd Esteem which others have for us, has not always blushing accompanying it.

§. 18. I would not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a Discourse of the *Passions*; they are *many more than those* I have here nam'd: And those I have taken notice of, would each of them require a much larger, and more accurate Discourse. I have only mention'd these here as so many Instances of Modes of Pleasure and Pain resulting in our Minds from various Considerations of Good and Evil. I might perhaps have instanc'd in other Modes of Pleasure and Pain more simple than these, as the Pain of *Hunger* and *Thirst*, and the Pleasure of Eating and Drinking to remove them; the Pain of tender Eyes, and the Pleasure of Musick; Pain from captious uninstruative Wrangling, and the Pleasure of rational Conversation with a Friend, or of well-directed Study in the Search and Discovery of Truth. But the *Passions* being of much more Concernment to us, I rather made choice to instance in them, and shew how the *Ideas* we have of them are deriv'd from Sensation and Reflection.

These Instances to shew how our Ideas of the Passions are got from Sensation and Reflection.

C H A P. XXI.

Of Power.

§. 1. **T**HE Mind being every day inform'd, by the Senses, of the Alteration of those simple *Ideas* it observes in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before; reflecting also on what passes within it self, and observing a constant Change of its *Ideas*, sometimes by the Impression of outward Objects on the Senses, and sometimes by the Determination of its own Choice; and concluding from what it has so constantly observ'd to have been, that the like Changes will for the future be made in the same things by like Agents, and by the like Ways; considers in one thing the Possibility of having any of its simple *Ideas* chang'd, and in another the Possibility of making that Change; and so comes by that *Idea* which we call *Power*. Thus we say, Fire has a *Power* to melt Gold, *i. e.* to destroy the Consistency of its insensible Parts, and consequently its Hardness, and make it fluid; and Gold has a *Power* to be melted: That the Sun has a *Power* to blanch Wax, and Wax a *Power* to be blanch'd by the Sun, whereby the Yellowness is destroy'd, and Whiteness made to exist in its room. In which, and the like Cases, the *Power* we consider is in reference to the Change of perceivable *Ideas*: For we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon any thing, but by the observable Change of its sensible *Ideas*: nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a Change of some of its *Ideas*.

This Idea how got.

§. 2. *Power*, thus consider'd, is two-fold, *viz.* as able to make, or able to receive any Change: The one may be call'd *Active*, and the other *Passive Power*. Whether Matter be not wholly destitute of *Active Power*, as its Author GOD is truly above all *passive Power*; and whether the intermediate State of created Spirits be not that alone which is capable of both *active* and *passive Power*, may be worth consideration. I shall not now enter into that Enquiry; my present Business being not to search into the Original of Power, but how we come by the *Idea* of it. But since *active Powers* make so great a part of our complex *Ideas* of natural Substances, (as we shall see hereafter) and I mention them as such according to common Apprehension; yet they being not perhaps so truly *active Power*, as our hasty Thoughts are apt to represent them, I judg it not amiss, by this Intimation, to direct our Minds to the consideration of GOD and Spirits, for the clearest *Idea* of *active Powers*.

Power active and passive.

§. 3. I confess *Power* includes in it some kind of Relation, (a Relation to Action or Change) as indeed which of our *Ideas*, of what kind soever, when attentively consider'd, does not? For our *Ideas* of Extension, Duration, and Number, do they not all contain in them a secret Relation of the Parts? Figure and Motion have something relative in them much more visibly: And sensible Qualities,

Power includes Relation.

lities, as Colours and Smells, &c. what are they but the *Powers* of different Bodies, in relation to our Perception? &c. And if consider'd in the things themselves, do they not depend on the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of the Parts? All which include some kind of Relation in them. Our *Idea* therefore of *Power*, I think, may well have a place amongst other simple *Ideas*, and be consider'd as one of them, being one of those that make a principal Ingredient in our complex *Ideas* of Substances, as we shall hereafter have occasion to observe.

The clearest Idea of active Power had from Spirit.

§. 4. We are abundantly furnish'd with the *Idea* of *passive Power* by almost all sorts of sensible things. In most of them we cannot avoid observing their sensible Qualities; nay, their very Substances to be in a continual Flux: And therefore with reason we look on them as liable still to the same Change. Nor have we of *active Power* (which is the more proper Signification of the word *Power*) fewer Instances: Since whatever Change is observ'd, the Mind must collect a Power somewhere able to make that Change, as well as a Possibility in the thing it self to receive it. But yet, if we will consider it attentively, Bodies, by our Senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an *Idea* of *active Power*, as we have from Reflection on the Operations of our Minds. For all *Power* relating to Action, and there being but two sorts of Action, whereof we have any *Idea*, viz. Thinking and Motion; let us consider whence we have the clearest *Ideas* of the *Powers*, which produce these Actions. 1. Of Thinking, Body affords us no *Idea* at all, it is only from Reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from Body any *Idea* of the beginning of Motion. A Body at rest affords us no *Idea* of any *active Power* to move; and when it is set in Motion it self, that Motion is rather a Passion, than an Action in it. For when the Ball obeys the Stroke of a Billiard-stick, it is not any Action of the Ball, but bare Passion: Also when by Impulse it sets another Ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the Motion it had receiv'd from another, and loses in it self so much as the other receiv'd; which gives us but a very obscure *Idea*, of an *active Power* of moving in Body, whilst we observe it only to transfer but not produce any Motion. For it is but a very obscure *Idea* of *Power*, which reaches not the Production of the Action, but the Continuation of the Passion. For so is Motion in a Body impell'd by another: The Continuation of the Alteration made in it from Rest to Motion, being little more an Action than the Continuation of the Alteration of its Figure by the same Blow, is an Action. The *Idea* of the beginning of Motion we have only from Reflection on what passes in our selves, where we find by Experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a Thought of the Mind, we can move the Parts of our Bodies, which were before at rest. So that it seems to me, we have from the Observation of the Operation of Bodies by our Senses but a very imperfect obscure *Idea* of *active Power*, since they afford us not any *Idea* in themselves of the *Power* to begin any Action, either Motion or Thought. But if, from the Impulse Bodies are observ'd to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear *Idea* of *Power*, it serves as well to my purpose, Sensation being one of those Ways whereby the Mind comes by its *Ideas*: Only I thought it worth while to consider here by the way, whether the Mind doth not receive its *Idea* of *active Power* clearer from Reflection on its own Operations, than it doth from any external Sensation.

Will and Understanding, two Powers.

§. 5. This at least I think evident, That we find in our selves a *Power* to begin or forbear, continue or end several Actions of our Minds, and Motions of our Bodies, barely by a Thought or Preference of the Mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular Action. This *Power* which the Mind has thus to order the consideration of any *Idea*, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the Motion of any part of the Body to its Rest, and *vice versa* in any particular Instance, is that which we call the *Will*. The actual Exercise of that Power, by directing any particular Action, or its Forbearance, is that which we call *Volition* or *Willing*. The Forbearance of that Action, consequent to such Order or Command of the Mind, is call'd *Voluntary*. And whatsoever Action is perform'd without such a Thought of the Mind, is call'd *Involuntary*. The Power of Perception is that which we call the *Understanding*. Perception, which we make the Act of the Understanding, is of three sorts: 1. The Perception of *Ideas* in our Mind. 2. The Perception of

of the Signification of Signs. 3. The Perception of the Connexion or Repugnancy, Agreement or Disagreement, that there is between any of our *Ideas*. All these are attributed to the *Understanding*, or perceptive Power, tho' it be the two latter only that Use allows us to say we understand.

§. 6. These Powers of the Mind, viz. of *Perceiving*, and of *Preferring*, are usually call'd by another Name: And the ordinary way of speaking is, That the *Understanding* and *Will* are two *Faculties* of the Mind; a Word proper enough if it be us'd as all Words should be, so as not to breed any Confusion in Mens Thoughts, by being suppos'd (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real Beings in the Soul that perform'd those Actions of Understanding and Volition. For when we say the *Will* is the commanding and superior Faculty of the Soul; that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior Faculties; that it follows the Dictates of the *Understanding*, &c. tho' these, and the like Expressions, by those that carefully attend to their own *Ideas*, and conduct their Thoughts more by the Evidence of Things, than the Sound of Words, may be understood in a clear and distinct Sense: Yet I suspect, I say, that this way of speaking of *Faculties*, has misled many into a confus'd Notion of so many distinct Agents in us, which had their several Provinces and Authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several Actions, as so many distinct Beings; which has been no small occasion of Wrangling, Obscurity, and Uncertainty in Questions relating to them.

§. 7. Every one, I think, finds in himself a Power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several Actions in himself. From the Consideration of the Extent of this Power of the Mind over the Actions of the Man, which every one finds in himself, arise the *Ideas* of *Liberty* and *Necessity*. *Whence the Ideas of Liberty and Necessity.*

§. 8. All the Actions that we have any *Idea* of, reducing themselves, as has been said, to these two, viz. Thinking and Motion; so far as a Man has a Power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the Preference or Direction of his own Mind, so far is a Man *free*. Wherever any Performance or Forbearance are not equally in a Man's Power; wherever doing or not doing, will not equally follow upon the Preference of his Mind directing it, there he is not *free*, tho' perhaps the Action may be voluntary. So that the *Idea* of *Liberty* is the *Idea* of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular Action, according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is prefer'd to the other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be produc'd by him according to his *Volition*, there he is not at *Liberty*, that Agent is under *Necessity*. So that *Liberty* cannot be where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Will; but there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no *Liberty*. A little Consideration of an obvious Instance or two, may make this clear.

§. 9. A Tennis-ball, whether in Motion by the Stroke of a Racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a *free Agent*. If we enquire into the reason, we shall find it is because we conceive not a Tennis-ball to think, and consequently not to have any Volition, or Preference of Motion to Rest, or *vice versa*; and therefore has not *Liberty*, is not a free Agent; but all its both Motion and Rest, come under our *Idea* of *Necessity*, and are so call'd. Likewise a Man falling into the Water (a Bridge breaking under him) has not herein *Liberty*, is not a free Agent. For tho' he has Volition, tho' he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the Forbearance of that Motion not being in his Power, the Stop or Cessation of that Motion follows not upon his Volition; and therefore therein he is not *free*. So a Man striking himself, or his Friend, by a convulsive Motion of his Arm, which it is not in his power, by Volition or the Direction of his Mind, to stop, or forbear, no body thinks he has in this *Liberty*; every one pities him, as acting by Necessity and Constraint. *Supposes the Understanding and Will.*

§. 10. Again, suppose a Man be carry'd, whilst fast asleep, into a Room, where is a Person he longs to see and speak with; and be there lock'd fast in, beyond his Power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himself in so desirable Company, which he stays willingly in, i. e. prefers his stay to going away. I ask, Is not this stay voluntary? I think no body will doubt it; and yet being lock'd fast in, 'tis evident he is not at *Liberty* not to stay; he has not Freedom to be gone. So that *Liberty* is not an *Idea* belonging to Volition, or preferring; *Belongs not to Volition.*

preferring; but to the Person having the Power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the Mind shall chuse or direct. Our *Idea* of Liberty reaches as far as that Power, and no farther. For wherever Restraint comes to check that Power, or Compulsion takes away that Indifferency of Ability on either side to act, or to forbear acting; there *Liberty*, and our Notion of it, presently ceases.

Voluntary opposed to Involuntary, not to Necessary.

§. 11. We have Instances enough, and often more than enough in our own Bodies. A Man's Heart beats, and the Blood circulates, which 'tis not in his power by any Thought or Volition to stop; and therefore in respect of these Motions, where Rest depends not on his Choice, nor would follow the Determination of his Mind, if it should prefer it, he is not a *free Agent*. Convulsive Motions agitate his Legs, so that, tho' he *wills* it ever so much; he cannot by any Power of his Mind stop their Motion, (as in that odd Disease call'd *Chorea Sancti Viti*) but he is perpetually dancing: He is not at liberty in this Action, but under as much necessity of moving, as a Stone that falls, or a Tennis-ball struck with a Racket. On the other side, a Palsy or the Stocks hinder his Legs from obeying the Determination of his Mind, if it would thereby transfer his Body to another place. In all these there is want of *Freedom*; tho' the sitting still even of a Paralytick, whilst he prefers it to a Removal, is truly voluntary. *Voluntary* then is not opposed to *Necessary*, but to *Involuntary*. For a Man may prefer what he can do, to what he cannot do; the State he is in, to its Absence or Change, tho' Necessity has made it in itself unalterable.

Liberty what.

§. 12. As it is in the Motions of the Body, so it is in the Thoughts of our Minds: where any one is such, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the Preference of the Mind, there we are at *liberty*. A waking Man being under the necessity of having some *Ideas* constantly in his Mind, is not at *liberty* to think, or not to think; no more than he is at *liberty*, whether his Body shall touch any other or no: But whether he will remove his Contemplation from one *Idea* to another, is many times in his Choice; and then he is in respect of his *Ideas* as much at *liberty*, as he is in respect of Bodies he rests on: he can at pleasure remove himself from one to another. But yet some *Ideas* to the Mind, like some Motions to the Body, are such as in certain Circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence by the utmost Effort it can use. A Man on the Rack is not at *liberty* to lay by the *Idea* of Pain, and divert himself with other Contemplations: And sometimes a boisterous Passion hurries our Thoughts as a Hurricane does our Bodies, without leaving us the Liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather chuse. But as soon as the Mind regains the Power to stop or continue, begin or forbear, any of these Motions of the Body without, or Thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then consider the Man as a *free Agent* again.

Necessity what

§. 13. Wherever Thought is wholly wanting, or the Power to act or forbear according to the Direction of Thought, there *Necessity* takes place. This in an Agent capable of Volition, when the Beginning or Continuation of any Action is contrary to that Preference of his Mind, is call'd *Compulsion*; when the hindering or stopping any Action is contrary to his Volition, it is call'd *Restraint*. Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing *necessary* Agents.

Liberty belongs not to the Will.

§. 14. If this be so (as I imagine it is) I leave it to be consider'd, whether it may not help to put an end to that long-agitated, and I think unreasonable, because unintelligible Question, *viz. Whether Man's Will be free, or no?* For if I mistake not, it follows from what I have said, that the Question it self is altogether improper; and it is as insignificant to ask, whether Man's *Will* be free, as to ask whether his Sleep be swift, or his Vertue square; *Liberty* being as little applicable to the *Will*, as Swiftness of Motion is to Sleep, or Squareness to Vertue. Every one would laugh at the Absurdity of such a Question as either of these; because it is obvious, that the Modifications of Motion belong not to Sleep, nor the Difference of Figure to Vertue: And when any one well considers it, I think he will as plainly perceive, that *Liberty*, which is but a Power, belongs only to Agents, and cannot be an Attribute of Modification of the *Will*, which is also but a Power.

§. 15. Such is the difficulty of explaining and giving clear Notions of inter-^{Volition.}nal Actions by Sounds, that I must here warn my Reader that *Ordering, Directing, Chusing, Preferring, &c.* which I have made use of will not distinctly enough express *Volition*, unless he will reflect on what he himself does when he *wills*. For example, *Preferring*, which seems perhaps best to express the Act of *Volition*, does it not precisely. For tho' a Man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever *wills* it? *Volition*, 'tis plain, is an Act of the Mind knowingly exerting that Dominion it takes it self to have over any part of a Man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from any particular Action. And what is the *Will*, but the Faculty to do this? And is that Faculty any thing more in effect than a Power, the Power of the Mind to determine its Thought, to the producing, continuing, or stopping any Action, as far as it depends on us? For can it be deny'd, that whatever Agent has a Power to think on its own Actions, and to prefer their doing or omission either to other, has that Faculty call'd *Will*? *Will* then is nothing but such a Power. *Liberty*, on the other side, is the Power a Man has to do or forbear doing any particular Action, according as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference in the Mind; which is the same thing as to say, according as he himself *wills* it.

§. 16. 'Tis plain then, that the *Will* is nothing but one Power or Ability, ^{Powers belong}and freedom another Power or Ability: so that to ask, whether the *Will* has ^{to Agents.} *Freedom*, is to ask whether one Power has another Power, one Ability another Ability; a Question at first sight too grossly absurd to make a dispute, or need an answer. For who is it that sees not that *Powers* belong only to *Agents*, and are *Attributes only of Substances*, and not of *Powers* themselves? So that this Way of putting the Question, *viz.* Whether the *Will* be free? is in effect to ask, Whether the *Will* be a Substance, an Agent? or at least to suppose it, since *Freedom* can properly be attributed to nothing else. If *Freedom* can with any Propriety of Speech be apply'd to Power, it may be attributed to the Power that is in a Man to produce, or forbear producing Motion in parts of his Body, by Choice or Preference; which is that which denominates him free, and is *Freedom* it self. But if any one should ask, whether *Freedom* were free, he would be suspected not to understand well what he said; and he would be thought to deserve *Midas's Ears*, who knowing that rich was a Denomination from the Possession of Riches, should demand whether Riches themselves were rich.

§. 17. However the name *Faculty*, which Men have given to this Power call'd the *Will*, and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the *Will* as acting, may, by an Appropriation that disguises its true Sense, serve a little to palliate the Absurdity; yet the *Will* in truth signifies nothing but a Power, or Ability, to prefer or chuse: And when the *Will*, under the name of a *Faculty*, is consider'd as it is, barely as an Ability to do something, the Absurdity in saying it is free, or not free, will easily discover it self. For if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of *Faculties*, as distinct Beings that can act, (as we do, when we say the *Will* orders, and the *Will* is free) 'tis fit that we should make a speaking *Faculty*, and a walking *Faculty*, and a dancing *Faculty*, by which those Actions are produc'd, which are but several Modes of Motion; as well as we make the *Will* and *Understanding* to be *Faculties*, by which the Actions of Chusing and Perceiving are produc'd, which are but several Modes of Thinking: And we may as properly say, that 'tis the singing *Faculty* sings, and the dancing *Faculty* dances; as that the *Will* chuses, or that the *Understanding* conceives; or, as is usual, that the *Will* directs the *Understanding*, or the *Understanding* obeys, or obeys not the *Will*: It being altogether as proper and intelligible to say, that the Power of Speaking directs the Power of Singing, or the Power of Singing obeys or disobeys the Power of Speaking.

§. 18. This way of talking, nevertheless, has prevail'd, and, as I grieve, produced great Confusion. For these being all different Powers in the Mind, or in the Man, to do several Actions, he exerts them as he thinks fit: but the Power to do one Action, is not operated on by the Power of doing another Action. For the Power of Thinking operates not on the Power of Chusing, nor the Power of Chusing on the Power of Thinking; no more than the Power of Dancing operates on the Power of Singing, or the Power of Singing on the Power of Dancing; as any one, who reflects on it, will easily perceive: And yet

yet this is it which we say, when we thus speak, That the *Will* operates on the *Understanding*, or the *Understanding* on the *Will*.

§. 19. I grant, that this or that actual Thought may be the Occasion of Volition, or exercising the Power a Man has to chuse; or the actual Choice of the Mind, the Cause of actual thinking on this or that thing: as the actual singing of such a Tune, may be the Occasion of dancing such a Dance, and the actual dancing of such a Dance the occasion of singing such a Tune. But in all these it is not one Power that operates on another: But it is the Mind that operates, and exerts these Powers; it is the Man that does the Action, it is the Agent that has Power, or is able to do. For Powers are Relations, not Agents: And that which has the Power, or not the Power to operate, is that alone which is or is not free, and not the Power it self. For Freedom, or not Freedom, can belong to nothing, but what has or has not a Power to act.

Liberty belongs not to the Will.

§. 20. The attributing to *Faculties* that which belong'd not to them, has given occasion to this way of talking: But the introducing into Discourses concerning the Mind, with the name of *Faculties*, a Notion of their operating, has, I suppose, as little advanc'd our Knowledge in that part of our selves, as the great use and mention of the like Invention of *Faculties*, in the Operations of the Body, has help'd us in the Knowledge of Physick. Not that I deny there are *Faculties*, both in the Body and Mind: They both of them have their Powers of Operating, else neither the one nor the other could operate. For nothing can operate, that is not able to operate; and that is not able to operate, that has no Power to operate. Nor do I deny, that those Words, and the like, are to have their place in the common Use of Languages, that have made them current. It looks like too much Affectation wholly to lay them by: And Philosophy it self, tho' it likes not a gaudy Dress, yet when it appears in publick, must have so much Complacency, as to be clothed in the ordinary Fashion and Language of the Country, so far as it can consist with Truth and Psepicuity. But the fault has been, that *Faculties* have been spoken of and represented as so many distinct Agents. For it being ask'd, what it was that digested the Meat in our Stomachs? It was a ready and very satisfactory Answer, to say, that it was the *digestive Faculty*. What was it that made any thing come out of the Body? the *expulsive Faculty*. What moved? the *motive Faculty*. And so in the Mind, the *intellectual Faculty*, or the *Understanding*, understood; and the *elective Faculty*, or the *Will*, willed or commanded. Which is in short to say, That the Ability to digest, digested; and the Ability to move, moved; and the Ability to understand, understood. For *Faculty*, *Ability*, and *Power*, I think, are but different names of the same things: which ways of speaking, when put into more intelligible words, will I think amount to thus much; that Digestion is perform'd by something that is able to digest, Motion by something able to move, and Understanding by something able to understand. And in truth it would be very strange if it should be otherwise, as strange as it would be, for a Man to be free without being able to be free.

But to the Agent or Man.

§. 21. To return then to the Enquiry about Liberty, I think the Question is not proper, whether the *Will* be free, but whether a Man be free. Thus, I think,

1. That so far as any one can, by the Direction or Choice of his Mind, preferring the Existence of any Action to the Non-existence of that Action, and *vice versa* make it to exist or not exist; so far he is free. For if I can, by a Thought directing the Motion of my Finger, make it move when it was at rest, or *vice versa*; 'tis evident, that in respect of that I am free: and if I can, by a like Thought of my Mind, preferring one to the other, produce either Words or Silence, I am at liberty to speak, or hold my peace; and as far as this Power reaches, of acting, or not acting, by the Determination of his own Thought preferring either, so far is a Man free. For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will? And so far as any one can, by preferring any Action to its not being, or Rest to any Action, produce that Action or Rest, so far can he do what he will. For such a preferring of Action to its absence, is the willing of it; and we can scarce tell how to imagine any Being freer, than to be able to do what he wills. So that in respect of Actions within the reach of such a Power in him, a Man seems as free, as 'tis possible for Freedom to make him.

§. 22. But the inquisitive Mind of Man, willing to shift off from himself, as far as he can, all Thoughts of Guilt, tho' it be by putting himself into a worse state than that of fatal Necessity, is not content with this: Freedom, unless it reaches farther than this, will not serve the turn: And it passes for a good Plea, that a Man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will, as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a Man's Liberty, there yet therefore is rais'd this farther Question, *Whether a Man be free to will?* which I think is what is meant, when it is disputed whether the *Will* be free. And as to that I imagine,

In respect of willing, a Man is not free.

§. 23. 2. That *Willing*, or *Volition*, being an Action, and Freedom consisting in a Power of acting or not acting, a Man in respect of willing, or the Act of Volition, when any Action in his power is once propos'd to his Thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free. The reason whereof is very manifest: For it being unavoidable that the Action depending on his *Will* should exist, or not exist; and its Existence, or not Existence, following perfectly the Determination and Preference of his Will, he cannot avoid willing the Existence, or not Existence of that Action; it is absolutely necessary that he will the one, or the other, *i. e.* prefer the one to the other: since one of them must necessarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the Choice and Determination of his Mind, that is, by his willing it: for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in respect of the Act of *Willing*, a Man in such a case is not free: Liberty consisting in a Power to act, or not to act; which, in regard of Volition, a Man, upon such a proposal, has not. For it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an Action in a Man's power, which is once so propos'd to his Thoughts; a Man must necessarily will the one or the other of them, upon which Preference or Volition, the Action or its Forbearance certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the Act of Volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a Man in respect of that Act of *Willing*, is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless Necessity and Freedom can consist together, and a Man can be free and bound at once.

§. 24. This then is evident, That in all Proposals of present Action, a Man is not at liberty to will or not to will, because he cannot forbear willing: Liberty consisting in a Power to act or to forbear acting, and in that only. For a Man that sits still, is said yet to be at liberty, because he can walk if he wills it. But if a Man sitting still has not a Power to remove himself, he is not at liberty; so likewise a Man falling down a Precipice, tho' in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion if he would. This being so, 'tis plain that a Man that is walking, to whom it is propos'd to give off walking, is not at liberty whether he will determine himself to walk, or give off walking, or no: He must necessarily prefer one, or t'other of them, walking or not walking; and so it is in regard of all other Actions in our power so propos'd, which are the far greater number. For considering the vast number of voluntary Actions that succeed one another every moment that we are awake in the course of our Lives, there are but few of them that are thought on or propos'd to the *Will*, till the time they are to be done: And in all such Actions, as I have shewn, the Mind in respect of willing has not a power to act, or not to act, wherein consists Liberty. The Mind in that case has not a power to forbear willing; it cannot avoid some Determination concerning them, let the Consideration be as short, the Thought as quick as it will, it either leaves the Man in the state he was before thinking, or changes it; continues the Action, or puts an end to it. Whereby it is manifest, that it orders and directs one, in preference to or with neglect of the other, and thereby either the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary.

§. 25. Since then it is plain, that in most cases a Man is not at liberty, whether he will or no; the next thing demanded, is, *Whether a Man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, Motion or Rest?* This Question carries the Absurdity of it so manifestly in it self, that one might thereby sufficiently be convinc'd that Liberty concerns not the Will. For to ask, whether a Man be at liberty to will either Motion or Rest, Speaking or Silence, which he pleases; is to ask, whether a Man can will what he wills, or be pleas'd with what he is pleas'd with. A Question which, I think, needs no Answer; and they who can make

The Will determin'd by something without it.

a Question of it, must suppose one Will to determine the Acts of another, and another to determine that; and so on *in infinitum*.

§. 26. To avoid these and the like Absurdities, nothing can be of greater use, than to establish in our Minds determin'd *Ideas* of the things under consideration. If the *Ideas* of Liberty and Volition were well fix'd in our Understandings, and carry'd along with us in our Minds, as they ought, thro' all the Questions that are rais'd about them; I suppose a great part of the Difficulties that perplex Mens Thoughts, and entangle their Understandings, would be much easier resolv'd; and we should perceive where the confus'd Signification of Terms, or where the nature of the thing caus'd the Obscurity.

Freedom.

§. 27. First then, it is carefully to be remember'd, That *Freedom* consists in the Dependence of the Existence, or not Existence of any Action, upon our Volition of it; and not in the Dependence of any Action, or its contrary, on our preference. A Man standing on a Cliff, is at liberty to leap twenty Yards downwards into the Sea, not because he has a power to do the contrary Action, which is to leap twenty Yards upwards, for that he cannot do: but he is therefore free, because he has a power to leap or not to leap. But if a greater Force than his either holds him fast, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that case: because the doing or forbearance of that particular Action, is no longer in his Power. He that is a close Prisoner in a Room twenty foot square, being at the North-side of his Chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty foot Southward, because he can walk or not walk it; but is not, at the same time, at liberty to do the contrary, and to walk twenty foot Northward.

In this then consists Freedom, viz. in our being able to act or not to act, according as we shall chuse or will.

Volition what.

§. 28. Secondly, We must remember, that *Volition* or *Willing*, is an Act of the Mind directing its Thought to the Production of any Action, and thereby exerting its Power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word *Action*, to comprehend the forbearance too of any Action propos'd; *sitting still*, or *holding one's peace*, when *walking* or *speaking* are propos'd, tho' mere Forbearances, requiring as much the Determination of the *Will*, and being often as weighty in their Consequences as the contrary Actions, may, on that consideration, well enough pass for Actions too: But this I say, that I may not be mistaken, if for brevity sake I speak thus.

What determines the Will.

§. 29. Thirdly, The *Will* being nothing but a Power in the Mind to direct the operative Faculties of a Man to Motion or Rest, as far as they depend on such Direction: To the Question, What is it determines the Will? the true and proper Answer is, The Mind. For that which determines the general Power of directing to this or that particular Direction, is nothing but the Agent it self exercising the Power it has that particular way. If this Answer satisfies not, 'tis plain the meaning of the Question, *What determines the Will?* is this, what moves the Mind, in every particular Instance to determine its general Power of directing to this or that particular Motion or Rest? And to this I answer, The Motive for continuing in the same State or Action, is only the present Satisfaction in it; the Motive to change, is always some *Uneasiness*: nothing setting us upon the change of State, or upon any new Action, but some *Uneasiness*. This is the great Motive that works on the Mind to put it upon Action, which for shortness sake we will call *determining of the Will*; which I shall more at large explain.

Will and Desire must not be confounded.

§. 30. But in the way to it, it will be necessary to premise, that tho' I have above endeavour'd to express the Act of *Volition* by *Chusing*, *Preferring*, and the like terms, that signify *Desire* as well as *Volition*, for want of other words to mark that Act of the Mind, whose proper Name is *Willing* or *Volition*; yet it being a very simple Act, whosoever desires to understand what it is, will better find it by reflecting on his own Mind, and observing what it does when it *will*s, than by any variety of articulate Sounds whatsoever. This Caution of being careful not to be misled by Expressions that do not enough keep up the difference between the *Will* and several Acts of the Mind that are quite distinct from it, I think the more necessary; because I find the Will often confounded with several of the Affections, especially *Desire*, and one put for the other; and that by Men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very distinct

Notions

Notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no small occasion of Obscurity and Mistake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that shall turn his Thoughts inwards upon what passes in his Mind when he *wills*, shall see that the *Wills* or Power of *Volition* is conversant about nothing, but that particular Determination of the Mind, whereby barely by a Thought the Mind endeavours to give Rise, Continuation, or Stop to any Action which it takes to be in its power. This well consider'd, plainly shews that the *Will* is perfectly distinguish'd from *Desire*; which in the very same Action may have a quite contrary Tendency from that which our *Will* sets us upon. A Man whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use Persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case, 'tis plain the *Will* and *Desire* run counter. I will the Action that tends one way, whilst my *Desire* tends another, and that the direct contrary. A Man who by a violent Fit of the Gout in his Limbs finds a Doziness in his Head, or a Want of Appetite in his Stomach remov'd, desires to be eased too of the Pain of his Feet or Hands (for wherever there is Pain, there is a *Desire* to be rid of it) tho' yet, whilst he apprehends that the removal of the Pain may translate the noxious Humour to a more vital part, his *Will* is never determin'd to any one Action that may serve to remove this Pain. Whence it is evident, that *Desiring* and *Willing* are two distinct Acts of the Mind; and consequently that the *Will*, which is but the Power of *Volition*, is much more distinct from *Desire*.

§. 31. To return then to the Enquiry, *What is it that determines the Will in regard to our Actions?* And that, upon second thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally suppos'd, the greater Good in view; but some (and for the most part the most pressing) *Uneasiness* a Man is at present under. This is that which successively determines the *Will*, and sets us upon those Actions we perform. This *Uneasiness* we may call, as it is, *Desire*; which is an *Uneasiness* of the Mind for want of some absent Good. All Pain of the Body, of what sort soever, and Disquiet of the Mind, is *Uneasiness*: And with this is always join'd *Desire*, equal to the Pain or *Uneasiness* felt, and is scarce distinguishable from it. For *Desire* being nothing but an *Uneasiness* in the want of an absent Good; in reference to any Pain felt, Ease is that absent Good; and till that Ease be attain'd; we may call it *Desire*, no body feeling Pain that he wishes not to be eased of, with a *Desire* equal to that Pain, and inseparable from it. Besides this *Desire* of Ease from Pain, there is another of absent positive Good; and here also the *Desire* and *Uneasiness* is equal. As much as we desire any absent Good, so much are we in pain for it. But here all absent Good does not, according to the Greatness it has, or is acknowledg'd to have, cause Pain equal to that Greatness; as all Pain causes *Desire* equal to it self: because the Absence of Good is not always a Pain, as the Presence of Pain is. And therefore absent Good may be look'd on, and consider'd without *Desire*. But so much as there is any where of *Desire*, so much there is of *Uneasiness*.

§. 32. That *Desire* is a State of *Uneasiness*, every one who reflects on himself will quickly find. Who is there that has not felt in *Desire* what the Wise Man lays of Hope, (which is not much different from it) that it being *desir'd* makes the Heart sick? and that still proportionable to the Greatness of the *Desire*; which sometimes raises the *Uneasiness* to that pitch, that it makes People cry out, *Give me Children, give me the thing desir'd, or I die?* Life it self, and all its Enjoyments, is a Burden cannot be born under the lasting and unremov'd Pressure of such an *Uneasiness*.

§. 33. Good and Evil, present and absent, 'tis true, work upon the Mind: but that which immediately determines the *Will*, from time to time, to every voluntary Action, is the *Uneasiness* of *Desire*, fix'd on some absent Good; either negative, as Indolence to one in Pain, or positive, as Enjoyment of Pleasure. That it is this *Uneasiness* that determines the *Will* to the successive voluntary Actions, whereof the greatest part of our Lives is made up, and by which we are conducted thro' different Courses to different Ends; I shall endeavour to shew, both from Experience and the Reason of the thing.

§. 34. When a Man is perfectly content with the State he is in, which is *This the Spring of A-* when he is perfectly without any *Uneasiness*, what Industry, what Action, what *Will* from.

Will is there left, but to continue in it? Of this every Man's Observation will satisfy him. And thus we see our All-wise Maker, suitable to our Constitution and Frame, and knowing what it is that determines the *Will*, has put into Man the *Uneasiness* of Hunger and Thirst, and other natural Desires, that return at their Seasons, to move and determine their *Wills*, for the Preservation of themselves, and the Continuation of their Species. For I think we may conclude, that if the bare Contemplation of these good Ends, to which we are carry'd by these several *Uneasinesses*, had been sufficient to determine the *Will*, and set us on work, we should have had none of these natural Pains, and perhaps in this World little or no Pain at all. *It is better to marry than to burn*, says St. Paul; where we may see what it is that chiefly drives Men into the Enjoyments of a conjugal Life. A little burning felt, pushes us more powerfully, than greater Pleasures in prospect draw or allure.

The greatest
positive Good
determines
not the *Will*,
but *Uneasiness*.

§ 35. It seems so establish'd and settled a Maxim by the general Consent of all Mankind, That Good, the greater Good determines the *Will*, that I do not at all wonder, that when I first publish'd my Thoughts on this Subject, I took it for granted; and I imagine that by a great many I shall be thought more excusable, for having then done so, than that now I have ventur'd to recede from so receiv'd an Opinion. But yet upon a stricter Inquiry, I am forc'd to conclude, that Good, the greater Good, tho' apprehended and acknowledg'd to be so, does not determine the *Will*, until our Desire, rais'd proportionably to it, makes us *uneasy* in the want of it. Convince a Man ever so much, that Plenty has its Advantages over Poverty; make him see and own, that the handsome Conveniencies of Life are better than nasty Penury; yet as long as he is content with the latter, and finds no *Uneasiness* in it, he moves not: his *Will* never is determin'd to any Action that shall bring him out of it. Let a Man be ever so well persuad'd of the Advantages of Virtue, that it is as necessary to a Man who has any great Aims in this World, or Hopes in the next, as Food to Life; yet till he *hunger* and *thirst* after Righteousness, till he feels an *Uneasiness* in the want of it, his *Will* will not be determin'd to any Action in pursuit of this confess'd greater Good; but any other *Uneasiness* he feels in himself, shall take place, and carry his *Will* to other Actions. On the other side, let a Drunkard see that his Health decays, his Estates wastes; Discredit and Diseases, and the want of all things, even of his beloved Drink, attends him in the Course he follows; yet the Returns of *Uneasiness* to miss his Companions, the habitual Thirst after his Cups, at the usual time, drives him to the Tavern, tho' he has in his view the Loss of Health and Plenty, and perhaps of the Joys of another Life: the least of which is no inconsiderable Good, but such as he confesses is far greater than the tickling of his Palat with a Glass of Wine, or the idle Chat of a soaking Club. 'Tis not for want of viewing the greater Good; for he sees and acknowledges it, and in the Intervals of his drinking Hours, will take Resolutions to pursue the greater Good; but when the *Uneasiness* to miss his accustom'd Delight returns, the greater acknowledg'd Good loses its hold, and the present *Uneasiness* determines the *Will* to the accustom'd Action; which thereby gets stronger footing to prevail against the next occasion tho' he at the same time makes secret Promises to himself, that he will do so no more; this is the last time he will act against the Attainment of those greater Goods. And thus he is from time to time in the State of that unhappy Complainer, *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*: Which Sentence, allow'd for true, and made good by constant Experience, may this, and possibly no other way, be easily made intelligible.

Because the
moral of *Uneasiness* is the
first Step to
Happiness.

§ 36. If we enquire into the Reason of what Experience makes so evident in Fact, and examine why 'tis *Uneasiness* alone operates on the *Will*, and determines it in its Choice; we shall find that we being capable but of one Determination of the *Will* to one Action at once; the present *Uneasiness* that we are under does naturally determine the *Will*, in order to that Happiness which we all aim at in all our Actions; forasmuch as whilst we are under any *Uneasiness*, we cannot apprehend our selves happy, or in the way to it. Pain and *Uneasiness* being, by every one, concluded and felt to be inconsistent with Happiness, spoiling the Relish even of those good things which we have; a little Pain serving to marr all the Pleasure we rejoic'd in. And therefore that which of course

Course determines the Choice of our *Will* to the next Action, will always be the removing of Pain, as long as we have any left, as the first and necessary Step towards Happiness.

§. 37. Another Reason why 'tis *Uneasiness* alone determines the *Will*, may be this; because that alone is present, and 'tis against the nature of things, that what is absent should operate where it is not. It may be said, that absent Good may by Contemplation be brought home to the Mind, and made present. The *Idea* of it indeed may be in the Mind, and view'd as present there; but nothing will be in the Mind as a present Good, able to counter-balance the Removal of any *Uneasiness* which we are under, till it raises our Desire; and the *Uneasiness* of that has the Prevalency in determining the *Will*. Till then the *Idea* in the Mind of whatever Good, is there only like other *Ideas*, the Object of bare unactive Speculation, but operates not on the *Will*, nor set us on work; the Reason whereof I shall shew by and by. How many are to be found, that have had lively Representations set before their Minds of the unspeakable Joys of Heaven, which they acknowledg both possible and probable too, who yet would be content to take up with their Happiness here? And so the prevailing *Uneasinesses* of their Desires, let loose after the Enjoyments of this Life, take their Turns in the determining their *Wills*; and all that while they take not one step, are not one jot mov'd towards the good things of another Life, consider'd as ever so great.

Because Uneasiness alone is present.

§. 38. Were the *Will* determin'd by the Views of Good, as it appears in Contemplation greater or less to the Understanding, which is the State of all absent Good, and that which in the receiv'd Opinion the *Will* is suppos'd to move to, and to be mov'd by, I do not see how it could ever get loose from the infinite eternal Joys of Heaven, once propos'd and consider'd as possible. For all absent Good, by which alone, barely propos'd and coming in view, the *Will* is thought to be determin'd, and so to set us on Action, being only possible but not infallibly certain; 'tis unavoidable that the infinitely greater possible Good should regularly and constantly determine the *Will* in all the successive Actions it directs: and then we should keep constantly and steddily in our Course towards Heaven, without ever standing still, or directing our Actions, to any other end. The eternal Condition of a future State infinitely outweighing the Expectation of Riches, or Honour, or any other worldly Pleasure which we can propose to our selves, tho' we should grant these the more probable to be attain'd: For nothing future is yet in possession, and so the Expectation even of these may deceive us. If it were so, that the greater Good in view determines the *Will*, so great a Good once propos'd could not but seize the *Will*, and hold it fast to the Pursuit of this infinitely greatest Good, without ever letting it go again: For the *Will* having a Power over, and directing the Thoughts as well as other Actions, would, if it were so, hold the Contemplation of the Mind fix'd to that Good.

Because all who allow the Joys of Heaven possible, pursue them not.

This would be the State of the Mind, and regular Tendency of the *Will* in all its Determinations, were it determin'd by that which is consider'd, and in View the greater Good; but that it is not so, is visible in Experience: The infinitely greatest confess'd Good being often neglected, to satisfy the successive *Uneasiness* of our Desires pursuing Trifles. But tho' the greatest allow'd, even everlasting unspeakable Good, which has sometimes mov'd and affected the Mind, does not stedfastly hold the *Will*, yet we see any very great and prevailing *Uneasiness*, having once laid hold on the *Will*, lets it not go; by which we may be convinc'd, what it is that determines the *Will*. Thus any vehement Pain of the Body, the ungovernable Passion of a Man violently in Love, or the impatient Desire of Revenge, keeps the *Will* steady and intent; and the *Will* thus determin'd never lets the Understanding lay-by the Object, but all the Thoughts of the Mind, and Powers of the Body are uninterruptedly employ'd that way, by the Determinations of the *Will*, influenc'd by that topping *Uneasiness* as long as it lasts; whereby it seems to me evident, that the *Will* or Power of setting us upon one Action in preference to all other, is determined in us by *Uneasiness*. And whether this be not so, I desire every one to observe in himself.

But any great Uneasiness is never neglected.

*Desire accom-
panies all Un-
easiness.*

§. 39. I have hitherto chiefly instanc'd in the *Uneasiness* of Desire, as that which determines the *Will*; because that is the chief and most sensible, and the *Will* seldom orders any Action, nor is there any voluntary Action perform'd, without some *Desire* accompanying it; which I think is the Reason why the *Will* and *Desire* are so often confounded. But yet we are not to look upon the *Uneasiness* which makes up, or at least accompanies most of the other Passions, as wholly excluded in the Case. *Aversion, Fear, Anger, Envy, Shame, &c.* have each their *Uneasiness* too, and thereby influence the *Will*. These Passions are scarce any of them in Life and Practice simple and alone, and wholly unmix'd with others; tho' usually in Discourse and Contemplation, that carries the Name which operates strongest, and appears most in the present State of the Mind: Nay there is, I think, scarce any of the Passions to be found without *Desire* join'd with it. I am sure, wherever there is *Uneasiness*, there is *Desire*: For we constantly desire Happiness; and whatever we feel of *Uneasiness*, so much 'tis certain we want of Happiness, even in our own Opinion, let our State and Condition otherwise be what it will. Besides, the present Moment not being our Eternity, whatever our Enjoyment be, we look beyond the present, and *Desire* goes with our Foresight, and that still carries the *Will* with it. So that even in Joy it self, that which keeps up the Action, whereon the Enjoyment depends, is the *Desire* to continue it, and *Fear* to lose it: And whenever a greater *Uneasiness* than that takes place in the Mind, the *Will* presently is by that determin'd to some new Action, and the present Delight neglected.

The most pressing Uneasiness naturally determines the Will.

§. 40. But we being in this World beset with sundry *Uneasinesses*, distracted with different *Desires*; the next Inquiry naturally will be, which of them has the Precedency in determining the *Will* to the next Action? and to that the Answer is, That ordinarily which is the most pressing of those that are judg'd capable of being then remov'd. For the *Will*, being the Power of directing our operative Faculties to some Action, for some End, cannot at any time be mov'd towards what is judg'd at that time unattainable: That would be to suppose an intelligent Being designedly to act for an End, only to lose its Labour, for so it is to act for what is judg'd not attainable; and therefore very great *Uneasinesses* move not the *Will*, when they are judg'd not capable of a Cure: They, in that Case, put us not upon Endeavours. But these set a-part, the most important and urgent *Uneasiness* we at that time feel, is that which ordinarily determines the *Will* successively, in that Train of voluntary Actions which makes up our Lives. The greatest present *Uneasiness* is the Spur to Action, that is constantly felt, and for the most part determines the *Will* in its choice of the next Action. For this we must carry along with us, that the proper and only Object of the *Will* is some Action of our's, and nothing else: For we producing nothing by our willing it, but some Action in our Power, 'tis there the *Will* terminates, and reaches no farther.

All desire Happiness.

§. 41. If it be farther ask'd what 'tis moves *Desire*? I answer, Happiness, and that alone. *Happiness* and *Misery* are the Names of two Extremes, the utmost Bounds whereof we know not; 'tis what *Eye hath not seen, Ear hath not heard, nor hath it enter'd into the Heart of Man to conceive*. But of some Degrees of both we have very lively Impressions, made by several Instances of Delight and Joy on the one side, and Torment and Sorrow on the other; which, for shortness sake, I shall comprehend under the names of Pleasure and Pain, there being Pleasure and Pain of the Mind as well as the Body: *With him is fulness of Joy, and Pleasure for evermore*. Or, to speak truly, they are all of the Mind; tho' some have their rise in the Mind from Thought, others in the Body from certain Modifications of Motion.

Happiness what.

§. 42. *Happiness* then in its full Extent is the utmost Pleasure we are capable of, and *Misery* the utmost Pain: And the lowest Degree of what can be call'd *Happiness*, is so much Ease from all Pain, and so much present Pleasure, as without which any one cannot be content. Now because Pleasure and Pain are produc'd in us by the Operation of certain Objects, either on our Minds or our Bodies, and in different Degrees: Therefore what has an aptness to produce Pleasure in us, is that we call *Good*; and what is apt to produce Pain in us we call *Evil*, for no other reason, but for its aptness to produce Pleasure and Pain

Pain in us, wherein consists our *Happiness* and *Misery*. Farther, tho' what is apt to produce any Degree of Pleasure, be in it self *Good*; and what is apt to produce any Degree of Pain, be *Evil*: yet it often happens, that we do not call it so, when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort; because when they come in competition, the Degrees also of Pleasure and Pain have justly a Preference. So that if we will rightly estimate what we call *Good* and *Evil*, we shall find it lies much in comparison: For the cause of every less Degree of Pain, as well as every greater Degree of Pleasure, has the nature of *Good*, and *vice versa*.

§. 43. Tho' this be that which is call'd *Good* and *Evil*; and all Good be the proper Object of *Desire* in general; yet all Good, even seen, and confess'd to be so, does not necessarily move every particular Man's *Desire*, but only that part, or so much of it as is consider'd and taken to make a necessary part of his *Happiness*. All other Good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not a Man's *Desires*, who looks not on it to make a part of that *Happiness*, wherewith he, in his present Thoughts, can satisfy himself. *Happiness*, under this view, every one constantly pursues, and *desires* what makes any part of it: other things, acknowledg'd to be Good, he can look upon without *Desire*, pass by, and be content without. There is no body, I think, so senseless, as to deny, that there is Pleasure in Knowledge: And for the Pleasures of Sense, they have too many Followers to let it be question'd, whether Men are taken with them or no. Now let one Man place his satisfaction in sensual Pleasures, another in the delight of Knowledge: Tho' each of them cannot but confess, there is great Pleasure in what the other pursues; yet neither of them making the other's Delight a part of his *Happiness*, their *Desires* are not mov'd, but each is satisfy'd without what the other enjoys, and so his Will is not determin'd to the pursuit of it. But yet as soon as the studious Man's Hunger and Thirst makes him *uneasy*, he, whose *Will* was never determin'd to any pursuit of good Cheer, poyant Sauces, delicious Wine, by the pleasant Taste he has found in them, is, by the *Uneasiness* of Hunger and Thirst, presently determin'd to Eating and Drinking, tho' possibly with great indifferency, what wholesome Food comes in his way. And on the other side, the Epicure buckles to Study, when Shame, or the desire to recommend himself to his Mistress, shall make him *uneasy* in the want of any sort of Knowledge. Thus how much soever Men are in earnest, and constant in pursuit of *Happiness*, yet they may have a clear view of Good, great and confess'd Good, without being concern'd for it, or mov'd by it, if they think they can make up their *Happiness* without it. Tho' as to Pain, that they are always concern'd for; they can feel no *Uneasiness* without being mov'd. And therefore being *uneasy* in the want of whatever is judg'd necessary to their *Happiness*, as soon as any Good appears to make a part of their proportion of *Happiness*, they begin to *desire* it.

§. 44. This, I think, any one may observe in himself, and others, That the greater visible Good does not always raise Mens *Desires*, in proportion to the Greatness, it appears, and is acknowledg'd to have: tho' every little Trouble moves us, and sets us on work to get rid of it. The Reason whereof is evident from the Nature of our *Happiness* and *Misery* it self. All present Pain, whatever it be; makes a part of our present *Misery*: But all absent Good does not at any time make a necessary part of our present *Happiness*, nor the absence of it make a part of our *Misery*. If it did, we should be constantly and infinitely miserable; there being infinite degrees of *Happiness*, which are not in our possession. All *Uneasiness* therefore being remov'd, a moderate portion of Good serves at present to content Men; and some few degrees of Pleasure in a succession of ordinary Injoyments make up a *Happiness*, wherein they can be satisfy'd. If this were not so, there could be no room for those indifferent and visibly trifling Actions, to which our *Wills* are so often determin'd, and wherein we voluntarily waste so much of our Lives; which remissness could by no means consist with a constant determination of *Will* or *Desire* to the greatest apparent Good. That this is so, I think few People need go far from home to be convinc'd. And indeed in this Life there are not many whose *Happiness* reaches so far as to afford them a constant train of moderate mean Pleasures; without any mixture of *Uneasiness*; and yet they could be content to stay here

What Good is
desir'd, what
not.

Why the greatest Good is not
always desir'd

for

for ever: tho' they cannot deny, but that it is possible there may be a State of eternal durable Joys after this Life, far surpassing all the Good that is to be found here. Nay, they cannot but see, that it is more possible than the Attainment and Continuation of that Pittance of Honour, Riches or Pleasure, which they pursue, and for which they neglect that eternal State: But yet in full view of this Difference, satisfy'd of the Possibility of a perfect, secure, and lasting Happiness in a future State, and under a clear Conviction, that it is not to be had here, whilst they bound their Happiness within some little Enjoyment, or Aim of this Life, and exclude the Joys of Heaven from making any necessary part of it; their Desires are not mov'd by this greater apparent Good, nor their *Wills* determin'd to any Action, or Endeavour for its Attainment.

Why not being
desir'd, it
moves not the
Will.

§. 45. The ordinary Necessities of our Lives fill a great part of them with the *Uneasiness* of Hunger, Thirst, Heat, Cold, Weariness with Labour, and Sleepiness in their constant Returns, &c. To which, if besides accidental Harms, we add the fantastical *Uneasiness*, (as Itch after Honour, Power, or Riches, &c.) which acquir'd Habits by Fashion, Example, and Education, have settled in us, and a thousand other irregular Desires, which Custom has made natural to us; we shall find, that a very little part of our Life is so vacant from these *Uneasinesses*, as to leave us free to the Attraction of remoter absent Good. We are seldom at ease, and free enough from the Sollicitation of our natural or adopted Desires, but a constant Succession of *Uneasinesses* out of that Stock, which natural Wants or acquir'd Habits have heaped up, take the *Will* in their turns: and no sooner is one Action dispatch'd, which by such a Determination of the *Will* we are set upon, but another *Uneasiness* is ready to set us on work. For the removing of the Pains we feel, and are at present press'd with, being the getting out of Misery, and consequently the first thing to be done in order to Happiness, absent Good, tho' thought on, confess'd, and appearing to be good, not making any part of this Unhappiness in its Absence, is justled out to make way for the Removal of those *Uneasinesses* we feel: till due and repeated Contemplation has brought it nearer to our Mind, given some relish of it, and rais'd in us some Desire: which then beginning to make a part of our present *Uneasiness*, stands upon fair terms with the rest, to be satisfy'd; and so, according to its Greatness and Pressure, comes in its turn to determine the *Will*.

Due Consideration raises
Desire.

§. 46. And thus by a due Consideration, and examining any Good propos'd, it is in our Power to raise our Desires in a due proportion to the value of that Good, whereby in its turn and place it may come to work upon the *Will*, and be pursu'd. For Good, tho' appearing, and allow'd ever so great, yet till it has rais'd Desires in our Minds, and thereby made us *uneasy* in its want, it reaches not our *Wills*; we are not within the Sphere of its Activity; our *Wills* being under the Determination only of those *Uneasinesses*, which are present to us, which (whilst we have any) are always solliciting, and ready at hand to give the *Will* its next Determination: the ballancing, when there is any in the Mind, being only which Desire shall be next satisfy'd, which *Uneasiness* first remov'd. Whereby it comes to pass, that as long as any *Uneasiness*, any Desire remains in our Mind, there is no room for Good, barely as such, to come at the *Will*, or at all to determine it. Because, as has been said, the first Step in our Endeavours after Happiness being to get wholly out of the Confines of Misery, and to feel no part of it, the *Will* can be at leisure for nothing else, till every *Uneasiness* we feel, be perfectly remov'd: which, in the multitude of Wants and Desires we are beset with in this imperfect State, we are not like to be ever freed from in this World.

The Power to
suspend the
Prosecution of
any Desire,
makes way
for Consideration.

§. 47. There being in us a great many *Uneasinesses* always solliciting, and ready to determine the *Will*, it is natural, as I have said, that the greatest and most pressing should determine the *Will* to the next Action; and so it does for the most part, but not always. For the Mind having in most cases, as is evident in Experience, a Power to suspend the Execution and Satisfaction of any of its Desires, and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the Objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the Liberty Man has; and from the not using of it right, comes all that Variety of Mistakes, Errors, and Faults which we run into in the Conduct of our Lives, and our Endeavours after Happiness; whilst we precipitate the

the Determination of our *Wills*, and engage too soon before due *Examination*. To prevent this, we have a Power to *suspend* the Prosecution of this or that Desire, as every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the Source of all Liberty; in this seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) call'd *Free-Will*. For during this *Suspension* of any Desire, before the *Will* be determin'd to Action, and the Action (which follows that Determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judg of the Good or Evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due *Examination*, we have judg'd we have done our Duty, all that we can or ought to do in pursuit of our Happiness; and 'tis not a Fault, but a Perfection of our Nature to desire, will, and act according to the last Result of a fair *Examination*.

§. 48. This is so far from being a Restraint or Diminution of *Freedom*, that it is the very Improvement and Benefit of it; 'tis not an Abridgment, 'tis the End and Use of our *Liberty*; and the farther we are remov'd from such a Determination, the nearer we are to Misery and Slavery. A perfect Indifferency in the Mind, not determinable by its last Judgment of the Good or Evil that is thought to attend its Choise, would be so far from being an Advantage and Excellency of any intellectual Nature, that it would be as great an Imperfection, as the want of Indifferency to act or not to act till determin'd by the *Will*, would be an Imperfection on the other side. A Man is at liberty to lift up his Hand to his Head, or let it rest quiet: He is perfectly indifferent in either? and it would be an Imperfection in him, if he wanted that Power, if he were depriv'd of that Indifferency. But it would be as great an Imperfection if he had the same Indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his Hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would save his Head or Eyes from a Blow he sees coming: 'Tis as much a Perfection, that Desire, or the Power of preferring, should be determin'd by Good, as that the Power of acting should be determin'd by the *Will*; and the certainer such Determination is, the greater is the Perfection. Nay, were we determin'd by any thing but the last Result of our own Minds, judging of the Good or Evil of any Action, we were not free. The very End of our Freedom being, that we may attain the Good we chuse. And therefore every Man is put under a necessity by his Constitution, as an intelligent Being, to be determin'd in *willing* by his own Thought and Judgment what is best for him to do: else he would be under the Determination of some other than himself, which is want of Liberty. And to deny that a Man's *Will*, in every Determination, follows his own Judgment, is to say, that a Man *wills* and acts for an End that he would not have, at the time that he *wills* and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present Thoughts before any other, 'tis plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unless he can have, and not have it; *will* and not *will* it at the same time; a Contradiction too manifest to be admitted!

To be determin'd by our own Judgment, is no Restraint to Liberty.

§. 49. If we look upon those *superior Beings* above us, who enjoy perfect Happiness, we shall have reason to judg that they are more steadily determin'd in their Choice of Good than we; and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite Creatures as we are to pronounce what infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot chuse what is not good; the Freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determin'd by what is best.

The freest Agents are so determin'd.

§. 50. But to give a right view of this mistaken part of Liberty, let me ask, Would any one be a Changeling, because he is less determin'd by wise Considerations than a wise Man? Is it worth the Name of *Freedom*, to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw Shame and Misery upon a Man's self? If to break loose from the Conduct of Reason, and to want that Restraint of Examination and Judgment, which keeps us from chusing or doing the worse, be *Liberty*, true Liberty, Madmen and Fools are the only Free-men: But yet, I think, no body would chuse to be mad for the sake of such *Liberty*, but he that is mad already. The constant Desire of Happiness, and the Constraint it puts upon us to act for it, no body, I think, accounts an Abridgment of *Liberty*, or at least an Abridgment of *Liberty* to be complain'd of. God Almighty himself is under the necessity of being happy; and the more any intelligent Being is so, the nearer is its approach to infinite Perfection and Happiness. That in this state of Ignorance

A constant Determination to a pursuit of Happiness, no Abridgment of Liberty.

rance we short-sighted Creatures might not mistake true Felicity, we are endow'd with a power to suspend any particular Desire, and keep it from determining the *Will*, and engaging us in Action. This is *standing still*, where we are not sufficiently assur'd of the way: Examination, is *consulting a Guide*. The Determination of the *Will* upon enquiry, is *following the Direction of that Guide*: And he that has a power to act or not to act, according as such Determination directs, is a *free Agent*; such Determination abridges not that Power wherein Liberty consists. He that has his Chains knock'd off, and the Prison-doors set open to him, is perfectly at *liberty*, because he may either go or stay; as he best likes; tho' his Preference be determin'd to stay, by the Darkness of the Night, or Illness of the Weather, or Want of other Lodging. He cease not to be free, tho' the Desire of some Convenience to be had there absolutely determines his Preference, and makes him stay in his Prison.

The Necessity
of pursuing
true Happi-
ness, the
Foundation of
Liberty.

§. 51. As therefore the highest Perfection of intellectual Nature lies in a careful and constant Pursuit of true and solid Happiness, so the Care of our selves, that we mistake not imaginary for real Happiness, is the necessary Foundation of our *Liberty*. The stronger Ties we have to an unalterable Pursuit of Happiness in general, which is our greatest Good, and which, as such, our Desires always follow, the more are we free from any necessary Determination of our *Will* to any particular Action, and from a necessary Compliance with our Desire, set upon any particular, and then appearing preferable Good, till we have duly examin'd, whether it has a tendency to, or be inconsistent with our real Happiness: And therefore till we are as much inform'd upon this Enquiry, as the Weight of the Matter, and the Nature of the Case demands; we are, by the necessity of preferring and pursuing true Happiness as our greatest Good, oblig'd to suspend the Satisfaction of our Desire in particular Cases.

The Reason of
it.

§. 52. This is the Hinge on which turns the *Liberty* of intellectual Beings, in their constant Endeavours after and steady Prosecution of true Felicity, that they can *suspend* this Prosecution in particular Cases, till they have look'd before them, and inform'd themselves whether that particular thing, which is then propos'd or desir'd, lie in the way to their main End, and make a real Part of that which is their greatest Good: for the Inclination and Tendency of their Nature to Happiness, is an Obligation and Motive to them, to take care not to mistake or miss it; and so necessarily puts them upon Caution, Deliberation, and Watchfulness, in the Direction of their particular Actions, which are the means to obtain it. Whatever Necessity determines to the pursuit of real Bliss, the same Necessity with the same Force establishes *Suspence*, *Deliberation*, and Scrutiny of each successive Desire, whether the Satisfaction of it does not interfere with our true Happiness, and mislead us from it. This, as seems to me, is the great Privilege of finite intellectual Beings; and I desire it may be well consider'd, whether the great Inlet and Exercise of all the *Liberty* Men have, are capable of, or can be useful to them, and that whereon depends the Turn of their Actions, does not lie in this, that they can *suspend* their Desires, and stop them from determining their *Wills* to any Action, till they have duly and fairly examin'd the Good and Evil of it, as far forth as the Weight of the thing requires. This we are able to do; and when we have done it, we have done our Duty, and all that is in our power, and indeed all that needs. For since the *Will* supposes Knowledge to guide its Choice, all that we can do, is to hold our *Wills* undetermin'd, till we have examin'd the Good and Evil of what we desire. What follows after that, follows in a Chain of Consequences link'd one to another, all depending on the last Determination of the Judgment; which, whether it shall be upon a hasty and precipitate View, or upon a due and mature Examination, is in our power: Experience shewing us, that in most Cases we are able to suspend the present Satisfaction of any Desire.

Government
of our Pas-
sions, the right
Improvement
of Liberty.

§. 53. But if any extreme Disturbance (as sometimes it happens) possesses our whole Mind, as when the Pain of the Rack, an impetuous *Uneasiness*, as of Love, Anger, or any other violent Passion, running away with us, allows us not the Liberty of Thought, and we are not Masters enough of our own Minds to consider thorowly and examine fairly; God, who knows our Frailty, pities our Weakness, and requires of us no more than we are able to do, and sees what was and what was not in our power, will judg as a kind and merciful Father.

But

But the Forbearance of a too hasty Compliance with our Desires, the Moderation and Restraint of our Passions, so that our Understandings may be free to examine, and Reason unbiass'd give its Judgment, being that whereon a right Direction of our Conduct to true Happiness depends; 'tis in this we should employ our chief Care and Endeavours. In this we should take pains to suit the Relish of our Minds to the true intrinsic Good or Ill that is in things, and not permit an allow'd or suppos'd possible great and weighty Good to slip out of our Thoughts, without leaving any Relish, any Desire of it self there, 'till by a due Consideration of its true Worth, we have form'd Appetites in our Minds suitable to it, and made our selves uneasy in the want of it, or in the fear of losing it. And how much this is in every one's Power, by making Resolutions to himself, such as he may keep, is easy for every one to try. Nor let any one say, he cannot govern his Passions, nor hinder them from breaking out, and carrying him into Action; for what he can do before a Prince, or a Great Man, he can do alone, or in the presence of God, if he will.

§. 54. From what has been said, it is easy to give account, how it comes to pass, that tho' all Men desire Happiness, yet their *Wills carry them so contrarily*, and consequently some of them to what is evil. And to this I say, that the various and contrary Choices that Men make in the World, do not argue that they do not all pursue Good; but that the same thing is not good to every Man alike. This Variety of Pursuits shews, that every one does not place his Happiness in the same thing, or chuse the same way to it. Were all the Concerns of Man terminated in this Life, why one follow'd Study and Knowledge, and another Hawking and Hunting; why one chose Luxury and Debauchery, and another Sobriety and Riches; would not be, because every one of these did not aim at his own Happiness, but because their *Happiness* was placed in different things. And therefore 'twas a right Answer of the Physician to his Patient that had sore Eyes: If you have more pleasure in the Taste of Wine than in the Use of your Sight, Wine is good for you; but if the pleasure of Seeing be greater to you than that of Drinking, Wine is naught.

§. 55. The Mind has a different Relish, as well as the Palat; and you will as fruitlessly endeavour to delight all Men with Riches or Glory (which yet some Men place their Happiness in) as you would to satisfy all Mens Hunger with Cheese or Lobsters; which tho' very agreeable and delicious Fare to some, are to others extremely nauseous and offensive: And many People would with reason prefer the Gripping of an hungry Belly, to those Dishes which are a Feast to others. Hence it was, I think, that the Philosophers of old did in vain enquire, whether *Summum Bonum* consisted in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Vertue, or Contemplation. And they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best Relish were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts; and have divided themselves into Sects upon it. For as pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves, but their Agreeableness to this or that particular Palat, wherein there is great Variety; so the greatest Happiness consists in the having those things which produce the greatest Pleasure, and in the absence of those which cause any Disturbance, any Pain. Now these, to different Men, are very different things. If therefore Men in this Life only have Hope, if in this Life they can only enjoy, 'tis not strange nor unreasonable, that they should seek their Happiness by avoiding all things that disease them here, and by pursuing all that delight them; wherein it will be no wonder to find variety and difference. For if there be no prospect beyond the Grave, the Inference is certainly right, *Let us eat and drink, let us enjoy what we delight in, for to-morrow we shall die.* This, I think, may serve to shew us the reason, why, tho' all Mens Desires tend to Happiness, yet they are not mov'd by the same Object. Men may chuse different things, and yet all chuse right; supposing them only like a Company of poor Insects, whereof some are Bees, delighted with Flowers and their Sweetness; others Beetles, delighted with other kind of Viands; which having enjoy'd for a season, they should cease to be, and exist no more for ever.

§. 56. These things duly weigh'd, will give us, as I think, a clear View into the state of human Liberty. Liberty, 'tis plain, consists in a Power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing as we will. This cannot be deny'd. But this seeming to comprehend only the Actions of a Man consecutive to Volition,

*How Men
come to pursue
different Courses.*

*How Men
come to chuse
ill.*

it is farther enquir'd, whether he be at liberty to *will* or no. And to this it has been answer'd, That in most cases a Man is not at liberty to forbear the Act of Volition; he must exert an Act of his *Will*, whereby the Action propos'd is made to exist, or not to exist. But yet there is a Case wherein a Man is at liberty in respect of *Willing*, and that is the chusing of a remote Good as an End to be pursu'd. Here a Man may suspend the Act of his Choice from being determin'd for or against the thing propos'd, till he has examin'd whether it be really of a nature in it self and Consequences to make him happy or no. For when he has once chosen it, and thereby it is become a part of his Happiness, it raises Desire, and that proportionably gives him uneasiness, which determines his *Will*, and sets him at work in pursuit of his Choice on all occasions that offer. And here we may see how it comes to pass, that a Man may justly incur Punishment, tho' it be certain that in all the particular Actions that he *wills*, he does, and necessarily does will that which he then judges to be good. For tho' his *Will* be always determin'd by that which is judged good by his Understanding, yet it excuses him not: because by a too hasty Choice of his own making, he has impos'd on himself wrong Measures of Good and Evil; which, however false and fallacious, have the same influence on all his future Conduct, as if they were true and right. He has vitiated his own Palat, and must be answerable to himself for the Sickness and Death that follows from it. The eternal Law and Nature of things must not be alter'd, to comply with his ill-order'd Choice. If the Neglect or Abuse of the Liberty he had to examine what would really and truly make for his Happiness misleads him, the Miscarriages that follow on it, must be imputed to his own Election. He had a power to suspend his Determination: it was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his own Happiness, and look that he were not deceiv'd. And he could never judge, that it was better to be deceiv'd than not, in a matter of so great and near concernment.

What has been said, may also discover to us the reason why Men in this World prefer different things, and pursue Happiness by contrary Courses. But yet since Men are always constant, and in earnest, in matter of Happiness and Misery, the Question still remains, *How Men come often to prefer the worse to the better*; and to chuse that, which by their own Confession has made them miserable.

§. 57. To account for the various and contrary ways Men take, tho' all aim at being happy, we must consider whence the various *Uneasinesses*, that determine the Will in the Preference of each voluntary Action, have their Rise.

From bodily
Pain.

1. Some of them come from Causes not in our Power, such as are often the Pains of the Body from Want, Disease, or outward Injuries, as the Rack, &c. which when present and violent, operate for the most part forcibly on the *Will*, and turn the Courses of Mens Lives from Vertue, Piety, and Religion, and what before they judg'd to lead to Happiness; every one not endeavouring, or thro' disuse not being able, by the Contemplation of remote and future Good, to raise in himself Desires of them strong enough to counter-balance the Uneasiness he feels in those bodily Torments, and to keep his *Will* steady in the Choice of those Actions which lead to future Happiness. A neighbour Country has been of late a tragical Theatre, from which we might fetch Instances, if there needed any, and the World did not in all Countries and Ages furnish examples enough to confirm that receiv'd Observation, *Necessitas cogit ad Turpia*; and therefore there is great reason for us to pray, *Lead us not into Temptation*.

From wrong
Desires arising
from wrong
Judgment.

2. Other *Uneasinesses* arise from our Desires of absent Good; which Desires always bear proportion to, and depend on the Judgment we make, and the Relish we have of any absent Good: in both which we are apt to be variously misled, and that by our own fault.

Our Judgment of present Good or Evil always right.

§. 58. In the first place, I shall consider the wrong Judgments Men make of future Good and Evil, whereby their Desires are misled. For as to present Happiness and Misery, when that alone comes in consideration, and the Consequences are quite remov'd, a Man never chuses amiss; he knows what best pleases him, and that he actually prefers. Things in their present Enjoyment are what they seem; the apparent and real good are, in this case, always the same. For the Pain or Pleasure being just so great, and no greater than it is felt, the present

sent Good or Evil is really so much as it appears. And therefore were every Action of our's concluded within it self, and drew no Consequences after it, we should undoubtedly never err in our Choice of Good; we should always infallibly prefer the best. Were the Pains of honest Industry, and of starving with Hunger and Cold, set together before us, no body would be in doubt which to chuse: Were the Satisfaction of a Lust, and the Joys of Heaven, offer'd at once to any one's present Possession, he would not ballance, or err in the Determination of his Choice.

§. 59. But since our voluntary Actions carry not a'l the Happiness and Misery that depend on them, along with them in their present Performance, but are the precedent Causes of Good and Evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are pass'd and cease to be; our Desires look beyond our present Enjoyments, and carry the Mind out to absent Good, according to the Necessity which we think there is of it, to the making or increase of our Happiness. 'Tis our Opinion of such a Necessity, that gives it its Attraction: without that, we are not mov'd by absent Good. For in this narrow Scantling of Capacity, which we are accusom'd to, and sensible of here, wherein we enjoy but one Pleasure at once, which, when all Uneasiness is away, is, whilst it lasts, sufficient to make us think our selves happy; 'tis not all remote, and even apparent Good, that affects us. Because the Indolency and Enjoyment we have, sufficing for our present Happiness, we desire not to venture the Change; since we judg that we are happy already, being content, and that is enough. For who is content, is happy. But as soon as any new Uneasiness comes in, this Happiness is disturb'd, and we are set a-fresh on work in the pursuit of Happiness.

§. 60. Their Aptness therefore to conclude that they can be happy without it, is one great Occasion that Men often are not rais'd to the Desire of the greatest absent Good. For whilst such Thoughts possess them, the Joys of a future State move them not; they have little Concern or Uneasiness about them; and the Will, free from the Determination of such Desires, is left to the pursuit of nearer Satisfaction, and to the removal of those Uneasinesses which it then feels, in its want of and longings after them. Charge but a Man's View of these things; let him see, that Virtue and Religion are necessary to his Happiness; let him look into the future State of Bliss or Misery, and see there God, the righteous Judg, ready to render to every Man according to his Deeds; to them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for Glory, and Honour, and Immortality, eternal Life; but unto every Soul that doth evil, Indignation and Wrath, Tribulation and Anguish: To him, I say, who hath a prospect of the different State of perfect Happiness or Misery, that attends all Men after this Life, depending on their Behaviour here, the Measures of Good and Evil, that govern his Choice, are mightily chang'd. For since nothing of Pleasure and Pain in this Life can bear any proportion to endless Happiness, or exquisite Misery of an immortal Soul hereafter; Actions in his power will have their preference, not according to the transient Pleasure or Pain that accompanies or follows them here, but as they serve to secure that perfect durable Happiness hereafter.

From a wrong Judgment of what makes a necessary part of their Happiness.

§. 61. But to account more particularly for the Misery that Men often bring on themselves, notwithstanding that they do all in earnest pursue Happiness, we must consider how Things come to be represented to our Desires, under deceitful Appearances: And that is by the Judgment pronouncing wrongly concerning them. To see how far this reaches, and what are the Causes of wrong Judgment, we must remember that things are judg'd good or bad in a double sense.

A more particular Account of wrong Judgments.

First, That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely Pleasure or Pain.

Secondly, But because not only present Pleasure and Pain, but that also which is apt by its Efficacy or Consequences to bring it upon us at a distance, is a proper Object of our Desires, and apt to move a Creature that has foresight; therefore things also that draw after them Pleasure and Pain, are consider'd as Good and Evil.

§. 62. The wrong Judgment that misleads us, and makes the Will often fasten on the worse side, lies in misreporting upon the various Comparisons of these. The wrong Judgment I am here speaking of, is not what one Man may think of the Determination of another, but what every Man himself must confess to be

wrong. For since I lay it for a certain ground, that every intelligent Being really seeks Happiness, which consists in the Enjoyment of Pleasure, without any considerable Mixture of Uneasiness; 'tis impossible any one should willingly put into his own Draught any bitter Ingredient, or leave out any thing in his power, that would tend to his Satisfaction, and the compleating of his Happiness, but only by *wrong Judgment*. I shall not here speak of that Mistake which is the Consequence of invincible Error, which scarce deserves the name of *wrong Judgment*; but of that *wrong Judgment* which every Man himself must confess to be so.

*In comparing
present and
future.*

§. 63. I. Therefore as to present Pleasure and Pain, the Mind, as has been said, never mistakes that which is really Good or Evil; that which is the greater Pleasure, or the greater Pain, is really just as it appears. But tho' present Pleasure and Pain shew their difference and degrees so plainly, as not to leave room for mistake; yet *when we compare present Pleasure or Pain with future*, (which is usually the Case in the most important Determinations of the Will) *we often make wrong Judgments* of them, taking our measures of them in different Positions of Distance. Objects, near our view, are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger size, that are more remote: and so it is with Pleasures and Pains; the present is apt to carry it, and those at a distance have the disadvantage in the comparison. Thus most Men, like spend-thrift Heirs, are apt to judge a little in hand better than a great deal to come; and so for small matters in Possession, part with great ones in Reversion. But that this is a *wrong Judgment*, every one must allow, let his Pleasure consist in whatever it will: since that which is future, will certainly come to be present; and then having the same advantage of Nearness, will shew it self in its full Dimensions, and discover his wilful Mistake, who judg'd of it by unequal Measures. Were the Pleasure of Drinking accompany'd, the very moment a Man takes off his Glass, with that sick Stomach and aching Head, which, in some Men are sure to follow not many hours after; I think no body, whatever pleasure he had in his Cups, would, on these conditions, ever let Wine touch his Lips; which yet he daily swallows, and the evil side comes to be chosen only by the Fallacy of a little difference in time. But if Pleasure or Pain can be so lessen'd only by a few hours removal, how much more will it be so by a farther distance, to a Man that will not by a right Judgment do what Time will, *i. e.* bring it home upon himself, and consider it as present, and there take its true dimensions? This is the way we usually impose on our selves, in respect of bare Pleasure and Pain, or the true degrees of Happiness or Misery: The future loses its just Proportion, and what is present obtains the preference as the greater. I mention not here the *wrong Judgment*, whereby the absent are not only lessen'd, but reduc'd to perfect nothing; when Men enjoy what they can in present, and make sure of that, concluding amiss that no Evil will thence follow. For that lies not in comparing the Greatness of future Good and Evil, which is that we are here speaking of; but in another sort of *wrong Judgment*, which is concerning Good or Evil, as it is consider'd to be the Cause and Procurement of Pleasure or Pain, that will follow from it.

Causes of this.

§. 64. *The Cause of our judging amiss*, when we compare our present Pleasure or Pain with future, seems to me to be *the weak and narrow Constitution of our Minds*. We cannot well enjoy two Pleasures at once, much less any Pleasure almost, whilst Pain possesses us. The present Pleasure, if it be not very languid, and almost none at all, fills our narrow Souls, and so takes up the whole Mind, that it scarce leaves any thought of things absent: or if among our Pleasures, there are some which are not strong enough to exclude the Consideration of things at a distance; yet we have so great an abhorrence of Pain, that a little of it extinguishes all our Pleasures: a little Bitter mingled in our Cup, leaves no Relish of the Sweet. Hence it comes, that at any rate we desire to be rid of the present Evil, which we are apt to think nothing absent can equal; because under the present Pain, we find not our selves capable of any the least degree of Happiness. Mens daily Complaints are a loud proof of this: The Pain that any one actually feels, is still of all other the worst; and 'tis with anguish they cry out, *Any rather than this; nothing can be so intolerable as what I now suffer.* And therefore our whole Endeavours and Thoughts are intent to get rid

rid of the present Evil, before all things, as the first necessary Condition to our Happiness, let what will follow. Nothing, as we passionately think, can exceed, or almost equal, the Uneasiness that sits so heavy upon us. And because the Abstinence from a present Pleasure that offers it self, is a Pain, nay oftentimes a very great one, the Desire being inflam'd by a near and tempting Object; 'tis no wonder that that operates after the same manner Pain doe, and lessens in our Thoughts what is future; and so forces us, as it were, blindfold into its Embraces.

§. 65. Add to this, that absent Good, or which is the same thing, future Pleasure, especially if of a sort we are unacquainted with, seldom is able to counter-balance any Uneasiness, either of Pain or Desire, which is present. For its Greatness being no more than what shall be really tasted when enjoy'd, Men are apt enough to lessen that, to make it give place to any present Desire; and conclude with themselves, that when it comes to Trial, it may possibly not answer the Report, or Opinion, that generally passes of it; they having often found, that not only what others have magnify'd, but even what they themselves have enjoy'd with great Pleasure and Delight at one time, has prov'd insipid or nauseous at another; and therefore they see nothing in it for which they should forego a present Enjoyment. But that this is a false way of judging, when apply'd to the Happiness of another Life, they must confess; unless they will say, God cannot make those happy he designs to be so. For that being intended for a State of Happiness, it must certainly be agreeable to every one's Wish and Desire: Could we suppose their Relishes as different there as they are here, yet the Manna in Heaven will suit every one's Palat. Thus much of the wrong Judgment we make of present and future Pleasure and Pain, when they are compar'd together, and so the absent consider'd as future.

§. 66. II. *As to things good or bad in their Consequences*, and by the aptness is in them to procure us Good or Evil in the future, *we judg amiss several ways.* *In considering Consequences of Actions.*

1. When we judg that so much Evil does not really depend on them, as in Truth there does.

2. When we judg, that tho' the Consequence be of that Moment, yet it is not of that Certainty, but that it may otherwise fall out, or else by some Means be avoided, as by Industry, Address, Change, Repentance, &c. That these are wrong ways of judging, were easy to shew in every Particular, if I would examine them at large singly: But I shall only mention this in general, viz. That it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater Good for a less, upon uncertain Guesses, and before a due Examination be made proportionable to the Weightiness of the Matter, and the Concernment it is to us not to mistake. This, I think, every one must confess, especially if he considers the usual Causes of this wrong Judgment, whereof these following are some.

§. 67. I. *Ignorance*: He that judges without informing himself to the utmost that he is capable, cannot acquit himself of judging amiss. *Causes of this.*

II. *Inadvertency*: When a Man overlooks even that which he does know. This is an affected and present Ignorance, which misleads our Judgments as much as the other. Judging is as it were ballancing an Account, and determining on which side the odds lie. If therefore either side be huddled up in haste, and several of the Sums, that should have gone into the Reckoning, be overlook'd and left out, this Precipitancy causes as wrong a Judgment, as if it were a perfect Ignorance. That which most commonly causes this, is the Prevalency of some present Pleasure or Pain, heighten'd by our feeble passionate Nature, most strongly wrought-on by what is present. To check this Precipitancy, our Understanding and Reason was given us, if we will make a right use of it, to search, and see, and then judge thereupon. Without Liberty, the Understanding would be to no purpose: And without Understanding, Liberty (if it could be) would signify nothing. If a Man sees what would do him good or harm, what would make him happy or miserable, without being able to move himself one step towards or from it, what is he the better for seeing? And he that is at liberty to ramble in perfect Darkeness, what is his Liberty better, than if he were driven up and down as a Bubble by the force of the Wind? The being acted by a blind Impulse from without, or from within, is little

little odds. The first therefore, and great use of Liberty, is to hinder blind Precipitancy; the principal Exercise of Freedom is to stand still, open the Eyes, look about, and take a View of the Consequence of what we are going to do, as much as the Weight of the Matter require. How much Sloth and Negligence, Heat and Passion, the Prevalency of Fashion, or acquir'd Indispositions, do severally contribute on occasion to these *wrong Judgments*, I shall not here farther enquire. I shall only add one other false Judgment, which I think necessary to mention, because perhaps it is little taken notice of, tho' of great Influence.

Wrong Judgment of what is necessary to our Happiness.

§. 68. All Men desire Happiness, that's past doubt; but, as has been already observ'd, when they are rid of Pain, they are apt to take up with any Pleasure at hand, or that Custom has endear'd to them, to rest satisfy'd in that; and ~~being~~ being happy, till some new Desire, by making them uneasy, disturbs that Happiness, and shews them that they are not so, they look no farther; nor is the Will determin'd to any Action, in pursuit of any other known or apparent Good. For since we find, that we cannot enjoy all sorts of Good, but one excludes another; we do not fix our Desires on every apparent greater Good, unless it be judg'd to be necessary to our Happiness; if we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not. This is another occasion to Men of *judging wrong*, when they take not that to be necessary to their Happiness, which really is so. This Mistake misleads us both in the Choice of the Good we aim at, and very often in the Means to it, when it is a remote Good. But which way ever it be, either by placing it where really it is not, or by neglecting the Means as not necessary to it; when a Man misses his great End, Happiness, he will acknowledg he judg'd not right. That which contributes to this Mistake, is the real or suppos'd Unpleasantness of the Actions, which are the way to this end; it seeming so preposterous a thing to Men, to make themselves unhappy in order to Happiness, that they do not easily bring themselves to it.

We can change the Agreeableness of Disagreeableness in things.

§. 69. The last Enquiry therefore concerning this matter is, Whether it be in a Man's power to change the Pleasantness and Unpleasantness that accompanies any sort of Action? and to that it is plain, in many cases he can. Men may and should correct their Palats, and give a relish to what either has, or they suppose has none. The Relish of the Mind is as various as that of the Body, and like that too may be alter'd; and 'tis a mistake to think, that Men cannot change the Displeasingness or Indifferency that is in Actions into Pleasure and Desire, if they will do but what is in their power. A due Consideration will do it in some cases; and Practice, Application and Custom in most. Bread or Tobacco may be neglected, where they are shewn to be useful to Health, because of an Indifferency or Disrelish to them; Reason and Consideration at first recommends, and begins their Trial, and Use finds, or Custom makes them pleasant. That this is so in Vertue too, is very certain. Actions are pleasing or displeasing, either in themselves, or consider'd as a means to a greater and more desirable End. The eating of a well-season'd Dish, suited to a Man's Palat, may move the Mind by the Delight it self that accompanies the eating, without reference to any other End: To which the Consideration of the Pleasure there is in Health and Strength (to which that Meat is subservient) may add a new Gusto, able to make us swallow an ill-relish'd Potion. In the latter of these, any Action is render'd more or less pleasing, only by the Contemplation of the End, and the being more or less persuaded of its Tendency to it, or necessary Connexion with it: But the Pleasure of the Action it self is best acquir'd or increas'd by Use and Practice. Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a distance we look'd on with Aversion; and by Repetitions wear us into a liking of what possibly, in the first Essay, displeas'd us. Habits have powerful Charms, and put so strong Attractions of Easiness and Pleasure into what we accustom our selves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at least be easy in the Omission of Actions, which habitual Practice has suited, and thereby recommends to us. Tho' this be very visible, and every one's Experience shews him he can do; yet it is a part in the Conduct of Men towards their Happiness, neglected to a degree, that it will be possibly entertain'd as a Paradox, if it be said, that Men can make Things or Actions more or less pleasing

to themselves; and thereby remedy that, to which one may justly impute a great deal of their wandring. Fashion and the common Opinion having settled wrong Notions, and Education and Custom ill Habits, the just Values of things are misplac'd, and the Palats of Men corrupted. Pains should be taken to rectify these; and contrary Habits change our Pleasures, and give a relish to that which is necessary or conducive to our Happiness. This every one must confess. he can do, and when Happiness is lost, and Misery overtakes him, he will confess he did amiss in neglecting it, and condemn himself for it: And I ask every one, whether he has not often done so?

§. 70. I shall not now enlarge any farther on the *wrong Judgments*, and Neglect of what is in their power, whereby Men mislead themselves. This would make a Volume, and is not my business. But whatever false Notions, or shameful Neglect of what is in their power, may put Men out of their way to Happiness, and distract them, as we see, into so different Courses of Life, this yet is certain, that Morality, establish'd upon its true Foundations, cannot but determine the Choice in any one that will but consider: And he that will not be so far a rational Creature as to reflect seriously upon infinite Happiness and Misery, must needs condemn himself as not making that use of his Understanding he should. The Rewards and Punishments of another Life, which the Almighty has establish'd as the Enforcements of his Law, are of weight enough to determine the Choice, against whatever Pleasure or Pain this Life can shew, when the eternal State is consider'd but in its bare Possibility, which no body can make any doubt of. He that will allow exquisite and endless Happiness to be but the possible Consequence of a good Life here, and the contrary State the possible Reward of a bad one; must own himself to judg very much amiss if he does not conclude, that a virtuous Life, with the certain Expectation of everlasting Bliss which may come, is to be prefer'd to a vicious one, with the Fear of that dreadful State of Misery, which 'tis very possible may overtake the Guilty; or at best the terrible uncertain Hope of Annihilation. This is evidently so, tho' the virtuous Life here had nothing but Pain, and the vicious continual Pleasure: which yet is, for the most part, quite otherwise, and wicked Men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their present Possession; nay, all things rightly consider'd, have, I think, even the worst part here, But when infinite Happiness is put in one Scale against infinite Misery in the other; if the worst that comes to the pious Man, if he mistakes, be the best that the Wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, who can without Madness run the venture? Who in his Wits would chuse to come within a Possibility of infinite Misery, which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that Hazard? Whereas on the other side, the sober Man ventures nothing against infinite Happiness to be got, if his Expectation comes to pass. If the good Man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he mistakes, he is not miserable, he feels nothing. On the other side, if the wicked be in the right, he is not happy; if he mistakes, he is infinitely miserable. Must it not be a most manifest wrong Judgment, that does not presently see to which side, in this case, the Preference is to be given? I have forbore to mention any thing of the Certainty or Probability of a future State, designing here, to shew the *wrong Judgment* that any one must allow he makes upon his own Principles, laid how he pleases, who prefers the short Pleasures of a vicious Life upon any Consideration, whilst he knows, and cannot but be certain, that a future Life is at least possible.

§. 71. To conclude this Enquiry into human Liberty, which as it stood before, I my self from the beginning fearing, and a very judicious Friend of mine, since the Publication, suspecting to have some mistake in it, tho' he could not particularly shew it me, I was put upon a stricter Review of this Chapter. Wherein lighting upon a very easy and scarce observable Slip I have made, in putting one seemingly indifferent Word for another, that Discovery open'd to me this present view, which here, in this *second Edition*, I submit to the learned World, and which in short is this: Liberty is a Power to act or not to act, according as the Mind directs. A Power to direct the operative Faculties to Motion or Rest in particular Instances, is that which we call the *Will*. That which in the Train of our voluntary Actions determines the *Will* to any Change of

*Preference of
Vice to Virtue
a manifest
wrong Judgment.*

Recapitulation.

of Operation, is some present Uneasiness; which is, or at least is always accompany'd with that of *Desire*. *Desire* is always mov'd by Evil, to fly it; because a total Freedom from Pain always makes a necessary part of our Happiness: But every *Good*, nay every *greater Good*, does not constantly move *Desire*, because it may not make, or may not be taken to make any necessary part of our Happiness. For all that we desire, is only to be happy. But tho' this general *Desire* of Happiness operates constantly and invariably, yet the Satisfaction of any particular *Desire* can be suspended from determining the *Will* to any subservient Action, till we have maturely examin'd, whether the particular apparent Good, which we then desire, makes a part of our real Happiness, or be consistent or inconsistent with it. The Result of our Judgment upon that Examination is what ultimately determines the Man, who could not be free if his *Will* were determin'd by any thing, but his own *Desire* guided by his own *Judgment*. I know that Liberty by some is plac'd in an *Indifferency* of the Man, antecedent to the Determination of his *Will*. I wish they, who lay so much stress on such an *antecedent Indifferency*, as they call it, had told us plainly, whether this suppos'd *Indifferency* be antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the Understanding, as well as to the Decree of the *Will*. For it is pretty hard to state it between them; *i. e.* immediately after the Judgment of the Understanding, and before the Determination of the *Will*, because the Determination of the *Will* immediately follows the Judgment of the Understanding; and to place Liberty in an *Indifferency*, antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the Understanding, seems to me to place Liberty in a State of Darkness, wherein we can neither see nor say any thing of it; at least it places it in a Subject incapable of it, no Agent being allow'd capable of Liberty, but in consequence of Thought and Judgment. I am not nice about Phrases, and therefore consent to say with those that love to speak so, that Liberty is plac'd in *Indifferency*; but 'tis in an *Indifferency* which remains after the Judgment of the Understanding; yea, even after the Determination of the *Will*: And that is an *Indifferency* not of the Man, (for after he has once judg'd which is best, *viz.* to do, or forbear, he is no longer indifferent) but an *Indifferency* of the operative Powers of the Man, which remaining equally able to operate, or to forbear operating after, as before the Decree of the *Will*, are in a State, which, if one pleases, may be call'd *Indifferency*; and as far as this *Indifferency* reaches, a Man is free, and no farther: *v. g.* I have the Ability to move my Hand, or let it rest, that operative Power is indifferent to move, or not to move my Hand: I am then in that respect perfectly free. My *Will* determines that operative Power to Rest, I am yet free, because the *Indifferency* of that my operative Power to act, or not to act, still remains; the Power of moving my Hand is not at all impair'd by the Determination of my *Will*, which at present orders Rest; the *Indifferency* of that Power to act, or not to act, is just as it was before, as will appear, if the *Will* puts it to the Trial, by ordering the contrary. But if during the Rest of my Hand, it be seiz'd by a sudden Palsy, the *Indifferency* of that operative Power is gone, and with it my Liberty, I have no longer Freedom in that respect, but am under a Necessity of letting my Hand rest. On the other side, if my Hand be put into motion by a Convulsion, the *Indifferency* of that operative Faculty is taken away by that Motion, and my Liberty in that case is lost: For I am under a necessity of having my Hand move. I have added this, to shew in what sort of *Indifferency* Liberty seems to me to consist, and not in any other, real or imaginary.

§. 72. True Notions concerning the Nature and Extent of *Liberty* are of so great Importance, that I hope I shall be pardon'd this Digression, which my Attempt to explain it, has led me into. The *Ideas* of *Will*, *Volition*, *Liberty*, and *Necessity*, in this Chapter of Power, came naturally in my way. In the former Edition of this Treatise I gave an account of my Thoughts concerning them, according to the Light I then had: And now, as a Lover of Truth, and not a Worshipper of my own Doctrines, I own some Change of my Opinion, which I think I have discover'd ground for. In what I first writ, I with an unbiass'd *Indifferency* follow'd Truth, whither I thought she led me. But neither being so vain as to fancy Infalibility, nor so disingenuous as to dissemble my Mistakes for fear of blemishing my Reputation, I have with the same sincere Design

Design for Truth only, not been ashamed to publish what a severer Enquiry has suggested. It is not impossible but that some may think my former Notions right, and some (as I have already found) these latter; and some neither. I shall not at all wonder at this Variety in Mens Opinions; impartial Deductions of Reason in controverted Points being so rare, and exact ones in abstract Notions not so very easy, especially if of any Length. And therefore I should think myself not a little beholden to any one, who would upon these, or any other grounds, fairly clear this Subject of *Liberty* from any Difficulties that may yet remain.

Before I close this Chapter, it may perhaps be to our purpose, and help to give us clearer Conceptions about *Power*, if we make our Thoughts take a little more exact Survey of *Actions*. I have said above, that we have *Ideas* but of two sorts of *Action*, viz. *Motion* and *Thinking*. These, in truth, tho' call'd and counted *Actions*, yet, if nearly consider'd, will not be found to be always perfectly so. For, if I mistake not, there are Instances of both kinds, which, upon due Consideration, will be found rather *Passions* than *Actions*, and consequently so far the Effects barely of passive Powers in those Subjects, which yet on their account are thought *Agents*. For in these Instances, the Substance that hath Motion or Thought, receives the Impression, whereby it is put into that *Action* purely from without, and so acts merely by the Capacity it has to receive such an Impression from some external Agent; and such a *Power* is not properly an *active Power*, but a mere passive Capacity in the Subject. Sometimes the Substance or Agent puts it self into *Action* by its own Power, and this is properly *active Power*. Whatsoever Modification a Substance has, whereby it produces any Effect, that is call'd *Action*, v. g. a solid Substance by Motion operates on, or alters the sensible *Ideas* of another Substance, and therefore this Modification of Motion we call *Action*. But yet this Motion in that solid Substance is, when rightly consider'd, but a *Passion*, if it receiv'd it only from some external Agent. So that the *active Power* of Motion is in no Substance which cannot begin Motion in it self, or in another Substance, when at rest. So likewise in *Thinking*, a Power to receive *Ideas* or Thoughts, from the Operation of any external Substance, is call'd a *Power* of thinking: But this is but a *passive Power*, or Capacity. But to be able to bring into view *Ideas* out of sight at one's own Choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an *active Power*. This Reflection may be of some use to preserve us from Mistakes about *Powers* and *Actions*, which Grammar, and the common Frame of Languages may be apt to lead us into; since what is signify'd by *Verbs* that Grammarians call *active*, does not always signify *Action*: v. g. this Proposition, I see the Moon, or a Star, or I feel the Heat of the Sun; tho' express'd by a *Verb active*, does not signify any *Action* in me, whereby I operate on those Substances; but the Reception of the *Ideas* of Light, Roundness and Heat, wherein I am not active, but barely passive, and cannot in that Position of my Eyes, or Body, avoid receiving them. But when I turn my Eyes another way, or remove my Body out of the Sun-beams, I am properly active; because of my own choice, by a Power within my self, I put my self into that Motion. Such an *Action* is the Product of *active Power*.

§. 73. And thus I have, in a short Draught, given a view of our *original Ideas*, from whence all the rest are deriv'd, and of which they are made up; which, if I would consider, as a Philosopher, and examine on what Causes they depend, and of what they are made, I believe they all might be reduc'd to these very few primary and original ones, viz.

Extension,

Solidity,

Mobility, or the Power of being mov'd;

which by our Senses we receive from Body:

Perceptivity, or the Power of Perception, or Thinking;

Motivity, or the Power of moving;

which by Reflection we receive from our Minds. I crave leave to make use of these two new Words, to avoid the Danger of being mistaken in the use of those which are equivocal. To which if we add

Existence,

Duration;

Number;

which belong both to the one and the other; we have, perhaps, all the original *Ideas*, on which the rest depend. For by these, I imagine, might be explain'd the nature of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, and all other *Ideas* we have, if we had but Faculties acute enough to perceive the severally modify'd Extensions, and Motions of these minute Bodies, which produce those several Sensations in us. But my present purpose being only to enquire into the Knowledge the Mind has of Things, by those *Ideas* and Appearances, which God has fitted it to receive from them, and how the Mind comes by that Knowledge, rather than into their Causes, or manner of Production; I shall not, contrary to the Design of this Essay, set my self to enquire philosophically into the peculiar Constitution of Bodies, and the Configuration of Parts, whereby they have the power to produce in us the *Ideas* of their sensible Qualities: I shall not enter any farther into that Disquisition, it sufficing to my purpose to observe, That Gold or Saffron has a power to produce in us the *Idea* of Yellow, and Snow or Milk the *Idea* of White; which we can only have by our Sight, without examining the Texture of the Parts of those Bodies, or the particular Figures or Motion of the Particles which rebound from them, to cause in us that particular Sensation: Tho' when we go beyond the bare *Ideas* in our Minds, and would enquire into their Causes, we cannot conceive any thing else to be in any sensible Object, whereby it produces different *Ideas* in us, but the different Bulk, Figure, Number, Texture, and Motion of its insensible Parts.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Mix'd Modes.

Mix'd Modes
what.

§. 1. **H**AVING treated of *Simple Modes* in the foregoing Chapters, and given several Instances of some of the most considerable of them, I shew what they are, and how we come by them; we are now in the next place to consider those we call *mix'd Modes*: such are the complex *Ideas* we mark by the names *Obligation*, *Drunkenness*, a *Lye*, &c. which, consisting of several Combinations of simple *Ideas* of different kinds, I have call'd *mix'd Modes*, to distinguish them from the more simple Modes, which consist only of simple *Ideas* of the same kind. These *mix'd Modes*, being also such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are not look'd upon to be Characteristical Marks of any real Beings that have a steady Existence, but scatter'd and independent *Ideas* put together by the Mind, are thereby distinguish'd from the complex *Ideas* of Substances.

Made by the
Mind.

§. 2. That the Mind, in respect of its simple *Ideas*, is wholly passive, and receives them all from the Existence and Operations of Things, such as Sensation or Reflection offers them, without being able to make any one *Idea*, Experience shews us: But if we attentively consider these *Ideas* I call *mix'd Modes*, we are now speaking of, we shall find their Original quite different. The Mind often exercises an active Power in making these several Combinations: For it being once furnish'd with simple *Ideas*, it can put them together in several Compositions, and so make variety of complex *Ideas*, without examining whether they exist so together in Nature. And hence I think it is that these *Ideas* are call'd *Notions*, as if they had their Original and constant Existence more in the thoughts of Men, than in the reality of Things; and to form such *Ideas*, it suffic'd, that the Mind puts the Parts of them together, and that they were consistent in the Understanding, without considering whether they had any real Being: Tho' I do not deny, but several of them might be taken from Observation, and the Existence of several simple *Ideas* so combin'd, as they are put together in the Understanding. For the Man who first fram'd the *Idea* of *Hypocrisy*, might have either taken it at first from the Observation of one, who made shew of good Qualities which he had not, or else have fram'd that *Idea* in his Mind, without having any such Pattern to fashion it by: For it is evident, that in the beginning of Languages and Societies of Men, several

ral of those complex *Ideas*, which were consequent to the Constitutions establish'd amongst them, must needs have been in the Minds of Men before they exist'd any where else; and that many Names that stood for such complex *Ideas* were in use, and so those *Ideas* fram'd, before the Combinations they stood for, ever exist'd.

§. 3. Indeed now that Languages are made, and abound with Words standing for such Combinations, *an usual way of getting these complex Ideas, is by the Explication of those Terms that stand for them.* For consisting of a Company of simple *Ideas* combin'd, they may by Words, standing for those simple *Ideas*, be represented to the Mind of one who understands those Words, tho' that complex Combination of simple *Ideas* were never offer'd to his Mind by the real Existence of Things. Thus a Man may come to have the *Idea* of *Sacrilege* or *Murder*, by enumerating to him the simple *Ideas* which these words stand for, without ever seeing either of them committed.

Sometimes got by the Explication of their Names.

§. 4. Every mix'd Mode consisting of many distinct simple *Ideas*, it seems reasonable to enquire, *whence it has its Unity*, and how such a precise Multitude comes to make but one *Idea*, since that Combination does not always exist together in Nature. To which I answer, It is plain it has its Unity from an Act of the Mind combining those several simple *Ideas* together, and considering them as one complex one, consisting of those Parts; and the Mark of this Union, or that which is look'd on generally to compleat it, is one Name given to that Combination. For 'tis by their Names that Men commonly regulate their Account of their distinct Species of mix'd Modes, seldom allowing or considering any Number of simple *Ideas* to make one complex one, but such Collections as there be Names for. Thus, tho' the killing of an old Man be as fit in Nature to be united into one complex *Idea*, as the killing a Man's Father; yet there being no name standing precisely for the one, as there is the name of *Parricide* to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex *Idea* nor a distinct Species of Actions, from that of killing a young Man, or any other Man.

The Name ties the Parts of mix'd Modes into one Idea.

§. 5. If we should enquire a little farther, to see *what it is that occasions Men to make several Combinations of simple Ideas into distinct, and, as it were, settled Modes*, and neglect others which, in the nature of Things themselves, have as much an aptness to be combin'd and make distinct *Ideas*, we shall find the Reason of it to be the End of Language; which being to mark or communicate Mens Thoughts to one another with all the Dispatch that may be, they usually make such Collections of *Ideas* into complex Modes, and affix Names to them, as they have frequent Use of in their way of Living and Conversation, leaving others, which they have but seldom an occasion to mention, loose and without Names that tie them together; they rather chusing to enumerate (when they have need) such *Ideas* as make them up, by the particular Names that stand for them, than to trouble their Memories by multiplying of complex *Ideas* with Names to them, which they shall seldom or never have any occasion to make use of.

The Cause of making mix'd Modes.

§. 6. This shews us *how it comes to pass, that there are in every Language many particular Words, which cannot be render'd by any one single Word of another.* For the several Fashions, Customs and Manners of one Nation, making several Combinations of *Ideas* familiar and necessary in one, which another People have never had any occasion to make, or perhaps so much as take notice of; Names come of course to be annex'd to them, to avoid long Periphrases in things of daily Conversation, and so they become so many distinct complex *Ideas* in their Minds. Thus *οσεγκρισμός* amongst the Greeks, and *Proscriptio* amongst the Romans, were words which other Languages had no names that exactly answer'd, because they stood for complex *Ideas*, which were not in the Minds of the Men of other Nations. Where there was no such Custom, there was no Notion of any such Actions; no Use of such Combinations of *Ideas* as were united, and as it were tied together by those Terms: And therefore in other Countries there were no Names for them.

Why Words in one Language have none answering in another.

§. 7. Hence also we may see the Reason *why Languages constantly change, take up new, and lay by old Terms; because change of Customs and Opinions bringing with it new Combinations of Ideas, which it is necessary frequently to*

And Languages change.

think on, and talk about new Names, to avoid long Descriptions, are annex'd to them, and so they become new Species of complex Modes. What a number of different *Ideas* are by this means wrap'd up in one short Sound, and how much of our Time and Breath is thereby sav'd, any one will see, who will but take the pains to enumerate all the *Ideas* that either *Reprieve* or *Appeal* stand for; and instead of either of those Names, use a Periphrasis, to make any one understand their Meaning.

*Mix'd Modes,
where they
exist.*

§. 8. Tho' I shall have occasion to consider this more at large, when I come to treat of Words and their Use; yet I could not avoid to take thus much notice here of the Names of *mix'd Modes*; which being fleeting, and transient Combinations of simple *Ideas*, which have but a short Existence any where but in the Minds of Men, and there too have no longer any Existence, than whilst they are thought on, have not so much any where the Appearance of a constant and lasting Existence, as in their Names: which are therefore, in these sort of *Ideas*, very apt to be taken for the *Ideas* themselves. For if we should enquire where the *Idea* of a *Triumph*, or *Apotheosis* exists, it is evident they could neither of them exist altogether any where in the things themselves, being Actions that requir'd Time to their Performance, and so could never all exist together: And as to the Minds of Men, where the *Ideas* of these Actions are suppos'd to be lodg'd, they have there too a very uncertain Existence; and therefore we are apt to annex them to the Names that excite them in us.

*How we get
the Ideas of
mix'd Modes.*

§. 9. There are therefore three ways whereby we get the complex *Ideas* of *mix'd Modes*. 1. By Experience and Observation of things themselves. Thus by seeing two Men wrestle, or fence, we get the *Idea* of Wrestling or Fencing. 2. By Invention, or voluntary putting together of several simple *Ideas* in our own Minds: So he that first invented Printing, or Etching, had an *Idea* of it in his Mind before it ever existed. 3. Which is the most usual way, by explaining the Names of Actions we never saw, or Notions we cannot see; and by enumerating, and thereby as it were, setting before our Imaginations all those *Ideas* which go to the making them up, and are the constituent Parts of them. For, having by Sensation and Reflection stor'd our Minds with simple *Ideas*, and by Use got the Names that stand for them, we can by those Names represent to another any complex *Idea* we would have him conceive, so that it has in it no simple *Ideas* but what he knows, and has with us the same Name for. For all our complex *Ideas* are ultimately resolvable into simple *Ideas*, of which they are compounded and originally made up, tho' perhaps their immediate Ingredients, as I may so say, are also complex *Ideas*. Thus the *mix'd Mode*, which the word *Lye* stands for, is made of these simple *Ideas*: 1. Articulate Sounds. 2. Certain *Ideas* in the Mind of the Speaker. 3. Those words the Signs of those *Ideas*. 4. Those Signs put together by Affirmation or Negation, otherwise than the *Ideas* they stand for are in the mind of the Speaker. I think I need not go any farther in the Analysis of that complex *Idea*, we call a *Lye*: What I have said, is enough to shew, that it is made up of simple *Ideas*: And it could not be but an offensive Tedioufness to my Reader, to trouble him with a more minute Enumeration of every particular simple *Idea*, that goes to this complex one; which, from what has been said, he cannot but be able to make out to himself. The same may be done in all our complex *Ideas* whatsoever; which, however compounded and decomposed, may at last be resolv'd into simple *Ideas*, which are all the Materials of Knowledge or Thought we have, or can have. Nor shall we have reason to fear that the Mind is hereby stinted to too scant a number of *Ideas*, if we consider what an inexhaustible Stock of simple Modes, Number and Figure alone affords us. How far then *mix'd Modes*, which admit of the various Combinations of different simple *Ideas*, and their infinite Modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily imagine: So that before we have done, we shall see that no body need be afraid, he shall not have Scope and Compass enough for his Thoughts to range in, tho' they be as I pretend, confin'd only to simple *Ideas* receiv'd from Sensation or Reflection, and their several Combinations.

*Motion,
Thinking and
Power have
been most mo-
dify'd.*

§. 10. It is worth our observing, which of all our simple *Ideas* have been most modify'd, and had most *mix'd Modes* made out of them, with Names given to them: And those have been these three; Thinking and Motion (which are the two

two *Ideas* which comprehend in them all Action) and Power, from whence these Actions are conceiv'd to flow. These simple *Ideas*, I say, of Thinking, Motion, and Power, have been those which have been most modify'd, and out of whose Modifications have been made most complex Modes, with Names to them. For Action being the great Business of Mankind, and the whole Matter about which all Laws are conversant, it is no wonder that the several Modes of Thinking and Motion should be taken notice of, the *Ideas* of them observ'd, and laid up in the Memory, and have Names assign'd to them; without which, Laws could be but ill made, or Vice and Disorder repress'd. Nor could any Communication be well had amongst Men, without such complex *Ideas*, with Names to them: And therefore Men have settled Names, and suppos'd settled *Ideas*, in their Minds, of Modes of Actions distinguish'd by their Causes, Means, Objects, Ends, Instruments, Time, Place, and other Circumstances; and also of their Powers fitted for those Actions: v. g. Boldness is the Power to speak or do what we intend, before others, without Fear or Disorder; and the Greeks call the Confidence of Speaking by a peculiar name, *παρρησία*: which Power or Ability in Man, of doing any thing, when it has been acquir'd by frequent doing the same thing, is that *Idea* we name *Habit*; when it is forward, and ready upon every occasion to break into Action, we call it *Disposition*. Thus *Testiness* is a Disposition or Aptness to be angry.

To conclude: Let us examine any Modes of Action, v. g. Consideration and Assent, which are Actions of the Mind; Running and Speaking, which are Actions of the Body; Revenge and Murder, which are Actions of both together: and we shall find them but so many Collections of simple *Ideas*, which together make up the complex ones signify'd by those Names.

§. 11. Power being the Source from whence all Action proceeds, the Substances wherein these Powers are, when they exert this Power into Act, are call'd Causes; and the Substances which thereupon are produc'd, or the simple *Ideas* which are introduc'd into any Subject by the exerting of that Power, are call'd Effects. The Efficacy whereby the new Substance or *Idea* is produc'd, is call'd, in the Subject exerting that Power, Action; but in the Subject, wherein any simple *Idea* is chang'd or produc'd, it is call'd Passion: which Efficacy, however various, and the Effects almost infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual Agents, to be nothing else but Modes of Thinking and Willing; in corporeal Agents, nothing else but Modifications of Motion. I say, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two: For whatever sort of Action, besides these, produces any Effects, I confess my self to have no Notion nor *Idea* of; and so it is quite remote from my Thoughts, Apprehensions, and Knowledge; and as much in the dark to me as five other Senses, or as the *Ideas* of Colours to a blind Man: And therefore many Words, which seem to express some Action, signify nothing of the Action or *Modus Operandi* at all, but barely the Effect, with some Circumstances of the Subject wrought on, or Cause operating; v. g. Creation, Annihilation, contain in them no *Idea* of the Action or Manner whereby they are produc'd, but barely of the Cause, and the Thing done. And when a Country-man says the Cold freezes Water, tho' the word Freezing seems to import some Action, yet truly it signifies nothing but the Effect, viz. that Water that was before fluid, is become hard and consistent, without containing any *Idea* of the Action whereby it is done.

§. 12. I think I shall not need to remark here, that tho' Power and Action make the greatest part of mix'd Modes, mark'd by Names, and familiar in the Minds and Mouths of Men; yet other simple *Ideas*, and their several Combinations, are not excluded: much less, I think, will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the mix'd Modes, which have been settled, with Names to them. That would be to make a Dictionary of the greatest part of the words made use of in Divinity, Ethicks, Law and Politicks, and several other Sciences. All that is requisite to my present Design, is, to shew what sort of *Ideas* those are which I call mix'd Modes, how the Mind comes by them, and that they are Compositions made up of simple *Ideas* got from Sensation and Reflection; which, I suppose, I have done.

C H A P. XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas of Substances.

Ideas of Sub-
stances, how
made.

§. 1. **T**H E Mind being, as I have declar'd, furnish'd with a great number of the simple *Ideas*, convey'd-in by the *Senses*, as they are found in exterior things, or by *Reflection* on its own Operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple *Ideas* go constantly together; which being presum'd to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common Apprehensions, and made use of for quick Dispatch, are call'd, so united in one Subject, by one name; which, by Inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of, and consider as one simple *Idea*, which indeed is a Complication of many *Ideas* together: Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple *Ideas* can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves to suppose some *Substratum* wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which therefore we call *Substance*.

Our Idea of
Substance in
general.

§. 2. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his *Notion of pure Substance in general*, he will find he has no other *Idea* of it at all, but only a Supposition of he knows not what Support of such Qualities, which are capable of producing simple *Ideas* in us; which Qualities are commonly call'd Accidents. If any one should be ask'd, what is the Subject wherein Colour or Weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended Parts: And if he were demanded, what is it that Solidity and Extension inhere in, he would not be in a much better case than the *Indian* before-mention'd, who, saying that the World was supported by a great Elephant, was ask'd what the Elephant rested on; to which his Answer was, A great Tortoise. But being again press'd to know what gave support to the broad-back'd Tortoise, reply'd, Something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct *Ideas*, we talk like Children; who being question'd what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory Answer, That it is *something*: which in truth signifies no more, when so used either by Children or Men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no distinct *Idea* of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The *Idea* then we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being nothing but the suppos'd, but unknown Support of those Qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, *sine re substante*, without something to support them, we call that Support *Substantia*; which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain *English*, standing under or upholding.

Of the sorts of
Substances.

§. 3. An obscure and relative *Idea* of Substance in general being thus made, we come to have the *Ideas of particular Sorts of Substances*, by collecting such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are by Experience and Observation of Mens Senses taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore suppos'd to flow from the particular internal Constitution, or unknown Essence of that Substance. Thus we come to have the *Ideas* of a Man, Horse, Gold, Water, &c. of which Substances, whether any one has any other clear *Idea*, farther than of certain simple *Ideas* co-existing together, I appeal to every one's own Experience. 'Tis the ordinary Qualities observable in Iron, or a Diamond, put together, that make the true complex *Idea* of those Substances, which a Smith or a Jeweller commonly knows better than a Philosopher; who, whatever substantial Forms he may talk of, has no other *Idea* of those Substances, than what is fram'd by a Collection of those simple *Ideas* which are to be found in them: only we must take notice, that our complex *Ideas* of Substances, besides all these simple *Ideas* they are made up of, have always the confus'd *Idea* of *something* to which they belong, and in which they subsist. And therefore when we speak of any sort of Substance, we say it is a *thing* having such or such Qualities; as Body is a *thing* that is extended, figur'd, and capable of Motion; Spirit, a *thing* capable of thinking; and so Hardness, Friability, and Power to draw Iron, we say, are Qualities

Qualities to be found in a Loadstone. These, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate, that the Substance is suppos'd always *something* besides the Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Thinking, or other observable *Ideas*, tho' we know not what it is.

§. 4. Hence, when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal Substances, as *Horse*, *Stone*, &c. tho' the *Idea* we have of either of them, be but the Complication or Collection of those several simple *Ideas* of sensible Qualities, which we use to find united in the thing call'd *Horse* or *Stone*; yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in and supported by some common Subject; which Support we denote by the name *Substance*, tho' it be certain we have no clear or distinct *Idea* of that thing we suppose a Support.

No clear Idea of Substance in general.

§. 5. The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, viz. Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, &c. which concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produc'd by it, we are apt to think these the Actions of some other *Substance*, which we call *Spirit*: whereby yet it is evident, that having no other *Idea* or Notion of Matter, but *something* wherein those many sensible Qualities which affect our Senses, do subsist; by supposing a Substance, wherein *Thinking*, *Knowing*, *Doubting*, and a Power of Moving, &c. do subsist, we have as clear a Notion of the Substance of *Spirit*, as we have of *Body*: the one being suppos'd to be (without knowing what it is) the *Substratum* to those simple *Ideas* we have from without; and the other suppos'd (with a like Ignorance of what it is) to be the *Substratum* to those Operations we experiment in our selves within. 'Tis plain then, that the *Idea* of corporeal Substance in Matter, is as remote from our Conceptions and Apprehensions, as that of spiritual Substance or *Spirit*: and therefore from our not having any Notion of the Substance of *Spirit*, we can no more conclude its Non-existence, than we can for the same reason deny the Existence of *Body*; it being as rational to affirm there is no *Body*, because we have no clear and distinct *Idea* of the Substance of Matter, as to say there is no *Spirit*, because we have no clear and distinct *Idea* of the Substance of a *Spirit*.

As clear an Idea of Spirit, as Body.

§. 6. Whatever therefore be the secret and abstract Nature of Substance in general, all the *Ideas* we have of particular distinct sorts of Substance, are nothing but several Combinations of simple *Ideas*, co-existing in such, tho' unknown, Cause of their Union, as makes the whole subsist of it self. 'Tis by such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of Substances to our selves; such are the *Ideas* we have of their several Species in our Minds; and such only do we, by their specifick Names, signify to others, v. g. *Man*, *Horse*, *Sun*, *Water*, *Iron*: upon hearing which words, every one who understands the Language, frames in his Mind a Combination of those several simple *Ideas*, which he has usually observ'd, or fancy'd to exist together under that Denomination; all which he supposes to rest in, and be as it were adherent to that unknown common Subject, which inheres not in any thing else. Tho' in the mean time it be manifest, and every one upon enquiry into his own Thoughts will find, that he has no other *Idea* of any Substance, v. g. let it be *Gold*, *Horse*, *Iron*, *Man*, *Vitriol*, *Bread*, but what he has barely of those sensible Qualities, which he supposes to inhere, with a Supposition of such a *Substratum*, as gives as it were a Support to those Qualities or simple *Ideas*, which he has observ'd to exist united together. Thus the *Idea* of the *Sun*, what is it but an Aggregate of those several simple *Ideas*, Bright, Hot, Roundish, having a constant regular Motion, at a certain distance from us, and perhaps some other? As he who thinks and discourses of the *Sun*, has been more or less accurate in observing those sensible Qualities, *Ideas*, or Properties, which are in that thing which he calls the *Sun*.

Of the sorts of Substances.

§. 7. For he has the perfectest *Idea* of any of the particular sorts of Substances, who has gather'd and put together most of those simple *Ideas* which do exist in it, among which are to be reckon'd its active Powers, and passive Capacities; which tho' not simple *Ideas*, yet in this respect, for brevity sake, may conveniently enough be reckon'd amongst them. Thus the Power of drawing *Iron*, is one of the *Ideas* of the complex one of that Substance we call a *Loadstone*; and a Power to be so drawn, is a part of the complex one we call *Iron*: which Powers pass for inherent Qualities in those Subjects. Because every Substance being

Power a great part of our complex Ideas or Substances.

being as apt, by the Powers we observe in it, to change some sensible Qualities in other Subjects, as it is to produce in us those simple *Ideas* which we receive immediately from it, does, by those new sensible Qualities introduc'd into other Subjects, discover to us those Powers, which do thereby mediately affect our Senses, as regularly as its sensible Qualities do it immediately: v. g. we immediately by our Senses perceive in *Fire* its Heat and Colour; which are, if rightly consider'd, nothing but Powers in it to produce those *Ideas* in us: We also by our Senses perceive the Colour and Brittleness of *Charcoal*, whereby we come by the Knowledge of another Power in *Fire*, which it has to change the Colour and Consistency of Wood. By the former *Fire* immediately, by the latter it mediately discovers to us these several Powers, which therefore we look upon to be a part of the Qualities of *Fire*, and so make them a part of the complex *Ideas* of it. For all those Powers that we take cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration of some sensible Qualities in those Subjects on which they operate, and so making them exhibit to us new sensible *Ideas*; therefore it is that I have reckon'd these Powers amongst the simple *Ideas*, which make the complex ones of the sorts of *Substances*; tho' these Powers, consider'd in themselves, are truly complex *Ideas*. And in this looser sense I crave leave to be understood, when I name any of these Potentialities amongst the simple *Ideas*, which we recollect in our Minds, when we think of particular *Substances*. For the Powers that are severally in them, are necessary to be consider'd, if we will have true distinct Notions of the several sorts of *Substances*.

And why.

§. 8. Nor are we to wonder, that Powers make a great part of our complex *Ideas of Substances*; since their secondary Qualities are those, which in most of them serve principally to distinguish *Substances* one from another, and commonly make a considerable part of the complex *Idea* of the several sorts of them. For our Senses failing us in the Discovery of the Bulk, Texture, and Figure of the minute parts of Bodies, on which their real Constitutions and Differences depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary Qualities, as the characteristic Notes and Marks, whereby to frame *Ideas* of them in our Minds, and distinguish them one from another. All which secondary Qualities, as has been shewn, are nothing but bare Powers. For the Colour and Taste of *Opium* are, as well as its soporifick or anodyne Virtues, mere Powers depending on its primary Qualities, whereby it is fitted to produce different Operations on different parts of our Bodies.

Three sorts of Ideas make our complex ones of Substances.

§. 9. The *Ideas* that make our complex ones of corporeal *Substances*, are of these three sorts. First, The *Ideas* of the primary Qualities of things, which are discover'd by our Senses, and are in them even when we perceive them not; such are the Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, and Motion of the parts of Bodies, which are really in them, whether we take notice of them or no. Secondly, The sensible secondary Qualities, which depending on these, are nothing but the Powers those *Substances* have to produce several *Ideas* in us by our Senses; which *Ideas* are not in the things themselves, otherwise than as any thing is in its Cause. Thirdly, The Aptness we consider in any Substance to give or receive such Alterations of primary Qualities, as that the Substance so alter'd, should produce in us different *Ideas* from what it did before; these are call'd active and passive Powers: All which Powers, as far as we have any Notice or Notion of them, terminate only in sensible simple *Ideas*. For whatever Alteration a *Load-stone* has the power to make in the minute Particles of *Iron*, we should have no Notion of any power it had at all to operate on *Iron*, did not its sensible Motion discover it: and I doubt not, but there are a thousand Changes, that Bodies we daily handle have a power to cause in one another, which we never suspect, because they never appear in sensible Effects.

Powers make a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances.

§. 10. Powers therefore justly make a great part of our complex *Ideas of Substances*. He that will examine his complex *Idea* of *Gold*, will find several of its *Ideas* that make it up, to be only Powers: as the Power of being melted, but of not spending it self in the *Fire*; of being dissolv'd in *Aq. Regia*; are *Ideas* as necessary to make up our complex *Idea* of *Gold*, as its Colour and Weight: which, if duly consider'd, are also nothing but different Powers. For to speak truly, *Yellowness* is not actually in *Gold*; but is a Power in *Gold* to produce that *Idea* in us by our Eyes, when placed in a due light: And the Heat, which we

we cannot leave out of our *Idea* of the Sun, is no more really in the Sun, than the white Colour it introduces into Wax. These are both equally Powers in the Sun, operating, by the Motion and Figure of its insensible Parts, so on a Man, as to make him have the *Idea* of Heat: and so on Wax, as to make it capable to produce in a Man the *Idea* of White.

§. 11. Had we Senses acute enough to discern the minute Particles of Bodies, and the real Constitution on which their sensible Qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different *Ideas* in us; and that which is now the yellow Colour of Gold, would then disappear, and instead of it we should see an admirable Texture of parts of a certain Size and Figure. This, Microscopes plainly discover to us: For what to our naked Eyes produces a certain Colour, is, by thus augmenting the Acuteness of our Senses, discover'd to be quite a different thing; and the thus altering, as it were, the Proportion of the Bulk of the minute Parts of a colour'd Object to our usual Sight, produces different *Ideas* from what it did before. Thus Sand or pounded Glass, which is opaque, and white to the naked Eye, is pellucid in a Microscope; and a Hair seen this way, loses its former Colour, and is in a great measure pellucid, with a mixture of some bright sparkling Colours, such as appear from the Refraction of Diamonds, and other pellucid Bodies. Blood to the naked Eye appears all red; but by a good Microscope, wherein its lesser Parts appear, shews only some few Globules of Red, swimming in a pellucid Liquor: and how these red Globules would appear, if Glasses could be found that yet could magnify them 1000 or 10,000 times more, is uncertain.

§. 12. The infinite wise Contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our Senses, Faculties, and Organs, to the Conveniences of Life, and the Business we have to do here. We are able, by our Senses, to know and distinguish things; and to examine them so far, as to apply them to our Uses, and several ways to accommodate the Exigences of this Life. We have Insight enough into their admirable Contrivances and wonderful Effects, to admire and magnify the Wisdom, Power, and Goodness of their Author. Such a Knowledge as this, which is suited to our present Condition, we want not Faculties to attain. But it appears not, that God intended we should have a perfect, clear, and adequate Knowledge of them: That perhaps is not in the Comprehension of any finite Being. We are furnish'd with Faculties (dull and weak as they are) to discover enough in the Creatures, to lead us to the Knowledge of the Creator, and the Knowledge of our Duty; and we are fitted well enough with Abilities, to provide for the Conveniences of Living: These are our Business in this World. But were our Senses alter'd, and made much quicker and acuter, the Appearance and outward Scheme of Things would have quite another face to us; and I am apt to think, would be inconsistent with our Being, or at least Well-being in this part of the Universe, which we inhabit. He that considers how little our Constitution is able to bear a Remove into parts of this Air, not much higher than that we commonly breathe in, will have reason to be satisfy'd, that in this Globe of Earth allotted for our Mansion, the all-wise Architect has suited our Organs, and the Bodies that are to affect them, one to another. If our Sense of Hearing were but a 1000 times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual Noise distract us? And we should in the quietest Retirement be less able to sleep or meditate, than in the middle of a Sea-fight. Nay, if that most instructive of our Senses, Seeing, were in any Man 1000 or 100,000 times more acute than it is now by the best Microscope, things several Millions of times less than the smallest Object of his Sight now, would then be visible to his naked Eyes, and so he would come nearer the Discovery of the Texture and Motion of the minute Parts of corporeal things; and in many of them, probably get *Ideas* of their internal Constitutions. But then he would be in a quite different World from other People: Nothing would appear the same to him, and others; the visible *Ideas* of every thing would be different. So that I doubt, whether he and the rest of Men could discourse concerning the Objects of Sight, or have any Communication about Colours, their Appearances being so wholly different. And perhaps such a Quickness and Tenderness of Sight could not endure bright Sun-shine, or so much as open Day-light; nor take in but a very small part of any Object at once, and that too

The now secondary Qualities of Bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute Parts.

Our Faculties of Discovery suited to our State.

only at a very near distance. And if by the help of such Microscopical Eyes (if I may so call them) a Man could penetrate farther than ordinary into the secret Composition and radical Texture of Bodies, he would not make any great advantage by the Change, if such an acute Sight would not serve to conduct him to the Market and Exchange; if he could not see things he was to avoid, at a convenient distance, nor distinguish things he had to do with, by those sensible Qualities others do. He that was sharp-sighted enough to see the Configuration of the minute Particles of the Spring of a Clock, and observe upon what peculiar Structure and Impulse its elastick Motion depends, would no doubt discover something very admirable: But if Eyes so fram'd could not view at once the Hand, and the Characters of the Hour-plate, and thereby at a distance see what a clock it was, their Owner could not be much benefited by that Acuteness; which, whilst it discover'd the secret Contrivance of the Parts of the Machine, made him lose its Use.

Conjecture about Spirits.

§. 13. And here give me leave to propose an extravagant Conjecture of mine, viz. That since we have some reason (if there be any Credit to be given to the Report of things, that our Philosophy cannot account for) to imagine, that Spirits can assume to themselves Bodies of different Bulk, Figure and Conformation of Parts; whether one great Advantage some of them have over us, may not lie in this, that they can so frame and shape to themselves Organs of Sensation or Preception, as to suit them to their present Design, and the Circumstances of the Object they would consider. For how much would that Man exceed all others in Knowledge, who had but the Faculty so to alter the Structure of his Eyes, that one Sense, as to make it capable of all the several degrees of Vision, which the Assistance of Glasses (casually at first light-on) has taught us to conceive? What Wonders would he discover, who could so fit his Eye to all sorts of Objects, as to see, when he pleas'd, the Figure and Motion of the minute Particles in the Blood, and other Juices of Animals, as distinctly as he does, at other times, the Shape and Motion of the Animals themselves? But to us, in our present state, unalterable Organs so contriv'd as to discover the Figure and Motion of the minute Parts of Bodies, whereon depend those sensible Qualities we now observe in them, would perhaps be of no advantage. God has, no doubt, made us so, as is best for us in our present Condition. He hath fitted us for the Neighbourhood of the Bodies that surround us, and we have to do with: And tho' we cannot, by the Faculties we have, attain to a perfect Knowledge of things, yet they will serve us well enough for those Ends above-mention'd, which are our great Concernment. I beg my Reader's Pardon, for laying before him so wild a Fancy, concerning the ways of Perception in Beings above us: But how extravagant soever it be, I doubt whether we can imagine any thing about the Knowledge of Angels, but after this manner, some way or other in proportion to what we find and observe in our selves. And tho' we cannot but allow, that the infinite Power and Wisdom of God may frame Creatures with a thousand other Faculties and Ways of perceiving things without them, than what we have; yet our Thoughts can go no farther than our own: so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very Guesses beyond the Ideas receiv'd from our own Sensation and Reflection. The Supposition at least, that Angels do sometimes assume Bodies, needs not startle us; since some of the most antient and most learned Fathers of the Church seem'd to believe, that they had Bodies: And this is certain, that their State and Way of Existence is unknown to us.

Complex Ideas of Substances.

§. 14. But to return to the matter in hand: The Ideas we have of Substances, and the Ways we come by them; I say, our *specifick* Ideas of Substances are nothing else but a Collection of a certain number of simple Ideas, consider'd as united in one thing. These Ideas of Substances, tho' they are commonly call'd simple Apprehensions, and the names of them simple Terms; yet in effect are complex and compounded. Thus the Idea which an *Englishman* signifies by the name *Swan* is white Colour, long Neck, red Beak, black Legs, and whole Feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the Water, and making a certain kind of noise; and perhaps, to a Man who has long observ'd those kind of Birds, some other Properties which all terminate in sensible simple Ideas, all united in one common Subject.

§. 15. Besides the complex *Ideas* we have of material sensible Substances, of *Idea of Spiritual Substances as clear as of bodily Substances.* which I have last spoken, by the simple *Ideas* we have taken from those Operations of our own Minds, which we experiment daily in our selves, as Thinking, Understanding, Willing, Knowing, and Power of beginning Motion, &c. co-existing in some Substance; we are able to frame the complex *Idea of an immaterial Spirit.* And thus, by putting together the *Ideas* of Thinking, Perceiving, Liberty and Power of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a Perception and Notion of immaterial Substances, as we have of material. For putting together the *Ideas* of Thinking and Willing, or the Power of moving or quiescing corporeal Motion, join'd to Substance, of which we have no distinct *Idea*, we have the *Idea* of an immaterial Spirit; and by putting together the *Ideas* of coherent solid Parts, and a power of being mov'd, join'd with Substance, of which likewise we have no positive *Idea*, we have the *Idea* of Matter. The one is as clear and distinct an *Idea* as the other: The *Idea* of Thinking, and moving a Body, being as clear and distinct *Ideas*, as the *Ideas* of Extension, Solidity, and being mov'd. For our *Idea* of Substance is equally obscure, or none at all in both; it is but a suppos'd I know not what, to support those *Ideas* we call Accidents. It is for want of Reflection that we are apt to think, that our Senses shew us nothing but material things. Every Act of Sensation, when duly consider'd, gives us an equal View of both Parts of Nature, the Corporeal and Spiritual. For whilst I know, by Seeing or Hearing, &c. that there is some corporeal Being without me, the Object of that Sensation; I do more certainly know, that there is some spiritual Being within me that sees and hears. This, I must be convinc'd, cannot be the Action of bare insensible Matter; nor ever could be, without an immaterial thinking Being.

§. 16. By the complex *Idea* of extended, figur'd, colour'd, and all other sensible Qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the *Idea* of the Substance of Body, as if we knew nothing at all: Nor after all the Acquaintance and Familiarity, which we imagine we have with Matter, and the many Qualities Men assure themselves they perceive and know in Bodies, will it perhaps upon Examination be found, that they have any more, or clearer, primary *Ideas* belonging to Body, than they have belonging to immaterial Spirit. *No Idea of abstract Substance.*

§. 17. The primary *Ideas* we have peculiar to Body, as contra-distinguish'd to Spirit, are the Cohesion of solid, and consequently separable, Parts, and a Power of communicating Motion by Impulse. These, I think, are the original *Ideas* proper and peculiar to Body; for Figure is but the Consequence of finite Extension. *The Cohesion of solid Parts and Impulse, the primary Ideas of Body.*

§. 18. The *Ideas* we have belonging, and peculiar to Spirit, are Thinking and Will, or a Power of putting Body into Motion by Thought, and, which is consequent to it, Liberty. For as Body cannot but communicate its Motion by Impulse to another Body which it meets with at rest; so the Mind can put Bodies into Motion, or forbear to do so as it pleases. The *Ideas* of Existence, Duration, and Mobility, are common to them both. *Thinking and Motivity the primary Ideas of Spirit.*

§. 19. There is no reason why it should be thought strange, that I make Mobility belong to Spirit: For having no other *Idea* of Motion, but Change of Distance with other Beings that are consider'd as at rest; and finding, that Spirits, as well as Bodies, cannot operate but where they are, and that Spirits do operate at several times in several places, I cannot but attribute Change of Place to all finite Spirits; (for of the infinite Spirit I speak not here.) For my Soul, being a real Being as well as my Body, is certainly as capable of changing Distance with any other Body, or Being, as Body it self; and so is capable of Motion. And if a Mathematician can consider a certain Distance, or a Change of that Distance between two Points, one may certainly conceive a Distance, and a Change of Distance between two Spirits; and so conceive their Motion, their Approach or Removal, one from another. *Spirits capable of Motion.*

§. 20. Every one finds in himself, that his Soul can think, will, and operate on his Body in the place where that is; but cannot operate on a Body, or in a Place an hundred Miles distant from it. No body can imagine, that his Soul can think, or move a Body at Oxford, whilst he is at London; and cannot but know, that being united to his Body, it constantly changes place all the whole Journey between Oxford and London, as the Coach or Horse does that carries him, and I think may be said to be truly all that while in motion; or if that will not be allow'd to afford us a clear *Idea* enough of its Motion, its being separated

parated from the Body in Death, I think, will: For to consider it as going out of the Body, or leaving it, and yet to have no *Idea* of its Motion, seems to me impossible.

§. 21. If it be said by any one, that it cannot change place, because it hath none, for Spirits are not *in Loco*, but *Ubi*; I suppose that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many, in an Age that is not much dispos'd to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceiv'd by such unintelligible ways of speaking. But if any one thinks there is any Sense in that Distinction, and that it is applicable to our present Purpose, I desire him to put it into intelligible *English*; and then from thence draw a Reason to shew, that immaterial Spirits are not capable of Motion. Indeed Motion cannot be attributed to G O D, not because he is an immaterial, but because he is an infinite Spirit.

*Idea of Soul
and Body com-
par'd.*

§. 22. Let us *compare* then our complex *Idea* of an immaterial Spirit with our complex *Idea* of Body, and see whether there be any more Obscurity in one than in the other, and in which most. Our *Idea* of Body, as I think, is an extended solid Substance, capable of communicating Motion by Impulse: And our *Idea* of Soul, as an immaterial Spirit, is of a Substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting Motion in Body, by Will or Thought. These, I think, are our complex *Ideas of Soul and Body, as contra-distinguish'd*; and now let us examine which has most Obscurity in it, and Difficulty to be apprehended. I know, that People, whose Thoughts are immers'd in Matter, and have so subjected their Minds to their Senses, that they seldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to say, they cannot comprehend a thinking thing, which perhaps is true: But I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing.

*Cohesion of so-
lid Parts in
Body, as hard
to be conceiv'd
as Thinking
in a Soul.*

§. 23. If any one say, he knows not what 'tis thinks in him; he means, he knows not what the Substance is of that thinking thing: No more, say I, knows he what the Substance is of that Solid thing. Farther, if he says he knows not how he thinks; I answer, Neither knows he how he is extended; how the solid Parts of Body are united, or cohere together to make Extension. For tho' the Pressure of the Particles of Air may account for the *Cohesion of several parts of Matter*, that are grosser than the Particles of Air, and have Pores less than the Corpuscles of Air; yet the Weight, or Pressure of the Air, will not explain, nor can be a cause of the Coherence of the Particles of Air themselves. And if the Pressure of the *Æther*, or any subtiler Matter than the Air, may unite, and hold fast together the Parts of a Particle of Air, as well as other Bodies; yet it cannot make Bonds for it self, and hold together the Parts that make up every the least Corpuscle of that *Materia subtilis*. So that that Hypothesis, how ingeniously soever explain'd, by shewing, that the Parts of sensible Bodies are held together by the Pressure of other external insensible Bodies, reaches not the Parts of the *Æther* it self: And by how much the more evident it proves, that the Parts of other Bodies are held together by the external pressure of the *Æther*, and can have no other conceivable Cause of their Cohesion and Union, by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the Cohesion of the Parts of the Corpuscles of the *Æther* it self; which we can neither conceive without Parts, they being Bodies, and divisible; nor yet how their Parts cohere, they wanting that Cause of Cohesion, which is given of the Cohesion of the Parts of all other Bodies.

§. 24. But in truth the Pressure of any ambient Fluid, how great soever, can be no intelligible Cause of the Cohesion of the solid Parts of Matter. For tho' such a Pressure may hinder the Avulsion of two polish'd Superficies one from another, in a Line perpendicular to them, as in the Experiment of two polish'd Marbles; yet it can never, in the least, hinder the Separation by a Motion, in a Line parallel to those Surfaces. Because the ambient Fluid, having a full Liberty to succeed in each Point of Space, deserted by a lateral Motion, resists such a Motion of Bodies so join'd, no more than it would resist the Motion of that Body, where it on all sides environ'd by that Fluid, and touch'd no other Body: And therefore, if there were no other cause of Cohesion, all Parts of Bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding Motion. For if the Pressure of the *Æther* be the adequate Cause of Cohesion, wherever that Cause operates not, there can be no Cohesion. And since it cannot operate against such a lateral Separation, (as has been shewn) therefore in every imaginary Plain,

Plain, intersecting any Mass of Matter, there could be no more Cohesion, than of two polish'd Surfaces, which will always, notwithstanding any imaginable Pressure of a Fluid, easily slide one from another. So that perhaps, how clear an *Idea* soever we think we have of the Extension of Body, which is nothing but the Cohesion of solid Parts, he that shall well consider it in his Mind, may have reason to conclude, That 'tis as easy for him to have a clear *Idea*, how the Soul thinks, as how Body is extended. For since Body is no farther, nor otherwise extended, than by the Union and Cohesion of its solid Parts, we shall very ill comprehend the *Extension* of Body, without understanding wherein consists the Union and Cohesion of its Parts; which seems to me as incomprehensible, as the manner of Thinking, and how it is perform'd.

§. 25. I allow it is usual for most People to wonder, how any one should find a Difficulty in what they think they every day observe. Do we not see, will they be ready to say, the Parts of Bodies stick firmly together? Is there any thing more common? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like, I say, concerning *Thinking*, and *voluntary Motion*? Do we not every moment experiment it in our selves; and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confess; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and consider how it is done, there I think we are at a loss, both in the one, and the other; and can as little understand how the Parts of Body cohere, as how we our selves perceive, or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the Parts of Gold, or Brass, (that but now in fusion were as loose from one another, as the Particles of Water, or the Sands of an Hour-glass) come in a few Moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another, that the utmost Force of Mens Arms cannot separate them; A considering Man will, I suppose, be here at a loss, to satisfy his own, or another Man's Understanding.

§. 26. The little Bodies that compose that Fluid we call *Water*, are so extremely small, that I have never heard of any one, who by a Microscope (and yet I have heard of some that have magnify'd to 10,000; nay, to much above 100,000 times) pretended to perceive their distinct Bulk, Figure, or Motion: And the Particles of *Water* are also so perfectly loose one from another, that the least Force sensibly separates them. Nay, if we consider their perpetual Motion, we must allow them to have no Cohesion one with another; and yet let but a sharp Cold come, and they unite, they consolidate, these little Atoms cohere, and are not, without great Force, separable. He that could find the Bonds that tie these heaps of loose little Bodies together so firmly; he that could make known the Cement that makes them stick so fast one to another, would discover a great, and yet unknown Secret: And yet when that was done, would he be far enough from making the Extension of Body (which is the Cohesion of its solid Parts) intelligible, till he could shew wherein consisted the Union, or Consolidation of the Parts of those Bonds, or of that Cement, or of the least Particle of Matter that exists. Whereby it appears, that this primary and suppos'd obvious Quality of Body, will be found, when examin'd, to be as incomprehensible as any thing belonging to our Minds, and a *solid extended Substance as hard to be conceiv'd as a thinking immaterial one*, whatever Difficulties some would raise against it.

§. 27. For, to extend our Thoughts a little farther, that Pressure, which is brought to explain the Cohesion of Bodies, is as unintelligible as the Cohesion it self. For if Matter be consider'd, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one send his Contemplation to the Extremities of the Universe, and there see what conceivable Hoops, what Bond he can imagine to hold this Mass of Matter in so close a Pressure together; from whence Steel has its Firmness, and the Parts of a Diamond their Hardness and Indissolubility. If Matter be finite, it must have its Extremes; and there must be something to hinder it from scattering asunder. If, to avoid this Difficulty, any one will throw himself into the Supposition of an Abyss of infinite Matter, let him consider what Light he thereby brings to the Cohesion of Body, and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by resolving it into a Supposition, the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all other: So far is our Extension of Body (which is nothing but the Cohesion of solid Parts) from being clearer, or more distinct, when

we

we would enquire into the Nature, Cause, or Manner of it, than the *Idea* of Thinking.

Communica-
tion of Motion
by Impulse or
by Thought, e-
qually intelli-
gible.

§. 28. Another *Idea* we have of Body, is the Power of *Communication of Motion by Impulse*; and of our Souls, the Power of *exciting Motion by Thought*. These *Ideas*, the one of Body, the other of our Minds, every day's Experience clearly furnishes us with: But if here again we enquire how this is done, we are equally in the dark. For in the Communication of Motion by Impulse, wherein as much Motion is lost to one Body, as is got to the other, which is the ordinarieſt Caſe, we can have no other Conception, but of the paſſing of Motion out of one Body into another; which, I think, is as obſcure and unconceivable, as how our Minds move or ſtop our Bodies by Thought; which we every moment find they do. The Increate of Motion by Impulſe, which is obſerv'd or believ'd ſometimes to happen, is yet harder to be underſtood. We have by daily Experience clear Evidence of Motion produc'd both by Impulſe and by Thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our Comprehension; we are equally at a loſs in both. So that however we conſider Motion, and its Communication, either from Body or Spirit, the *Idea which belongs to Spirit is at leaſt as clear as that which belongs to Body*. And if we conſider the active Power of moving, or, as I may call it, *Motivity*, it is much clearer in Spirit than Body; ſince two Bodies, plac'd by one another at reſt, will never afford us the *Idea* of a Power in the one to move the other, but by a borrow'd Motion: Whereas the Mind, every day, affords us *Ideas* of an active Power of moving of Bodies; and therefore it is worth our Conſideration, whether active Power be not the proper Attribute of Spirits, and paſſive Power of Matter. Hence may be conjectur'd, that created Spirits are not totally ſeparate from Matter, becauſe they are both active and paſſive. Pure Spirit, viz. God, is only active; pure Matter is only paſſive; thoſe Beings that are both active and paſſive, we may judg to partake of both. But be that as it will, I think, we have as many, and as clear *Ideas* belonging to Spirit, as we have belonging to Body, the Subſtance of each being equally unknown to us; and the *Idea* of Thinking in Spirit, as clear as of Extension in Body; and the Communication of Motion by Thought, which we attribute to Spirit, is as evident as that by Impulſe, which we aſcribe to Body. Conſtant experience makes us ſenſible of both of theſe, tho' our narrow Underſtandings can comprehend neither. For when the Mind would look beyond thoſe original *Ideas* we have from Senſation or Reflection, and penetrate into their Cauſes, and manner of Production, we find ſtill it diſcovers nothing but its own Short-ſightedneſs.

§. 29. To conclude, Senſation convinces us, that there are ſolid extended Subſtances; and Reflection, that there are thinking ones: Experience aſſures us of the Exiſtence of ſuch Beings; and that the one hath a power to move Body by Impulſe, the other by Thought; this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I ſay, every moment furniſhes us with the clear *Ideas*, both of the one and the other. But beyond theſe *Ideas*, as receiv'd from their proper Sources, our Faculties will not reach. If we would enquire farther into their Nature, Cauſes, and Manner, we perceive not the Nature of Extension clearer than we do of Thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as eaſy as the other; and there is no more Difficulty to conceive how a Subſtance we know not, ſhould by Thought ſet Body into Motion, than how a Subſtance we know not, ſhould by Impulſe ſet Body into Motion. So that we are no more able to diſcover wherein the *Ideas* belonging to Body conſiſt, than thoſe belonging to Spirit. From whence it ſeems probable to me, that the ſimple *Ideas* we receive from Senſation and Reflection, are the Boundaries of our Thoughts; beyond which the Mind, whatever Efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any Discoveries, when it would pry into the Nature and hidden Cauſes of thoſe *Ideas*.

Idea of Body
& Spirit com-
par'd.

§. 30. So that, in ſhort, the *Idea* we have of Spirit, compar'd with the *Idea* we have of Body, ſtands thus: The Subſtance of Spirit is unknown to us; and ſo is the Subſtance of Body equally unknown to us. Two primary Qualities or Properties of Body, viz. ſolid coherent Parts and Impulſe, we have diſtin& clear *Ideas* of: ſo likewiſe we know, and have diſtin& clear *Ideas* of two primary Qualities or Properties of Spirit, viz. Thinking, and a power of Action; i. e. a

Power

Power of beginning or stopping several Thoughts or Motions. We have also the *Ideas* of several Qualities inherent in Bodies, and have the clear distinct *Ideas* of them: which Qualities are but the various Modifications of the Extension of cohering solid Parts, and their Motion. We have likewise the *Ideas* of the several Modes of Thinking, *viz.* Believing, Doubting, Intending, Fearing, Hoping; all which are but the several Modes of Thinking. We have also the *Ideas* of willing, and moving the Body consequent to it, and with the Body it self too; for, as has been shewn, Spirit is capable of Motion.

§. 31. Lastly, If this Notion of immaterial Spirit may have perhaps some Difficulties in it, not easy to be explain'd, we have therefore no more reason to deny or doubt the Existence of such Spirits, than we have to deny or doubt the Existence of Body; because the Notion of Body is cumber'd with some Difficulties very hard, and perhaps impossible to be explain'd or understood by us. For I would fain have instanc'd any thing in our Notion of Spirit more perplex'd, or nearer a Contradiction, than the very Notion of Body includes in it; the Divisibility in *infinitum* of any finite Extension, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in Consequences impossible to be explicated or made in our Apprehensions consistent; Consequences that carry greater Difficulty, and more apparent Absurdity, than any thing can follow from the Notion of an immaterial knowing Substance.

The Notion of Spirit involves no more Difficulty in it than that of Body.

§. 32. Which we are not at all to wonder at, since we, having but some few superficial *Ideas* of things, discover'd to us only by the Senses from without, or by the Mind, reflecting on what it experiments in it self within, have no knowledg beyond that, much less of the internal Constitution, and true Nature of things, being destitute of Faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and discovering in our selves Knowledg, and the Power of voluntary Motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without us, the Cohesion and Separation of solid Parts, which is the Extension and Motion of Bodies; we have as much reason to be satisfy'd with our Notion of immaterial Spirit, as with our Notion of Body, and the Existence of the one as well as the other. For it being no more a Contradiction that Thinking should exist, separate and independent from Solidity, than it is a Contradiction that Solidity should exist, separate and independent from Thinking, they being both but simple *Ideas*, independent one from another; and having as clear and distinct *Ideas* in us of Thinking, as of Solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without Solidity, *i. e.* immaterial, to exist, as a solid thing without Thinking, *i. e.* Matter, to exist; especially since it is not harder to conceive how Thinking should exist without Matter, than how Matter should think. For whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple *Ideas* we have from Sensation and Reflection, and dive farther into the Nature of things, we fall presently into Darknesh and Obscurity, Perplexedness and Difficulties; and can discover nothing farther but our own Blindness and Ignorance. But which-ever of these complex *Ideas* be clearest, that of Body, or immaterial Spirit, this is evident, that the simple *Ideas* that make them up, are no other than what we have receiv'd from Sensation or Reflection; and so is it of all our other *Ideas* of Substances, even of God himself.

We know nothing beyond our simple Ideas.

§. 33. For if we examine the *Idea* we have of the incomprehensible supreme Being, we shall find, that we come by it the same way; and that the complex *Ideas* we have both of God and separate Spirits, are made up of the simple *Ideas* we receive from Reflection; *v. g.* having from what we experiment in our selves, got the *Ideas* of Existence and Duration; of Knowledg and Powers, of Pleasure and Happiness; and of several other Qualities and Powers, which it is better to have than to be without: when we would frame an *Idea* the most suitable we can to the supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our *Idea* of Infinity; and so putting them together, make our complex *Idea* of God. For that the Mind has such a Power of enlarging some of its *Ideas*, receiv'd from Sensation and Reflection, has been already shewn.

Idea of God.

§. 34. If I find that I know some few things, and some of them, or all, perhaps imperfectly, I can frame an *Idea* of knowing twice as many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to Number; and thus enlarge my *Idea* of Knowledg, by extending its Comprehension to all things existing, or possible.

The

The same also I can do of knowing them more perfectly; *i. e.* all their Qualities, Powers, Causes, Consequences, and Relations, &c. till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can any way relate to them; and thus frame the *Idea* of infinite or boundless Knowledge. The same may also be done of Power, till we come to that we call infinite; and also of the Duration of Existence, without Beginning or End; and so frame the *Idea* of an eternal Being. The Degrees or Extent wherein we ascribe Existence, Power, Wisdom, and all other Perfection (which we can have any *Ideas* of) to that Sovereign Being which we call God, being all boundless and infinite, we frame the best *Idea* of him our Minds are capable of: All which is done, I say, by enlarging those simple *Ideas* we have taken from the Operations of our own Minds, by Reflection; or by our Senses, from exteriour things, to that Vastness to which Infinity can extend them.

Idea of God.

§. 35. For it is Infinity, which join'd to our *Ideas* of Existence, Power, Knowledge, &c. makes that complex *Idea*, whereby we represent to our selves, the best we can, the supreme Being. For tho' in his own Essence (which certainly we do not know, nor knowing the real Essence of a Pebble, or a Fly, or of our own selves) God be simple and uncompounded; yet, I think, I may say we have no other *Idea* of him, but a complex one of Existence, Knowledge, Power, Happiness, &c. infinite and eternal: which are all distinct *Ideas*, and some of them being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been shewn, originally got from *Sensation* and *Reflection*, go to make up the *Idea* or Notion we have of God.

No Ideas in our complex one of Spirits, but those got from Sensation or Reflection.

§. 36. This farther is to be observ'd, that there is no *Idea* we attribute to God, bating Infinity, which is not also a part of our complex *Idea* of other Spirits. Because, being capable of no other simple *Ideas*, belonging to any thing but Body, but those which by Reflection we receive from the Operation of our own Minds, we can attribute to Spirits no other but what we receive from thence: And all the difference we can put between them in our Contemplation of Spirits, is only in the several Extents and Degrees of their Knowledge, Power, Duration, Happiness, &c. For that in our *Ideas*, as well of Spirits, as of other things, we are restrain'd to those we receive from *Sensation* and *Reflection*, is evident from hence; That in our *Ideas* of Spirits, how much soever advanc'd in Perfection beyond those of Bodies, even to that of Infinite, we cannot yet have any *Idea* of the manner wherein they discover their Thoughts one to another: tho' we must necessarily conclude, that separate Spirits, which are Beings that have perfecter Knowledge and greater Happiness than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their Thoughts than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal Signs and particular Sounds; which are therefore of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate Communication, having no experiment in our selves, and consequently no Notion of it at all, we have no *Idea* how Spirits, which use not Words, can with Quickness, or much less, how Spirits, that have no Bodies, can be Masters of their own Thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleasure, tho' we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such a Power.

Recapitulation.

§. 37. And thus we have seen, *what kind of Ideas we have of Substances of all kinds*, wherein they consist, and how we come by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,

First, That all our *Ideas* of the several sorts of Substances, are nothing but Collections of simple *Ideas*, with a Supposition of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist; tho' of this suppos'd Something, we have no clear distinct *Idea* at all.

Secondly, That all the simple *Ideas*, that thus united in one common *Substratum*, make up our complex *Ideas* of several sorts of the Substances, are no other but such as we have receiv'd from *Sensation* or *Reflection*. So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted with, and that come nearest the Comprehension of our most enlarg'd Conceptions, we cannot go beyond those simple *Ideas*. And even in those which seem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely surpass any thing we can perceive in our selves by *Reflection*, or discover by *Sensation* in other things, we can attain to nothing but those simple *Ideas*, which we originally receiv'd from *Sensation* or *Reflection*; as is

is evident in the complex *Ideas* we have of Angels, and particularly of God himself.

Thirdly, That most of the simple *Ideas*, that make up our complex *Ideas* of Substances, when truly consider'd, are only Powers, however we are apt to take them for positive Qualities; v. g. the greatest part of the *Ideas* that make our complex *Idea* of Gold, are Yellowness, great Weight, Ductility, Fusibility, and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, &c. all united together in an unknown *Substratum*: all which *Ideas* are nothing else but so many Relations to other Substances, and are not really in the Gold, consider'd barely in it self, tho' they depend on those real and primary Qualities of its internal Constitution, whereby it has a Fitness differently to operate, and be operated-on by several other Substances.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Collective Ideas of Substances.

§. 1. BESIDES these complex *Ideas* of several single Substances, as of Man, One *Idea*, Horse, Gold, Violet, Apple, &c. the Mind hath also complex collective *Ideas* of Substances; which I so call, because such *Ideas* are made up of many particular Substances consider'd together, as united into one *Idea*, and which to join'd are look'd on as one: v. g. the *Idea* of such a Collection of Men as make an Army, tho' consisting of a great number of distinct Substances, is as much one *Idea*, as the *Idea* of a Man: And the great collective *Idea* of all Bodies whatsoever, signify'd by the name World, is as much one *Idea*, as the *Idea* of any the least Particle of Matter in it; it sufficing to the Unity of any *Idea*, that it be consider'd as one Representation or Picture, tho' made up of ever so many Particulars.

§. 2. These collective *Ideas* of Substances, the Mind makes by its Power of Composition, and uniting severally, either simple or complex *Ideas* into one, as it does by the same Faculty make the complex *Ideas* of particular Substances, consisting of an Aggregate of divers simple *Ideas* united in one Substance: And as the Mind, by putting together the repeated *Ideas* of Unity, makes the collective Mode, or complex *Idea* of any Number, as a Score, or a Gross, &c. so by putting together several particular Substances, it makes collective *Ideas* of Substances, as a Troop, an Army, a Swarm, a City, a Fleet; each of which every one finds, that he represents to his own Mind by one *Idea*, in one View; and so under that Notion considers those several things as perfectly one, as one Ship, or one Atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an Army of ten thousand Men should make one *Idea*, than how a Man should make one *Idea*; it being as easy to the Mind to unite into one the *Idea* of a great number of Men, and consider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular, all the distinct *Ideas* that make-up the Composition of a Man, and consider them all together as one.

§. 3. Amongst such kind of collective *Ideas*, are to be counted most part of artificial things, at least such of them as are made-up of distinct Substances: And, in truth, if we consider all these collective *Ideas* aright; as *Army*, *Constellation*, *Universe*, as they are united into so many single *Ideas*, they are but the artificial Draughts of the Mind; bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one View, the better to contemplate and discourse of them, united into one Conception, and signify'd by one Name. For there are no things so remote, nor so contrary, which the Mind cannot, by this Art of Composition, bring into one *Idea*; as is visible in that signify'd by the Name *Universe*.

Made by the Power of composing in the Mind.

All artificial things are collective Ideas.

C H A P. XXV.

Of Relation.

Relation what §. 1. **B**ESIDES the *Ideas*, whether simple or complex, that the Mind has of things, as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their Comparison one with another. The Understanding, in the Consideration of any thing, is not confin'd to that precise Object: It can carry any *Idea* as it were beyond it self, or at least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other. When the Mind so considers one thing, that it does as it were, bring it to, and set it by another, and carry its View from one to t'other: This is, as the words import, *Relation* and *Respect*; and the Denominations given to positive things, intimating that Respect, and serving as Marks to lead the Thoughts beyond the Subject it self denominated to something distinct from it, are what we call *Relatives*; and the things so brought together, *Related*. Thus, when the Mind considers *Caius* as such a positive Being, it takes nothing into that *Idea*, but what really exists in *Caius*; v. g. when I consider him as a Man, I have nothing in my Mind but the complex *Idea* of the Species, Man. So likewise, when I say *Caius* is a white Man, I have nothing but the bare Consideration of Man, who hath that white Colour. But when I give *Caius* the name *Husband*, I intimate some other Person; and when I give him the name *Whiter*, I intimate some other thing: in both cases my Thought is led to something beyond *Caius*, and there are two things brought into consideration. And since any *Idea*, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the Mind thus brings two things together, and as it were takes a view of them at once, tho' still consider'd as distinct; therefore any of our *Ideas* may be the Foundation of Relation. As in the above-mention'd Instance, the Contract and Ceremony of Marriage with *Sempronia*, is the Occasion of the Denomination or Relation of Husband; and the Colour White, the occasion why he is said whiter than Free-stone.

Relations without correlative Terms, not easily perceiv'd. §. 2. These, and the like *Relations*, express'd by relative Terms that have others answering them, with a reciprocal Intimation, as Father and Son, Bigger and Less, Cause and Effect, are very obvious to every one, and every body at first sight perceives the Relation. For Father and Son, Husband and Wife, and such other correlative Terms, seem so nearly to belong one to another, and thro' Custom do so readily chime and answer one another in Peoples Memories, that upon the naming of either of them, the Thoughts are presently carry'd beyond the thing so nam'd; and no body overlooks or doubts of a Relation, where it is so plainly intimated. But where Languages have fail'd to give correlative Names, there the Relation is not always so easily taken notice of. Concubine is, no doubt, a relative Name, as well as Wife: But in Languages where this, and the like words, have not a correlative Term, there People are not so apt to take them to be so, as wanting that evident Mark of Relation which is between Correlatives, which seem to explain one another, and not to be able to exist, but together. Hence it is, that many of those Names which, duly consider'd, do include evident Relations, have been call'd external Denominations. But all Names, that are more than empty Sounds, must signify some *Idea*, which is either in the thing to which the Name is apply'd; and then it is positive, and is look'd on as united to, and existing in the thing to which the Denomination is given: or else it arises from the Respect the Mind finds in it to something distinct from it, with which it considers it; and then it includes a Relation.

Some seemingly absolute Terms contain Relations. §. 3. Another sort of relative Terms there is, which are not look'd-on to be either relative, or so much as external Denominations; which yet, under the form and appearance of signifying something absolute in the Subject, do conceal a tacit, tho' less observable Relation. Such are the seemingly positive Terms of *Old*, *Great*, *Imperfect*, &c. whereof I shall have occasion to speak more at large in the following Chapters.

§. 4. This farther may be observ'd, That the *Ideas* of Relation may be the same in Men, who have far different *Ideas* of the things that are related, or that are thus compar'd; v. g. those who have far different *Ideas* of a *Man*, may yet agree in the Notion of a *Father*: which is a Notion superinduc'd to the Substance, or *Man*, and refers only to an Act of that thing call'd *Man*, whereby he contributed to the Generation of one of his own kind, let *Man* be what it will.

§. 5. The Nature therefore of Relation consists in the referring or comparing two things one to another; from which Comparison, one or both comes to be denominated. And if either of those things be remov'd or cease to be, the Relation ceases, and the Denomination consequent to it, tho' the other receive in it self no Alteration at all: v. g. *Caius*, whom I consider to day as a *Father*, ceases to be so to morrow, only by the Death of his Son, without any Alteration made in himself. Nay, barely by the Mind's changing the Object to which it compares any thing, the same thing is capable of having contrary Denominations at the same time: v. g. *Caius*, compar'd to several Persons, may truly be said to be older and younger, stronger and weaker, &c.

§. 6. Whatsoever doth or can exist, or be consider'd as one thing, is positive: And so not only simple *Ideas* and Substances, but Modes also are positive Beings; tho' the Parts of which they consist, are very often relative one to another; but the whole together consider'd as one thing, and producing in us the complex *Idea* of one thing; which *Idea* is in our Minds, as one Picture, tho' an Aggregate of divers Parts, and under one Name, it is a positive or absolute Thing, or *Idea*. Thus a Triangle, tho' the Parts thereof compar'd one to another be relative, yet the *Idea* of the whole is a positive absolute *Idea*. The same may be said of a Family, a Tune, &c. for there can be no Relation, but betwixt two things consider'd as two things. There must always be in Relation two *Ideas*, or Things, either in themselves really separate, or consider'd as distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their Comparison.

§. 7. Concerning Relation in general, these things may be consider'd:

First, That there is no one Thing, whether simple *Idea*, Substance, Mode, or Relation, or Name of either of them, which is not capable of almost an infinite number of Considerations, in reference to other things; and therefore this makes no small part of Mens Thoughts and Words: v. g. one single *Man* may at once be concern'd in, and sustain all these following Relations, and many more, viz. *Father*, *Brother*, *Son*, *Grand-father*, *Grand-son*, *Father-in-Law*, *Son-in-Law*, *Husband*, *Friend*, *Enemy*, *Subject*, *General*, *Judg*, *Patron*, *Client*, *Professor*, *European*, *Englishman*, *Islander*, *Servant*, *Master*, *Possessor*, *Captain*, *Superiour*, *Inferiour*, *Bigger*, *Less*, *Older*, *Younger*, *Contemporary*, *Like*, *Unlike*, &c. to an almost infinite Number: he being capable of as many Relations, as there can be Occasions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of Agreement, Disagreement, or Respect whatsoever. For, as I said, Relation is a way of comparing or considering two things together, and giving one, or both of them some Appellation from that Comparison; and sometimes giving even the Relation it self a Name.

§. 8. Secondly, This farther may be consider'd concerning Relation, That tho' it be not contain'd in the real Existence of things, but something extraneous and super-induc'd; yet the *Ideas* which relative Words stand for, are often clearer and more distinct, than of those Substances to which they do belong. The Notion we have of a *Father*, or *Brother*, is a great deal clearer and more distinct, than that we have of a *Man*; or, if you will, *Paternity* is a thing whereof 'tis easier to have a clear *Idea*, than of *Humanity*: And I can much easier conceive what a *Friend* is, than what *GOD*. Because the Knowledge of one Action, or one simple *Idea*, is oftentimes sufficient to give me the Notion of a Relation: but to the knowing of any substantial Being, an accurate Collection of sundry *Ideas* is necessary. A *Man*, if he compares two things together, can hardly be suppos'd not to know what it is, wherein he compares them: so that when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a very clear *Idea* of that Relation. The *Ideas* then of Relations are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct in our Minds, than those of Substances. Because it is commonly hard to know all the simple *Ideas* which are really in any Substance,

but for the most part easy enough to know the simple *Ideas* that make up any Relation I think on, or have a Name for: v. g. Comparing two Men, in reference to one common Parent, it is very easy to frame the *Ideas* of Brothers, without having yet the perfect *Idea* of a Man. For significant relative Words, as well as others, standing only for *Ideas*; and those being all either simple, or made up of single ones, it suffices for the knowing the precise *Idea* the relative Term stands for, to have a clear Conception of that which is the Foundation of the Relation; which may be done without having a perfect and clear *Idea* of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the Notion, that one laid the Egg out of which the other was hatch'd, I have a clear *Idea* of the Relation of *Dam* and *Chick*, between the two Cassiowaries in St. James's Park; tho' perhaps I have but a very obscure and imperfect *Idea* of those Birds themselves.

Relations all terminate in simple Ideas.

§. 9. *Thirdly*, Tho' there be a great number of Considerations, wherein things may be compar'd one with another, and so a multitude of *Relations*; yet they all terminate in, and are concern'd about those simple *Ideas*, either of Sensation or Reflection: which I think to be the whole Materials of all our Knowledge. To clear this, I shall shew it in the most considerable Relations that we have any Notion of, and in some that seem to be the most remote from *Sense* or *Reflection*; which yet will appear to have their *Ideas* from thence, and leave it past doubt, that the Notions we have of them are but certain simple *Ideas*, and so originally deriv'd from *Sense* or *Reflection*.

Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated, are relative.

§. 10. *Fourthly*, That *Relation* being the considering of one thing with another, which is extrinsic to it, it is evident, that all Words that necessarily lead the Mind to any other *Ideas* than are suppos'd really to exist in that thing, to which the Word is apply'd, are relative Words: v. g. A Man Black, Merry, Thoughtful, Thirsty, Angry, Extended; these, and the like, are all absolute, because they neither signify nor intimate any thing, but what does or is suppos'd really to exist in the Man thus denominated: But *Father*, *Brother*, *King*, *Husband*, *Blacker*, *Merrier*, &c. are Words which, together with the thing they denominate, imply also something else separate and exterior to the Existence of that thing.

Conclusion.

§. 11. Having laid down these Premises concerning *Relation* in general, I shall now proceed to shew, in some Instances, how all the *Ideas* we have of *Relation* are made up, as the others are, only of simple *Ideas*; and that they all, how refin'd or remote from *Sense* soever they seem, terminate at last in simple *Ideas*. I shall begin with the most comprehensive Relation, wherein all things that do or can exist, are concern'd; and that is, the Relation of *Cause* and *Effect*. The *Idea* whereof, how deriv'd from the two Fountains of all our Knowledge, *Sensation* and *Reflection*, I shall in the next place consider.

C H A P. XXVI.

Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations.

Whence their Ideas got.

§. 1. IN the notice that our Senses take of the constant Vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe, that several particular, both Qualities and Substances, begin to exist; and that they receive this their Existence from the due Application and Operation of some other Being. From this Observation, we get our *Ideas* of *Cause* and *Effect*. That which produces any simple or complex *Idea*, we denote by the general name *Cause*; and that which is produc'd, *Effect*. Thus finding that in that Substance which we call Wax, Fluidity, which is a simple *Idea* that was not in it before, is constantly produc'd by the Application of a certain Degree of Heat; we call the simple *Idea* of Heat, in relation to Fluidity in Wax, the Cause of it, and Fluidity the Effect. So also finding that the Substance Wood; which is a certain Collection of simple *Ideas* so call'd, by the Application of Fire is turn'd into another Substance call'd Ashes; i. e. another complex *Idea*, consisting of a Collection of simple *Ideas*, quite different from that complex *Idea* which we call Wood; we consider Fire, in relation to Ashes, as Cause, and the Ashes as Effect. So that whatever is consider'd by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular simple *Idea*, or Collection of

Of simple *Ideas*, whether Substance or Mode, which did not before exist, hath thereby in our Minds the Relation of a Cause, and so is denominated by us.

§. 2. Having thus, from what our Senses are able to discover in the Operations of Bodies on one another, got the Notion of Cause and Effect, viz. *Creation, Generation, making Alteration.* That a Cause is that which makes any other thing, either simple *Idea*, Substance or Mode begin to be; and an Effect is that, which had its beginning from some other thing: The Mind finds no great Difficulty to distinguish the several Originals of things into two sorts.

First, When the thing is wholly made new, so that no part thereof did ever exist before; as when a new Particle of Matter doth begin to exist, *in rerum natura*, which had before no Being, and this we call *Creation*.

Secondly, When a thing is made up of Particles, which did all of them before exist, but that every thing so constituted of pre-existing Particles, which, consider'd all together, make up such a Collection of simple *Ideas*, had not any Existence before, as this Man, this Egg, Rose or Cherry, &c. And this, when refer'd to a Substance, produc'd in the ordinary Course of Nature by an internal Principle, but set on work by, and receiv'd from some external Agent or Cause, and working by insensible ways, which we perceive not, we call *Generation*: When the Cause is extrinsecal, and the Effect produc'd by a sensible Separation, or *Juxta-Position* of discernible Parts, we call it *Making*; and such are all artificial things. When any simple *Idea* is produc'd, which was not in that Subject before, we call it *Alteration*. Thus a Man is generated, a Picture made, and either of them alter'd, when any new sensible Quality or simple *Idea* is produc'd in either of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exist, which were not there before, are *Effects*; and those things, which operated to the Existence, *Causes*. In which, and all other Cases, we may observe, that the Notion of Cause and Effect, has its Rise from *Ideas*, receiv'd by Sensation or Reflection; and that this Relation, how comprehensive soever, terminates at last in them. For to have the *Idea* of Cause and Effect, it suffices to consider any simple *Idea*, or Substance, as beginning to exist by the Operation of some other, without knowing the manner of that Operation.

§. 3. Time and Place are also the Foundations of very large Relations, and all finite Beings at least are concern'd in them. But having already shewn, in another place, how we get these *Ideas*, it may suffice here to intimate, that most of the Denominations of things, receiv'd from time, are only Relations. Thus when any one says, that Queen Elizabeth liv'd sixty nine, and reign'd forty five Years, these words import only the Relation of that Duration to some other, and means no more than this, That the Duration of her Existence was equal to sixty nine, and the Duration of her Government to forty five annual Revolutions of the Sun; and so are all words answering *How long*. Again, William the Conqueror invaded England about the year 1070. which means this; That taking the Duration from our Saviour's Time till now, for one entire great Length of Time, it shews at what Distance this Invasion was from the two Extremes: And so do all words of Time, answering to the Question *When*, which shew only the Distance of any Point of Time, from the Period of a longer Duration from which we measure, and to which we thereby consider it as related.

§. 4. There are yet, besides those, other words of Time, that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive *Ideas*, which yet will, when consider'd, be found to be relative, such as are *Young*, *Old*, &c. which include and intimate the Relation any thing has to a certain Length of Duration, whereof we have the *Idea* in our Minds. Thus having settled in our Thoughts the *Idea* of the ordinary Duration of a Man to be seventy Years, when we say a Man is *Young*, we mean that his Age is yet but a small part of that which usually Men attain to: And when we denominate him *Old*, we mean that his Duration is run out almost to the end of that which Men do not usually exceed. And so 'tis but comparing the particular Age, or Duration of this or that Man, to the *Idea* of that Duration which we have in our Minds, as ordinarily belonging to that sort of Animals: which is plain, in the Application of these Names to other things; for a Man is called young at twenty Years, and very young at seven Years old: But yet a Horse we call old at twenty, and a Dog at seven Years; because in each

each of these, we compare their Age to different *Ideas* of Duration, which are settled in our Minds, as belonging to these several sorts of Animals, in the ordinary Course of Nature. But the Sun and Stars, tho' they have out-lasted several Generations of Men, we call not old, because we do not know what period GOD hath set to that sort of Beings. This Term belonging properly to those things which we can observe, in the ordinary Course of things, by a natural Decay, to come to an end in a certain period of Time; and so have in our Minds, as it were, a Standard to which we can compare the several Parts of their Duration; and by the relation they bear thereunto, call them young or old: which we cannot therefore do to a Ruby or a Diamond, things whose usual Periods we know not.

Relations of
Place and Ex-
tension.

§. 5. The Relation also that things have to one another in their Places and Distances, is very obvious to observe; as Above, Below, a Mile distant from Charing Cross, in England, and in London. But as in Duration, so in Extension and Bulk, there are some *Ideas* that are relative, which we signify by Names that are thought positive; as *Great* and *Little* are truly Relations. For here also having, by Observation, settled in our Minds the *Ideas* of the Bigness of several Species of things, from those we have been most accusom'd to, we make them as it were the Standards whereby to denominate the Bulk of others. Thus we call a great Apple, such a one as is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to; and a little Horse, such a one as comes not up to the size of that *Idea* which we have in our Minds to belong ordinarily to Horses: And that will be a great Horse to a *Welshman*, which is but a little one to a *Fleming*; they two having, from the different Breed of their Countries, taken several siz'd *Ideas* to which they compare, and in relation to which they denominate their Great and their Little.

Absolute
Terms often
stand for Re-
lations.

§. 6. So likewise *Weak* and *Strong* are but relative Denominations of Power, compar'd to some *Ideas* we have, at that time, of greater or less Power. Thus when we say a Weak Man, we mean one that has not so much Strength or Power to move, as usually Men have, or usually those of his size have; which is a comparing his Strength to the *Idea* we have of the usual Strength of Men, or Men of such a size. The like, when we say the Creatures are all weak things; *Weak*, there, is but a relative Term, signifying the Disproportion there is in the Power of GOD and the Creatures. And so abundance of Words, in ordinary Speech, stand only for Relations (and perhaps the greatest part) which at first sight seem to have no such Signification: v.g. The Ship has necessary Stores. *Necessary* and *Stores* are both relative Words; one having a Relation to the accomplishing the Voyage intended, and the other to future Use. All which Relations, how they are confin'd to and terminate in *Ideas* deriv'd from *Sensation* or *Reflection*, is too obvious to need any Explication.

C H A P. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diversity.

Wherein Identity
consists.

§. 1. **A**NOTHER occasion the Mind often takes of comparing, is the very Being of Things, when considering any thing as existing at any determin'd Time and Place, we compare it with it self existing at another time, and thereon form the *Ideas* of Identity and Diversity. When we see any thing to be in any place in any Instant of Time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: And in this consists Identity, when the *Ideas* it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former Existence, and to which we compare the present. For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exists any where at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there it self alone. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no; it refers always to something that

that existed such a time in such a place, which 'twas certain at that instant was the same with it self, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two Beginnings of Existence, nor two things one Beginning; it being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place, or one and the same thing in different places. That therefore that had one Beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different Beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse. That which has made the difficulty about this Relation, has been the little Care and Attention used in having precise Notions of the things to which it is attributed.

§. 2. We have the *Ideas* but of three sorts of Substances; 1. God. 2. Fi- *Identity of*
nite Intelligences. 3. *Bodies*. First, GOD is without Beginning, eternal, un- *Substances*.
alterable, and every where; and therefore concerning his Identity, there can be no doubt. Secondly, Finite Spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the Relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its Identity, as long as it exists. Thirdly, The same will hold of every Particle of Matter, to which no Addition or Subtraction of Matter being made, it is the same. For tho' these three sorts of Substances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the same place; yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place: or else the Notions and Names of Identity and Diversity would be in vain, and there could be no such distinction of Substances, or any thing else one from another. For example: Could two Bodies be in the same place at the same time, then those two Parcels of Matter must be one and the same, take them great or little; nay, all Bodies must be one and the same. For by the same reason that two Particles of Matter may be in one place, all *Identity of*
Bodies may be in one place: which, when it can be suppos'd, takes away the *Modes*.
Distinction of Identity and Diversity of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a Contradiction, that two or more should be one, Identity and Diversity are Relations and Ways of comparing well founded, and of use to the Understanding. All other things being but Modes or Relations ultimately terminated in Substances, the Identity and Diversity of each particular Existence of them too will be by the same way determin'd: only as to things whose Existence is in Succession; such as are the Actions of finite Beings, *v.g. Motion* and *Thought*, both which consist in a continu'd Train of Succession, concerning their Diversity, there can be no question: Because each perishing the moment it begins, they cannot exist in different times, or in different places, as permanent Beings can at different times exist in distant places; and therefore no Motion or Thought, consider'd as at different times, can be the same, each part thereof having a different Beginning of Existence.

§. 3. From what has been said, 'tis easy to discover what is so much enquir'd *Principium*
after, the *Principium Individuationis*; and that, 'tis plain, is Existence it self, *Individuationis*.
which determines a Being of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the same kind. This, tho' it seems easier to conceive in simple Substances or Modes, yet when reflected on, is not more difficult in compounded ones, if care be taken to what it is apply'd: *v. g.* Let us suppose an Atom, *i. e.* a continu'd Body under one immutable Superficies, existing in a determin'd time and place; 'tis evident that, consider'd in any instant of its Existence, it is in that instant the same with it self. For being at that instant what it is, and nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue as long as its Existence is continu'd; for so long it will be the same, and no other. In like manner, if two or more Atoms be join'd together into the same Mass, every one of those Atoms will be the same, by the foregoing Rule: And whilst they exist united together, the Mass, consisting of the same Atoms, must be the same Mass, or the same Body, let the Parts be ever so differently jumbled. But if one of these Atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same Mass, or the same Body. In the State of living Creatures, their Identity depends not on a Mass of the same Particles, but on something else. For in them the Variation of great Parcels of Matter alters not the Identity: An Oak growing from a Plant to a great Tree, and then lop'd, is still the same Oak; and a Colt grown-up to a Horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the

the same Horse: tho', in both these cases, there may be a manifest Change of the Parts; so that truly they are not either of them the same Masses of Matter, tho' they be truly one of them the same Oak, and the other the same Horse. The reason whereof is, that in these two Cases of a Mass of Matter, and a living Body, *Identity* is not apply'd to the same thing.

Identity of Vegetables.

§. 4. We must therefore consider wherein an Oak differs from a Mass of Matter, and that seems to me to be in this; that the one is only the Cohesion of Particles of Matter any how united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the Parts of an Oak; and such an Organization of those Parts as is fit to receive and distribute Nourishment, so as to continue and frame the Wood, Bark, and Leaves, &c. of an Oak, in which consists the vegetable Life. That being then one Plant which has such an Organization of Parts in one coherent Body partaking of one common Life, it continues to be the same Plant as long as it partakes of the same Life, tho' that Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter vitally united to the living Plant, in a like continu'd Organization conformable to that sort of Plants. For this Organization being at any one Instant in any one Collection of Matter, is in that particular Concrete distinguish'd from all other, and is that individual Life, which existing constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards, in the same Continuity of insensibly succeeding Parts united to the living Body of the Plant, it has that Identity which makes the same Plant, and all the Parts of it Parts of the same Plant, during all the time that they exist united in that continu'd Organization, which is fit to convey that common Life to all the Parts so united.

Identity of Animals.

§. 5. The case is not so much different in *Brutes*, but that any one may hence see what makes an Animal, and continues it the same. Something we have like this in Machines, and may serve to illustrate it. For example, what is a Watch? 'Tis plain 'tis nothing but a fit Organization, or Construction of Parts, to a certain End, which when a sufficient Force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would suppose this Machine one continu'd Body, all whose organiz'd Parts were repair'd, increas'd or diminish'd by a constant Addition or Separation of insensible Parts, with one common Life, we should have something very much like the Body of an Animal; with this Difference, That in an Animal the Fitness of the Organization, and the Motion wherein Life consists, begin together, the Motion coming from within; but in Machines, the Force coming sensibly from without, is often away when the Organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

Identity of Man.

§. 6. This also shews wherein the Identity of the same *Man* consists, viz. in nothing but a Participation of the same continu'd Life, by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in Succession vitally united to the same organiz'd Body. He that shall place the Identity of Man in any thing else, but like that of other Animals in one fitly organiz'd Body, taken in any one Instant, and from thence continu'd under one Organization of Life in several successively fleeting Particles of Matter united to it, will find it hard to make an *Embryo*, one of Years, mad and sober, the same Man, by any Supposition, that will not make it possible for *Seth*, *Ismael*, *Socrates*, *Pilate*, *St. Austin*, and *Cesar Borgia*, to be the same Man. For if the Identity of Soul alone makes the same Man, and there be nothing in the Nature of Matter, why the same individual Spirit may not be united to different Bodies, it will be possible that those Men living in distant Ages, and of different Tempers, may have been the same Man: which way of speaking must be, from a very strange use of the word *Man*, apply'd to an *Idea*, out of which Body and Shape is excluded. And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the Notions of those Philosophers who allow of Transmigration, and are of opinion that the Souls of Men may, for their Miscarriages, be detrudd into the Bodies of Beasts, as fit Habitations, with Organs suited to the Satisfaction of their brutal Inclinations. But yet, I think, no body, could he be sure that the Soul of *Helioabalus* were in one of his Hogs, would yet say, that Hog were a *Man* or *Helioabalus*.

Identity suited to the Idea.

§. 7. 'Tis not therefore Unity of Substance, that comprehends all sorts of Identity, or will determine it in every case: But to conceive and judg of it a-right, we must consider what *Idea* the word it is apply'd-to, stands for; it being one thing to be the same *Substance*, another the same *Man*, and a third the

the same *Person*, if *Person*, *Man*, and *Substance* are three Names standing for three different *Ideas*; for such as is the *Idea* belonging to that Name, such must be the *Identity*: which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great deal of that Confusion, which often occurs about this matter, with no small seeming Difficulties, especially concerning *Personal Identity*, which therefore we shall in the next place a little consider.

§. 8. An Animal is a living organiz'd Body; and consequently the same Animal, as we have observ'd, is the same continu'd Life communicated to different Particles of Matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organiz'd living Body. And whatever is talk'd of other Definitions, ingenuous Observation puts it past doubt, that the *Idea* in our Minds, of which the Sound *Man* in our Mouths is the Sign, is nothing else but of an Animal of such a certain Form: since I think I may be confident, that whoever should see a Creature of his own Shape and Make, tho' it had no more Reason all its Life than a *Cat* or a *Parrot*, would call him still a *Man*; or whoever should hear a *Cat* or a *Parrot* discourse, reason and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a *Cat* or a *Parrot*; and say, the one was a dull irrational *Man*, and the other a very intelligent rational *Parrot*. A Relation we have in an Author of great Note, is sufficient to countenance the Supposition of a rational *Parrot*. His Words* are:

"I had a mind to know from Prince Maurice's own Mouth the Account of a common, but much credited Story, that I had heard so often from many others, of an old *Parrot* he had in *Brasil* during his Government there, that spoke, and ask'd, and answer'd common Questions like a reasonable Creature: so that those of his Train there generally concluded it to be Witchery or Possession; and one of his Chaplains, who liv'd long afterwards in *Holland*, would never from that time endure a *Parrot*, but said, they all had a Devil in them. I had heard many Particulars of this Story, and assever'd by People hard to be discredited, which made me ask Prince Maurice what there was of it. He said, with his usual Plainness and Dryness in Talk, there was something true, but a great deal false of what had been reported. I desir'd to know of him what there was of the first? He told me short and coldly, that he had heard of such an old *Parrot* when he came to *Brasil*; and tho' he believ'd nothing of it, and 'twas a good way off, yet he had so much Curiosity as to send for it: that 'twas a very great and a very old one, and when it came first into the Room where the Prince was, with a great many Dutch-men about him, it said presently, *What a Company of white Men are here?* They ask'd it what he thought that Man was, pointing at the Prince? It answer'd, *Some General or other*; when they brought it close to him, he ask'd it, **Dou venez vous?* It answer'd, *De Marinman*. The Prince *A qui estes vous?* The *Parrot*, *A un Portugais*. Prince, *Que fais tula?* *Parrot*, *Je garde les poulles*. The Prince laugh'd, and said, *Vous gardes le poulles?* The *Parrot* answer'd, *Ouy, moy & je scay bien faire*; and made the Chuck four or five times that People use to make to Chickens when they call them. I set down the Words of this worthy Dialogue in *French*, just as Prince Maurice said them to me. I ask'd him in what Language the *Parrot* spoke, and he said, in *Brasilian*; I ask'd whether he understood *Brasilian*, he said, no, but he had taken care to have two Interpreters by him, the one a *Dutch-man* that spoke *Brasilian*, and the other a *Brasilian* that spoke *Dutch*; that he ask'd them separately and privately, and both of them agreed in telling him just the same thing that the *Parrot* said. I could not but tell this odd Story, because it is so much out of the way, and from the first Hand, and what may pass for a good one; for I dare say this Prince at least believ'd himself in all he told me, having ever pass'd for a very honest and pious Man: I leave it to Naturalists to reason, and to other Men to believe as they please upon it; however, it is not perhaps amiss to relieve or enliven a busy Scene sometimes with such Digressions, whether to the purpose or no."

I had taken care that the Reader should have the Story at large in the Author's own words, because he seems to me not to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagin'd that so able a Man as he, who had Sufficiency enough

Same Man.

* *Memoirs of what pass'd in Christendom from 1672 to 1679* p. 352.

* *Whence come ye? It answered, From Marinman. The Prince, To whom do you belong? The Parrot, To a Portuguese. Prince, What do you there? Parrot, I look after the Chickens. The Prince laugh'd, and said, You look after the Chickens? The Parrot answer'd, Yes I, and I know well enough how to do it.*

Same Man.

to warrant all the Testimonies he gives of himself, should take so much pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin so close not only on a Man whom he mentions as his Friend, but on a Prince in whom he acknowledges very great Honesty and Piety, a Story which if he himself thought incredible, he could not but also think ridiculous. The Prince, 'tis plain, who vouches this Story, and our Author, who relates it from him, both of them call this Talker a *Parrot*; and I ask any one else, who thinks such a Story fit to be told, whether if this *Parrot*, and all of its kind, had always talk'd, as we have a Prince's Word for it, as this one did; whether, I say, they would not have pass'd for a Race of *rational Animals*: but yet whether for all that they would have been allow'd to be Men, and not *Parrots*? For I presume 'tis not the *Idea* of a thinking or rational Being alone that makes the *Idea* of a *Man* in most Peoples Sense, but of a Body, so and so shap'd, join'd to it; and if that be the *Idea* of a *Man*, the same successive Body not shifted all at once, must, as well as the same immaterial Spirit, go to the making of the same *Man*.

Personal Identity.

§. 9. This being premis'd to find wherein *personal Identity* consists, we must consider what *Person* stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has Reason and Reflection, and can consider it self as it felt, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that Consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present Sensations and Perceptions: And by this every one is to himself that which he calls *Self*; it not being consider'd in this case, whether the same *Self* be continu'd in the same or divers Substances. For since Consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that that makes every one to be what he calls *Self*, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists *personal Identity*, i. e. the Sameness of a rational Being: And as far as this Consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that *Person*; it is the same *Self* now it was then; and 'tis by the same *Self* with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.

Consciousness makes personal Identity.

§. 10. But it is farther enquir'd, whether it be the same Identical Substance? This few would think they had reason to doubt of, if these Perceptions, with their Consciousness, always remain'd present in the Mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently the same to it self. But that which seems to make the Difficulty is this, that this Consciousness being interrupted always by Forgetfulness, there being no moment of our Lives wherein we have the whole Train of all our past Actions before our Eyes in one view, but even the best Memories losing the Sight of one part whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our Lives, not reflecting on our past Selves, being intent on our present Thoughts, and in sound Sleep, having no Thoughts at all, or at least none with that Consciousness which remarks our waking Thoughts: I say, in all these cases, our Consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the Sight of our past Selves, Doubts are rais'd whether we are the same thinking thing, i. e. the same Substance or no. Which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns no *personal Identity* at all: The Question being, what makes the same *Person*, and not whether it be the same Identical Substance, which always thinks in the same Person; which in this case matters not at all: Different Substances, by the same Consciousness, (where they do partake in it) being united into one Person, as well as different Bodies by the same Life are united into one Animal, whose *Identity* is preserv'd, in that Change of Substances, by the Unity of one continu'd Life. For it being the same Consciousness that makes a Man be himself to himself, *personal Identity* depends on that only, whether it be annex'd only to one individual Substance, or can be continu'd in a Succession of several Substances. For as far as any intelligent Being can repeat the *Idea* of any past Action with the same Consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same Consciousness it has of any present Action; so far it is the same *personal Self*. For it is by the Consciousness it has of its present Thoughts

Thoughts and Actions, that it is *Self* to it *Self* now, and so will be the same *Self*, as far as the same Consciousness can extend to Actions past or to come; and would be by Distance of Time, or Change of Substance, no more two *Persons*, than a Man be two Men by wearing other Clothes to day than he did yesterday, with a long or short Sleep between: The same Consciousness uniting those distant Actions into the same *Person*, whatever Substances contributed to their Production.

§. 11. That this is so, we have some kind of Evidence in our very Bodies, all whose Particles, whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious *Self*, so that we feel when they are touch'd, and are affected by, and conscious of Good or Harm that happens to them, are a part of our *Selves*; i. e. of our thinking conscious *Self*. Thus the *Limbs* of his Body is to every one a part of *himself*: he sympathizes and is concern'd for them. Cut off an Hand, and thereby separate it from that Consciousness we had of its Heat, Cold, and other Affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is *himself*, any more than the remotest part of Matter. Thus we see the Substance, whereof *personal Self* consisted at one time, may be vary'd at another, without the Change of *personal Identity*; there being no question about the same *Person*, tho' the *Limbs*, which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

§. 12. But the question is, whether if the same Substance which thinks be chang'd, it can be the same *Person*; or remaining the same, it can be different *Persons*.

And to this I answer, first, This can be no Question at all to those who place Thought in a purely material animal Constitution, void of an immaterial Substance. For whether their Supposition be true or no, 'tis plain they conceive *personal Identity* preserv'd in something else than Identity of Substance; as animal Identity is preserv'd in Identity of Life, and not of Substance. And therefore those who place Thinking in an immaterial Substance only, before they can come to deal with these Men, must shew why *personal Identity* cannot be preserv'd in the Change of immaterial Substances or Variety of particular immaterial Substances, as well as animal Identity is preserv'd in the Change of material Substances, or Variety of particular Bodies: unless they will say, 'tis one immaterial Spirit that makes the same Life in Brutes, as it is one immaterial Spirit that makes the same *Person* in Men; which the *Cartesians* at least will not admit, for fear of making Brutes thinking things too.

§. 13. But next, as to the first part of the Question, Whether if the same thinking Substance (supposing immaterial Substances only to think) be chang'd, it can be the same *Person*? I answer, That cannot be resolv'd, but by those who know what kind of Substances they are that do think, and whether the Consciousness of past Actions can be transfer'd from one thinking Substance to another. I grant, were the same Consciousness the same individual Action, it could not: but it being but a present Representation of a past Action, why it may not be possible, that that may be represented to the Mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be shewn. And therefore how far the Consciousness of past Actions is annex'd to any individual Agent, so that another cannot possibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of Action it is that cannot be done without a reflex Act of Perception accompanying it, and how perform'd by thinking Substances, who cannot think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the *same Consciousness*, not being the same individual Act, why one intellectual Substance may not have represented to it, as done by it self, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other Agent; why, I say, such a Representation may not possibly be without Reality of Matter of Fact, as well as several Representations in Dreams are, which yet whilst dreaming we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it never is so, will by us, till we have clearer Views of the nature of thinking Substances, be best resolv'd into the Goodness of God, who, as far as the Happiness or Misery of any of his sensible Creatures is concern'd in it, will not by a fatal Error of theirs transfer from one to another that Consciousness which draws Reward or Punishment with it. How far this may be an Argument against those who would place Thinking in a System of fleeting animal Spirits, I leave to be consider'd. But

yet to return to the Question before us, it must be allow'd, That if the same Consciousness (which, as has been shewn, is quite a different thing from the same numerical Figure or Motion in Body) can be transfer'd from one thinking Substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking Substances may make but one Person. For the same Consciousness being preserv'd, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv'd.

§. 14. As the second part of the Question, Whether the same immaterial Substance remaining, there may be two distinct Persons? which Question seems to me to be built on this, Whether the same immaterial Being, being conscious of the Actions of its past Duration, may be wholly strip'd of all the Consciousness of its past Existence, and lose it beyond the Power of ever retrieving again; and so as it were beginning a new Account from a new Period, have a Consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new State. All those who hold Pre-existence are evidently of this mind, since they allow the Soul to have no remaining Consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent State, either wholly separate from Body, or informing any other Body; and if they should not, 'tis plain, Experience would be against them. So that personal Identity reaching no farther than Consciousness reaches, a pre-existent Spirit not having continu'd so many Ages in a State of Silence, must needs make different Persons. Suppose a *Christian Platonist* or *Pythagorean* should, upon God's having ended all his Works of Creation the seventh Day, think his Soul hath existed ever since; and should imagine it has revolv'd in several human Bodies, as I once met with one, who was perswaded his had been the Soul of *Socrates*: (how reasonably I will not dispute; this I know, that in the Post he fill'd, which was no inconsiderable one, he pass'd for a very rational Man, and the Press has shewn that he wanted not Parts or Learning) would any one say, that he being not conscious of any of *Socrates's* Actions or Thoughts, could be the same Person with *Socrates*? Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude that he has in himself an immaterial Spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in the constant Change of his Body keeps him the same; and is that which he calls himself: Let him also suppose it to be the same Soul that was in *Nestor* or *Thersites*, at the Siege of *Troy* (for Souls being, as far as we know any thing of them in their nature, indifferent to any Parcel of Matter, the Supposition has no apparent Absurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now, the Soul of any other Man: But he now having no Consciousness of any of the Actions either of *Nestor* or *Thersites*, does or can he conceive himself the same Person with either of them? Can he be concern'd in either of their Actions? attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the Actions of any other Man that ever existed? So that this Consciousness not reaching to any of the Actions of either of those Men, he is no more one Self with either of them, than if the Soul or immaterial Spirit that now informs him, had been created, and began to exist, when it began to inform his present Body; tho' it were ever so true, that the same Spirit that inform'd *Nestor's* or *Thersites's* Body, were numerically the same that now informs his. For this would no more make him the same Person with *Nestor*, than if some of the Particles of Matter that were once a part of *Nestor*, were now a part of this Man; the same immaterial Substance, without the same Consciousness, no more making the same Person by being united to any Body, than the same Particle of Matter, without Consciousness united to any Body, makes the same Person. But let him once find himself conscious of any of the Actions of *Nestor*, he then finds himself the same Person with *Nestor*.

§. 15. And thus we may be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the same Person at the Resurrection, tho' in a Body not exactly in Make or Parts the same which he had here, the same Consciousness going along with the Soul that inhabits it. But yet the Soul alone, in the Change of Bodies, would scarce to any one, but to him that makes the Soul the Man, be enough to make the same Man. For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the Consciousness of the Prince's past Life, enter and inform the Body of a Cocker, as soon as deserted by his own Soul, every one sees he would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince's Actions: But who would say it was the same Man? The Body too goes to the making the Man, and would, I guess, to every body determine the Man in this case; wherein the Soul, with all its Princely Thoughts

Thoughts about it, would not make another Man : but he would be the same Cocker to every one besides himself. I know that in the ordinary way of speaking, the same Person, and the same Man, stand for one and the same thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases, and to apply what articulate Sounds to what *Ideas* he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet when we will enquire what makes the same *Spirit*, *Man*, or *Person*, we must fix the *Ideas* of *Spirit*, *Man*, or *Person* in our Minds ; and having resolv'd with our selves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, when it is the same, and when not.

§ 16. But tho' the same immaterial Substance or Soul does not alone, where-
 ever it be, and in whatsoever State, make the same Man ; yet 'tis plain Con-
 sciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to Ages past, unites
 Existences and Actions, very remote in time, into the same Person, as well as
 it does the Existences and Actions of the immediately preceding Moment : So
 that whatever has the Consciousness of present and past Actions, is the same
 Person to whom they both belong. Had I the same Consciousness that I saw
 the Ark and Noah's Flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the *Thames* last Win-
 ter, or as that I write now ; I could no more doubt that I who write this now,
 that saw the *Thames* overflow'd last Winter, and that view'd the Flood at the
 general Deluge, was the same *Self*, place that *Self* in what Substance you please,
 than that I who write this am the same *my self* now whilst I write (whether I
 consist of all the same Substance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was
 yesterday. For as to this point of being the same *Self*, it matters not whether
 this present *Self* be made up of the same or other Substances ; I being as much
 concern'd, and as justly accountable for any Action was done a thousand Years
 since, appropriated to me now by this Self-consciousness, as I am for what I did
 the last Moment.

§ 17. *Self* is that conscious thinking thing (whatever Substance made up of,
 whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not) which is
 sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and Pain, capable of Happiness or Misery, and
 so is concern'd for it *self*, as far as that Consciousness extends. Thus every one
 finds, that whilst comprehended under that Consciousness, the little Finger is as
 much a part of it *self*, as what is most so. Upon Separation of this little Fin-
 ger, should this Consciousness go along with the little Finger, and leave the
 rest of the Body, 'tis evident the little Finger would be the *Person*, the same
Person ; and *Self* then would have nothing to do with the rest of the Body.
 As in this case it is the Consciousness that goes along with the Substance, when
 one part is separate from another, which makes the same *Person*, and constitutes
 this inseparable *Self* ; so it is in reference to Substance remote in time. That
 with which the Consciousness of this present thinking thing can join it *self*, makes
 the same *Person*, and is one *Self* with it, and with nothing else ; and so attri-
 butes to it *self*, and owns all the Actions of that thing as its own, as far as that
 Consciousness reaches, and no farther : as every one who reflects, will perceive.

§ 18. In this *personal Identity*, is founded all the Right and Justice of Re-
 ward and Punishment ; Happiness and Misery being that for which every one
 is concern'd for *himself*, not mattering what becomes of any Substance, not
 join'd to, or affected with that Consciousness. For as it is evident in the In-
 stance I gave but now, if the Consciousness went along with the little Finger
 when it was cut off, that would be the same *Self* which was concern'd for the
 whole Body yesterday, as making a part of it *self*, whose Actions then it cannot
 but admit as its own now. Tho' if the same Body should still live, and imme-
 diately, from the Separation of the little Finger, have its own peculiar Con-
 sciousness, whereof the little Finger knew nothing ; it would not at all be con-
 cern'd for it, as a part of it *self*, or could own any of its Actions, or have any
 of them imputed to him.

§ 19. This may shew us wherein *personal Identity* consists, not in the Identity
 of Substance, but, as I have said, in the Identity of *Consciousness* ; wherein, if
Socrates and the present Mayor of *Queenborough* agree, they are the same Person :
 If the same *Socrates* waking and sleeping do not partake of the same *Conscious-*
ness, *Socrates* waking and sleeping is not the same Person. And to punish *Socra-*

Consciousness
makes the
same Person.

Self depends
on Conscious-
ness.

Object of Re-
ward and Pu-
nishment.

tes waking for what sleeping *Socrates* thought, and waking *Socrates* was never conscious of, would be no more of Right, than to punish one Twin for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their Outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguish'd; for such Twins have been seen.

§. 20. But yet possibly it will still be objected, Suppose I wholly loose the Memory of some parts of my Life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same Person that did those Actions, had those Thoughts that I was once conscious of, tho' I have now forgot them? To which I answer, That we must here take notice what the Word *I* is apply'd to; which, in this case, is the Man only. And the same Man being presum'd to be the same Person, *I* is easily here suppos'd to stand also for the same Person. But if it be possible for the same Man to have distinct incommunicable Consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same Man would at different times make different Persons; which, we see, is the Sense of Mankind in the solemnest Declaration of their Opinions, human Laws not punishing the *Mad Man* for the *Sober Man's* Actions, nor the *Sober Man* for what the *Mad Man* did, thereby making them two Persons: which is somewhat explain'd by our way of speaking in *English*, when we say such an one is not himself, or is besides himself; in which Phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now, or at least first used them, thought that Self was chang'd, the self-same Person was no longer in that Man.

Difference between Identity of Man and Person.

§. 21. But yet 'tis hard to conceive that *Socrates*, the same individual Man, should be two Persons. To help us a little in this, we must consider what is meant by *Socrates*, or the same individual Man.

First, It must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking Substance; in short, the same numerical Soul, and nothing else.

Secondly, Or the same Animal, without any regard to an immaterial Soul.

Thirdly, Or the same immaterial Spirit united to the same Animal.

Now take which of these Suppositions you please, it is impossible to make personal Identity to consist in any thing but Consciousness, or reach any farther than that does.

For by the first of them, it must be allow'd possible, that a Man born of different Women, and in distant Times, may be the same Man. A way of speaking, which whoever admits, must allow it possible for the same Man to be two distinct Persons, as any two that have liv'd in different Ages, without the knowledge of one another's Thoughts.

By the second and third, *Socrates* in this Life, and after it, cannot be the same Man any way, but by the same Consciousness; and so making human Identity to consist in the same thing wherein we place personal Identity, there will be no difficulty to allow the same Man to be the same Person. But then they who place human Identity in Consciousness only, and not in something else, must consider how they will make the Infant *Socrates* the same Man with *Socrates* after the Resurrection. But whatsoever to some Men makes a Man, and consequently the same individual Man, wherein perhaps few are agreed, personal Identity can by us be placed in nothing but Consciousness (which is that alone which makes what we call Self) without involving us in great Absurdities.

§. 22. But is not a Man drunk and sober the same Person, why else is he punish'd for the Fact he commits when drunk, tho' he be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same Person, as a Man that walks, and does other things in his Sleep, is the same Person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Human Laws punish both, with a Justice suitable to their way of Knowledge; because in these cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit: and so the Ignorance in Drunkenness or Sleep, is not admitted as a Plea. For tho' Punishment be annex'd to Personality, and Personality to Consciousness, and the Drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did; yet human Judicatures justly punish him, because the Fact is prov'd against him, but want of Consciousness cannot be prov'd for him. But in the great Day, wherein the Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of; but shall receive his Doom, his Conscience accusing or excusing him.

§. 23. Nothing but Consciousness can unite remote Existences into the same Person, the Identity of Substance will not do it. For whatever Substance there is, however fram'd, without Consciousness there is no Person: And a Carcase may be a Person, as well as any sort of Substance be so without Consciousness. *Consciousness, alone makes Self.*

Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable Consciousnesses acting the same Body, the one constantly by Day, the other by Night; and, on the other side, the same Consciousness acting by Intervals two distinct Bodies: I ask in the first case, Whether the *Day* and the *Night-man* would not be two as distinct Persons, as *Socrates* and *Plato*? And whether, in the second case, there would not be one Person in two distinct Bodies, as much as one Man is the same in two distinct Clothings? Nor is it at all material to say, that this same, and this distinct *Consciousness*, in the Cases abovemention'd, is owing to the same and distinct immaterial Substances, bringing it with them to those Bodies; which, whether true or no, alters not the Case: since 'tis evident the *personal Identity* would equally be determin'd by the *Consciousness*, whether that *Consciousness* were annex'd to some individual immaterial Substance or no. For granting, that the thinking Substance in Man must be necessarily suppos'd immaterial, 'tis evident that immaterial thinking thing may sometimes part with its past *Consciousness*, and be restor'd to it again, as appears in the Forgetfulness Men often have of their past Actions; and the Mind many times recovers the Memory of a past *Consciousness*, which it had lost for twenty Years together. Make the Intervals of Memory and Forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by Day and Night, and you have two Persons with the same immaterial Spirit, as much as in the former Instance two Persons with the same Body. So that *Self* is not determin'd by Identity or Diversity of Substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only by Identity of *Consciousness*.

§. 24. Indeed it may conceive the Substance, whereof it is now made up, to have existed formerly, united in the same conscious Being: but *Consciousness* remov'd, that Substance is no more it *self*, or makes no more a part of it, than any other Substance; as is evident in the Instance we have already given of a Limb cut off, of whose Heat, or Cold, or other Affections, having no longer any *Consciousness*, it is no more of a Man's *self*, than any other Matter of the Universe. In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial Substance, which is void of that *Consciousness*, whereby I am my *self* to my *self*: If there be any part of its Existence, which I cannot upon Recollection join with that present *Consciousness* whereby I am now my *self*, it is in that part of its Existence no more my *self*, than any other immaterial Being. For whatsoever any Substance has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my *Consciousness* make my own Thought and Action, it will no more belong to me, whether a Part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial Being any where existing.

§. 25. I agree, the more probable Opinion is, That this *Consciousness* is annex'd to, and the Affection of one individual immaterial Substance.

But let Men, according to their diverse Hypotheses, resolve of that as they please. This every intelligent Being, sensible of Happiness or Misery, must grant, that there is something that is *himself* that he is concern'd for, and would have happy; that this *Self* has existed in a continu'd Duration more than one Instant, and therefore 'tis possible may exist, as it has done, Months and Years to come, without any certain Bounds to be set to its Duration; and may be the same *Self*, by the same *Consciousness* continu'd on for the future. And thus, by this *Consciousness*, he finds himself to be the *same Self* which did such or such an Action some Years since, by which he comes to be happy or miserable now. In all which account of *Self*, the same numerical Substance is not consider'd as making the same *Self*; but the same continu'd *Consciousness*, in which several Substances may have been united, and again separated from it, which, whilst they continu'd in a vital Union with that, wherein this *Consciousness* then resided, made a part of that same *Self*. Thus any part of our Bodies vitally united to that which is conscious in us, makes a part of our *Selves*: But upon Separation from the vital Union, by which that *Consciousness* is communicated, that which a moment since was part of our *Selves*, is no more so, than a part of another Man's *Self* is a part of me; and 'tis not impossible, but

in

in a little time may become a real Part of another Person. And so we have the same numerical Substance become a Part of two different Persons; and the same Person preserv'd under the Change of various Substances. Could we suppose any Spirit wholly strip'd of all its Memory or Consciousness of past Actions, as we find our Minds always are of a great part of ours, and sometimes of them all; the Union or Separation of such a spiritual Substance would make no variation of personal Identity, any more than that of any Particle of Matter does. Any Substance vitally united to the present thinking Being, is a part of that very *same Self* which now is: Any thing united to it by a Consciousness of former Actions, makes also a part of the *same Self*, which is the same both then and now.

Person, a Forensic Term.

§. 26. *Person*, as I take it, is the Name for this *Self*. Wherever a Man finds what he calls *Himself*, there I think another may say is the *same Person*. It is a forensic Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery. This Personality extends it *self* beyond present Existence to what is past, only by Consciousness, whereby it becomes concern'd and accountable, owns and imputes to it *self* past Actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason that it does the present. All which is founded in a Concern for Happiness, the unavoidable Concomitant of Consciousness; that which is conscious of Pleasure and Pain, desiring that that Self that is conscious should be happy. And therefore whatever past Actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present *Self* by Consciousness, it can be no more concern'd in, than if they had never been done: And to receive Pleasure or Pain, *i. e.* Reward or Punishment, on the account of any such Action, is all one as to be made happy or miserable in its first Being, without any Demerit at all. For supposing a Man punish'd now for what he had done in another Life, whereof he could be made to have no Consciousness at all, what difference is there between that Punishment, and being created miserable? And therefore conformable to this the Apostle tells us, that at the Great Day, when every one shall receive according to his Doings, the Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open. The Sentence shall be justify'd by the Consciousness all Persons shall have, that they *themselves*, in what Bodies soever they appear, or what Substances soever that Consciousness adheres to, are the *same* that committed those Actions, and deserve that Punishment for them.

§. 27. I am apt enough to think I have, in treating of this Subject, made some Suppositions that will look strange to some Readers, and possibly they are so in themselves. But yet, I think, they are such as are pardonable in this Ignorance we are in of the Nature of that thinking thing that is in us, and which we look on as our *Selves*. Did we know what it was, or how it was ty'd to a certain System of fleeting animal Spirits; or whether it could or could not perform its Operations of Thinking and Memory out of a Body organiz'd as ours is; and whether it has pleas'd God, that no one such Spirit shall ever be united to any but one such Body, upon the right Constitution of whose Organs its Memory should depend; we might see the Absurdity of some of those Suppositions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do, (in the dark concerning these Matters) the Soul of a Man, for an immaterial Substance, independent from Matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the Nature of things be no Absurdity at all to suppose, that the same Soul may, at different times, be united to different Bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one Man: As well as we suppose a Part of a Sheep's Body yesterday should be a Part of a Man's Body to morrow, and in that Union make up a vital Part of *Melchior* himself, as well as it did of his Ram.

The Difficulty from ill use of Names.

§. 28. To conclude, whatever Substance begins to exist, it must, during its Existence, necessarily be the same: Whatever Compositions of Substances begin to exist during the Union of those Substances, the Concrete must be the same: Whatsoever Mode begins to exist, during its Existence, it is the same: And so if the Composition be of distinct Substances and different Modes, the same Rule holds: Whereby it will appear, that the Difficulty or Obscurity that has been about this Matter, rather rises from the Names ill us'd, than from any Obscurity in things themselves. For whatever makes the specific Idea to which the Name is apply'd, if that Idea be steddily kept to, the Distinction of any thing into

into the same, and divers will easily be conceiv'd, and there can arise no Doubt about it.

§. 29. For supposing a rational Spirit be the *Idea* of a *Man*, 'tis easy to know what is the *same Man*, viz. the *same Spirit*, whether separate or in a Body, will be the *same Man*. Supposing a rational Spirit vitally united to a Body of a certain Conformation of Parts to make a *Man*, whilst that rational Spirit, with that vital Conformation of Parts, tho' continu'd in a fleeting successive Body, remains, it will be the *same Man*. But if to any one the *Idea* of a *Man* be but the vital Union of Parts in a certain Shape; as long as that vital Union and Shape remains, in a Concrete no otherwise the same, but by a continu'd Succession of fleeting Particles, it will be the *same Man*. For whatever be the Composition, whereof the complex *Idea* is made, whether Existence makes it one particular thing under any Denomination, the same Existence continu'd, preserves it the same Individual under the same Denomination.

Continu'd Existence makes Identity.

C H A P. XXVIII.

Of other Relations.

§. 1. **B**ESIDES the before-mention'd Occasions of Time, Place, and Cause, the Falsity of comparing, or referring things one to another, there are, as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.

First, The first I shall name is some one simple *Idea*; which being capable of Parts or Degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the Subjects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple *Idea*, v. g. *Whiter, Sweeter, Bigger, Equal, More, &c.* These Relations depending on the Equality and Excess of the same simple *Idea*, in several Subjects, may be call'd, if one will, *Proportional*; and that these are only conversant about those simple *Ideas* receiv'd from Sensation or Reflection, is so evident, that nothing need be said to evince it.

Proportional.

§. 2. *Secondly*, Another occasion of comparing things together, or considering one thing, so as to include in that Consideration some other thing, is the Circumstances of their Origin or Beginning; which being not afterwards to be alter'd, make the Relations depending thereon as lasting as the Subjects to which they belong; v. g. *Father and Son, Brothers, Cousin-Germans, &c.* which have their Relations by one Community of Blood, wherein they partake in several Degrees; *Country-men, i. e.* those who were born in the same Country, or Tract of Ground; and these I call *natural Relations*: wherein we may observe, that Mankind have fitted their Notions and Words to the use of common Life, and not to the Truth and Extent of things. For 'tis certain, that in reality the Relation is the same betwixt the Begetter and the Begotten, in the several Races of other Animals as well as Men: But yet 'tis seldom said, This Bull is the Grandfather of such a Calf; or that two Pigeons are Cousin-Germans. It is very convenient, that by distinct Names these Relations should be observ'd, and mark'd out in Mankind; there being occasion, both in Laws, and other Communications one with another, to mention and take notice of Men under these Relations: from whence also arise the Obligations of several Duties amongst Men. Whereas in Brutes, Men having very little or no cause to mind these Relations, they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar Names. This, by the way, may give us some Light into the different State and Growth of Languages; which being suited only to the Convenience of Communication, are proportion'd to the Notions Men have, and the Commerce of Thoughts familiar amongst them; and not to the Reality or Extent of things, nor to the various Respects might be found among them, nor the different abstract Considerations might be fram'd about them. Where they had no Philosophical Notions, there they had no Terms to express them: And 'tis no wonder Men should have fram'd no Names for those things they found no occasion to discourse of. From whence it is easy to imagine, why, as in some Countries, they may not have so much as the Name for a Horse; and in others, where they are more careful of the Pedigrees of their Horses than of their

Natural.

own, that there they may have not only Names for particular Horses, but also of their several Relations of Kindred one to another.

Instituted. §. 3. *Thirdly*, Sometimes the Foundation of considering things, with reference to one another, is some Act whereby any one comes by a moral Right, Power, or Obligation to do something. Thus a *General* is one that hath Power to command an Army; and an Army under a General is a Collection of arm'd Men oblig'd to obey one Man. A *Citizen*, or a *Burgher*, is one who has a Right to certain Privileges in this or that Place. All this sort depending upon Mens Wills, or Agreement in Society, I call *instituted*, or *voluntary*; and may be distinguish'd from the natural, in that they are most, if not all of them, some way or other alterable, and separable from the Persons to whom they have sometimes belong'd, tho' neither of the Substances, so related, be destroy'd. Now, tho' these are all reciprocal, as well as the rest, and contain in them a Reference of two things one to another; yet, because one of the two things often wants a relative Name, importing that Reference, Men usually take no notice of it, and the Relation is commonly over-look'd: *v. g.* a *Patron* and *Client* are easily allow'd to be Relations, but a *Constable* or *Dictator* are not so readily, at first hearing, consider'd as such; because there is no peculiar Name for those who are under the Command of a Dictator, or Constable, expressing a Relation to either of them; tho' it be certain, that either of them hath a certain Power over some others; and so is so far related to them, as well as a Patron is to his Client, or General to his Army.

Moral. §. 4. *Fourthly*, There is another sort of Relation which is the Conformity, or Disagreement, Mens voluntary Actions have to a Rule to which they are refer'd, and by which they are judg'd of; which, I think, may be call'd *Moral Relation*, as being that which denominates our moral Actions, and deserves well to be examin'd, there being no Part of Knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get determin'd *Ideas*, and avoid, as much as may be, Obscurity and Confusion. Human Actions, when with their various Ends, Objects, Manners, and Circumstances, they are fram'd into distinct complex *Ideas*, are, as has been shewn, so many *mix'd Modes*, a great Part whereof have Names annex'd to them. Thus, supposing Gratitude to be a Readiness to acknowledge and return Kindness receiv'd, Polygamy to be the having more Wives than one at once; when we frame these Notions thus in our Minds, we have there so many determin'd *Ideas* of mix'd Modes. But this is not all that concerns our Actions; it is not enough to have determin'd *Ideas* of them, and to know what Names belong to such and such Combinations of *Ideas*. We have a farther and greater Concernment, and that is, to know whether such Actions so made up are morally good or bad.

*Moral Good
and Evil.*

§. 5. *Good* and *Evil*, as hath been shewn, B. II. Ch. 20. §. 2. and Ch. 21. §. 42. are nothing but Pleasure or Pain, or that which occasions, or procures Pleasure or Pain to us. *Moral Good* and *Evil* then is only the Conformity or Disagreement of our voluntary Actions to some Law, whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us by the Will and Power of the Law-Maker; which Good and Evil, Pleasure or Pain, attending our Observance, or Breach of the Law, by the Decree of the Law-maker, is that we call *Reward* and *Punishment*.

Moral Rules.

§. 6. Of these *Moral Rules*, or Laws, to which Men generally refer, and by which they judge of the Rectitude or Pravity of their Actions, there seem to me to be *three sorts*, with their three different Enforcements, or Rewards and Punishments. For since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man, without annexing to it some Enforcement of Good and Evil to determine his Will, we must, where-ever we suppose a Law, suppose also some Reward or Punishment annex'd to that Law. It would be in vain for one intelligent Being to set a Rule to the Actions of another, if he had it not in his Power to reward the Compliance with, and punish Deviation from his Rule, by some Good and Evil, that is not the natural Product and Consequence of the Action it self. For that being a natural Convenience, or Inconvenience, would operate of it self without a Law. This, if I mistake not, is the true Nature of all Law, properly so call'd.

Laws.

§. 7. The Laws that Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their Rectitude, or Obliquity, seem to me to be these three. 1. The *Divine Law*.
2. The

2. The *Civil Law*. 3. The Law of *Opinion or Reputation*, if I may so call it. By the Relation they bear to the first of these, Men judge whether their Actions are Sins or Duties; by the Second, whether they be Criminal or Innocent; and by the third, whether they be Vertues or Vices.

§. 8. *First*, The *Divine Law*, whereby I mean that Law which God has set to the Actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the Light of Nature or the Voice of Revelation. That God has given a Rule whereby Men should govern themselves, I think there is no body so brutish as to deny. He has a Right to do it, we are his Creatures: He has Goodness and Wisdom to direct our Actions to that which is best; and he has power to enforce it by Rewards and Punishments, of infinite Weight and Duration, in another Life; for no body can take us out of his hands. This is the only true Touchstone of *moral Rectitude*, and by comparing them to this Law it is, that Men judge of the most considerable *moral Good or Evil* of their Actions: that is, whether as *Duties or Sins* they are like to procure them Happiness or Misery from the hands of the ALMIGHTY.

§. 9. *Secondly*, The *Civil Law*, the Rule set by the Commonwealth to the Actions of those who belong to it, is another Rule to which Men refer their Actions, to judge whether they be *criminal* or no. This Law no body overlooks; the Rewards and Punishments that enforce it being ready at hand, and suitable to the Power that makes it which is the Force of the Commonwealth, engag'd to protect the Lives, Liberties, and Possessions of those who live according to its Laws, and has power to take away Life, Liberty, or Goods from him who disobeys: which is the Punishment of Offences committed against this Law.

§. 10. *Thirdly*, The Law of *Opinion or Reputation*. Vertue and Vice are Names pretended and suppos'd every where to stand for Actions in their own nature right and wrong; and as far as they really are so apply'd, they so far are co-incident with the *Divine Law* above-mention'd. But yet whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these Names *Vertue and Vice*, in the particular Instance of their Application, thro' the several Nations and Societies of Men in the World, are constantly attributed only to such Actions, as in each Country and Society are in Reputation or Discredit. Nor is it to be thought strange, that Men every where should give the name of *Vertue* to those Actions, which amongst them are judg'd praise-worthy; and call that *Vice*, which they account blameable: since otherwise they would condemn themselves, if they should think any thing *right*, to which they allow'd Commendation; any thing *wrong*, which they let pass without Blame. Thus the Measure of what is every where call'd and esteem'd *Vertue and Vice* is this Approbation or Dislike, Praise or Blame, which by a secret and tacit Consent establishes it self in the several Societies, Tribes, and Clubs of Men in the World; whereby several Actions come to find Credit or Disgrace amongst them, according to the Judgment, Maxims, or Fashions of that place. For tho' Men uniting into politick Societies have resign'd up to the Publick the disposing of all their Force, so that they cannot employ it against any Fellow-Citizens any farther than the Law of the Country directs; yet they retain still the Power of thinking well or ill, approving or disapproving of the Actions of those whom they live amongst, and converse with: And by this Approbation and Dislike, they establish amongst themselves what they will call *Vertue and Vice*.

§. 11. That this is the common Measure of *Vertue and Vice* will appear to any one who considers, that tho' that passes for *Vice* in one Country, which is counted a *Vertue*, or at least not *Vice* in another, yet every where *Vertue* and Praise, *Vice* and Blame go together. *Vertue* is every where that which is thought praise-worthy; and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publick Esteem, is call'd *Vertue* *. *Vertue* and Praise are so united, that they are call'd often

* Our Author, in his Preface to the fourth Edition, taking notice how apt Men have been to mistake him, added what here follows. Of this the Ingenious Author of the *Discourse concerning the Nature of Man*, has given me a late Instance, to mention no other. For the Civility of his Expressions, and the Candor that belongs to his Order, forbid me to think, that he would have closed his

often by the same name. *Sunt sua præmia Laudi*, says *Virgil*; and so *Cicero*, *Nihil habet natura præstantius, quam Honestatem, quam Laudem, quam Dignitatem, quam Decus*; which, he tells you, are all names for the same thing, *Tusc. l. 2.* This is the Language of the Heathen Philosophers, who well understood wherein their Notions of *Vertue* and *Vice* consisted. And tho' perhaps by the different Temper, Education, Fashion, Maxims, or Interest of different sorts of Men, it fell out that what was thought Praise-worthy in one place, escap'd not Censure in another; and so in different Societies, *Vertues* and *Vices* were chang'd: yet, as to the main, they for the most part kept the same every where. For since nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with Esteem and Reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage, and to blame and discountenance the contrary; 'tis no wonder that Esteem and Discredit, *Vertue* and *Vice*, should in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right or Wrong, which the Law of God hath establish'd: there being nothing that so directly and visibly secures and advances the general Good of Mankind in this World, as Obedience to the Laws he has set them; and nothing that breeds such Mischiefs and Confusion, as the Neglect of them. And therefore Men, without renouncing all Sense and Reason, and their own Interest, which they are so constantly true to, could not generally mistake in placing their Commendation and Blame on that side that really deserv'd it not. Nay, even those Men whose Practice was otherwise, fail'd not to give their Approbation right; few being deprav'd to that degree, as not to condemn, at least in others the Fault they themselves were guilty of: whereby, even in the Corruption of Manners, the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of *Vertue* and *Vice*, were pretty well preserv'd. So that even the Exhortations of inspir'd Teachers have not fear'd to appeal to common Repute: *Whatsoever is lovely, whatsoever is of good report, if there be any Vertue, if there be any Praise, &c. Phil. 4. 8.*

§. 12.

Preface with an Insinuation, as if in what I had said, *Book 2. Chap. 28.* concerning the third Rule which Men refer their Actions to, I went about to make *Vertue Vice*, and *Vice-Vertue*, unless he had mistaken my Meaning; which he could not have done, if he had but given himself the trouble to consider what the Argument was I was then upon, and what was the chief Design of that Chapter, plainly enough set down in the fourth Section, and those following. For I was there not laying down moral Rules, but shewing the Original and Nature of moral Ideas, and enumerating the Rules Men make use of in moral Relations, whether those Rules were true or false: And pursuant thereto, I tell what has every where that Denomination, which in the Language of that place answers to *Vertue* and *Vice* in ours, which Alters not the Nature of things, tho' Men do generally judge of, and denominate their Actions according to the Esteem and Fashion of the Place, or Sect they are of.

If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had said, *B. 1. c. 13. §. 18.* and in this present Chapter, §. 13, 14, 15, and 20. he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable Nature of Right and Wrong, and what I call *Vertue* and *Vice*: And if he had observ'd, that in the place he quotes, I only report, as Matter of Fact, what others call *Vertue* and *Vice*, he would not have found it liable to any great Exception. For, I think, I am not much out in saying, that one of the Rules made use of in the World for a ground or measure of a moral Relation, is that Esteem and Reputation which several sorts of Actions find variously in the several Societies of Men, according to which they are there call'd *Vertue* or *Vices*: And whatever Authority the learned Mr. Lowde places in his *Old English Dictionary*, I dare say it no where tells him (if I should appeal to it) that the same Action is not in Credit, call'd and counted a *Vertue* in one place, which being in Dispute, passes for and under the name of *Vice* in another. The taking notice that Men bestow the Names of *Vertue* and *Vice* according to this Rule of Reputation, is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards the making *Vice Vertue*, and *Vertue Vice*. But the good Man does well, and as becomes his Calling, to be watchful in such Points, and to take the alarm, even at Expressions, which standing alone by themselves might sound ill, and be suspected.

'Tis to this Zeal, allowable in his Function, that I forgive his citing, as he does, these words of mine, in §. 11. of this Chapter: *The Exhortations of inspir'd Teachers have not fear'd to appeal to common Repute; Whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are good report, if there be any Vertue, if there be any Praise, &c. Phil. 4. 8.* without taking notice of those immediately preceding, which introduce them, run thus: *Whereby in the Corruption of Manners, the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preserv'd; so that even the Exhortations of inspir'd Teachers, &c.* By which words, and the rest of that Section, it is plain that I brought that Passage of St. Paul, not to prove that the general Measure of what Men call *Vertue* and *Vice*, throughout the World, was the Reputation and Fashion of each

§. 12. If any one shall imagine that I have forgot my own Notion of a Law, when I make *the Law*, whereby Men judge of *Vertue* and *Vice*, to be nothing else but the Consent of private Men, who have not Authority enough to make a Law; especially wanting that, which is so necessary and essential to a Law, a Power to enforce it: I think I may say, that he who imagines Commendation and Disgrace not to be strong Motives on Men, to accommodate themselves to the Opinions and Rules of those with whom they converse, seems little skill'd in the Nature or History of Mankind: the greatest part whereof he shall find to govern themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this Law of Fashion; and so they do that which keeps them in Reputation with their Company, little regard the Laws of God, or the Magistrate. The Penalties that attend the Breach of God's Laws, some, nay, perhaps most Men seldom seriously reflect on; and amongst those that do, many whilst they break the Law, entertain thoughts of future Reconciliation, and making their peace for such Breaches. And as to the Punishments due from the Laws of the Commonwealth, they frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of Impunity. But no Man escapes the Punishment of their Censure and Dislike, who offends against the Fashion and Opinion of the Company he keeps, and would recommend himself to. Nor is there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the constant Dislike and Condemnation of his own Club. He must be of a strange and unusual Constitution, who can content himself to live in constant Disgrace and Disrepute with his own particular Society. Solitude many Men have sought, and been reconcil'd to: but no body, that has the least Thought or Sense of a Man about him, can live in Society under the constant Dislike and ill Opinion of his Familiars, and those he converses with. This is a Burden too heavy for human Sufferance: And he must be made up of irreconcilable Contradictions who can take pleasure in Company, and yet be insensible of Contempt and Disgrace from his Companions.

each particular Society within it self; but to shew, that tho' it were so, yet, for reasons I there give, Men, in that way of denominating their Actions, did not for the most part much vary from the Law of Nature; which is that standing and unalterable Rule, by which they ought to judge of the moral Rectitude and Pravity of their Actions, and accordingly denominate them *Vertues* or *Vices*. Had Mr. Lowde consider'd this, he would have found it little to his purpose, to have quoted that Passage in a sense I used it not; and would, I imagine, have spar'd the Explication he subjoins to it, as not very necessary. But I hope this second Edition will give him Satisfaction in the point; and that this matter is now so express'd, as to shew him there was no cause of Scruple.

Tho' I am forc'd to differ from him in those Apprehensions he has express'd in the latter end of his Preface, concerning what I had said about *Vertue* and *Vice*; yet we are better agreed than he thinks, in what he says in his third Chapter, p. 78. concerning *natural Inscription* and *innate Notions*. I shall not deny him the Privilege he claims, p. 52. to state the Question as he pleases, especially when he states it so, as to leave nothing in it contrary to what I have said: For, according to him, *innate Notion being conditional things, depending upon the Concurrence of several other Circumstances, in order to the Soul's exerting them*; all that he says for *innate, imprinted, impress'd Notions* (for of *innate Ideas* he says nothing at all) amounts at last only to this: That there are certain Propositions, which tho' the Soul from the beginning, or when a Man is born, does not know, yet by *Assistance from the outward Senses, and the Help of some previous Cultivation*, it may afterwards come certainly to know the truth of; which is no more than what I have affirm'd in my first Book. For I suppose, by the *Soul's exerting them*, he means its beginning to know them, or else the *Soul's exerting of Notions* will be to me a very unintelligible Expression; and I think at best is a very unfit one in this Case, it misleading Mens Thoughts by an Insinuation, as if these Notions were in the Mind before the *Soul exerts them*, i. e. before they are known: whereas truly before they are known, there is nothing of them in the Mind, but a Capacity to know them, when the *Concurrence of those Circumstances*, which this ingenious Author thinks necessary *in order to the Soul's exerting them*, brings them into our Knowledge.

P. 52. I find him express it thus; *These natural Notions are not so imprinted upon the Soul, as they naturally and necessarily exert themselves (even in Children and Idiots) without any Assistance from the outward Senses, or without the Help of some previous Cultivation*. Here he says *they exert themselves*, as p. 78. that the *Soul exerts them*. When he has explain'd to himself or others what he means by the *Soul exerting innate Notions, or their exerting themselves*, and what that *previous Cultivation and Circumstances, in order to their being exerted*, are; he will, I suppose, find there is so little of Controversy between him and me in the Point, bating that he calls that *exerting of Notions*, which I in a more vulgar Stile call *knowing*, that I have reason to think he brought in my Name upon this occasion only out of the pleasure he has to speak civilly of me; which I must gratefully acknowledge he has done every where he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as some others have done, a Title I have no right to.

*These three
Laws the
Rules of Moral
Good and Evil.*

*Morality is the
Relation of
Actions to
these Rules.*

§. 13. These three then, *First*, The Law of God; *Secondly*, The Law of politick Societies; *Thirdly*, The Law of Fashion, or private Censure, are those to which Men variously compare their Actions: And 'tis by their Conformity to one of these Laws that they take their Measures, when they would judge of their moral Rectitude, and denominate their Actions good or bad.

§. 14. Whether the Rule, to which, as to a Touchstone, we bring our voluntary Actions, to examine them by, and try their Goodness, and accordingly to name them; which is, as it were, the Mark of the Value we set upon them: whether, I say, we take that Rule from the Fashion of the Country, or the Will of a Law-maker, the Mind is easily able to observe the Relation any Action hath to it, and to judge whether the Action agrees or disagrees with the Rule; and so hath a Notion of *Moral Goodness* or *Evil*, which is either Conformity or not Conformity of any Action to that Rule: and therefore is often call'd moral Rectitude. This Rule being nothing but a Collection of several simple *Ideas*, the Conformity thereto is but so ordering the Action, that the simple *Ideas* belonging to it may correspond to those which the Law requires. And thus we see how moral Beings and Notions are founded on, and terminated in these simple *Ideas* we have receiv'd from Sensation or Reflection. For example, let us consider the complex *Idea* we signify by the word Murder; and when we have taken it asunder, and examin'd all the Particulars, we shall find them to amount to a Collection of simple *Ideas* deriv'd from Reflection or Sensation, *viz.* *First*, From Reflection on the Operations of our Minds, we have the *Ideas* of Willing, Considering, Purposing before-hand, Malice, or wishing Ill to another; and also of Life, or Preception, and Self-motion. *Secondly*, From Sensation we have the Collection of those simple sensible *Ideas* which are to be found in a Man, and of some Action, whereby we put an end to Perception and Motion in the Man; all which simple *Ideas* are comprehended in the word Murder. This Collection of simple *Ideas* being found by me to agree or disagree with the Esteem of the Country I have been bred in, and to be held by most Men there worthy Praise or Blame, I call the Action vertuous or vicious: If I have the Will of a supreme invisible Law-maker for my Rule; then, as I suppos'd the Action commanded or forbidden by God, I call it Good or Evil, Sin or Duty: And if I compare it to the Civil Law, the Rule made by the Legislative Power of the Country, I call it Lawful or Unlawful, a Crime or no Crime. So that whencesoever we take the Rule of moral Actions, or by what Standard soever we frame in our Minds the *Ideas* of Vertues or Vices, they consist only and are made up of Collections of simple *Ideas*, which we originally receiv'd from Sense or Reflection, and their Rectitude or Obliquity consists in the Agreement or Disagreement with those Patterns prescrib'd by some Law.

§. 15. To conceive rightly of *Moral Actions*, we must take notice of them under this twofold Consideration. *First*, As they are in themselves each made up of such a Collection of simple *Ideas*. Thus *Drunkenness*, or *Lying*, signify such or such a Collection of simple *Ideas*, which I call mix'd Modes: And in this sense they are as much *positive absolute Ideas*, as the drinking of a Horse, or speaking of a Parrot. *Secondly*, Our Actions are consider'd as good, bad, or indifferent; and in this respect they are *relative*, it being their Conformity to, or Disagreement with some Rule that makes them to be regular or irregular, good or bad: And so, as far as they are compar'd with a Rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under Relation. Thus the challenging and fighting with a Man, as it is a certain positive Mode, or particular sort of Action, by particular *Ideas*, distinguish'd from all others, is call'd *Dueling*: Which, when consider'd, in relation to the Law of God, will deserve the name Sin, to the Law of Fashion, in some Countries, Valour and Vertue; and to the municipal Law of some Governments, a capital Crime. In this case, when the positive Mode has one Name, and another Name as it stands in relation to the Law, the Distinction may as easily be observ'd, as it is in Substances, where one Name, *v. g.* *Man*, is us'd to signify the thing; another, *v. g.* *Father* to signify the Relation.

The Denominations of Actions often mislead us.

§. 16. But because very frequently the positive *Idea* of the Action, and its Moral Relation, are comprehended together under one Name, and the same Word made use of to express both the Mode or Action, and its moral Rectitude

tude or Obliquity; therefore the Relation it self is less taken notice of, and there is often no *Distinction* made *between the positive Idea of the Action, and the Reference it has to a Rule.* By which Confusion of these two distinct Considerations under one Term, those who yield too easily to the Impressions of Sounds, and are forward to take Names for Things, are often misled in their Judgment of Actions. Thus the taking from another what is his, without his Knowledge or Allowance, is properly call'd *Stealing*; but that Name being commonly understood to signify also the moral Pravity of the Action, and to denote its Contrariety to the Law, Men are apt to condemn whatever they hear call'd *Stealing*, as an ill Action, disagreeing with the Rule of Right. And yet the private taking away his Sword from a Madman, to prevent his doing Mischief, tho' it be properly denominated *Stealing*, as the name of such a *mix'd Mode*; yet when compar'd to the Law of God, and consider'd in its Relation to that Supreme Rule, it is no Sin or Transgression, tho' the name *Stealing* ordinarily carries such an Intimation with it.

§. 17. And thus much for the Relation of human Actions to a Law, which *Relations innumerable.* therefore I call *moral Relations.*

'Twould make a Volume to go over all sorts of *Relations*; 'tis not therefore to be expected, that I should here mention them all. It suffices to our present purpose, to shew by these, what the *Ideas* are we have of this comprehensive Consideration, call'd *Relation*: Which is so *various*, and the Occasions of it so *many* (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another) that it is not very easy to reduce it to Rules, or under just Heads. Those I have mention'd, I think, are some of the most considerable, and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our *Ideas* of Relations, and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this Argument, from what has been said, give me leave to observe;

§. 18. *First*, That it is evident, that *all Relation terminates in*, and is ultimately founded on those *simple Ideas* we have got from *Sensation or Reflection*: So *All Relations terminate in simple Ideas.* that all that we have in our Thoughts our selves (if we think of any thing, or have any meaning) or would signify to others, when we use Words standing for Relations, is nothing but some simple *Ideas*, or Collection of simple *Ideas*, compar'd one with another. This is so manifest in that sort call'd *Proportional*, that nothing can be more: For when a Man says, Honey is sweeter than Wax, it is plain that his Thoughts in this Relation terminate in this simple *Idea*, Sweetness, which is equally true of all the rest; tho' where they are compounded or decompounded, the simple *Ideas* they are made up of, are, perhaps, seldom taken notice of. *V. g.* when the Word Father is mention'd; *First*, There is meant that particular Species, or collective *Idea*, signified by the word Man. *Secondly*, Those sensible simple *Ideas*, signified by the word Generation: And, *Thirdly*, The Effects of it, and all the simple *Ideas* signify'd by the word Child. So the word Friend being taken for a Man, who loves, and is ready to do good to another, has all these following *Ideas* to the making of it up: *First*, All the simple *Ideas*, comprehended in the word Man, or intelligent Being. *Secondly*, The *Idea* of Love. *Thirdly*, The *Idea* of Readiness or Disposition. *Fourthly*, The *Idea* of Action, which is any kind of Thought or Motion. *Fifthly*, The *Idea* of Good, which signifies any thing that may advance his Happiness, and terminates at last, if examin'd, in particular simple *Ideas*; of which the word *Good* in general signifies any one, but if remov'd from all simple *Ideas* quite, it signifies nothing at all. And thus also all moral words terminate at last, tho' perhaps more remotely, in a Collection of simple *Ideas*: The immediate signification of relative Words, being very often other suppos'd known Relations; which, if trac'd one to another, still end in simple *Ideas*.

§. 19. *Secondly*, That in Relations, we have for the most part, if not always, *We have ordinarily as clear* as clear a Notion of the Relation, as we have of these simple *Ideas* wherein it is *(or clearer)* founded. Agreement or Disagreement, whereon Relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly as clear *Ideas*, as of any other whatsoever; it being but the distinguishing simple *Ideas*, or their Degrees one from another, *Notion of the Relation, as of its Foundation.* without which we could have no distinct Knowledge at all. For if I have a clear *Idea* of Sweetness, Light or Extension, I have too, of equal, or more or less of each of these: If I know what it is for one Man to be born of a Woman, *viz. Sempronia*, I know what it is for another Man to be born of the same Woman

Woman *Sempronia*; and so have as clear a Notion of Brothers, as of Births, and perhaps clearer. For if I believ'd that *Sempronia* dug *Titus* out of the Parsly-Bed (as they use to tell Children) and thereby became his Mother; and that afterwards, in the same manner, she dug *Caius* out of the Parsly-Bed, I had as clear a Notion of the Relation of Brothers between them, as if I had all the Skill of a Midwife: the Notion that the same Woman contributed, as Mother, equally to their Births (tho' I were ignorant or mistaken in the manner of it) being that on which I grounded the Relation, and that they agreed in that Circumstance of Birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their Descent from the same Person, without knowing the particular Circumstances of that Descent, is enough to found my Notion of their having or not having the Relation of Brothers. But tho' the *Ideas* of particular *Relations* are capable of being as clear and distinct in the Minds of those who will duly consider them, as those of mix'd Modes, and more determinate than those of Substances; yet the Names belonging to *Relation*, are often of as doubtful and incertain Signification, as those of Substances or mix'd Modes, and much more than those of simple *Ideas*; because relative Words being the Marks of this Comparison which is made only by Mens Thoughts, and is an *Idea* only in Mens Minds, Men frequently apply them to different Comparisons of Things, according to their own Imaginations, which do not always correspond with those of others using the same Names.

The Notion of the Relation is the same, whether the Rule any Action is compar'd to, be true or false.

§. 20. *Thirdly*, That in these I call *Moral Relations*, I have a true Notion of Relation, by comparing the Action with the Rule, whether the Rule be true or false. For if I measure any thing by a Yard, I know whether the thing I measure be longer or shorter than that suppos'd Yard, tho' perhaps the Yard I measure by be not exactly the Standard; which indeed is another Inquiry. For tho' the Rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it; yet the Agreement or Disagreement observable in that which I compare with it, makes me perceive the Relation. Tho' measuring by a wrong Rule, I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its moral Rectitude, because I have try'd it by that which is not the true Rule; but I am not mistaken in the Relation which that Action bears to that Rule I compare it to, which is Agreement or Disagreement.

C H A P. XXIX.

Of Clear and Obscure, Distinct and Confus'd Ideas.

Ideas some clear and distinct, others obscure and confus'd.

§. 1. **H**AVING shewn the Original of our *Ideas*, and taken a View of their several sorts; consider'd the Difference between the simple and the complex, and observ'd how the complex ones are divided into those of Modes, Substances and Relations; all which, I think, is necessary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the Progress of the Mind in its Apprehension and Knowledge of Things: it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the Examination of *Ideas*. I must, nevertheless, crave Leave to offer some few other Considerations concerning them. The first is, That some are *clear*, and others *obscure*; some *distinct*, and others *confus'd*.

Clear and obscure, explain'd by Sight.

§. 2. The Perception of the Mind being most aptly explain'd by Words relating to the Sight, we shall best understand what is meant by *clear* and *obscure* in our *Ideas*, by reflecting on what we call *clear* and *obscure* in the Objects of Sight. Light being that which discovers to us visible Objects, we give the Name of *obscure* to that which is not plac'd in a Light sufficient to discover minutely to us the Figure and Colours which are observable in it, and which, in a better Light, would be discernible. In like manner our *simple Ideas* are *clear*, when they are such as the Objects themselves, from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well-order'd Sensation or Perception, present them. Whilst the Memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the Mind, whenever it has occasion to consider them, they are *clear Ideas*. So far as they either want any thing of that original Exactness, or have lost any of their first Freshness, and are, as it were, faded or tarnish'd by time, so far are they *obscure*. *Complex Ideas*,

Ideas, as they are made up of simple ones, so they are *clear*, when the *Ideas* that go to their Composition are clear; and the Number and Order of those simple *Ideas*, that are the Ingredients of any complex one, is determinate and certain.

§. 3. The Cause of *Obscurity* in simple *Ideas*, seems to be either dull Organs, or *Causes of Obscurity*, very slight and transient Impressions made by the Objects, or else a Weakness in the Memory not able to retain them as receiv'd. For to return again to visible Objects, to help us to apprehend this Matter: If the Organs or Faculties of Perception, like Wax over-harden'd with Cold, will not receive the Impression of the Seal, from the usual Impulse wont to imprint it; or, like Wax of a Temper too soft, will not hold it well when well imprinted; or else supposing the Wax of a Temper fit, but the Seal not apply'd with a sufficient Force to make a clear Impression: in any of these Cases, the Print left by the Seal will be *obscure*. This, I suppose, needs no Application to make it plainer.

§. 4. As a *clear Idea* is that whereof the Mind has such a full and evident Perception, as it does receive from an outward Object operating duly on a well-dispos'd Organ, so a *distinct Idea* is that wherein the Mind perceives a difference from all other; and a *confused Idea* is such an one, as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different. *Distinct and confused, what.*

§. 5. If no *Idea* be *confus'd*, but such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it should be different; it will be hard, may any one say, to find any where a *confused Idea*. For let any *Idea* be as it will, it can be no other but such as the Mind perceives it to be; and that very Perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other *Ideas*, which cannot be other, *i. e.* different, without being perceiv'd to be so. No *Idea* therefore can be undistinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from it self: for from all other it is evidently different. *Objection.*

§. 6. To remove this Difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the *Confusion* *Ideas* are at any time chargeable with, we must consider, that things rank'd under distinct Names, are suppos'd different enough to be distinguish'd, that so each sort by its peculiar name may be mark'd, and discours'd of a-part upon any occasion: And there is nothing more evident, than that the greatest part of different names are suppos'd to stand for different things. Now, every *Idea* a Man has, being visibly what it is, and distinct from all other *Ideas* but it self; that which makes it *confus'd*, is, when it is such, that it may as well be call'd by another name, as that which it is express'd by: the Difference which keeps the things (to be rank'd under these two different names) distinct, and makes some of them belong rather to the one, and some of them to the other of those names, being left out; and so the Distinction, which was intended to be kept up by those different Names, is quite lost. *Confusion of Ideas, is in reference to their Names.*

§. 7. The Defaults which usually occasion this *Confusion*, I think, are chiefly these following: *Defaults which make Confusion*

First, When any complex *Idea* (for 'tis complex *Ideas* that are most liable to Confusion) is made up of *too small a Number of simple Ideas*, and such only as are common to other things, whereby the Differences that make it deserve a different name, are left out. Thus he that has an *Idea* made up of barely the simple ones of a Beast with Spots, has but a *confus'd Idea* of a Leopard; it not being thereby sufficiently distinguish'd from a Lynx, and several other sorts of Beasts that are spotted. So that such an *Idea*, tho' it hath the peculiar name Leopard, is not distinguishable from those design'd by the names Lynx or Panther, and may as well come under the name Lynx as Leopard. How much the Custom of defining of Words by general Terms, contributes to make the *Ideas* we would express by them *confus'd* and undetermin'd, I leave others to consider. This is evident, that *confus'd Ideas* are such as render the Use of Words uncertain, and take away the benefit of distinct Names. When the *Ideas*, for which we use different Terms, have not a Difference answerable to their distinct Names, and so cannot be distinguish'd by them, there it is that they are truly *confus'd*. *First, complex Ideas made up of too few simple ones.*

§. 8. Secondly, Another Default which makes our *Ideas* *confus'd*, is, when tho' the Particulars that make up any *Idea* are in number enough; yet they are so jumbled together, that it is not easily discernible, whether it more belongs to the Name that is given it, than to any other. There is nothing properer to make *Secondly, Or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together.*

us conceive this Confusion, than a sort of Pictures usually shewn as surprising Pieces of Art, wherein the Colours, as they are laid by the Pencil on the Table it self, mark out very odd and unusual Figures, and have no discernible Order in their Position. This Draught, thus made up of Parts wherein no Symmetry nor Order appears, is in it self no more a confus'd thing, than the Picture of a cloudy Sky; wherein tho' there be as little Order of Colours or Figures to be found, yet no body thinks it a confus'd Picture. What is it then that makes it be thought confus'd, since the want of Symmetry does not? As it is plain it does not; for another Draught made, barely in imitation of this, could not be call'd confus'd. I answer, That which makes it be thought confus'd, is, the applying it to some Name, to which it does no more discernibly belong, than to some other: *v. g.* When it is said to be the Picture of a Man, or *Cæsar*, then any one with reason counts it confus'd: because it is not discernible, in that State, to belong more to the name Man, or *Cæsar*, than to the name Baboon, or *Pompey*; which are suppos'd to stand for different *Ideas* from those signify'd by Man, or *Cæsar*. But when a cylindrical Mirrour, plac'd right, hath produc'd those irregular Lines on the Table into their due Order and Proportion, then the Confusion ceases, and the Eye presently sees that it is a Man, or *Cæsar*, i. e. that it belongs to those Names; and that it is sufficiently distinguishable from a Baboon, or *Pompey*, i. e. from the *Ideas* signify'd by those Names. Just thus it is with our *Ideas*, which are as it were the Pictures of things. No one of these mental Draughts, however the Parts are put together, can be call'd confus'd (for they are plainly discernible as they are) till it be rank'd under some ordinary Name, to which it cannot be discern'd to belong, any more than it does to some other Name of an allow'd different Signification.

Thirdly, Or are
mutable and
undetermin'd.

§. 9. Thirdly, A third Defect that frequently gives the name of confus'd to our *Ideas*, is, when any one of them is *uncertain* and *undetermin'd*. Thus we may observe Men, who not forbearing to use the ordinary Words of their Language, till they have learn'd their precise Signification, change the *Idea* they make this or that Term stand for, almost as often as they use it. He that does this, out of uncertainty of what he should leave out, or put into his *Idea* of Church or *Idolatry*, every time he thinks of either, and holds not steddily to any one precise Combination of *Ideas* that makes it up, is said to have a confus'd *Idea* of *Idolatry* or the Church: tho' this be still for the same reason that the former, *viz.* because a mutable *Idea* (if we will allow it to be one *Idea*) cannot belong to one Name rather than another; and so loses the Distinction that distinct Names are design'd for.

Confusion with-
out reference to
Names, hardly
conceivable.

§. 10. By what has been said, we may observe how much Names, as suppos'd steddily Signs of things, and by their difference to stand for and keep things distinct that in themselves are different, are the *Occasion of denominating* *Ideas* distinct or confus'd, by a secret and unobserv'd Reference the Mind makes of its *Ideas* to such Names. This perhaps will be fuller understood, after what I say of Words, in the third Book, has been read and consider'd. But without taking notice of such a Reference of *Ideas*, to distinct Names, as the Signs of distinct things, it will be hard to say what a confus'd *Idea* is. And therefore when a Man designs, by any Name, a sort of things, or any one particular thing, distinct from all others; the complex *Idea* he annexes to that Name, is the more distinct, the more particular the *Ideas* are, and the greater and more determinate the Number and Order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more it has of these, the more has it still of the perceivable Differences, whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all *Ideas* belonging to their Names, even those that approach nearest to it, and thereby all Confusion with them is avoided.

Confusion con-
cerns a ways
two *Ideas*.

§. 11. *Confusion*, making it a difficulty to separate two things that should be separated, concerns always two *Ideas*; and those most, which most approach one another. Whenever therefore we suspect any *Idea* to be confus'd, we must examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot easily be separated from: and that will always be found an *Idea* belonging to another Name, and so should be a different thing, from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct, being either the same with it, or making a Part of it, or at least as properly call'd by that Name, as the other it is rank'd under; and so keeps

keeps not that Difference from that other *Idea*, which the different Names import.

§. 12. This, I think, is the *Confusion* proper to *Ideas*, which still carries with it a secret Reference to Names. At least, if there be any other *Confusion* of *Ideas*, this is that which most of all disorders Mens Thoughts and Discourses: *Ideas*, as rank'd under Names, being those that for the most part Men reason of within themselves, and always those which they commune about with others. And therefore where there are suppos'd two different *Ideas* mark'd by two different Names, which are not as distinguishable as the Sounds that stand for them, there never fails to be *Confusion*: And where any *Ideas* are distinct, as the *Ideas* of those two Sounds they are mark'd by, there can be between them no *Confusion*. The Way to prevent it, is to collect and unite into our complex *Idea*, as precisely as is possible, all those Ingredients whereby it is differenc'd from others; and to them so united in a determinate Number and Order, apply steddily the same Name. But this neither accommodating Men's Ease or Vanity, or serving any Design but that of naked Truth, which is not always the thing aim'd at, such Exactness is rather to be wish'd than hoped for. And since the loose Application of Names to undetermin'd, variable, and almost no *Ideas*, serves both to cover our own Ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for Learning and Superiority in Knowledge, it is no wonder that most Men should use it themselves, whilst they complain of it in others. Tho', I think, no small part of the *Confusion* to be found in the Notions of Men, might by Care and Ingenuity be avoided, yet I am far from concluding it every where wilful. Some *Ideas* are so complex, and made up of so many Parts, that the Memory does not easily retain the very same precise Combination of simple *Ideas* under one Name; much less are we able constantly to divine for what precise complex *Idea* such a Name stands in another Man's Use of it. From the first of these, follows *Confusion* in a Man's own Reasonings and Opinions within himself; from the latter, frequent *Confusion* in discoursing and arguing with others. But having more at large treated of Words, their Defects and Abuses, in the following Book, I shall here say no more of it.

§. 13. Our complex *Ideas* being made up of Collections, and so Variety of simple ones, may accordingly be very clear and distinct in one part, and very obscure and confused in another. In a Man who speaks of a *Chiliaedron*, or a Body of a thousand Sides, the *Idea* of the Figure may be very confus'd, tho' that of the Number be very distinct; so that he being able to discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex *Idea*, which depends upon the Number of a Thousand, he is apt to think he has a distinct *Idea* of a *Chiliaedron*; tho' it be plain, he has no precise *Idea* of its Figure, so as to distinguish it by that, from one that has but 999 Sides: the not observing whereof, causes no small Error in Mens Thoughts, and *Confusion* in their Discourses.

§. 14. He that thinks he has a distinct *Idea* of the Figure of a *Chiliaedron*, let him for trial-sake take another parcel of the same uniform Matter, viz. Gold, or Wax, of an equal Bulk, and make it into a Figure of 999 Sides: He will, I doubt not, be able to distinguish these two *Ideas* one from another, by the number of Sides; and reason and argue distinctly about them, whilst he keeps his Thoughts and Reasoning to that part only of these *Ideas*, which is contain'd in their Numbers; as that the Sides of the one could be divided into two equal Numbers, and of the other not, &c. But when he goes about to distinguish them by their Figure, he will there be presently at a loss, and not be able, I think, to frame in his Mind two *Ideas*, one of them distinct from the other, by the bare Figure of these two Pieces of Gold; as he could, if the same parcels of Gold were made one into a Cube, the other a Figure of five Sides. In which incomplete *Ideas*, we are very apt to impose on our selves, and wrangle with others, especially where they have particular and familiar Names. For being satisfy'd in that part of the *Idea*, which we have clear; and the Name which is familiar to us, being apply'd to the whole, containing that part also which is imperfect and obscure; we are apt to use it for that confused Part, and draw Deductions from it, in the obscure part of its Signification, as confidently as we do from the other.

Instance in
Eternity.

§. 15. Having frequently in our Mouths the Name *Eternity*, we are apt to think we have a positive comprehensive *Idea* of it, which is as much as to say, that there is no part of that Duration which is not clearly contain'd in our *Idea*. 'Tis true, that he that thinks so may have a clear *Idea* of Duration; he may also have a very clear *Idea* of a very great Length of Duration; he may also have a clear *Idea* of the Comparison of that great one with still a greater: But it not being possible for him to include in his *Idea* of any Duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole Extent together of a Duration where he supposes no End, that Part of his *Idea*, which is still beyond the Bounds of that large Duration, he represents to his own Thoughts, is very obscure and undetermin'd. And hence it is, that in Disputes and Reasonings concerning Eternity, or any other *Infinite*, we are apt to blunder, and involve our selves in manifest Absurdities.

Divisibility of
Matter.

§. 16. In Matter we have no clear *Ideas* of the Smallness of Parts much beyond the smallest that occur to any of our Senses: and therefore when we talk of the Divisibility of Matter *in infinitum*, tho' we have clear *Ideas* of Division and Divisibility, and have also clear *Ideas* of Parts made out of a whole by Division; yet we have but very obscure and confus'd *Ideas* of Corpuscles, or minute Bodies so to be divided, when by former Divisions they are reduc'd to a Smallness much exceeding the Perception of any of our Senses; and so all that we have clear and distinct *Ideas* of, is of what Division in general or abstractly is, and the Relation of *Totum* and *Pars*: But of the Bulk of the Body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain Progressions, I think, we have no clear nor distinct *Idea* at all. For I ask any one, Whether taking the smallest Atom of Dust he ever saw, he has any distinct *Idea* (bating still the Number which concerns not Extension) betwixt the 100,000, and the 1000,000 Part of it. Or if he thinks he can refine his *Ideas* to that degree, without losing sight of them, let him add ten Cyphers to each of those Numbers. Such a degree of Smallness is not unreasonable to be suppos'd, since a Division carry'd on so far, brings it no nearer the End of infinite Division, than the first Division into two Halfs does. I must confess, for my part, I have no clear distinct *Ideas* of the different Bulk or Extension of those Bodies, having but a very obscure one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of Division of Bodies *in infinitum*, our *Idea* of their distinct Bulks, which is the Subject and Foundation of Division, comes, after a little Progression, to be confounded, and almost lost in Obscurity. For that *Idea*, which is to represent only Bigness, must be very obscure and confus'd, which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big, but only by Number; so that we have clear distinct *Ideas*, we may say, of ten and one, but no distinct *Ideas* of two such Extensions. 'Tis plain from hence, that when we talk of infinite Divisibility of Body, or Extension, our distinct and clear *Ideas* are only of Numbers; but the clear distinct *Ideas* of Extension, after some Progress of Division, is quite lost: and of such minute Parts we have no distinct *Ideas* at all; but it returns, as all our *Ideas* of Infinite do, at last to that of Number always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any distinct *Idea* of actual infinite Parts. We have, 'tis true, a clear *Idea* of Division, as often as we think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear *Idea* of infinite Parts in Matter, than we have a clear *Idea* of an infinite Number, by being able still to add new Numbers to any assign'd Number we have: Endless Divisibility giving us no more a clear and distinct *Idea* of actually infinite Parts, than endless Addibility (if I may so speak) gives us a clear and distinct *Idea* of an actually infinite Number; they both being only in a Power still of increasing the Number, be it already as great as it will. So that of what remains to be added (wherein consists the Infinity) we have but an obscure, imperfect, and confus'd *Idea*; from or about which we can argue or reason with no Certainty or Clearness, no more than we can in Arithmetick, about a Number of which we have no such distinct *Idea* as we have of 4 or 100; but only this relative obscure one, that compar'd to any other, it is still bigger: And we have no more a clear positive *Idea* of it when we say or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400,000,000, than if we should say it is bigger than 40, or 4; 400,000,000, having no nearer a Proportion to the End of Addition, or Number, than 4. For he that adds only 4 to 4, and so proceeds, shall as soon come to the End of all

all Addition, as he that adds 400,000,000, to 400,000,000. And so likewise in Eternity, he that has an *Idea* of but four Years, has as much a positive compleat *Idea* of Eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000 of Years: For what remains of Eternity beyond either of these two Numbers of Years, is as clear to the one as the other; neither of them has any clear positive *Idea* of it at all. For he that adds only 4 Years to 4, and so on, shall as soon reach Eternity, as he that adds 400,000,000 of Years, and so on; or if he please, doubles the Increase as often as he will: The remaining Abyss being still as far beyond the End of all these Progressions, as it is from the Length of a Day or an Hour. For nothing finite bears any Proportion to infinite; and therefore our *Ideas*, which are all finite, cannot bear any. Thus it is also in our *Idea* of *Extension*, when we increase it by Addition, as well as when we diminish it by Division, and would enlarge our Thoughts to infinite Space. After a few Doublings of those *Ideas* of Extension, which are the largest we are accusom'd to have, we lose the clear distinct *Idea* of that Space: It becomes a confus'dly great one, with a Surplus of still greater; about which, when we would argue or reason, we shall always find ourselves at a loss; confus'd *Ideas* in our Arguings and Deductions from that part of them which is confus'd, always leading us into Confusion.

C H A P. XXX.

Of Real and Fantastical Ideas.

§. 1. **B**ESIDES what we have already mention'd concerning *Ideas*, other *Real Ideas* are Considerations belong to them, in reference to things from whence they *conformable to* are taken; or which they may be suppos'd to represent: and thus, I think, they *their Archetypes* may come under a threefold Distinction; and are,

First, Either real or fantastical.

Secondly, Adequate or inadequate.

Thirdly, True or false.

First, By *real Ideas*, I mean such as have a Foundation in Nature; such as have a Conformity with the real Being and Existence of things, or with their Archetypes. *Fantastical* or *Chimerical*, I call such as have no Foundation in Nature, nor have any Conformity with that Reality of Being to which they are tacitly refer'd as to their Archetypes. If we examine the several sorts of *Ideas* before-mention'd, we shall find that,

§. 2. *First*, Our *simple Ideas* are all real, all agree to the Reality of things. *Simple Ideas* Not that they are all of them the Images or Representations of what does exist; *all real*. the contrary whereof, in all but the primary Qualities of Bodies, hath been already shewn. But tho' Whiteness and Coldness are no more in Snow than Pain is; yet those *Ideas* of Whiteness and Coldness, Pain, &c. being in us the Effects of Powers in things without us, ordain'd by our Maker to produce in us such Sensations; they are *real Ideas* in us, whereby we distinguish the Qualities that are really in things themselves. For these several Appearances being design'd to be the Marks whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with, our *Ideas* do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing Characters, whether they be only constant Effects, or else exact Resemblances of something in the things themselves; the Reality lying in that steady Correspondence they have with the distinct Constitutions of real Beings. But whether they answer to those Constitutions, as to Causes or Patterns, it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly produc'd by them. And thus our *simple Ideas* are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those Powers of things which produce them in our Minds, that being all that is requisite to make them real, and not Fictions at Pleasure. For in *simple Ideas* (as has been shewn) the Mind is wholly confin'd to the Operation of things upon it, and can make to it self no *simple Idea*, more than what it has receiv'd.

Complex Ideas
are voluntary
Combinations.

§. 3. Tho' the Mind be wholly passive in respect of its simple *Ideas*; yet, I think, we may say, it is not so in respect of its complex *Ideas*: for those being Combinations of simple *Ideas* put together, and united under one general Name; 'tis plain that the Mind of Man uses some kind of Liberty, in forming those complex *Ideas*: How else comes it to pass that one Man's *Idea* of Gold, or Justice, is different from another's? but because he has put in or left out of his some simple *Idea*, which the other has not. The Question then is, Which of these are real, and which barely imaginary Combinations? What Collections agree to the Reality of things, and what not? And to this I say, That,

Mix'd Modes
made of con-
sistent Ideas,
are real.

§. 4. Secondly, *Mix'd Modes and Relations* having no other Reality but what they have in the Minds of Men, there is nothing more requir'd to those kind of *Ideas* to make them real, but that they be so fram'd, that there be a Possibility of existing conformable to them. These *Ideas* themselves being Archetypes, cannot differ from their Archetypes, and so cannot be chimerical, unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent *Ideas*. Indeed, as any of them have the Names of a known Language assign'd to them, by which he that has them in his Mind would signify them to others, so bare Possibility of existing is not enough; they must have a Conformity to the ordinary Signification of the Name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantastical: as if a Man would give the Name of Justice to that *Idea*, which common Use calls Liberality. But this Fantasticalness relates more to Propriety of Speech, than Reality of *Ideas*: For a Man to be undisturb'd in Danger, sedately to consider what is fittest to be done, and to execute it steddily, is a mix'd Mode, or a complex *Idea* of an Action which may exist. But to be undisturb'd in Danger, without using one's Reason or Industry, is what is also possible to be; and so is as real an *Idea* as the other. Tho' the first of these having the Name *Courage* given to it, may, in respect of that Name, be a right or wrong *Idea*: But the other, whilst it has not a common receiv'd Name of any known Language assign'd to it, is not capable of any Deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but it self.

Ideas of Sub-
stances are real,
when they agree
with the Exis-
tence of things.

§. 5. Thirdly, Our complex *Ideas of Substances* being made all of them in reference to things existing without us, and intended to be Representations of Substances, as they really are, are no farther real, than as they are such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are really united, and co-exist in things without us. On the contrary, those are fantastical which are made up of such Collections of simple *Ideas* as were really never united, never were found together in any Substance; v. g. a rational Creature, consisting of a Horse's Head, join'd to a Body of human Shape, or such as the *Centaurs* are describ'd: or, a Body yellow, very maleable, fusible, and fix'd; but lighter than common Water: or an uniform, unorganiz'd Body, consisting, as to Sense, all of similar Parts, with Perception and voluntary Motion join'd to it. Whether such Substances as these can possibly exist or no, 'tis probable we do not know: But be that as it will, these *Ideas* of Substances being made conformable to no Pattern existing that we know, and consisting of such Collections of *Ideas*, as no Substance ever shew'd us united together, they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary: But much more are those complex *Ideas* so, which contain in them any Inconsistency or Contradiction of their Parts.

C H A P. XXXI.

Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

Adequate Ide-
as are such as
perfectly repre-
sent their Ar-
chetypes.

§. 1. OF our real *Ideas*, some are adequate, and some are inadequate. Those I call adequate, which perfectly represent those Archetypes which the Mind supposes them taken from; which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. Inadequate *Ideas* are such, which are but a partial or incomplete Representation of those Archetypes to which they are refer'd. Upon which account it is plain,

§. 2.

§. 2. *First*, That all our simple Ideas are adequate. Because being nothing but the Effects of certain Powers in things, fitted and ordain'd by GOD to produce such Sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those Powers: and we are sure they agree to the Reality of things. For if Sugar produce in us the *Ideas* which we call Whiteness and Sweetness, we are sure there is a Power in Sugar to produce those *Ideas* in our Minds, or else they could not have been produc'd by it. And so each Sensation answering the Power that operates on any of our Senses, the *Idea* so produc'd is a real *Idea*, (and not a Fiction of the Mind, which has no Power to produce any simple *Idea*;) and cannot but be adequate, since it ought only to answer that Power: And so all simple *Ideas* are adequate. 'Tis true, the things producing in us these simple *Ideas* are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the Causes of them; but as if those *Ideas* were real Beings in them. For tho' Fire be call'd painful to the Touch, whereby is signify'd the Power of producing in us the *Idea* of Pain, yet it is denominated also Light and Hot; as if Light and Heat were really something in the Fire more than a Power to excite these *Ideas* in us; and therefore are call'd *Qualities* in, or of the Fire. But these being nothing, in truth, but Powers to excite such *Ideas* in us, I must, in that sense, be understood when I speak of secondary *Qualities*, as being in things; or of their *Ideas*, as being in the Objects that excite them in us. Such ways of speaking, tho' accommodated to the vulgar Notions, without which one cannot be well understood; yet truly signify nothing but those Powers which are in things to excite certain Sensation or *Ideas* in us: since were there no fit Organs to receive the Impressions Fire makes on the Sight and Touch, nor a Mind join'd to those Organs to receive the *Ideas* of Light and Heat by those Impressions from the Fire or the Sun, there would yet be no more Light or Heat in the World, than there would be Pain, if there were no sensible Creature to feel it, tho' the Sun should continue just as it is now, and Mount *Aetna* flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and Extension, and the Termination of it, Figure, with Motion and Rest, whereof we have the *Ideas*, would be really in the World as they are, whether there were any sensible Being to perceive them or no: And therefore we have reason to look on those as the real Modifications of Matter, and such as are the exciting Causes of all our various Sensations from Bodies. But this being an Enquiry not belonging to this Place, I shall enter no farther into it, but proceed to shew what complex *Ideas* are adequate, and what not.

§. 3. *Secondly*, Our complex Ideas of Modes, being voluntary Collections of simple *Ideas* which the Mind puts together without reference to any real Archetypes or standing Patterns existing any where, are and cannot but be adequate *Ideas*. Because they not being intended for Copies of things really existing, but for Archetypes made by the Mind to rank and denominate things by, cannot want any thing; they having each of them that Combination of *Ideas*, and thereby that Perfection which the Mind intended they should: so that the Mind acquiesces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the *Idea* of a Figure, with three Sides meeting in three Angles, I have a compleat *Idea*, wherein I require nothing else to make it perfect. That the Mind is satisfy'd with the Perfection of this its *Idea*, is plain in that it does not conceive, that any Understanding hath, or can have a more compleat or perfect *Idea* of that thing it signifies by the word *Triangle*, supposing it to exist, than it self has in that complex *Idea* of three Sides, and three Angles; in which is contain'd all that is, or can be essential to it, or necessary to compleat it, wherever or however it exists. But in our *Ideas* of Substances it is otherwise. For there desiring to copy things as they really do exist, and to represent to our selves that Constitution on which all their Properties depend, we perceive our *Ideas* attain not that Perfection we intend: We find they still want something we should be glad were in them; and so are all inadequate. But mix'd Modes and Relations, being Archetypes without Patterns, and so having nothing to represent but themselves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being so to it self. He that at first put together the *Idea* of Danger perceiv'd, Absence of Disorder from Fear, sedate Consideration from what was justly to be done, and executing of that without Disturbance, or being deter'd by the Danger

Danger of it, had certainly in his Mind that complex *Idea* made up of that Combination; and intending to be nothing else, but what it is, nor to have in it any other simple *Ideas*, but what it hath, it could not also but be an *adequate Idea*: And laying this up in his Memory, with the name *Courage* annex'd to it, to signify it to others, and denominate from thence any Action he should observe to agree with it, had thereby a Standard to measure and denominate Actions by, as they agreed to it. This *Idea* thus made, and laid up for a Pattern, must necessarily be *adequate*, being refer'd to nothing else but it self, nor made by any other Original, but the Good-liking and Will of him that first made this Combination.

Modes in reference to settled Names, may be inadequate.

§. 4. Indeed another coming after, and in Conversation learning from him the word *Courage*, may make an *Idea*, to which he gives that name *Courage*, different from what the first Author apply'd it to, and has in his Mind, when he uses it. And in this Case, if he designs that his *Idea* in Thinking should be conformable to the other's *Idea*, as the name he uses in speaking is conformable in Sound to his, from whom he learn'd it, his *Idea* may be very wrong and *inadequate*: Because in this Case, making the other Man's *Idea* the Pattern of his *Idea* in thinking, as the other Man's Word or Sound is the Pattern of his in speaking, his *Idea* is so far defective and *inadequate*, as it is distant from the Archetype and Pattern he refers it to, and intends to express and signify by the Name he uses for it; which Name he would have to be a Sign of the other Man's *Idea* (to which, in it's proper Use, it is primarily annex'd) and of his own, as agreeing to it: To which, if his own does not exactly correspond, it is faulty and inadequate.

§. 5. Therefore these complex *Ideas of Modes*, when they are refer'd by the Mind, and intended to correspond to the *Ideas* in the Mind of some other intelligent Being, express'd by the Names we apply to them, they may be very deficient, wrong and *inadequate*; because they agree not to that, which the Mind designs to be their Archetype and Pattern: In which respect only, any *Idea of Modes* can be wrong, imperfect or *inadequate*. And on this Account our *Ideas of mix'd Modes* are the most liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper speaking, than knowing right.

Ideas of Substances, as refer'd to real Essences, not adequate.

§. 6. Thirdly, What *Ideas we have of Substances*, I have above shewn. Now those *Ideas* have in the Mind a double Reference: 1. Sometimes they are refer'd to a suppos'd real Essence of each Species of Things. 2. Sometimes they are only design'd to be Pictures and Representations in the Mind of Things that do exist by *Ideas* of those Qualities that are discoverable in them. In both which ways, these Copies of those Originals and Archetypes, are imperfect and *inadequate*.

First, It is usual for Men to make the Names of Substances stand for Things, as suppos'd to have certain real Essences, whereby they are of this or that Species: And Names standing for nothing but the *Ideas* that are in Mens Minds, they must consequently refer their *Ideas* to such real Essences, as to their Archetypes. That Men (especially such as have been bred up in the Learning taught in this Part of the World) do suppose certain specifick Essences of Substances, which each Individual, in its several kinds, is made conformable to, and partakes of; is so far from needing Proof, that it will be thought strange if any one should do otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the specifick Names they rank particular Substances under, to Things as distinguish'd by such specifick real Essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss, if it should be doubted, whether he call'd himself Man, with any other Meaning, than as having the real Essence of a Man? And yet if you demand what those real Essences are, 'tis plain Men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows, that the *Ideas* they have in their Minds, being refer'd to real Essences, as to Archetypes which are unknown, must be so far from being *adequate*, that they cannot be suppos'd to be any Representation of them at all. The complex *Ideas* we have of Substances, are, as it has been shewn, certain Collections of simple *Ideas* that have been observ'd or suppos'd constantly to exist together. But such a complex *Idea* cannot be the real Essence of any Substance; for then the Properties we discover in that Body, would depend on that complex *Idea*, and be deducible from it, and their necessary Connection

nection with it be known; as all Properties of a Triangle depend on, and as far as they are discoverable, are deducible from the complex *Idea* of three Lines, including a Space. But it is plain, that in our complex *Ideas* of Substances, are not contain'd such *Ideas*, on which all the other Qualities, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common *Idea* Men have of *Iron*, is a Body of a certain Colour, Weight and Hardness; and a Property that they look on as belonging to it, is Malleableness. But yet this Property has no necessary Connection with that complex *Idea*, or any part of it: And there is no more reason to think that Malleableness depends on that Colour, Weight and Hardness, than that that Colour, or that Weight depends on its Malleableness. And yet, tho' we know nothing of these real Essence, there is nothing more ordinary, than that Men should attribute the sorts of Things to such Essences. The particular parcel of Matter, which makes the Ring I have on my Finger, is forwardly, by most Men, 'suppos'd to have a real Essence, whereby it is *Gold*; and from whence those Qualities flow, which I find in it, *viz.* its peculiar Colour, Weight, Hardness, Fusibility, Fixedness, and change of Colour upon a slight touch of Mercury, &c. This Essence, from which all these Properties flow, when I enquire into it, and search after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover: The farthest I can go, is only to presume, that it being nothing but Body, its real Essence, or internal Constitution, on which these Qualities depend, can be nothing but the Figure, Size and Connection of its solid Parts; of neither of which, having any distinct Perception at all, can I have any *Idea* of its Essence, which is the Cause that it has that particular shining Yellowness, a greater Weight than any thing I know of the same Bulk, and a Fitness to have its Colour chang'd by the touch of Quick-silver. If any one will say, that the real Essence and internal Constitution, on which these Properties depend, is not the Figure, Size and Arrangement or Connection of its solid Parts, but something else, call'd its particular *Form*; I am farther from having any *Idea* of its real Essence, than I was before: for I have an *Idea* of a Figure, Size and Situation of solid Parts in general, tho' I have none of the particular Figure, Size, or putting together of Parts, whereby the Qualities above-mention'd are produc'd; which Qualities I find in that particular parcel of Matter that is on my Finger, and not in another parcel of Matter, with which I cut the Pen I write with. But when I am told, that something besides the Figure, Size and Posture of the solid Parts of that Body, is its Essence, something call'd *substantial Form*; of that, I confess, I have no *Idea* at all, but only of the *Sound Form*, which is far enough from an *Idea* of its real Essence, or Constitution. The like Ignorance as I have of the real Essence of this particular Substance, I have also of the real Essence of all other natural ones: Of which Essences, I confess I have no distinct *Ideas* at all; and I am apt to suppose others, when they examine their own Knowledge, will find in themselves, in this one Point, the same sort of Ignorance.

§. 7. Now then, when Men apply to this particular parcel of Matter on my Finger, a general Name already in Use, and denominate it *Gold*, do they not ordinarily, or are they not understood to give it that Name as belonging to a particular Species of Bodies, having a real internal Essence; by having of which Essence, this particular Substance comes to be of that Species, and to be call'd by that Name? If it be so, as it is plain it is, the Name, by which Things are mark'd, as having that Essence, must be refer'd primarily to that Essence; and consequently the *Idea* to which that Name is given, must be refer'd also to that Essence, and be intended to represent it. Which Essence, since they, who so use the Names, know not, their *Ideas of Substances* must be *all adequate* in that respect, as not containing in them that real Essence which the Mind intends they should.

§. 8. *Secondly*, Those who neglecting that useless Supposition of unknown *Ideas of Substances*, whereby they are distinguish'd, endeavour to copy the Substances *as Collections of their Qualities*, that exist in the World, by putting together the *Ideas* of those sensible Qualities which are found co-existing in them, tho' they come much nearer a Likeness of them, than those who imagine they know not what real specifick Essences; *inadequate*: yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate *Ideas* of those Substances they would thus copy into their Minds; nor do those Copies exactly and fully contain all

that is to be found in their Archetypes. Because those Qualities, and Powers of Substances, whereof we make their complex *Ideas*, are so many and various, that no Man's complex *Idea* contains them all. That our abstract *Ideas* of Substances do not contain in them all the simple *Ideas* that are united in the things themselves, is evident, in that Men do rarely put into their complex *Idea* of any Substance, all the simple *Ideas* they do know to exist in it. Because endeavouring to make the Signification of their specifick Names as clear, and as little cumbersome as they can, they make their specifick *Ideas* of the sorts of Substances, for the most part, of a few of those simple *Ideas* which are to be found in them: But these having no original Precedency, or Right to be put in, and make the specifick *Idea* more than others that are left out, 'tis plain that both these ways our *Ideas* of Substances are deficient and inadequate. The simple *Ideas*, whereof we make our complex ones of Substances, are all of them (bating only the Figure and Bulk of some sorts) Powers, which being Relations to other Substances, we can never be sure that we know all the Powers that are in any one Body, till we have try'd what Changes it is fitted to give to, or receive from other Substances, in their several ways of Application: Which being impossible to be try'd upon any one Body, much less upon all, it is impossible we should have adequate *Ideas* of any Substance, made up of a Collection of all its Properties.

§. 9. Whosoever first lit on a parcel of that sort of Substance we denote by the word *Gold*, could not rationally take the Bulk and Figure he observ'd in that Lump, to depend on its real Essence or internal Constitution. Therefore those never went into his *Idea* of that Species of Body; but its peculiar Colour, perhaps, and Weight, were the first he abstracted from it, to make the complex *Idea* of that Species. Which both are but Powers; the one to affect our Eyes after such a manner, and to produce in us that *Idea* we call Yellow; and the other to force upwards any other Body of equal Bulk, they being put into a pair of equal Scales, one against another. Another perhaps added to these the *Ideas* of Fusibility and Fixedness, two other passive Powers, in relation to the Operation of Fire upon it; another, its Ductility and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, two other Powers relating to the Operation of other Bodies, in changing its outward Figure or Separation of it into insensible Parts. These, or part of these, put together, usually make the complex *Idea* in Mens Minds, of that sort of Body we call *Gold*.

§. 10. But no one, who hath consider'd the Properties of Bodies in general, or this sort in particular, can doubt that this call'd *Gold* has infinite other Properties, not contain'd in that complex *Idea*. Some who have examin'd this Species more accurately, could, I believe, enumerate ten times as many Properties in *Gold*, all of them as inseparable from its internal Constitution, as its Colour or Weight: And, 'tis probable, if any one knew all the Properties that are by divers Men known of this Metal, there would an hundred times as many *Ideas* go to the complex *Idea* of *Gold*, as any one Man yet has in his; and yet perhaps that not be the thousandth part of what is to be discover'd in it. The Changes which that one Body is apt to receive, and make in other Bodies, upon a due Application, exceeding far not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear so much a Paradox to any one, who will but consider how far Men are yet from knowing all the Properties of that one, no very compound Figure, a *Triangle*; tho' it be no small number that are already by Mathematicians discover'd of it.

Ideas of Substances, as Collections of their Qualities, are all inadequate.

§. 11. So that all our complex *Ideas* of Substances are imperfect and inadequate. Which would be so also in Mathematical Figures, if we were to have our complex *Ideas* of them, only by collecting their Properties in reference to other Figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our *Ideas* be of an *Ellipsis*, if we had no other *Idea* of it, but some few of its Properties? Whereas having in our plain *Idea* the whole Essence of that Figure, we from thence discover those Properties, and demonstratively see how they flow, and are inseparable from it.

Simple Ideas
ἐκτυπα, and
adequate.

§. 12. Thus the Mind has three sorts of abstract *Ideas* or nominal Essences: First, Simple *Ideas*, which are ἐκτυπα, or Copies; but yet certainly adequate, Because being intended to express nothing but the Power in things to produce in the Mind such a Sensation, that Sensation, when it is produc'd, cannot but be

be the Effect of that Power. So the Paper I write on, having the Power, in the Light (I speak according to the common Motion of Light) to produce in me the Sensation which I call White, it cannot but be the Effect of such a Power, in something without the Mind; since the Mind has not the Power to produce any such *Idea* in it self, and being meant for nothing else but the Effect of such a Power, that simple *Idea* is real and *adequate*: the Sensation of White, in my mind, being the Effect of that Power; which is in the Paper to produce it, is perfectly *adequate* to that Power; or else, that Power would produce a different *Idea*.

§. 13. Secondly, The complex Ideas of Substances are *Ecotypes*, Copies too; but not perfect ones, not *adequate*: which is very evident to the Mind, in that it plainly perceives that whatever Collection of simple *Ideas* it makes of any Substance that exists, it cannot be sure that it exactly answers all that are in that Substance: since not having try'd all the Operations, of all other Substances upon it, and found all the Alterations it would receive from, or cause in other Substances, it cannot have an exact *adequate* Collection of all its active and passive Capacities; and so not have an *adequate* complex *Idea* of the Powers of any Substance existing, and its Relations, which is that sort of complex *Idea* of Substances we have. And after all, if we could have, and actually had, in our complex *Idea*, an exact Collection of all the secondary Qualities or Powers of any Substance, we should not yet thereby have an *Idea* of the Essence of that thing. For since the Powers or Qualities that are observable by us, are not the real Essence of that Substance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any Collection whatsoever of these Qualities, cannot be the real Essence of that thing. Whereby it is plain, that our *Ideas* of Substances are not *adequate*; are not what the Mind intends them to be. Besides, a Man has no *Idea* of Substance in general, nor knows what Substance is in it self.

§. 14. Thirdly, Complex Ideas of Modes and Relations, are Originals, and Archetypes; are not Copies, nor made after the Pattern of any real Existence, to which the Mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to answer. These being such Collections of simple *Ideas*, that the Mind it self puts together, and such Collections, that each of them contains in it precisely all that the Mind intends it should, they are Archetypes and Essences of Modes that may exist; and so are design'd only for, and belong only to such Modes, as when they do exist, have an exact Conformity with those complex *Ideas*. The *Ideas* therefore of Modes and Relations cannot but be *adequate*.

Ideas of Substances are εντυπα, inadequate.

Ideas of Modes and Relations, are Archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of True and False Ideas.

§. 1. **T**HO Truth and Falshood belong, in Propriety of Speech, only to Propositions; yet *Ideas* are oftentimes term'd *true* or *false* (as what Words are there, that are not used with great Latitude, and with some Deviation from their strict and proper Significations?) Tho', I think, that when *Ideas* themselves are term'd *true* or *false*, there is still some secret or tacit Proposition, which is the Foundation of that Denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the particular Occasions wherein they come to be call'd *true* or *false*. In all which, we shall find some kind of Affirmation or Negation, which is the reason of that Denomination. For our *Ideas* being nothing but bare Appearances or Perceptions in our Minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be *true* or *false*, no more than a single Name of any thing can be said to be *true* or *false*.

Truth and Falshood properly belong to Propositions.

§. 2. Indeed both *Ideas* and Words may be said to be *true* in a metaphysical sense of the word Truth, as all other things, that any way exist, are said to be *true*; i. e. really to be such as they exist. Tho' in things call'd *true*, even in that sense, there is perhaps a secret Reference to our *Ideas*, look'd upon as the Standards of that Truth, which amounts to a mental Proposition, tho' it be usually not taken notice of.

Metaphysical Truth contains a tacit Proposition.

No Idea, as an
Appearance in
the Mind, true
or false.

Ideas refer'd
to any thing,
may be true or
false.

Other Mens
Ideas, real
Existence, and
suppos'd real
Essences, are
what Men u-
sually refer
their Ideas to.

The Cause of
such Referen-
ces.

Cause of such
References.

§. 3. But 'tis not in that metaphysical Sense of Truth which we enquire here, when we examine whether our *Ideas* are capable of being *true* or *false*; but in the more ordinary Acceptation of these words: And so I say, that the *Ideas* in our Minds being only so many Perception, or Appearances there, none of them are *false*; the *Idea* of a Centaur having no more Falshood in it, when it appears in our Minds, than the name Centaur has Falshood in it, when it is pronounc'd by our Mouths or written on Paper. For Truth or Falshood lying always in some Affirmation, or Negation, mental or verbal, our *Ideas* are *not capable*, any of them, of being *false*, till the Mind passes some Judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies something of them.

§. 4. Whenever the Mind refers any of its *Ideas* to any thing extraneous to them, they are then *capable to be call'd true or false*. Because the Mind in such a Reference makes a tacit Supposition of their Conformity to that thing: which Supposition, as it happens to be *true* or *false*, so the *Ideas* themselves come to be denominated. The most usual Cases wherein this happens, are these following:

§. 5. First, When the Mind supposes any *Idea* it has, *conformable* to that in other Mens Minds, call'd by the same common Name; v. g. when the Mind intends or judges its *Ideas* of Justice, Temperance, Religion, to be the same with what other Men give those Names to.

Secondly, When the Mind supposes any *Idea* it has in it self, to be *conformable* to some real Existence. Thus the two *Ideas*, of a Man and a Centaur, suppos'd to be the *Ideas* of real Substances, are the one *true*, and the other *false*; the one having a Conformity to what has really existed, the other not.

Thirdly, When the Mind refers any of its *Ideas* to that real Constitution and Essence of any thing, whereon all its properties depend: and thus the greatest part, if not all our *Ideas* of Substances, are *false*.

§. 6. These Suppositions the Mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own *Ideas*. But yet, if we will examine it, we shall find it is chiefly, if not only, concerning its abstract complex *Ideas*. For the natural Tendency of the Mind being towards Knowledge; and finding that, if it should proceed by and dwell upon only particular things, its Progress would be very slow, and its Work endless: Therefore to shorten its way to Knowledge, and make each Perception more comprehensive; the first thing it does, as the Foundation of the easier enlarging its Knowledge, either by Contemplation of the things themselves that it would know, or Conference with others about them, is to bind them into Bundles, and rank them so into Sorts, that what Knowledge it gets of any of them, it may thereby with Assurance extend to all of that sort; and so advance by larger Steps in that, which is its great business, Knowledge. This, as I have elsewhere shew'd, is the reason why we collect things under comprehensive *Ideas*, with Names annex'd to them, into *Genera* and *Species*, i. e. into Kinds and Sorts.

§. 7. If therefore we will warily attend to the Motions of the Mind, and observe what Course it usually takes in its way to Knowledge; we shall, I think, find that the Mind having got any *Idea*, which it thinks may have use of, either in Contemplation or Discourse, the first thing it does, is to abstract it, and then get a name to it; and so lay it up in its Store-house, the Memory, as containing the Essence of a sort of things, of which that Name is always to be the Mark. Hence it is, that we may often observe, that when any one sees a new thing of a kind that he knows not, he presently asks what it is, meaning by that Enquiry nothing but the Name. As if the Name carry'd with it the Knowledge of the Species, or the Essence of it: whereof it is indeed used as the Mark, and is generally suppos'd annex'd to it.

§. 8. But this abstract *Idea* being something in the Mind between the Thing that exists, and the Name that is given to it; it is in our *Ideas*, that both the Rightness of our Knowledge, and the Propriety or Intelligibleness of our Speaking, consists. And hence it is, that Men are so forward to suppose, that the abstract *Ideas* they have in their Minds, are such as agree to the things existing without them, to which they are refer'd; and are the same also, to which the Names they give them do by the Use and Propriety of that Language belong. For without this double Conformity of their *Ideas*, they find they should both

both think amiss of things in themselves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

§. 9. First then, I say, That when the Truth of our Ideas is judg'd of, by the Conformity they have to the Ideas which other Men have, and commonly signify by the same Name, they may be any of them false. But yet simple Ideas are least of all liable to be so mistaken; because a Man by his Senses, and every Day's Observation, may easily satisfy himself what the simple Ideas are, which their several Names that are in common use stand for; they being but few in number, and such as if he doubts or mistakes in, he may easily rectify by the Objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is seldom, that any one mistakes in his Names of simple Ideas; or applies the Name *Red*, to the Idea *Green*; or the Name *Sweet*, to the Idea *Bitter*: much less are Men apt to confound the Names of Ideas, belonging to different Senses; and call a Colour by the name of a Taste, &c. whereby it is evident, that the simple Ideas they call by any Name, are commonly the same that others have and mean when they use the same Names.

§. 10. Complex Ideas are much more liable to be false in this respect; and the complex Ideas of mix'd Modes, much more than those of Substances: Because in Substances (especially those which the common and unborrow'd Names of any Language are apply'd to) some remarkable sensible Qualities, serving ordinarily to distinguish one sort from another, easily preserve those, who take any care in the Use of their words, from applying them to sorts of Substances, to which they do not at all belong. But in mix'd Modes we are much more uncertain; it being not so easy to determine of several Actions, whether they are to be call'd *Justice* or *Cruelty*, *Liberality* or *Prodigality*. And so in referring our Ideas to those of other Men, call'd by the same Names, ours may be false; and the Idea in our Minds, which we express by the word *Justice*, may perhaps be that which ought to have another Name.

§. 11. But whether or no, our Ideas of mix'd Modes are more liable than any sort to be different from those of other Men, which are mark'd by the same Names; this at least is certain, That this sort of Falshood is much more familiarly attributed to our Ideas of mix'd Modes, than to any other. When a Man is thought to have a false Idea of *Justice*, or *Gratitude*, or *Glory*, it is for no other reason, but that his agrees not with the Ideas which each of those Names are the Signs of in other Men.

§. 12. The Reason whereof seems to me to be this, That the abstract Ideas of mix'd Modes, being Mens voluntary Combinations of such a precise Collection of simple Ideas; and so the Essence of each Species being made by Men alone, whereof we have no other sensible Standard existing any where, but the Name it self, or the Definition of that Name: we have nothing else to refer these our Ideas of mix'd Modes to, as a Standard to which we would conform them, but the Ideas of those who are thought to use those Names in their most proper Significations; and so as our Ideas conform or differ from them, they pass for true or false. And thus much concerning the Truth and Falshood of our Ideas, in reference to their Names.

§. 13. Secondly, As to the Truth and Falshood of our Ideas, in reference to the real Existence of things, when that is made the Standard of their Truth, none of them can be term'd false, but only our complex Ideas of Substances.

§. 14. First, Our simple Ideas being barely such Perceptions as God has fitted us to receive, and given Power to external Objects to produce in us by establish'd Laws and Ways, suitable to his Wisdom and Goodness, tho' incomprehensible to us; their Truth consists in nothing else but in such Appearances as are produc'd in us, and must be suitable to those Powers he has plac'd in external Objects, or else they could not be produc'd in us: And thus answering those Powers, they are what they should be, true Ideas. Nor do they become liable to any Imputation of Falshood, if the Mind (as in most Men I believe it does) judges these Ideas to be in the things themselves. For God, in his Wisdom, having set them as Marks of Distinction in things, whereby we may be able to discern one thing from another, and so chuse any of them for our Uses, as we have occasion; it alters not the nature of our simple Idea, whether we think that the Idea of *Blue* be in the *Violet* it self, or in our Mind only; and only the Power of producing it by the Texture of its Parts, reflecting the Particles of Light,

Simple Ideas may be false, in reference to others of the same Name, but are least liable to be so.

Ideas of mix'd Modes most liable to be false in this Sense.

Or at least to be thought false.

And why.

As refer'd to real Existences none of our Ideas can be false, but those of Substances.

First, Simple Ideas in this sense not false, and why.

Light, after a certain manner, to be in the Violet it self. For that Texture in the Object, by a regular and constant Operation, producing the same *Idea* of Blue in us, it serves us to distinguish, by our Eyes, that from any other thing, whether that distinguishing Mark, as it is really in the *Violet*, be only a peculiar Texture of Parts, or else that very Colour, the *Idea* whereof (which is in us) is the exact Resemblance. And it is equally from that Appearance to be denominated *Blue*, whether it be that real Colour, or only a peculiar Texture in it, that causes in us that *Idea*: since the name *Blue* notes properly nothing, but that Mark of Distinction that is in a *Violet*, discernible only by our Eyes, whatever it consists in, that being beyond our Capacities distinctly to know, and perhaps would be of less use to us, if we had Faculties to discern.

Tho' one Man's Idea of Blue should be different from another's.

§. 15. Neither would it carry any Imputation of *Falshood* to our simple *Ideas*, if by the different Structure of our Organs it were so order'd, that the same Object should produce in several Mens Minds different *Ideas* at the same time; v. g. if the *Idea* that a *Violet* produc'd in one Mans Mind by his Eyes were the same that a *Marigold* produc'd in another Man's, and *vice versa*. For since this could never be known, because one Man's Mind could not pass into another's Man's Body, to perceive what Appearances were produc'd by those Organs; neither the *Ideas* hereby, nor the Names would be at all confounded, or any *Falshood* be in either. For all things that had the Texture of a *Violet*, producing constantly the *Idea* which he call'd *Blue*; and those which had the Texture of a *Marigold*, producing constantly the *Idea* which he has constantly call'd *Yellow*; whatever those Appearances were in his Mind, he would be able as regularly to distinguish things for his Use by those Appearances, and understand and signify those Distinctions mark'd by the Names *Blue* and *Yellow*, as if the Appearances, or *Ideas* in his Mind, receiv'd from those two Flowers, were exactly the same with the *Ideas* in other Mens Minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the sensible *Ideas* produc'd by any Object in different mens Minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike. For which Opinion, I think, there might be many Reasons offer'd: But that being besides my present Business, I shall not trouble my Reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary Supposition, if it could be prov'd, is of little use, either for the Improvement of our Knowledge, or Conveniency of Life; and so we need not trouble our selves to examine it.

First, Simple Ideas in this Sense not false, and why.

§. 16. From what has been said concerning our simple *Ideas*, I think it evident, That our simple *Ideas* can none of them be false in respect of things existing without us. For the Truth of these Appearances, or Perceptions in our Minds, consisting, as has been said, only in their being answerable to the Powers in external Objects, to produce by our Senses such Appearances in us; and each of them being in the Mind, such as it is, suitable to the Power that produc'd it, and which alone it represents; it cannot upon that account, or as refer'd to such a Pattern, be false. *Blue* or *Yellow*, *Bitter* or *Sweet*, can never be false *Ideas*; these Perceptions in the Mind are just such as they are there, answering the Powers appointed by God to produce them; and so are truly what they are and are intended to be. Indeed the Names may be misapply'd; but that in this respect makes no *Falshood* in the *Ideas*: as if a Man ignorant in the English Tongue should call *Purple* *Scarlet*,

Secondly, Modes not false.

§. 17. Secondly, Neither can our complex *Ideas* of Modes, in reference to the Essence of any thing really existing, be false. Because whatever complex *Idea* I have of any Mode, it hath no reference to any Pattern existing, and made by Nature: It is not suppos'd to contain in it any other *Ideas* than what it hath; nor to represent any thing but such a Complication of *Ideas* as it does. Thus when I have the *Idea* of such an Action of a Man, who forbears to afford himself such Meat; Drink, and Clothings, and other Conveniences of Life as his Riches and Estate will be sufficient to supply, and his Station requires, I have no false *Idea*; but such an one as represents an Action, either as I find or imagine it; and so is capable of neither Truth or *Falshood*. But when I give the Name *Frugality*, or *Vertue* to this Action, then it may be call'd a false *Idea*, if thereby it be suppos'd to agree with that *Idea*, to which, in Propriety of Speech, the Name of *Frugality* doth belong; or to be conformable to that Law, which is the Standard of Vertue and Vice.

§. 18. *Thirdly*, Our complex Ideas of Substances, being all refer'd to Patterns in things themselves, may be false. That they are all false, when look'd upon as the Representations of the unknown Essences of things, is so evident, that there needs nothing to be said of it. I shall therefore pass over that chimerical Supposition, and consider them as Collections of simple Ideas in the Mind, taken from Combinations of simple Ideas existing together constantly in things, of which Patterns they are the suppos'd Copies : And in this Reference of them, to the Existence of things, they are false Ideas. 1. When they put together simple Ideas, which in the real Existence of things have no Union ; as when to the Shape and Size that exist together in a Horse, is join'd, in the same complex Idea, the Power of barking like a Dog : which three Ideas, however put together into one in the Mind, were never united in Nature ; and this therefore may be call'd a false Idea of an Horse. 2. Ideas of Substances are, in this respect, also false, when from any Collection of simple Ideas that do always exist together, there is separated, by a direct Negation, any other simple Idea which is constantly join'd with them. Thus, if to Extension, Solidity, Fusibility, the peculiar Weightiness, and yellow Colour of Gold, any one join in his Thoughts the Negation of a greater Degree of Fixedness than is in Lead or Copper, he may be said to have a false complex Idea as well as when he joins to those other simple ones the Idea of perfect absolute Fixedness. For either way, the complex Idea of Gold being made up of such simple ones as have no Union in Nature, may be term'd false. But if he leave out of this his complex Idea, that of Fixedness quite, without either actually joining to, or separating of it from the rest in his Mind, it is, I think, to be look'd on as an inadequate and imperfect Idea rather than a false one ; since tho' it contains not all the simple Ideas that are united in Nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exist together.

Thirdly, Ideas of Substances when false.

§. 19. Tho' in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking I have shew'd in what sense, and upon what ground our Ideas may be sometimes call'd true or false ; yet if we will look a little nearer into the Matter, in all cases where any Idea is call'd true or false, it is from some Judgment that the Mind makes, or is suppos'd to make, that is true or false. For Truth or Falshood, being never without some Affirmation or Negation, express or tacit, it is not to be found but where Signs are join'd or separated, according to the Agreement or Disagreement of the things they stand for. The Signs we chiefly use are either Ideas or Words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal Propositions. Truth lies in so joining or separating these Representatives, as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or disagree ; and Falshood in the contrary, as shall be more fully shew'd hereafter.

Truth or Falshood always supposes Affirmation or Negation.

§. 20. Any Idea then which we have in our Minds, whether conformable or not to the Existence of things, or to any Ideas in the Minds of other Men, cannot properly for this alone be call'd false. For these Representations, if they have nothing in them but what is really existing in things without, cannot be thought false, being exact Representations of something : Nor yet if they have any thing in them differing from the Reality of things, can they properly be said to be false Representations, or Ideas of things they do not represent. But the Mistake and Falshood is,

Ideas in themselves neither true nor false.

§. 21. First, When the Mind having any Idea, it judges and concludes it the same that is in other mens Minds, signify'd by the same Name ; or that it is conformable to the ordinary receiv'd Signification or Definition of that Word, when indeed it is not : which is the most usual Mistake in mix'd Modes, tho' other Ideas also are liable to it.

But are false, 1. When judg'd agreeable to another Man's Idea, without being so.

§. 22. Secondly, When it having a complex Idea made up of such a Collection of simple ones, as Nature never puts together, it judges it to agree to a Species of Creatures really existing ; as when it joins the Weight of Tin, to the Colour, Fusibility, and Fixedness of Gold.

2. When judg'd to agree to real Existence, when they do not.

§. 23. Thirdly, When in its complex Idea it has united a certain Number of simple Ideas that do really exist together in some sort of Creatures, but has also left out others as much inseparable, it judges this to be a perfect compleat Idea of a sort of things which really it is not ; v. g. having join'd the Ideas of Substance, yellow, malleable, most heavy, and fusible, it takes that complex Idea to be

3. When judg'd adequate, without being so.

the

the compleat *Idea* of Gold, when yet its peculiar Fixedness and Solubility in *Aqua Regia* are as inseparable from those other *Ideas* or Qualities of that Body, as they are one from another.

4. When
judg'd to re-
present the
real Essence.

§. 24. *Fourthly*, The Mistake is yet greater, when I judg, that this complex *Idea*, contains in it the real Essence of any Body existing; when at least it contains but some few of those Properties which flow from its real Essence and Constitution. I say, only some few of those Properties; for those Properties consisting mostly in the active and passive Powers it has, in reference to other things, all that are vulgarly known of any one Body, and of which the complex *Idea* of that kind of things is usually made, are but a very few, in comparison of what a Man, that has several ways try'd and examin'd it, knows of that one sort of things; and all that the most expert Man knows, are but few, in comparison of what are really in that Body, and depend on its internal or essential Constitution. The Essence of a Triangle lies in a very little Compass, consists in a very few *Ideas*; three Lines including a Space make up that Essence: But the Properties that flow from this Essence, are more than can be easily known or enumerated. So I imagine it is in Substances, their real Essences lie in a little Compass; tho' the Properties flowing from that internal Constitution are endless.

Ideas when
false.

§. 25. To conclude, a Man having no Notion of any thing without him, but by the *Idea* he has of it in his Mind (which *Idea* he has a Power to call by what Name he pleases) he may indeed make an *Idea* neither answering the Reality of things, nor agreeing to the *Ideas* commonly signify'd by other Peoples words; but cannot make a wrong or false *Idea* of a thing, which is no otherwise known to him but by the *Idea* he has of it: v. g. When I frame an *Idea* of the Legs, Arms, and Body of a Man, and join to this a Horse's Head and Neck, I do not make a false *Idea* of any thing; because it represents nothing without me. But when I call it a *Man* or *Tartar*, and imagine it either to represent some real Being without me, or to be the same *Idea* that others call by the same Name; in either of these cases I may err. And upon this account it is, that it comes to be term'd a false *Idea*; tho' indeed the *Falseness* lies not in the *Idea*, but in that tacit mental Proposition, wherein a Conformity and Resemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having fram'd such an *Idea* in my Mind, without thinking either that Existence, or the Name *Man* or *Tartar*, belongs to it, I will call it *Man* or *Tartar*, I may be justly thought fantastical in the naming, but not erroneous in my Judgment; nor the *Idea* any way false.

More properly
to be call'd
Right or
Wrong.

§. 26. Upon the whole matter, I think, That our *Ideas*, as they are consider'd by the Mind, either in reference to the proper Signification of their Names, or in reference to the Reality of things, may very fitly be call'd right or wrong *Ideas*, according as they agree or disagree to those Patterns to which they are refer'd. But if any one had rather call them true or false, 'tis fit he use a Liberty, which every one has, to call things by those Names he thinks best; tho' in Propriety of Speech, *Truth* or *Falseness*, will, I think, scarce agree to them, but as they, some way or other, virtually contain in them some mental Proposition. The *Ideas* that are in a Man's Mind, simply consider'd, cannot be wrong, unless complex ones, wherein inconsistent Parts are jumbled together. All other *Ideas* are in themselves right, and the Knowledge about them right and true Knowledge: But when we come to refer them to any thing, as to their Patterns and Archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such Archetypes.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Association of Ideas.

Something
unreasonable
in most Men.

§. 1. **T**HERE is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him, and is in it self really extravagant in the Opinions, Reasonings, and Actions of other Men. The least Flaw of this kind, if at all different

different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to espy in another, and will by the Authority of Reason forwardly condemn, tho' he be guilty of much greater Unreasonableness in his own Tenets and Conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly, if at all, be convinc'd of.

§. 2. This proceeds not wholly from Self-love, tho' that has often a great hand in it. Men of fair Minds, and not given up to the over-weening of Self-flattery, are frequently guilty of it; and in many Cases one with Amazement hears the Arguings, and is astonish'd at the Obstinacy of a worthy Man, who yields not to the Evidence of Reason, tho' laid before him as clear as Day-light. *Not wholly from Self-love.*

§. 3. This sort of Unreasonableness is usually imputed to Education and Prejudice, and for the most part truly enough, tho' that reaches not the bottom of the Disease, nor shews distinctly enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly assign'd for the Cause, and Prejudice is a good general Name for the thing it self: But yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther, who would trace this sort of Madness to the Root it springs from, and so explain it, as to shew whence this Flaw has its Original in very sober and rational Minds, and wherein it consists. *Nor from Education.*

§. 4. I shall be pardon'd for calling it by so harsh a Name as *Madness*, when it is consider'd, that Opposition to Reason deserves that Name, and is really Madness; and there is scarce a Man so free from it, but that if he should always, on all occasions, argue or do as in some cases he constantly does, would not be thought fitter for *Bedlam* than civil Conversation. I do not here mean when he is under the Power of an unruly Passion, but in the steady calm Course of his Life. That which will yet more apologize for this harsh Name and ungrateful Imputation on the greatest part of Mankind, is, that enquiring a little by the by into the Nature of Madness, B. II. C. 11. §. 13. I found it to spring from the very same Root, and to depend on the very same Cause we are here speaking of. This Consideration of the thing it self, at a time when I thought not the least on the Subject which I am now treating of, suggested it to me. And if this be a Weakness to which all Men are so liable; if this be a Taint which so universally infects Mankind, the greater Care should be taken to lay it open under its due Name, thereby to excite the greater Care in its Prevention and Cure. *A degree of Madness.*

§. 5. Some of our *Ideas* have a natural Correspondence and Connection one with another: It is the Office and Excellency of our Reason to trace these and hold them together in that Union and Correspondence which is founded in their peculiar Beings. Besides this, there is another Connection of *Ideas* wholly owing to Chance or Custom: *Ideas* that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some Mens Minds, that 'tis very hard to separate them, they always keep in Company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the Understanding, but its Associate appears with it; and if they are more than two, which are thus united, the whole Gang, always inseparable, shew themselves together. *From a wrong Connection of Ideas.*

§. 6. This strong Combination of *Ideas*, not ally'd by Nature, the Mind makes in it self either voluntarily or by chance; and hence it comes in different Men to be very different, according to their different Inclinations, Education, Interests, &c. Custom settles Habits of Thinking in the Understanding, as well as of Determining in the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which seems to be but Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set a going, continue in the same Steps they have been us'd to; which, by often treading, are worn into a smooth Path, and the Motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend Thinking, thus *Ideas* seem to be produc'd in our Minds; or if they are not, this may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual Train, when once they are put into that Track, as well as it does to explain such Motions of the Body. A Musician us'd to any Tune, will find, that let it but once begin in his Head, the *Ideas* of the several Notes of it will follow one another orderly in his Understanding, without any Care or Attention, as regularly as his Fingers move orderly over the Keys of the Organ to play out the Tune he has begun, tho' his unattentive Thoughts be elsewhere a wandering. Whether the natural Cause of these *Ideas*, as well as of that regular Dancing of his Fingers, be the Motion of his animal Spirits, I

will not determine, how probable soever, by this Instance, it appears to be so. But this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual Habits, and of the tying together of *Ideas*.

Some Antipathies an Effect of it.

§. 7. That there are such Associations of them made by Custom in the Minds of most Men, I think no body will question, who has well consider'd himself or others; and to this, perhaps, might be justly attributed most of the Sympathies and Antipathies observable in Men, which work as strongly, and produce as regular Effects as if they were natural, and are therefore call'd so, tho' they at first had no other Original but the accidental Connection of two *Ideas*, which either the Strength of the first Impression, or future Indulgence so united, that they always afterwards kept company together in that Man's Mind, as if they were but one *Idea*. I say most of the Antipathies, I do not say all, for some of them are truly natural, depend upon our original Constitution, and are born with us; but a great Part of those which are counted natural, would have been known to be from unheeded, tho', perhaps, early Impressions, or wanton Fancies at first, which would have been acknowledg'd the Original of them, if they had been warily observ'd. A grown Person surfeiting with Honey, no sooner hears the Name of it, but his Fancy immediately carries Sickness and Qualms to his Stomach, and he cannot bear the very *Idea* of it; other *Ideas* of Dislike, and Sickness, and Vomiting, presently accompany it, and he is disturb'd, but he knows from whence to date this Weakness, and can tell how he got this Indisposition. Had this happen'd to him by an Over-Dose of Honey, when a Child, all the same Effects would have follow'd, but the Cause would have been mistaken, and the Antipathy counted natural.

§. 8. I mention this not out of any great necessity there is in this present Argument, to distinguish nicely between natural and acquir'd Antipathies; but I take notice of it for another purpose, (*viz.*) That those who have Children, or the Charge of their Education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue Connection of *Ideas* in the Minds of young People. This is the Time most susceptible of lasting Impressions; and tho' those relating to the Health of the Body, are by discreet People minded and fenc'd against, yet I am apt to doubt, that those which relate more peculiarly to the Mind, and terminate in the Understanding or Passions, have been much less heeded than the thing deserves: nay, those relating purely to the Understanding, have, as I suspect, been by most Men wholly overlook'd.

A great Cause of Errors.

§. 9. This wrong Connection in our Minds of *Ideas* in themselves, loose and independent one of another, has such an Influence, and is of so great Force to set us awry in our Actions, as well Moral as Natural, Passions, Reasonings and Notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be look'd after.

Instances.

§. 10. The *Ideas* of *Goblins* and *Sprights*, have really no more to do with Darkness, than Light; yet let but a foolish Maid inculcate these often on the Mind of a Child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives: but Darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful *Ideas*, and they shall be so join'd, that he can no more bear the one than the other.

§. 11. A Man receives a sensible Injury from another, thinks on the Man and that Action over and over; and by ruminating on them strongly, or much in his Mind, so cements those two *Ideas* together, that he makes them almost one; never thinks on the Man, but the Pain and Displeasure he suffer'd comes into his Mind with it, so that he scarce distinguishes them, but has as much an Aversion for the one as the other. Thus Hatreds are often begotten from slight and almost innocent Occasions, and Quarrels propagated and continu'd in the World.

§. 12. A Man has suffer'd Pain or Sickness in any place, he saw his Friend die in such a Room; tho' these have in nature nothing to do one with another, yet when the *Idea* of the Place occurs to his Mind, it brings (the Impression being once made) that of the Pain and Displeasure with it; he confounds them in his Mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

§. 13. When this Combination is settled, and whilst it lasts, it is not in the Power of Reason to help us, and relieve us from the Effects of it. *Ideas* in our Minds,

Minds, when they are there, will operate according to their Natures and Circumstances; and here we see the Cause why Time cures certain Affections, which Reason, tho' in the right, and allow'd to be so, has not Power over, nor is able against them to prevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in other Cases. The Death of a Child, that was the daily Delight of his Mother's Eyes, and Joy of her Soul, rends from her Heart the whole Comfort of her Life, and gives her all the Torment imaginable: Use the Consolations of Reason in this Case, and you were as good preach Ease to one on the Rack, and hope to allay, by rational Discourses, the Pain of his Joints tearing asunder. Till Time has by Disuse separated the Sense of that Enjoyment, and its Loss from the Idea of the Child returning to her Memory, all Representations, tho' ever so reasonable, are in vain; and therefore some in whom the Union between these Ideas is never dissolv'd, spend their Lives in Mourning, and carry an incurable Sorrow to their Graves.

Why Time cures some Disorders in the Mind, which Reason cannot.

§. 14. A Friend of mine knew one perfectly cur'd of Madness by a very harsh and offensive Operation. The Gentleman, who was thus recover'd, with great Sense of Gratitude and Acknowledgment, own'd the Cure all his Life after, as the greatest Obligation he could have receiv'd; but whatever Gratitude and Reason suggested to him, he could never bear the Sight of the Operator: That Image brought back with it the Idea of that Agony which he suffer'd from his Hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.

Farther Instances of the Effect of the Association of Ideas.

§. 15. Many Children imputing the Pain they endur'd at School to their Books they were corrected for, so join those Ideas together, that a Book becomes their Aversion, and they are never reconcil'd to the Study and Use of them all their Lives after; and thus Reading become a Torment to them, which otherwise possibly they might have made the great Pleasure of their Lives. There are Rooms convenient enough, that some Men cannot study in, and Fashions of Vessels, which tho' ever so clean and commodious, they cannot drink out of, and that by reason of some accidental Ideas which are annex'd to them, and make them offensive: and who is there that hath not observ'd some Man to flag at the Appearance, or in the Company of some certain Person not otherwise superior to him, but because having once on some occasion got the Ascendant, the Idea of Authority and Distance goes along with that of the Person, and he that has been thus subjected, is not able to separate them?

§. 16. Instances of this kind are so plentiful every where, that if I add one more, it is only for the pleasant Oddness of it. It is of a young Gentleman, who having learnt to dance, and that to great Perfection, there happen'd to stand an old Trunk in the Room where he learnt. The Idea of this remarkable piece of Household-Stuff, had so mix'd it self with the Turns and Steps of all his Dances, that tho' in that Chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was only whilst that Trunk was there; nor could he perform well in any other place, unless that or some such other Trunk had its due Position in the Room. If this Story shall be suspected to be dress'd up with some comical Circumstances a little beyond precise Nature; I answer for my self, that I had it some Years since from a very sober and worthy Man, upon his own knowledg, as I report it: and I dare say, there are very few inquisitive Persons, who read this, who have not met with Accounts, if not Examples of this nature, that may parallel, or at least justify this.

§. 17. Intellectual Habits and Defects this way contracted, are not less frequent and powerful, tho' less observ'd. Let the Ideas of Being and Matter be strongly join'd either by Education or much Thought, whilst these are still combin'd in the Mind, what Notions, what Reasonings will there be about separate Spirits? Let Custom from the very Childhood have join'd Figure and Shape to the Idea of God, and what Absurdities will that Mind be liable to about the Deity?

Its Influence on intellectual Habits.


Let the Idea of Infallibility be inseparably join'd to any Person, and these two constantly together possess the Mind; and then one Body, in two Places at once, shall unexamin'd be swallow'd for a certain Truth, by an implicit Faith, whenever that imagin'd infallible Person dictates and demands Assent without Inquiry.

Observable in
different Sects.

§. 18. Some such wrong and unnatural Combinations of *Ideas* will be found to establish the irreconcilable Opposition between different Sects of Philosophy and Religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their Followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse Truth offer'd by plain Reason. Interest, tho' it does a great deal in the Case, yet cannot be thought to work whole Societies of Men to so universal a Perverseness, as that every one of them to a Man should knowingly maintain Fashood: Some at least must be allow'd to do what all pretend to, *i. e.* to pursue Truth sincerely; and therefore there must be something that blinds their Understandings, and makes them not see the Falshood of what they embrace for real Truth, That which thus captivates their Reasons, and leads Men of Sincerity blindfold from common Sense, will, when examin'd, be found to be what we are speaking of: Some independent *Ideas*, of no Alliance to one another, are by Education, Custom, and the constant Din of their Party, so coupled in their Minds, that they always appear there together; and they can no more separate them in their Thoughts, than if they were but one *Idea*, and they operate as if they were so. This gives Sense to Jargon, Demonstration to Absurdities, and Consistency to Nonsense, and is the Foundation of the greatest, I had almost said of all the Errors in the World; or if it does not reach so far, it is at least the most dangerous one, since so far as it obtains, it hinders Men from seeing and examining. When two things in themselves disjoin'd, appear to the Sight constantly united; if the Eye sees these things riveted, which are loose, where will you begin to rectify the Mistakes that follow in two *Ideas*, that they have been accusom'd so to join in their Minds, as to substitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves? This, whilst they are under the Deceit of it, makes them incapable of Conviction, and they applaud themselves as zealous Champions for Truth, when indeed they are contending for Error; and the Confusion of two different *Ideas*, which a customary Connection of them in their Minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their Heads with false Views, and their Reasonings with false Consequences.

Insion.

§. 19. Having thus given an Account of the Original, Sorts and Extent of our *Ideas*, with several other Considerations, about these (I know not whether I may say) Instruments or Materials of our Knowledge; the Method I at first propos'd to my self, would now require, that I should immediately proceed to shew what Use the Understanding makes of them, and what Knowledge we have by them. This was that which, in the first general View I had of this Subject, was all that I thought I should have to do: But upon a nearer Approach, I find that there is so close a Connection between *Ideas* and Words; and our abstract *Ideas*, and general Words have so constant a Relation one to another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge, which all consists in Propositions, without considering, first, the Nature, Use and Signification of Language; which therefore must be the Business of the next Book.



BOOK.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of Words or Language in General.

§. 1.  OD having design'd Man for a sociable Creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnish'd him also with Language, which was to be the great Instrument and common Tie of Society. *Man therefore had by Nature his Organs so fashion'd, as to be fit to frame articulate Sounds,* which we call Words. But this was not enough to produce Language? for Parrots, and several other Birds, will be taught to make articulate Sounds distinct enough, which yet, by no means, are capable of Language.

§. 2. Besides articulate Sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, that he should be *able to use these Sounds as Signs of internal Conceptions*; and to make them stand as Marks for the *Ideas* within his own Mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Mens Minds be convey'd from one to another.

§. 3. But neither was this sufficient to make Words so useful as they ought to be. It is not enough for the perfection of Language, that Sounds can be made Signs of *Ideas*, unless those *Signs* can be so made use of, as to comprehend several particular Things: For the Multiplication of Words would have perplex'd their Use, had every particular thing need of a distinct Name to be signify'd by. To remedy this Inconvenience, Language had yet a farther Improvement in the use of general Terms, whereby one Word was made to mark a multitude of particular Existences: which advantageous use of Sounds was obtain'd only by the Difference of the *Ideas* they were made Signs of; those Names becoming general, which are made to stand for general *Ideas*, and those remaining particular, where the *Ideas* they are us'd for are particular.

§. 4. Besides these Names which stand for *Ideas*, there be other Words which Men make use of, not to signify any *Idea*, but the want or absence of some *Ideas* simple or complex, or all *Ideas* together; such as are *Nihil* in Latin, and in English, *Ignorance* and *Barrenness*. All which negative or privative Words, cannot be said properly to belong to, or signify no *Ideas*: for then they would be perfectly insignificant Sounds; but they relate to positive *Ideas*, and signify their Absence.

§. 5. It may also lead us a little towards the Original of all our Notions and Knowledge, if we remark how great a Dependance our Words have on common sensible *Ideas*; and how those, which are made use of to stand for Actions and Notions quite remov'd from Sense, have their Rise from thence, and from obvious sensible *Ideas* are transfer'd to more abstruse Significations, and made to stand for *Ideas* that come not under the cognizance of our Senses; v. g. to *Imagine*, *Apprehend*, *Comprehend*, *Adhere*, *Conceive*, *Instil*, *Disgust*, *Disturbance*, *Tranquillity*, &c. are all Words taken from the Operations of sensible Things, and apply'd to certain Modes of Thinking. *Spirit*, in its primary signification, is Breath; *Angel*, a Messenger: And I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their Sources, we should find, in all Languages, the Names, which stand for Things that fall not under our Senses, to have had their first rise from sensible *Ideas*. By which

which we may give some kind of guess, what kind of Notions they were, and whence deriv'd, which fill'd their Minds who were the first Beginners of Languages; and how Nature, even in the naming of things, unawares suggested to Men the Originals and Principles of all their Knowledge: whilst, to give Names that might make known to others any Operations they felt in themselves, or any other *Ideas* that came not under their Senses, they were fain to borrow Words from ordinary known *Ideas* of Sensation, by that means to make others the more easily to conceive those Operations they experimented in themselves, which made no outward sensible Appearances: and then when they had got known and agreed Names, to signify those internal Operations of their own Minds, they were sufficiently furnish'd to make known by Words all their other *Ideas*; since they could consist of nothing, but either of outward sensible Perceptions, or of the inward Operations of their Minds about them: we having, as has been prov'd, no *Ideas* at all, but what originally come either from sensible Objects without, or what we feel within our selves, from the inward Workings of our own Spirits, of which we are conscious to our selves within.

Distribution.

§. 6. But to understand better the Use and Force of Language, as subservient to Instruction and Knowledge, it will be convenient to consider,

First, To what it is that Names, in the use of Language, are immediately apply'd.

Secondly, Since all (except proper) Names are general, and so stand not particularly for this or that single thing, but for Sorts and Ranks of things; it will be necessary to consider, in the next place, what the Sorts and Kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin Names, what the Species and Genera of Things are; wherein they consist, and how they come to be made. These being (as they ought) well look'd into, we shall the better come to find the right Use of Words, the natural Advantages and Defects of Language, and the Remedies that ought to be used, to avoid the Inconveniences of Obscurity or Uncertainty in the signification of Words, without which it is impossible to discourse with any Clearness, or Order, concerning Knowledge: which being conversant about Propositions, and those most commonly universal ones, has greater connection with Words then perhaps is suspected.

These Considerations therefore shall be the matter of the following Chapters.

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

Words are sensible Signs necessary for Communication.

§. 1. **M**AN, tho' he has great variety of Thoughts, and such, from which others, as well as himself, might receive Profit and Delight; yet they are all within his own Breast, invisible, and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made appear. The Comfort and Advantage of Society not being to be had without Communication of Thoughts, it was necessary that Man should find out some external sensible Signs, whereby those invisible *Ideas*, which his Thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose nothing was so fit, either for Plenty or Quickness, as those articulate Sounds, which with so much Ease and Variety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how Words, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, come to be made use of by Men, as the *Signs* of their *Ideas*; not by any natural Connection that there is between particular articulate Sounds and certain *Ideas*, for then there would be but one Language amongst all Men; but by a voluntary Imposition, whereby such a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such an *Idea*. The Use then of Words is to be sensible Marks of *Ideas*; and the *Ideas* they stand for, are their proper and immediate Signification.

Words are the sensible Signs of his Ideas who uses them.

§. 2. The use Men have of these Marks, being either to record their own Thoughts for the assistance of their own Memory, or as it were to bring out their *Ideas*, and lay them before the view of others; Words in their primary or immediate Signification stand for nothing but the *Ideas* in the Mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever or carelessly those *Ideas* are collected from the things

things which they are suppos'd to represent. When a Man speaks to another; it is that he may be understood; and the End of Speech is, that those Sounds, as Marks, may make known his *Ideas* to the Hearer. That then which Words are the Marks of, are the *Ideas* of the Speaker: nor can any one apply them, as Marks, immediately to any thing else, but the *Ideas* that he himself hath. For this would be to make them Signs of his own Conceptions, and yet apply them to other *Ideas*; which would be to make them Signs, and not Signs of his *Ideas* at the same time; and so in effect to have no Signification at all. Words being voluntary Signs, they cannot be voluntary Signs impos'd by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them Signs of nothing, Sounds without Signification. A Man cannot make his Words the Signs either of Qualities in things, or of Conceptions in the Mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Till he has some *Ideas* of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the Conceptions of another Man; nor can he use any Signs for them: for thus they would be the Signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the Signs of nothing. But when he represents to himself other Mens *Ideas* by some of his own, if he consent to give them the same Names that other Men do, 'tis still to his own *Ideas*; to *Ideas* that he has, and not to *Ideas* that he has not.

§. 3. This is so necessary in the Use of Language, that in this respect the Knowing and the Ignorant, the Learned and Unlearned, use the Words they speak (with any meaning) all alike. They, in every Man's Mouth, stand for the *Ideas* he has, and which he would express by them. A Child having taken notice of nothing in the Metal he hears call'd Gold, but the bright shining yellow Colour, he applies the word Gold only to his own *Idea* of that Colour, and nothing else; and therefore calls the same Colour in a Peacock's Tail, Gold. Another that hath better observ'd, adds to shining yellow great Weight: And then the Sound Gold, when he uses it, stands for a complex *Idea* of a shining yellow and very weighty Substance. Another adds to those Qualities Fusibility: and then the word Gold to him signifies a Body, bright, yellow fusible, and very heavy. Another adds Malleability: Each of these uses equally the word Gold, when they have occasion to express the *Idea* which they have apply'd it to: but it is evident, that each can apply it only to his own *Idea*; nor can he make it stand as a Sign of such a complex *Idea* as he has not.

Words are the sensible Signs of his Ideas who uses them.

§. 4. But tho' Words, as they are used by Men, can properly and immediately signify nothing but the *Ideas* that are in the Mind of the Speaker; yet they in their Thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things.

Words often secretly refer'd, First, to the Ideas in other Mens Minds.

First, They suppose their Words to be Marks of the *Ideas* in the Minds also of other Men, with whom they communicate: For else they should talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the Sounds they apply'd to one *Idea*, were such as by the Hearer were apply'd to another; which is to speak two Languages. But in this, Men stand not usually to examine, whether the *Idea* they and those they discourse with have in their Minds, be the same: but think it enough that they use the Word, as they imagine, in the common Acceptation of that Language; in which they suppose, that the *Idea* they make it a sign of, is precisely the same, to which the understanding Men of that Country apply that Name.

§. 5. Secondly, Because Men would not be thought to talk barely of their own Imaginations, but of things as really they are; therefore they often suppose their Words to stand also for the Reality of things. But this relating more particularly to Substances, and their Names, as perhaps the former does to simple *Ideas* and Modes, we shall speak of these two different ways of applying Words more at large, when we come to treat of the Names of mix'd Modes, and Substances, in particular: Tho' give me leave here to say, that it is a perverting the use of Words, and brings unavoidable Obscurity and Confusion into their Signification, whenever we make them stand for any thing, but those *Ideas* we have in our own Minds.

Secondly, to the Reality of things.

§. 6. Concerning Words also it is farther to be consider'd: First, That they being immediately the Signs of Mens *Ideas*, and by that means the Instruments whereby Men communicate their Conceptions, and express to one another those Thoughts and Imaginations they have within their own Breasts; there comes by constant Use to be such a Connection between certain Sounds, and the *Ideas* they stand for, that the Names heard almost as readily excite certain *Ideas*, as if the Objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect

Words by use readily excite Ideas.

affect the Senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible Qualities; and in all Substances, that frequently and familiarly occur to us.

*Words often
used without
Signification.*

§. 7. Secondly, That tho' the proper and immediate Signification of Words are *Ideas* in the Mind of the Speaker, yet because by familiar use from our Cradles we come to learn certain articulate Sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our Tongues, and always at hand in our Memories, but yet are not always careful to examine, or settle their Significations perfectly; it often happens that *Men*, even when they would apply themselves to an attentive Consideration, do *set their thoughts more on Words than Things*. Nay, because Words are many of them learn'd, before the *Ideas* are known for which they stand; therefore some, not only Children, but *Men*, speak several words no otherwise than Parrots do, only because they have learn'd them, and have been accusom'd to those Sounds. But so far as Words are of use and signification, so far is there a constant Connection between the Sound and the *Idea*, and a Designation that the one stand for the other; without which Application of them they are nothing but so much insignificant Noise.

*Their Signifi-
cation perfect-
ly arbitrary.*

§. 8. Words by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in *Men* certain *Ideas* so constantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose a natural Connection between them. But that they signify only *Mens* peculiar *Ideas*, and that by a perfectly arbitrary Imposition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same Language) the same *Ideas* we take them to be the signs of: And every Man has so inviolable a Liberty, to make Words stand for what *Ideas* he pleases, that no one hath the Power to make others have the same *Ideas* in their Minds, that he has when they use the same words that he does. And therefore the great *Augustus* himself, in the possession of that Power which rul'd the World, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin Word: which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what *Idea* any Sound should be a sign of, in the Mouths and common Language of his Subjects. 'Tis true, common Use by a tacit Consent appropriate certain Sounds to certain *Ideas* in all Languages, which so far limits the Signification of that Sound, that unless a Man applies it to the same *Idea*, he does not speak properly: And let me add, that unless a Man's Words excite the same *Ideas* in the Hearer, which he makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be the consequence of any Man's using of Words differently, either from their general Meaning, or the particular Sense of the Person to whom he addresses them, this is certain, their Signification, in his use of them, is limited to his *Ideas*, and they can be Signs of nothing else,

C H A P. III.

Of General Terms.

*The greatest
part of Words
general.*

§. 1. **A**LL things that exist being particulars, it may perhaps be thought reasonable that Words, which ought to be conform'd to Things, should be so too; I mean, in their Signification: but yet we find the quite contrary. The far greatest part of Words, that make all Languages, are general Terms; which has not been the Effect of Neglect or Chance, but of Reason and Necessity.

*For every par-
ticular thing
to have a
Name is im-
possible.*

§. 2. First, It is impossible that every particular Thing should have a distinct peculiar Name. For the Signification and Use of Words, depending on that Connection which the Mind makes between its *Ideas* and the Sounds it uses as Signs of them, it is necessary, in the Application of Names to Things, that the Mind should have distinct *Ideas* of the Things, and retain also the particular Name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar Appropriation to that *Idea*. But it is beyond the Power of human Capacity to frame and retain distinct *Ideas* of all the particular things we meet with: every Bird and Beast Men saw, every Tree and Plant that affected the Senses, could not find a place in the most capacious Understanding. If it be look'd on as an instance of a prodigious Memory, that some Generals have been able to call every Soldier in their Army by his proper

proper Name; we may easily find a reason, why Men have never attempted to give Names to each Sheep in their Flock, or Crow that flies over their Heads; much less to call every Leaf of Plants, or Grain of Sand that came in their way, by a peculiar Name.

§. 3. Secondly, If it were possible, *it would yet be useless*; because it would not serve to the chief end of Language. Men would in vain heap up Names of particular Things, that would not serve them to communicate their Thoughts. Men learn Names, and use them in Talk with others, only that they may be understood: which is then only done, when by Use or Consent the Sound I make by the Organs of Speech, excites in another Man's Mind, who hears it, the *Idea* I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This cannot be done by Names apply'd to particular Things, whereof I alone having the *Ideas* in my Mind, the Names of them could not be significant or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those very particular Things which had fallen under my Notice.

§. 4. Thirdly, But yet granting this also feasible (which I think is not) yet a distinct Name for every particular Thing would not be of any great use for the Improvement of Knowledge: which tho' founded in particular things, enlarges it self by general Views; to which, things reduc'd into Sorts under general Names, are properly subservient. These, with the Names belonging to them, come within some compass, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the Mind can contain, or Use requires: And therefore, in these Men, have for the most part stop'd; but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular things, by appropriated Names, where Convenience demands it. And therefore in their own Species, which they have most to do with, and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular Persons, they make use of proper Names; and there distinct Individuals have distinct Denominations.

§. 5. Besides Persons, Countries also, Cities, Rivers, Mountains, and other the like Distinctions of Place, have usually found peculiar Names, and that for the same reason; they being such as Men have often an occasion to mark particularly, and as it were set before others in their Discourses with them. And I doubt not, but if we had reason to mention particular Horses, as often as we have to mention particular Men, we should have proper Names for the one, as familiar as for the other, and *Bucephalus* would be a word as much in use, as *Alexander*. And therefore we see that amongst Jockeys, Horses have their proper Names to be known and distinguish'd by, as commonly as their Servants; because, amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this or that particular Horse, when he is out of sight.

§. 6. The next thing to be consider'd, is, *How general Words come to be made*. For since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general Terms, or where find we those general Natures they are suppos'd to stand for? Words become general, by being made the signs of general *Ideas*; and *Ideas* become general, by separating from them the Circumstances of Time, and Place, and any other *Ideas*, that may determine them to this or that particular Existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more Individuals than one; each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract *Idea*, is (as we call it) of that sort.

§. 7. But to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps be amiss to trace our Notions and Names from their beginning, and observe by what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our *Ideas* from our first Infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the *Ideas* of the Persons Children converse with (to instance in them alone) are like the Persons themselves only particular. The *Ideas* of the Nurse, and the Mother, are well framed in their Minds; and, like Pictures of them there, represent only those Individuals. The Names they first gave to them, are confin'd to these Individuals; and the names of *Nurse* and *Mamma* the Child uses, determine themselves to those Persons. Afterwards, when Time and a larger Acquaintance has made them observe, that there are a great many other things in the World that in some common Agreements of Shape, and several other Qualities, resemble their Father and Mother, and those Persons they have been used to, they frame an *Idea*, which they find those many Particulars do partake in; and to that they give,

with others, the name *Man* for example. And thus they come to have a general Name, and a general Idea. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex Idea they had of *Peter* and *James*, *Mary* and *Jane*, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.

§. 8. By the same way that they come by the general Name and Idea of *Man*, they easily advance to more general Names and Notions. For observing that several things that differ from their Idea of *Man*, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that Name, have yet certain Qualities wherein they agree with *Man*, by retaining only those Qualities, and uniting them into one Idea, they have again another and a more general Idea; to which having given a Name, they make a Term of a more comprehensive extension: Which new Idea is made, not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the shape, and some other Properties signify'd by the name *Man*, and retaining only a Body, with Life, Sense, and spontaneous Motion, comprehended under the name *Animal*.

General Natures are nothing but abstract Ideas.

§. 9. That this is the way whereby Men first form'd general Ideas, and general Names to them, I think, is so evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the considering of a Man's self or others, and the ordinary Proceedings of their Minds in Knowledge: And he that thinks general Natures or Notions are any thing else but such abstract and partial Ideas of more complex ones, taken at first from particular Existences, will, I fear, be at a loss where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his Idea of *Man* differ from that of *Peter* and *Paul*, or his Idea of *Horse* from that of *Bucephalus*, but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each Individual, and retaining so much of those particular complex Ideas of several particular Existences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex Ideas signify'd by the names *Man* and *Horse*, leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a new distinct complex Idea, and giving the name *Animal* to it; one has a more general Term, that comprehends with *Man* several other Creatures. Leave out of the Idea of *Animal*, Sense and spontaneous Motion; and the remaining complex Idea, made up of the remaining simple ones of Body, Life, and Nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive Term *Vivens*. And not to dwell longer upon this particular, so evident in it self, by the same way the Mind proceeds to *Body*, *Substance*, and at last to *Being*, *Thing*, and such universal Terms, which stand for any of our Ideas whatsoever. To conclude, this whole Mystery of *Genera* and *Species*, which make such a noise in the Schools, and are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract Ideas, more or less comprehensive, with names annex'd to them. In all which, this is constant and unvariable, That every more general Term stands for such an Idea, as is but a part of any of those contain'd under it.

Why the Genus is ordinarily made use of in Definitions.

§. 10. This may shew us the reason, why, in the defining of Words, which is nothing but declaring their signification, we make use of the Genus, or next general Word that comprehends it. Which is not out of necessity, but only to save the labour of enumerating the several simple Ideas, which the next general Word or Genus stands for; or, perhaps, sometimes the shame of not being able to do it. But tho' defining by Genus and Differentia (I crave leave to use these Terms of Art, tho' originally Latin, since they most properly suit those Notions they are apply'd to) I say, tho' defining by the Genus be the shortest way, yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the best. This I am sure, it is not the only, and so not absolutely necessary. For Definition being nothing but making another understand by Words, what Idea the Term defin'd stands for, a Definition is best made by enumerating those simple Ideas that are combin'd in the signification of the Term defin'd: and if instead of such an Enumeration, Men have accustom'd themselves to use the next general Term; it has not been out of necessity, or for greater clearness, but for quickness and dispatch sake. For, I think, that to one who desir'd to know what Ideas the word *Man* stood for, if it should be said, that *Man* was a solid extended Substance, having Life, Sense, spontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of Reasoning; I doubt not but the meaning of the Term *Man* would be as well understood, and the Idea it stands for be at least as clearly made known, as when it is defin'd to be a rational Animal:

mal: which by the several Definitions of *Animal*, *Vivens*, and *Corpus*, resolves it self into those enumerated *Ideas*. I have, in explaining the Term *Man*, follow'd here the ordinary Definition of the Schools: which tho', perhaps, not the most exact, yet serves well enough to my present purpose. And one may, in this instance, see what gave occasion to the Rule, that a Definition must consist of *Genus* and *Differentia*: and it suffices to shew us the little necessity there is of such a Rule, or advantage in the strict observing of it. For Definitions, as has been said, being only the explaining of one Word by several others, so that the Meaning or *Idea* it stands for may be certainly known; Languages are not always so made according to the Rules of Logick, that every Term can have its Signification exactly and clearly express'd by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary; or else those who have made this Rule, have done ill, that they have given us so few Definitions conformable to it. But of Definitions, more in the next Chapter.

§. 11. To return to general Words, it is plain by what has been said, That *General* and *Universal* belong not to the real Existence of things; but are the *Inventions* and *Creatures* of the *Understanding*, made by it for its own use, and concern only Signs, whether Words or *Ideas*. Words are general, as has been said, when used for Signs of general *Ideas*, and so are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and *Ideas* are general, when they are set up as the Representatives of many particular things: but Universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their Existence; even those Words and *Ideas*, which in their signification are general. When therefore we quit Particulars, the Generals that rest are only Creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the Capacity they are put into by the Understanding, of signifying or representing many particulars. For the Signification they have, is nothing but a Relation, that by the Mind of Man is added to them.

General and Universal are Creatures of the Understanding.

§. 12. The next thing therefore to be consider'd, is, *What kind of Signification it is, that General Words have*. For as it is evident, that they do not signify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general Terms, but proper Names: so on the other side 'tis as evident, they do not signify a plurality; for *Man* and *Men* would then signify the same, and the Distinction of Numbers (as the Grammarians call them) Would be superfluous and useless. That then which general Words signify, is a sort of things; and each of them does that, by being a sign of an abstract *Idea* in the Mind, to which *Idea*, as things existing are found to agree, so they come to be rank'd under that name; or, which is all one, be of that sort. Whereby it is evident, that the *Essences* of the sorts, or (if the Latin Word pleases better) *Species* of things, are nothing else but these abstract *Ideas*. For the having the *Essence* of any *Species*, being that which makes any thing to be of that *Species*, and the Conformity to the *Idea* to which the Name is annex'd, being that which gives a right to that Name; the having the *Essence*, and the having that Conformity, must needs be the same thing: since to be of any *Species*, and to have a right to the name of that *Species*, is all one. As for example, to be a *Man*, or of the *Species Man*, and to have right to the name *Man*, is the same thing. Again, to be a *Man*, or of the *Species Man*, and have the *Essence* of a *Man*, is the same thing. Now since nothing can be a *Man*, or have a right to the name *Man*, but what has a conformity to the abstract *Idea* the name *Man* stands for; nor any thing be a *Man*, or have a right to the *Species Man*, but what has the *Essence* of that *Species*. It follows, that the abstract *Idea* for which the name stands, and the *Essence* of the *Species* is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that the *Essences* of the sorts of things, and consequently the sorting of this, is the Workmanship of the Understanding, that abstracts and makes those general *Ideas*.

Abstract Ideas are the Essences of the Genera and Species.

§. 13. I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature in the production of things makes several of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, especially in the Races of Animals, and all things propagated by Seed. But yet, I think, we may say the sorting of them under Names is the Workmanship of the Understanding, taking occasion from the Similitude it observes amongst them to make abstract general *Ideas*, and set them up in the Mind, with Names annex'd to them as Patterns or Forms, (for in that sense the word

They are the Workmanship of the Understanding, but have their foundation in the Similitude of things.

Form has a very proper Signification) to which as particular things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that Species, have that Denomination, or are put into that *Classis*. For when we say, this is a *Man*, that a *Horse*; this *Justice*, that *Cruelty*; this a *Watch*, that a *Jack*; what do we else but rank things under different specific Names, as agreeing to those abstract *Ideas*, of which we have made those Names the signs? And what are the Essences of those Species set out and mark'd by Names, but those abstract *Ideas* in the Mind; which are as it were the Bonds between particular things that exist, and the Names they are to be rank'd under? And when general Names have any connection with particular Beings, these abstract *Ideas* are the *Medium* that unites them: so that the Essences of Species, as distinguish'd and denominated by us, neither are nor can be any thing but those precise abstract *Ideas* we have in our Minds. And therefore the suppos'd real Essences of Substances, if different from our abstract *Ideas*, cannot be the Essences of the Species we rank things into. For two Species may be one as rationally, as two different Essences be the Essence of one Species: And I demand what are the alterations may or may not be in a *Horse* or *Lead*, without making either of them to be of another Species? In determining the Species of things by our abstract *Ideas*, this is easy to resolve: but if any one will regulate himself herein by suppos'd real Essences, he will, I suppose, be at a loss; and he will never be able to know when any thing precisely ceases to be of the Species of a *Horse* or *Lead*.

Each distinct
abstract Idea
is a distinct
Essence.

§. 14. Nor will any one wonder, that I say these *Essences*, or abstract *Ideas*, (which are measures of Name, and the Boundaries of Species) are the *Workmanship of the Understanding*, who considers, that at least the complex ones are often, in several Men, different Collections of simple *Ideas*: and therefore that is *Covetousness* to one Man, which is not so to another. Nay, even in Substances, where their abstract *Ideas* seem to be taken from the things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no not in that Species which is most familiar to us, and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance: It having been more than once doubted, whether the *Fetus* born of a Woman were a *Man*, even so far, as that it hath been debated, whether it were or were not to be nourish'd and baptiz'd: which could not be, if the abstract *Idea* of Essence, to which the Name *Man* belong'd, were of Nature's making; and were not the uncertain and various Collection of simple *Ideas*, which the Understanding puts together, and then abstracting it, affix'd a Name to it. So that in truth every distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence: and the Names that stand for such distinct *Ideas* are the Names of things essentially different. Thus a Circle is as essentially different from an Oval, as a Sheep from a Goat: and Rain is as essentially different from Snow, as Water from Earth; that abstract *Idea* which is the Essence of one, being impossible to be communicated to the other. And thus any two abstract *Ideas*, that in any part vary one from another, with two distinct Names annex'd to them, constitute two distinct sorts, or, if you please, Species, as essentially different as any two the most remote, or opposite in the World.

Real and Nominal Essence.

§. 15. But since the *Essences* of things are thought, by some, (and not without reason) to be wholly unknown; it may not be amiss to consider the several Significations of the word *Essence*.

First, *Essence* may be taken for the Being of any thing, whereby it is what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally in Substances unknown, Constitution of things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend, may be call'd their *Essence*. This is the proper original Signification of the Word, as is evident from the Formation of it; *Essentia*, in its primary notation, signifying properly *Being*. And in this sense it is still us'd, when we speak of the *Essence* of particular things, without giving them any name.

Secondly, The Learning and Disputes of the Schools having been much busy'd about *Genus* and *Species*, the word *Essence* has almost lost its primary Signification: and instead of the real Constitution of things, has been almost wholly apply'd to the artificial Constitution of *Genus* and *Species*. 'Tis true, there is ordinarily suppos'd a real Constitution of the sorts of things; and 'tis past doubt, there must be some real Constitution, on which any Collection of simple *Ideas* co-existing, must depend. But it being evident, that things are rank'd under

under Names into Sorts or *Species*, only as they agree to certain abstract *Ideas*, to which we have annex'd those Names; the *Essence* of each *Genus*, or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract *Idea*, which the General, or *Sortal* (if I may have leave so to call it from *Sort*, as I do *General* from *Genus*) Name stands for. And this we shall find to be that which the word *Essence* imports in its most familiar use. These two sorts of *Essences*, I suppose, may not unfitly be term'd, the one the *Real*, the other the *Nominal Essence*.

§. 16. Between the *Nominal Essence*, and the Name, there is so near a Convection, that the Name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular Being but what has this *Essence*, whereby it answers that abstract *Idea*, whereof that Name is the Sign.

Constant Con-
nection be-
tween the
Name and no-
minal Essence.

§. 17. Concerning the real *Essences* of corporeal Substances, (to mention those only) there are, if I mistake not, two Opinions. The one is of those, who using the word *Essence* for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those *Essences*, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this or that *Species*. The other, and more rational Opinion, is of those who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts; from which flow those sensible Qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we have occasion to rank them into sorts under common Denominations. The former of these Opinions, which supposes these *Essences*, as a certain Number of Forms or Molds, wherein all natural things, that exist, are cast, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplex'd the Knowledge of natural things. The frequent Productions of Monsters, in all the *Species* of Animals, and of Changelings, and other strange Issues of human Birth, carry with them difficulties, not possible to consist with this *Hypothesis*: Since it is as impossible, that two things, partaking exactly of the same real *Essence*, should have different Properties, as that the two Figures partaking in the same real *Essence* of a Circle should have different Properties. But were there no other reason against it, yet the Supposition of *Essences* that cannot be known, and the making them nevertheless to be that which distinguishes the *Species* of things, is so wholly useless, and unserviceable to any part of our Knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, and content our selves with such *Essences* of the Sorts or *Species* of things as come within the reach of our Knowledge: which, when seriously consider'd, will be found, as I have said, to be nothing else but those abstract complex *Ideas*, to which we have annex'd distinct general Names.

Supposition
that *Species*
are distin-
guish'd by
their real *Es-
sences*, useless.

§. 18. *Essences* being thus distinguish'd into *Nominal* and *Real*, we may farther observe, that in the *Species* of simple *Ideas* and *Modes*, they are always the same; but in *Substances* always quite different. Thus a Figure including a Space between three Lines, is the real as well as nominal *Essence* of a Triangle; it being not only the abstract *Idea* to which the general Name is annex'd, but the very *Essentia* or Being of the thing it self, that Foundation from which all its Properties flow, and to which they are all inseparably annex'd. But it is far otherwise concerning that parcel of Matter, which makes the Ring on my Finger, wherein these two *Essences* are apparently different. For it is the real Constitution of its insensible Parts, on which depend all those Properties of Colour, Weight, Fusibility, Fixedness, &c. which makes it to be *Gold*, or gives it a right to that Name which is therefore its nominal *Essence*: Since nothing can be call'd *Gold* but what has a Conformity of Qualities to that abstract complex *Idea*, to which that Name is annex'd. But this Distinction of *Essences*, belonging particularly to Substances, we shall, when we come to consider their Names, have an occasion to treat of more fully.

Real and no-
minal *Essence*
the same in
simple *Ideas*
and *Modes*,
different in
Substances.

§. 19. That such abstract *Ideas*, with Names to them, as we have been speaking of, are *Essences*, may farther appear by what we are told concerning *Essences*, viz. that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real Constitutions of things which begin and perish with them. All things that exist, besides their Author, are all liable to change; especially those things we are acquainted with, and have rank'd into Bands under distinct Names or Ensigns. Thus that which was Grass to day, is to morrow the Flesh of a Sheep; and within few days after becomes part of a Man: In all which, and the like

Essences inge-
nerable and
incorruptible.

Changes,

Changes, 'tis evident their real *Essence*, i. e. that Constitution, whereon the Properties of these several things depended, is destroy'd, and perishes with them. But *Essences* being taken for *Ideas*, establish'd in the Mind, with Names annex'd to them, they are suppos'd to remain steddily the same, whatever Mutations the particular Substances are liable to. For whatever becomes of *Alexander* and *Bucephalus*, the *Ideas* to which *Man* and *Horse* are annex'd, are suppos'd nevertheless to remain in the same; and so the *Essences* of those Species are preserv'd whole and undestroyed, whatever Changes happen to any, or all of the Individuals of those Species. By this means the *Essence* of a Species rests safe and entire, without the Existence of so much as one Individual of that kind. For were there now no Circle existing any where in the World, (as perhaps that Figure exists not any where exactly mark'd out) yet the *Idea* annex'd to that Name would not cease to be what it is; nor cease to be as a Pattern to determine which of the particular Figures we meet with have or have not a right to the name *Circle*, and so to shew which of them, by having that *Essence*, was of that Species. And tho' there neither were nor had been in Nature such a Beast as an *Unicorn*, or such a Fish as a *Mermaid*; yet supposing those Names to stand for complex abstract *Ideas* that contain'd no Inconsistency in them, the *Essence* of a *Mermaid* is as intelligible as that of a *Man*; and the *Idea* of an *Unicorn* as certain, steddy, and permanent as that of a *Horse*. From what has been said it is evident, that the Doctrine of the Immutability of *Essences* proves them to be only abstract *Ideas*; and is founded on the Relation establish'd between them, and certain Sounds as Signs of them; and will always be true as long as the same Name can have the same Signification.

Recapitulation.

§. 20. To conclude, this is that which in short I would say, viz. That all the great Business of *Genera* and *Species*, and their *Essences*, amounts to no more but this, That Men making abstract *Ideas*, and settling them in their Minds with Names annex'd to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider things, and discourse of them, as it were in Bundles, for the easier and readier Improvement and Communication of their Knowledge; which would advance but slowly, were their Words and Thoughts confin'd only to Particulars.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of simple Ideas.

Name of simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each something peculiar.

1. Names of simple Ideas and Substances, intimate real Existence.

2. Names of simple Ideas and Modes signify always both real and nominal Essence.

3. Names of simple Ideas undefinable.

§. 1. **T**HO' all Words, as I have shewn, signify nothing immediately but the *Ideas* in the Mind of the Speaker; yet upon a nearer Survey we shall find that the Names of simple Ideas, mix'd Modes, (under which I comprise Relations too) and natural Substances, have each of them something peculiar and different from the other. For example:

§. 2. First, The Names of simple Ideas and Substances, with the abstract *Ideas* in the Mind, which they immediately signify, intimate also some real Existence, from which was deriv'd their original Pattern. But the Names of mix'd Modes terminate in the *Idea* that is in the Mind, and lead not the Thoughts any farther, as we shall see more at large in the following Chapter.

§. 3. Secondly, The Names of simple Ideas and Modes signify always the real as well as nominal Essence of their Species. But the Names of natural Substances signify rarely, if ever, any thing but barely the nominal Essences of those Species, as we shall shew in the Chapter that treats of the Names of Substances in particular.

§. 4. Thirdly, The Names of simple Ideas are not capable of any Definitions; the Names of all complex *Ideas* are. It has not, that I know, been yet observ'd by any body, what Words are, and what are not capable of being defin'd; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in mens Discourses, whilst some demand Definitions of Terms that cannot be defin'd: and others think they ought to rest satisfy'd in an Explication made by a more general Word, and its Restriction, or to speak in Terms of Art, by a Genus and Difference) when even after such Definition made according to rule, those who hear it, have often no more a clear Conception of the meaning of the Word

Word than they had before. This at least I think, that the shewing what Words are, and what are not capable of Definitions, and wherein consists a good Definition, is not wholly besides our present purpose; and perhaps will afford so much Light to the Nature of these Signs, and our *Ideas*, as to deserve a more particular Consideration.

§. 5. I will not here trouble my self, to prove that all Terms are not definable from that Progress, *in infinitum*, which it will visibly lead us into, if we should allow that all Names could be defin'd. For if the Terms of one Definition were still to be defin'd by another, where at last should we stop? But I shall from the nature of our *Ideas*, and the signification of our Words shew, why some Names can, and others cannot be defin'd, and which they are.

§. 6. I think, it is agreed, that a Definition is nothing else, but the shewing the meaning of one Word by several other not synonymous Terms. The meaning of words being only the *Ideas* they are made to stand for by him that uses them; the meaning of any Term is then shew'd, or the Word is defin'd, when by other Words, the *Idea* it is made the Sign of, and annex'd to in the Mind of the Speaker, is as it were represented, or set before the View of another; and thus its Signification ascertain'd: This is the only Use and End of Definitions; and therefore the only measure of what is, or is not a good Definition.

§. 7. This being premis'd, I say, that the Names of simple Ideas, and those only, are incapable of being defin'd. The reason whereof is this, That the several Terms of a Definition, signifying several *Ideas*, they can all together by no means represent an *Idea*, which has no Composition at all: And therefore a Definition, which is properly nothing but the shewing the meaning of one Word by several others not signifying each the same thing, can in the Names of simple *Ideas* have no place.

§. 8. The not observing this Difference in our *Ideas*, and their Names, has produc'd that eminent trifling in the Schools, which is so easy to be observ'd in the Definitions they give us of some few of these simple *Ideas*. For as to the greatest part of them, even those Masters of Definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the impossibility they found in it. What more exquisite Jargon could the Wit of Man invent, than this Definition, *The Act of a Being in Power, as far forth as in Power?* which would puzzle any rational Man, to whom it was not already known by its famous Absurdity, to guess what word it could ever be suppos'd to be the Explication of. If Tully asking a Dutchman what *Beweeginge* was, should have receiv'd this Explication in his own Language, that it was *Actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia*; I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have understood what the word *Beweeginge* signify'd, or have guess'd what *Idea* a Dutchman ordinarily had in his Mind, and would signify to another when he us'd that Sound.

§. 9. Nor have the modern Philosophers, who have endeavour'd to throw off the Jargon of the Schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded in defining simple *Ideas*, whether by explaining their Causes, or any otherwise. The Atomists, who define Motion to be a Passage from one Place to another, what do they more than put one synonymous word for another? For what is Passage, other than Motion? And if they were ask'd what Passage was, how would they better define it than by Motion? For is it not at least as proper and significant to say, *Passage is a Motion from one Place to another*, as to say, *Motion is a Passage*, &c? This is to translate, and not to define, when we change two words of the same Signification one for another; which, when one is better understood than the other, may serve to discover what *Idea* the unknown stands for; but is very far from a Definition; unless we will say every English word in the Dictionary is the Definition of the Latin word it answers, and that Motion is a Definition of *Motus*. Nor will the successive Application of the Parts of the Surfaces of one Body, to those of another, which the Cartesians give us, prove a much better Definition of Motion, when well examin'd.

§. 10. The Act of Perspicuous, as far forth as perspicuous, is another Peripatetic Definition of a simple *Idea*; which tho' not more absurd than the former of Motion, yet betrays its Uselessness and Insignificancy more plainly, because Experience will easily convince any one, that it cannot make the meaning of the word Light (which it pretends to define) at all understood by a blind Man; but

but the Definition of *Motion* appears not at first sight so useless, because it escapes this way of Trial. For this simple *Idea*, entering by the Touch as well as Sight, 'tis impossible to shew an Example of any one, who has no other way to get the *Idea* of *Motion*, but barely by the Definition of that Name. Those who tell us, that *Light* is a great number of little Globules, striking briskly on the bottom of the Eye, speak more intelligibly than the Schools; but yet these words ever so well understood would make the *Idea* the word *Light* stands for, no more known to a Man that understands it not before, than if one should tell him, that *Light* was nothing but a Company of little Tennis-Balls, which Fairies all day long struck with Rackets against some Mens Foreheads, whilst they pass'd by others. For granting this Explication of the thing to be true; yet the *Idea* of the Cause of *Light*, if we had it ever so exact, would no more give us the *Idea* of *Light* it self, as it is such a particular Perception in us, than the *Idea* of the Figure and Motion of a sharp piece of Steel, would give us the *Idea* of that Pain which it is able to cause in us. For the Cause of any Sensation, and the Sensation it self, in all the simple *Ideas* of one Sense, are two *Ideas*; and two *Ideas* so different and distant one from another, that no two can be more so. And therefore should *Des Cartes's* Globules strike ever so long on the *Retina* of a Man, who was blind by a *Gutta Serena*, he would thereby never have any *Idea* of *Light*, or any thing approaching it, tho' he understood what little Globules were, and what striking on another Body was, ever so well. And therefore the *Cartesians* very well distinguish between that *Light* which is the Cause of that Sensation in us, and the *Idea* which is produc'd in us by it, and is that which is properly *Light*.

Simple Ideas
why undefin-
able, farther
explain'd.

§. 11. *Simple Ideas*, as has been shewn are only to be got by those *Impressions*, Objects themselves make on our Minds, by the proper Inlets appointed to each sort. If they are not receiv'd this way, all the *Words* in the World, made use of to explain, or define any of their Names, will never be able to produce in us the *Idea* it stands for. For Words being Sounds, can produce in us no other simple *Ideas*, than of those very Sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary Connection, which is known to be between them, and those simple *Ideas*, which common Use has made them Signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any words can give him the Taste of a Pine-Apple, and make him have the true *Idea* of the Relish of that celebrated delicious Fruit. So far as he is told it as a resemblance with any Tastes, whereof he has the *Ideas* already in his Memory, imprinted there by sensible Objects not strangers to his Palate, so far may he approach that resemblance in his Mind. But this is not giving us that *Idea* by a Definition, but exciting in us other simple *Ideas*, by their known Names; which will be still very different from the true Taste of that Fruit it self. In *Light* and Colours, and all other simple *Ideas*, it is the same thing; for the Signification of Sounds is not natural, but only impos'd and arbitrary. And no Definition of *Light*, or *Redness*, is more fitted, or able to produce either of those *Ideas* in us, than the Sound *Light* or *Red* by it self. For to hope to produce an *Idea* of *Light*, or Colour, by a Sound, however form'd, is to expect that Sounds should be visible, or Colours audible, and to make the Ears do the Office of all the other Senses. Which is all one as to say, that we might taste, smell and see by the Ears; a sort of Philosophy worthy only of *Sancho Pancha*, who had the Faculty to see *Dulcinea* by Hearsay. And therefore he that has not before receiv'd into his Mind, by the proper Inlet, the simple *Idea* which any word stands for, can never come to know the signification of that word by any other Words or Sounds whatsoever put together, according to any Rules of Definition. The only way is, by applying to his Senses the proper Object; and so producing that *Idea* in him, for which he has learn'd the name already. A studious blind Man, who had mightily beat his Head about visible Objects, and made use of the Explication of his Books and Friends, to understand those Names of *Light* and Colours, which often came in his way, brag'd one Day, that he now understood what *Scarlet* signify'd. Upon which his Friend demanding, what *Scarlet* was? the blind Man answer'd, It was like the Sound of a Trumpet. Just such an understanding of the Name of any other simple *Idea* will he have, who hopes to get it only from a Definition, or other words made use of to explain it.

§. 12. The Case is quite otherwise in *complex Ideas*; which consisting of several simple ones, it is in the power of words, standing for the several *Ideas* that make that Composition, to imprint complex *Ideas* in the Mind, which were never there before, and so make their Names be understood. In such Collections of *Ideas*, passing under one name, *Definition*, or the teaching the signification of one word by several others, has place, and may make us understand the Names of Things, which never came within the reach of our Senses: and frame *Ideas* suitable to those in other Mens Minds, when they use those Names: provided that none of the Terms of the Definition stand for any such simple *Ideas*, which he to whom the Explication is made, has never yet had in his Thought. Thus the word *Statue* may be explain'd to a blind Man by other words, when *Picture* cannot; his Senses having given him the *Idea* of Figure, but not of Colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him. This gain'd the Prize to the Painter against the Statuary: each of which contending for the Excellency of his Art, and the Statuary bragging that his was to be prefer'd, because it reach'd farther, and even those who had lost their Eyes, could yet perceive the Excellency of it; the Painter agreed to refer himself to the Judgment of a blind Man; who being brought where there was a Statue made by the one, and a Picture drawn by the other, he was first led to the Statue, in which he trac'd with his Hands all the Lineaments of the Face and Body, and with great admiration applauded the Skill of the Workman. But being led to the Picture, and having his Hands laid upon it, was told, That now he touch'd the Head, and then the Forehead, Eyes, Nose, &c. as his Hand mov'd over the Parts of the Picture on the Cloth, without finding any the least distinction: Whereupon he cry'd out, that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine piece of Workmanship, which could represent to them all those Parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing.

§. 14. He that should use the word *Rainbow* to one who knew all those Colours, but yet had never seen that *Phænomenon*, would, by enumerating the Figure, Largeness, Position and Order of the Colours, so well define that word, that it might be perfectly understood. But yet that *Definition*, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind Man understand it; because several of the simple *Ideas* that make that complex one, being such as he never receiv'd by Sensation and Experience, no words are able to excite them in his Mind.

§. 14. Simple *Ideas*, as has been shew'd, can only be got by Experience, from those Objects, which are proper to produce in us those Perceptions. When by this means we have our Minds stor'd with them, and know the Names for them, then we are in a Condition to define, and by *Definition* to understand the Names of complex *Ideas*, that are made up of them. But when any Term stands for a simple *Idea*, that a Man has never yet had in his Mind, it is impossible, by any words to make known its meaning to him. When any Term stands for an *Idea* a Man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that that Term is the sign of it, there another Name, of the same *Idea* which he has been accus'd to, may make him understand its meaning. But in no case whatsoever is any Name of any simple *Idea*, capable of a *Definition*:

§. 15. Fourthly, But tho' the Names of *simples Ideas* have not the help of *Definition* to determine their signification, yet that hinders not but that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain, than those of mix'd Modes and Substances: Because they standing only for one simple Perception, Men for the most part, easily and perfectly agree in their signification; and there is little room for Mistake and Wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once that Whiteness is the name of that Colour he has observ'd in Snow or Milk, will not be apt to misapply that word as long as he retains that *Idea*; which when he has quite lost, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of simple *Ideas* to be put together, which makes the Doubtfulness in the names of mix'd Modes; nor a suppos'd, but an unknown real Essence, with Properties depending thereon, the precise number whereof are also unknown, which makes the difficulty in the names of Substances. But, on the contrary, in simple *Ideas* the whole signification of the Name is known at once, and consists not of Parts, whereof more

The contrary
shew'd in
complex Ideas
by Instances of
a Statue and
Rainbow.

The Names of
complex Ideas
when to be
made intelli-
gible by
Words.

4. Names of
simple Ideas
least doubtful.

or less being put in, the *Idea* may be vary'd, and so the signification of its Name be obscure or uncertain.

5. Simple Ideas have few Ascents in Linea Predicamentali.

§. 16. *Fifthly*, This farther may be observ'd concerning *simple Ideas*, and their Names, that they have but few Ascents in Linea Predicamentali (as they call it) from the lowest Species to the Summum Genus. The reason whereof is, that the lowest Species being but one simple *Idea*, nothing can be left out of it; that so the difference being taken away, it may agree with some other thing in one *Idea* common to them both; which having one Name, is the *Genus* of the other two: v. g. There is nothing can be left out of the *Idea* of White and Red, to make them agree in one common Appearance, and so have one general Name; as *Rationality* being left out of the complex *Idea* of *Man*, makes it agree with Brute, in the more general *Idea* and Name of *Animal*: And therefore when to avoid unpleasant Enumerations. Men would comprehend both *White* and *Red*, and several other such simple *Ideas*, under one general Name; they have been fain to do it by a word, which denotes only the way they get into the Mind. For when *White*, *Red* and *Yellow* are all comprehended under the *Genus* or name *Colour*, it signifies no more but such *Ideas* as are produc'd in the Mind only by the Sight, and have entrance only thro' the Eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general Term, to comprehend both *Colours* and *Sounds*, and the like simple *Ideas*, they do it by a word that signifies all such as come into the Mind only by one Sense: And so the general term *Quality*, in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Tastes*, *Smells* and tangible *Qualities*, with distinction from *Extension*, *Number*, *Motion*, *Pleasure* and *Pain*, which make Impressions on the Mind, and introduce their *Ideas* by more Senses than one.

6. Names of simple Ideas stand for Ideas not at all arbitrary.

§. 17. *Sixthly*, The Names of simple *Ideas*, Substances, and mix'd Modes, have also this difference; That those of *mix'd Modes* stand for *Ideas* perfectly arbitrary; those of *Substances* are not perfectly so, but refer to a Pattern, tho' with some Latitude; and those of *simple Ideas* are perfectly taken from the Existence of Things, and are not arbitrary at all. Which, what difference it makes in the significations of their Names, we shall see in the following Chapters.

The Names of simple Modes differ little from those of simple *Ideas*.

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of mix'd Modes and Relations.

They stand for abstract Ideas, as other general Names.

§. 1. **T**HE Names of mix'd Modes being general, they stand, as has been shewn, for Sorts or Species of Things, each of which has its peculiar Essence. The Essences of these Species also, as has been shew'd. are nothing but the abstract *Ideas* in the Mind, to which the Name is annex'd. Thus far the Names and Essences of mix'd Modes, have nothing but what is common to them with other *Ideas*: But if we take a little nearer Survey of them, we shall find that they have something peculiar, which perhaps may deserve our Attention.

1. The Ideas they stand for, are made by the Understanding.

§. 2. The first Particularity I shall observe in them, is, That the abstract *Ideas*, or, if you please, the Essences of the several Species of *mix'd Modes* are made by the Understanding, wherein they differ from those of simple *Ideas*: In which sort, the Mind has no Power to make any one, but only receives such as are presented to it, by the real Existence of things operating upon it.

2. Made arbitrarily, and without Patterns.

§. 3. In the next place, these *Essences of the Species of mix'd Modes*, are not only made by the Mind, but made very arbitrarily, made without Patterns, or reference to any real Existence. Wherein they differ from those of Substances, which carry with them the Supposition of some real Being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But in its complex *Ideas* of mix'd Modes, the Mind takes a Liberty not to follow the Existence of Things exactly. It unites and retains certain Collections, as so many distinct specifick *Ideas*, whilst others, that as often occur in Nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward Things, pass neglected, without particular Names or Specifications.

Nor

Nor does the Mind, in these of mix'd Modes, as in the complex *Ideas* of Substances, examine them by the real Existence of things; or verify them by Patterns, containing such peculiar Compositions in Nature. To know whether his *Idea* of *Adultery* or *Incest* be right, will a Man seek it any where amongst things existing? Or is it true, because any one has been witness to such an Action? No: but it suffices here, that Men have put together such a Collection into one complex *Idea*, that makes the *Archetype* and specifick *Idea*, whether ever any such Action were committed in *verum natura* or no.

§. 4. To understand this aright, we must consider *wherein this making of these* *How this is done.* complex *Ideas* consists; and that is not in the making any new *Idea*, but putting together those which the Mind had before. Wherein the Mind does these three things: First, It chuses a certain Number: Secondly, It gives them Connection, and makes them into one *Idea*: Thirdly, It ties them together by a Name. If we examine how the Mind proceeds in these, and what liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe how these Essences of the Species of mix'd Modes are the Workmanship of the Mind, and consequently, that the Species themselves are of Mensmaking.

§. 5. No body can doubt, but that these *Ideas* of mix'd Modes are made by a voluntary Collection of *Ideas* put together in the Mind, independent from any original Patterns in Nature, who will but reflect that this sort of complex *Ideas* may be made, abstracted, and have names given them, and so a Species be constituted, before any one Individual of that Species ever existed. Who can doubt but the *Ideas* of *Sacrilege* or *Adultery* might be framed in the Mind of Men, and have names given them; and so these Species of mix'd Modes be constituted, before either of them was ever committed; and might be as well discours'd of, and reason'd about, and as certain Truths discover'd of them, whilst yet they had no being but in the Understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real Existence? Whereby it is plain, how much *the sorts of mix'd Modes are the Creatures of the Understanding*, where they have a Being as subservient to all the Ends of real Truth and Knowledge, as when they really exist: And we cannot doubt but Law-makers have often made Laws about Species of Actions, which were only the Creatures of their own Understandings; Beings that had no other existence, but in their own Minds. And I think no body can deny, but that the *Resurrection* was a Species of mix'd Modes in the Mind, before it really existed. *Evidently arbitrary, that the Idea is often before the Existence.*

§. 6. To see *how arbitrarily these Essences of mix'd Modes are made* by the Mind, *Instances; Murder, Incest, Stabbing.* we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little looking into them will satisfy us, that 'tis the Mind that combines several scatter'd independent *Ideas* into one complex one, and by the common name it gives them, makes them the Essence of a certain Species, without regulating it self by any Connection they have in Nature. For what greater Connection in Nature has the *Idea* of a Man, than the *Idea* of a Sheep, with killing; that this is made a particular Species of Action, signify'd by the word *Murder*, and the other not? Or what Union is there in Nature between the *Idea* of the Relation of a Father, with Killing, than that of a Son, or Neighbour; that those are combin'd into one complex *Idea*, and thereby made the Essence of the distinct Species *Parricide*, whilst the other make no distinct Species at all? But tho' they have made killing a Man's Father, or Mother, a distinct Species from killing his Son, or Daughter; yet in some other cases, Son and Daughter are taken in too, as well as Father and Mother; and they are all equally comprehended in the same Species, as in that of *Incest*. Thus the Mind in mix'd Modes arbitrarily unites into complex *Ideas*, such as it finds convenient; whilst others that have altogether as much Union in Nature, are left loose, and never combin'd into one *Idea*, because they have no need of one name. 'Tis evident then, that the Mind by its free choice gives a Connection to a certain number of *Ideas*, which in nature have no more Union with one another, than others that it leaves out: Why else is the part of the Weapon, the beginning of the Wound is made with, taken notice of, to make the distinct Species call'd *Stabbing*, and the Figure and Matter of the Weapon left out? I do not say this is done without reason, as we shall see more by and by; but this I say, that it is done by the free choice of the Mind, pursuing its own ends; and that therefore these Species of mix'd Modes are the Workmanship of the Understanding: And there is nothing more evident,

evident, than that for the most part, in the framing these *Ideas*, the Mind searches not its Patterns in Nature, nor refers the *Ideas* it makes to the real Existence of things; but puts such together, as may best serve its own purposes, without tying itself to a precise Imitation of any thing that really exists.

But still subservient to the end of Language.

§. 7. But tho' these complex *Ideas*, or *Essences of mix'd Modes*, depend on the Mind, and are made by it with great liberty; yet they are not made at random, and jumbled together without any reason at all. Tho' these complex *Ideas* be not always copy'd from Nature, yet they are always suited to the End for which abstract *Ideas* are made: And tho' they be Combinations made of *Ideas* that are loose enough, and have as little Union in themselves, as several other to which the Mind never gives a Connection that combines them into one *Idea*; yet they are always made for the convenience of Communication, which is the chief End of Language. The Use of Language is, by short Sounds to signify with ease and dispatch general Conceptions; wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contain'd, but also a great variety of independent *Ideas* collected into one complex one. In the making therefore of the Species of mix'd Modes, Men have had regard only to such Combinations as they had occasion to mention one to another. Those they have combin'd into distinct complex *Ideas*, and given Names to; whilst others that in Nature have as near an Union, are left loose and unregarded. For to go no farther than human Actions themselves, if they would make distinct abstract *Ideas* of all the Varieties might be observ'd in them, the Number must be infinite, and the Memory confounded with the Plenty, as well as overcharg'd to little purpose. It suffices, that Men make and name so many complex *Ideas* of these mix'd Modes, as they find they have occasion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their Affairs. If they join to the *Idea* of Killing, the *Idea* of Father, or Mother, and so make a distinct Species from killing a Man's Son or Neighbour, it is because of the different Heinousness of the Crime, and the distinct Punishment is due to the murdering a Man's Father and Mother, different from what ought to be inflicted on the Murder of a Son or Neighbour; and therefore they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct Name, which is the end of making that distinct Combination. But tho' the *Ideas* of Mother and Daughter are so differently treated, in reference to the *Idea* of Killing, that the one is join'd with it, to make a distinct abstract *Idea* with a name, and so a distinct Species, and the other not; yet in respect of carnal Knowledg, they are both taken in under *Incest*: and that still for the same convenience of expressing under one Name, and reckoning of one Species, such unclean Mixtures as have a peculiar Turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid Circumlocutions, and tedious Descriptions.

Whereof the intranslatable Words of divers Languages are a proof.

§. 8. A moderate Skill in different Languages will easily satisfy one of the truth of this; it being so obvious to observe great store of Words in one Language, which have not any that answer them in another. Which plainly shews, that those of one Country, by their Customs and Manner of Life, have found occasion to make several complex *Ideas*, and give names to them, which others never collected into specifick *Ideas*. This could not have happen'd, if these Species were the steady Workmanship of Nature, and not Collections made and abstracted by the Mind, in order to naming, and for the convenience of Communication. The Terms of our Law, which are not empty Sounds, will hardly find Words that answer them in the Spanish or Italian, no scanty Languages; much less, I think, could any one translate them into the Caribees or Westoe Tongues: And the *Versura* of the Romans, or *Corban* of the Jews, have no Words in other Languages to answer them; the reason whereof is plain, from what has been said. Nay, if we will look a little more nearly into this matter, and exactly compare different Languages, we shall find, that tho' they have Words which in Translations and Dictionaries are suppos'd to answer one another, yet there is scarce one of ten amongst the Names of complex *Ideas*, especially of mix'd Modes, that stands for the same precise *Idea*, which the Word does that in Dictionaries it is render'd by. There are no *Ideas* more common, and less compounded, than the Measures of Time, Extension, and Weight, and the Latin Names, *Hora*, *Pes*, *Libra*, are without difficulty render'd by the English Names, *Hour*, *Foot*, and *Pound*: but yet there is nothing more evident, than that the *Ideas* a Roman annex'd to these Latin Names, were very far different from those

those which an *Englishman* expresses by those *English* ones. And if either of these should make use of the measures that those of the other Language design'd by their Names, he would be quite out in his account. These are too sensible proofs to be doubted; and we shall find this much more so, in the Names of more abstract and compounded *Ideas*, such as are the greatest part of those which make up moral Discourses: whose Names, when Men come curiously to compare with those they are translated into, in other Languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correspond in the whole extent of their Significations.

§. 9. The reason why I take so particular notice of this, is, that we may not be mistaken about *Genera* and *Species*, and their *Essences*, as if they were things regularly and constantly made by Nature, and had a real Existence in things; when they appear, upon a more wary Survey, to be nothing else but an Artifice of the Understanding, for the easier signifying such Collections of *Ideas*, as it should often have occasion to communicate by one general Term; under which divers particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that abstract *Idea*, might be comprehended. And if the doubtful Signification of the word *Species* may make it sound harsh to some, that I say that the *Species* of mix'd Modes are made by the Understanding; yet, I think, it can by no body be deny'd, that 'tis the Mind makes those abstract complex *Ideas*, to which specifick Names are given. And if it be true, as it is, that the Mind makes the Patterns for sorting and naming of things, I leave it to be consider'd who makes the Boundaries of the Sort or *Species*; since with me, *Species* and *Sort* have no other difference, than than that of a *Latin* and *English* Idiom.

This shews Species to be made for Communication.

§. 10. The near Relation that there is between *Species*, *Essences*, and their general Name, at least in mix'd Modes, will farther appear, when we consider that it is the Name that seems to preserve those *Essences*, and give them their lasting duration. For the Connection between the loose parts of those complex *Ideas* being made by the Mind, this Union, which has no particular foundation in Nature, would cease again, were there not something that did as it were hold it together, and keep the parts from scattering. Tho' therefore it be the Mind that makes the Collection, 'tis the Name which is as it were the Knot that ties them fast together. What a vast variety of different *Ideas* does the word *Triumphus* hold together, and deliver to us as one *Species*! Had this Name been never made or quite lost, we might, no doubt, have had descriptions of what pass'd in that Solemnity: but yet, I think, that which holds those different parts together, in the Unity of one complex *Idea*, is that very word annex'd to it; without which, the several parts of that would no more be thought to make one thing, than any other Shew, which having never been made but once, had never been united into one complex *Idea*, under one denomination. How much therefore, in mix'd Modes, the Unity necessary to any *Essence* depends on the Mind; and how much the Continuation and fixing of that Unity depends on the Name in common use annex'd to it; I leave to be consider'd by those, who look upon *Essences* and *Species* as real establish'd things in Nature.

In mix'd Modes 'tis the Name that ties the Combination together, and makes it a Species.

§. 11. Suitable to this, we find, that Men speaking of mix'd Modes, seldom imagine or take any other for *Species* of them, but such as are set out by name: because they being of Man's making only, in order to naming, no such *Species* are taken notice of, or suppos'd to be, unless a Name be join'd to it, as the sign of Man's having combin'd into one *Idea* several loose ones; and by that Name giving a lasting Union to the Parts, which would otherwise cease to have any, as soon as the Mind laid by that abstract *Idea*, and ceas'd actually to think on it. But when a Name is once annex'd to it, wherein the parts of that complex *Idea* have a settled and permanent Union; then is the *Essence* as it were establish'd, and the *Species* look'd on as compleat. For to what purpose should the Memory charge it self with such Compositions, unless it were by Abstraction to make them general? And to what purpose make them general, unless it were that they might have general Names, for the convenience of Discourse and Communication? Thus we see, that killing a Man with a Sword or a Hatcher, are look'd on as no distinct *Species* of Action: but if the Point of the Sword first enter the Body, it passes for a distinct *Species*, where it has a distinct Name; as in *England*, in whose Language it is call'd *Stabbing*: But in another Country, where it has not happen'd to be specify'd under a peculiar Name, it passes not

for

for a distinct *Species*. But in the *Species* of corporeal Substances, tho' it be the Mind that makes the nominal Essence; yet since those *Ideas* which are combin'd in it are suppos'd to have an Union in Nature, whether the Mind joins them or no, therefore those are look'd on as distinct *Species*, without any Operation of the Mind, either abstracting or giving a Name to that complex *Idea*.

For the Originals of mix'd Modes, we look no farther than the Mind, which also shews them to be the Workmanship of the Understanding.

§. 12. Conformable also to what has been said, concerning the *Essences* of the *Species* of mix'd Modes, that they are the Creatures of the Understanding, rather than the Works of Nature: Conformable, I say to this, we find that their Names lead our Thoughts to the Mind, and no farther. When we speak of Justice, or Gratitude, we frame to our selves no Imagination of any thing existing, which we would conceive; but our Thoughts terminate in the abstract *Ideas* of those Vertues, and look not farther: as they do, when we speak of a Horse or Iron, whose specifick *Ideas* we consider not, as barely in the Mind, but as in things themselves, which afford the original Patterns of those *Ideas*. But in mix'd Modes, at least the most considerable parts of them, which are moral Beings, we consider the original Patterns as being in the Mind; and to those we refer for the distinguishing of particular Beings under Names. And hence I think it is, That these *Essences* of the *Species* of mix'd Modes are by a more particular Name call'd *Notions*; as by a peculiar Right, appertaining to the Understanding.

Their being made by the Understanding without Patterns, shews the reason why they are so compounded.

§. 13. Hence likewise we may learn, *Why the complex Ideas of mix'd Modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded, than those of natural Substances*. Because they being the Workmanship of the Understanding, pursuing only its own ends, and the conveniency of expressing in short those *Ideas* it would make known to another, does with great liberty unite often into one abstract *Idea* things that in their Nature have no coherence; and so, under one Term, bundle together a great variety of compounded and decompounded *Ideas*. Thus the Name of *Procession*, what a great mixture of independent *Ideas* of Persons, Habits, Tapers, Orders, Motions, Sounds, does it contain in that complex one, which the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put together, to express by that one Name? Whereas the complex *Ideas* of the sorts of Substances are usually made up of only a small number of simple ones; and in the *Species* of Animals, these two, viz. Shape and Voice, commonly make the whole nominal Essence.

Names of mix'd Modes stand always for their real Essences.

§. 14. Another thing we may observe from what has been said, is, That the Names of mix'd Modes always signify (when they have any determin'd Signification) the real *Essences* of their *Species*. For these abstract *Ideas* being the Workmanship of the Mind, and not refer'd to the real Existence of things, there is no Supposition of any thing more signify'd by that Name, but barely that complex *Idea* the Mind it self has form'd, which is all it would have express'd by it; and is that, on which all the Properties of the *Species* depend, and from which alone they all flow: and so in these the real and nominal Essence is the same; which of what Concernment it is to the certain Knowledge of general Truth we shall see hereafter.

Why their Names are usually got before their *Ideas*.

§. 15. This also may shew us the reason, *Why for the most part the Names of mix'd Modes are got, before the Ideas they stand for are perfectly known*. Because there being no *Species* of these ordinarily taken notice of, but what have Names, and those *Species*, or rather their *Essences*, being abstract complex *Ideas* made arbitrarily by the Mind, it is convenient, if not necessary, to know the Names, before one endeavour to frame these complex *Ideas*: unless a Man will fill his Head with a company of abstract complex *Ideas*, which others having no Names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. I confess, that in the beginning of Languages it was necessary to have the *Idea*, before one gave it the Name: And so it is still, where making a new complex *Idea*, one also, by giving it a new Name, makes a new Word. But this concerns not Languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for *Ideas*, which Men have frequent occasion to have and communicate: And in such, I ask, whether it be not the ordinary method, that Children learn the Names of mix'd Modes, before they have their *Ideas*? What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract *Idea* of Glory and Ambition, before he has heard the Name of them? In simple *Ideas* and Substances, I grant it is otherwise; which being such *Ideas* as have a real Existence and Union in Nature, the *Ideas* or Names are got one before the other, as it happens.

§. 16.

§. 16. What has been said here of mix'd Modes, is with very little difference applicable also to Relations; which, since every Man himself may observe, I may spare my self the pains to enlarge on: Especially, since what I have here said concerning Words in this third Book, will possibly be thought by some to be much more than what so slight a Subject requir'd. I allow it might be brought into a narrower Compals: but I was willing to stay my Reader on an Argument that appears to me new, and a little out of the way, (I am sure 'tis one I thought not of when I began to write) That by searching it to the bottom, and turning it on every side, some part or other might meet with every one's Thoughts, and give occasion to the most averse or negligent to reflect on a general Miscarriage; which, tho' of great consequence, is little taken notice of. When it is consider'd what a pudder is made about *Essences*, and how much all sorts of Knowledg, Discourse, and Conversation are pester'd and disorder'd by the careless and confus'd Use and Application of Words, it will perhaps be thought worth while thorowly to lay it open. And I shall be pardon'd if I have dwelt long on an Argument which I think therefore needs to be inculcated; because the Faults, Men are usually guilty of in this kind, are not only the greatest hinderances of true Knowledg, but are so well thought of, as to pass for it. Men would often see what a small Pittance of Reason and Truth, or possibly none at all, is mix'd with those huffing Opinions they are swell'd with; if they would but look beyond fashionable Sounds, and observe what *Ideas* are, or are not comprehended under those words with which they are so arm'd at all points, and with which they so confidently lay about them. I shall imagine I have done some service to Truth, Peace and Learning, if, by any enlargement on this Subject, I can make Men reflect on their own Use of Language; and give them reason to suspect, that since it is frequent for others, it may also be possible for them to have sometimes very good and approv'd Words in their Mouths and Writings, with very uncertain, little, or no Signification. And therefore it is not unreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves, and not to be unwilling to have them examin'd by others. With this design therefore I shall go on with what I have farther to say concerning this matter.

Reason of my being so large on this Subject.

C H A P. VI.

Of the Names of Substances.

§. 1. **T**HE common Names of Substances, as well as other general Terms, stand for Sorts; which is nothing else but the being made Signs of such complex *Ideas*, wherein several particular Substances do or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common Conception, and signify'd by one Name. I say, do or might agree: for tho' there be but one Sun existing in the World, yet the *Idea* of it being abstracted, so that more Substances (if there were several) might each agree in it; it is as much a Sort, as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars. They want not their Reasons who think there are, and that each fix'd Star would answer the *Idea* the Name *Sun* stands for, to one who were plac'd in a due distance; which, by the way, may shew us how much the Sorts, or, if you please, *Genera* and *Species* of things (for those *Latin* Terms signify to me no more than the *English* word *Sort*) depend on such Collections of *Ideas* as Men have made, and not on the real Nature of things; since 'tis not impossible, but that in propriety of Speech, that might be a Sun to one, which is a Star to another.

The common Names of Substances stand for Sorts.

§. 2. The Measure and Boundary of each Sort, or *Species*, whereby it is constituted that particular Sort, and distinguish'd from others, is that we call its *Essence*, which is nothing but that abstract *Idea* to which the Name is annex'd: so that every thing contain'd in that *Idea* is essential to that Sort. This, tho' it be all the *Essence* of natural Substances that we know, or by which we distinguish them into Sorts; yet I call it by a peculiar Name, the *nominal Essence*, to distinguish it from that real Constitution of Substances, upon which depends

The Essence of each sort is the abstract Ideas.

this

this *nominal Essence*, and all the Properties of that Sort; which therefore, as has been said, may be call'd the *real Essence*: v. g. the *nominal Essence* of Gold is that complex *Idea* the Word *Gold* stands for, let it be, for instance, a Body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fusible, and fix'd. But the *real Essence* is the Constitution of the insensible Parts of that Body, on which those Qualities, and all the other Properties of Gold depend. How far these two are different, tho' they are both call'd *Essence*, is obvious at first sight to discover.

The nominal
and real Es-
sence differ-
ent.

§. 3. For tho' perhaps voluntary Motion, with Sense and Reason, join'd to a Body of a certain Shape, be the complex *Idea* to which I, and others, annex the name *Man*, and so be the *nominal Essence* of the *Species* so call'd; yet no body will say that that complex *Idea* is the *real Essence* and Source of all those Operations which are to be found in any Individual of that Sort. The Foundation of all those Qualities, which are the Ingredients of our complex *Idea*, is something quite different: And had we such a Knowledge of that Constitution of *Man*, from which his Faculties of Moving, Sensation, and Reasoning, and other Powers flow; and on which his so regular Shape depends, as 'tis possible Angels have, and 'tis certain his Maker has; we should have a quite other *Idea* of his *Essence* than what now is contain'd in our Definition of that *Species*, be it what it will: And our *Idea* of any individual *Man* would be as far different from what it now is, as is his who knows all the Springs and Wheels and other Contrivances within, of the famous Clock at *Strasburgh*, from that which a gazing Country-man has of it, who barely sees the Motion of the Hand, and hears the Clock strike, and observes only some of the outward Appearances.

Nothing essen-
tial to Indivi-
duals,

§. 4. That *Essence*, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to *Sorts*; and that it is consider'd in particular Beings no farther than as they are rank'd into *Sorts*, appears from hence: That take but away the abstract *Ideas*, by which we sort Individuals, and rank them under common Names, and then the thought of any thing *essential* to any of them, instantly vanishes; we have no notion of the one without the other; which plainly shews their relation. 'Tis necessary for me to be as I am; GOD and Nature has made me so: but there is nothing, I have is essential to me. An Accident, or Disease, may very much alter my Colour, or Shape; a Fever, or Fall, may take away my Reason or Memory or both; and an Apoplexy leave neither Sense nor Understanding, no nor Life. Other Creatures of my Shape may be made with more, and better, or fewer, and worse Faculties than I have: and others may have Reason and Sense in a Shape and Body very different from mine. None of these are essential to the one, or the other, or to any Individual whatsoever, till the Mind refers it to some Sort or *Species* of things; and then presently, according to the abstract *Idea* of that Sort, something is found *essential*. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and he will find that as soon as he supposes or speaks of *Essential*, the Consideration of some *Species*, or the complex *Idea*, signify'd by some general Name, comes into his Mind: And 'tis in reference to that, that this or that Quality is said to be *essential*. So that if it be ask'd, whether it be *essential* to me or any other particular corporeal Being to have Reason? I say no; no more than it is *essential* to this white thing I write on, to have words in it. But if that particular Being be to be counted of the sort *Man*, and to have the name *Man* given it, then Reason is *essential* to it, supposing Reason to be a part of the complex *Idea* the name *Man* stands for: as it is *essential* to this thing I write on to contain words, if I will give it the name *Treatise*, and rank it under that *Species*. So that *essential*, and *not essential*, relate only to our abstract *Ideas*, and the Names annex'd to them; which amounts to no more but this, That whatever particular thing has not in it those Qualities, which are contain'd in the abstract *Idea*, which any general Term stands for, cannot be rank'd under that *Species*, nor be call'd by that name, since that abstract *Idea* is the very *Essence* of that *Species*.

§. 5. Thus if the *Idea* of *Body*, with some People, be bare Extension or Space, then Solidity is not *essential* to *Body*: If others make the *Idea*, to which they give the name *Body*, to be Solidity and Extension, then Solidity is *essential* to *Body*. That therefore, and that alone is consider'd as *essential*, which makes a part of the complex *Idea* the Name of a Sort stands for, without which no particular thing can be reckon'd of that Sort, nor be entitled to that Name. Should there

there be found a parcel of Matter that had all the other Qualities that are in Iron, but wanted Obedience to the Load-stone: and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive Direction from it, Would any one question, whether it wanted any thing *essential*? It would be absurd to ask, Whether a thing really existing wanted any thing *essential* to it. Or could it be demanded, Whether this made an *essential* or *specifick* difference or no; since we have no other measure of *essential* or *specifick*, but our abstract *Ideas*? And to talk of *specifick* Differences in Nature, without reference to general *Ideas* and Names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, What is sufficient to make an *essential* difference in Nature, between any two particular Beings, without any regard had to some abstract *Idea*, which is look'd upon as the Essence and Standard of a *Species*? All such Patterns and Standards, being quite laid aside, particular Beings, consider'd barely in themselves, will be found to have all their Qualities equally *essential*; and every thing, in each Individual, will be *essential* to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. For tho' it may be reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the Magnet be *essential* to Iron? yet, I think, it is very improper and insignificant to ask, Whether it be *essential* to the particular parcel of Matter I cut my Pen with, without considering it under the name Iron, or as being of a certain *Species*? And if, as has been said, our abstract *Ideas*, which have Names annex'd to them, are the Boundaries of *Species*, nothing can be *essential* but what is contain'd in those *Ideas*.

§. 6. 'Tis true, I have often mention'd a *real Essence*, distinct in Substances from those abstract *Ideas* of them, which I call their *nominal Essence*. By this *real Essence* I mean that real Constitution of any thing, which is the Foundation of all those Properties that are combin'd in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the *nominal Essence*; that particular Constitution which every thing has within it self, without any relation to any thing without it. But *Essence*, even in this sense, *relates to a Sort*, and supposes a *Species*: For being that real Constitution, on which the Properties depend, it necessarily supposes a sort of things, Properties belonging only to *Species*, and not to Individuals; v. g. Supposing the *nominal Essence* of Gold to be Body of such a peculiar Colour and Weight, with Malleability and Fusibility, the real *Essence* is that Constitution of the Parts of Matter, on which these Qualities, and their Union, depend; and is also the Foundation of its Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, and other Properties accompanying that complex *Idea*. Here are *Essences* and *Properties*, but all upon supposition of a Sort, or general abstract *Idea*, which is consider'd as immutable: but there is no individual Parcel of Matter, to which any of these Qualities are so annex'd, as to be *essential* to it, or inseparable from it, That which is *essential* belongs to it as a Condition, whereby it is of this or that Sort: But take away the Consideration of its being rank'd under the Name of some abstract *Idea*, and then there is nothing necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the *real Essences* of Substances, we only suppose their Being, without precisely knowing what they are: But that which annexes them still to the *Species*, is the *nominal Essence*, of which they are the suppos'd Foundation and Cause.

§. 7. The next thing to be consider'd, is, by which of those *Essences* it is that Substances are determin'd into Sorts, or *Species*; and that, 'tis evident, is by the *nominal Essence*. For 'tis that alone that the Name, which is the mark of the Sort, signifies. 'Tis impossible therefore that any thing should determine the Sorts of things, which we rank under general Names, but that *Idea* which that Name is design'd as a mark for; which is that, as has been shewn, which we call the *nominal Essence*. Why do we say, This is a *Horse*, and that a *Mule*; this is an *Animal*, that an *Herb*? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that Sort, but because it has that *nominal Essence*, or, which is all one, agrees to that abstract *Idea* that Name is annex'd to? And I desire any one but to reflect on his own Thoughts when he hears or speaks any of those, or other Names of Substances, to know what sort of *Essences* they stand for.

§. 8. And that the *Species* of things to us are nothing but the ranking them under distinct Names, according to the complex *Ideas* in us; and not according to precise, distinct, real *Essences* in them, is plain from hence, That we find many of the Individuals that are rank'd into one Sort, call'd by one common Name, and so-

The *nominal Essence* bounds the *Species*.

receiv'd as being of one *Species*, have yet Qualities depending on their real Constitutions, as far different one from another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ *specifically*. This as it is easy to be observ'd by all who have to do with natural Bodies, so Chymists especially are often, by sad Experience, convinc'd of it, when they, sometimes in vain, seek for the same Qualities in one parcel of Sulphur, Antimony or Vitriol, which they have found in others. For tho' they are Bodies of the same *Species*, having the same nominal *Essence*, under the same Name; yet do they often, upon severe ways of Examination, betray Qualities so different one from another; as to frustrate the Expectation and Labour of very wary Chymists. But if Things were distinguish'd into *Species*, according to their real Essences, it would be as impossible to find different Properties in any two individual Substances of the same *Species*, as it is to find different Properties in two Circles, or two equilateral Triangles. That is properly the *Essence* to us, which determines every particular to this or that *Classis*; or, which is the same thing, to this or that general Name: And what can that be else, but that abstract *Idea*, to which that Name is annex'd? and so has, in truth, a Reference, not so much to the being of particular things, as to their general Denominations.

Not the real
Essence which
we know not.

§. 9. Nor indeed can we rank, and sort Things, and consequently (which is the end of sorting) denominate them by their real Essences, because we know them not. Our Faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledge and distinction of Substances, than a Collection of those sensible *Ideas* which we observe in them; which however made with the greatest Diligence and Exactness we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal Constitution, from which those Qualities flow, than, as I said, a Countryman's *Idea* is from the inward Contrivance of that famous Clock at *Strasbourg*, whereof he only sees the outward Figure and Motions. There is not so contemptible a plant or Animal that does not confound the most enlarg'd Understanding. Tho' the familiar use of Things about us, take off our Wonder; yet it cures not our Ignorance. When we come to examine the Stones we tread on, or the Iron we daily handle, we presently find we know not their Make, and can give no reason of the different Qualities we find in them. 'Tis evident the internal Constitution, whereon their Properties depend, is unknown to us. For to go no farther than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst them, What is that Texture of Parts, that real *Essence*, that makes Lead and Antimony fusible; Wood and Stones not? What makes Lead and Iron malleable, Antimony and Stones not? And yet how infinitely these come short of the fine Contrivances, and unconceivable real Essences of Plants or Animals, every one knows. The workmanship of the All-wise and Powerful God, in the great Fabrick of the Universe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the Capacity and Comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent Man, than the best Contrivance of the most ingenious Man doth the Conceptions of the most ignorant of rational Creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range Things into Sorts, and dispose them into certain Glasses, under Names, by their real Essences, that are so far from our Discovery or Comprehension. A blind Man may as soon sort things by their Colours, and he that has lost his Smell, as well distinguish a Lily and a Rose by their Odors, as by those internal Constitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish Sheep and Goats by their real Essences, that are unknown to him, may be pleas'd to try his Skill in those *Species*, call'd *Cassowary* and *Querechinchio*; and by their internal real Essences determine the Boundaries of those *Species*, without knowing the complex *Idea* of sensible Qualities, that each of those stand for, in the Countries where those Animals are to be found.

Not substantial
Forms
which we
know less.

§. 10. Those therefore who have been taught, that the several *Species* of Substances had their distinct internal *substantial Forms*; and that it was those *Forms* which made the distinction of Substances into their true *Species* and *Genera*, were led yet farther out of the way, by having their Minds set upon fruitless Enquiries after *substantial Forms*, wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure, or confus'd Conception in general.

§. 11. That our ranking and distinguishing natural Substances into *Species*, consists in the Nominal Essences the Mind makes, and not in the real Essences to be found

found in the Things themselves, is farther evident from our *Ideas* of *Spirits* That the nominal Essence is that whereby we distinguish Species, farther evident from Spirits. For the Mind getting, only by reflecting on its own Operations, those simple *Ideas* which it attributes to *Spirits*, it hath, or can have no other Notion of *Spirits*, but by attributing all those Operations, it finds in it self, to a sort of Beings, without consideration of Matter. And even the most advanc'd Notion we have of God, is but attributing the same simple *Ideas* which we have got from Reflection on what we find in our selves, and which we conceive to have more Perfection in them, than would be in their Absence; attributing, I say, those simple *Ideas* to him in an unlimited degree. Thus having got, from reflecting on our selves, the *Idea* of Existence, Knowledge, Power and Pleasure, each of which we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of each, the better; joining all these together, with Infinity to each of them, we have the complex *Idea* of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise and happy Being. And tho' we are told, that there are different *Species* of *Angels*; yet we know not how to frame distinct specifick *Ideas* of them: not out of any Conceit that the Existence of more *Species* than one of *Spirits* is impossible, but because having no more simple *Ideas* (nor being able to frame more) applicable to such Beings, but only those few taken from our selves, and from the Actions of our own Minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several Parts of our Bodies, we can no otherwise distinguish in our Conceptions the several *Species* of *Spirits*, one from another, but by attributing those Operations and Powers, we find in our selves, to them in a higher or lower degree; and so have no very distinct specifick *Ideas* of *Spirits*, except only of GOD, to whom we attribute both Duration, and all those other *Ideas* with Infinity; to the other *Spirits*, with limitation. Nor as I humbly conceive do we, between GOD and them in our *Ideas*, put any difference by any number of simple *Ideas*, which we have of one, and not of the other, but only that of Infinity. All the particular *Ideas* of Existence, Knowledge, Will, Power, and Motion, &c. being *Ideas* deriv'd from the Operations of our Minds, we attribute all of them to all sorts of *Spirits*, with the difference only of degrees, to the utmost we can, imagine, even Infinity, when we would frame, as well as we can, an *Idea* of the first Being; who yet, 'tis certain, is infinitely more remote in the real Excellency of his Nature, from the highest and perfectest of all created Beings, than the greatest Man, nay purest Seraphim, is from the most contemptible part of Matter; and consequently must infinitely exceed what our narrow Understandings can conceive of him.

§. 12. It is not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to Reason, that there may be many *Species* of *Spirits*, as much separated and diversify'd one from another, by distinct Properties, whereof we have no *Ideas*, as the *Species* of sensible Things are distinguish'd one from another by Qualities, which we know and observe in them. That there should be more *Species* of intelligent Creatures above us, than there are of sensible and material below us, is probable to me from hence, That in all the visible corporeal World, we see no Chasms or Gaps. All quite down from us, the Descent is by easy Steps, and a continu'd Series of Things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are Fishes that have Wings, that are not Strangers to the airy Region; and there are some Birds, that are Inhabitants of the Water, whose Blood is cold as Fishes, and their Flesh is so like in Taste, that the scrupulous are allow'd them on Fish-days. There are Animals so near of kin both to Birds and Beasts, that they are in the middle between both: Amphibious Animals link the Terrestrial and Aquatick together; Seals live at Land and at Sea, and Porpoises have the warm Blood and Entrails of a Hog, not to mention what is confidently reported of Mermaids or Seamen. There are some Brutes, that seem to have as much Knowledge and Reason, as some that are call'd Men; and the Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms are so nearly join'd, that if you will take the lowest of one, and the highest of the other, there will scarce be perceiv'd any great difference between them; and so on, till we come to the lowest and the most inorganical Parts of Matter, we shall find every where, that the several *Species* are link'd together, and differ but in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider the infinite Power and Wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think, that it is suitable to the magnificent Harmony of the Universe, and the great

Whereof there are probably numberless Species.

Design and infinite Goodness of the Architect, that the *Species* of Creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us toward his infinite Perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us downwards: Which if it be probable, we have reason then to be persuaded, that there are far more *Species* of Creatures above us, than there are beneath; we being, in degrees of Perfection, much more remote from the infinite Being of GOD, than we are from the lowest State of Being, and that which approaches nearest to nothing. And yet of all those distinct *Species*, for the Reasons abovesaid, we have no clear distinct *Ideas*.

The nominal
Essence that of
the *Species*,
prov'd from
Water and
Ice.

§. 13. But to return to the *Species* of corporeal Substances. If I should ask any one, whether *Ice* and *Water* were two distinct *Species* of Things, I doubt not but I should be answer'd in the affirmative: And it cannot be deny'd, but he that says they are two distinct *Species*, is in the right. But if an *Englishman*, bred in *Jamaica*, who perhaps had never seen nor heard of *Ice*, coming into *England* in the Winter, find the *Water*, he puts in his *Bason* at night, in a great part frozen in the morning, and not knowing any peculiar Name it had, should call it harden'd *Water*; I ask, whether this would be a new *Species* to him different from *Water*? And, I think, it would be answer'd here, It would not be to him a new *Species*, no more than congeal'd *Gelly*, when it is cold, is a distinct *Species* from the same *Gelly* fluid and warm; or than liquid *Gold*, in the *Furnace*, is a distinct *Species* from hard *Gold* in the hands of a *Workman*. And if this be so, 'tis plain, that our distinct *Species* are nothing but distinct complex *Ideas*, with distinct Names annex'd to them. 'Tis true, every Substance that exists has its peculiar Constitution, whereon depend those sensible Qualities and Powers we observe in it; but the ranking of Things into *Species*, which is nothing but sorting them under several Titles, is done by us according to the *Ideas* that we have of them: Which tho' sufficient to distinguish them by Names, so that we may be able to discourse of them, when we have them not present before us; yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal Constitutions, and that Things existing are distinguish'd by Nature into *Species*, by real Essences, according as we distinguish them into *Species* by Names, we shall be liable to great Mistakes.

Difficulties against a certain number of real Essences.

§. 14. To distinguish substantial Beings into *Species*, according to the usual Supposition, that there are certain precise *Essences* or *Forms* of Things, whereby all the Individuals existing, are by Nature distinguish'd into *Species*, these things are necessary:

§. 15. *First*, To be assur'd that Nature, in the Production of Things, always designs them to partake of certain regulated establish'd *Essences*, which are to be the Models of all things to be produc'd. This, in that crude Sense it is usually propos'd, would need some better Explication before it can fully be assented to.

§. 16. *Secondly*, It would be necessary to know whether Nature always attains that *Essence* it designs in the production of things. The irregular and monstrous Births, that in divers sorts of Animals have been observ'd, will always give us reason to doubt of one or both of these.

§. 17. *Thirdly*, It ought to be determin'd whether those we call *Monsters* be really a distinct *Species*, according to the scholastick Notion of the word *Species*; since it is certain, that every thing that exists has its particular Constitution: And yet we find that some of these monstrous Productions have few or none of those Qualities, which are suppos'd to result from, and accompany the *Essence* of that *Species*, from whence they derive their Originals, and to which, by their Descent, they seem to belong.

Our nominal
Essences of
Substances,
not perfect
Collections of
Properties.

§. 18. *Fourthly*, The real *Essences* of those things, which we distinguish into *Species*, and as so distinguish'd we name, ought to be known; *i. e.* we ought to have *Ideas* of them. But since we are ignorant in these four Points, the suppos'd real *Essences* of Things stand us not in stead for the distinguishing Substances into *Species*.

§. 19. *Fifthly*, The only imaginable Help in this Case would be, that having fram'd perfect complex *Ideas* of the *Properties* of things, flowing from their different real *Essences*, we should thereby distinguish them into *Species*. But neither can this be done; for being ignorant of the real *Essence* it self, it is impossible

possible to know all those Properties that flow from it, and are so annex'd to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude, that that Essence is not there, and so the Thing is not of that *Species*. We can never know what are the precise number of Properties depending on the real Essence of *Gold*, any one of which failing, the real Essence of *Gold*, and consequently *Gold*, would not be there, unless we knew the real Essence of *Gold* it self, and by that determin'd that *Species*. By the word *Gold* here, I must be understood to design a particular piece of Matter; v. g. the last Guinea that was coin'd. For if it should stand here in its ordinary Signification for that complex *Idea*, which I or any one else calls *Gold*; i. e. for the nominal Essence of *Gold*, it would be *Jargon*: so hard is it to shew the various meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing else but words to do it by.

§. 20. By all which it is clear, That our distinguishing Substances into *Species* by Names, is not at all founded on their real Essences; nor can we pretend to range and determine them exactly into *Species*, according to the internal essential Differences.

§. 21. But since, as has been remark'd, we have need of general words, tho we know not the real Essences of Things; all we can do is to collect such a number of simple *Ideas*, as by Examination we find to be united together in Things existing, and thereof to make one complex *Idea*. Which tho it be not the real Essence of any Substance that exists, is yet the *specifick Essence*, to which our Name belongs, and is convertible with it; by which we may at least try the Truth of these nominal Essences. For example, there be that say, that the Essence of *Body* is Extension: If it be so, we can never mistake in putting the Essence of any thing for Thing it self. Let us then in Discourse put *Extension* for *Body*; and when we would say that *Body* moves, let us say that *Extension* moves, and see how it will look. He that should say that one *Extension* by Impulse moves another *Extension*, would by the bare Expression, sufficiently shew the Absurdity of such a Notion. The Essence of any thing, in respect of us, is the whole complex *Idea*, comprehended and mark'd by that Name; and in Substances, besides the several distinct simple *Ideas* that make them up, the confus'd one of Substance, or of an unknown Support and Cause of their Union, is always a part: And therefore the Essence of *Body* is not bare Extension, but an extended solid thing: and so to say an extended solid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible as to say, *Body* moves or impels. Likewise to say, that a rational Animal is capable of Conversation, is all one as to say a *Man*. But no one will say, that Rationality is capable of Conversation, because it makes not the whole Essence to which we give the name *Man*.

§. 22. There are Creatures in the World that have Shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want Language and Reason. There are Naturals amongst us that have perfectly our Shape, but want Reason, and some of them Language too: There are Creatures, as 'tis said (*fit fides penes Authorem*, but there appears no Contradiction that there should be such) that with Language, and Reason, and a Shape in other things agreeing with ours, have hairy Tails; others where the Males have no Beards, and others where the Females have. If it be ask'd, whether these be all *Men* or no, all of human *Species*; 'tis plain, the Question refers only to the nominal Essence: For those of them to whom the definition of the word *Man*, or the complex *Idea* signify'd by that Name, agrees, are *Men*, and the other not, But if the Inquiry be made concerning the suppos'd real Essence, and whether the internal Constitution and Frame of these several Creatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible for us to answer, no part of that going into our specifick *Idea*; only we have reason to think, that where the Faculties or outward Frame so much differs, the internal Constitution is not exactly the same. But what difference in the internal real Constitution makes a specifick difference, it is in vain to enquire; whilst our Measures of *Species* be, as they are, only our abstract *Ideas*, which we know; and not that internal Constitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of Hair only on the Skin, be a Mark of a different internal specifick Constitution between a Changeling and a Drill, when they agree in Shape, and want of Reason and Speech? And shall not the want of Reason and Speech be a sign to us of different

But such a Collection as our Name stands for.

Our abstract Ideas are to us the Measures of Species; instance in that of Man.

real

real Constitutions and *Species* between a Changeling and a reasonable Man? And so of the rest, if we pretend that the distinction of *Species* or Sorts is fixedly establish'd by the real Frame and secret Constitutions of things.

Species not distinguish'd by Generation.

§. 23. Nor let any one say, that the Power of Propagation in Animals by the mixture of Male and Female, and in Plants by Seeds, keeps the suppos'd real *Species* distinct and entire. For granting this to be true, it would help us in the distinction of the *Species* of things no farther than the Tribes of Animals and Vegetables. What must we do for the rest? But in those too it is not sufficient: for if History lye not, Woman have conceiv'd by Drills; and what real *Species*, by that Measure, such a Production will be in Nature, will be a new Question: and we have reason to think this is not impossible, since Mules and Jumarts, the one from the mixture of an Ass and a Mare, the other from the mixture of a Bull and a Mare, are so frequent in the World. I once saw a Creature that was the issue of a Cat and a Rat, and had the plain Marks of both about it? wherein Nature appear'd to have follow'd the Pattern of neither sort alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which, he that shall add the monstrous Productions that are so frequently to be met with in Nature, will find it hard, even in the Race of Animals, to determine by the Pedegree of what *Species* every Animal's Issue is; and be at a loss about the real Essence, which he thinks certainly convey'd by Generation, and has alone a right to the specifick Name. But farther, if the *Species* of Animals and Plants are to be distinguish'd only by Propagation, must I go to the *Indies* to see the Sire and Dam of the one, and the Plant from which the Seed was gather'd that produc'd the other, to know whether this be a Tyger or that Tea?

Not by substantial Forms.

§. 24. Upon the whole matter, 'tis evident, that 'tis their own Collections of sensible Qualities, that Men make the Essences of their several sorts of Substances; and that their real internal Structures are not consider'd by the greatest part of Men, in the sorting them. Much less were any *substantial Forms* ever thought on by any, but those who have in this one part of the World learn'd the Language of the Schools: and yet those ignorant Men, who pretend not any insight into the real Essences, nor trouble themselves about substantial Forms, but are content with knowing things one from another by their sensible Qualities, are often better acquainted with their Differences, can more nicely distinguish them from their Uses, and better know what they may expect from each, than those learned quick-sighted Men, who look so deep into them, and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential.

The specifick Essences are made by the Mind.

§. 25. But supposing that the real *Essences* of Substances were discoverable by those that would severely apply themselves to that Enquiry, yet we could not reasonably think, that the ranking of things under general Names, was regulated by those internal real Constitutions, or any thing else but their obvious Appearances: since Languages, in all Countries, have been establish'd long before Sciences. So that they have not been Philosophers, or Logicians, or such who have troubled themselves about *Forms* and *Essences*, that have made the general Names that are in use amongst the several Nations of Men: but those more or less comprehensive Terms have for the most part, in all Languages, receiv'd their birth and signification from ignorant and illiterate People, who sort and denominated things by those sensible Qualities they found in them; thereby to signify them, when absent, to others, whether they had an occasion to mention a sort or a particular thing.

Therefore very various and uncertain.

§. 26. Since then it is evident, that we sort and name Substances by their nominal, and not by their real *Essences*; the next thing to be consider'd is, how and by whom these *Essences* come to be made. As to the latter, 'tis evident they are made by the Mind, and not by Nature: For were they Nature's Workmanship, they could not be so various and different in several Men, as experience tells us they are. For if we will examin it, we shall not find the nominal Essence of any one *Species* of Substances in all Men the same; no not of that which of all others we are the most intimately acquainted with. It could not possibly be, that the abstract *Idea* to which the name *Man* is given, should be different in several Men, if it were of Nature's making; and that to one it should be *Animal rationale*, and to another *Animal implume bipes latis unguibus*. He that annexes the Name *Man*, to a complex *Idea* made up of Sense and spontaneous Motion, join'd to a Body of such a Shape, has thereby one Essence of the

the *Species Man*; and he that, upon farther examination, adds Rationality, has another Essence of the *Species* he calls *Man*: by which means, the same Individual will be a true *Man* to the one, which is not so to the other. I think, there is scarce any one will allow this upright Figure, so well known, to be the essential difference of the *Species Man*; and yet how far Men determine of the sorts of Animals rather by their Shape than Descent, is very visible: since it has been more than once debated, whether several human *Fœtus*'s should be preserv'd or receiv'd to Baptism or no, only because of the difference of their outward Configuration from the ordinary Make of Children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of Reason, as Infants cast in another Mold: Some whereof tho' of an approv'd Shape, are never capable of as much appearance of Reason, all their lives, as is to be found in an Ape, or an Elephant; and never give any signs of being act'd by a rational Soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward Figure, which only was found wanting, and not the Faculty of Reason, which no body could know would be wanting in its due Season, was made essential to the human *Species*: The learned Divine and Lawyer, must, on such occasions, renounce his sacred Definition of *Animal Rationale*, and substitute some other Essence of the human *Species*. Monsieur Menage furnishes us with an Example worth the taking notice of on this occasion. *When the Abbot of St. Martin, says he, was born, he had so little of the Figure of a Man, that it bespoke him rather a Monster. 'Twas for some time under Deliberation, whether he should be baptiz'd or no. However, he was baptiz'd and declar'd a Man provisionally [till time should shew what he would prove.] Nature had molded him so untowardly, that he was call'd all his life the Abbot Malotru, i. e. Ill-shaped. He was of Caen. Menagiana 430.* This Child, we see, was very near being excluded out of the *Species* of *Man* barely by his Shape. He escap'd very narrowly as he was, and 'tis certain a Figure a little more oddly turn'd had cast him, and he had been executed as a thing not to be allow'd to pass for a Man. And yet there can be no reason given, why if the Lineaments of his Face had been a little alter'd, a rational Soul could not have been lodg'd in him; why a Visage somewhat longer, or a Nose flatter, or a wider Mouth, could not have sufficed, as well as the rest of his ill Figure, with such a Soul, such Parts, as made him, disfigur'd as he was, capable to be a Dignitary in the Church.

§. 27. Wherein then, would I gladly know, consists the precise and unmovable Boundaries of that *Species*? 'Tis plain, if we examine, there is no such thing made by Nature, establish'd by her amongst Men. The real Essence of that, or any other sort of Substances, 'tis evident we know not; and therefore are so undetermin'd in our nominal Essences, which we make our selves, that if several Men were to be ask'd concerning some oddly-shaped *Fœtus*, as soon as born, whether it were a *Man* or no, 'tis past doubt, one should meet with different Answers. Which could not happen, if the nominal Essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the *Species* of substances, were not made by Man, with some liberty; but were exactly copy'd from precise Boundaries set by Nature, whereby it distinguish'd all Substances into certain *Species*. Who would undertake to resolve, what *Species* that Monster was of, which is mention'd by *Licetus, lib. 1. c. 3.* with a Man's Head and Hogs Body? Or those other, which to the Bodies of Men had the Heads of Beasts, as Dogs, Horses, &c. if any of these Creatures had liv'd, and could have spoke, it would have increas'd the difficulty. Had the upper part, to the middle, been of human Shape, and all below Swine; had it been Murder to destroy it? Or must the Bishop have been consulted, whether it were Man enough to be admitted to the Font or no? as, I have been told, it happen'd in *France* some Years since, in somewhat a like case. So uncertain are the Boundaries of *Species* of Animals to us, who have no other Measures than the complex *Ideas* of our own collecting: And so far are we from certainly knowing what a *Man* is; tho', perhaps, it will be judg'd great Ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet I think, I may say, that the certain Boundaries of that *Species* are so far from being determin'd, and the precise number of simple *Ideas*, which make the nominal Essence, so far from being settled and perfectly known, that very material Doubts may still arise about it. And I imagine, none of the Definitions of the word *Man*, which we yet have, nor Descriptions of that sort of Animal, are so perfect and exact, as

to satisfy a considerate inquisitive Person, much less to obtain a general Consent, and to be that which Men would every where stick by, in the Decision of Cases, and determining of Life and Death, Baptism or no Baptism, in Productions that might happen.

But not so arbitrary as mix'd Modes.

§. 28. But tho' these *nominal Essences of Substances* are made by the Mind, they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of *mix'd modes*. To the making of any nominal Essence, it is necessary, *First*, That the *Ideas* whereof it consists, have such an Union as to make but one *Idea*, how compounded soever. *Secondly*, That the particular *Ideas* so united be exactly the same, neither more nor less. For if two abstract complex *Ideas* differ either in Number or Sorts of their component parts, they make two different, and not one and the same Essence. In the first of these, the Mind, in making its complex *Ideas* of Substances, only follows Nature; and puts none together, which are not suppos'd to have an Union in Nature. No body joins the Voice of a Sheep, with the Shape of a Horse; nor the Colour of Lead, with the Weight and Fixedness of Gold, to be the complex *Ideas* of any real Substances: unless he has a Mind to fill his Head with *Chimera's*, and his Discourse with unintelligible Words. Men observing certain Qualities always join'd and existing together, therein copy'd Nature; and of *Ideas* so united, made their complex ones of Substances. For tho' Men may make what complex *Ideas* they please, and give what Names to them they will; yet if they will be understood, when they speak of things really existing, they must in some degree conform their *Ideas* to the things they would speak of: or else Mens Language will be like that of *Babel*; and every Man's Words being intelligible only to himself, would no longer serve to Conversation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life, if the *Ideas* they stand for be not some way answering the common Appearances and Agreement of Substances, as they really exist.

Tho' very imperfect.

§. 29. *Secondly*, Tho' the Mind of Man, in making its complex *Ideas of Substances*, never puts any together that do not really or are not suppos'd to co-exist; and so it truly borrows that Union from Nature: yet the number it combines, depends upon the various *Care, Industry, or Fancy of him that makes it*. Men generally content themselves with some few sensible obvious Qualities; and often, if not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly united, as those that they take. Of sensible Substances there are two sorts; one of organiz'd Bodies which are propagated by Seed; and in these, the Shape is that, which to us is the leading Quality and most characteristical Part that determines the Species. And therefore in Vegetables and Animals, an extended solid Substance of such a certain Figure usually serves the turn. For however some Men seem to prize their Definition of *Animal Rational*, yet should there a Creature be found, that had Language and Reason, but partook not of the usual shape of a Man, I believe it would hardly pass for a *Man*, how much soever it were *Animal Rational*. And if *Baalams* Ass had, all his life, discours'd as rational as he did once with his Master, I doubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the Name *Man*, or allow'd him to be of the same Species with himself. As in Vegetables and Animals 'tis the Shape, so in most other Bodies, not propagated by Seed, 'tis the Colour we must fix on, and are most led by. Thus where we find the Colour of Gold, we are apt to imagine all the other Qualities, comprehended in our complex *Idea*, to be there also: and we commonly take these two obvious Qualities, *viz.* Shape and Colour, for so presumptive *Ideas* of several Species, that in a good Picture we readily say this is a Lion, and that a Rose; this is a Gold, and that a Silver Goblet, only by the different Figures and Colours represented to the Eye by the Pencil.

Which yet serve for common Converse.

§. 30. But tho' this serves well enough for gross and confus'd Conceptions, and unaccurate ways of Talking and Thinking; yet Men are far enough from having agreed on the precise number of simple *Ideas*, or Qualities, belonging to any sort of things, signify'd by its name. Nor is it a wonder, since it requires much time, pains, and skill, strict enquiry, and long examination, to find out what and how many those simple *Ideas* are, which are constantly and inseparably united in Nature, and are alway to be found together in the same Subject. Most Men wanting either Time, Inclination, or Industry enough for this, even to some tolerable degree, content themselves with some few obvious and outward Appearances of things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common Affairs of

of Life: And so, without farther examination, give them Names, or take up the names already in use. Which, tho' in common Conversation they pass well enough for the signs of some few obvious Qualities co-existing, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a settled signification, a precise number of simple *Ideas*; much less all those, which are united in Nature. He that shall consider after so much stir about *Genus* and *Species*, and such a deal of Talk of specifick Differences, how few Words we have yet settled Definitions of, may with reason imagine that those *Firms*, which there hath been so much noise made about, are only *Chimeras*, which give us no light into the specifick Natures of things. And he that shall consider, how far the Names of Substances are from having Significations, wherein all who use them do agree, will have reason to conclude, that tho' the nominal Essences of Substances are all suppos'd to be copy'd from Nature, yet they are all, or most of them, very imperfect. Since the Composition of those complex *Ideas* are, in several Men, very different: and therefore that these Boundaries of *Species* are as Men, and not as Nature makes them, it at least there are in Nature any such prefix'd Bounds. 'Tis true, that many particular Substances are so made by Nature, that they have Agreement and Likeness one with another, and so afford a foundation of being rank'd into sorts. But the sorting of things by us, or the making of determinate *Species*, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms, I cannot see how it can be properly said, that Nature sets the Boundaries of the *Species* of things: or if it be so, our Boundaries of *Species* are not exactly conformable to those in Nature. For we having need of general Names for present use, stay not for a perfect discovery of all those Qualities which would best shew us their most material Differences and Agreements; but we our selves divide them, by certain obvious Appearances, into *Species*, that we may the easier under general names communicate our Thoughts about them. For having no other Knowledge of any Substance, but of the simple *Ideas* that are united in it; and observing several particular things to agree with others in several of those simple *Ideas*, we make that Collection our specifick *Idea*, and give it a general Name; that in recording our own Thoughts, and in our Discourse with others, we may in one short word design all the Individuals that agree in that complex *Idea*, without enumerating the simple *Ideas* that make it up; and so not waste our Time and Breath in tedious Descriptions: which we see they are fain to do, who would discourse of any new sort of things, they have not yet a name for.

§. 31. But however these *Species* of Substances pass well enough in ordinary Conversation, it is plain that this complex *Idea*, wherein they observe several Individuals to agree, is by different Men made very differently; by some more and others less accurately. in some, this complex *Idea* contains a greater, and in others a smaller number of Qualities; and so is apparently such as the Mind makes it. The yellow shining Colour makes *Gold* to Children; others add Weight, Malleableness, and Fusibility; and others yet other Qualities, which they find join'd with that yellow Colour, as constantly as its Weight and Fusibility: For in all these and the like Qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex *Idea* of that Substance wherein they are all join'd, as another. And therefore different Men leaving out or putting in several simple *Ideas*, which others do not, according to their various Examination, Skill, or Observation of that Subject, have different Essences of *Gold*; which must therefore be of their own, and not of Nature's making.

§. 32. If the number of simple *Ideas*, that make the nominal Essence of the lowest *Species*, or first sorting of Individuals, depends on the Mind of Man variously collecting them, it is much more evident that they do so, in the more comprehensive *Classis*, which by the Masters of Logick are call'd *Genera*. These are complex *Ideas* designedly imperfect: And 'tis visible at first sight, that several of those Qualities that are to be found in the things themselves, are purposely left out of *generical Ideas*. For as the Mind, to make general *Ideas* comprehending several particulars, leaves out those of Time, and Place, and such other, that make them incommunicable to more than one Individual; so to make other yet more general *Ideas*, that may comprehend different sorts, it leaves out those Qualities that distinguish them, and puts into its new Collection only such *Ideas* as are common to several sorts. The same Convenience that

Essences of
Species under
the same
name very
different.

The more ge-
neral our *I*-
deas are, the
more incom-
pleat and par-
tial they are.

made Men express several parcels of yellow Matter coming from *Guinea* and *Peru* under one name, sets them also upon making of one Name that may comprehend both Gold and Silver, and some other Bodies of different sorts. This is done by leaving out those Qualities, which are peculiar to each sort; and retaining a complex *Idea* made up of those that are common to them all. To which the name *Metal* being annex'd, there is a *Genus* constituted; the Essence whereof being that abstract *Idea*, containing only Malleableness and Fusibility, with certain degrees of Weight and Fixedness, wherein some Bodies of several kinds agree, leaves out the Colour, and other Qualities peculiar to Gold and Silver, and the other sorts comprehended under the name *Metal*. Whereby it is plain, that Men follow not exactly the Patterns set them by Nature, when they make their general *Ideas* of Substances; since there is no Body to be found, which has barely Malleableness and Fusibility in it, without other Qualities as inseparable as those. But Men, in making their general *Ideas*, seeing more the Convenience of Language and quick Dispatch, by short and comprehensive Signs, than the true and precise Nature of things as they exist, have, in the framing their abstract *Ideas*, chiefly pursu'd that End which was to be furnish'd with store of general and variously comprehensive Names. So that in this whole business of *Genera* and *Species* the *Genus*, or more comprehensive, is but a partial Conception of what is in the *Species*, and the *Species* but a partial *Idea* of what is to be found in each Individual. If therefore any one will think, that a *Man*, and a *Horse*, and an *Animal*, and a *Plant*, &c. are distinguish'd by real Essences, made by Nature, he must think Nature to be very liberal of these real Essences, making one for Body, another for an *Animal*, and another for a *Horse*; and all these Essences liberally bestow'd upon *Bucephalus*. But if we would rightly consider what is done, in all these *Genera* and *Species*, or Sorts, we should find, that there is no new thing made, but only more or less comprehensive Signs whereby we may be enabled to express, in a few Syllables, great Numbers of particular things, as they agree in more or less general Conceptions, which we have fram'd to that purpose. In all which we may observe, that the more general term is always the Name of a less complex *Idea*; and that each *Genus* is but a partial Conception of the *Species* comprehended under it. So that if these abstract general *Ideas* be thought to be compleat, it can only be in respect of a certain establish'd Relation between them and certain Names, which are made use of to signify them; and not in respect of any thing existing, as made by Nature.

This all accommodated to the end of Speech.

§. 33. This is adjusted to the true end of Speech, which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our Notions. For thus he, that would discourse of things as they agreed in the complex *Idea* of Extension and Solidity, needed but use the word *Body* to denote all such. He that to these would join others, signify'd by the words *Life*, *Sense*, and spontaneous Motion, needed but use the word *Animal*, to signify all which partook of those *Ideas*: and he that had made a complex *Idea* of a Body, with *Life*, *Sense*, and Motion, with the Faculty of Reasoning, and a certain Shape join'd to it, needed but use the short monosyllable *Man* to express all Particulars that correspond to that complex *Idea*. This is the proper business of *Genus* and *Species*: and this Men do, without any consideration of real Essences, or substantial Forms, which come not within the reach of our Knowledge, when we think of those things; nor within the Signification of our words, when we discourse with others.

Instance in Contraries.

§. 34. Were I to talk with any one of a sort of Birds I lately saw in *St. James's Park*, about three or four Foot high, with a Covering of something between Feathers and Hair, of a dark brown Colour without Wings, but in the place thereof two or three little Branches coming down like Sprigs of Spanish Broom, long great Legs, with Feet only of three Claws, and without a Tail; I must make this Description of it, and so may make others understand me: But when I am told that the Name of it is *Cassuaris*, I may then use that Word to stand in discourse for all my complex *Idea* mention'd in that Description; tho' by that word, which is now become a specifick Name, I know no more of the real Essence or Constitution of that sort of Animals than I did before; and knew probably as much of the Nature of that *Species* of Birds, before I learn'd the Name, as many English-men do of Swans, or Herons, which

which are specifick Names, very well known, or Sorts of Birds common in England.

§. 35. From what has been said, 'tis evident, that *Men make Sorts of things*. For it being different Essences alone that make different *Species*, 'tis plain that they who make those abstract *Ideas*, which are the nominal Essences, do thereby make the *Species*, or Sort. Should there be a Body found, having all the other Qualities of Gold, except malleableness, 'twould no doubt be made a question whether it were Gold or no, *i. e.* whether it were of that *Species*. This could be determin'd only by that abstract *Idea* to which every one annex'd the name *Gold*: so that it would be true Gold to him, and belong to that *Species*, who included not Malleableness in his nominal Essence, signify'd by the Sound *Gold*; and on the other side it would not be true Gold, or of that *Species* to him who included Malleableness in his specifick *Idea*. And who, I pray, is it that makes these diverse *Species* even under one and the same Name, but Men that make two different abstract *Ideas* consisting not exactly of the same Collection of Qualities? Nor is it a mere Supposition to imagine that a Body may exist, wherein the other obvious Qualities of Gold may be without Malleableness; since it is certain, that Gold it self will be sometimes so eager, (as Artists call it) that it will as little endure the Hammer as Glass it self. What we have said, of the putting in or leaving Malleableness out of the complex *Idea*, the name *Gold* is by any one annex'd to, may be said of its peculiar Weight, Fixedness, and several other the like Qualities: For whatsoever is left out, or put in, 'tis still the complex *Idea*, to which that Name is annex'd, that makes the *Species*: and as any particular Parcel of Matter answers that *Idea*, so the Name of the Sort belongs truly to it; and 'tis of that *Species*. And thus any thing is true *Gold*, perfect *Metal*. All which determination of the *Species*, 'tis plain, depends on the Understanding of Man, making this or that complex *Idea*. Men determine the Sorts.

§. 36. This then, in short, is the case: *Nature makes many particular things* which do agree one with another, in many sensible Qualities, and probably too in their internal Frame and Constitution: but 'tis not this real Essence that distinguishes them into *Species*; 'tis Men, who, taking occasion from the Qualities they find united in them, and wherein they observe often several Individuals to agree, *range them into Sorts, in order to their naming*, for the convenience of comprehensive Signs; under which Individuals, according to their conformity to this or that abstract *Idea*, come to be rank'd as under Ensigns; so that this is of the Blue, that the Red Regiment; this is a Man, that a Drill: And in this, I think, consists the whole business of *Genus* and *Species*. Nature makes the Similitude.

§. 37. I do not deny but Nature, in the constant Production of particular Beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and of kin one to another: But I think it nevertheless true, that *the Boundaries of the Species, whereby Men sort them, are made by Men*; since the Essences of the *Species*, distinguish'd by different Names, are, as has been prov'd, of Man's making, and seldom adequate to the internal Nature of the things they are taken from. So that we may truly say, such a manner of sorting of things is the Workmanship of Men.

§. 38. One thing I doubt not but will seem very strange in this Doctrine; which is, that from what has been said it will follow, that *each abstract Idea, with a name to it, makes a distinct Species*. But who can help it if Truth will have it so? For so it must remain till some body can shew us the *Species* of things limited and distinguish'd by something else; and let us see, that general Terms signify not our abstract *Ideas*, but something different from them. I would fain know why a Shock and a Hound are not as distinct *Species* as a Spaniel and an Elephant. We have no other *Idea* of the different Essence of an Elephant and a Spaniel, than we have of the different Essence of a Shock and a Hound; all the essential difference, whereby we know and distinguish them one from another, consisting only in the different Collection of simple *Ideas*, to which we have given those different Names. Each abstract Idea is an Essence.

§. 39. How much *the making of Species and Genera is in order to general Names*, and how much general Names are necessary, if not to the Being, yet at least to the compleating of a *Species*, and making it pass for such, will appear, besides what has been said above concerning Ice and Water, in a very familiar Genera and Species are in order to naming.

Example. A silent and a striking *Watch* are but one *Species* to those who have but one Name for them: but he that has the name *Watch* for one, and *Clock* for the other, and distinct complex *Ideas*, to which those Names belong, to him they are different *Species*. It will be said perhaps that the inward Contrivance and Constitution is different between these two, which the Watch-maker has a clear *Idea* of. And yet, 'tis plain, they are but one *Species* to him, when he has but one Name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward Contrivance to make a new *Species*? There are some *Watches* that are made with four Wheels, others with five: Is this a specifick difference to the Workman? Some have Strings and Physies, and others none; some have the Ballance loose, and others regulated by a Spiral Spring, and others by Hogs-Bristles: Are any or all of these enough to make a specifick difference to the Workman, that knows each of these, and several other different Contrivances, in the internal Constitutions of *Watches*? 'Tis certain each of these hath a real difference from the rest: But whether it be an essential, a specifick difference or no, relates only to the complex *Idea* to which the name *Watch* is given: as long as they all agree in the *Idea* which that Name stands for, and that Name does not as a generical Name comprehend different *Species* under it, they are not essentially nor specifically different. But if any one will make minuter Divisions from Differences that he knows in the internal Frame of *Watches*, and to such precise complex *Ideas*, give Names that shall prevail; they will then be new *Species* to them, who have those *Ideas* with Names to them; and can, by those differences, distinguish *Watches* into these several sorts, and then *Watch* will be a generical Name. But yet they would be no distinct *Species* to Men ignorant of Clock-work and the inward Contrivances of *Watches*, who had no other *Idea* but the outward Shape and Bulk. with the marking of the Hours by the Hand. For to them all those other Names would be but synonymous Terms for the same *Idea*, and signify no more, nor no other thing but a *Watch*. Just thus, I think, it is in natural things. No body will doubt that the Wheels or Springs (if I may so say) within, are different in a *rational Man* and a *Changeling*, no more than that there is a difference in the Frame between a *Drill* and a *Changeling*. But whether one, or both these Differences be essential or specifick, is only to be known to us, by their agreement or disagreement with the complex *Idea* that the name *Man* stands for: For by that alone can it be determin'd, whether one, or both, or neither of those be a *Man* or no.

Species of artificial things less confus'd than natural.

§. 40. From what has been before said, we may see the reason why, in the *Species of artificial things*, there is generally less Confusion and Uncertainty, than in natural. Because an *artificial* thing being a production of Man, which the Artificer design'd, and therefore well knows the *Idea* of, the Name of it is suppos'd to stand for no other *Idea*, nor to import any other Essence than what is certainly to be known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the *Idea* or Essence of the several sorts of *artificial* things consisting, for the most part, in nothing but the determinate Figure of sensible Parts; and sometimes Motion depending thereon, which the Artificer fashions in Matter, such as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our Faculties to attain a certain *Idea* thereof, and so settle the Signification of the Names, whereby the *Species of artificial things* are distinguish'd with less Doubt, Obscurity and Equivocation, than we can in things natural, whose Differences and Operations depend upon Contrivances beyond the reach of our Discoveries.

Artificial things of distinct Species.

§. 41. I must be excus'd here if I think *artificial things* are of distinct *Species*, as well as natural: since I find they are as plainly and orderly rank'd into Sorts, by different abstract *Ideas*, with general Names annex'd to them, as distinct one from another as those of natural Substances. For why should we not think a *Watch* and *Pistol*, as distinct *Species* one from another, as a *Horse* and a *Dog*, they being express'd in our Minds by distinct *Ideas*, and to others by distinct Appellations?

Substances alone have proper Names.

§. 42. This is farther to be observ'd concerning *Substances*, that they alone of all our several sorts of *Ideas* have particular or proper Names, whereby one only particular thing is signify'd. Because in simple *Ideas*, Modes, and Relations, it seldom happens that Men have occasion to mention often this or that Particular when it is absent. Besides, the greatest part of mix'd Modes, being Actions

Actions which perish in their Birth, are not capable of a lasting Duration as Substances, which are the Actors; and wherein the simple *Ideas* that make up the complex *Ideas* design'd by the Name, have a lasting Union.

§. 43. I must beg pardon of my Reader, for having dwelt so long upon this Subject, and perhaps with some Obscurity. But I desire it may be consider'd how difficult it is to lead another by Words into the Thoughts of things, strip'd of those specifick Differences we give them: which things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into some sort or other, and suggest to the Mind the usual abstract *Idea* of that *Species*, and so cross my purpose. For to talk of a *Man*, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary Signification of the name *Man*, which is our complex *Idea* usually annex'd to it; and bid the Reader consider *Man* as he is in himself, and as he is really distinguish'd from others in his internal Constitution, or real Essence, that is, by something he knows, not what, looks like trifling: and yet thus one must do who would speak of the suppos'd real Essences and *Species* of things, as thought to be made by Nature, if it be but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing signify'd by the general Names, which Substances are call'd by. But because it is difficult by known familiar Names to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an Example to make the different Consideration the Mind has of specifick Names and *Ideas* a little more clear; and to shew how the complex *Ideas* of Modes are refer'd sometimes to Archetypes in the Minds of other intelligent Beings; or, which is the same, to the Signification annex'd by others to their receiv'd Names; and sometimes to no Archetypes at all. Give me leave also to shew how the Mind always refers its *Ideas* of Substances, either to the Substances themselves, or to the Signification of their Names as to the *Archetypes*; and also to make plain the Nature of *Species*, or sorting of things, as apprehended, and made use of by us; and of the Essences belonging to those *Species*, which is perhaps of more moment, to discover the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledge, than we at first imagine.

§. 44. Let us suppose *Adam* in the State of a grown Man, with a good Understanding, but in a strange Country, with all things new and unknown about him; and no other Faculties, to attain the Knowledge of them, but what one of this Age has now. He observes *Lamech* more melancholy than usual, and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his Wife *Adah* (whom he most ardently lov'd) that she had too much kindness for another Man. *Adam* discourses these his Thoughts to *Eve* and desires her to take care that *Adah* commit not folly: And in these Discourses with *Eve* he makes use of these two new words, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*. In time *Adam's* Mistake appears, for he finds *Lamech's* Trouble proceeded from having kill'd a Man: But yet the two Names, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*; the one standing for Suspicion, in a Husband, of his Wife's Disloyalty to him, and the other for the Act of committing Disloyalty, lost not their distinct Significations. It is plain then that here were two distinct complex *Ideas* of mix'd Modes, with Names to them, two distinct *Species* of Actions essentially different; I ask wherein consisted the Essences of these two distinct *Species* of Action? And 'tis plain it consisted in a precise Combination of simple *Ideas*, different in one from the other. I ask, whether the complex *Idea* in *Adam's* Mind, which he call'd *Kinneah*, were adequate or no? And it is plain it was, for it being a Combination of simple *Ideas*, which he, without any regard to any Archetype, without respect to any thing as a Pattern, voluntarily put together, abstract and gave the name *Kinneah* to, to express in short to others, by that one Sound, all the simple *Ideas* contain'd and united in that complex one; it must necessarily follow, that it was an adequate *Idea*. His own Choice having made that Combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being refer'd to no other Archetype which it was suppos'd to represent.

§. 45. These words, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*, by degrees grew into common use; and then the case was somewhat alter'd. *Adam's* Children had the same Faculties, and thereby the same Power that he had to make what complex *Ideas* of mix'd Modes they pleas'd in their own Minds; to abstract them, and make what Sounds they pleas'd the Signs of them: But the use of Names being to make our *Ideas* within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the

Difficulty to treat of Words.

Instance of mix'd Modes in Kinneah and Niouph;

same

same Signs stands for the same *Idea* in two who would communicate their Thoughts, and discourse together. Those therefore of *Adam's* Children, that found these two words, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*, in familiar use, could not take them for insignificant Sounds; but must needs conclude, they stood for something, for certain *Ideas*, abstract *Ideas*, they being general Names, which abstract *Ideas* were the Essences of the Species distinguish'd by those Names. If therefore they would use these words, as Names of Species already establish'd and agreed on, they were oblig'd to conform the *Ideas*, in their Minds, signify'd by these Names, to the *Ideas*, that they stood for in other mens Minds, as to their Patterns and *Archetypes*; and then indeed their *Ideas* of these complex Modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (especially those that consisted of Combinations of many simple *Ideas*) not to be exactly conformable to the *Ideas* in other mens minds, using the same Names; tho' for this there be usually a Remedy at hand, which is to ask the meaning of any word we understand not, of him that uses it: it being as impossible to know certainly what the words Jealousy and Adultery (which I think answer *חמד* and *זנות*) stand for in another man's Mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it was impossible, in the beginning of Language, to know what *Kinneah* and *Niouph* stood for in another man's Mind, without Explication, they being voluntary Signs in every one.

Instance of
Substances in
Zahab.

§. 46. Let us now also consider, after the same manner, the Names of Substances in their first Application. One of *Adam's* Children, roving in the Mountains, lights on a glittering Substance which pleases his Eye; home he carries it to *Adam*, who, upon consideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow Colour, and an exceeding great Weight. These, perhaps at first, are all the Qualities he takes notice of in it: and abstracting this complex *Idea*, consisting of a Substance having that peculiar bright Yellowness, and a Weight very great in proportion to its Bulk, he gives it the name *Zahab*, to denominate and mark all Substances that have these sensible Qualities in them. 'Tis evident now that, in this case, *Adam* acts quite differently from what he did before in forming those *Ideas* of mix'd Modes, to which he gave the name *Kinneah* and *Niouph*. For there he puts *Ideas* together, only by his own imagination, not taken from the Existence of any thing; and to them he gave Names to denominate all things that should happen to agree to those his abstract *Ideas*, without considering whether any such thing did exist or no: the Standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his *Idea* of this new Substance, he takes the quite contrary Course; here he has a Standard made by Nature; and therefore being to represent that to himself, by the *Idea* he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in no simple *Idea* into his complex one, but what he has the Preception of from the thing it self. He takes care that his *Idea* be conformable to this *Archetype*, and intends the Name should stand for an *Idea* so conformable.

§. 47. This piece of Matter, thus denominated *Zahab* by *Adam*, being quite different from any he had seen before, no body, I think, will deny to be a distinct Species, and to have its peculiar Essence; and that the name *Zahab* is the mark of the Species, and a Name belonging to all things partaking in that Essence. But here it is plain, the Essence, *Adam* made the name *Zahab* stand for, was nothing but a Body hard, shining, yellow, and very heavy. But the inquisitive Mind of Man, not content with the Knowledge of these, as I may say superficial Qualities, puts *Adam* on farther examination of this Matter. He therefore knocks and beats it with Flints, to see what was discoverable in the Inside: He finds it yield to Blows, but not easily separate into pieces: He finds it will bend with breaking. Is not now Ductility to be added to his former *Idea*, and made part of the Essence of the Species that name *Zahab* stands for? Farther Trials discover Fusibility and Fixedness. Are not they also, by the same reason that any of the others were, to be put into the complex *Idea* signify'd by the name *Zahab*? If not, what reason will there be shewn more for the one than the other? If these must, then all the other Properties, which any farther Trials shall discover in this matter, ought by the same reason to make a part of the Ingredients of the complex *Idea*, which the name *Zahab* stands for, and so be the Essences of the Species mark'd by that Name. Which Properties,

perties, because they are endless, it is plain, that the *Idea* made after this fashion by this *Archetype*, will be always inadequate.

§. 48. But this is not all, it would also follow, that the *Names of Substances* Their Ideas, imperfect, and therefore various. would not only have (as in truth they have) but would also be suppos'd to have *different Significations, as us'd by different Men*, which would very much cumber the use of Language. For if every distinct Quality, that were discover'd in any Matter by any one, were suppos'd to make a necessary part of the complex *Idea*, signify'd by the common Name given it, it must follow, that Men must suppose the same word to signify different Things in different Men; since they cannot doubt but different Men may have discover'd several Qualities in Substances of the same Denomination; which others know nothing of.

§. 49. To avoid this therefore, they have suppos'd a real *Essence belonging to every Species*, from which these Properties all flow, and would have their Name Therefore to fix their Species, a real Essence is suppos'd. of the Species stand for that. But they not having any *Idea* of that real Essence in Substances, and their Words signifying nothing but the *Ideas* they have, that which is done by this Attempt, is only to put the Name or Sound in the place and stead of the thing having that real Essence, without knowing what the real Essence is; and this is that which Men do, when they speak of Species of Things, as supposing them made by Nature, and distinguish'd by real Essences.

§. 50. For let us consider, when we affirm, that all *Gold* is fix'd, either it means that Fixedness is a part of the Definition; part of the nominal Essence the word *Gold* stands for; and so this Affirmation, *all Gold is fix'd*, contains nothing but the signification of the Term *Gold*. Or else it means, that Fixedness not being a part of the Definition of the word *Gold*, is a Property of that Substance it self: In which case, it is plain, that the word *Gold* stands in the place of a Substance, having the real Essence of a Species of Things made by Nature. In which way of Substitution it has so confus'd and uncertain a signification, that tho' this Proposition, *Gold is fix'd*, be in that sense an Affirmation of something real, yet 'tis a Truth will always fail us in its particular Application, and so is of no real Use nor Certainty. For let it be ever so true that all *Gold i. e.* all that has the real Essence of *Gold*, is fix'd, what serves this for, whilst we know not in this sense what is or is not *Gold*? For if we know not the real Essence of *Gold*, 'tis impossible we should know what parcel of Matter has that Essence, and so whether it be true *Gold* or no. Which Supposition is of no use.

§. 51. To conclude: What liberty *Adam* had at first to make any complex *Ideas* of mix'd modes, by no other Pattern but by his own Thoughts; the same have all Men ever since had. And the same necessity of conforming his *Ideas* of Substances to Things without him, as to *Archetypes* made by Nature, that *Adam* was under, if he would not wilfully impose upon himself, the same are all Men ever since under too. The same Liberty also that *Adam* had of affixing any new Name to any *Idea*, the same has any one still (especially the Beginners of Languages, if we can imagine any such) but only with this difference, that in Places where Men in Society have already establish'd a Language amongst them, the signification of words are very warily and sparingly to be alter'd: Because Men being furnish'd already with Names for their *Ideas*, and common Use having appropriated known Names to certain *Ideas*, an affected Misapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous. He that hath new Notions; will, perhaps, venture sometimes on the coining new Terms to express them: But Men think it a Boldness, and 'tis uncertain whether common Use will ever make them pass for current. But in Communication with others, it is necessary, that we conform the *Ideas* we make the vulgar Words of any Language stand for, to their known proper Significations (which I have explain'd at large already) or else to make known that new Signification we apply them to. Conclusion.

CHAP. VII.

Of Particles.

Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together.

§. 1. **B**ESIDES Words, which are Names of *Ideas* in the Mind, there are a great many others that are made use of, to signify the *Connection* that the Mind gives to *Ideas*, or *Propositions* one with another. The Mind, in communicating its Thought to others, does not only need Signs of the *Ideas* it has then before it, but others also, to shew or intimate some particular Action of its own, at that time, relating to those *Ideas*. This it does several ways; as *Is*, and *Is not*, are the general Marks of the Mind, affirming or denying. But besides Affirmation or Negation, without which there is in Words no Truth or Falshood, the Mind does, in declaring its Sentiments to others, connect not only the Parts of Propositions, but whole Sentences one to another, with their several Relations and Dependencies, to make a coherent Discourse.

In them consists the Art of Well speaking.

§. 2. The Words, whereby it signifies what Connection it gives to the several Affirmations and Negations, that it unites in one continu'd Reasoning or Narration, are generally call'd *Particles*; and 'tis in the right use of these, that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good Style. To think well, it is not enough that a Man has *Ideas* clear and distinct in his Thoughts, nor that he observes the Agreement or Disagreement of some of them; but he must think in train, and observe the dependence of his Thoughts and Reasonings one upon another. And to express well such methodical and rational Thoughts, he must have words to shew what *Connection*, *Restriction*, *Distinction*, *Opposition*, *Emphasis*, &c. he gives to each respective Part of his Discourse. To mistake in any of these, is to puzzle, instead of informing his Hearer; and therefore it is that those words, which are not truly by themselves the Names of any *Ideas*, are of such constant and indispensable use in Language, and do much contribute to Mens well expressing themselves.

They shew what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.

§. 3. This part of Grammar has been perhaps as much neglected, as some others over-diligently cultivated. 'Tis easy for Men to write, one after another, of Cases and Genders, Moods and Tenses, Gerunds and Supines. In these, and the like, there has been great Diligence us'd; and Particles themselves, in some Languages, have been, with great shew of Exactness, rank'd into their several Orders. But tho' *Prepositions* and *Conjunctions*, &c. are Names well known in Grammar, and the Particles contain'd under them carefully rank'd into their distinct Subdivisions; yet he who would shew the right use of Particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a little more Pains, enter into his own Thoughts, and observe nicely the several Postures of his Mind in discoursing.

They shew what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.

§. 4. Neither is it enough, for the explaining of these Words, to render them, as is usually in Dictionaries, by words of another Tongue which came nearest to their signification: For what is meant by them, is commonly as hard to be understood in one, as another Language. They are all Marks of some Action, or Intimation of the Mind; and therefore to understand them rightly, the several Views, Postures, Stands, Turns, Limitations and Exceptions, and several other Thoughts of the Mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient Names, are diligently to be study'd. Of these there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of Particles, that most Languages have to express them by; and therefore it is not to be wonder'd that most of these Particles have divers, and sometimes almost opposite significations. In the Hebrew Tongue there is a Particle consisting but of one single Letter, of which there are reckon'd up, as I remember, seventy, I am sure above fifty several significations.

Instance in But.

§. 5. *BUT* is a Particle, none more familiar in our Language; and he that says it is a discretive Conjunction, and that it answers *Sed* in Latin, or *Mais* in French, thinks he has sufficiently explain'd it. But it seems to me to intimate several Relations, the Mind gives to the several Propositions or Parts of them, which it joins by this Monosyllable.

First

First, *BUT* to say no more: Here it intimates a stop of the Mind in the course it was going, before it came to the end of it.

Secondly, *I saw BUT two Plants*: Here it shews, that the Mind limits the sense to what is express'd, with a Negation of all other.

Thirdly, *You pray; BUT it is not that GOD would bring you to the true Religion.*

Fourthly, *BUT that he would confirm you in your own.* The first of these *BUTS* intimates a Supposition in the Mind of something otherwise than it should be; the latter shews, that the Mind makes a direct opposition between that, and what goes before it.

Fifthly, *All Animals have Sense; BUT a Dog is an Animal*: Here it signifies little more, but that the latter Proposition is join'd to the former, as the *Minor* of a Syllogism.

§. 6. To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other Significations of this Particle, if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude, and consider it in all the places it is to be found: which if one should do, I doubt, whether in all those manners it is made use of, it would deserve the Title of *Discretive*, which Grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full Explanation of this sort of Signs. The Instances I have given in this one, may give occasion to reflect upon their use and force in Language, and lead us into the contemplation of several Actions of our Minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these Particles; some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the Sense of a whole Sentence contain'd in them.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.

§. 1. **T**HE ordinary Words of Language, and our common Use of them, would have given us light into the nature of our *Ideas*, if they had been but consider'd with Attention. The Mind, as has been shewn, has a power to abstract its *Ideas*, and so they become *Essences*, general *Essences*, whereby the sorts of things are distinguish'd. Now each abstract *Idea* being distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the other, the Mind will, by its intuitive Knowledge, perceive their difference; and therefore in Propositions, no two whole *Ideas* can ever be affirm'd one of another. This we see in the common Use of Language, which permits not any two abstract Words, or Names of abstract *Ideas*, to be affirm'd one of another. For how near of kin soever they may seem to be, and how certain soever it is, that Man is an Animal, or Rational, or White, yet every one at first hearing perceives the Falseness of these Propositions; *Humanity is Animality*, or *Rationality*, or *Whiteness*: And this is as evident, as any of the most allow'd Maxims. All our Affirmations then are only inconcrete, which is the affirming, not one abstract *Idea* to be another, but one abstract *Idea* to be join'd to another; which abstract *Ideas*, in Substances, may be of any sort; in all the rest, are little else but of Relations; and in Substances, the most frequent are of Powers: v. g. *a Man is White*, signifies, that the thing that has the Essence of a Man, has also in it the Essence of Whiteness, which is nothing but a power to produce the *Idea* of Whiteness in one, whose Eyes can discover ordinary Objects; or *a Man is rational*, signifies that the same thing that hath the Essence of a Man, hath also in it the Essence of Rationality, i. e. a Power of Reasoning.

§. 2. This Distinction of Names shews us also the difference of our *Ideas*: For if we observe them, we shall find that our simple *Ideas* have all abstract, as well as concrete Names; the one whereof is (to speak the Language of Grammarians) a Substantive, the other an Adjective; as Whiteness, White, Sweetness, Sweet. The like also holds in our *Ideas* of Modes and Relations; as Justice, Just; Equality, Equal; only with this difference, That some of the concrete Names of Relations, amongst Men chiefly, are Substantives; as *Paternitas*, *Pater*; where-

Abstract Terms not predicable one of another, and why.

They shew the difference of our Ideas.

of it were easy to render a reason. But as to our *Ideas* of *Substances*, we have very few or no *abstract Names* at all. For tho' the Schools have introduc'd *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, *Corporietas*, and some others; yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of *Names* of *Substances*, to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of *abstract ones*: and those few that the Schools forg'd, and put into the mouths of their Scholars, could never yet get admittance into common Use, or obtain the Licence of publick Approbation. Which seems to me at least to intimate the Confession of all Mankind, that they have no *Ideas* of the real Essences of *Substances*, since they have not *Names* for such *Ideas*; which no doubt they would have had, had not their Conscioufness to themselves of their ignorance of them, kept them from so idle an Attempt. And therefore tho' they had *Ideas* enough to distinguish Gold from a Stone, and Metal from Wood; yet they but timorously ventur'd on such terms, as *Aurietas* and *Saxietas*, *Metallietas* and *Lignietas*, or the like *Names*, which should pretend to signify the real Essences of those *Substances*, whereof they knew they had no *Ideas*. And indeed it was only the Doctrine of *Substantial Forms*, and the Confidence of mistaken Pretenders to a Knowledge that they had not, which first coin'd, and then introduc'd *Animalitas*, and *Humanitas*, and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own Schools, and could never get to be current amongst understanding Men. Indeed, *Humanitas* was a Word familiar amongst the *Romans*, but in a far different sense, and stood not for the *abstract Essence* of any *Substance*; but was the *abstract Name* of a *Mode*, and its concrete *Humanus*, not *Homo*.

C H A P. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts.

§. 1. FROM what has been said in the foregoing Chapters, it is easy to perceive what Imperfection there is in Language, and how the very Nature of Words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations. To examine the Perfection or Imperfection of Words, it is necessary first to consider their Use and End: For as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so are they more or less perfect. We have, in the former part of this *Discourse*, often upon occasion mention'd a double Use of Words.

First, One for the recording of our own Thoughts.

Secondly, The other for the communicating of our Thoughts to others.

Any Words will serve for recording.

§. 2. As to the first of these, for the recording our own Thoughts for the help of our own Memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to our selves, any Words will serve the turn. For since Sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any *Ideas*, a Man may use what Words he pleases, to signify his own *Ideas* to himself: and there will be no imperfection in them, if he constantly use the same sign for the same *Idea*; for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the right Use and Perfection of Language.

Communication by Words, Civil or Philosophical.

§. 3. Secondly, As to Communication of Words, that too has a double Use.

I. Civil.

II. Philosophical.

First, By their civil Use, I mean such a Communication of Thoughts and *Ideas* by Words, as may serve for the upholding common Conversation and Commerce, about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniences of civil Life, in the Societies of Men one amongst another.

Secondly, By the Philosophical Use of Words, I mean such an Use of them, as may serve to convey the precise Notions of things, and to express, in general Propositions, certain and undoubted Truths, which the Mind may rest upon and be satisfy'd with, in its search after true Knowledge. These two Uses are very distinct; and a great deal less Exactness will serve in the one than in the other, as we shall see in what follows.

§. 4. The chief end of Language in Communication being to be understood, Words serve not well for that end, neither in Civil nor Philosophical Discourse, when any Word does not excite in the Hearer the same *Idea* which it stands for in the Mind of the Speaker. Now since Sounds have no natural Connection with our *Ideas*, but have all their signification from the arbitrary Imposition of Men, the *Doubtfulness* and *Uncertainty of their Signification*, which is the *Imperfection* we here are speaking of, has its cause more in the *Ideas* they stand for, than in any Incapacity there is in one Sound more than in another, to signify any *Idea*: for in that regard they are all equally perfect.

That then which makes *Doubtfulness* and *Uncertainty* in the Signification of some more than other Words, is the difference of *Ideas* they stand for.

§. 5. Words having naturally no Signification, the *Idea* which each stands for must be learn'd and retain'd by those, who would exchange Thoughts, and hold intelligible Discourse with others in any Language. But this is hardest to be done, where,

First, The *Ideas* they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great number of *Ideas* put together.

Secondly, Where the *Ideas* they stand for have no certain Connection in Nature; and so no settled Standard, any where in Nature existing, to rectify and adjust them by.

Thirdly, Where the Signification of the Word is refer'd to a Standard, which Standard is not easy to be known.

Fourthly, Where the Signification of the Word, and the real Essence of the Thing, are not exactly the same.

These are Difficulties that attend the Signification of several Words that are intelligible. Those which are not intelligible at all, such as Names standing for any simple *Ideas*, which another has not Organs or Faculties to attain; as the Names of Colours to a blind Man, or Sounds to a deaf Man; need not here be mention'd.

In all these cases we shall find an Imperfection in Words, which I shall more at large explain, in their particular application to our several sorts of *Ideas*: For if we examine them, we shall find that the Names of *mix'd Modes* are most liable to *Doubtfulness* and *Imperfection*, for the two first Reasons; and the Names of *Substances* chiefly for the two latter.

§. 6. *First*, The Names of *mix'd Modes* are many of them liable to great Uncertainty and Obscurity in their Signification.

I. Because of that great Composition these complex *Ideas* are often made up of. To make Words serviceable to the end of Communication, it is necessary (as has been said) that they excite in the Hearer exactly the same *Idea* they stand for in the Mind of the Speaker. Without this, Men fill one another's heads with Noise and Sounds; but convey not thereby their Thoughts, and lay not before one another their *Ideas*, which is the end of Discourse and Language. But when a Word stands for a very complex *Idea* that is compounded and decompounded, it is not easy for Men to form and retain that *Idea* so exactly, as to make the Name in common use stand for the same precise *Idea* without any the least variation. Hence it comes to pass, that Mens Names of very compound *Ideas*, such as for the most part are moral Words, have seldom, in two different Men, the same precise Signification; since one Man's complex *Idea* seldom agrees with another's, and often differs from his own, from that which he had yesterday, or will have to morrow.

§. 7. II. *Because the Names of mix'd Modes*, for the most part, want Standards in Nature, whereby Men may rectify and adjust their Significations; therefore they are very various and doubtful. They are Assemblages of *Ideas* put together at the pleasure of the Mind, pursuing its own ends of Discourse, and suited to its own Notions; whereby it designs not to copy any thing really existing, but to denominate and rank things, as they come to agree, with those Archetypes or Forms it has made. He that first brought the word *Sham*, *Wheel*, or *Banter* in use, put together, as he thought fit, those *Ideas* he made it stand for: And as it is with any new Names of Modes, that are now brought into any Language; so it was with the old ones, when they were first made use of, Names therefore that stand for Collections of *Ideas* which the Mind makes at

The Imperfection of Words is the Doubtfulness of their Signification.

Causes of their Imperfection.

The Names of mix'd Modes doubtful. First, Because the Ideas they stand for, are so complex.

Secondly, Because they have no Standards.

pleasure, must needs be of doubtful signification, when such Collections are no where to be found constantly united in Nature, nor any Patterns to be shewn whereby Men may adjust them. What the word *Murder*, or *Sacrilege*, &c. signifies, can never be known from things themselves: There be many of the parts of those complex *Ideas*, which are not visible in the Action it self; the Intention of the Mind, or the Relation of Holy Things, which make a part of *Murder* or *Sacrilege*, have no necessary Connection with the outward and visible Action of him that commits either: and the pulling the Trigger of the Gun with which the Murder is committed, and is all the Action that perhaps is visible, has no natural Connection with those other *Ideas* that make up the complex one, nam'd *Murder*. They have their Union and Combination only from the Understanding, which unites them under one Name: but uniting them without any Rule or Pattern, it cannot be but that the signification of the Name that stands for such voluntary Collections, should be often various in the Minds of different Men, who have scarce any standing Rule to regulate themselves and their Notions by, in such arbitrary *Ideas*.

Propriety not
a sufficient
Remedy.

§. 8. 'Tis true, *Common Use* that is the Rule of Propriety, may be suppos'd here to afford some aid, to settle the Signification of Language; and it cannot be deny'd, but that in some measure it does. *Common Use regulates the meaning of Words* pretty well for common Conversation; but no Body having an Authority to establish the precise Signification of Words, nor determine to what *Ideas* any one shall annex them, common use is not sufficient to adjust them to philosophical Discourses; there being scarce any Name of any very complex *Idea* (to say nothing of others) which in common use has not a great latitude, and which, keeping within the bounds of Propriety, may not be made the sign of far different *Ideas*. Besides, the Rule and Measure of Propriety it self being no where establish'd, it is often matter of dispute whether this or that way of using a word, be Propriety of Speech or no. From all which it is evident, that the Names of such kind of very complex *Ideas* are naturally liable to this Imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain signification; and even in Men that have a mind to understand one another, do not always stand for the same *Idea* in Speaker and Hearer. Tho' the names *Glory* and *Gratitude* be the same in every Man's mouth thro' a whole Country, yet the complex collective *Idea*, which every one thinks on, or intends by that name, is apparently very different in Men using the same Language.

The way of
learning these
Names con-
tributes also
to their
Doubtfulness.

§. 9. The way also wherein the Names of mix'd Modes are ordinarily learn'd, does not a little contribute to the Doubtfulness of their Signification. For if we will observe how Children learn Languages, we shall find that to make them understand what the Names of simple *Ideas*, or Substances, stand for, People ordinarily shew them the thing whereof they would have them have the *Idea*; and then repeat to them the Name that stands for it, as *White*, *Sweet*, *Milk*, *Sugar*, *Cat*, *Dog*. But as for mix'd Modes, especially the most material of them, moral Words, the Sounds are usually learn'd first; and then to know what complex *Ideas* they stand for, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or (which happens for the most part) are left to their own Observation and Industry; which being little laid out in the search of the true and precise meaning of Names, these moral Words are in most Mens mouths little more than bare Sounds; or when they have any, 'tis for the most part but a very loose and undetermin'd, and consequently obscure and confus'd Signification. And even those themselves, who have with more attention settled their Notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience, to have them stand for complex *Ideas*, different from those which other, even intelligent and studious Men, make them the signs of. Where shall one find any, either *controversial Debate*, or *familiar Discourse*, concerning *Honour*, *Faith*, *Grace*, *Religion*, *Church*, &c. wherein it is not easy to observe the different Notions Men have of them? which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the Signification of those Words, nor have in their Minds the same complex *Ideas* which they make them stand for: and so all the Contests that follow thereupon, are only about the meaning of a Sound. And hence we see, that in the Interpretation of Laws, whether Divine or Human, there is no end; Comments beget Comments, and Explications make new Matter for Explications: And of limiting, distinguishing, varying the

the Signification of these moral Words, there is no End. These *Ideas* of Mens making, are, by Men still having the same Power, multiply'd in *infinitum*. Many a Man, who was pretty well satisfy'd of the meaning of a Text of Scripture, or Clause in the Code at first reading, has by consulting Commentators quite lost the sense of it, and by those Elucidations given rise or increase to his Doubts, and drawn Obscurity upon the place. I say not this, that I think Commentaries needless; but to shew how uncertain the Names of mix'd Modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those who had both the Intention and the Faculty of Speaking as clearly as Language was capable to express their Thoughts.

§. 10. What Obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the Writings of Men, who have liv'd in remote Ages and different Countries, it will be needless to take notice; since the numerous Volumes of learned Men, employing their Thoughts that way, are proofs more than enough to shew what Attention, Study, Sagacity, and Reasoning are requir'd, to find out the true meaning of *antient Authors*. But there being no Writings we have any great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of, but those that contain either Truths we are requir'd to believe, or Laws we are to obey, and draw Inconveniences on us when we mistake or transgress, we may be less anxious about the Sense of other Authors; who writing but their own Opinions, we are under no greater necessity to know them, than they to know our's. Our Good or Evil depending not on their Decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their Notions: And therefore in the reading of them, if they do not use their Words with a due Clearness and Perspicuity, we may lay them aside, and without any injury done them resolve thus with our selves,

Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi.

§. 11. If the Signification of the Names of mix'd Modes are uncertain, because there be no real Standards existing in Nature, to which those *Ideas* are refer'd, and by which they may be adjusted, the Names of Substances are of a doubtful Signification, for a contrary reason, *viz.* Because the *Ideas* they stand for are suppos'd conformable to the Reality of things, and are refer'd to the Standards made by Nature. In our *Ideas* of Substances we have not the liberty, as in mix'd Modes, to frame what Combinations we think fit, to be the characteristical Notes to rank and denominate things by. In these we must follow Nature, suit our complex *Ideas* to real Existences, and regulate the Signification of their Names by the things themselves, if we will have our Names to be the signs of them, and stand for them. Here, 'tis true, we have Patterns to follow; but Patterns that will make the Signification of their Names very uncertain: For Names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning, if the *Ideas* they stand for be refer'd to Standards without us, that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly.

§. 12. The Names of Substances have, as has been shew'd, a double Reference in Names of Substances refer'd, their ordinary Use.

First, Sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their Signification is suppos'd to agree to the real Constitution of things, from which all their Properties flow, and in which they all centre. But this real Constitution, or (as it is apt to be call'd) Essence, being utterly unknown to us, any Sound that is put to stand for it, must be very uncertain in its Application; and it will be impossible to know what things are, or ought to be call'd an *Horse*, or *Antimony*, when those words are put for real Essences, that we have no *Ideas* of at all. And therefore in this Supposition, the Names of Substances being refer'd to Standards that cannot be known, their Significations can never be adjusted and establish'd by those Standards.

§. 13. *Secondly*, The simple *Ideas* that are found to co-exist in Substances being that which their Names immediately signify, these, as united in the several Sorts of things, are the proper Standards to which their Names are refer'd, and by which their Significations may be best rectify'd. But neither will these *Archetypes* so well serve to this Purpose, as to leave these Names without very various and uncertain Significations. Because these simple *Ideas* that co-exist, and are united in the same Subject, being very numerous, and having all an equal right to go into the complex specifick *Ideas*, which the specifick Name is to stand for,

Hence unavoidable Obscurity in antient Authors.

Names of Substances refer'd, 1. To real Essences that cannot be known.

2. To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.

for, Men, tho' they propose to themselves the very same Subject to consider, yet frame very different *Ideas* about it; and so the Name they use for it unavoidably comes to have, in several Men, very different Significations. The simple Qualities which make up the complex *Ideas* being most of them Powers, in relation to Changes, which they are apt to make in, or receive from other Bodies, are almost infinite. He that shall but observe what a great variety of alterations any one of the baser Metals is apt to receive from the different application only of Fire; and how much a greater number of Changes any of them will receive in the hands of a Chymist, by the application of other Bodies, will not think it strange that I count the Properties of any sort of Bodies not easy to be collected, and completely known by the ways of Enquiry, which our Faculties are capable of. They being therefore at least so many, that no Man can know the precise and definite number, they are differently discover'd by different Men, according to their various Skill, Attention, and Ways of handling; who therefore cannot chuse but have different *Ideas* of the same Substance, and therefore make the Signification of its common Name very various and uncertain. For the complex *Ideas* of Substances being made up of such simple ones as are suppos'd to co-exist in Nature, every one has a right to put into his complex *Idea* those Qualities he has found to be united together. For tho' in the Substance *Gold*, one satisfies himself with Colour and Weight, yet another thinks Solubility in *Aq. Regia* as necessary to be join'd with that Colour in his *Idea* of *Gold*, as any one does its Fusibility; Solubility in *Aq. Regia* being a Quality as constantly join'd with its Colour and Weight, as Fusibility, or any other; others put in its Ductility or Fixedness, &c. as they have been taught by Tradition or Experience. Who of all these has establish'd the right Signification of the word *Gold*? or who shall be the Judge to determine? Each has his Standard in Nature, which he appeals to, and with reason thinks he has the same right to put into his complex *Idea* signify'd by the word *Gold*, those Qualities which upon trial he has found united; as another, who has not so well examin'd, has to leave them out; or a third, who has made other trials, has to put in others. For the Union in nature of these Qualities being the true Ground of their Union in one complex *Idea*, who can say, one of them has more reason to be put in, or left out, than another? From whence it will always unavoidably follow, that the complex *Ideas* of Substances, in Men using the same Name for them, will be very various; and so the Significations of those Names very uncertain.

3. To co-exist-
ing Qualities
which are
known but
imperfectly.

§. 14. Besides, there is scarce any particular thing existing, which, in some of its simple *Ideas*, does not communicate with a greater, and in others a less Number of particular Beings: Who shall determine in this case which are those that are to make up the precise Collection that is to be signify'd by the specific Name; or can with any just Authority prescribe, which obvious or common Qualities are to be left out; or which more secret, or more particular, are to be put into the Signification of the Name of any Substance? All which together seldom or never fail to produce that various and doubtful Signification in the Names of Substances, which causes such Uncertainty, Disputes, or Mistakes, when we come to a Philosophical Use of them.

With this Im-
perfection they
may serve for
Civil, but
not well for
Philosophical
Use.

§. 15. 'Tis true, as to civil and common Conversation, the general Names of Substances, regulated in their ordinary Signification by some obvious Qualities (as by the Shape and Figure in things of known seminal Propagation, and in other Substances, for the most part by Colour, join'd with some other sensible Qualities) do well enough to design the things Men would be understood to speak of: And so they usually conceive well enough the Substances meant by the word *Gold*, or *Apple*, to distinguish the one from the other. But in Philosophical Enquiries and Debates, where general Truths are to be establish'd, and Consequences drawn from Positions laid down; there the precise Signification of the Names of Substances will be found, not only not to be well establish'd, but also very hard to be so. For example, he that shall make Malleableness, or a certain degree of Fixedness, a part of his complex *Idea* of *Gold*, may make Propositions concerning *Gold*, and draw Consequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from *Gold* taken in such a Signification: But yet such as another Man can never be forc'd to admit, nor be convinc'd of their Truth, who

makes

makes not Malleableness, or the same degree of Fixedness, part of that complex *Idea*, that the name *Gold*, in his use of it, stands for.

§. 16. This is a natural, and almost unavoidable Imperfection in almost all the Names of Substances, in all Languages whatsoever, which Men will easily find, when once passing from confus'd or loose Notions, they come to more strict and close Enquiries. For then they will be convinc'd how doubtful and obscure those words are in their Signification, which in ordinary use appear'd very clear and determin'd. I was once in a Meeting of very Learned and Ingenious Physicians, where by chance there arose a Question, whether any Liquor pass'd thro' the Filaments of the Nerves. The Debate having been manag'd a good while by variety of Arguments on both sides, I (who had been us'd to suspect, that the greatest part of Disputes were more about the Signification of words, than a real difference in the Conception of things) desir'd, That before they went any farther on in this Dispute, they would first examine, and establish amongst them, what the word *Liquor* signify'd. They at first were a little surpriz'd at the Proposal; and had they been Persons less ingenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one: since there was no one there that thought not himself to understand very perfectly what the word *Liquor* stood for; which I think too none of the most perplex'd Names of Substances. However, they were pleas'd to comply with my Motion, and upon Examination found, that the Signification of that word was not so settled and certain as they had all imagin'd; but that each of them made it a sign of a different complex *Idea*. This made them perceive that the main of their Dispute was about the Signification of that Term; and that they differ'd very little in their Opinions, concerning some fluid and subtil Matter, passing thro' the Conduits of the Nerves; tho' it was not so easy to agree whether it was to be call'd *Liquor* or no, a thing which when consider'd, they thought it not worth the contending about.

§. 17. How much this is the case, in the greatest part of Disputes that Men are engag'd so hotly in, I shall perhaps have an occasion in another place to take notice. Let us only here consider a little more exactly the fore-mention'd Instance of the word *Gold*, and we shall see how hard it is precisely to determine its Signification. I think all agree to make it stand for a Body of a certain yellow shining Colour; which being the *Idea* to which Children have annex'd that Name, the shining yellow part of a Peacock's Tail is properly to them *Gold*. Others, finding Fusibility join'd with that yellow Colour in certain Parcels of Matter, made of that Combination a complex *Idea*, to which they give the name *Gold* to denote a sort of Substance; and so exclude from being *Gold* all such yellow shining Bodies, as by Fire will be reduc'd to Ashes; and admit to be of that Species, or to be comprehended under that name *Gold*, only such Substances as having that shining yellow Colour will by Fire be reduc'd to Fusion, and not to Ashes. Another, by the same Reason, adds the Weight, which, being a Quality as straitly join'd with that Colour as its Fusibility, he thinks has the same reason to be join'd in its *Idea*, and to be signify'd by its Name: and therefore the other made up of Body, of such a Colour and Fusibility, to be imperfect; and so on of all the rest: wherein no one can shew a Reason why some of the inseparable Qualities, that are always united in Nature, should be put into the nominal Essence, and others left out: or why the word *Gold*, signifying that sort of Body the Ring on his Finger is made of, should determine that sort rather by its Colour, Weight, and Fusibility, than by its Colour, Weight, and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*: since the dissolving it by that Liquor is as inseparable from it as the Fusion by Fire; and they are both of them nothing, but the relation which that Substance has to two other Bodies, which have a Power to operate differently upon it. For by what right is it that Fusibility comes to be a part of the Essence signify'd by the word *Gold*, and Solubility but a Property of it? or why is its Colour part of the Essence, and its Malleableness but a Property? That which I mean is this, That these being all but Properties depending on its real Constitution, and nothing but Powers, either active or passive, in reference to other Bodies; no one has Authority to determine the signification of the word *Gold* (as refer'd to such a Body existing in Nature) more to one Collection of *Ideas* to be found

in

in that Body than to another: whereby the Signification of that Name must unavoidably be very uncertain; since, as has been said, several People observe several Properties in the same Substance; and, I think, I may say no body all. And therefore we have but very imperfect Descriptions of things, and Words have very uncertain Significations.

The Names of
simple Ideas
the least
doubtful.

§. 18. From what has been said, it is easy to observe what has been before remark'd, viz. That the Names of simple Ideas are, of all others, the least liable to Mistakes, and that for these Reasons. First, Because the Ideas they stand for, being each but one single Perception, are much easier got, and more clearly retain'd, than the more complex ones, and therefore are not liable to the Uncertainty which usually attends those compounded ones of Substances and mix'd Modes, in which the precise number of simple Ideas, that make them up, are not easily agreed, and so readily kept in the Mind. And Secondly, Because they are never refer'd to any other Essence, but barely that Perception they immediately signify: which Reference is that which renders the Signification of the Names of Substances naturally so perplex'd, and gives occasion to so many Disputes. Men, that do not perversly use their Words, or on purpose set themselves to cavil, seldom mistake in any Language which they are acquainted with, the Use and Signification of the Names of simple Ideas: *White* and *Sweet*, *Tellow* and *Bitter*, carry a very obvious meaning with them, which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives he is ignorant of, and seeks to be inform'd. But what precise Collection of simple Ideas, *Modesty* or *Frugality* stand for in another's Use, is not so certainly known. And however we are apt to think, we well enough know what is meant by *Gold* or *Iron*; yet the precise complex Idea, others make them the Signs of, is not so certain: And I believe it is very seldom that in Speaker and Hearer they stand for exactly the same Collection. Which must needs produce Mistakes and Disputes, when they are made use of in Discourses, wherein Men have to do with universal Propositions, and would settle in their Minds universal Truths, and consider the Consequences that follow from them.

And next to
them simple
Modes.

§. 19. By the same Rule, the Names of simple Modes are, next to those of simple Ideas, least liable to Doubt and Uncertainty, especially those of Figure and Number, of which Men have so clear and distinct Ideas. Who ever, that had a mind to understand them, mistook the ordinary meaning of *Seven*, or a *Triangle*? And in general the least compounded Ideas in every kind have the least dubious Names.

The most
doubtful are
the Names of
very com-
pounded mix-
ed Modes and
Substances.

§. 20. Mix'd Modes therefore, that are made up but of a few and obvious simple Ideas, have usually Names of no very uncertain Signification. But the Names of mix'd Modes, which comprehend a great number of simple Ideas, are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermin'd Meaning, as has been shewn. The Names of Substances, being annex'd to Ideas that are neither the real Essences nor exact Representations of the Patterns they are refer'd to, are liable yet to greater Imperfection and Uncertainty, especially when we come to a philosophical Use of them.

Why this im-
perfection
charg'd upon
Words.

§. 21. The great Disorder that happens in our Names of Substances, proceeding for the most part from our want of Knowledge, and Inability to penetrate into their real Constitutions, it may probably be wonder'd, *Why I charge this as an imperfection rather upon our Words than Understandings.* This Exception has so much appearance of Justice, that I think my self oblig'd to give a reason why I have follow'd this Method. I must confess then, that when I first began this Discourse of the Understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought that any Consideration of Words was at all necessary to it. But when, having pass'd over the Original and Composition of our Ideas, I began to examine the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledge, I found it had so near a Connection with Words, that unless their force and manner of Signification were first well observ'd, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning Knowledge: which being conversant about Truth, had constantly to do with Propositions. And tho' it terminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of Words, that they seem'd scarce separable from our general Knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much between our Understandings and the Truth, which it would contem-
plate

plate and apprehend that like the *Medium* thro' which visible Objects pass, their Obscurity and Disorder does not seldom cast a mist before our Eyes, and impose upon our Understandings. If we consider, in the Fallacies Men put upon themselves as well as others, and the Mistakes in Mens Disputes and Notions, how great a part is owing to Words, and their uncertain or mistaken Significations, we shall have reason to think this no small obstacle in the way to Knowledge; which, I conclude, we are the more carefully to be warn'd of, because it has been so far from being taken notice of as an Inconvenience, that the Arts of improving it have been made the business of Mens study; and obtain'd the Reputation of Learning and Subtily, as we shall see in the following Chapter. But I am apt to imagine, that were the imperfections of Language, as the Instrument of Knowledge, more thorowly weigh'd, a great many of the Controversies that make such a noise in the world, would of themselves cease; and the way to Knowledge, and perhaps Peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does.

§. 22. Sure I am, that the Signification of Words in all Languages, depending very much on the Thoughts, Notions, and *Ideas* of him that uses them, must unavoidably be of great uncertainty to Men of the same Language and Country. This is so evident in the *Greek* Authors, that he that shall peruse their Writings will find in almost every one of them a distinct Language, tho' the same Words. But when to this natural difficulty in every Country, there shall be added different Countries and remote Ages, wherein the Speakers and Writers had very different Notions, Tempers, Customs, Ornaments, and Figures of Speech, &c. every one of which influenc'd the Signification of their Words then, tho' to us now they are lost and unknown; it would become us to be charitable one to another in our Interpretations or Misunderstanding of those antient Writings: which tho' of great concernment to be understood, are liable to the unavoidable Difficulties of Speech, which (if we except the Names of simple *Ideas*, and some very obvious things) is not capable, without a constant defining the Terms of conveying the Sense and Intention of the Speaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty, to the Hearer. And in Discourses of Religion, Law, and Morality, as they are matters of the highest concernment, so there will be the greatest difficulty.

§. 23. The Volumes of Interpreters and Commentators on the Old and New Testament, are but too manifest proofs of this. Tho' every thing said in the Text be infallibly true, yet the Reader may be, nay cannot chuse but be very fallible in the understanding of it. Nor is it to be wonder'd, that the Will of GOD, when clothed in Words, should be liable to that doubt and uncertainty, which unavoidably attends that sort of Conveyance; when even his Son, whilst clothed in Flesh, was subject to all the Frailties and Inconveniences of human Nature, Sin excepted. And we ought to magnify his Goodness, that he hath spread before all the World such legible Characters of his Works and Providence, and given all Mankind so sufficient a Light of Reason, that they to whom this written Word never came, could not (whenever they set themselves to search) either doubt of the Being of a GOD, or of the Obedience due to him. Since then the Precepts of natural Religion are plain, and very intelligible to all Mankind, and seldom come to be controverted; and other reveal'd Truths, which are convey'd to us by Books and Languages, are liable to the common and natural Obscurities and Difficulties incident to Words; methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in imposing our own Sense and Interpretations of the latter.

This should teach us Moderation, in imposing our own Sense of old Authors.

C H A P. X.

Of the Abuse of Words.

Abuse of
Words.

§. 1. **B**ESIDES the Imperfection that is naturally in Language, and the Obscurity and Confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the Use of Words, there are several wilful *Faults and Neglects* which Men are guilty of in this way of Communication, whereby they render these signs less clear and distinct in their Signification, than naturally they need to be.

First, Words
without any, or
without clear
Ideas.

§. 2. *First*, In this kind, the first and most palpable Abuse is, the using of Words without clear and distinct *Ideas*; or, which is worse, signs without any thing signified. Of these there are two sorts:

I. One may observe, in all Languages, certain Words, that if they be examined, will be found, in their first Original and their appropriated Use, not to stand for any clear and distinct *Ideas*. These, for the most part, the several *Sects* of Philosophy and Religion have introduced. For their Authors, or promoters, either affecting something singular and out of the way of common Apprehensions, or to support some strange Opinions, or cover some Weakness of their Hypothesis, seldom fail to coin new Words, and such as when they come to be examined may justly be called *insignificant Terms*. For having either had no determinate Collection of *Ideas* annex'd to them, when they were first invented; or at least such as, if well examined will be found inconsistent; 'tis no wonder if afterwards, in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain empty Sounds, with little or no signification, amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their mouths as the distinguishing Characters of their Church, or School, without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precise *Ideas* they stand for. I shall not need here to heap up Instances; every one's Reading and Conversation will sufficiently furnish him: or if he wants to be better stored, the great Mint-masters of these kind of Terms, I mean the School-men and Metaphysicians (under which, I think, the disputing Natural and Moral Philosophers of these latter Ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content him.

§. 3. II. Others there be, who extend this Abuse yet farther, who take so little care to lay by Words, which in their primary Notation have scarce any clear and distinct *Ideas* which they are annex'd to, that by an unpardonable Negligence they familiarly use Words, which the Propriety of Language has affixed to very important *Ideas*, without any distinct meaning at all. *Wisdom, Glory, Grace, &c.* are Words frequent enough in every man's mouth; but if a great many of those who use them, should be ask'd what they mean by them, they would be at a stand, and not know what to answer: A plain proof, that tho' they have learn'd those Sounds, and have them ready at their tongue's end, yet there are no determin'd *Ideas* laid up in their Minds, which are to be express'd to others by them.

Occasion'd by
learning
Names
before the
Ideas they
belong to.

§. 4. Men having been *accustom'd* from their Cradles to learn Words, which are easily got and retain'd, before they knew, or had framed the complex *Ideas* to which they were annex'd, or which were to be found in the things they were thought to stand for, they usually continue to do so all their Lives; and without taking the pains necessary to settle in their Minds determin'd *Ideas*, they use their words for such unsteady and confus'd Notions as they have, contenting themselves with the same Words other People use: as if their very Sound necessarily carry'd with it constantly the same meaning. This, tho' Men make a shift with, in the ordinary Occurrences of Life, where they find it necessary to be understood, and therefore they make signs till they are so; yet this Insignificancy in their Words, when they come to reason concerning either their Tenets or Interest, manifestly fills their Discourse with abundance of empty unintelligible Noise and Jargon, especially in moral Matters, where the Words for the most part standing for arbitrary and numerous Collections of *Ideas*, not regularly and permanently united in Nature, their bare Sounds are often only thought on, or at

at least very obscure and uncertain Notions annex'd to them. Men take the Words they find in use amongst their Neighbours; and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without much troubling their Heads about a certain fix'd meaning: whereby, besides the ease of it, they obtain this advantage, That as in such Discourses they seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom to be convinc'd that they are in the wrong; it being all one to go about to draw those Men out of their mistakes, who have no settled Notions, as to dispossess a Vagrant of his Habitation, who has no settled abode. This I guess to be so; and every one may observe in himself and others, whether it be or no.

§. 5. Secondly, Another great Abuse of Words, is, *Inconstancy* in the use of them. It is hard to find a Discourse written of any Subject, especially of Controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read with attention, the same Words (and those commonly the most material in the Discourse, and upon which the Argument turns) used sometimes for one Collection of simple *Ideas*, and sometimes for another; which is a perfect Abuse of Language. Words being intended for signs of my *Ideas*, to make them known to others, not by any natural Signification, but by a voluntary Imposition, 'tis plain Cheat and Abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one thing, and sometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great Folly, or greater Dishonesty. And a Man, in his Accompts with another, may, with as much fairness, make the Characters of Numbers stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for another Collection of Units (*v. g.* this Character 3 stand sometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight) as in his Discourse, or Reasoning, make the same Words stand for different Collections of simple *Ideas*. If Men should do so in their Reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak thus, in the Affairs and Business of the World, and call 8 sometimes seven, and sometimes nine, as best serv'd his advantage, would presently have clap'd upon him one of the two Names Men are constantly disgusted with. And yet in Arguings and learned Contests, the same sort of proceeding passes commonly for Wit and Learning: but to me it appears a greater dishonesty, than the misplacing of Counters in the casting up a Debt; and the Cheat the greater, by how much Truth is of greater concernment and value than Money.

² Unstably
Application of
them.

§. 6. Thirdly, Another Abuse of Language is, an *affected Obscurity*, by either applying old Words to new and unusual Significations, or introducing new and ambiguous Terms, without defining either; or else putting them so together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. Tho' the Peripatetick Philosophy has been most eminent in this way, yet other Sects have not been wholly clear of it. There is scarce any of them that are not cumber'd with some Difficulties (such is the Imperfection of human Knowledge) which they have been fain to cover with Obscurity of Terms, and to confound the Signification of Words, which, like a Mist before Peoples Eyes, might hinder their weak Parts from being discover'd. That *Body* and *Extension*, in common use, stand for two distinct *Ideas*, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For were their Signification precisely the same, it would be proper, and as intelligible to say, the *Body of an Extension*, as the *Extension of a Body*; and yet there are those who find it necessary to confound their Signification. To this Abuse, and the Mischiefs of confounding the Signification of Words, Logick and the liberal Sciences, as they have been handled in the Schools, have given reputation; and the admir'd Art of Disputing hath added much to the natural Imperfection of Languages, whilst it has been made use of and fitted to perplex the Signification of Words, more than to discover the Knowledge and Truth of Things: And he that will look into that sort of learned Writings, will find the Words there much more obscure, uncertain, and undetermin'd in their Meaning, than they are in ordinary Conversation.

³ Affected
Obscurity by
wrong Appli-
cation.

§. 7. This is unavoidably to be so, where Mens Parts and Learning are estimated by their Skill in *Disputing*. And if Reputation and Reward shall attend these Conquests, which depend mostly on the Fineness and Niceties of Words; 'tis no wonder if the Wit of Man so employ'd, should perplex, involve, and subtilize the Signification of Sounds, so as never to want something to say, in

Logick and
Dispute has
much contri-
buted to this.

opposing or defending any Question; the Victory being adjudg'd not to him who had Truth on his side, but the last Word in the Dispute.

Calling it
Subtily.

§. 8. This, tho' a very useless Skill, and that which I think the direct opposite to the ways of Knowledge, hath yet pass'd hitherto under the laudable and esteem'd Names of *Subtily* and *Acuteness*; and has had the Applause of the Schools, and Encouragement of one part of the learned Men of the World. And no wonder, since the Philosophers of old (the disputing and wrangling Philosophers I mean, such as *Lucian* wittily and with reason taxes) and the Schoolmen since, aiming at Glory and Esteem for their great and universal Knowledge, easier a great deal to be pretended to, than really acquir'd, found this a good Expedient to cover their Ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable Web of perplex'd Words, and procure to themselves the Admiration of others by unintelligible Terms, the apter to produce wonder, because they could not be understood: whilst it appears in all History, that these profound Doctors were no wiser, nor more useful than their Neighbours; and brought but small advantage to human Life, or the Societies wherein they liv'd: unless the coining of new Words, where they produc'd no new things to apply them to, or the perplexing or obscuring the Signification of old ones, and so bringing all Things into question and dispute, were a thing profitable to the Life of Man, or worthy Commendation and Reward.

This Learning
very little
benefits Society.

§. 9. For notwithstanding these learned Disputants, these all-knowing Doctors, it was to the unscholastick Statesman, that the Governments of the World ow'd their Peace, Defence, and Liberties; and from the illiterate and contemn'd Mechanick (a Name of Disgrace) that they receiv'd the Improvements of useful Arts. Nevertheless, this artificial Ignorance, and *learned Gibberish*, prevail'd mightily in these last Ages, by the Interest and Artifice of those, who found no easier way to that pitch of Authority and Dominion they have attain'd, than by amusing the Men of Business and Ignorant with hard words, or employing the Ingenious and Idle in intricate Disputes about unintelligible Terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless Labyrinth. Besides, there is no such way to gain admittance, or give defence to strange and absurd Doctrines, as to guard them round about with Legions of obscure, doubtful, and undefined Words: which yet make these Retreats more like the Dens of Robbers, or Holes of Foxes, than the Fortresses of fair Warriours; which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the Strength that is in them, but the Briars and Thorns, and the Obscurity of the Thickets they are beset with. For Untruth being unacceptable to the Mind of Man, there is no other Defence left for Absurdity, but Obscurity.

But destroys
the Instruments of
Knowledge
and Communication.

§. 10. Thus learned Ignorance, and this Art of keeping, even inquisitive Men, from true Knowledge, hath been propagated in the World, and hath much perplex'd, whilst it pretended to inform the understanding. For we see that other well-meaning and wise Men, whose Education and Parts had not acquir'd that *Acuteness*, could intelligibly express themselves to one another; and in its plain use make a benefit of Language. But tho' unlearned Men well enough understood the words *White* and *Black*, &c. and had constant Notions of the Ideas signify'd by those words; yet there were Philosophers found, who had Learning and *Subtily* enough to prove, that *Snow was Black*; i. e. to prove, that *White was Black*. Whereby they had the Advantage to destroy the Instruments and Means of Discourse, Conversation, Instruction and Society; whilst with great Art and *Subtily* they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of words, and thereby render Language less useful, than the real Defects of it had made it; a Gift, which the Illiterate had not attain'd to.

As useful as
to confound
the Sound of
the Letters.

§. 11. These learned Men did equally instruct Mens Understandings, and profit their Lives, as he who should alter the signification of known Characters, and, by a subtle Device of Learning, far surpassing the Capacity of the Illiterate, Dull and Vulgar, should, in his Writing, shew that he could put *A* for *B*, and *D* for *E*, &c. to the no small Admiration and Benefit of his Reader. It being as senseless to put *Black*, which is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible Idea, to put it, I say, for another, or the contrary Idea, i. e. to call *Snow Black*, as to put this mark *A*, which is a Character agreed on to stand for one Modification of Sound, made by a certain Motion of the Organs of Speech,

for

for *B*; which is agreed on to stand for another Modification of Sound, made by another certain Motion of the Organs of Speech.

§. 12. Nor hath this Mischief stop'd in logical Niceities, or curious empty Speculations, it hath invaded the great Concernments of human Life and Society, obscur'd and perplex'd the material Truths of Law and Divinity, brought Confusion, Disorder and Uncertainty into the Affairs of Mankind; and if not destroy'd, yet in great measure render'd useless, those two great Rules, Religion and Justice. What have the greatest part of the Comments and Disputes upon the Laws of *G O D* and Man serv'd for, but to make the Meaning more doubtful, and perplex the Sense? What have been the Effect of those multiply'd curious Distinctions and acute Niceties, but Obscurity and Uncertainty, leaving the Words more unintelligible, and the Reader more at a loss? How else comes it to pass that Princes, speaking or writing to their Servants, in their ordinary Commands, are easily understood; speaking to their People, in their Laws, are not so? And, as I remark'd before, doth it not often happen, that a Man of an ordinary Capacity very well understands a Text or a Law that he reads, till he consults an Expofitor, or goes to Council; who by that time he hath done explaining them, makes the words signify either nothing at all, or what he pleases.

This Art has perplex'd Religion and Justice.

§. 13. Whether any By-Interests of these Professions have occasioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be consider'd, whether it would not be well for Mankind, whose Concernment it is to know things as they are, and to do what they ought, and not to spend their Lives in talking about them, or tossing words to and fro; whether it would not be well, I say, that the use of Words were made plain and direct, and that Language, which was given us for the improvement of Knowledge and bond of Society, should not be employ'd to darken Truth, and unsettle Peoples Rights; to raise Mists, and render unintelligible both Morality and Religion? Or that at least, if this will happen, it should not be thought Learning or Knowledge to do so?

And ought not to pass for Learning.

§. 14. Fourthly, Another great Abuse of Words is, the taking them for Things. This tho' it in some degree concerns all Names in general, yet more particularly affects those of Substances. To this Abuse those Men are most subject, who confine their Thoughts to any one System, and give themselves up into a firm Belief of the Perfection of any receiv'd Hypothesis; whereby they come to be persuaded, that the Terms of that Sect are so suited to the nature of Things, that they perfectly correspond with their real Existence. Who is there, that has been bred up in the Peripatetick Philosophy, who does not think the ten Names, under which are rank'd the ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the nature of Things? Who is there of that School, that is not persuaded, that *substantial Forms*, *vegetative Souls*, *abhorrence of a Vacuum*, *intentional Species*, &c. are something real? These words Men have learn'd from their very Entrance upon Knowledge, and have found their Masters and Systems lay great stress upon them; and therefore they cannot quit the Opinion, that they are conformable to Nature, and are the Representations of something that really exists. The *Platonist* have their *Soul of the World*, and the *Epicureans* their *Endeavour towards Motion* in their Atoms, when at rest. There is scarce any Sect in Philosophy has not a distinct Set of Terms, that others understand not; but yet this Gibberish, which, in the Weakness of Human Understanding, serves so well to palliate Mens Ignorance, and cover their Errors, comes by familiar use among those of the same Tribe, to seem the most important part of Language, and of all other the Terms the most significant. And should *Aerial* and *Ætherial Vehicles* come once, by the Prevalency of that Doctrine, to be generally receiv'd any where, no doubt those Terms would make Impressions on Mens Minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as *Peripatetick Forms* and *intentional Species* have heretofore done.

As Taking them for Things.

§. 15. How much Names taken for Things are apt to mislead the Understanding, Instance, in the attentive reading of philosophical Writers would abundantly discover; and that, perhaps, in words little suspected of any such Misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one: How many intricate Disputes have there been about *Matter*, as if there were some such thing really in Nature, distinct from *Body*; as 'tis evident the word *Matter* stands for an *Idea* distinct from

Instance, in Matter.

from the *Idea* of Body? For if the *Idea* these two Terms stood for, were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all places be put one for another. But we see, that tho' it be proper to say, there is *one Matter of all Bodies*, one cannot say, there is *one Body of all Matters*: We familiarly say, one *Body* is bigger than another; but it sounds harsh (and I think is never us'd) to say, one *Matter* is bigger than another. Whence comes this then? *viz.* from hence, that tho' *Matter* and *Body* be not really distinct, but wherever there is the one, there is the other; yet *Matter* and *Body* stands for two different Conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the other. For *Body* stands for a solid extended figur'd Substance, whereof *Matter* is but a partial and more confus'd Conception, it seeming to me to be us'd for the Substance and Solidity of Body, without taking in its Extension and Figure: And therefore it is that speaking of *Matter*, we speak of it always as one, because in truth it expressly contains nothing but the *Idea* of a solid Substance, which is every where the same, every where uniform. This being our *Idea* of *Matter*, we no more conceive or speak of different *Matters* in the World, than we do of different Solidities; tho' we both conceive and speak of different Bodies, because Extension and Figure are capable of Variation. But since Solidity cannot exist without Extension and Figure, the taking *Matter* to be the Name of something really existing under that Precision, has no doubt produc'd those obscure and unintelligible Discourses and Disputes, which have fill'd the Heads and Books of Philosophers concerning *Materia Prima*; which Imperfection or Abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general Terms, I leave to be consider'd. This I think, I may at least say, that we should have a great many fewer Disputes in the World, if Words were taken for what they are, the Signs of our *Ideas* only, and not for Things themselves. For when we argue about *Matter*, or any the like Term, we truly argue only about the *Idea* we express by that Sound, whether that precise *Idea* agree to any Thing really existing in Nature or no. And if Men would tell what *Ideas* they make their Words stand for, there could not be half that Obscurity or Wrangling, in the search or support of Truth, that there is.

This makes
Errors last-
ing.

§. 16. But whatever Inconvenience follows from this Mistake of Words, this I am sure, that by constant and familiar use, they charm Men into Notions far remote from the Truth of Things. 'Twould be a hard matter to persuade any one, that the words which his Father or Schoolmaster, the Parson of the Parish, or such a Reverend Doctor us'd, signify'd nothing that really existed in Nature: Which, perhaps, is none of the least Causes, that Men are so hardly drawn to quit their Mistakes, even in Opinions purely philosophical, and where they have no other Interest but Truth. For the words they have a long Time been us'd to, remaining firm in their Minds, 'tis no wonder that the wrong Notions annex'd to them should not be remov'd.

§. Setting
them for
what they
cannot signify.

§. 17. Fifthly, Another Abuse of Words, is the setting them in the place of things which they do or can by no means signify. We may observe, that in the general Names of Substances, whereof the nominal Essences are only known to us, when we put them into Propositions, and affirm or deny any thing about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose, or intend they should stand for the real Essence of a certain sort of Substances. For when a Man says *Gold is malleable*, he means and would insinuate something more than this, that *what I call Gold is malleable*, (tho' truly it amounts to no more) but would have this understood, *viz.* that *Gold*, i. e. *what has the real Essence of Gold, is malleable*; which amounts to thus much, that *Malleableness depends on, and is inseparable from the real Essence of Gold*. But a Man, not knowing wherein that real Essence consists, the Connection in his Mind of Malleableness, is not truly with an Essence he knows not, but only with the Sound *Gold* he puts for it. Thus when we say, that *Animal rationale* is, and *Animal implume bipes latis unguibus* is not, a good Definition of a Man; 'tis plain, we suppose the name *Man* in this case to stand for the real Essence of a Species, and would signify, that a *rational Animal* better describ'd that real Essence, than a *two-leg'd Animal with broad Nails, and without Feathers*. For else, why might not *Plato* as properly make the word ἀνθρωπος or *Man* stand for his complex *Idea*, made up of the *Ideas* of a Body, distinguish'd from others by a certain Shape and other outward Appearances, as A-
ristotle

Aristotle, make the complex *Idea*, to which he gave the name $\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\gamma\omega\tau\omicron\varsigma$ or *Man*, of Body and the Faculty of Reasoning join'd together; unless the name $\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\gamma\omega\tau\omicron\varsigma$ or *Man* were suppos'd to stand for something else than what it signifies; and to be put in the place of some other thing than the *Idea* a Man professes he would express by it?

§. 18. 'Tis true, the Names of Substances would be much more useful, and Propositions made in them much more certain, were the real Essences of Substances the *Ideas* in our Minds which those words signify'd. And 'tis for want of those real Essences that our Words convey so little Knowledge or Certainty in our Discourses about them: And therefore the Mind, to remove that Imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a secret Supposition, to stand for a thing having that real Essence, as if thereby it made some nearer Approaches to it. For tho' the word *Man* or *Gold* signify nothing truly but a complex *Idea* of Properties united together in one sort of Substances: Yet there is scarce any body in the use of these words, but often supposes each of those Names to stand for a thing having the real Essence on which those Properties depend. Which is so far from diminishing the Imperfection of our Words, that by a plain Abuse it adds to it when we would make them stand for something which not being in our complex *Idea*, the Name we use can no ways be the sign of.

v. g. Putting them for the real Essences of Substances.

§. 19. This shews us the reason why in *mix'd Modes* any of the *Ideas* that make the Composition of the complex one, being left out or chang'd, it is allow'd to be another thing, i. e. to be of another Species, as is plain in *Chancemedly*, *Man-slaughter*, *Murder*, *Parricide*, &c. The reason whereof is, because the complex *Idea* signify'd by that Name is the real as well as nominal Essence; and there is no secret Reference of that Name to any other Essence but that. But in *Substances* it is not so. For tho' in that call'd *Gold* one puts into his complex *Idea* what another leaves out, and *vice versa*; yet Men do not usually think that therefore the Species is chang'd: because they secretly in their Minds refer that Name, and suppose it annex'd to a real immutable Essence of a thing existing, on which those Properties depend. He that adds to his complex *Idea* of *Gold* that of Fixedness and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have chang'd the Species; but only to have a more perfect *Idea*, by adding another simple *Idea*, which is always in fact join'd with those other, of which his former complex *Idea* consisted. But this reference of the Name to a thing, whereof we have not the *Idea*, is so far from helping at all, that it only serves the more to involve us in Difficulties. For by this tacit Reference to the real Essence of that Species of Bodies, the word *Gold* (which by standing for a more or less perfect Collection of simple *Ideas*, serves to design that sort of Body well enough in civil Discourse) comes to have no Signification at all, being put for somewhat whereof we have no *Idea* at all, and so can signify nothing at all, when the Body it self is away. For however it may be thought all one; yet, if well consider'd, it will be found a quite different thing to argue about *Gold* in Name, and about a parcel of the Body it self, v. g. a piece of *Leaf-Gold* laid before us; tho' in Discourse we are fain to substitute the Name for the thing.

Hence we think every change of our *Idea* in Substances, not to change the Species.

§. 20. That which I think very much disposes Men to substitute their Names for the real Essences of *Species*, is the Supposition before-mention'd, that Nature works regularly in the Production of things, and sets the Boundaries to each of those *Species*, by giving exactly the same real internal Constitution to each Individual, which we rank under one general Name. Whereas anyone who observes their different Qualities, can hardly doubt, that many of the Individuals, call'd by the same Name, are, in their internal Constitution, as different one from another as several of those which are rank'd under different Specifick Names, *This Supposition* however, that the same precise internal Constitution goes always with the same Specifick Name, makes Men forward to take those Names for the Representatives of those real Essences, tho' indeed they signify nothing but the complex *Ideas* they have in their Minds when they use them. So that, if I may so say, signifying one thing, and being suppos'd for, or put in the place of another, they cannot but in such a kind of use cause a great deal of Uncertainty in mens Discourses; especially in those who have thorowly imbib'd the Doctrine

The Cause of the Abuse, a Supposition of Nature's working always regularly.

of

This Abuse
contains two
false supposi-
tions.

of *substantial Forms*, whereby they firmly imagine the several Species of things to be determin'd and distinguish'd.

§. 21. But however preposterous and absurd it be to make our Names stand for *Ideas* we have not, or (which is all one) Essences that we know not, it being in effect to make our Words the Signs of nothing; yet 'tis evident to any one, who reflects ever so little on the use Men make of their Words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a Man asks whether this or that thing he sees, let it be a Drill, or a monstrous *Fœtus*, be a *Man* or no; 'tis evident, the Question is not, whether that particular thing agree to his complex *Idea* express'd by the name *Man*: but whether it has in it the real Essence of a Species of things, which he supposes his name *Man* to stand for. In which way of using the Names of Substances, there are these false Suppositions contain'd.

First, That there are certain precise Essences, according to which Nature makes all particular things, and by which they are distinguish'd into *Species*. That every thing has a real Constitution, whereby it is what it is, and on which its sensible Qualities depend, is past doubt: But I think it has been prov'd that this makes not the distinction of *Species*, as we rank them; nor the Boundaries of their Names.

Secondly, This tacitly also insinuates, as if we had *Ideas* of these propos'd Essences. For to what purpose else is it to enquire whether this or that thing have the real Essence of the Species *Man*, if we did not suppose that there were such a specifick Essence known? which yet is utterly false: And therefore such Application of Names, as would make them stand for *Ideas* which we have not, must needs cause great Disorder in Discourses and Reasonings about them, and be a great Inconvenience in our Communication by words.

6. A Sup-
position that
Words have a
certain and
evident Signi-
fication.

§. 22. *Sixthly*, There remains yet another more general, tho' perhaps less observ'd *Abuse of Words*; and that is, that Men having by a long and familiar use annex'd to them certain *Ideas*, they are apt to imagine so near and necessary a Connection between the Names and the Signification they use them in, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is; and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the Words deliver'd, as if it were past doubt, that in the use of those common receiv'd Sounds, the Speaker and Hearer had necessarily the same precise *Ideas*: Whence presuming, that when they have in Discourse us'd any Term, they have thereby as it were set before others, the very thing they talk of. And so likewise taking the words of others, as naturally standing for just what they themselves have been accusom'd to apply them to, they never trouble themselves to explain their own, or understand clearly others meaning. From whence commonly proceeds Noise and Wrangling without Improvement or Information; whilst Men take Words to be the constant regular Marks of agreed Notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady Signs of their own *Ideas*. And yet Men think it strange, if in Discourse, or (where it is often absolutely necessary) in Dispute, one sometimes asks the meaning of their Terms: tho' the Arguings one may every day observe in Conversation, make it evident, that there are few Names of complex *Ideas* which any two Men use for the same just precise Collection. 'Tis hard to name a Word which will not be a clear Instance of this. *Life* is a Term none more familiar. Any one almost would take it for an Affront to be ask'd what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in question, whether a Plant, that lies ready form'd in the Seed, have *Life*; whether the Embrio in an Egg before Incubation, or a Man in a Swoon without Sense or Motion, be alive or no; it is easy to perceive that a clear distinct settled *Idea* does not always accompany the use of so known a word as that of *Life* is. Some gross and confus'd Conceptions Men indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common Words of their Language; and such a loose use of their Words serves them well enough in their ordinary Discourses or Affairs. But this is not sufficient for Philosophical Enquiries. Knowledge and Reasoning require precise determinate *Ideas*. And tho' Men will not be so importunately dull, as not to understand what others say, without demanding an Explication of their Terms; nor so troublesomely critical, as to correct others in the use of the Words they receive from them: yet where Truth and Knowledge are concern'd in the case, I know not what fault it can be to desire the Explication of Words, whose
Sense

Sense seems dubious ; or why a Man should be ashamed to own his Ignorance, in what sense another Man uses his Words, since he has no other way of certainly knowing it, but by being inform'd. This Abuse of taking Words upon trust, has no where spread so far, nor with so ill effects, as amongst Men of Letters. The multiplication and obstinacy of Disputes, which has so laid waste the intellectual World, is owing to nothing more, than to this ill Use of Words. For tho' it be generally believ'd that there is great diversity of Opinions in the Volumes and Variety of Controversies the World is distracted with ; yet the most I can find that the contending learned Men of different Parties do, in their Arguings one with another, is, that they speak different Languages. For I am apt to imagine, that when any of them quitting Terms, think upon Things, and know what they think, they think all the same ; tho' perhaps what they would have, be different.

§. 23. To conclude this Consideration of the Imperfection and Abuse of Language ; the *Ends of Language in our Discourse with others*, being chiefly these three : *First*, To make known one Man's Thoughts or *Ideas* to another : *Secondly*, To do it with as much ease and *quickness* as is possible : and, *Thirdly*, Thereby to convey the *Knowledge* of things : Language is either abus'd or deficient, when it fails of any of these three.

The Ends of Language :
1. To convey our Ideas.

First, Words fail in the first of these Ends, and lay not open one Man's *Ideas* to another's view : 1. When Men have Names in their mouths without any determin'd *Ideas* in their Minds, whereof they are the signs : or, 2. When they apply the common receiv'd Names of any Language to *Ideas*, to which the common Use of that Language does not apply them : or, 3. When they apply them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by and by for another *Idea*.

§. 24. *Secondly*, Men fail of conveying their Thoughts with all the quickness and ease that may be, when they have complex *Ideas* without having distinct Names for them. This is sometimes the fault of the Language it self, which has not in it a Sound yet apply'd to such a Signification ; and sometimes the fault of the Man, who has not yet learn'd the Name for that *Idea* he would shew another.

2. To do it with quickness.

§. 25. *Thirdly*, There is no Knowledge of things convey'd by Mens Words, when their *Ideas* agree not to the Reality of things. Tho' it be a Defect, that has its Original in our *Ideas*, which are not so conformable to the Nature of things, as Attention, Study, and Application might make them ; yet it fails not to extend it self to our Words too, when we use them as Signs of real Beings, which yet never had any Reality or Existence.

3. Therewith to convey the Knowledge of things.

§. 26. *First*, He that hath Words of any Language, without distinct *Ideas* in his Mind to which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them in Discourse, only make a noise without any Sense or Signification ; and how learned soever he may seem by the use of hard Words or learned Terms, is not much more advanc'd thereby in Knowledge, than he would be in Learning, who had nothing in his Study but the bare Titles of Books, without possessing the Contents of them. For all such Words, however put into Discourse, according to the right Construction of Grammatical Rules, or the Harmony of well-turn'd Periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare Sounds, and nothing else.

How Mens Words fail in all these.

§. 27. *Secondly*, He that has complex *Ideas*, without particular Names for them, would be in no better a Case than a Bookseller, who had in his Warehouse Volumes that lay there unbound, and without Titles ; which he could therefore make known to others, only by shewing the loose Sheets, and communicate them only by Tale. This Man is hinder'd in his Discourse, for want of Words to communicate his complex *Ideas*, which he is therefore forc'd to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them ; and so is fain often to use twenty Words, to express what another Man signifies in one.

§. 28. *Thirdly*, He that puts not constantly the same Sign for the same *Idea*, but uses the same Words sometimes in one, and sometimes in another Signification, ought to pass in the Schools and Conversation for as fair a Man, as he does in the Market and Exchange, who sells several things under the same Name.

§. 29. *Fourthly*, He that applies the Words of any Language to *Ideas* different from those to which the common Use of that Country applies them, however

his own Understanding may be fill'd with Truth and Light, will not by such Words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his Terms. For however the Sounds are such as are familiarly known, and easily enter the ears of those who are accustom'd to them; yet standing for other *Ideas* than those they usually are annex'd to, and are wont to excite in the Mind of the Hearers, they cannot make known the Thoughts of him who thus uses them.

§. 30. *Fifthly*, he that hath imagin'd to himself Substances such as never have been, and fill'd his Head with *Ideas* which have not any correspondence with the real Nature of things, to which yet he gives settled and defin'd Names, may fill his Discourse, and perhaps another Man's Head, with the fantastical Imaginations of his own Brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true Knowledge.

§. 31. He that hath Names without *Ideas*, wants Meaning in his Words, and speaks only empty Sounds. He that hath complex *Ideas*, without Names for them, wants Liberty and Dispatch in his Expressions, and is necessitated to use Periphrases. He that uses his Words loosely and unsteddily, will either be not minded, or not understood. He that applies his Names to *Ideas* different from their common Use, wants Propriety in his Language, and speaks Gibberish. And he that hath *Ideas* of Substances disagreeing with the real Existence of things, so far wants the Materials of true Knowledge in his Understanding, and hath instead thereof *Chimera's*.

How in Substances.

§. 32. In our Notions concerning Substances, we are liable to all the former Inconveniences: *v. g.* He that uses the word *Tarantula*, without having any Imagination or *Idea* of what it stands for, pronounces a good Word; but so long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that in a new-discover'd Country shall see several sorts of Animals and Vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true *Ideas* of them, as of a Horse or a Stag; but can speak of them only by a description, till he shall either take the Names the Natives call them by, or give them Names himself. 3. He that uses the word *Body* sometimes for pure Extension, and sometimes for Extension and Solidity together, will talk very fallaciously. 4. He that gives the name *Horse* to that *Idea* which common Usage calls *Mule*, talks improperly, and will not be understood. 5. He that thinks the name *Centaur* stands for some real Being, imposes on himself, and mistakes Words for Things.

How in Modes and Relations.

§. 33. In Modes and Relations generally we are liable only to the four first of these Inconveniences; *viz.* 1. I may have in my Memory the Names of Modes, as *Gratitude*, or *Charity*, and yet not have any precise *Ideas* annex'd in my Thoughts to those Names. 2. I may have *Ideas*, and not know the Names that belong to them; *v. g.* I may have the *Idea* of a Man's drinking, till his Colour and Humour be alter'd, till his Tongue trips, and his Eyes look red, and his Feet fail him; and yet not know, that it is to be call'd *Drunkenness*. 3. I may have the *Ideas* of Vertues or Vices, and Names also, but apply them amiss: *v. g.* when I apply the name *Frugality* to that *Idea* which others call and signify by this Sound, *Corvetousness*. 4. I may use any of those Names with inconsistency. 5. But in Modes and Relations, I cannot have *Ideas* disagreeing to the Existence of things: for Modes being complex *Ideas*, made by the Mind at pleasure; and Relation being but my way of considering or comparing two things together, and so also an *Idea* of my own making; these *Ideas* can scarce be found to disagree with any thing existing, since they are not in the Mind as the Copies of things regularly made by Nature, nor as Properties inseparably flowing from the internal Constitution or Essence of any Substance; but as it were Patterns lodg'd in my Memory, with Names annex'd to them, to denominate Actions and Relations by, as they come to exist. But the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong Name to my Conceptions; and so using Words in a different sense from other People, I am not understood, but am thought to have wrong *Ideas* of them, when I give wrong Names to them. Only if I put in my *Ideas* of mix'd Modes or Relations, any inconsistent *Ideas* together, I fill my head also with *Chimera's*; since such *Ideas*, if well examin'd, cannot so much as exist in the Mind, much less any real Being be ever denominated from them.

7. Figurative Speech also an Abuse of Language.

§. 34. Since Wit and Fancy finds easier entertainment in the World, than dry Truth and real Knowledge, *figurative Speeches* and Allusion in Language will hardly

ly be admitted, as an Imperfection or *Abuse* of it. I confess, in Discourses where we seek rather Pleasure and Delight than Information and Improvement, such Ornaments as are borrow'd from them can scarce pass for Faults. But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and Clearness, all the artificial and figurative Application of words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong *Ideas*, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheat: And therefore however laudable or allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular Addresses, they are certainly in all Discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where Truth and Knowledge are concern'd, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the Language or Person that makes use of them. What and how various they are, will be superfluous here to take notice; the Books of Rhetorick which abound in the World, will instruct those who want to be inform'd: only I cannot but observe, how little the Preservation and Improvement of Truth and Knowledge, is the Care and Concern of Mankind; since the Arts of Fallacy are endow'd and prefer'd. 'Tis evident how much Men love to deceive and be deceiv'd, since Rhetorick, that powerful Instrument of Error and Deceit, has its establish'd Professors, is publickly taught, and has always been had in great Reputation: And, I doubt not, but it will be thought great Boldness, if not Brutality in me, to have said thus much against it. *Eloquence*, like the Fair Sex, has too prevailing Beauties in it, to suffer it self ever to be spoken against. And 'tis in vain to find fault with those Arts of Deceiving, wherein Men find pleasure to be deceiv'd.

C H A P. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.

§. 1. **T**HE natural and improv'd Imperfections of Languages, we have seen above at large; and Speech being the great Bond that holds Society together, and the common Conduit whereby the Improvements of Knowledge are convey'd from one Man, and one Generation to another, it would well deserve our most serious Thoughts, to consider what Remedies are to be found for these *Inconveniences* above-mention'd. *They are worth seeking.*

§. 2. I am not so vain to think, that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect Reforming the Languages of the World, no not so much as of his own Country, without rendering himself ridiculous. To require that Men should use their Words constantly in the same sense, and for none but determin'd and uniform *Ideas*, would be to think that all Men should have the same Notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and distinct *Ideas* of: which is not to be expected by any one, who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with Men to be very knowing or very silent. And he must be very little skill'd in the World, who thinks that a voluble Tongue shall accompany only a good Understanding; or that Mens talking much or little, shall hold proportion only to their Knowledge. *Are not easy.*

§. 3. But tho' the Market and Exchange must be left to their own ways of Talking, and Gossippings not to be robb'd of their antient Privilege; tho' the Schools and Men of Argument would perhaps take it amiss to have any thing offer'd to abate the length, or lessen the number of their Disputes: yet methinks those who pretend seriously to search after or maintain Truth, should think themselves oblig'd to study how they might deliver themselves without Obscurity, Doubtfulness, or Equivocation, to which Mens Words are naturally liable, if care be not taken. *But yet necessary to Philosophy.*

§. 4. For he that shall well consider the Errors and Obscurity, the Mistakes and Confusion, that are spread in the World by an ill use of Words, will find some reason to doubt whether Language, as it has been employ'd, has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of Knowledge amongst Mankind. How many are there, that when they would think on things, fix their Thoughts only *Misuse of Words the cause of great Errors.*

on Words, especially when they would apply their Minds to moral matters? And who then can wonder, if the Result of such Contemplations, and Reasonings about little more than Sounds, whilst the *Ideas* they annex'd to them are very confus'd or very unsteady, or perhaps none at all; who can wonder, I say, that such Thoughts and Reasonings end in nothing but Obscurity and Mistake, without any clear Judgment or Knowledge?

Obstinacy.

§. 5. This Inconvenience, in an ill use of Words, Men suffer in their own private Meditations: but much more manifest are the Disorders which follow from it, in Conversation, Discourse, and Arguings with others. For Language being the great Conduit, whereby Men convey their Discoveries, Reasonings, and Knowledg, from one to another, he that makes an ill use of it, tho' he does not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledge, which are in things themselves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or stop the Pipes, whereby it is distributed to the publick use and advantage of Mankind. He that uses Words without any clear and steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into Errors? And he that designedly does it, ought to be look'd on as an Enemy to Truth and Knowledg. And yet who can wonder, that all the Sciences and Parts of Knowledg have been so over-charg'd with obscure and equivocal Terms, and insignificant and doubtful Expressions, capable to make the most Attentive or Quick-sighted, very little or not at all the more knowing or orthodox; since Subtlety, in those who make profession to teach or defend Truth, hath pass'd so much for a Vertue: A Vertue, indeed, which consistng for the most part in nothing but the fallacious and illusory use of *obscure* or *deceitful Terms*, is only fit to make Men more conceited in their Ignorance, and *obstinate* in their Errors.

And Wrangling.

§. 6. Let us look into the Books of Controversy of any kind; there we shall see, that the Effect of obscure, unsteady or equivocal Terms, is nothing but Noise and Wrangling about Sounds, without convincing or bettering a Man's Understanding. For if the *Idea* be not agreed on betwixt the Speaker and Hearer, for which the words stand, the Argument is not about Things, but Names. As often as such a word, whose signification is not ascertain'd betwixt them, comes in use, their Understandings have no other Object wherein they agree, but barely the Sound; the Things that they think on at that time, as express'd by that word, being quite different.

Instance, Bat and Bird.

§. 7. Whether a *Bat* be a *Bird* or no, is not a Question; whether a *Bat* be another thing than indeed it is, or have other Qualities than indeed it has, for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of: But the Question is, 1. Either between those that acknowledg'd themselves to have but imperfect *Ideas* of one or both of those sorts of things, for which these Names are suppos'd to stand; and then it is a real Inquiry concerning the nature of a *Bird* or a *Bat*, to make their yet imperfect *Ideas* of it more compleat, by examining, whether all the simple *Ideas*, to which, combin'd together, they both give the name *Bird*, be all to be found in a *Bat*: But this is a Question only of Enquirers (not Disputers) who neither affirm, nor deny, but examine. Or, 2. It is a Question between Disputants, whereof the one affirms, and the other denies, that a *Bat* is a *Bird*. And then the Question is barely about the signification of one or both these words; in that they not having both the same complex *Ideas*, to which they give these two Names, one holds, and t'other denies, that these two Names may be affirm'd one of another. Were they agreed in the signification of these two Names, it were impossible they should dispute about them: For they would presently and clearly see (were that adjust'd between them) whether all the simple *Ideas*, of the more general name *Bird*, were found in the complex *Idea* of a *Bat*, or no; and so there could be no doubt, whether a *Bat* were a *Bird* or no. And here I desire it may be consider'd and carefully examin'd, whether the greatest part of the Disputes in the World are not merely verbal, and about the signification of Words; and whether, if the Terms they are made in were defin'd, and reduc'd in their signification (as they must be where they signify any thing) to determin'd Collections of the simple *Ideas* they do or should stand for, those Disputes would not end of themselves, and immediately vanish. I leave it then to be consider'd, what the Learning of Disputation is, and how well they are employ'd for the Advantage of themselves or others, whose Business is only the vain Ostentation of Sounds; *i. e.* those who spend their

their Lives in Disputes and Controversies. When I shall see any of those Combatants strip all his Terms of Ambiguity and Obscurity (which every one may do in the words he uses himself) I shall think him a Champion for Knowledge, Truth and Peace, and not the Slave of Vain-Glory, Ambition, or a Party.

§. 8. To remedy the Defects of Speech before-mention'd to some degree, and to prevent the Inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the Observation of these following Rules may be of use, till some body better able shall judge it worth his while, to think more maturely on this Matter, and oblige the World with his Thoughts on it.

First, A Man should take care to use no Word without a Signification, no Name without an Idea for which he makes it stand. This Rule will not seem altogether needless, to any one who shall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such Words, as *Instinct*, *Sympathy*, and *Antipathy*, &c. in the Discourse of others, so made use of, as he might easily conclude, that those that us'd them had no Ideas in their Minds to which they apply'd them; but spoke them only as Sounds, which usually serv'd instead of Reasons on the like occasions. Not but that these Words, and the like, have very proper Significations in which they may be us'd; but there being no natural Connection between any Words and any Ideas, these, and any other, may be learn'd by rote, and pronounc'd or writ by Men, who have no Ideas in their Minds, to which they have annex'd them, and for which they make them stand; which is necessary they should, if Men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone.

§. 9. Secondly, 'Tis not enough a Man uses his Words as Signs of some Ideas: those Ideas he annexes them to, if they be simple, must be clear and distinct; if complex, must be determinate, i. e. the precise Collection of simple Ideas settled in the Mind, with that Sound annex'd to it, as the sign of that precise determin'd Collection, and no other. This is very necessary in Names of Modes, and especially moral words; which having no settled Objects in Nature, from whence their Ideas are taken, as from their Original, are apt to be very confus'd. *Justice* is a word in every Man's Mouth, but most commonly with a very undetermin'd loose signification: Which will always be so, unless a Man has in his Mind a distinct comprehension of the component Parts that complex Idea consists of; and if it be decomposed, must be able to resolve it still on, till he at last comes to the simple Ideas that make it up: And unless this be done, a Man makes an ill use of the Word, let it be *Justice*, for Example, or any other: I do not say, a Man needs stand to recollect and make this Analysis at large, every time the word *Justice* comes in his way: But this at least is necessary, that he have so examin'd the signification of that Name, and settled the Idea of all its Parts in his Mind, that he can do it when he pleases. If one, who makes his complex Idea of *Justice*, to be such a Treatment of the Person or Goods of another, as is according to Law, hath not a clear and distinct Idea what Law is, which makes a part of his complex Idea of Justice, 'tis plain his Idea of Justice it self will be confus'd and imperfect. This Exactness will perhaps, be judg'd very troublesome; and therefore most Men will think they may be excus'd from settling the complex Ideas of mix'd Modes so precisely in their Minds. But yet I must say, till this be done, it must not be wonder'd that they have a great deal of Obscurity and Confusion in their own Minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their Discourses with others.

§. 10. In the Names of Substances, for a right use of them, something more is requir'd than barely determin'd Ideas. In these the Names must also be conformable to Things, as they exist; but of this I shall have occasion to speak more at large by and by. This Exactness is absolutely necessary in Inquiries after Philosophical Knowledge, and in Controversies about Truth. And tho' it would be well too, if it extended it self to common Conversation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life; yet I think that is scarce to be expected. Vulgar Notions suit vulgar Discourses; and both, tho' confus'd enough, yet serve pretty well the Market and the Wake. Merchants and Lovers, Cooks and Taylors, have words wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary Affairs; and so, I think, might Philosophers and Disputants too, if they had a mind to understand, and to be clearly understood.

1. Remedy, is use no Word without an Idea.

2. To have distinct Ideas annex'd to them in Modes.

And conformable in Substances.

3. Propriety.

§. 11. *Thirdly*, 'Tis not enough that Men have *Ideas*, determin'd *Ideas*, for which they make these Signs stand; but they *must* also take care to *apply* their *Words*, as near as may be, to *such* *Ideas* as *common Use* has annex'd them to. For *Words*, especially of *Languages* already fram'd, being no *Man's* private possession, but the common measure of *Commerce* and *Communication*, 'tis not for any one, at pleasure, to change the *Stamp* they are current in, nor alter the *Ideas* they are affix'd to; or at least, when there is a necessity to do so, he is bound to give notice of it. *Mens Intentions* in speaking are, or at least should be, to be understood; which cannot be without frequent *Explanations*, *Demands*, and other the like incommodious *Interruptions*, where *Men* do not follow common use. *Propriety* of *Speech* is that which gives our *Thoughts* entrance into other *Mens Minds* with the greatest *Ease* and *Advantage*; and therefore deserves some part of our *Care* and *Study*, especially in the *Names* of moral *Words*. The proper signification and the use of *Terms* is best to be learned from those, who in their *Writings* and *Discourses* appear to have had the clearest *Notions*, and apply'd to them their *Terms* with the exactest *Choice* and *Fitness*. This way of using a *Man's* *Words* according to the *Propriety* of the *Language*, tho' it have not always the good *Fortune* to be understood; yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him, who is so unskilful in the *Language* he speaks, as not to understand it, when made use of as it ought to be.

4. To make known their meaning.

§. 12. *Fourthly*, But because common *Use* has not so visibly annex'd any signification to *Words*, as to make *Men* know always certainly what they precisely stand for: And because *Men*, in the improvement of their *Knowledge*, come to have *Ideas* different from the vulgar and ordinary receiv'd ones, for which they must either make new *Words* (which *Men* seldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of *Affectation* or *Novelty*) or else must use old ones in a new *Signification*: Therefore after the *Observation* of the foregoing *Rules*, it is sometimes necessary, for the ascertaining the signification of *Words*, to declare their *Meaning*, where either common *Use* has left it uncertain and loose (as it has in most *Names* of very complex *Ideas*) or where the *Term*, being very material in the *Discourse*, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to any *Doubtfulness* or *Mistake*.

And that three ways.

§. 13. As the *Ideas*, *Mens* *Words* stand for, are of different sorts; so the way of making known the *Ideas*, they stand for, when there is occasion, is also different. For tho' defining be thought the proper way to make known the proper signification of *Words*; yet there are some *Words* that will not be defin'd, as there are others, whose precise *Meaning* cannot be made known but by *Definition*; and perhaps a third, which partake somewhat of both the other, as we shall see in the names of simple *Ideas*, *Modes* and *Substances*.

1. In simple Ideas, by synonymous Terms or shewing.

§. 14. *First*, When a *Man* makes use of the *Name* of any simple *Idea*, which he perceives is not understood, or is in danger to be mistaken, he is oblig'd by the *Laws* of *Ingenuity*, and the end of *Speech*, to declare his meaning, and make known what *Idea* he makes it stand for. This, as has been shewn, cannot be done by *Definition*; and therefore, when a synonymous *Word* fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left. *First*, Sometimes the naming the *Subject*, wherein that simple *Idea* is to be found, will make its *Name* be understood by those who are acquainted with that *Subject*, and know it by that *Name*. So, to make a *Countryman* understand what *Fueillemorte* Colour signifies, it may suffice to tell him, 'tis the Colour of wither'd *Leaves* falling in *Autumn*. *Secondly*, But the only sure way of making known the signification of the *Name* of any simple *Idea*, is by presenting to his *Senses* that *Subject* which may produce it in his *Mind*, and make him actually have the *Idea* that word stands for.

2. In mix'd Modes, by definition.

§. 15. *Secondly*, *Mix'd Modes*, especially those belonging to *Morality*, being most of them such *Combinations* of *Ideas*, as the mind puts together of its own choice, and whereof there are not always standing *Patterns* to be found existing; the signification of their *Names* cannot be made known, as those of simple *Ideas*, by any shewing; but in recompence thereof, may be perfectly and exactly defin'd. For they being *Combinations* of several *Ideas*, that the *Mind* of *Man* has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any *Archetypes*, *Men* may, if they please, exactly know the *Ideas* that go to each *Composition*, and so both use these words in a certain and undoubted *Signification*, and perfectly declare,

clare, when there is occasion, what they stand for. This, if well consider'd, would lay great blame on those, who make not their Discourses about moral things very clear and distinct. For since the precise signification of the Names of mix'd Modes, or, which is all one, the real Essence of each Species is to be known, they being not of Nature's but Man's making, it is a great Negligence and Perverseness to Discourse of moral Things with Uncertainty and Obscurity; which is more pardonable in treating of natural Substances, where doubtful Terms are hardly to be avoided, for a quite contrary Reason, as we shall see by and by.

§. 16. Upon this ground it is, that I am bold to think, that *Morality is capable of Demonstration*, as well as Mathematicks: since the precise real Essence of the Things moral Words stand for, may be perfectly known; and so the Congruity or Incongruity of the Things themselves be certainly discover'd, in which consists perfect Knowledge. Nor let any one object, that the Names of Substances are often to be made use of in Morality, as well as those of Modes, from which will arise Obscurity. For as to Substances, when concern'd in moral Discourses, their divers Natures are not so much enquir'd into, as suppos'd; v.g. when we say, that *Man is Subject to Law*, we mean nothing by *Man*, but a corporeal rational Creature: What the real Essence or other Qualities of that Creature are, in this Case, is no way consider'd. And therefore, whether a Child or Changeling be a *Man* in a physical Sense, may among the Naturalists be as disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the *moral Man*, as I may call him, which is this immoveable unchangeable *Idea, a corporeal rational Being*. For were there a Monkey, or any other Creature to be found, that had the use of Reason to such a degree as to be able to understand general Signs, and to deduce Consequences about general *Ideas*, he would no doubt be subject to Law, and in that Sense be a *Man*, how much soever he differ'd in Shape from others of that Name. The Names of Substances, if they be us'd in them as they should, can no more disturb Moral than they do Mathematical Discourses: where, if the Mathematician speaks of a *Cube* or *Globe of Gold*, or any other Body, he has his clear settled *Idea* which varies not, tho' it may by mistake be apply'd to a particular Body to which it belongs not.

Morality capable of Demonstration.

§. 17. This I have here mention'd by the bye, to shew of what Consequence it is for Men, in their Names of mix'd Modes, and consequently in all their moral Discourses, to define their Words when there is occasion: since thereby moral Knowledge may be brought to so great Clearness and Certainty. And it must be great want of Ingenuity (to say no worse of it) to refuse to do it: since a *Definition is the only way whereby the precise Meaning of moral Words can be known*; and yet a way whereby their Meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving room for any contest about it. And therefore the Negligence or Perverseness of Mankind cannot be excus'd, if their Discourses in Morality be not much more clear than those in Natural Philosophy: since they are about *Ideas* in the Mind, which are none of them false or disproportionate, they having no external Beings for the *Archetypes* which they are refer'd to, and must correspond with. It is far easier for Men to frame in their Minds an *Idea* which shall be the Standard to which they will give the Name *Justice*, with which Pattern so made all Actions that agree shall pass under that Denomination, than, having seen *Aristides*, to frame an *Idea* that shall in all Things be exactly like him, who is as he is, let men make what *Idea* they please of him. For the one, they need but know the Combination of *Ideas* that are put together in their own Minds; for the other, they must enquire into the whole Nature, and abstruse hidden Constitution, and various Qualities of a thing existing without them.

Definition can make moral Discourses clear.

§. 18. Another Reason that makes the *defining of mix'd Modes* so necessary, especially of *moral Words*, is what I mention'd a little before, viz. That it is the *only way whereby the Signification of the most of them can be known with Certainty*. For the *Ideas* they stand for, being for the most part such whose component Parts no where exist together, but scatter'd and mingled with others, it is the Mind alone that collects them, and gives them the Union of one *Idea*: and it is only by Words, enumerating the several simple *Ideas* which the Mind has united, that we can make known to others what their Names stand for; the

And is the only way.

Assistance

Assistance of the Senses in this case not helping us, by the proposal of sensible Objects, to shew the *Ideas* which our Names of this kind stand for, as it does often in the Names of sensible simple *Ideas*, and also to some degree in those of Substances.

3. In Substances, by shewing and defining.

§. 19. Thirdly, For the explaining the Signification of the Names of Substances, as they stand for the *Ideas* we have of their distinct Species, both the fore-mention'd ways, viz. of shewing and defining, are requisite in many cases to be made use of. For there being ordinarily in each Sort some leading Qualities, to which we suppose the other *Ideas*, which make up our complex *Idea* of that Species, annex'd; we forwardly give the specifick Name to that thing, wherein that characteristical Mark is found, which we take to be the most distinguishing *Idea* of that Species. These leading or characteristical (as I may so call them) *Ideas*, in the sorts of Animals and Vegetables, is (as has been before remark'd, Ch. VI. §. 29. and Ch. IX. §. 15.) mostly Figure, and inanimate Bodies Colour, and in some both together. Now,

Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances are best got by shewing.

§. 20. These leading sensible Qualities are those which make the chief Ingredients of our specifick *Ideas*, and consequently the most observable and unvariable part in the Definitions of our specifick Names, as attributed to Sorts of Substances coming under our Knowledge. For tho' the Sound *Man*, in its own Nature, be as apt to signify a complex *Idea* made up of Animality and Rationality, united in the same Subject, as to signify any other Combination; yet us'd as a Mark to stand for a sort of Creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward Shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex *Idea*, signify'd by the word *Man*, as any other we find in it: and therefore why *Plato's Animal implume bipes latis unguibus* should not be as good a Definition of the name *Man*, standing for that sort of Creatures, will not be easy to shew: for 'tis the Shape, as the leading Quality, that seems more to determine that Species, than a Faculty of Reasoning, which appears not at first, and in some never. And if this be not allow'd to be so, I do not know how they can be excus'd from Murder, who kill monstrous Births, (as we call them) because of an extraordinary Shape, without knowing whether they have a rational Soul or no; which can be no more discern'd in a well-form'd, than ill-shap'd Infant, as soon as born. And who is it has inform'd us, that a rational Soul can inhabit no Tenement, unless it has just such a sort of Frontispiece, or can join it self to, and inform no sort of Body but one that is just of such an outward Structure?

Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances are best got by shewing.

§. 21. Now these leading Qualities are best made known by shewing, and can hardly be made known otherwise. For the Shape of an *Horse*, or *Cassuary*, will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the Mind by Words, the Sight of the Animals doth it a thousand times better: And the *Idea* of the particular Colour of *Gold* is not to be got by any Description of it, but only by the frequent Exercise of the Eyes about it, as is evident in those who are us'd to this Metal, who will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the Sight; where others (who have as good Eyes, but yet by use have not got the precise nice *Idea* of that peculiar Yellow) shall not perceive any difference. The like may be said of those other simple *Ideas*, peculiar in their kind to any Substance; for which precise *Ideas* there are no peculiar Names. The particular ringing Sound there is in *Gold*, distinct from the Sound of other Bodies, has no particular Name annex'd to it, no more than the particular Yellow that belongs to that Metal.

The Ideas of their Powers best by Definition.

§. 22. But because many of the simple *Ideas* that make up our specifick *Ideas* of Substances, are Powers which lie not obvious to our Senses in the things as they ordinarily appear; therefore in the Signification of our Names of Substances, some part of the Signification will be better made known by enumerating those simple *Ideas*, than in shewing the Substance it self. For he that, to the yellow-shining Colour of *Gold* got by Sight, shall, from my enumerating them, have the *Ideas* of great Ductility, Fusibility, Fixedness, and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, will have a perfecter *Idea* of *Gold* than he can have by seeing a piece of *Gold*, and thereby imprinting in his Mind only its obvious Qualities. But if the formal Constitution of this shining heavy, ductil thing (from whence all these its Properties flow) lay open to our Senses, as the formal Constitution, or Essence of a Triangle does, the Signification of the word *Gold* might as easily be ascertain'd as that of *Triangle*.

§. 23. Hence we may take notice how much the Foundation of all our Knowledge of corporeal things lies in our Senses. For how Spirits, separate from Bodies (whose Knowledge and Ideas of these things are certainly much more perfect than our's) know them, we have no Notion, no Idea at all. The whole Extent of our Knowledge or Imagination reaches not beyond our own Ideas limited to our ways of Perception. Tho' yet it be not to be doubted that Spirits of a higher rank than those immers'd in Flesh, may have as clear Ideas of the radical Constitution of Substances, as we have of a Triangle, and so perceive how all their Properties and Operations flow from thence: but the manner how they come by that Knowledge exceeds our Conceptions.

A Reflection on the Knowledge of Spirits.

§. 24. But tho' Definitions will serve to explain the Names of Substances as they stand for our Ideas; yet they leave them not without great Imperfection as they stand for things. For our Names of Substances being not put barely for our Ideas, but being made use of ultimately to represent things, and so are put in their place, their Signification must agree with the Truth of things as well as with Mens Ideas. And therefore in Substances we are not always to rest in the ordinary complex Idea, commonly receiv'd as the Signification of that Word, but must go a little farther, and enquire into the Nature and Properties of the things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our Ideas of their distinct Species; or else learn them from such as are us'd to that sort of things, and are experienc'd in them. For since 'tis intended their Names should stand for such Collections of simple Ideas as do really exist in things themselves, as well as for the complex Idea in other mens minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they stand for: therefore to define their Names right, natural History is to be enquir'd into; and their Properties are, with Care and Examination, to be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding Inconveniences in Discourses and Arguings about natural Bodies and substantial Things, to have learn'd, from the Propriety of the Language, the common but confus'd or very imperfect Idea to which each Word is apply'd, and to keep them to that Idea in our use of them: but we must, by acquainting our selves with the History of that sort of things, rectify and settle our complex Idea belonging to each specifick Name; and in discourse with others (if we find them mistake us) we ought to tell what the complex Idea is, that we make such a Name stand for. This is the more necessary to be done by all those who search after Knowledge and philosophical Verity, in that Children being taught Words whilst they have but imperfect Notions of things, apply them at random, and without much thinking, and seldom frame determin'd Ideas to be signify'd by them. Which Custom (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinary Affairs of Life and Conversation) they are apt to continue when they are Men: and so begin at the wrong end, learning Words first and perfectly, but make the Notions to which they apply those Words afterwards very overtly. By this means it comes to pass, that Men speaking the proper Language of their Country, *i. e.* according to Grammar-Rules of that Language, do yet speak very improperly of things themselves; and by their arguing one with another, make but small Progress in the Discoveries of useful Truths, and the Knowledge of things, as they are to be found in themselves, and not in our Imaginations; and it matters not much, for the improvement of our Knowledge, how they are call'd.

Ideas also of Substances must be conformable to things.

§. 25. It were therefore to be wish'd, That Men, vers'd in physical Enquiries, and acquainted with the several sorts of natural Bodies, would set down those simple Ideas, wherein they observe the Individuals of each sort constantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that Confusion which comes from several Persons applying the same Name to a Collection of a smaller or greater number of sensible Qualities, proportionably as they have been more or less acquainted with, or accurate in examining the Qualities of any sort of things which come under one Denomination. But a Dictionary of this sort containing, as it were, a natural History, requires too many Hands, as well as too much Time, Cost, Pains, and Sagacity, ever to be hop'd for; and till that be done, we must content our selves with such Definitions of the Names of Substances, as explain the sense Men use them in. And it would be well, where there is occasion, if they would afford us so much. This yet is not

Not easy to be made so.

usually done; but Men talk to one another, and dispute in Words, whose meaning is not agreed between them, out of a mistake, that the Signification of common Words are certainly establish'd, and the precise *Ideas* they stand for perfectly known; and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them. Both which Suppositions are false: no Names of complex *Ideas* having so settled determin'd Significations, that they are constantly us'd for the same precise *Ideas*. Nor is it a shame for a Man not to have a certain Knowledge of any thing, but by the necessary ways of attaining it; and so it is no discredit nor to know what precise *Idea* any Sound stands for in another man's Mind, without he declare it to me by some other way than barely using that Sound, there being no other way, without such a Declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed the necessity of Communication by Language brings Men to an Agreement in the Signification of common Words, within some tolerable Latitude, that may serve for ordinary Conversation: and so a Man cannot be suppos'd wholly ignorant of the *Ideas* which are annex'd to words by common Use, in a Language familiar to him. But common Use, being but a very uncertain Rule, which reduces it self at last to the *Ideas* of particular Men, proves often but a very variable Standard. But tho' such a Dictionary, as I have above-mention'd, will require too much Time, Cost and Pains to be hop'd for in this Age; yet methinks it is not unreasonable to propose, that Words standing for things, which are known and distinguish'd by their outward Shapes, should be express'd by little Draughts and Prints made of them. A Vocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more ease, and in less time, teach the true Signification of many Terms, especially in Languages of remote Countries or Ages, and settle truer *Ideas* in mens Minds of several things, whereof we read the Names in antient Authors, than all the large and laborious Comments of learned Criticks. Naturalists, that treat of Plants and Animals, have found the Benefit of this way: And he that has had occasion to consult them, will have reason to confess, that he has a clearer *Idea* of *Apisum*, or *Ibex*, from a little Print of that Herb or Beast, than he could have from a long Definition of the Names of either of them. And so no doubt he would have of *Sirigil* and *Sistrum*, if instead of a *Curry-Comb* and *Cymbal*, which are the *English* Names Dictionaries render them by, he could see stamp'd in the Margin, small Pictures of these Instruments, as they were in use amongst the Ancients. *Toga*, *Tunica*, *Pallium*, are Words easily translated by *Gown*, *Coat*, and *Cloak*; but we have thereby no more true *Ideas* of the Fashion of those Habits amongst the *Romans*, than we have of the Faces of the Taylors who made them. Such things as these, which the Eye distinguishes by their Shapes, would be best let into the Mind by Draughts made of them, and more determine the Signification of such Words than any other Words set for them, or made use of to define them. But this only by the bye.

§. By Constancy in their Signification.

§. 26. *Fifthly*, If Men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their Words, and Definitions of their Terms are not to be had; yet this is the least that can be expected, that in all Discourses, wherein one Man pretends to instruct or convince another, he should use the same Word constantly in the same sense: If this were done (which no body can refuse without great dissimulation) many of the Books extant might be spar'd; many of the Controversies in Dispute would be at an End; several of those great Volumes, swollen with ambiguous Words, now us'd in one sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow compass; and many of the Philosophers (to mention no other) as well as Poets Works, might be contain'd in a Nutshell.

When the Variation is to be explain'd.

§. 27. But after all, the Provision of Words is so scanty in respect of that infinite Variety of Thoughts, that Men, wanting Terms to suit their precise Notions, will, notwithstanding their utmost Caution, be forc'd often to use the same Word in somewhat different Senses. And tho' in the continuation of a Discourse, or the pursuit of an Argument, there be hardly room to digress into a particular Definition, as often as a Man varies the Signification of any Term; yet the import of the Discourse will, for the most part, if there be no design'd Fallacy, sufficiently lead candid and intelligent Readers into the true meaning of it: but where that is not sufficient to guide the Reader, there it concerns the Writer to explain his meaning, and shew in what sense he there uses that Term.

B O O K

B O O K IV.

C H A P. I.

Of Knowledge in general.

§. 1.  I N C E the *Mind*, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own *Ideas*, which it alone does or can contemplate; it is evident, that our Knowledge is only conversant about them. *Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas.*

§. 2. Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the Perception of the Connection and Agreement, or Disagreement and Repugnancy of any of our *Ideas*. In this alone it consists. Where this Perception is, there is Knowledge; and where it is not, there, tho' we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of Knowledge. For when we know that *White is not Black*, what do we else but perceive that these two *Ideas* do not agree? When we possess our selves with the utmost Security of the Demonstration, that *the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones*, what do we more but perceive, that Equality to two right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three Angles of a Triangle? *Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas.*

§. 3. But to understand a little more distinctly, wherein this Agreement or Disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts: *This Agreement four fold.*

1. Identity, or Diversity.
2. Relation.
3. Co-existence, or necessary Connection.
4. Real Existence.

§ 4. First, As to the first sort of Agreement or Disagreement, viz. Identity or Diversity. 'Tis the first Act of the Mind, when it has any Sentiments or *Ideas* at all, to perceive its *Ideas*; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be no Knowledge, no Reasoning, no Imagination, no distinct Thoughts at all. By this the Mind clearly and infallibly perceives each *Idea* to agree with it self, and to be what it is; and all distinct *Ideas* to disagree, i. e. the one not to be the other: and this it does without Pains, Labour or Deduction; but at first view, by its natural Power of Perception and Distinction. And tho' Men of Art have reduc'd this into those general Rules, *What is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*; for ready Application in all Cases, wherein there may be occasion to reflect on it; yet it is certain, that the first Exercise of this Faculty is about particular *Ideas*. A Man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his Mind, that the *Ideas* he calls *White* and *Round*, are the very *Ideas* they are, and that they are not other *Ideas* which he calls *Red* or *Square*. Nor can any Maxim or Proposition in the world make him know it clearer or surer than he did before, and without any such general Rule. This then is the first Agreement or Disagreement, which the Mind perceives in its *Ideas*; which it always perceives at first sight: And if there ever happen any doubt about it, 'twill always be found to be about the Names, and not the *Ideas* themselves, whose Identity and Diversity will always be perceiv'd, as soon and as clearly as the *Ideas* themselves are, nor can it possibly be otherwise. *1. Of Identity or Diversity.*

2. Relative.

§. 5. *Secondly*, The next sort of Agreement, or Disagreement, the Mind perceives in any of its *Ideas*, may, I think, be call'd *Relative*, and is nothing but the Perception of the Relation between any two *Ideas*, of what kind soever, whether Substances, Modes, or any other. For since all distinct *Ideas* must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universally and constantly deny'd one of another, there could be no room for any positive Knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any Relation between our *Ideas*, and find out the Agreement or Disagreement they have one with another, in several ways the Mind takes of comparing them.

3. Of Co-existence.

§. 6. *Thirdly*, The third sort of Agreement, or Disagreement, to be found in our *Ideas*, which the Perception of the Mind is employ'd about, is *Co-existence*, or *Non-Co-existence* in the same Subject; and this belongs particularly to Substances. Thus, when we pronounce concerning *Gold* that it is fix'd, our Knowledge of this Truth amounts to no more but this, that Fixedness, or a Power to remain in the Fire unconsum'd, is an *Idea* that always accompanies and is join'd with that particular sort of Yellowness, Weight, Fusibility, Malleableness, and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, which make our complex *Idea*, signify'd by the word *Gold*.

4. Of real Existence.

§. 7. *Fourthly*, The fourth and last sort is, that of *actual real Existence* agreeing to any *Idea*. Within these four sorts of Agreement or Disagreement, is, I suppose, contain'd all the Knowledge we have, or are capable of: For all the Enquiries that we can make concerning any of our *Ideas*, all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them, is, That it is, or is not, the same with some other; that it does, or does not, always co-exist with some other *Idea* in the same Subject; that it has this or that Relation to some other *Idea*; or that it has a real Existence without the Mind. Thus *Blue is not Yellow*, is of Identity: *Two Triangles upon equal Bases between two Parallels are equal*, is of Relation: *Iron is susceptible of magnetical Impression*, is of Co-existence: *GOD is*, is of real Existence. Tho' Identity and Co-existence are truly nothing but Relations, yet they are so peculiar ways of Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas*, that they deserve well to be consider'd as distinct Heads, and not under Relation in general; since they are so different Grounds of Affirmation and Negation, as will easily appear to any one, who will but reflect on what is said in several places of this Essay. I should now proceed to examine the several degrees of our Knowledge, but that it is necessary first to consider the different Acceptations of the word *Knowledge*.

Knowledge
actual or habitual.

§. 8. There are several ways wherein the Mind is possess'd of Truth, each of which is call'd *Knowledge*.

1. There is *actual Knowledge*, which is the present View the Mind has of the Agreement or Disagreement of any of its *Ideas*, or of the Relation they have one to another.

2. A Man is said to know any Proposition, which having been once laid before his Thoughts, he evidently perceiv'd the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas* whereof it consists; and so lodg'd it in his Memory, that whenever that Proposition comes again to be reflect'd on, he, without doubt or hesitation, embraces the right side, assents to, and is certain of the Truth of it. This, I think, one may call *habitual Knowledge*: And thus a Man may be said to know all those Truths which are lodg'd in his Memory, by a foregoing clear and full Perception, whereof the Mind is assur'd past doubt, as often as it has occasion to reflect on them. For our finite Understandings being able to think clearly and distinctly but on one thing at once, if Men had no knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant; and he that knew most, would know but one Truth, that being all he was able to think on at one time.

Habitual
Knowledge
twofold.

§. 9. Of habitual Knowledge, there are also, vulgarly speaking, two degrees: *First*, The one is of such Truths laid up in the Memory, as whenever they occur to the Mind, it actually perceives the Relation is between those *Ideas*. And this is in all those Truths, whereof we have an *intuitive Knowledge*; where the *Ideas* themselves, by an immediate View, discover their Agreement or Disagreement one with another.

Secondly,

Secondly, The other is of *such Truths, whereof the Mind having been convinc'd, it retains the Memory of the Conviction, without the Proofs.* Thus a Man that remembers certainly that he once perceiv'd the Demonstration, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, is certain that he knows it, because he cannot doubt of the Truth of it. In his adherence to a Truth, where the Demonstration by which it was at first known is forgot, tho' a Man may be thought rather to believe his Memory than really to know, and this way of entertaining a Truth seem'd formerly to me like something between Opinion and Knowledg; a sort of Assurance which exceeds bare Belief, for that relies on the Testimony of another: yet upon a due examination I find it comes not short of perfect Certainty, and is in effect true Knowledg. That which is apt to mislead our first Thoughts into a mistake in this matter, is, that the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas* in this case is not perceiv'd, as it was at first, by an actual View of all the intermediate *Ideas*, whereby the Agreement or Disagreement of those in the Proposition was at first perceiv'd; but by other intermediate *Ideas*, that shew the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas* contain'd in the Proposition whose Certainty we remember. For Example, in this Proposition, That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, one who has seen and clearly perceiv'd the Demonstration of this Truth, knows it to be true, when that Demonstration is gone out of his Mind; so that at present it is not actually in view, and possibly cannot be recollected: but he knows it in a different way from what he did before. The Agreement of the two *Ideas* join'd in that Proposition is perceiv'd, but it is by the intervention of other *Ideas* than those which at first produc'd that Perception. He remembers, *i. e.* he knows (for Remembrance is but the reviving of some past Knowledg) that he was once certain of the Truth of this Proposition, That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones. The Immutability of the same Relations between the same immutable Things, is now the *Idea* that shews him, that if the three angles of a Triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true in the case, is always true; what *Idea* once agreed, will always agree; and consequently what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it. Upon this ground it is, that particular Demonstrations in Mathematicks afford general Knowledg. If then the Perception that the same *Ideas* will eternally have the same Habitudes and Relations, be not a sufficient ground of Knowledg, there could be no Knowledg of general Propositions in Mathematicks; for no Mathematical Demonstration would be any other than particular: and when a Man had demonstrated any Proposition concerning one Triangle or Circle, his Knowledg would not reach beyond that particular Diagram. If he would extend it farther, he must renew his Demonstrations in another Instance, before he could know it to be true in another like Triangle, and so on: by which means one could never come to the Knowledg of any general Propositions. No Body, I think, can deny that Mr. Newton certainly knows any Proposition, that he now at any time reads in his Book, to be true; tho' he has not in actual view that admirable Chain of intermediate *Ideas*, whereby he at first discover'd it to be true. Such a Memory as that, able to retain such a Train of Particulars, may be well thought beyond the reach of human Faculties; when the very Discovery, Perception, and laying together that wonderful Connection of *Ideas*, is found to surpass most Readers Comprehension. But yet 'tis evident, the Author himself knows the Proposition to be true, remembering he once saw the Connection of those *Ideas*, as certainly as he knows such a Man wounded another, remembering that he saw him run him thro'. But because the Memory is not always so clear as actual Perception, and does in all Men more or less decay in length of time, this amongst other Differences is one, which shews that *demonstrative Knowledg* is much more imperfect than *intuitive*, as we shall see in the following Chapter.

C H A P. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

Intuitive. §. 1. **A**LL our Knowledge consisting, as I have said, in the view the Mind has of its own *Ideas*, which is the utmost Light and greatest Certainty we, with our Faculties, and in our way of Knowledge, are capable of; it may not be amiss, to consider a little the degrees of its Evidence. The different Clearness of our Knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of Perception the Mind has of the Agreement or Disagreement of any of its *Ideas*. For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes the Mind perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of two *Ideas* immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this, I think, we may call *intuitive Knowledge*. For in this, the Mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth Light, only by being directed toward it. Thus the Mind perceives, That *White* is not *Black*, That a *Circle* is not a *Triangle*, That *Three* are more than *Two*, and equal to *One* and *Two*. Such kind of Truths the Mind perceives at the first sight of the *Ideas* together, by bare *Intuition*, without the intervention of any other *Idea*; and this kind of Knowledge is the clearest and most certain, that human Frailty is capable of. This part of Knowledge is irresistible, and like bright Sun-shine forces it self immediately to be perceiv'd, as soon as ever the Mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination, but the Mind is presently fill'd with the clear Light of it. 'Tis on this *Intuition* that depends all the Certainty and Evidence of all our Knowledge; which Certainty every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater: For a Man cannot conceive himself capable of a greater Certainty, than to know that any *Idea* in his Mind is such as he perceives it to be; and that two *Ideas*, wherein he perceives a difference, are different, and not precisely the same. He that demands a greater Certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and shews only that he has a mind to be a Sceptick, without being able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly on this *Intuition*, that in the next degree of Knowledge, which I call *Demonstrative*, this *Intuition* is necessary in all the Connections of the intermediate *Ideas*, without which we cannot attain Knowledge and Certainty.

Demonstrative.

§. 2. The next degree of Knowledge is, where the Mind perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of any *Ideas*, but not immediately. Tho' wherever the Mind perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of any of its *Ideas*, there be certain Knowledge; yet it does not always happen, that the Mind sees that Agreement or Disagreement which there is between them, even where it is discoverable: and in that case remains in Ignorance, and at most gets no farther than a probable Conjecture. The Reason why the Mind cannot always perceive presently the Agreement or Disagreement of two *Ideas*, is, because those *Ideas*, concerning whose Agreement or Disagreement the Enquiry is made, cannot by the Mind be so put together as to shew it. In this case then, when the Mind cannot so bring its *Ideas* together, as by their immediate Comparison, and as it were Juxta-position or Application one to another, to perceive their Agreement or Disagreement, it is fain, by the intervention of other *Ideas* (one or more, as it happens) to discover the Agreement or Disagreement which it searches; and this is that which we call *Reasoning*. Thus the Mind being willing to know the Agreement or Disagreement in bigness, between the three Angles of a Triangle and two right ones, cannot by an immediate view and comparing them do it: because the three Angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compar'd with any one or two Angles; and so of this the Mind has no immediate, no intuitive Knowledge. In this case the Mind is fain to find out some other Angles, to which the three Angles of a Triangle have an Equality; and finding those equal to two right ones, comes to know their Equality to two right ones.

§. 3. Those intervening *Ideas* which serve to shew the Agreement of any two others, are call'd *Proofs*; and where the Agreement or Disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceiv'd, it is call'd *Demonstration*, it being shewn to the Understanding, and the Mind made see that it is so. A quickness in the Mind to find out these intermediate *Ideas* (that shall discover the Agreement or Disagreement of any other) and to apply them right, is, I suppose, that which is call'd *Sagacity*. Depends on Proofs.

§. 4. This Knowledge by intervening *Proofs*, tho' it be certain, yet the Evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the Assent so ready, as in intuitive Knowledge. For tho' in *Demonstration*, the Mind does at last perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas* it considers; yet 'tis not without pains and attention: There must be more than one transient View to find it. A steady Application and Pursuit is requir'd to this Discovery: and there must be a Progression by steps and degrees, before the Mind can in this way arrive at Certainty, and come to perceive the Agreement or Repugnancy between two *Ideas* that need *Proofs* and the Use of Reason to shew it. But not so easy.

§. 5. Another difference between intuitive and demonstrative Knowledge, is, that tho' in the latter all doubt be remov'd, when by the intervention of the intermediate *Ideas* the Agreement or Disagreement is perceiv'd; yet before the *Demonstration* there was a doubt, which in intuitive Knowledge cannot happen to the Mind, that has its Faculty of Perception left to a Degree capable of distinct *Ideas*, no more than it can be a doubt to the Eye (that can distinctly see White and Black) whether this Ink and this Paper be all of a Colour. If there be Sight in the Eyes, it will at first glimpse, without hesitation perceive the Words printed on this Paper different from the Colour of the Paper: And so if the Mind have the Faculty of distinct Perception, it will perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of those *Ideas* that produce intuitive Knowledge. If the Eyes have lost the Faculty of seeing, or the Mind of perceiving, we in vain enquire after the Quickness of Sight in one, or Clearness of Perception in the other. Not without precedent Doubts.

§. 6. 'Tis true, the Perception produc'd by *Demonstration* is also very clear, yet it is often with a great Abatement of that evident Lustre and full Assurance, that always accompany that which I call *intuitive*; like a Face reflected by several Mirrors one to another, where as long as it retains the Similitude and Agreement with the Object, it produces a Knowledge: but 'tis still in every successive Reflection with a lessening of that perfect Clearness and Distinctness, which is in the first, till at last, after many removes, it has a great mixture of Dimness, and is not at first sight so knowable, especially to weak Eyes. Thus it is with Knowledge, made out by a long Train of *Proofs*. Not so clear.

§. 7. Now, in every step Reason makes in demonstrative Knowledge, there is an intuitive Knowledge of that Agreement or Disagreement, it seeks with the next intermediate *Idea*, which it uses as a *Proof*: for if it were not so, that yet would need a *Proof*; since without the Perception of such Agreement or Disagreement, there is no Knowledge produc'd. If it be perceiv'd by it self, it is intuitive Knowledge: If it cannot be perceiv'd by it self, there is need of some intervening *Idea*, as a common measure to shew their Agreement or Disagreement: By which it is plain, that every step in Reasoning that produces Knowledge, has intuitive Certainty; which when the Mind perceives, there is no more requir'd, but to remember it to make the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas*, concerning which we enquire, visible and certain. So that to make any thing a *Demonstration*, it is necessary to perceive the immediate Agreement of the intervening *Ideas*, whereby the Agreement or Disagreement of the two *Ideas* under Examination (whereof the one is always the first, and the other the last in their account) is found. This intuitive Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the intermediate *Ideas*, in each step and progression of the *Demonstration*, must also be carry'd exactly in the Mind, and a Man must be sure that no part is left out: which, because in long Deductions, and the use of many *Proofs*, the Memory does not always so readily and exactly retain; therefore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuitive Knowledge, and Men embrace often Falshood for *Demonstrations*. Each step must have intuitive Evidence.

§. 8. The necessity of this intuitive Knowledge, in each step of scientific or demonstrative Reasoning, gave occasion, I imagine, to that mistaken Axiom, Hence the mistake, ex prae-cognitis & praeconcessis, that

that all Reasoning was *ex praeognitis & praeoncessis*; which how far it is mistaken, I shall have occasion to shew more at large, when I come to consider Propositions, and particularly those Propositions which are call'd Maxims; and to shew that 'tis by a Mistake, that they are suppos'd to be the Foundations of all our Knowledg and Reasonings.

Demonstration not limited to Quantity.

§. 9. It has been generally taken for granted, that Mathematicks alone are capable of Demonstrative Certainty: But to have such an Agreement or Disagreement, as may intuitively be perceiv'd, being, as I imagine, not the Privilege of the *Ideas* of *Number*, *Extension* and *Figure* alone; it may possibly be the want of due Method and Application in us, and not of sufficient Evidence in things, that Demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other Parts of Knowledg, and been scarce so much as aim'd at by any but Mathematicians. For whatever *Ideas* we have, wherein the Mind can perceive the immediate Agreement or Disagreement that is between them, there the Mind is capable of intuitive Knowledg; and where it can perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, by an intuitive Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement they have with any intermediate *Ideas*, there the Mind is capable of Demonstration, which is not limited to *Ideas* of *Extension*, *Figure*, *Number*, and their Modes.

Why it has been so thought.

§. 10. The Reason why it has been generally sought for, and suppos'd to be only in those, I imagine has been not only the general Usefulness of those Sciences; but because, in comparing their Equality or Excess, the Modes of Numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable: and tho' in Extension, every the least Excess is not so perceptible, yet the Mind has found out ways, to examine and discover demonstratively the just Equality of two Angles, or Extensions, or Figures: and both these, *i. e.* Numbers and Figures, can be set down by visible and lasting Marks, wherein the *Ideas* under consideration are perfectly determin'd; which for the most part they are not, where they are mark'd only by Names and Words.

§. 11. But in other simple *Ideas*, whose Modes and Differences are made and counted by Degrees, and not Quantity, we have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their Differences, as to perceive or find ways to measure their just Equality, or the least Differences. For those other simple *Ideas*, being Appearances or Sensations, produc'd in us by the Size, Figure, Number and Motion of minute Corpuscles singly insensible, their different degrees also depend upon the Variation of some, or all of those Causes; which since it cannot be observ'd by us in particles of Matter, whereof each is too subtle to be perceiv'd, it is impossible for us to have any exact Measures of the different degrees of these simple *Ideas*. For supposing the Sensation or *Idea* we name *Whiteness*, be produc'd in us by a certain Number of Globules, which having a Verticity about their own Centers, strike upon the *Retina* of the Eye, with a certain degree of Rotation, as well as progressive Swiftnes; it will hence easily follow, that the more the superficial Parts of any Body are so order'd, as to reflect the greater number of Globules of Light, and to give them that proper Rotation, which is fit to produce this Sensation of White in us, the more white will that Body appear, that from an equal Space sends to the *Retina* the greater number of such Corpuscles, with that peculiar sort of Motion. I do not say, that the Nature of Light consists in very small round Globules, nor of Whiteness in such a Texture of Parts, as gives a certain Rotation to these Globules, when it reflects them; for I am not now treating physically of Light or Colours. But this, I think, I may say, that I cannot (and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did) conceive how Bodies without us can any ways affect our Senses, but by the immediate Contact of the sensible Bodies themselves, as in Tasting and Feeling, or the impulse of some insensible Particles coming from them, as in Seeing, Hearing and Smelling; by the different Impulse of which Parts, caus'd by their different Size, Figure and Motion, the variety of Sensations is produc'd in us.

§. 12. Whether then they be Globules, or no; or whether they have a Verticity about their own Centers, that produce the *Idea* of *Whiteness* in us, this is certain, that the more Particles of Light are reflected from a Body, fitted to give them that peculiar Motion which produces the Sensation of Whiteness in us;

us; and possibly too, the quicker that peculiar Motion is, the whiter does the Body appear, from which the greater number are reflected, as is evident in the same piece of Paper put in the Sun-beams, in the Shade, and in a dark Hole; in each of which it will produce in us the *Idea* of Whiteness in far different degrees.

§. 13. Not knowing therefore what number of Particles, nor what Motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of *Whiteness*, we cannot demonstrate the certain Equality of any two degrees of *Whiteness*, because we have no certain Standard to measure them by, nor Means to distinguish every the least real Difference, the only Help we have being from our Senses, which in this point fail us. But where the Difference is so great, as to produce in the Mind clearly distinct *Ideas*, whose Differences can be perfectly retain'd, there these *Ideas* of Colours, as we see in different kinds, as Blue and Red, are as capable of Demonstration, as *Ideas* of Number and Extension. What I have here said of *Whiteness* and Colours, I think, holds true in all secondary Qualities, and their Modes.

Why it has been so thought.

§. 14. These two, viz. Intuition and Demonstration, are the degrees of our Knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these, with what Assurance soever embrac'd, is but Faith, or Opinion, but not Knowledge, at least in all general Truths. There is, indeed, another Perception of the Mind, employ'd about the particular Existence of finite Beings without us; which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of Certainty, passes under the name of Knowledge. There can be nothing more certain, than that the *Idea* we receive from an external Object is in our Minds; this is intuitive Knowledge. But whether there be any thing more than barely that *Idea* in our Minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the Existence of any thing without us, which corresponds to that *Idea*, is that, whereof some Men think there may be a Question made; because Men may have such *Ideas* in their Minds, when no such Thing exists, no such Object affects their Senses. But yet here, I think, we are provided with an Evidence, that puts us past doubting: For I ask any one, Whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different Perception, when he looks on the Sun by Day, and thinks on it by Night; when he actually tastes Wormwood, or smells a Rose, or only thinks on that Savour or Odour? We as plainly find the Difference there is between any *Idea* reviv'd in our Minds by our own Memory, and actually coming into our Minds by our Senses, as we do between any two distinct *Ideas*. If any one say, a Dream may do the same thing, and all these *Ideas* may be produc'd in us without any external Objects, he may please to dream that I make him this Answer; 1. That 'tis no great matter, whether I remove his Scruple, or no: Where a I is but Dream, Reasoning and Arguments are of no use, Truth and Knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the Fire, and being actually in it. But yet if he be resolv'd to appear so sceptical, as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the Fire is nothing but a Dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such thing as Fire actually exists without us: I answer, That we certainly finding that Pleasure or Pain follows upon the application of certain Objects to us, whose Existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our Senses; this certainly is as great as our Happiness or Misery, beyond which we have no Concernment to know, or to be. So that, I think, we may add to the two former sorts of Knowledge this also, of the Existence of particular external Objects, by that Perception and Consciousness we have of actual Entrance of *Ideas* from them, and allow these three degrees of Knowledge, viz. Intuitive, Demonstrative and Sensitive: in each of which there are different degrees and ways of Evidence and Certainty.

Sensitive Knowledge of particular Existence.

§. 15. But since our Knowledge is founded on, and employ'd about our *Ideas* only, will it not follow from thence, that it is conformable to our *Ideas*; and that where our *Ideas* are clear and distinct, or obscure and confus'd, our Knowledge will be so too? To which I answer, No: For our Knowledge consisting in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, its Clearness or Obscurity consists in the Clearness or Obscurity of that Perception, and not in the Clearness or Obscurity of the *Ideas* themselves; v. g. a Man that

Knowledge not always clear, where the Ideas are so.

has as clear *Ideas* of the Angles of a Triangle, and of Equality to two right ones, as any Mathematician in the World, may yet have but a very obscure Perception of their Agreement, and so have but a very obscure Knowledge of it. But *Ideas*, which by reason of their Obscurity or otherwise, are confus'd, cannot produce any clear or distinct Knowledge; because as far as any *Ideas* are confus'd, so far the Mind cannot perceive clearly, whether they agree or disagree. Or to express the same thing in a way less apt to be misunderstood: He that hath not determin'd *Ideas* to the Words he uses, cannot make Propositions of them, of whose Truth he can be certain.

C H A P. III.

Of the Extent of Human Knowledg.

§. 1. **K**NOWLEDG, as has been said, lying in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our *Ideas*, it follows from hence, That,

1. No farther than we have *Ideas*.

2. No farther than we can perceive their Agreement or Disagreement.

3. Intuitive Knowledge extends it self not to all the Relations of all our *Ideas*.

4. Nor demonstrative Knowledge.

5. Sensitive Knowledge narrower than either.

6. Our Knowledge therefore narrower than our *Ideas*.

First, We can have Knowledge no farther than we have *Ideas*.

§. 2. Secondly, That we can have no Knowledge farther than we can have Perception of that Agreement or Disagreement. Which Perception being, 1. Either by *Intuition*, or the immediate comparing any two *Ideas*; or, 2. By Reason, examining the Agreement or Disagreement of two *Ideas*, by the Intervention of some others: Or, 3. By *Sensation*, perceiving the Existence of particular Things: Hence it also follows,

§. 3. Thirdly, That we cannot have an *intuitive Knowledge*, that shall extend it self to all our *Ideas*, and all that we would know about them; because we cannot examine and perceive all the Relations they have one to another by *Juxtaposition*, or an immediate Comparison one with another. Thus having the *Ideas* of an obtuse, and an acute-angled Triangle, both drawn from equal Bases, and between Parallels, I can, by intuitive Knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that way know whether they be equal or no; because their Agreement or Disagreement in Equality can never be perceiv'd by an immediate comparing them: The difference of Figure makes their Parts incapable of an exact immediate Application; and therefore there is need of some intervening Quantities to measure them by, which is *Demonstration*, or rational Knowledge.

§. 4. Fourthly, it follows also, from what is above observ'd, that our *rational Knowledge* cannot reach to the whole Extent of our *Ideas*: Because between two different *Ideas* we would examine, we cannot always find such *Mediums*, as we can connect one to another with an intuitive Knowledge, in all the Parts of the Deduction; and wherever that fails, we come short of Knowledge and Demonstration.

§. 5. Fifthly, *Sensitive Knowledge*, reaching no farther than the Existence of Things actually present to our Senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

§. 6. From all which it is evident, that the Extent of our Knowledge comes not only short of the Reality of Things, but even of the Extent of our own *Ideas*. Tho' our Knowledge be limited to our *Ideas*, and cannot exceed them either in Extent or Perfection; and tho' these be very narrow Bounds, in respect of the Extent of All-Being, and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some even created Understandings, not ty'd down to the dull and narrow Information is to be receiv'd from some few, and not very acute ways of Perception, such as are our Senses; yet it would be well with us if our Knowledge were but as large as our *Ideas*, and there were not many Doubts and Inquiries concerning the *Ideas* we have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in this World resolv'd. Nevertheless I do not question but that human Knowledge, under the present Circumstances of our Beings and Constitutions, may be carry'd much farther than it hitherto has been, if Men would sincerely, and with freedom of Mind, imploy all that Industry and Labour of Thought, in improving

improving the means of discovering Truth, which they do for the colouring or support of Falshood, to maintain a System, Interest or Party they are once engag'd in. But yet after all, I think I may, without Injury to human Perfection, be confident, that our Knowledg would never reach to all we might desire to know concerning those *Ideas* we have; nor be able to surmount all the Difficulties, and resolve all the Questions might arise concerning any of them. We have the *Ideas* of a *Square*, a *Circle*, and *Equality*; and yet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a *Circle* equal to a *Square*, and certainly know that it is so. We have the *Ideas* of *Matter* and *Thinking*, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any mere material Being thinks, or no; it being impossible for us, by the Contemplation of our own *Ideas*, without Revelation, to discover, whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly dispos'd, a Power to perceive and think, or else join'd and fix'd to Matter so dispos'd, a thinking immaterial Substance: it being, in respect of our Notions, not much more remote from our Comprehension to conceive, that G O D can if he pleases, superadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should superadd to it another Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking; since we know not wherein Thinking consists, nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleas'd to give that Power, which cannot be in any created Being, but merely by the good Pleasure and Bounty of the Creator. For I see no Contradiction in it, that the first eternal thinking Being should, if he pleas'd, give to certain Systems of created senseless Matter, put together, as he thinks fit, some degrees of Sense, Perception and Thought: Tho', as I think, I have prov'd, *lib. 4. ch. 10.* it is no less than a Contradiction to suppose Matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of Sense and Thought) should be that eternal first thinking Being. What Certainty of Knowledg can any one have that some Perceptions, such as *v.g.* Pleasure and Pain, should not be in some Bodies themselves, after a certain manner modify'd and mov'd, as well as that they should be in an immaterial Substance, upon the Motion of the Parts of Body? Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect Body; and Motion, according to the utmost reach of our *Ideas*, being able to produce nothing but Motion: so that when we allow it to produce Pleasure or Pain, or the *Idea* of a Colour or Sound, we are fain to quit our Reason, go beyond our *Ideas*, and attribute it wholly to the good Pleasure of our Maker. For since we must allow he has annex'd Effects to Motion, which we can no way conceive Motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude, that he could not order them as well to be produc'd in a Subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a Subject we cannot conceive the Motion of Matter can any way operate upon? I say not this, that I would any way lessen the Belief of the Soul's Immateriality: I am not here speaking of Probability, but Knowledg; and I think not only, that it becomes the Modesty of Philosophy not to pronounce magisterially, where we want that Evidence that can produce Knowledg; but also, that it is of use to us to discern how far our Knowledg does reach: for the state we are at present in, not being that of Vision, we must, in many things, content our selves with Faith and Probability; and in the present Question, about the Immateriality of the Soul, if our Faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative Certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great Ends of Morality and Religion are well enough secur'd, without Philosophical Proofs of the Soul's Immateriality; since it is evident, that he who made us at first begin to subsist here, sensible intelligent Beings, and for several years continu'd us in such a State, can and will restore us to the like State of Sensibility in another World, and make us capable there to receive the Retribution he has design'd to Men, according to their Doings in this Life. And therefore 'tis not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or t'other, as some over-zealous for or against the Immateriality of the Soul, have been forward to make the World believe. Who, either on the one side, indulging too much their Thoughts immers'd altogether in Matter, can allow no Existence to what is not material: Or who, on the other side, finding not *Cogitation* within the natural Powers of Matter, examin'd over and over again by the utmost Intention of Mind, have the confidence to conclude, that Omnipotency it self cannot give Perception and Thought to a Substance which has the Modification of Solidity. He that considers how hard-

ly Sensation is, in our Thoughts, reconcileable to extended Matter; or Existence to any thing that hath no Extension at all, will confess, that he is very far from certainly knowing what his Soul is. 'Tis a Point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our Knowledge: And he who will give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricate part of each Hypothesis, will scarce find his Reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the Soul's Materiality. Since on which side soever he views it, either as an unextended Substance, or as a thinking extended Matter; the Difficulty to conceive either, will, whilst either alone is in his Thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side. An unfair way which some Men take with themselves: who, because of the unconceivableness of something they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary Hypothesis, tho' altogether as unintelligible to an unbiass'd Understanding. This serves not only to shew the Weakness and the Scantiness of our Knowledge, but the insignificant Triumph of such sort of Arguments, which, drawn from our own Views, may satisfy us that we can find no certainty on one side of the Question; but do not at all thereby help us to Truth by running into the opposite Opinion, which, on examination, will be found clog'd with equal difficulties. For what Safety, what Advantage to any one is it, for the avoiding the seeming Absurdities, and to him unmountable Rubs he meets with in one Opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is built on something altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from his Comprehension? 'Tis past controversy, that we have in us something that thinks; our very Doubts about what it is, confirm the Certainty of its being, tho' we must content our selves in the Ignorance of what kind of *Being* it is: and 'tis in vain to go about to be sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most other cases to be positive against the being of any thing, because we cannot comprehend its Nature. For I would fain know what Substance exists, that has not something in it which manifestly baffles our Understandings? Other Spirits, who see and know the Nature and inward Constitution of things, how much they exceed us in Knowledge: To which if we add larger Comprehension, which enables them at one glance to see the Connection and Agreement of very many *Ideas*, and readily supplies to them the intermediate Proofs, which we by single and slow steps, and long poring in the dark, hardly at last find out, and are often ready to forget one before we have hunted out another; we may guess at some part of the Happiness of superior Ranks of Spirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating Sight, as well as a larger Field of Knowledge. But to return to the Argument in hand; our Knowledge, I say, is not only limited to the Paucity and Imperfections of the *Ideas* we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes short of that too. But how far it reaches, let us now enquire.

How far our
Knowledg
reaches.

1. Our Know-
ledg of Iden-
tity and Di-
versity as far
as our *Ideas*.

2. Of Co-
existence a
a very little
way.

§. 7. The Affirmations or Negations we make concerning the *Ideas* we have, may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduc'd to these four sorts, viz. Identity, Co-existence, Relation, and real Existence. I shall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of these.

§. 8. First, As to Identity and Diversity, in this way of the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas*, our intuitive Knowledge is as far extended as our *Ideas* themselves: and there can be no *Idea* in the Mind, which it does not presently, by an intuitive Knowledge, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

§. 9. Secondly, As to the second sort, which is the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas* in Co-existence; in this, our Knowledge is very short, tho' in this consists the greatest and most material part of our Knowledge concerning Substances. For our *Ideas* of the Species of Substances being, as I have shew'd, nothing but certain Collections of simple *Ideas* united in one Subject, and so co-existing together; v. g. Our *Idea* of Flame is a Body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of Gold, a Body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fusible: These, or some such complex *Ideas* as these in mens Minds, do these two Names of the different Substances, Flame, and Gold, stand for. When we would know any thing farther concerning these, or any other sort of Substances, what do we enquire, but what other Qualities or Powers these Substances have

or

or have not? which is nothing else but to know what other simple *Ideas* do or do not co-exist with those that make up that complex *Idea*?

§. 10. This, how weighty and considerable a part soever of human Science, is yet very narrow, and scarce any at all. The Reason whereof is, that the simple *Ideas*, whereof our complex *Ideas* of Substances are made up, are, for the most part, such as carry with them, in their own Nature, no visible necessary Connection or Inconsistency with any other simple *Ideas*, whose Co-existence with them we would inform our selves about. *Because the Connection between most simple Ideas is unknown.*

§. 11. The *Ideas* that our complex ones of Substances are made up of, and about which our Knowledg concerning Substances is most employ'd, are those of their *Secondary Qualities*: which depending all (as has been shewn) upon the primary Qualities of their minute and insensible Parts; or if not upon them, upon something yet more remote from our Comprehension; 'tis impossible we should know which have a necessary Union or Inconsistency one with another: For not knowing the Root they spring from, not knowing what Size, Figure, and Texture of Parts they are, on which depend, and from which result those Qualities which make our complex *Idea* of Gold, 'tis impossible we should know what other Qualities result from, or are incompatible with the same Constitution of the insensible parts of Gold; and so consequently must always co-exist with that complex *Idea* we have of it, or else are inconsistent with it. *Epecially of secondary Qualities.*

§. 12. Besides this Ignorance of the primary Qualities of the insensible Parts of Bodies, on which depend all their secondary Qualities, there is yet another and more incurable part of Ignorance, which sets us more remote from a certain Knowledg of the Co-existence or In co-existence (if I may so say) of different *Ideas* in the same Subject; and that is, that there is no discoverable Connection between any *secondary Quality*, and those *primary Qualities* which it depends on. *Because all Connection between any secondary and primary Qualities is undiscoverable.*

§. 13. That the Size, Figure and Motion of one Body should cause a Change in the Size, Figure and Motion of another Body, is not beyond our Conception: the Separation of the Parts of one Body upon the Intrusion of another; and the Change from Rest to Motion upon impulse; these and the like seem to us to have some *Connection* one with another. And if we knew these primary Qualities of Bodies, we might have reason to hope we might be able to know a great deal more of these Operations of them one upon another: But our Minds not being able to discover any *Connection* betwixt these primary Qualities of Bodies, and the Sensations that are produc'd in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted Rules of the Consequences or Co-existence of any secondary Qualities, tho' we could discover the Size, Figure or Motion of those invisible Parts which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing what Figure, Size or Motion of Parts produce a yellow Colour, a sweet Taste, or a sharp Sound, that we can by no means conceive how any Size, Figure or Motion of any Particles, can possibly produce in us the *Idea* of any Colour, Taste or Sound whatsoever; there is no conceivable *Connection* betwixt the one and the other.

§. 14. In vain therefore shall we endeavour to discover by our *Ideas* (the only true way of certain and universal Knowledg) what other *Ideas* are to be found constantly join'd with that of our complex *Idea* of any Substance: since we neither know the real Constitution of the minute Parts on which their Qualities do depend; nor, did we know them, could we discover any necessary *Connection* between them, and any of the *secondary Qualities*: which is necessary to be done before we can certainly know their necessary Co-existence. So that let our complex *Idea* of any Species of Substances be what it will, we can hardly, from the simple *Ideas* contain'd in it, certainly determine the necessary Co-existence of any other Quality whatsoever. Our Knowledg in all these Enquiries reaches very little farther than our Experience. Indeed, some few of the primary Qualities have a necessary Dependance and visible Connection one with another, as Figure necessarily supposes Extension; receiving or communicating Motion by impulse, supposes Solidity. But tho' these and perhaps some other of our *Ideas* have, yet there are so few of them, that have a visible *Connection* one with another, that we can by Intuition or Demonstration discover the Co-existence of very few of the Qualities are to be found united in Substances: and we are left only

only to the Assistance of our Senses, to make known to us what Qualities they contain. For of all the Qualities that are *co-existent* in any Subject, without this Dependence and evident Connection of their *Ideas* one with another, we cannot know certainly any two to *co-exist* any farther than Experience, by our Senses, informs us. Thus, tho' we see the yellow Colour, and upon trial find the Weight, Malleableness, Fusibility, and Fixedness, that are united in a piece of Gold; yet because no one of these *Ideas* has any evident Dependence, or necessary Connection with the other, we cannot certainly know, that where any four of these are, the fifth will be there also, how highly probable soever it may be: because the highest Probability amounts not to Certainty, without which there can be no true Knowledge. For this *Co-existence* can be no farther known than it is perceiv'd; and it cannot be perceiv'd, but either in particular Subjects, by the Observation of our Senses, or in general, by the necessary Connection of the *Ideas* themselves.

Of Repugnancy to co-existence larger.

§. 15. As to Incompatibility or Repugnancy to Co-existence, we may know, that any Subject can have of each sort of primary Qualities, but one particular at once; v. g. each particular Extension, Figure, Number of Parts, Motion, excludes all other of each kind. The like also is certain of all sensible *Ideas* peculiar to each Sense; for whatever of each kind is present in any Subject excludes all other of that sort; v. g. no one Subject can have two Smells or two Colours at the same time. To this perhaps will be said, has not an *Opall*, or the infusion of *Lignum Nephriticum*, two Colours at the same time? To which I answer, that these Bodies, to Eyes differently plac'd, may at the same time afford different Colours: But I take liberty also to say, that to Eyes differently plac'd, 'tis different parts of the Object that reflect the Particles of Light: And therefore 'tis not the same Part of the Object, and so not the very same Subject, which at the same time appears both yellow and azure. For 'tis as impossible that the very same Particle of any Body should at the same time differently modify or reflect the Rays of Light, as that it should have two different Figures and Textures at the same time.

Of the Co-existence of Powers a very little way.

§. 16. But as to the Powers of Substances to change the sensible Qualities of other Bodies, which make a great part of our Enquiries about them, and is no considerable Branch of our Knowledge; I doubt, as to these, wherein our Knowledge reaches much farther than our Experience; or whether we can come to the discovery of most of these Powers, and be certain that they are in any Subject, by the Connection with any of those *Ideas* which to us make its Essence. Because the active and Passive Powers of Bodies, and their ways of operating, consisting in a Texture and motion of Parts, which we cannot by any means come to discover; 'tis but in very few cases, we can be able to perceive their Dependence on, or Repugnance to any of those *Ideas* which make our complex one of that sort of things. I have here instanc'd in the Corpuscularian Hypothesis, as that which is thought to go farthest in an intelligible Explication of the Qualities of Bodies; and I fear the Weakness of human Understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer Discovery of the necessary Connection and Co-existence of the Powers which are to be observ'd united in several sorts of them. This at least is certain, that which ever Hypothesis be clearest and truest, (for of that it is not my business to determine) our Knowledge concerning corporeal Substances will be very little advanced by any of them, till we are made see what Qualities and Powers of Bodies have a necessary Connection or Repugnancy one with another; which in the present State of Philosophy, I think, we know but to a very small degree: And I doubt whether, with those Faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general Knowledge (I say not particular Experience) in this part much farther. Experience is that which in this Part we must depend on. And it were to be wish'd that it were more improv'd. We find the Advantages some Mens generous Pains have this way brought to the Stock of natural Knowledge. And if others, especially the Philosophers by Fire, who pretend to it, had been so wary in their Observations, and sincere in their Reports, as those who call themselves Philosophers ought to have been; our Acquaintance with the Bodies here about us, and our Insight into their Powers and Operations, had been yet much greater.

§. 17. If we are at a loss in respect of the Powers and Operations of Bodies, *Of Spirits, yet I think it is easy to conclude, we are much more in the dark in reference to Spirits; narrower.* whereof we naturally have no *Ideas*, but what we draw from that of our own, by reflecting on the Operations of our own Souls within us, as far as they can come within our Observation. But how inconsiderable a rank the Spirits that inhabit our Bodies hold amongst those various and possibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings; and how far short they come of the Endowments and Perfections of Cherubims and Seraphims, and infinite sorts of Spirits above us; is what by a transient hint, in another place, I have offer'd to my Reader's Consideration.

§. 18. Asto the third sort of our Knowledg, viz. the *Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas in any other Relation*: This, as it is the largest Field of our Knowledg, so it is hard to determine how far it may extend; because the Advances that are made in this part of Knowledg, depending on our Sagacity in finding intermediate *Ideas*, that may shew the *Relations and Habitudes of Ideas*, whose Co-existence is not consider'd, 'tis a hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such Discoveries; and when Reason has all the helps it is capable of, for the finding of Proofs, or examining the Agreement or Disagreement of remote *Ideas*. They that are ignorant of *Algebra* cannot imagine the Wonders in this kind are to be done by it: and what farther Improvements and Helps, advantageous to other parts of Knowledg, the sagacious Mind of Man may yet find out, 'tis not easy to determine. This at least I believe, that the *Ideas* of Quantity are not those alone that are capable of Demonstration and Knowledg; and that other, and perhaps more useful parts of Contemplation, would afford us Certainty, if Vices, Passions, and domineering Interest did not oppose or menace such Endeavours.

The *Idea* of a Supreme Being, infinite in Power, Goodness and Wisdom, whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the *Idea* of our selves, as understanding rational Beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly consider'd and pursu'd, afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action, as might place *Morality amongst the Sciences capable of demonstration*: wherein I doubt not but from self-evident Propositions, by necessary Consequences, as incontestable as those in *Mathematicks*, the measures of Right and Wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same Indifferency and Attention to the one, as he does to the other of these Sciences. The *Relation* of other *Modes* may certainly be perceiv'd, as well as those of Number and Extension: and I cannot see why they should not also be capable of Demonstration, if due Methods were thought on to examine or pursue their Agreement or Disagreement. *Where there is no Property, there is no Injustice*, is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in *Euclid*: For the *Idea* of *Property* being a Right to any thing; and the *Idea* to which the name *Injustice* is given, being the Invasion or Violation of that Right; it is evident, that these *Ideas* being thus establish'd, and these Names annex'd to them, I can as certainly know this Proposition to be true, as that a Triangle has three Angles equal to two right ones. Again, *No Government allows absolute Liberty*: The *Idea* of Government being the Establishment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws which require Conformity to them; and the *Idea* of absolute Liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases; I as am capable of being certain of the Truth of this Proposition, as of any in *Mathematicks*.

§. 19. That which in this respect has given the advantage to the *Ideas* of Quantity, and made them thought more capable of Certainty and Demonstration, is,

First, That they can be set down and represented by sensible Marks, which have a greater and nearer Correspondence with them than any Words or Sounds whatsoever. Diagrams drawn on Paper are Copies of the *Ideas* in the Mind, and not liable to the Uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification. An Angle, Circle or Square, drawn in Lines, lies open to the View, and cannot be mistaken: it remains unchangeable, and may at leisure be consider'd and examin'd, and the Demonstration be revis'd, and all the parts of it may be gone over more than once without any danger of the least change in the *Ideas*. This cannot be thus done in *moral Ideas*, we have no sensible Marks that resemble them,

3. Of other Relations it is not easy to say how far.

Morality capable of Demonstration.

Two things have made moral Ideas thought incapable of Demonstration. Their Complexity, and want of sensible Representations.

them, whereby we can let them down; we have nothing but Words to express them by: which tho', when written, they remain the same, yet the *Ideas* they stand for may change in the same Man; and 'tis very seldom that they are not different in different Persons.

Secondly, Another thing that makes the greater difficulty in *Ethicks*, is, That moral *Ideas* are commonly more complex than those of the Figures ordinarily consider'd in *Mathematicks*. From whence these two Inconveniences follow: First, That their Names are of more uncertain Signification, the precise Collection of simple *Ideas* they stand for not being so easily agreed on, and so the Sign that is us'd for them in Communication always, and in thinking often, does not steddily carry with it the same *Idea*. Upon which the same Disorder, Confusion and Error follows, as would if a Man, going to demonstrate something of an *Heptagon*, should in the Diagram he took to do it, leave out one of the Angles, or by over-sight make the Figure with one Angle more than the Name ordinarily imported, or he intended it should, when at first he thought of his Demonstration. This often happens, and is hardly avoidable in very complex moral *Ideas*, where the same Name being retain'd, one Angle, i. e. one simple *Idea* is left out or put in, in the complex one (still call'd by the same name) more at one time than another. Secondly, From the Complexedness of these moral *Ideas*, there follows another Inconvenience, viz. that the Mind cannot easily retain those precise Combinations, so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in the Examination of the Habitues and Correspondencies, Agreements or Disagreements, of several of them one with another; especially where it is to be judg'd of by long Deductions, and the Intervention of several other complex *Ideas*, to shew the Agreement or Disagreement of two remote ones.

The great help against this which Mathematicians find in Diagrams and Figures, which remain unalterable in their Draughts, is very apparent, and the Memory would often have great difficulty otherwise to retain them so exactly whilst the Mind went over the Parts of them step by step, to examine their several Correspondencies. And tho' in casting up a long Sum, either in *Addition*, *Multiplication*, or *Division*, every part be only a Progression of the Mind, taking a view of its own *Ideas*, and considering their Agreement or Disagreement; and the Resolution of the Question be nothing but the Result of the whole, made up of such particulars, whereof the Mind has a clear Perception: yet without setting down the several parts by Marks, whose precise Significations are known, and by Marks that last and remain in view when the Memory had let them go, it would be almost impossible to carry so many different *Ideas* in mind, without confounding or letting slip some parts of the Reckoning, and thereby making all our Reasonings about it useless. In which case, the Cyphers or Marks help not the Mind at all to perceive the Agreement of any two or more Numbers, their Equalities or Proportions: That, the Mind has only by intuition of its own *Ideas* of the Numbers themselves. But the numerical Characters are helps to the Memory, to record and retain the several *Ideas* about which the Demonstration is made, whereby a Man may know how far his intuitive Knowledge, in surveying several of the particulars, has proceeded; that so he may without confusion go on to what is yet unknown, and at last have in one view before him the Result of all his Perceptions and Reasonings.

Remedies of
these Difficul-
ties.

§. 20. One part of these *Advantages* in moral *Ideas*, which has made them be thought not capable of Demonstration, may in a good measure be remedy'd by Definitions, setting down that Collection of simple *Ideas*, which every Term shall stand for, and then using the Terms steddily and constantly for that precise Collection. And what Methods *Algebra*, or something of that kind, may hereafter Suggest, to remove the other Difficulties, is not easy to foretel. Confident I am, that if Men would in the same method, and with the same indifferency, search after Moral, as they do Mathematical Truths, they would find them to have a stronger Connection one with another, and a more necessary Consequence from our clear and distinct *Ideas*, and to come nearer perfect Demonstration than is commonly imagin'd. But much of this is not to be expected, whilst the Desire of Esteem, Riches, or Power, makes Men espouse the well-endow'd Opinions in fashion, and then seek Arguments either to make good their Beauty, or varnish over and cover their Deformity: Nothing being so beautiful

beautiful to the Eye, as Truth is to the Mind; nothing so deform'd and irreconcilable to the Understanding, as a Lye. For tho' many a Man can with satisfaction enough own a no very handsom Wife in his Bosom; yet who is bold enough openly to avow, that he has espous'd a Falshood, and receiv'd into his Breast so ugly a thing as a Lye? Whilst the Parties of Men cram their Tethers down all Mens throats, whom they can get into their power, without permitting them to examine their Truth or Falshood, and will not let Truth have fair play in the World, nor Men the liberty to search after it; what Improvements can be expected of this kind? What greater Light can be hoped for in the moral Sciences? The subject part of Mankind in most places might, instead thereof, with *Egyptian* Bondage expect *Egyptian* Darknes, were not the Candle of the Lord set up by himself in Mens Minds, which it is impossible for the Breath or Power of Man wholly to extinguish.

§. 21. As to the fourth sort of our Knowledg, viz. of the *real actual Existence* of things, we have an intuitive Knowledg of our own *Existence*; a demonstrative Knowledg of the *Existence* of a God; of the *Existence* of any thing else, we have no other but a sensitive Knowledg, which extends not beyond the Objects present to our Senses.

4. Of real Existence: we have an intuitive Knowledg of our own;

§. 22. Our Knowledg being so narrow, as I have shew'd, it will perhaps give us some light into the present State of our Minds, if we look a little into the dark side, and take a view of our *Ignorance*: which being infinitely larger than our Knowledg, may serve much to the quieting of Disputes, and Improvement of useful Knowledg; if discovering how far we have clear and distinct *Ideas*, we confine our Thoughts within the Contemplation of those things that are within the reach of our Understandings, and launch not out into that Abyss of Darknes (where we have not Eyes to see, nor Faculties to perceive any thing) out of a Presumption, that nothing is beyond our Comprehension. But to be satisfy'd of the Folly of such a Conceit, we need not go far. He that knows any thing, knows this in the first place, that he needs not seek long for Instances of his Ignorance. The meanest and most obvious things that come in our way, have dark sides, that the quickest Sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest and most enlarg'd Understandings of thinking Men find themselves puzzled, and at a loss, in every particle of Matter. We shall the less wonder to find it so, when we consider the *Causes of our Ignorance*; which, from what has been said, I suppose, will be found to be chiefly these three:

demonstrative, of God's; sensitive, of some few other things.

Our Ignorance great.

First, Want of *Ideas*.

Secondly, Want of a discoverable Connection between the *Ideas* we have.

Thirdly, Want of tracing and examining our *Ideas*.

§. 23. First, There are some things, and thole not a few, that we are ignorant of for want of *Ideas*.

First, One cause of it want of *Ideas*, either such as we have no Conception of, or such as particularly we have not.

First, All the simple *Ideas* we have, are confin'd (as I have shewn) to those we receive from corporeal Objects by *Sensation*, and from the Operations of our own Minds as the Objects of *Reflection*. But how much these few and narrow Inlets are disproportionate to the vast whole Extent of all Beings, will not be hard to persuade those who are not so foolish as to think their Span the measure of all things. What other simple *Ideas* 'tis possible the Creatures in other parts of the Universe may have, by the assistance of Senses and Faculties more or perfecter than we have, or different from our's, 'tis not for us to determine. But to say, or think there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them, is no better an Argument, than if a blind Man should be positive in it, that there was no such thing as Sight and Colours, because he had no manner of *Idea* of any such thing, nor could by any means frame to himself any Notion about Seeing. The Ignorance and Darknes that is in us, no more hinders nor confines the Knowledg that is in others, than the Blindness of a Mole is an argument against the Quick sightedness of an Eagle. He that will consider the infinite Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of the Creator of all things, will find reason to think, it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a Creature, as he will find Man to be; who, in all probability, is one of the lowest of all intellectual Beings. What Faculties therefore other Species of Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature and inmost Constitutions of things, what *Ideas* they may receive of them, far different from our's, we know

not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want several other views of them, besides those we have, to make Discoveries of them more perfect. And we may be convinc'd that the *Ideas* we can attain to by our Faculties, are very disproportionate to things themselves, when a positive clear distinct one of Substance it self, which is the Foundation of all the rest, is conceal'd from us. But want of *Ideas* of this kind being a Part as well as Cause of our Ignorance, cannot be describ'd. Only this, I think, I may confidently say of it, that the intellectual and sensible World, are in this perfectly alike; That that part, which we see of either of them, holds no proportion with what we see not; and whatsoever we can reach with our Eyes, or our Thoughts, of either of them, is but a point, almost nothing in comparison of the rest.

Because of
their Remote-
ness; or,

§. 24. Secondly, Another great Cause of Ignorance, is the want of *Ideas* we are capable of. As the want of *Ideas*, which our Faculties are not able to give us, shuts us wholly from those views of things, which 'tis reasonable to think other Beings, perfecter than we, have, of which we know nothing; so the want of *Ideas* I now speak of, keeps us in ignorance of things we conceive capable of being known to us. *Bulk*, *Figure*, and *Motion*, we have *Ideas* of. But tho' we are not without *Ideas* of these primary Qualities of Bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the particular *Bulk*, *Figure*, and *Motion*, of the greatest part of the Bodies of the Universe, we are ignorant of the several Powers, Efficacies, and Ways of Operations, whereby the Effects, which we daily see, are produc'd. These are hid from us in some things, by being *too remote*; and in others, by being *too minute*. When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the World, and the Reasons we have to think, that what lies within our ken, is but a small part of the immense Universe, we shall then discover an huge Abyss of Ignorance. What are the particular Fabricks of the great Masses of Matter, which make up the whole stupendous Frame of corporeal Beings, how far they are extended, what is their Motion, and how continu'd or communicated, and what influence they have one upon another, are Contemplations that at first glimpse our Thoughts lose themselves in. If we narrow our Contemplation, and confine our Thoughts to this little Canton, I mean this System of our Sun, and the grosser Masses of Matter, that visibly move above it; what several sorts of Vegetables, Animals, and intellectual corporeal Beings, infinitely different from those of our little spot of Earth, may there probably be in the other Planets, to the knowledg of which, even of their outward Figures and Parts, we can no way attain, whilst we are confin'd to this Earth; there being no natural Means, either by Sensation or Reflection, to convey their certain *Ideas* into our Minds? They are out of the reach of those Inlets of all our Knowledg: and what sorts of Furniture and Inhabitants those Mansions contain in them, we cannot so much as guess, much less have clear and distinct *Ideas* of them.

Because of
their Minute-
ness.

§. 25. If a great, nay, far the greatest part of the several Ranks of *Bodies* in the Universe, scape our notice by their Remoteness, there are others that are no less conceal'd from us by their *Minuteness*. These insensible Corpuscles being the active Parts of Matter, and the great Instruments of Nature, on which depend not only all their secondary Qualities, but also most of their natural Operations; our want of precise distinct *Ideas* of their primary Qualities, keeps us in an incurable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could discover the Figure, Size, Texture, and Motion of the minute constituent parts of any two Bodies, we should know without trial several of their Operations one upon another, as we do now the Properties of a Square or a Triangle. Did we know the mechanical Affection of the Particles of *Rhubarb*, *Hemlock*, *Opium*, as a Man, as a Watch-maker, does those of a Watch, whereby it performs its Operations, and of a File which by rubbing on them will alter the Figure of any of the Wheels; we should be able to tell beforehand, that *Rhubarb* will purge, *Hemlock* kill, and *Opium* make a Man sleep, as well as a Watch-maker can, that a little piece of Paper laid on the Ballance will keep the Watch from going, till it be remov'd; or that some small part of it being rub'd by a File, the Machine would quite lose its Motion, and the Watch go no more. The dissolving of Silver in *Aqua Fortis*, and Gold in *Aqua Regia*, and not *vice versa*, would be then perhaps no more difficult to know, than

it

it is to a Smith to understand why the turning of one Key will open a Lock, and not the turning of another. But whilst we are destitute of Senses acute enough to discover the minute Particles of Bodies, and to give us *Ideas* of their mechanical Affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their Properties and ways of Operation; nor can we be assur'd about them any farther, than some few trials we make, are able to reach. But whether they will succeed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain Knowledge of universal Truths concerning natural Bodies: and our Reason carries us here- in very little beyond particular matter of fact.

§. 26. And therefore I am apt to doubt, that how far soever human Industry may advance useful and *experimental Philosophy in physical things, scientific* will still be out of our reach; because we want perfect and adequate *Ideas* of those very Bodies which are nearest to us, and most under our command. Those which we have rank'd into Classes under names, and we think our selves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and incomplete *Ideas* of. Distinct *Ideas* of the several sorts of Bodies that fall under the examination of our Senses, perhaps we may have: but adequate *Ideas*, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And tho' the former of these will serve us for common Use and Discourse, yet whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of *scientific Knowledge*; nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable Truths concerning them. *Certainty* and *Demonstration* are things we must not, in these matters, pretend to. By the Colour, Figure, Taste, and Smell, and other sensible Qualities, we have as clear and distinct *Ideas* of Sage and Hemlock, as we have of a Circle and a Triangle: But having no *Ideas* of the particular primary Qualities of the minute Parts of either of these Plants, nor of other Bodies which we would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will produce; nor when we see those effects, can we so much as guess, much less know, their manner of production. Thus having no *Ideas* of the particular mechanical Affections of the minute Parts of Bodies that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their Constitutions, Powers, and Operations: and of Bodies more remote, we are yet more ignorant, not knowing so much as their very outward Shapes, or the sensible and grosser parts of their Constitutions.

Hence no Science of Bodies.

§. 27. This, at first sight, will shew us how disproportionate our Knowledge is to the whole extent even of material Beings; to which if we add the Consideration of that infinite number of *Spirits* that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our Knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance, nor can frame to our selves any distinct *Ideas* of their several Ranks and Sorts, we shall find this cause of Ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable obscurity, almost the whole Intellectual World; a greater certainly, and more beautiful World than the material. For baring some very few, and those, if I may so call them, superficial *Ideas* of Spirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all Spirits, the eternal independent Author of them and us and all things; we have no certain Information, so much as of the Existence of other Spirits, but by Revelation. Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery: And all those Intelligences, whereof 'tis likely there are more Orders than of corporeal Substances, are things whereof our natural Faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are Minds and thinking Beings in other Men as well as himself, every Man has a Reason, from their Words and Actions, to be satisfy'd: And the Knowledge of his own Mind cannot suffer a Man, that considers, to be ignorant, that there is a GOD. But that there are degrees of Spiritual Beings between us and the great GOD, who is there that by his own Search and Ability can come to know? Much less have we distinct *Ideas* of their different Natures, Conditions, States, Powers, and several Constitutions, wherein they agree or differ from one another, and from us. And therefore in what concerns their different Species and Properties, we are under an absolute ignorance.

Much less of Spirits.

§. 28. Secondly, What a small part of the substantial Beings that are in the Universe, the want of *Ideas* leave open to our Knowledge, we have seen. In the next place, another cause of Ignorance, of no less moment, is a want of a discoverable Connection between those *Ideas* we have: For wherever we want that,

Secondly, Want of a discoverable Connection between Ideas we we have.

we are utterly incapable of universal and certain Knowledge; and are, as in the former case, left only to Observation and Experiment: which, how narrow and confin'd it is, how far from general Knowledge, we need not be told. I shall give some few Instances of this cause of our Ignorance, and so leave it. 'Tis evident that the Bulk, Figure, and Motion of several Bodies about us, produce in us several Sensations, as of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, Pleasure and Pain, &c. These mechanical Affections of Bodies having no affinity at all with those *Ideas* they produce in us (there being no conceivable Connection between any Impulse of any sort of Body, and any Perception of a Colour, or Smell, which we find in our Minds) we can have no distinct Knowledge of such Operations beyond our Experience; and can reason no otherwise about them, than as effects produc'd by the Appointment of an infinitely wise Agent, which perfectly surpasses our Comprehensions. As the *Ideas* of sensible secondary Qualities which we have in our Minds, can by us be no way deduc'd from bodily Causes, nor any Correspondence or Connection be found between them and those primary Qualities which (Experience shews us) produce them in us; so on the other side, the Operation of our Minds upon our Bodies is as unconceivable. How any Thought should produce a Motion in Body, is as remote from the Nature of our *Ideas*, as how any Body should produce any Thought in the Mind. That it is so, if Experience did not convince us, the Consideration of the things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us. These, and the like, tho' they have a constant and regular Connection, in the ordinary course of things; yet that Connection being not discoverable in the *Ideas* themselves, which appearing to have no necessary dependance one on another, we can attribute their Connection to nothing else but the arbitrary Determination of that All-wise Agent, who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak Understandings to conceive.

Instances.

§. 39. In some of our *Ideas* there are certain Relations, Habitues, and Connections, so visibly included in the Nature of the *Ideas* themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any Power whatsoever. And in these only we are capable of certain and universal Knowledge. Thus the *Idea* of a right-lin'd Triangle necessarily carries within it an Equality of its Angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this Relation, this Connection of these two *Ideas*, to be possibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary Power, which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwise. But the Coherence and Continuity of the Parts of Matter; the Production of Sensation in us of Colours and Sounds, &c. by Impulse and Motion; nay, the original Rules and Communication of Motion being such, wherein we can discover no natural Connection with any *Ideas* we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleasure of the wise Architect. I need not, I think, here mention the Resurrection of the Dead, the future State of this Globe of Earth, and such other things, which are by every one acknowledg'd to depend wholly on the Determination of a free Agent. The things that, as far as our Observation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a Law set them; but yet by a Law that we know not: whereby, tho' Causes work steddily, and Effects constantly flow from them, yet their Connections and Dependencies being not discoverable in our *Ideas*, we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them. From all which 'tis easy to perceive what a darkness we are involv'd in, how little 'tis of Being, and the things that are, that we are capable to know. And therefore we shall do no Injury to our Knowledge, when we modestly think with our selves, that we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole Nature of the Universe, and all the things contain'd in it, that we are not capable of a philosophical Knowledge of the Bodies that are about us, and make a part of us: concerning their secondary Qualities, Powers, and Operations, we can have no universal Certainty. Several Effects come every day within the Notice of our Senses, of which we have so far *sensitive* Knowledge; but the Causes, Manner, and Certainty of their Production, for the two foregoing Reasons, we must be content to be ignorant of. In these we can go no farther than particular Experience informs us of matter of fact, and by Analogy to guess what Effects the like Bodies are, upon other trials, like to produce. But as to a perfect Science of natural Bodies (not to mention spiritual

ritual Beings) we are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing, that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it.

§. 30. *Thirdly*, Where we have adequate *Ideas*, and where there is a certain and discoverable Connection between them, yet we are often ignorant, for want of tracing those *Ideas* which we have, or may have; and for want of finding out those intermediate *Ideas*, which may shew us what Habitude of Agreement or Disagreement they have one with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical Truths, not out of any Imperfection of their Faculties, or Uncertainty in the things themselves; but for want of Application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those *Ideas*. That which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our *Ideas*, and finding out their Relations, and Agreements or Disagreements one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of *Words*. It is impossible that Men should ever truly seek or certainly discover the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* themselves, whilst their Thoughts flutter about, or stick only in Sounds of doubtful and uncertain Significations. Mathematicians abstracting their Thoughts from Names, and accustoming themselves to set before their Minds the *Ideas* themselves that they would consider, and not Sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that Perplexity, Puddering, and Confusion, which has so much hinder'd Mens progress in other parts of Knowledge. For whilst they stick in Words of undetermin'd and uncertain Signification, they are unable to distinguish True from False, Certain from Probable, Consistent from Inconsistent, in their own Opinions. This having been the Fate or Misfortune of a great part of the Men of Letters, the Increase brought into the Stock of real Knowledge, has been very little, in proportion to the Schools, Disputes, and Writings, the World has been fill'd with; whilst Students, being lost in the great Wood of Words, knew not whereabout they were, how far their Discoveries were advanc'd, or what was wanting in their own or the general Stock of Knowledge. Had Men in the Discoveries of the material, done as they have in those of the intellectual World, involv'd all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful ways of talking, Volumes writ of Navigation and Voyages, Theories and Stories of Zones and Tydes, multiply'd and disputed; nay, Ships built, and Fleets set out, would never have taught us the way beyond the Line; and the Antipodes would be still as much unknown, as when it was declar'd Heresy to hold there were any. But having spoken sufficiently of Words, and the ill or careless use that is commonly made of them, I shall not say any thing more of it here.

Thirdly, Want of tracing our Ideas.

§. 31. Hitherto we have examined the *Extent* of our Knowledge, in respect of the several sorts of Beings that are. There is another *Extent* of it, in respect of *Universality*, which will also deserve to be consider'd; and in this regard, our Knowledge follows the Nature of our *Ideas*. If the *Ideas* are abstracted, whose Agreement or Disagreement we perceive, our Knowledge is universal. For what is known of such general *Ideas*, will be true of every particular thing, in whom that Essence, *i. e.* that abstract *Idea* is to be found; and what is once known of such *Ideas*, will be perpetually and for ever true. So that as to all general Knowledge, we must search and find it only in our own Minds, and 'tis only the examining of our own *Ideas*, that furnisheth us with that. Truths belonging to Essences of things (that is, to abstract *Ideas*) are eternal, and are to be found out by the Contemplation only of those Essences: as the Existence of things is to be known only from Experience. But having more to say of this in the Chapters where I shall speak of general and real Knowledge, this may here suffice as to the Universality of our Knowledge in general.

Extent in respect of Universality.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Reality of Knowledge.

§. 1. I Doubt not but my Reader by this Time may be apt to think, that I have been all this while only building a Castle in the Air; and be ready to say to me, To what purpose all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the Percep-

Obj. Knowledge placed in Ideas may be all bare Vision

tion

tion of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own *Ideas*: but who knows what those *Ideas* may be? Is there any thing so extravagant, as the Imaginations of Mens Brains? Where is the Head that has no *Chimera's* in it? Or if there be a sober and a wise Man, what difference will there be, by your Rules, between his Knowledge and that of the most extravagant Fancy in the World? They both have their *Ideas*, and perceive their Agreement and Disagreement one with another. If there be any difference between them, the advantage will be on the warm-headed Man's side, as having the more *Ideas*, and the more lively: And so, by your Rules, he will be the more knowing. If it be true, that all Knowledge lies only in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own *Ideas*, the Visions of an Enthusiast, and the Reasonings of a sober Man, will be equally certain. 'Tis no Matter how things are; so a Man observe but the Agreement of his own Imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all Truth, all Certainty. Such Castles in the Air, will be as strong Holds of Truth, as the Demonstrations of *Euclid*. That an Harpy is not a Centaur, is by this way as certain Knowledge, and as much a Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle.

But of what use is all this fine Knowledge of Mens own Imaginations, to a Man that enquires after the reality of things? It matters not what Mens Fancies are, 'tis the Knowledge of Things that is only to be priz'd; 'tis this alone gives a Value to our Reasonings, and Preference to one Man's Knowledge over another's; that it is of Things as they really are, and not of Dreams and Fancies.

Answ. Not so, where *Ideas* agree with Things.

§. 2. To which I answer, That if our Knowledge of our *Ideas* terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is something farther intended, our most serious Thoughts will be of little more use, than the Reveries of a crazy Brain; and the Truths built thereon of no more weight, than the Discourses of a Man who sees things clearly in a Dream, and with great assurance utters them. But, I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this way of Certainty, by the Knowledge of our own *Ideas*, goes a little farther than bare Imagination: and, I believe it will appear, that all the Certainty of general Truths a Man has, lies in nothing else.

Answ. Not so, where *Ideas* agree with Things.

§. 3. 'Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but only by the intervention of the *Ideas* it has of them. Our Knowledge therefore is *real*, only so far as there is a Conformity between our *Ideas* and the Reality of Things. But what shall be here the Criterion? How shall the Mind, when it perceives nothing but its own *Ideas*, know that they agree with Things themselves? This, tho' it seems not to want difficulty, yet, I think, there be two sorts of *Ideas*, that, we may be assur'd, agree with Things.

As, 1. All simple *Ideas* do.

§. 4. First, The first are simple *Ideas*, which since the Mind, as has been shew'd, can by no means make it to self, must necessarily be the Product of Things operating on the Mind in a natural way, and producing therein those Perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are ordain'd and adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple *Ideas* are not *Fictions* of our Fancies, but the natural and regular Productions of Things without us, really operating upon us, and so carry with them all the Conformity which is intended, or which our State requires: For they represent to us Things under those Appearances which they are fitted to produce in us, whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular Substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for our Necessities, and apply them to our Uses. Thus the *Idea* of Whiteness, or Bitterness, as it is in the Mind, exactly answering that Power which is in any Body to produce it there, has all the real Conformity it can, or ought to have, with things without us. And this Conformity between our simple *Ideas*, and the Existence of Things, is sufficient for real Knowledge.

2. All complex *Ideas*, except of Substances.

§. 5. Secondly, All our complex *Ideas*, except those of Substances, being *Archetypes* of the Mind's own making, not intended to be the Copies of any thing, nor refer'd to the Existence of any thing, as to their Originals, cannot want any Conformity necessary to real Knowledge. For that which is not design'd to represent any thing but it self, can never be capable of a wrong Representation, nor mislead us from the true Apprehension of any thing, by its Dis likeness to it; and such, excepting those of Substances, are all our complex *Ideas*: Which, as I have shew'd in another place, are Combinations of *Ideas*, which the Mind, by its

its free Choice, put together, without considering any Connection they have in nature. And hence it is, that in all these sorts the *Ideas* themselves are consider'd as the *Archetypes*, and things no otherwise regarded, but as they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the Knowledge we attain concerning these *Ideas*, is real, and reaches Things themselves; because in all our Thoughts, Reasonings and Discourses of this kind, we intend things no farther than as they are conformable to our *Ideas*. So that in these we cannot miss of a certain undoubted reality.

§. 6. I doubt not but it will be easily granted, that the Knowledge we have of *Mathematical Truths*, is not only certain, but *real Knowledge*; and not the bare empty Vision of vain insignificant *Chimeras* of the Brain: And yet, if we will consider, we shall find that it is only of our own *Ideas*. The Mathematician considers the Truth and Properties belonging to a Rectangle, or Circle, only as they are in *Idea* in his own Mind. For 'tis possible he never found either of them existing mathematically, *i. e.* precisely true, in his Life. But yet the Knowledge he has of any Truths or Properties belonging to a Circle, or any other mathematical Figure, are nevertheless true and certain, even of real things existing; because real things are no farther concern'd, nor intended to be meant by any such Propositions, than as things really agree to those *Archetypes* in his Mind. Is it true of the *Idea* of a *Triangle*, that its three Angles are equal to two right ones? It is true also of a *Triangle*, wherever it really exists. Whatever other Figure exists, that is not exactly answerable to that *Idea* of a *Triangle* in his Mind, is not at all concern'd in that Proposition: And therefore he is certain all his Knowledge concerning such *Ideas*, is real Knowledge; because intending things no farther than they agree with those his *Ideas*, he is sure what he knows concerning those Figures, when they have barely an *Ideal existence* in his Mind, will hold true of them also, when they have a real Existence in Matter; his Consideration being barely of those Figures, which are the same, wherever or however they exist.

§. 7. And hence it follows, that *moral Knowledge* is as capable of real Certainty, as *Mathematics*. For Certainty being but the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas*; and Demonstration nothing but the Perception of such Agreement, by the Intervention of other *Ideas*, or Mediums; our *moral Ideas*, as well as mathematical, being *Archetypes* themselves, and so adequate and compleat *Ideas*; all the Agreement or Disagreement, which we shall find in them, will produce real Knowledge, as well as in mathematical Figures.

§. 8. For the attaining of Knowledge and Certainty, it is requisite that we have determin'd *Ideas*; and to make our Knowledge *real*, it is requisite that the *Ideas* answer their *Archetypes*. Nor let it be wonder'd, that I place the Certainty of our Knowledge in the Consideration of our *Ideas*, with so little Care and Regard (as it may seem) to the real Existence of Things: Since most of those Discourses, which take up the Thoughts, and engage the Disputes of those who pretend to make it their Business to enquire after Truth and Certainty, will, I presume, upon examination, be found to be *general Propositions*, and Notions in which Existence is not at all concern'd. All the Discourses of the Mathematicians about the squaring of a Circle, Conick Sections, or any other part of *Mathematics*, concern not the Existence of any of those Figures; but their Demonstrations, which depend on their *Ideas*, are the same, whether there be any Square or Circle existing in the World, or no. In the same manner, the Truth and Certainty of *moral* Discourses abstracts from the Lives of Men, and the Existence of those Vertues in the World whereof they treat. Nor are *Tully's* Offices less true, because there is no Body in the World that exactly practises his Rules, and lives up to that Pattern of a virtuous Man which he has given us, and which existed no where, when he writ, but in *Idea*. If it be true in Speculation, *i. e.* in *Idea*, that *Murder deserves Death*, it will also be true in reality of any Action that exists conformable to that *Idea* of *Murder*. As for other Actions, the Truth of that Proposition concerns them not. And thus it is of all other Species of Things, which have no other Essence but those *Ideas* which are in the Minds of Men.

§. 9. But it will here be said, that if *moral Knowledge* be plac'd in the Contemplation of our own *moral Ideas*, and those, as other Modes, be of our own making,

Hence the
Reality of
Mathematical
Know-
ledg.

And of Mo-
ral,

Existence not
required to
make it real.

Nor will it be
less true or
certain, be-
cause moral
Ideas are of
our own mak-
ing and nam-
ing.

making, what strange Notions will there be of *Justice* and *Temperance*? What Confusion of Vertues and Vices, if every one may make what *Idea* of them he pleases? No Confusion nor Disorder in the things themselves, nor the Reasonings about them; no more than (in Mathematicks) there would be a Disturbance in the Demonstration, or a Change in the Properties of Figures, and their Relations one to another, if a Man should make a Triangle with four Corners, or a Trapezium with four right Angles; that is, in plain *English*, change the Names of the Figures, and call that by one Name, which Mathematicians call ordinarily by another. For let a Man make to himself the *Idea* of a Figure with three Angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, *Equilateralum* or *Trapezium*, or any thing else, the Properties of, and Demonstrations about that *Idea* will be the same, as if he call'd it a *Rectangular Triangle*. I confess the change of the Name, by the impropriety of Speech, will at first disturb him, who knows not what *Idea* it stands for; but as soon as the Figure is drawn, the Consequences and Demonstration are plain and clear. Just the same is it in moral Knowledg, let a Man have the *Idea* of taking from others, without their Consent, what their honest Industry has possess'd them of, and call this *Justice*, if he please. He that takes the Name here without the *Idea* put to it, will be mistaken, by joining another *Idea* of his own to that Name: But strip the *Idea* of that Name, or take it such as it is in the Speaker's Mind, and the same Things will agree to it, as if you call'd it *Injustice*. Indeed wrong Names in moral Discourses breed usually more Disorder, because they are not so easily rectify'd as in Mathematicks, where the Figure once drawn and seen, makes the Name uselefs and of no Force. For what need of a Sign, when the thing signify'd is present and in view? But in moral Names that cannot be so easily and shortly done, because of the many Decompositions that go to the making up the complex *Ideas* of those Modes. But yet for all this, *miscalling* of any of those *Ideas*, contrary to the usual signification of the words of that Language, hinders not, but that we may have certain and demonstrative Knowledg of their several Agreements or Disagreements, if we will carefully, as in Mathematicks, keep to the same precise *Ideas*, and trace them in their several Relations one to another, without being led away by their Names. If we but separate the *Idea* under consideration from the Sign that stands for it, our Knowledg goes equally on in the Discovery of real Truth and Certainty, whatever Sounds we make use of.

Misnaming
disturbs not
the Certainty
of the Know-
ledg.

§. 10. One thing more we are to take notice of, That where GOD, or any other Law-maker, hath defin'd any moral Names, there they have made the Essence of that Species to which that Name belongs; and there it is not safe to apply or use them otherwise: But in other Cases, 'tis bare Impropriety of Speech to apply them contrary to the common Usage of the Country. But yet even this too disturbs not the Certainty of that Knowledg, which is still to be had by a due Contemplation, and comparing of those even nick-nam'd *Ideas*.

Ideas of Sub-
stances have
their Arche-
types without
us.

§. 11. Thirdly, There is another sort of complex *Ideas*, which being refer'd to *Archetypes* without us, may differ from them, and so our Knowledg about them may come short of being real. Such are our *Ideas* of Substances, which consisting of a Collection of simple *Ideas*, suppos'd taken from the Works of Nature, may yet vary from them, by having more or different *Ideas* united in them, than are to be found united in the things themselves. From whence it comes to pass, that they may, and often do fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves.

So far as they
agree with
those, so far
our Knowledg
concerning
them is real.

§. 12. I say then, that to have *Ideas* of Substances, which, by being conformable to things, may afford us real Knowledg, it is not enough, as in Modes, to put together such *Ideas* as have no Inconsistence, tho' they did never before so exist: v. g. the *Ideas* of *Sacrilege* or *Perjury*, &c. were as real and true *Ideas* before, as after the Existence of any such Fact. But our *Ideas* of Substances being suppos'd Copies, and refer'd to *Archetypes* without us, must still be taken from something that does or has existed; they must not consist of *Ideas* put together at the pleasure of our thoughts, without any real Pattern they were taken from, tho' we can perceive no Inconsistence in such a Combination. The reason whereof is, because we knowing not what real Constitution it is of Substances, whereon our simple *Ideas* depend, and which really is the Cause of the

strict

strict Union of some of them one with another, and the Exclusion of others ; there are very few of them, that we can be sure are, or are not inconsistent in Nature, any farther than Experience and sensible Observation reach. Herein therefore is founded the *Reality* of our Knowledg concerning *Substances*, that all our complex *Ideas* of them must be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones, as have been discover'd to co-exist in Nature. And our *Ideas* being thus true, tho' not perhaps, very exact Copies, are yet the Subjects of *real* (as far as we have any) *Knowledg* of them. Which (as has been already shewn) will not be found to reach very far : But so far as it does, it will still be *real Knowledg*. Whatever *Ideas* we have, the Agreement we find they have with others, will still be *Knowledg*. If those *Ideas* be abstract, it will be general *Knowledg*. But to make it *real* concerning *Substances*, the *Ideas* must be taken from the real Existence of things. Whatever simple *Ideas* have been found to co-exist in any Substance, these we may with confidence join together again, and so make abstract *Ideas* of *Substances*. For whatever have once had an union in Nature, may be united again.

§. 13. This, if we rightly consider, and *confine not our Thoughts* and abstract *Ideas* to Names, as if there were, or could be no other *Sorts* of things than what known Names had already determin'd, and as it were set out, we should think of things with greater Freedom and less Confusion than perhaps we do. It would possibly be thought a bold Paradox, if not a very dangerous Fallhood, if I should say, that some *Changelings*, who have liv'd forty Years together without any appearance of Reason, are something between a Man and a Beast : Which Prejudices is founded upon nothing else but a false Supposition, that these two Names, *Man* and *Beast*, stand for distinct Species so set out by real Essences, that there can come no other Species between them. Whereas if we will abstract from those Names, and the Supposition of such specifick Essences made by Nature, wherein all things of the same Denominations did exactly and equally partake ; if we would not fancy that there were a certain number of these Essences, wherein all things, as in Molds, were cast and form'd, we should find that the *Idea* of the Shape, Motion, and Life of a Man without Reason, is as much a distinct *Idea*, and makes as much a distinct *sort* of things from Man and Beast, as the *Idea* of the Shape of an *Ass* with Reason, would be different from either that of Man or Beast, and be a Species of an Animal between, or distinct from both.

In our Enquiries about Substances, we must consider Ideas, and not confine our Thoughts to Names or Species suppos'd set out by Names.

§. 14. Here every body will be ready to ask, If *Changelings* may be suppos'd something between Man and Beast, pray what are they ? I answer, *Changelings*, which is as good a Word to signify something different from the Signification of *MAN* or *BEAST*, as the Names *Man* and *Beast* are to have Significations different one from the other. This, well consider'd, would resolve this matter, and shew my meaning without any more ado. But I am not so unacquainted with the Zeal of some Men, which enables them to spin Consequences, and to see Religion threaten'd whenever any one ventures to quit their Forms of Speaking, as not to foresee what Names such a Proposition as this is like to be charg'd with : And without doubt it will be ask'd, If *Changelings* are something between Man and Beast, what will become of them in the other World ? To which I answer, 1. It concerns me not to know or enquire. To their own Master they stand or fall. It will make their state neither better nor worse, whether we determine any thing of it or no. They are in the hands of a faithful Creator and a bountiful Father, who disposes not of his Creatures according to our narrow Thoughts or Opinions, nor distinguishes them according to Names and Species of our Contrivance. And we that know so little of this present World we are in, may, I think, content our selves without being peremptory in defining the different states, which Creatures shall come into when they go off this Stage. It may suffice us, that he hath made known to all those, who are capable of Instruction, Discourse and Reasoning, that they shall come to an Account, and receive according to what they have done in this Body.

Objection against a Changeling, being something between a Man and Beast, answer'd.

§. 15. But, *Secondly*, I answer, The Force of these mens Question (*viz.* Will you deprive *Changelings* of a future State ?) is founded on one of these two Suppositions, which are both false. The first is, That all things that have the out-

ward Shape and Appearance of a Man must necessarily be design'd to an immortal future Being after this Life: Or, secondly, that whatever is of human Birth must be so. Take away these Imaginations, and such Questions will be groundless and ridiculous. I desire then those who think there is no more but an accidental difference between themselves and *Changelings*, the Essence in both being exactly the same, to consider whether they can imagine Immortality annex'd to any outward Shape of the Body; the very proposing it, is, I suppose, enough to make them disown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much soever immers'd in Matter, allow'd that Excellency to any Figure of the gross sensible outward Parts, as to affirm eternal Life due to it, or a necessary Consequence of it; or that any Mass of Matter should, after its Dissolution here, be again restor'd hereafter to an everlasting State of Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, only because it was molded into this or that Figure, and had such a particular frame of its visible Parts. Such an Opinion as this, placing Immortality in a certain superficial Figure, turns out of doors all consideration of Soul or Spirit, upon whose account alone some corporeal Beings have hitherto been concluded immortal, and others not. This is to attribute more to the outside than inside of things; to place the Excellency of a Man more in the external Shape of his Body, than internal Perfections of his Soul: which is but little better than to annex the great and inestimable Advantage of Immortality and Life everlasting, which he has above other material Beings; to annex it, I say to cut off his Beard, or the Fashion of his Coat. For this or that outward Make of our Bodies no more carries with it the Hopes of an eternal Duration, than the Fashion of a Man's Suit gives him reasonable grounds to imagine it will never wear out, or that it will make him immortal. 'Twill perhaps be said, that no body thinks that the Shape makes any thing immortal, but 'tis the Shape is the Sign of a rational Soul within, which is immortal. I wonder who made it the Sign of any such thing: for barely saying it, will not make it so. It would require some Proofs to persuade one of it. No Figure that I know speaks any such Language. For it may as rationally be concluded, that the dead Body of a Man, wherein there is to be found no more Appearance or Action of Life than there is in a Statue, has yet nevertheless a living Soul in it because of its Shape; as that there is a rational Soul in a *Changeling*, because he has the Outside of a rational Creature, when his Actions carry far less Marks of Reason with them, in the whole Course of his Life, than what are to be found in many a Beast.

Monsters.

§. 16. But 'tis the Issue of rational Parents, and must therefore be concluded to have a rational Soul. I know not by what Logick you must so conclude. I am sure this is a Conclusion, that Men no where allow of. For if they did, they would not make bold, as every where they do, to destroy ill-form'd and mis-shap'd Productions. Ay, but these are *Monsters*. Let them be so; What will your driveling, unintelligent, intractable *Changeling* be? Shall a Defect in the Body make a *Monster*: a Defect in the Mind (the far more Noble, and in the common Phrase, the far more Essential Part) not? Shall the want of a Nose or a Neck make a *Monster*, and put such Issue out of the rank of Men; the want of Reason and Understanding, not? This is to bring all back again to what was exploded just now: This is to place all in the Shape, and to take the Measure of a Man only by his Outside. To shew that, according to the ordinary way of Reasoning in this matter, People do lay the whole stress on the Figure, and resolve the whole Essence of the Species of Man (as they make it) into the outward Shape, how unreasonable soever it be, and how much soever they disown it; we need but trace their Thoughts and Practice a little farther, and then it will plainly appear. The well-shap'd *Changeling* is a Man, has a rational Soul, tho' it appear not; this is past doubt, say you. Make the Ears a little longer, and more pointed, and the Nose a little flatter than ordinary, and then you begin to boggle: Make the Face yet narrower, flatter, and longer, and then you are at a stand: Add still more and more of the Likeness of a Brute to it, and let the Head be perfectly that of some other Animal, then presently 'tis a *Monster*; and 'tis Demonstration with you that it hath no rational Soul, and must be destroy'd. Where now (I ask) shall be the just measure of the utmost Bounds of that Shape, that carries with it

it a rational Soul? For since there have been human *Fœtus*'s produc'd, half Beast, and half Man; and others three parts one, and one part t'other; and so it is possible they may be in all the variety of Approaches to the one or the other Shape, and may have several degrees of Mixture of the Likeness of a Man or a Brute; I would gladly know what are those precise Lineaments, which according to this Hypothesis, are, or are not capable of a rational Soul to be join'd to them? What sort of Outside is the certain Sign that there is, or is not such an Inhabitant within? For till that be done, we talk at random of *Man*: and shall always, I fear, do so, as long as we give our selves up to certain Sounds, and the Imaginations of settled and fix'd Species in Nature, we know not what. But after all, I desire it may be consider'd, that those who think they have answer'd the Difficulty, by telling us, that a mis-shap'd *Fœtus* is a *Monster*, run into the same Fault they are arguing against, by constituting a Species between Man and Beast. For what else, I pray, is their Monster in the case (if the word *Monster* signifies any thing at all) but something neither Man nor Beast, but partaking somewhat of either? And just so is the *Changing* before mention'd. So necessary is it to quit the common Notion of Species and Essences, if we will truly look into the Nature of things, and examine them, by what our Faculties can discover in them as they exist, and not by groundless Fancies, that have been taken up about them.

§. 17. I have mention'd this here, because I think we cannot be too cautious *Words and* that *Words* and *Species*, in the ordinary Notions which we have been us'd to of *Species*. them, impose not on us. For I am apt to think, therein lies one great obstacle to our clear and distinct Knowledg, especially in reference to Substances; and from thence has rose a great part of the Difficulties about Truth and Certainty. Would we accustom our selves to separate our Contemplations and Reasonings from Words, we might, in a great measure, remedy this Inconvenience within our own Thoughts: But yet it would still disturb us in our Discourse with others, as long as we retain'd the Opinion, that *Species* and their Essences were any thing else but our abstract *Ideas* (such as they are) with Names annex'd to them, to be the signs of them.

§. 18. Wherever we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our *Ideas*, there is certain Knowledg: and wherever we are sure those *Ideas* agree *Recapitulation* with the reality of things, there is certain real Knowledg. Of which Agreement of our *Ideas* with the reality of things, having here given the Marks, I think I have shewn wherein it is, that *Certainty*, *real Certainty*, consists: Which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess, to me heretofore, one of those *Desiderata* which I found great want of.

C H A P. V.

Of Truth in general.

§. 1. **W**HAT is *Truth*, was an Enquiry many Ages since; and it being *What Truth* that which all Mankind either do, or pretend to search after, it *is*. cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it consists, and so acquaint our selves with the Nature of it, as to observe how the Mind distinguishes it from Falshood.

§. 2. *Truth* then seems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to signify *A right joining or separating of Signs, as the things signify'd by them, do agree or disagree one with another.* The *joining or separating of Signs* here meant, is what by another name we call Proposition. So that *Truth* properly belongs only to Propositions: whereof there are two sorts, *viz.* Mental and Verbal; as there are two sorts of Signs commonly made use of, *viz.* *Ideas* and Words.

§. 3. To form a clear Notion of *Truth*, it is very necessary to consider *Truth* *Which make* of Thought, and *Truth* of Words, distinctly one from another: but yet it is *mental or verbal Propositions.* very difficult to treat of them asunder. Because it is unavoidable, in treating of mental Propositions, to make use of Words: and then the Instances given

of *mental Propositions* cease immediately to be barely *Mental*, and become *Verbal*. For a *mental Proposition* being nothing but a bare Consideration of the *Ideas*, as they are in our Minds strip'd of Names, they lose the Nature of purely *mental Propositions*, as soon as they are put into Words.

Mental Propositions are very hard to be treated of.

§. 4. And that which makes it yet *harder to treat of mental and verbal Propositions separately*, is, That most Men, if not all, in their Thinking and Reasonings within themselves, make use of Words instead of *Ideas*; at least when the Subject of their Meditation contains in it complex *Ideas*. Which is a great Evidence of the Imperfection and Uncertainty of our *Ideas* of that kind, and may, if attentively made use of, serve for a Mark to shew us, what are those things we have clear and perfect establish'd *Ideas* of, and what not. For if we will curiously observe the way our Mind takes in Thinking and Reasoning, we shall find, I suppose, that when we make any Propositions within our own Thoughts about *White* or *Black*, *Sweet* or *Bitter*, a *Triangle* or a *Circle*, we can and often do frame in our Minds the *Ideas* themselves, without reflecting on the Names. But when we would consider, or make Propositions about the more complex *Ideas*, as of a *Man*, *Vitriol*, *Fortitude*, *Glory*, we usually put the Name for the *Idea*: Because the *Ideas* these Names stand for, being for the most part imperfect, confus'd, and undetermin'd, we reflect on the Names themselves, because they are more clear, certain and distinct, and readier occur to our Thoughts than the pure *Ideas*: and so we make use of these Words instead of the *Ideas* themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within our selves, and make tacit mental Propositions. In *Substances*, as has been already noted, this is occasion'd by the Imperfection of our *Ideas*: we making the Name stand for the real Essence, of which we have no *Idea* at all. In *Modes*, it is occasion'd by the great Number of simple *Ideas*, that go to the making them up. For many of them being compounded, the Name occurs much easier than the complex *Idea* it self, which requires Time and Attention to be recollected, and exactly represented to the Mind, even in those Men who have formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impossible to be done by those, who, tho' they have ready in their Memory the greatest part of the common Words of their Language, yet perhaps never troubled themselves in all their Lives to consider what precise *Ideas* the most of them stood for. Some confus'd or obscure Notions have serv'd their turns; and many who talk very much of *Religion* and *Conscience*, of *Church* and *Faith*, of *Power* and *Right*, of *Obstructions* and *Humours*, *Melancholy*, and *Choler*, would perhaps have little left in their Thoughts and Meditations, if one should desire them to think only of the things themselves, and lay by those Words, with which they so often confound others, and not seldom themselves also.

Being nothing but the joining or separating Ideas without Words.

§. 5. But to return to the Consideration of Truth: We must, I say, observe two sorts of Propositions that we are capable of making.

First, *Mental*, wherein the *Ideas* in our Understandings are without the use of Words put together, or separated by the Mind, perceiving or judging of their Agreement or Disagreement.

Secondly, *Verbal Propositions*, which are Words, the Signs of our *Ideas*, put together or separated in Affirmative or Negative Sentences. By which way of affirming or denying, these Signs, made by Sounds, are as it were put together or separated one from another. So that Proposition consists in joining or separating Signs, and Truth consists in the putting together or separating those Signs, according as the things, which they stand for, agree or disagree.

When mental Propositions contain real Truth, and when verbal.

§. 6. Every one's Experience will satisfy him, that the Mind, either by perceiving or supposing the Agreement or Disagreement of any of its *Ideas*, does tacitly within it self put them into a kind of Proposition affirmative or negative, which I have endeavour'd to express by the Terms, *Putting together* and *Separating*. But this Action of the Mind, which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning Man, is easier to be conceiv'd by reflecting on what passes in us when we affirm or deny, than to be explain'd by Words. When a Man has in his Mind the *Idea* of two Lines, viz. the *Side* and *Diagonal* of a Square, whereof the *Diagonal* is an inch long, he may have the *Idea* also of the Division of that Line, into a certain Number of equal Parts; v. g. into Five, Ten, an Hundred, a Thousand, or any other Number, and may have the *Idea* of that inch

inch Line being divisible or not divisible, into such equal parts, as a certain number of them will be equal to the Side-line. Now whenever he perceives, believes, or supposes such a kind of Divisibility to agree or disagree to his *Idea* of that Line, he, as it were, *joins* or *separates* those two *Ideas*, viz. the *Idea* of that Line, and the *Idea* of that kind of Divisibility; and so makes a mental Proposition, which is true or false, according to such a kind of Divisibility, a Divisibility into such *aliquot* parts, does really agree to that Line or no. When *Ideas* are so put together, or separated in the Mind, as they, or the things they stand for do agree or not, that is, as I may call it, *mental Truth*. But *Truth* of Words is something more; and that is, the affirming or denying of Words one of another, as the *Ideas* they stand for agree or disagree: And this again is twofold; either *purely verbal* and trifling, which I shall speak of, Chap. 10. or *real* and instructive; which is the Object of that real Knowledge, which we have spoken of already.

§. 7. But here again will be apt to occur the same Doubt about Truth, that did about Knowledge: And it will be objected, That if Truth be nothing but the joining or separating of Words in Propositions, as the *Ideas* they stand for agree or disagree in Mens Minds, the Knowledge of Truth is not so valuable a Thing, as it is taken to be, nor worth the Pains and Time Men employ to the search of it; since by this account it amounts to no more than the Conformity of Words to the Chimeras of Mens Brains. Who knows not what odd Notions many Mens Heads are fill'd with, and what strange *Ideas* all Mens Brains are capable of? But if we rest here, we know the Truth of nothing by this Rule, but of the visionary World in our own Imaginations; nor have other Truth, but what as much concerns *Harpies* and *Centaur*s, as Men and Horses. For those, and the like, may be *Ideas* in our Heads, and have their Agreement and Disagreement there, as well as the *Ideas* of real Beings, and so have as true Propositions made about them. And 'twill be altogether as true a Proposition, to say all *Centaur*s are *Animals*, as that all *Men* are *Animals*; and the Certainty of one, as great as the other. For in both the Propositions, the Words are put together, according to the Agreement of the *Ideas* in our Minds: And the Agreement of the *Idea* of *Animal* with that of *Centaur*, is as clear and visible to the Mind, as the Agreement of the *Idea* of *Animal* with that of *Man*; and so these two Propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use is all such Truth to us?

§. 8. Tho' what has been said in the foregoing Chapter, to distinguish real from imaginary Knowledge, might suffice here, in answer to this Doubt, to distinguish *real Truth* from *Chimerical*, or (if you please) *barely nominal*, they depending both on the same foundation; yet it may not be amiss here again to consider, that tho' our Words signify nothing but our *Ideas*, yet being design'd by them to signify things, the Truth they contain, when put into Propositions, will be only *verbal*, when they stand for *Ideas* in the Mind, that have not an Agreement with the Reality of things. And therefore Truth, as well as Knowledge, may well come under the distinction of *Verbal* and *Real*; that being only *verbal Truth*, wherein Terms are join'd according to the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas* they stand for, without regarding whether our *Ideas* are such as really have, or are capable of having an Existence in Nature. But then it is they contain *real Truth*, when these Signs are join'd, as our *Ideas* agree; and when our *Ideas* are such, as we know are capable of having an Existence in Nature: which in Substances we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed.

§. 9. Truth is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* as it is. *Falshood* is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* otherwise than it is. And so far as these *Ideas*, thus mark'd by Sounds, agree to their Archetypes, so far only is the Truth *real*. The Knowledge of this Truth consists in knowing what *Ideas* the Words stand for, and the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of those *Ideas*, according as it is mark'd by those Words.

§. 10. But because Words are look'd on as the great Conduits of Truth and Knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of Truth, and commonly in reasoning about it, we make use of Words and Propositions, I shall more at large

Objection against verbal Truth, that thus it may all be chimerical.

Answer'd, Real Truth is about Ideas agreeing to Things.

Falshood is the joining of Names otherwise than their Ideas agree.

General Propositions to be treated of more at large.

large enquire, wherein the Certainty of real Truths, contain'd in Propositions, consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to shew in what sort of universal Propositions we are capable of being *certain* of their real Truth or Falshood.

I shall begin with general Propositions, as those which most employ our Thoughts, and exercise our Contemplation. *General Truths* are most look'd after by the Mind, as those that most enlarge our Knowledge; and by their Comprehensiveness, satisfying us at once of many Particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our way to Knowledge.

Moral and
metaphysical
Truth.

§. 11. Besides Truth taken in the strict sense before-mention'd, there are other sorts of Truths; as, 1. *Moral Truth*, which is speaking of things according to the Persuasion of our own Minds, tho' the Proposition we speak agree not to the Reality of things. 2. *Metaphysical Truth*, which is nothing but the real Existence of things, conformable to the *Ideas* to which we have annex'd their Names. This, tho' it seems to consist in the very Beings of things, yet when consider'd a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit Proposition, whereby the Mind joins that particular thing to the *Idea* it had before settled with a Name to it. But these Considerations of Truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present Purpose, it may suffice here only to have mention'd them.

C H A P. VI.

Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

Treating of
Words neces-
sary to Know-
ledg.

§. 1. **T**H O' the examining and judging of *Ideas* by themselves, their Names being quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinct Knowledge; yet thro' the prevailing Custom of using Sounds for *Ideas*, I think it is very seldom practis'd. Every one may observe how common it is for Names to be made use of, instead of the *Ideas* themselves, even when Men think and reason within their own Breasts; especially if the *Ideas* be very complex, and made up of a great Collection of simple ones. This makes the Consideration of Words and Propositions so necessary a part of the Treatise of Knowledge, that 'tis very hard to speak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other.

General
Truths hardly
to be under-
stood, but in
verbal Pro-
positions.

§. 2. All the Knowledge we have, being only of particular or general Truths, 'tis evident that whatever may be done in the former of these, the latter, which is that which with reason is most sought after, can never be well made known, and is very seldom apprehended, but as conceiv'd and express'd in Words. It is not therefore out of our way, in the Examination of our Knowledge, to enquire into the Truth and Certainty of universal Propositions.

Certainty two-
fold, of Truth
and of Know-
ledg.

§. 3. But that we may not be misled in this case, by that which is the danger every where, I mean by the Doubtfulness of Terms, 'tis fit to observe, that Certainty is two-fold; *Certainty of Truth*, and *Certainty of Knowledge*. *Certainty of Truth* is, when Words are so put together in Propositions, as exactly to express the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas* they stand for, as really it is. *Certainty of Knowledge* is, to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, as express'd in any Proposition. This we usually call knowing, or being certain of the Truth of any Proposition.

No Proposi-
tion can be
known to be
true, where
the Essence of
each Species
mention'd is
not known.

§. 4. Now because we cannot be certain of the Truth of any general Proposition, unless we know the precise Bounds and extent of the Species its Terms stand for, it is necessary we should know the Essence of each Species, which is that which constitutes and bounds it. This, in all simple *Ideas* and Modes, is not hard to do. For in these, the real and nominal Essence being the same; or, which is all one, the abstract *Idea* which the general Term stands for, being the sole Essence and Boundary that is or can be suppos'd of the Species, there can be no doubt, how far the Species extends, or what things are comprehended under each Term: which, 'tis evident, are all that have an exact Conformity with the *Idea* it stands for, and no other. But in Substances wherein a real Essence distinct from the nominal is suppos'd to constitute, determine, and bound the Species, the

Extent

Extent of the general Word is very uncertain: because not knowing this real Essence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that *Species*; and consequently what may, or may not with certainty be affirm'd of it. And thus speaking of a *Man*, or *Gold*, or any other *Species* of natural Substances, as suppos'd constituted by a precise real Essence, which Nature regularly imparts to every individual of that Kind, whereby it is made to be of that *Species*, we cannot be certain of the Truth of any Affirmation or Negation made of it. For *Man*, or *Gold*, taken in this sense, and used for *Species* of things constituted by real Essences different from the complex *Idea* in the Mind of the Speaker, stand for we know not what: and the Extent of these *Species*, with such Boundaries, are so unknown and undetermin'd, that 'tis impossible with any certainty to affirm, that all Men are rational, or that all Gold is yellow. But where the nominal Essence is kept to, as the Boundary of each *Species*, and Men extend the Application of any general Term no farther than to the particular things, in which the complex *Idea* it stands for is to be found, there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each *Species*, nor can be in doubt, on this account, whether any Propositions be true or no. I have chose to explain this Uncertainty of Propositions in this scholastick way, and have made use of the Terms of *Essences* and *Species*, on purpose to shew the Absurdity and Inconvenience there is to think of them, as of any other sort of Realities, than barely abstract *Ideas* with Names to them. To suppose that the *Species* of things are any thing but the sorting of them under general Names, according as they agree to several abstract *Ideas*, of which we make those Names the Signs, is to confound Truth, and introduce Uncertainty into all general Propositions that can be made about them. Tho' therefore these things might, to People not possess'd with scholastick Learning, be perhaps treated of in a better and clearer way; yet those wrong Notions of *Essences* or *Species* having got root in most Peoples Minds, who have receiv'd any Tincture from the Learning which has prevail'd in this part of the World, are to be discover'd and remov'd, to make way for that use of Words which should convey Certainty with it.

§. 5. The Names of Substances then, whenever made to stand for *Species*, which are suppos'd to be constituted by real Essences, which we know not, are not capable to convey Certainty to the Understanding: of the Truth of general Propositions made up of such Terms, we cannot be sure. The reason whereof is plain: For how can we be sure that this or that Quality is in *Gold*, when we know not what is or is not *Gold*? Since in this way of speaking, nothing is *Gold*, but what partakes of an Essence, which we not knowing, cannot know where it is or is not, and so cannot be sure that any parcel of Matter in the World is or is not in this sense *Gold*; being incurably ignorant, whether it has or has not that which makes any thing to be call'd *Gold*, i. e. that real Essence of *Gold* whereof we have no *Idea* at all: this being as impossible for us to know, as it is for a blind Man to tell in what Flower the Colour of a *Pansie* is, or is not to be found, whilst he has no *Idea* of the Colour of a *Pansie* at all. Or if we could (which is impossible) certainly know where a real Essence, which we know not, is; v. g. in what parcels of Matter the real Essence of *Gold* is; yet could we not be sure, that this or that Quality could with Truth be affirm'd of *Gold*: since it is impossible for us to know, that this or that Quality or *Idea* has a necessary Connection with a real Essence, of which we have no *Idea* at all, whatever *Species* that suppos'd real Essence may be imagin'd to constitute. This more particularly concerns Substances.

§. 6. On the other side, the Names of Substances, when made use of, as they should be, for the *Ideas* Men have in their Minds, tho' they carry a clear and determinate Signification with them, will not yet serve us to make any universal Propositions, of whose Truth we can be certain. Not because in this use of them we are uncertain what things are signify'd by them, but because the complex *Ideas* they stand for, are such Combinations of simple ones, as carry not with them any discoverable Connection or Repugnancy, but with a very few other *Ideas*. The Truth of few universal Propositions concerning Substances, is to be known.

§. 7. The complex *Ideas*, that our Names of the *Species* of Substances properly stand for, are Collections of such Qualities as have been observ'd to co-exist in an unknown *Substratum*, which we call *Substance*: but what other Qualities necessarily co-exist with such Combinations, we cannot certainly know, Because Co-existence of Ideas in few cases is to be known.

unless

unless we can discover their natural Dependance ; which in their primary Qualities, we can go but a very little way in ; and in all their secondary Qualities, we can discover no Connection at all, for the Reasons mention'd, Chap. 3. *Viz.*

1. Because we know not the real Constitutions of Substances, on which each *secondary Quality* particularly depends. 2. Did we know that, it would serve us only for experimental (not universal) Knowledge ; and reach with Certainty no farther, than that bare Instance : because our Understandings can discover no conceivable Connection between any *secondary Quality*, and any Modification whatsoever of any of the *primary* ones. And therefore there are very few general Propositions to be made concerning Substances, which can carry with them *undoubted Certainty*.

instances in Gold.

§. 8. *All Gold is fix'd*, is a Proposition whose Truth we cannot be certain of, how universally soever it be believ'd. For if, according to the useless Imagination of the Schools, any one supposes the Term *Gold* to stand for a Species of things set out by Nature, by a real Essence belonging to it, 'tis evident he knows not what particular Substances are of that Species ; and so cannot, with certainty affirm any thing universally of *Gold*. But if he makes *Gold* stand for a Species determin'd by its nominal Essence, let the nominal Essence, for Example, be the complex *Idea* of a *Body* of a certain *yellow Colour*, *malleable*, *fusible*, and *heavier* than any other known ; in this proper use of the Word *Gold*, there is no Difficulty to know what is or is not *Gold*. But yet no other Quality can with certainty be universally affirm'd or deny'd of *Gold*, but what hath a discoverable Connection or Consistency with that nominal Essence. *Fixedness*, for example, having no necessary Connection, that we can discover, with the Colour, Weight, or any other simple *Idea* of our complex one, or with the whole Combination together ; it is impossible that we should certainly know the Truth of this Proposition, *That all Gold is fix'd*.

§. 9. As there is no discoverable Connection between *Fixedness*, and the Colour, Weight, and other simple *Ideas* of that nominal Essence of *Gold* ; so if we make our complex *Idea* of *Gold*, a *Body yellow, fusible, ductile, weighty*, and *fix'd*, we shall be at the same uncertainty concerning *Solubility in Aq. Regia*, and for the same reason : Since we can never, from consideration of the *Ideas* themselves, with certainty affirm or deny of a *Body*, whose complex *Idea* is made up of *yellow, very weighty, ductile, fusible, and fix'd*, that it is soluble in *Aq. Regia* ; and so on, of the rest of its Qualities. I would gladly meet with one general Affirmation concerning any Quality of *Gold*, that any one can certainly know is true. It will, no doubt, be presently objected, Is not this an universal certain Proposition, *All Gold is malleable* ? To which I answer, It is a very certain Proposition, if *Malleableness* be a part of the complex *Idea* the word *Gold* stands for. But then here is nothing affirm'd of *Gold*, but that that Sound stands for an *Idea* in which *Malleableness* is contain'd : And such a sort of Truth and Certainty as this, it is to say, *a Centaur is four-footed*. But if *Malleableness* makes not a part of the specific Essence the Name *Gold* stands for, 'tis plain, *All Gold is malleable*, is not a certain Proposition. Because, let the complex *Idea* of *Gold* be made up of which soever of its other Qualities you please, *Malleableness* will not appear to depend on that complex *Idea*, nor follow from any simple one contain'd in it : The Connection that *Malleableness* has (if it has any) with those other Qualities, being only by the intervention of the real Constitution of its sensible Parts ; which, since we know not, 'tis impossible we should perceive that Connection, unless we could discover that which ties them together.

As far as any such Co-existence can be known, so far universal Propositions may be certain. But this will go but a little way, because,

§. 10. The more, indeed, of these co-existing Qualities we unite into one complex *Idea*, under one Name, the more precise and determinate we make the Signification of that Word ; but yet never make it thereby more capable of *universal Certainty*, in respect of other Qualities not contain'd in our complex *Idea* ; since we perceive not their Connection or Dependance one on another, being ignorant both of that real Constitution in which they are all founded, and also how they flow from it. For the chief part of our Knowledge concerning Substances, is not, as in other things, barely of the Relation of two *Ideas* that may exist separately ; but is of the necessary Connection and Co-existence of several distinct *Ideas* in the same Subject, or of their Repugnancy so to co-exist. Could

Could we begin at the other End, and discover what it was, wherein that Colour consisted, what made a Body lighter or heavier, what Texture of Parts made it malleable, fusible, and fix'd, and fit to be dissolv'd in this sort of Liquor, and not in another; if (I say) we had such an *Idea* as this of Bodies, and could perceive wherein all sensible Qualities originally consist, and how they are produc'd; we might frame such abstract *Ideas* of them, as would furnish us with Matter of more general Knowledg, and enable us to make universal Propositions, that should carry *general Truth* and *Certainty* with them. But whilst our complex *Ideas* of the sorts of Substances are so remote from that internal real Constitution, on which their sensible Qualities depend, and are made up of nothing but an imperfect Collection of those apparent Qualities our Senses can discover; there can be very few general Propositions concerning Substances, of whose real Truth we can be *certainly* assur'd: since there are but few simple *Ideas*, of whose Connection and necessary Co-existence we can have certain and undoubted Knowledg. I imagine, amongst all the *secondary Qualities* of Substances, and the Powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whose necessary Co-existence, or Repugnance to co-exist, can certainly be known, unless in those of the same sense, which necessarily exclude one another, as I have elsewhere shew'd. No one, I think, by the Colour that is in any Body, can certainly know what Smell, Taste, Sound, or tangible Qualities it has, nor what Alterations it is capable to make or receive, on or from other Bodies. The same may be said of the Sound or Taste, &c. Our specifick Names of Substances standing for any Collections of such *Ideas*, 'tis not to be wonder'd, that we can with them make very few general Propositions of *undoubted real Certainty*. But yet so far as any complex *Idea*, of any sort of Substances, contains in it any simple *Idea*, whose necessary Co-existence with any other may be discover'd, so far *universal Propositions* may with *certainty* be made concerning it: v. g. Could any one discover a necessary Connection between *Malleableness*, and the Colour or *Weight* of *Gold*, or any other part of the complex *Idea* signify'd by that Name, he might make a certain universal Proposition concerning *Gold* in this respect; and the real Truth of this Proposition, That *all Gold is malleable*, would be as *certain* as of this, *The three Angles of all right-lin'd Triangles are equal to two right ones.*

§. 11. Had we such *Ideas* of Substances, as to know what real Constitutions produce those sensible Qualities we find in them, and how those Qualities flow'd from thence, we could by the specifick *Ideas* of their real Essences in our own Minds, more certainly find out their Properties, and discover what Qualities they had or had not, than we can now by our Senses: and to know the Properties of *Gold*, it would be no more necessary that *Gold* should exist, and that we should make experiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing the Properties of a Triangle, that a Triangle should exist in any Matter; the *Idea* in our Minds would serve for the one as well as the other. But we are so far from being admitted into the Secrets of Nature, that we scarce so much as ever approach the first Entrance towards them. For we are wont to consider the Substances we meet with, each of them as an entire thing by it self, having all its Qualities in it self, and independent of other things; overlooking, for the most part, the Operations of those invisible Fluids they are encompass'd with, and upon whose Motions and Operations depend the greatest part of those Qualities which are taken notice of in them, and are made by us the inherent Marks of Distinction whereby we know and denominate them. Put a Piece of *Gold* any where by it self, separate from the reach and influence of all other Bodies, it will immediately lose all its Colour and Weight, and perhaps Malleableness too; which, for ought I know, would be chang'd into a perfect Friability. *Water*, in which to us *Fluidity* is an essential Quality, left to it self, would cease to be fluid. But if inanimate Bodies owe so much of their present state to other Bodies without them, that they would not be what they appear to us, were those Bodies that environ them remov'd, it is yet more so in *Vegetables*, which are nourish'd, grow, and produce Leaves, Flowers, and Seeds, in a constant Succession. And if we look a little nearer into the state of *Animals*, we shall find that their Dependance, as to Life, Motion, and the most considerable Qualities to be observ'd in them, is so wholly on extrinsecal Causes and Qualities of other Bodies that make no part of them, that they cannot subsist a moment

The Qualities which make our complex Ideas of Substances, depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceived Causes.

without them: tho' yet those Bodies on which they depend, are little taken notice of, and make no part of the complex *Ideas* we frame of those Animals. Take the Air but a minute from the greatest part of living Creatures, and they presently lose Sense, Life, and Motion. This the Necessity of Breathing has forc'd into our Knowledge. But how many other extrinsecal, and possibly very remote Bodies, do the Springs of those admirable Machines depend on, which are not vulgarly observ'd, or so much as thought on; and how many are there, which the severest Enquiry can never discover? The Inhabitants of this Spot of the Universe, tho' remov'd so many Millions of Miles from the Sun, yet depend so much on the duly temper'd Motion of Particles coming from, or agitated by it, that were this Earth remov'd but a small part of that distance out of its present Situation, and placed a little farther or nearer that Source of Heat, 'tis more than probable that the greatest part of the Animals in it would immediately perish: since we find them so often destroy'd by an Excess or Defect of the Sun's Warmth, which an accidental Position, in some Parts of this our little Globe, exposes them to. The Qualities observ'd in a *Loadstone* must needs have their Source far beyond the Confines of that Body; and the Ravage made often on several sorts of Animals by invisible Causes, the certain Death (as we are told) of some of them, by barely passing the Line, or, as 'tis certain of others, by being remov'd into a neighbouring Country, evidently shew that the Concurrence and Operation of several Bodies, with which they are seldom thought to have any thing to do, is absolutely necessary to make them be what they appear to us, and to preserve those Qualities by which we know and distinguish them. We are then quite out of the way, when we think that things contain within themselves the Qualities that appear to us in them: And we in vain search for that Constitution within the Body of a Fly, or an Elephant, upon which depend those Qualities and Powers we observe in them. For which perhaps, to understand them aright, we ought to look not only beyond this our Earth and Atmosphere, but even beyond the Sun, or remotest Star our Eyes have yet discover'd. For how much the Being and Operation of particular Substances in this our Globe depend on Causes utterly beyond our view, is impossible for us to determine. We see and perceive some of the Motions and grosser Operations of things here about us; but whence the Streams come that keep all these curious Machines in motion and repair, how convey'd and mov'd, is beyond our Notice and Apprehension: and the great Parts and Wheels, as I may so say, of this stupendous Structure of the Universe, may, for ought we know, have such a Connection and Dependence in their Influences and Operations one upon another, that perhaps things in this our Mansion would put on quite another face, and cease to be what they are, if some one of the Stars or great Bodies incomprehensibly remote from us, should cease to be or move as it does. This is certain, Things however absolute and intire they seem in themselves, are but Retainers to other parts of Nature, for that which they are most taken notice of by us. Their observable Qualities, Actions, and Powers, are owing to something without them; and there is not so compleat and perfect a part that we know of Nature, which does not owe the Being it has, and the Excellencies of it, to its Neighbours; and we must not confine our Thoughts within the Surface of any Body, but look a great deal farther, to comprehend perfectly those Qualities that are in it.

§. 12. If this be so, it is not to be wonder'd, that we have very imperfect *Ideas of Substances*; and that the real Essences, on which depend their Properties and Operations, are unknown to us. We cannot discover so much as that *Size, Figure, and Texture* of their minute and active Parts, which is really in them; much less the different Motions and Impulses made in and upon them by Bodies from without, upon which depends, and by which is form'd, the greatest and most remarkable part of those Qualities we observe in them, and of which our complex *Ideas* of them are made up. This Consideration alone is enough to put an end to all our Hopes of ever having the *Ideas* of their real Essences; which, whilst we want the nominal Essences we make use of instead of them, will be able to furnish us but very sparingly with any general Knowledge, or universal Propositions capable of real Certainty.

§. 13. We are not therefore to wonder, if *Certainty* be to be found in very few general Propositions made concerning Substances: Our Knowledge of their Qualities and Properties go very seldom farther than our Senses reach and inform us. Possibly inquisitive and observing Men may, by strength of *Judgment* penetrate farther, and on Probabilities taken from wary Observation, and Hints well laid together, often guess right at what Experience has not yet discover'd to them. But this is but guessing still; it amounts only to Opinion, and has not that *Certainty* which is requisite to Knowledge. For all *general Knowledge* lies only in our own Thoughts, and consists barely in the Contemplation of our own abstract *Ideas*. Wherever we perceive any Agreement or Disagreement amongst them, there we have *general Knowledge*; and by putting the Names of those *Ideas* together accordingly in Propositions, can with certainty pronounce *general Truths*. But because the abstract *Ideas* of Substances, for which their specific Names stand, whenever they have any distinct and determinate Signification, have a discoverable Connection or Inconsistency with but a very few other *Ideas*; the *Certainty of universal Propositions concerning Substances* is very narrow and scanty in that part, which is our principal Enquiry concerning them: and there are scarce any of the Names of Substances, let the *Idea* it is apply'd to be what it will, of which we can generally and with certainty pronounce, that it has or has not this or that other Quality belonging to it, and constantly co-existing or inconsistent with that *Idea*, wherever it is to be found.

§. 14. Before we can have any tolerable Knowledge of this kind, we must first know what Changes the *primary Qualities* of one Body do regularly produce in the *primary Qualities* of another, and how. Secondly, We must know what *primary Qualities* of any Body produce certain Sensations or *Ideas* in us. This is in truth no less than to know all the Effects of Matter, under its divers Modifications of Bulk, Figure, Cohesion of Parts, Motion and Rest. Which I think, every body will allow, is utterly impossible to be known by us without Revelation. Nor if it were reveal'd to us, what sort of Figure, Bulk and Motion of Corpuscles, would produce in us the Sensation of a yellow Colour, and what sort of Figure, Bulk and Texture of Parts, in the Superficies of any Body, were fit to give such Corpuscles their due Motion to produce that Colour; would that be enough to make *universal Propositions with Certainty*, concerning the several sorts of them, unless we had Faculties acute enough to perceive the precise Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of Bodies in those minute Parts, by which they operate on our Senses, that so we might by those frame our abstract *Ideas* of them. I have mention'd here only *corporeal Substances*, whose Operations seem to lie more level to our Understandings: For as to the *Operations of Spirits*, both their thinking and moving of Bodies, we at first Sight find our selves at a loss; tho' perhaps, when we have apply'd our Thoughts a little nearer to the Consideration of Bodies, and their Operations, and examin'd how far our Notions, even in these, reach, with any Clearness, beyond sensible Matter of Fact, we shall be bound to confess, that even in these too our Discoveries amount to very little beyond perfect Ignorance and Incapacity.

§. 15. This is evident, the abstract complex *Ideas of Substances*, for which their general Names stand, not comprehending their real Constitutions, can afford us but very little *universal Certainty*. Because our *Ideas* of them are not made up of that, on which those Qualities we observe in them, and would inform our selves about, do depend, or with which they have any certain Connection: v. g. Let the *Idea* to which we give the name *Man*, be, as it commonly is, a Body of the ordinary Shape, with Sense, voluntary Motion, and Reason join'd to it: This being the abstract *Idea*, and consequently the Essence of our Species *Man*, we can make but very few general certain Propositions concerning *Man*, standing for such an *Idea*. Because not knowing the real Constitution on which Sensation, Power of Motion, and Reasoning, with that peculiar Shape, depend, and whereby they are united together in the same Subject, there are very few other Qualities, with which we can perceive them to have a necessary Connection: and therefore we cannot with Certainty affirm, That all *Men sleep by Intervals*; That no *Man can be nourish'd by Wood or Stones*; That all *Men will be poison'd by Hemlock*: because these *Ideas* have no Connection nor Repugnancy with this our nominal Essence of *Man*, with this abstract *Idea* that Name stands for. We

must in these and the like appeal to Trial in particular Subjects, which can reach but a little way. We must content our selves with probability in the rest; but can have no general Certainty, whilst our specifick *Idea* of *Man* contains not that real Constitution, which is the Root, wherein all his inseparable Qualities are united, and from whence they flow. Whilst our *Idea*, the word *Man* stands for, is only an imperfect Collection of some sensible Qualities and Powers in him, there is no discernible Connection or Repugnance between our specifick *Idea*, and the Operation of either the Parts of Hemlock or Stones, upon his Constitution. There are Animals that safely eat Hemlock, and others that are nourish'd by Wood and Stones: But as long as we want *Ideas* of those real Constitutions of different sorts of Animals, whereon these and the like Qualities and Powers depend, we must not hope to reach *Certainty* in universal Propositions concerning them. Those few *Ideas* only, which have a discernible Connection with our nominal Essence, or any part of it, can afford us such Propositions. But these are so few, and of so little moment, that we may justly look on our certain *general Knowledge of Substances*, as almost none at all.

Wherein lies
the general
Certainty of
Propositions.

§. 16. To conclude, *General Propositions*, of what kind soever, are then only capable of *Certainty*, when the Terms us'd in them stand for such *Ideas*, whose Agreement or Disagreement, as there express'd, is capable to be discover'd by us. And we are then certain of their Truth or Falshood, when we perceive the *Ideas* the Terms stand for, to agree or not agree, according as they are affirm'd or deny'd one of another. Whence we may take notice, that *general Certainty* is never to be found but in our *Ideas*. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere in Experiment, or Observations without us, our Knowledge goes not beyond Particulars. 'Tis the Contemplation of our own abstract *Ideas*, that alone is able to afford us *general Knowledge*.

C H A P. VI.

Of Maxims.

They are self-evident.

§. 1. **T**HERE are a sort of Propositions, which under the name of *Maxims* and *Axioms* have pass'd for Principles of Science; and because they are *self-evident*, have been suppos'd innate, altho' no Body (that I know) ever went about to shew the Reason and Foundation of their Clearness or Cogency. It may however be worth while to enquire into the Reason of their Evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone, and also examine how far they influence and govern our other Knowledge.

Wherein that
Self-evidence
consists.

§. 2. *Knowledge*, as has been shewn, consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*: Now where that Agreement or Disagreement is perceiv'd immediately by it self, without the Intervention or Help of any other, there our *Knowledge* is *self-evident*. This will appear to be so to any one, who will but consider any of those Propositions, which, without any proof, he assents to at first sight: for in all of them he will find, that the Reason of his Assent is from that Agreement or Disagreement, which the Mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those *Ideas* answering the Affirmation or Negation in the Proposition.

Self-evidence
not peculiar to
receiv'd
Axioms.

§. 3. This being so, in the next place let us consider, whether this *Self-evidence* be peculiar only to those Propositions, which commonly pass under the name of *Maxims*, and have the Dignity of *Axioms* allow'd them. And here 'tis plain, that several other Truths, not allow'd to be *Axioms*, partake equally with them in this *Self-evidence*. This we shall see, if we go over these several sorts of Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, which I have abovemention'd, viz. Identity, Relation, Co-existence, and real Existence; which will discover to us, that not only those few Propositions, which have had the credit of *Maxims*, are self-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite number of other Propositions are such.

§. 4. For, *First*, the immediate Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Identity*, being founded in the Mind's having distinct *Ideas*, this affords

fords us as many *self-evident* Propositions, as we have distinct *Ideas*. Every one that has any Knowledge at all, has, as the Foundation of it, various and distinct *Ideas*: And it is the first Act of the Mind (without which it can never be capable of any Knowledge) to know every one of its *Ideas* by it self, and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in himself, that he knows the *Ideas* he has; that he knows also, when any one is in his Understanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another. Which always being so (it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives) he can never be in doubt when any *Idea* is in his Mind, that it is there, and is that *Idea* it is; and that two distinct *Ideas*, when they are in his Mind, are there, and are not one and the same *Idea*. So that all such Affirmations and Negations are made without any possibility of Doubt, Uncertainty or Hesitation, and must necessarily be assented to as soon as understood; that is, as soon as we have in our Minds determin'd *Ideas*, which the Terms in the Proposition stand for. And therefore wherever the Mind with Attention considers any Proposition, so as to perceive the two *Ideas* signify'd by the Terms, and affirm'd or deny'd one of the other, to be the same or different; it is presently and infallibly certain of the Truth of such a Proposition, and this equally, whether these Propositions be in Terms standing for more general *Ideas*, or such as are less so, *v. g.* whether the general *Idea* of *Being* be affirm'd of it self, as in this Proposition, *whatsoever is, is*; or a more particular *Idea* be affirm'd of it self, as *a Man is a Man*, or *whatsoever is White is White*; or whether the *Idea* of *Being* in general be deny'd of *not Being*, which is the only (if I may so call it) *Idea* different from it, as in this other Proposition, *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*; or any *Idea* of any particular Being be deny'd of another different from it, as *a Man is not a Horse*, *Red is not Blue*. The Difference of the *Ideas*, as soon as the Terms are understood, makes the Truth of the Proposition presently visible, and that with an equal Certainty and Easiness in the less, as well as the more general Propositions, and all for the same reason, *viz.* Because the Mind perceives in any *Ideas*, that it has the same *Idea* to the same with it self; and two different *Ideas* to be different and not the same. And this it is equally certain of, whether these *Ideas* be more or less general, abstract and comprehensive. It is not therefore alone to these two general Propositions, *Whatsoever is, is*; and, *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*; that this Self-evidence belongs by any peculiar Right. The Perception of being, or not being, belongs no more to these vague *Ideas*, signify'd by the Terms *Whatsoever* and *Thing*, than it does to any other *Ideas*. These two general Maxims amounting to no more in short but this, that *the same is the same*, and *same is not different*, are Truths known in more particular Instances, as well as in these general Maxims, and known also in particular Instances, before these general Maxims are ever thought on, and draw all their Force from the Discernment of the Mind employ'd about particular *Ideas*. There is nothing more visible than that the Mind, without the help of any Proof, or Reflection on either of these general Propositions, perceives so clearly, and knows so certainly, that the *Idea* of *White* is the *Idea* of *White*, and not the *Idea* of *Blue*; and that the *Idea* of *White*, when it is in the Mind, is there, and is not absent; that the Consideration of these Axioms can add nothing to the Evidence or Certainty of its Knowledge. Just so it is (as every one may experiment in himself) in all the *Ideas* a Man has in his Mind: He knows each to be it self, and not to be another; and to be in his Mind, and not away when it is there, with a Certainty that cannot be greater; and therefore the Truth of no general Proposition can be known with a greater Certainty, nor add any thing to this. So that in respect of Identity, our intuitive Knowledge reaches as far as our *Ideas*. And we are capable of making as many self-evident Propositions, as we have Names for distinct *Ideas*. And I appeal to every one's own Mind, whether this Proposition, *A Circle is a Circle*, be not as self-evident a Proposition, as that consisting of more general Terms, *Whatsoever is, is*: And again, whether this Proposition, *Blue is not Red*, be not a Proposition that the Mind can no more doubt of, as soon as it understands the Words, than it does of that Axiom, *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*; and so of all the like.

1. As to Identity and Diversity all Propositions are equally self-evident.

2. In Co-existence we have few self-evident Propositions.

3. In other Relations we may have.

4. Concerning real Existence we have none.

These Axioms do not much influence our other Knowledge.

Because they are not the Truths we first knew.

§. 5. Secondly, As to Co-existence, or such necessary Connection between two Ideas, that in the Subject where one of them is suppos'd, there the other must necessarily be also: Of such Agreement or Disagreement as this, the Mind has an immediate Perception but in very few of them. And therefore in this sort we have but very little intuitive Knowledge; nor are there to be found very many Propositions that are self-evident, tho' some there are; v. g. the Idea of filling a Place equal to the Contents of its Superficies, being annex'd to our Idea of Body, I think it is a self-evident Proposition, *That two Bodies cannot be in the same Place.*

§. 6. Thirdly, As to the Relations of Modes, Mathematicians have fram'd many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality. As *Equals taken from Equals, the Remainder will be Equals*; which, with the rest of that kind, however they are receiv'd for Maxims by the Mathematicians, and are unquestionable Truths; yet, I think, that any one who considers them, will not find that they have a clearer Self-evidence than these, that *one and one are equal to two*; that if you take from the five Fingers of one Hand two, and from the five Fingers of the other Hand two, the remaining Number will be equal. These and a thousand other such Propositions may be found in Numbers, which, at the very first hearing, force the Assent, and carry with them an equal, if not greater Clearness, than those Mathematical Axioms.

§. 7. Fourthly, As to real Existence, since that has no Connection with any other of our Ideas, but that of our selves, and of a first Being, we have in that, concerning the real Existence of all other Beings, not so much as demonstrative, much less a self-evident Knowledge; and therefore concerning those there are no Maxims.

§. 8. In the next place let us consider, what Influence these receiv'd Maxims have upon the other Parts of our Knowledge. The Rules establish'd in the Schools, that all Reasonings are *ex praecognitis et praconcessis*, seems to lay the Foundation of all other Knowledge in these Maxims, and to suppose them to be *praecognita*; whereby, I think, are meant these two things: First, That these Axioms are those Truths that are first known to the Mind. And, Secondly, That upon them the other Parts of our Knowledge depend.

§. 9. First, That they are not the Truths first known to the Mind, is evident to Experience, as we have shewn in another place, *Book I. chap. 2.* Who perceives not that a Child certainly knows that a Stranger is not its Mother; that its Sucking-Bottle is not the Rod, long before he knows that *'tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be?* And how many Truths are there about Numbers, which it is obvious to observe that the Mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinc'd of, before it ever thought on these general Maxims, to which Mathematicians, in their Arguings, do sometimes refer them? Whereof the Reason is very plain: For that which makes the Mind assent to such Propositions, being nothing else but the Perception it has of the Agreement or Disagreement of its Ideas, according as it finds them affirm'd or deny'd one of another in words it understands, and every Idea being known to be what it is, and every two distinct Ideas being known not to be the same; it must necessarily follow, that such self-evident Truths must be first known, which consist of Ideas that are first in the Mind: and the Ideas first in the Mind, 'tis evident, are those of particular things, from whence, by slow degrees, the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones; which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Sense, are settled in the Mind, with general Names to them. Thus particular Ideas are first receiv'd and distinguish'd, and so Knowledge got about them; and next to them, the less general or specifick, which are next to particular: For abstract Ideas are not so obvious or easy to Children, or the yet unexercis'd Mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to grown Men, 'tis only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find, that general Ideas are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves, as we are apt to imagine. For example, Does it not require some Pains and Skill to form the general Idea of a Triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult) for it must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenor; but all and none

none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an *Idea* wherein some Parts of several different and inconsistent *Ideas* are put together. 'Tis true, the Mind, in this imperfect State, has need of such *Ideas*, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of Communication, and Inlargement of Knowledge; to both which it is naturally very much inclin'd. But yet one has reason to suspect such *Ideas* are Marks of our Imperfection; at least this is enough to shew, that the most abstract and general *Ideas* are not those that the Mind is *first* and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest Knowledge is conversant about.

§. 10. Secondly, From what has been said it plainly follows, that these magnify'd *Maxims* are not the Principles and Foundations of all our other Knowledge. For if there be a great many other Truths, which have as much self-evidence as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impossible they should be the *Principles*, from which we deduce all other Truths. Is it impossible to know that *One* and *Two* are equal to *Three*, but by virtue of this, or some such Axiom, viz. *the Whole is equal to all its Parts taken together*? Many a one knows that *One* and *Two* are equal to *Three*, without having heard, or thought on that, or any other Axiom, by which it might be prov'd; and knows it as certainly, as any other Man knows, that the *Whole is equal to all its Parts*, or any other Maxim, and all from the same Reason of Self-evidence; the Equality of those *Ideas* being as visible and certain to him without that, or any other Axiom, as with it, it needing no Proof to make it perceiv'd. Nor after the Knowledge, *That the Whole is equal to all its Parts*, does he know that *One* and *Two* are equal to *Three*, better or more certainly than he did before. For if there be any odds in those *Ideas*, the *Whole* and *Parts* are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be settled in the Mind, than those of *One*, *Two* and *Three*. And indeed, I think, I may ask these Men, who will needs have all Knowledge besides those general Principles themselves, to depend on general, innate and self-evident Principles; what Principle is requisite to prove, that *One* and *One* are *Two*, that *Two* and *Two* are *Four*, that *Three* times *Two* are *Six*? Which being known without any proof, do evince, that either all Knowledge does not depend on certain *Præcognita* or general *Maxims*, call'd Principles, or else that these are Principles; and if these are to be counted Principles, a great part of Numeration will be so. To which if we add all the self-evident Propositions, which may be made about all our distinct *Ideas*, Principles will be almost infinite, at least innumerable, which Men arrive to the Knowledge of, at different Ages; and a great many of these innate Principles, they never come to know all their Lives. But whether they come in view of the Mind, earlier or later, this is true of them, that they are all known by their native Evidence, are wholly independent, receive no Light, nor are capable of any Proof one from another; much less the more particular, from the more general; or the more simple, from the more compounded: the more simple, and less abstract, being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier apprehended. But which-ever be the clearest *Idea*, the Evidence and Certainty of all such Propositions is in this, That a Man sees the same *Idea* to be the same *Idea*, and infallibly perceives two different *Ideas* to be different *Ideas*. For when a Man has in his Understanding the *Ideas* of *One* and of *Two*, the *Idea* of *Yellow*, and the *Idea* of *Blue*, he cannot but certainly know, that the *Idea* of *One* is the *Idea* of *One*, and not the *Idea* of *Two*; and that the *Idea* of *Yellow* is the *Idea* of *Yellow*, and not the *Idea* of *Blue*. For a Man cannot confound the *Idea* of his Mind, which he has distinct: That would be to have them confus'd and distinct at the same time, which is a Contradiction: And to have none distinct, is to have no use of our Faculties, to have no Knowledge at all. And therefore what *Idea* soever is affirm'd of it self, or whatsoever two entire distinct *Ideas* are deny'd one of another, the Mind cannot but assent to such a Proposition as infallibly true, as soon as it understands the Terms without Hesitation or need of Proof, or regarding those made in more general Terms, and call'd *Maxims*.

Because on them the other Parts of our Knowledge do not depend.

§. 11. What shall we then say? Are these general *Maxims* of no use? By no means; tho' perhaps their Use is not that, which it is commonly taken to be. But since doubting in the least of what hath been by some Men ascrib'd to these *Maxims* may be apt to be cry'd out against, as overturning the Foundations of

What Use these general *Maxims* have,

all

all the Sciences; it may be worth while to consider them, with respect to other parts of our Knowledge, and examine more particularly to what Purposes they serve, and to what not.

1. It is evident from what has been already said, that they are of no use to prove or confirm less general self-evident Propositions.

2. 'Tis as plain that they are not, nor have been the Foundations whereon any Science hath been built. There is, I know, a great deal of Talk, propagated from Scholastick Men, of Sciences and the *Maxims* on which they are built: But it has been my ill luck never to meet with any such Sciences; much less any one built upon these two *Maxims*, *What is, is*; and *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*. And I would be glad to be shewn where any such Science, erected upon these, or any other general *Axioms*, is to be found: and should be oblig'd to any one who would lay before me the Frame and System of any Science so built on these or any such like *Maxims*, that could not be shewn to stand as firm without any consideration of them. I ask, Whether these general *Maxims* have not the same use in the Study of Divinity, and in Theological Questions, that they have in the other Sciences? They serve here too to silence Wranglers, and put an end to Dispute. But I think that no body will therefore say, that the *Christian Religion* is built on these *Maxims*, or that the Knowledge we have of it is deriv'd from these *Principles*. 'Tis from Revelation we have receiv'd it, and without Revelation these *Maxims* had never been able to help us to it. When we find out an *Idea*, by whose Intervention we discover the Connection of two others, this is a Revelation from God to us, by the Voice of Reason. For we then come to know a Truth that we did not know before. When God declares any Truth to us, this is a Revelation to us by the Voice of his Spirit, and we are advanc'd in our Knowledge. But in neither of these do we receive our Light or Knowledge from *Maxims*. But in the one, the things themselves afford it, and we see the Truth in them by perceiving their Agreement or Disagreement. In the other, God himself affords it immediately to us, and we see the Truth of what he says in his unerring Veracity.

3. They are not of use to help Men forwards in the Advancement of Sciences, or new Discoveries of yet unknown Truths. Mr. *Newton*, in his never enough to be admir'd Book, has demonstrated several Propositions, which are so many new Truths, before unknown to the World, and are farther Advances in Mathematical Knowledge: But for the Discovery of these, it was not the general *Maxims*, *What is, is*; or, *The Whole is bigger than a Part*, or the like, that help'd him. These were not the Clues that led him into the Discovery of the Truth and Certainty of those Propositions. Nor was it by them that he got the Knowledge of those Demonstrations; but by finding out intermediate *Ideas*, that shew'd the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas*, as express'd in the Propositions he demonstrated. This is the great Exercise and Improvement of human Understanding in the enlarging of Knowledge, and advancing the Sciences; wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from the Contemplation of these, or the like magnify'd *Maxims*. Would those who have this traditional Admiration of these Propositions, that they think no step can be made in Knowledge without the support of an *Axiom*, no Stone laid in the building of the Sciences without a general *Maxim*, but distinguish between the Method of acquiring Knowledge, and of communicating; between the Method of raising any Science, and that of teaching it to others as far as it is advanc'd; they would see that those general *Maxims* were not the Foundations on which the first Discoverers rais'd their admirable Structures, nor the Keys that unlock'd and open'd those Secrets of Knowledge. Tho' afterwards, when Schools were erected, and Sciences had their Professors to teach what others had found out, they often made use of *Maxims*, *i. e.* laid down certain Propositions which were self-evident, or to be receiv'd for true; which being settled in the Minds of their Scholars, as unquestionable Verities, they on occasion made use of, to convince them of Truths in particular Instances that were not so familiar to their Minds, as those general *Axioms* which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully settled in their Minds. Tho' these particular Instances, when well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the Understand-

ing

ing than the general *Maxims* brought to confirm them : And it was in those particular Instances that the first Discoverer found the Truth, without the help of the general *Maxims* : And so may any one else do, who with Attention considers them.

To come therefore to the Use that is made of *Maxims*.

1. They are of use, as has been observ'd, in the ordinary Methods of teaching Sciences as far as they are advanc'd ; but of little or none in advancing them farther.

2. They are of use in Disputes, for the silencing of obstinate Wranglers, and bringing those Contests to some Conclusion. Whether a need of them to that end came not in, in the manner following, I crave leave to enquire. The Schools having made Disputation the Touchstone of Mens Abilities, and the Criterion of Knowledge, adjudg'd Victory to him that kept the Field : and he that had the last Word, was concluded to have the better of the Argument, if not of the Cause. But because by this means there was like to be no Decision between skilful Combatants, whilst one never fail'd of a *medius terminus* to prove any Proposition ; and the other could as constantly, without, or with a Distinction, deny the *Major* or *Minor* ; to prevent, as much as could be, the running out of Disputes into an endless Train of Syllogisms, certain general Propositions, most of them indeed self-evident, were introduc'd into the Schools ; which being such as all Men allow'd and agreed in, were look'd on as general Measures of Truth, and serv'd instead of Principles (where the Disputants had not laid down any other between them) beyond which there was no going, and which must not be receded from by either side. And thus these *Maxims* getting the Name of *Principles*, beyond which Men in Dispute could not retreat, were by mistake taken to be the Originals and Sources, from whence all Knowledge began, and the Foundations whereon the Sciences were built. Because, when in their Disputes they came to any of these, they stop'd there, and went no farther, the Matter was determin'd. But how much this is a Mistake, hath been already shewn.

This Method of the Schools, which have been thought the Fountains of Knowledge, introduc'd, as I suppose, the like use of these *Maxims*, into a great part of Conversation out of the Schools, to stop the Mouth of Cavillers, whom any one is excus'd from arguing any longer with, when they deny these general self-evident Principles receiv'd by all reasonable Men, who have once thought of them : But yet their use herein is but to put an end to Wrangling. They in truth, when urg'd in such cases, teach nothing : That is already done by the intermediate *Ideas* made use of in the Debate, whose Connection may be seen without the help of those *Maxims*, and so the Truth known before the *Maxim* is produc'd, and the Argument brought to a first Principle. Men would give off a wrong Argument before it came to that, if in their Disputes they propos'd to themselves the finding and embracing of Truth, and not a Contest for Victory. And thus *Maxims* have their use to put a stop to their Perverseness, whose Ingenuity should have yielded sooner. But the Method of the Schools having allow'd and encourag'd Men to oppose and resist evident Truth till they are baffled, *i. e.* till they are reduc'd to contradict themselves or some establish'd Principle ; 'tis no wonder that they should not in civil Conversation be asham'd of that, which in the Schools is counted a Vertue and a Glory ; obstinately to maintain that side of the Question they have chosen, whether true or false, to the last Extremity ; even after Conviction. A strange way to attain Truth and Knowledge : And that which I think the rational part of Mankind, not corrupted by Education, could scarce believe should ever be admitted amongst the Lovers of Truth, and Students of Religion or Nature ; or introduc'd into the Seminaries of those who are to propagate the Truths of Religion or Philosophy amongst the Ignorant and Unconvinc'd. How much such a way of Learning is likely to turn young Mens Minds from the sincere Search and Love of Truth ; nay, and to make them doubt whether there is any such thing, or at least worth the adhering to, I shall not now enquire. This I think, that bating those Places, which brought the *Peripatetick* Philosophy into their Schools, where it continu'd many Ages, without teaching the World any thing but the Art of Wrangling ; these *Maxims* were no where thought the

What use
these general
Maxims
have.

Foundations on which the Sciences were built, nor the great Helps to the Advancement of Knowledge.

As to these *General Maxims* therefore, they are, as I have said, of great Use in Disputes, to stop the Mouths of Wranglers; but not of much Use to the Discovery of unknown Truths, or to help the Mind forwards in its Search after Knowledge. For who ever began to build his Knowledge on this general Proposition, *What is, is*; or, *It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*: and from either of these, as from a Principle of Science, deduc'd a System of useful Knowledge? Wrong Opinions often involving Contradictions, one of these Maxims, as a Touch stone, may serve well to shew whither they lead. But yet, however fit to lay open the Absurdity or Mistake of a Man's Reasoning or Opinion, they are of very little Use for enlightning the Understanding: And it will not be found, that the Mind receives much help from them in its Progress in Knowledge; which would be neither less, nor less certain, were these two *General Propositions* never thought on. 'Tis true, as I have said, they sometimes serve in Argumentation to stop a Wrangler's Mouth, by shewing the Absurdity of what he saith, and by exposing him to the Shame of contradicting what all the World knows, and he himself cannot but own to be true. But it is one thing to shew a Man he is in an Error; and another to put him in possession of Truth: and I would fain know what Truths these two Propositions are able to teach, and by their Influence make us know, which we did not know before, or could not know without them. Let us reason from them as well as we can, they are only about identical Predications, and influence, if any at all, none but such. Each particular Proposition concerning Identity or Diversity, is as clearly and certainly known in it self, if attended to, as either of these general ones: only these general ones, as serving in all cases, are therefore more inculcated and insisted on. As to other less general Maxims, many of them are no more than bare verbal Propositions, and teach us nothing but the respect and import of Names one to another. *The whole is equal to all its Parts*; What real Truth, I beseech you, does it teach? What more is contain'd in that Maxim than what the Signification of the word *Totum*, or the *Whole*, does of it self import? And he that knows that the word *Whole* stands for what is made up of all its Parts, knows very little less, than that the *Whole* is equal to all its *Parts*. And upon the same ground, I think that this Proposition, *A Hill is higher than a Valley*, and several the like, may also pass for Maxims. But yet Masters of *Mathematicks*, when they would, as Teachers of what they know, initiate others in that Science, do not without reason place this, and some other such Maxims, at the entrance of their *Systems*; that their Scholars, having in the Beginning perfectly acquainted their Thoughts with these Propositions made in such general Terms, may be us'd to make such Reflections, and have these more general Propositions, as form'd Rules and Sayings, ready to apply to all particular Cases. Not that if they be equally weigh'd, they are more clear and evident than the particular Instances they are brought to confirm; but that being more familiar to the Mind, the very naming them is enough to satisfy the Understanding. But this, I say, is more from our Custom of using them, and the Establishment they have got in our Minds by our often thinking of them, than from the different Evidence of the things. But before Custom has settled Methods of Thinking and Reasoning in our Minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwise; and that the Child, when a part of his Apple is taken away, knows it better in that particular Instance, than by this general Proposition, *The Whole is equal to all its Parts*; and that if one of these have need to be confirm'd to him by the other, the General has more need to be let into his Mind by the Particular, than the Particular by the General. For in Particulars our Knowledge begins, and so spreads it self by degrees to Generals. Tho' afterwards the Mind takes the quite contrary Course, and having drawn his Knowledge into as general Propositions as it can, makes those familiar to its Thoughts, and accustoms it self to have recourse to them, as to the Standards of Truth and Falshood. By which familiar Use of them, as Rules to measure the Truth of other Propositions, it comes in time to be thought, that more particular Propositions have their Truth and Evidence from their Conformity to these more general ones, which in Discourse and Argumentation,

Argumentation, are so frequently urg'd, and constantly admitted. And this I think to be the reason why amongst so many self-evident Propositions, the most general only have had the Title of Maxims.

§. 12. One thing farther, I think, it may not be amiss to observe concerning these general Maxims, That they are so far from improving or establishing our Minds in true Knowledge, that if our Notions be wrong, loose or unsteady, and we resign up our Thoughts to the Sound of Words, rather than fix them on settled determin'd Ideas of things: I say, these general Maxims will serve to confirm us in Mistakes; and in such a way of use of Words, which is most common, will serve to prove Contradictions: v.g. He that, with *Des Cartes*, shall frame in his Mind an Idea of what he calls *Body*, to be nothing but Extension, may easily demonstrate, that there is no *Vacuum*, i. e. no Space void of Body, by this Maxim, *What is, is*. For the Idea to which he annexes the name *Body*, being bare Extension, his Knowledge, that Space cannot be without Body, is certain. For he knows his own Idea of Extension clearly and distinctly, and knows that it is *what it is*, and not another Idea, tho' it be call'd by these three names, *Extension*, *Body*, *Space*. Which three Words, standing for one and the same Idea, may no doubt, with the same Evidence and Certainty, be affirm'd one of another, as each of it self: And it is as certain, that whilst I use them all to stand for one and the same Idea, this Predication is as true and identical in its Signification, *That Space is Body*, as this Predication is true and identical, *That Body is Body*, both in Signification and Sound.

§. 13. But if another shall come, and make to himself another Idea, different from *Des Cartes's*, of the thing, which yet, with *Des Cartes*, he calls by the same name *Body*; and make his Idea, which he expresses by the word *Body* to be of a thing that hath both *Extension* and *Solidity* together; he will as easily demonstrate, that there may be a *Vacuum*, or Space without a Body, as *Des Cartes* demonstrated the contrary. Because the Idea, to which he gives the name *Space*, being barely the simple one of *Extension*; and the Idea, to which he gives the name *Body*, being the complex Idea of *Extension* and *Resistibility*, or *Solidity*, together in the same Subject, these two Ideas are not exactly one and the same, but in the Understanding as distinct as the Ideas of One and Two, White and Black, or as of *Corporeity* and *Humanity*, if I may use those barbarous Terms: And therefore the Predication of them in our Minds, or in Words standing for them, is not identical, but the Negation of them one of another; viz. this Proposition, *Extension or Space is not Body*, is as true and evidently certain, as this Maxim, *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, can make any Proposition.

§. 14. But yet tho' both these Propositions (as you see) may be equally demonstrated, viz. That there may be a *Vacuum*, and that there cannot be a *Vacuum*, by these two certain Principles, (viz.) *What is, is*; and *The same thing can not be, and be*: yet neither of these Principles will serve to prove to us, that any, or what Bodies do exist: For that we are left to our Senses, to discover to us as far as they can. Those Universal and Self-evident Principles, being only our constant, clear, and distinct Knowledge of our own Ideas, more general or comprehensive, can assure us of nothing that passes without the Mind, their Certainty is founded only upon the Knowledge we have of each Idea by it self, and of its Distinction from others; about which we cannot be mistaken whilst they are in our Minds, tho' we may, and often are mistaken, when we retain the Names without the Ideas; or use them confusedly sometimes for one, and sometimes for another Idea. In which cases the Force of these *Axioms*, reaching only to the Sound, and not the Signification of the Words, serves only to lead us into Confusion, Mistake, and Error. 'Tis to shew Men, that these Maxims, however cry'd up for the great Guards of Truth, will not secure them from Error in a careless loose use of their Words, that I have made this Remark. In all that is here suggested concerning their little use for the Improvement of Knowledge, or dangerous use in undetermin'd Ideas, I have been far enough from saying or intending they should be laid aside, as some have been too forward to charge me. I affirm them to be Truths, self-evident Truths; and so cannot be laid aside. As far as their Influence will reach, 'tis in vain to endeavour, nor would I attempt to abridg it. But yet without any

Maxims, if care be not taken in the Use of Words, may prove Contradictions.

Instance in Vacuum.

They prove not the Existence of things without us.

Their Appli-
cation dan-
gerous about
complex Ideas.

injury to Truth or Knowledge, I may have reason to think their use is not answerable to the great stress which seems to be laid on them; and I may warn Men not to make an ill use of them, for the confirming themselves in Errors.

§. 15. But let them be of what use they will in verbal Propositions, they cannot discover or prove to us the least Knowledge of the Nature of Substances, as they are found and exist without us, any farther than grounded on Experience. And tho' the Consequence of these two Propositions, call'd Principles, be very clear, and their Use not dangerous or hurtful, in the Probation of such things, wherein there is no need at all of them for Proof, but such as are clear by themselves without them, viz. where our *Ideas* are determin'd, and known by the Names that stand for them: yet when these Principles, viz. *What is, is*; and, *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*; are made use of in the Probation of Propositions, wherein are Words standing for complex *Ideas*, v. g. *Man, Horse, Gold, Vertue*; there they are of infinite danger, and most commonly make Men receive and retain Falshood for manifest Truth, and Uncertainty for Demonstration: upon which follows Error, Obstinacy, and all the Mischiefs that can happen, for wrong Reasoning. The reason whereof is nor, that these Principles are less true, or of less force in proving Propositions made of Terms standing for complex *Ideas*, than where the Propositions are about simple *Ideas*: But because Men mistake generally, thinking that where the same Terms are preserv'd, the Propositions are about the same things, tho' the *Ideas* they stand for are in truth different; therefore these Maxims are made use of to support those, which in Sound and Appearance are contradictory Propositions; as is clear in the Demonstrations above-mention'd about a *Vacuum*. So that whilst Men take Words for Things, as usually they do, these Maxims may and do commonly serve to prove contradictory Propositions: as shall yet be farther made manifest.

Instance in
Man.

§. 16. For instance; Let *Man* be that concerning which you would by these first Principles demonstrate any thing, and we shall see, that so far as Demonstration is by these Principles, it is only verbal, and gives us no certain universal true Proposition, or Knowledge of any Being existing without us. First, a Child having fram'd the *Idea* of a *Man*, it is probable that his *Idea* is just like that Picture, which the Painter makes of the visible Appearances join'd together; and such a Complication of *Ideas* together in his Understanding, makes up the single complex *Idea* which he calls *Man*, whereof White or Flesh-colour in *England* being one, the Child can demonstrate to you that a *Negro* is not a *Man*, because White Colour was one of the constant simple *Ideas* of the complex *Idea* he calls *Man*: And therefore he can demonstrate by the Principle, *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, that a *Negro* is not a *Man*; the Foundation of his Certainty being not that universal Proposition, which perhaps he never heard nor thought of, but the clear distinct Perception he hath of his own simple *Ideas* of Black and White, which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can ever mistake one for another, whether he knows that Maxim or no: And to this Child, or any one who hath such an *Idea*, which he calls *Man*, can you never demonstrate that a *Man* hath a Soul, because his *Idea* of *Man* includes no such Notion or *Idea* in it. And therefore to him, the Principle of *What is, is*, proves not this matter; but it depends upon Collection and Observation, by which he is to make his complex *Idea* call'd *Man*.

§. 17. Secondly, Another that hath gone farther in framing and collecting the *Idea* he calls *Man*, and to the outward Shape adds *Laughter* and *Rational Discourse*, may demonstrate that Infants and Changelings are no Men, by this Maxim, *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*: And I have discours'd with very rational Men, who have actually deny'd that they are Men.

§. 18. Thirdly, Perhaps another makes up the complex *Idea* which he calls *Man*, only out of the *Ideas* of Body in general, and the Powers of Language and Reason, and leaves out the Shape wholly: This Man is able to demonstrate, that a Man may have no Hands, but be *Quadrupes*, neither of those being included in his *Idea* of *Man*; and in whatever Body or Shape he found *Speech* and *Reason* join'd; that was a *Man*: because having a clear Knowledge of such a complex *Idea*, it is certain that *What is, is*.

§. 19. So that, if rightly consider'd, I think we may say, That where our *Ideas* are determin'd in our Minds, and have annex'd to them by us known and steady Names under those settled Determinations, there is *little need or no use* at all of these *Maxims*, to prove the Agreement or Disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the Truth or Falshood of such Propositions, without the help of these and the like *Maxims*, will not be *help'd* by these *Maxims* to do it: since he cannot be suppos'd to know the Truth of these *Maxims* themselves without proof, if he cannot know the Truth of others without proof, which are as self-evident as these. Upon this Ground it is, that intuitive Knowledge neither requires nor admits any proof, one part of it more than another. He that will suppose it does, takes away the Foundation of all Knowledge and Certainty: And he that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his Assent to this Proposition, That *Two are equal to Two*, will also have need of a proof to make him admit, that *What is, is*. He that needs a Probation to convince him, That *Two are not Three*, That *White is not Black*, That *a Triangle is not a Circle*, &c. or any other two determin'd distinct *Ideas* are not one and the same, will need also a Demonstration to convince him, That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.

Little use of these Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and distinct Ideas.

§. 20. And as these *Maxims* are of *little use*, where we have determin'd *Ideas*, so they are, as I have shew'd, of *dangerous use*, where our *Ideas* are not determin'd; and where we use Words that are not annex'd to determin'd *Ideas*, but such as are of a loose and wandering Signification, sometimes standing for one, and sometimes for another *Idea*: from which follows Mistake and Error, which these *Maxims* (brought as Proofs to establish Propositions, wherein the Terms stand for undetermin'd *Ideas*) do by their Authority confirm and rivet.

Their Use dangerous where our Ideas are confus'd.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Trifling Propositions.

§. 1. **W**HETHER the *Maxims* treated of in the foregoing Chapter, be of that use to real Knowledge, as is generally suppos'd, I leave to be consider'd. This, I think, may confidently be affirm'd, That there are universal Propositions; which tho' they be certainly true, yet they add no Light to our Understandings, bring no increase to our Knowledge. Such are,

Some Propositions bring no Increase to our Knowledge.

§. 2. *First, All purely identical Propositions.* These obviously, and at first blush, appear to contain no Instructions in them. For when we affirm the said Term of it self, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real *Idea*, it shews us nothing but what we must certainly know before, whether such a Proposition be either made by or propos'd to us. Indeed that most general one, *What is, is*, may serve sometimes to shew a Man the Absurdity he is guilty of, when by Circumlocution, or equivocal Terms, he would, in particular Instances, deny the same thing of it self; because no Body will so openly bid defiance to common Sense, as to affirm visible and direct Contradictions in plain words; or if he does, a Man is excus'd if he breaks off any farther Discourse with him. But yet, I think I may say, that neither that receiv'd Maxim, nor any other identical Proposition teaches us any thing: And tho' in such kind of Propositions, this great and magnify'd Maxim, boasted to be the Foundation of Demonstration, may be and often is made use of to confirm them; yet all it proves, amounts to no more than this, That the same Word may with great certainty be affirm'd of it self, without any doubt of the Truth of any such Proposition, and let me add also, without any real Knowledge.

As First, Identical Propositions.

§. 3. For at this rate, any very ignorant Person, who can but make a Proposition, and knows what he means when he says, *Ay* or *No*, may make a million of Propositions, of whose Truths he may be infallibly certain, and yet not know one thing in the World thereby; v. g. what is a Soul, is a Soul; or a Soul is a Soul; a Spirit is a Spirit; a Fetiche is a Fetiche, &c. These all being equivalent to this Proposition, viz. *What is, is*, i. e. *what hath Existence, hath Existence*; or, *who hath a Soul, hath a Soul*. What is this more than trifling with Words?

Words? It is but like a Monkey shifting his Oyster from one hand to the other; and had he had but Words, might, no doubt, have said, Oyster in right hand is *Subject*, and Oyster in left hand is *Predicate*: and so might have made a self-evident Proposition of Oyster, *i. e. Oyster is Oyster*; and yet, with all this, not have been one whit the wiser or more knowing: and that way of handling the Matter, would much at one have satisfy'd the Monkey's Hunger, or a Man's Understanding; and they would have improv'd in Knowledge and Bulk together.

I know there are some, who because *Identical Propositions* are self-evident, shew a great concern for them, and think they do great service to Philosophy by crying them up, as if in them was contain'd all Knowledge, and the Understanding were led into all Truth by them only. I grant as forwardly as any one, that they are all true and self-evident. I grant farther, that the Foundation of all our Knowledge lies in the Faculty we have of perceiving the same *Idea* to be the same, and of discerning it from those that are different, as I have shewn in the foregoing Chapter. But how that vindicates the making use of *Identical Propositions*, for the Improvement of Knowledge, from the Imputation of Trifling, I do not see. Let any one repeat, as often as he pleases, that *the Will is the Will*, or lay what stress on it he thinks fit; of what use is this, and an infinite the like Propositions, for the enlarging our Knowledge? Let a Man abound as much as the Plenty of Words, which he has, will permit him in such Propositions as these; *A Law is a Law*, and *Obligation is Obligation*; *Right is Right*, and *Wrong is Wrong*: will these and the like ever help him to an acquaintance with *Ethicks*? or instruct him or others in the Knowledge of *Morality*? Those who know not, nor perhaps ever will know, what is *Right* and what is *Wrong*, nor the Measures of them; can with as much assurance make, and infallibly know the truth of these and all such Propositions, as he that is best instructed in *Morality* can do. But what advance do such Propositions give in the Knowledge of any thing necessary or useful for their Conduct?

He would be thought to do little less than trifle, who, for the enlightning the Understanding in any part of Knowledge, should be busy with *Identical Propositions*, and insist on such Maxims as these: *Substance is Substance*, and *Body is Body*; *a Vacuum is a Vacuum*, and *a Vortex is a Vortex*; *a Centaur is a Centaur*, and *a Chimera is a Chimera*, &c. For these and all such are equally true, equally certain, and equally self-evident. But yet they cannot but be counted trifling, when made use of as Principles of Instruction, and stress laid on them, as Helps to Knowledge: since they teach nothing but what every one, who is capable of Discourse, knows without being told? *viz.* That the same Term is the same Term, and the same Idea the same Idea. And upon this account it was that I formerly did, and do still think, the offering and inculcating such Propositions, in order to give the Understanding any new Light or Inlet into the Knowledge of things, no better than trifling.

Instruction lies in something very different; and he that would enlarge his own, or another's Mind, to Truths he does not yet know, must find out intermediate *Ideas*, and then lay them in such order one by another, that the Understanding may see the Agreement or Disagreement of those in Question. Propositions that do this, are instructive; but they are far from such as affirm the same Term of it self: which is no way to advance one's self or others, in any sort of Knowledge. It no more helps to that, than it would help any one in his learning to read, to have such Propositions as these inculcated to him, *An A is an A*, and *a B is a B*; which a Man may know as well as any Schoolmaster, and yet never be able to read a word as long as he lives. Nor do these, or any such *Identical Propositions* help him one jot forward in the Skill of Reading, let him make what use of them he can.

If those who blame my calling them *Trifling Propositions*, had but read, and been at the pains to understand what I had above writ in very plain *English*, they could not but have seen that by *Identical Propositions*, I mean only such, wherein the same Term importing the same *Idea*, is affirm'd of it self: which I take to be the proper Signification of *Identical Propositions*; and concerning all such, I think I may continue safely to say, That to propose them as instructive, is no better than trifling. For no one who has the Use of Reason can miss them,

them, where it is necessary they should be taken notice of; nor doubt of their Truth, when he does take notice of them.

But if Men will call Propositions *Identical*, wherein the same Term is not affirm'd of it self, whether they speak more properly than I, others must judge: This is certain, all that they say of Propositions that are not *Identical* in my sense, concerns not me, nor what I have said; all that I have said relating to those Propositions wherein the same Term is affirm'd of it self. And I would fain see an Instance, wherein any such can be made use of, to the Advantage and Improvement of any one's Knowledge. Instances of other kinds, whatever, use may be made of them, concern not me, as not being such as I call *Identical*.

§. 4. Secondly, Another sort of trifling Propositions is, when a Part of the complex Idea is predicated of the Name of the Whole; a part of the Definition of the Word defin'd. Such are all Propositions wherein the Genus is predicated of the Species, or more comprehensive of less comprehensive Terms: For what Information, what Knowledge carries this Proposition in it, viz. *Lead is a Metal*, to a Man who knows the complex Idea the name *Lead* stands for? all the simple Ideas that go to the complex one signify'd by the Term *Metal*, being nothing but what he before comprehended, and signify'd by the Name *Lead*. Indeed, to a Man that knows the Signification of the word *Metal*, and not of the word *Lead*, it is a shorter way to explain the Signification of the word *Lead*, by saying it is a *Metal*, which at once expresses several of its simple Ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a Body very heavy, fusible, and malleable.

§. 5. A like trifling it is, to predicate any other part of the Definition of the Term defin'd, or to affirm any one of the simple Ideas of a complex one, of the Name of the whole complex Idea; as *All Gold is fusible*. For *Fusibility* being one of the simple Ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the Sound *Gold* stands for, what can it be but playing with Sounds, to affirm that of the Name *Gold*, which is comprehended in its receiv'd Signification? 'Twould be thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely as a Truth of moment, That *Gold is yellow*; and I see not how it is any jot more material to say, *It is fusible*, unless that Quality be left out of the complex Idea, of which the Sound *Gold* is the Mark in ordinary Speech. What Instruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is suppos'd to know before? For I am suppos'd to know the Signification of the Word another uses to me, or else he is to tell me. And if I know that the Name of *Gold* stands for this complex Idea of *Body, Yellow, Heavy, Fusible, Malleable*, 'twill not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a Proposition, and gravely say, *All Gold is fusible*. Such Propositions can only serve to shew the Disingenuity of one, who will go from the Definition of his own Terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry no Knowledge with them, but of the Signification of Words, however certain they be.

§. 6. Every *Man is an Animal*, or living Body, is as certain a Proposition as can be; but no more conducing to the Knowledge of things, than to say, *A Palfry is an Ambling Horse*, or a neighing ambling *Animal*, both being only about the Signification of Words, and make me know but this; That *Body, Sense, and Motion*, or Power of Sensation and Moving, are three of those Ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word *Man*; and where they are not to be found together, the Name *Man* belongs not to that thing: And so of the other, that *Body, Sense, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of Voice*, are some of those Ideas which I always comprehend, and signify by the word *Palfry*; and when they are not to be found together, the Name *Palfry* belongs not to that thing. 'Tis just the same, and to the same purpose, when any Term standing for any one or more of the simple Ideas, that altogether make up that complex Idea which is call'd a *Man*, is affirm'd of the Term *Man*: v. g. suppose a *Roman* signified by the Word *Homo*, all these distinct Ideas united in one Subject, *Corporeitas, Sensibilitas, Potentia se movendi, Rationalitas, Risibilitas*; he might, no doubt, with great certainty, universally affirm one, more, or all of these together of the word *Homo*, but did no more than say that the word *Homo*, in his Country, comprehended in its Signification all these Ideas. Much like a Romance Knight; who by the word *Palfry* signify'd these Ideas; *Body of a certain*

tain Figure, four-legg'd, with Sense, Motion, Ambling, Neighing, White, used to have a Woman on his Back; might with the same Certainty universally affirm also any or all of these of the word *Palfry*: but did thereby teach no more, but that the word *Palfry*, in his or Romance Language, stood for all these, and was not to be apply'd to any thing, where any of these was wanting. But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing *Sense*, *Motion*, *Reason*, and *Laughter*, were united, that thing had actually a Notion of *G O D*, or would be cast into a Sleep by *Opium*, made indeed an instructive Proposition: because neither having the Notion of *G O D*, nor being cast into Sleep by *Opium*, being contain'd in the Idea signify'd by the word *Mun*, we are by such Propositions taught something more than barely what the word *Man* stands for; and therefore the Knowledge contain'd in it, is more than *Verbal*.

For this teaches but the Signification of Words.

§. 7. Before a Man makes any Proposition, he is suppos'd to understand the Terms he uses in it, or else he talks like a Parrot, only making a noise by Imitation, and framing certain Sounds, which he has learnt of others; but not, as a Rational Creature, using them for Signs of *Ideas* which he has in his Mind. The Hearer also is suppos'd to understand the Terms as the Speaker uses them, or else he talks jargon, and makes an unintelligible noise. And therefore he trifles with words, who makes such a Proposition, which when it is made, contains no more than one of the Terms does, and which a Man was suppos'd to know before; v. g. *A Triangle hath three Sides*, or *Saffron is yellow*. And this is no farther tolerable, than where a Man goes to explain his Terms, to one who is suppos'd or declares himself not to understand him: and then it teaches only the Signification of that Word, and the Use of that Sign.

But no real Knowledge.

§. 8. We can know then the Truth of two sorts of Propositions with perfect Certainty; the one is, of those trifling Propositions which have a Certainty in them, but 'tis only a *verbal Certainty*, but not instructive. And, secondly, we can know the Truth, and so may be certain in Propositions which affirm something of another, which is a necessary Consequence of its precise complex *Idea*, but not contain'd in it: As that *the external Angle of all Triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal Angles*; which Relation of the outward Angle to either of the opposite internal Angles, making no Part of the complex *Idea* signify'd by the name *Triangle*, this is a real Truth, and conveys with it instructive real Knowledge.

General Propositions concerning Substances are often trifling.

§. 9. We have little or no Knowledge of what Combinations there be of simple *Ideas* existing together in Substances, but by our Senses, we cannot make any universal certain Propositions concerning them, any farther than our nominal Essences lead us: which being to a very few and inconsiderable Truths, in respect of those which depend on their real Constitutions, the general Propositions that are made about Substance, if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling; and if they are instructive, are uncertain, and such as we can have no Knowledge of their real Truth, how much soever constant Observation and Analogy may assist our Judgments in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent Discourses, that amount yet to nothing. For 'tis plain, that Names of substantial Beings, as well as others, as far as they have relative Significations affix'd to them, may, with great truth be join'd negatively and affirmatively in Propositions as their relative Definitions make them fit to be so join'd; and Propositions consisting of such Terms, may, with the same clearness, be deduc'd one from another, as those that convey the most real Truths: and all this, without any Knowledge of the Nature or Reality of things existing without us. By this method one may make Demonstrations and undoubted Propositions in Words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the Knowledge of the Truth of things; v. g. he that having learnt these following Words, with their ordinary mutually relative Acceptions annex'd to them; v. g. *Substance*, *Man*, *Animal*, *Form*, *Soul*, *Vegetative*, *Sensitive*, *Rational*, may make several undoubted Propositions about the Soul, without knowing at all what the Soul really is: and of this sort, a Man may find an infinite number of Propositions, Reasonings, and Conclusions, in Books of Metaphysics, School-Divinity, and some sort of Natural Philosophy; and after all, know as little of *G O D*, *Spirits*, or *Bodies*, as he did before he set out.

§. 10. He that hath liberty to define, *i. e.* determine the Signification of his Names of Substances (as certainly every one does in effect, who makes them stand for his own *Ideas*) and makes their Significations at a venture, taking them from his own or other Mens Fancies, and not from an Examination or Enquiry into the Nature of things themselves; may, with little trouble, demonstrate them one of another, according to those several Respects and mutual Relations he has given them one to another; wherein, however things agree or disagree in their own nature, he needs mind nothing but his own Notions, with the Names he hath bestow'd upon them: but thereby no more increases his own Knowledge, than he does his Riches, who taking a Bag of Counters, calls one in a certain place a *Pound*, another in another place a *Shilling*, and a third in a third place a *Penny*; and so proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and cast up a great Sum, according to his Counters so placed, and standing for more or less as he pleases, without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a Pound, Shilling, or Penny is, but only that one is contain'd in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve: which a Man may also do in the Signification of Words, by making them in respect of one another, more or less, or equally comprehensive.

§. 11. Tho' yet concerning most Words used in Discourses, especially argumentative and controversial, there is this more to be complain'd of, which is the worst sort of *Trifling*, and which sets us yet farther from the Certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them, *viz.* that most Writers are so far from instructing us in the Nature and Knowledge of things, that they use their Words loosely and uncertainly, and do not, by using them constantly and steadily in the same Significations, make plain and clear Deductions of Words one from another, and make their Discourses coherent and clear (how little soever it were instructive) which were not difficult to do, did they not find it convenient to shelter their Ignorance or Obstinacy, under the Obscurity and Perplexedness of their Terms: to which, perhaps, Inadvertency and ill Custom do in many Men much contribute.

And why.

Thirdly, Using Words variously is trifling with them.

§. 12. To conclude; Barely verbal Propositions may be known by these following Marks:

First, All Propositions, wherein two abstract Terms are affirm'd one of another, are barely about the Signification of sounds. For since no abstract *Idea* can be the same with any other but it self, when its abstract Name is affirm'd of any other Term, it can signify no more but this, that it may or ought to be call'd by that Name, or that these two Names signify the same *Idea*. Thus, should any one say, that *Parsimony is Frugality*, that *Gratitude is Justice*, that this or that Action is or is not *Temperance*; however specious these and the like Propositions may at first sight seem, yet when we come to press them, and examine nicely what they contain, we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the Signification of those Terms.

§. 13. Secondly, All Propositions wherein a part of the complex *Idea*, which any Term stands for, is predicated of that Term, are only verbal; *v. g.* to say that *Gold is a Metal* or *heavy*. And thus all Propositions, wherein more comprehensive Words, call'd *Genera*, are affirm'd of subordinate or less comprehensive, call'd *Species*, or *Individuals*, are barely verbal.

Marks of verbal Propositions:
1. Predication in abstract.

2. A part of the Definition predicated of any Term.

When by these two Rules we have examin'd the Propositions that make up the Discourses we ordinarily meet with both in and out of Books, we shall, perhaps, find that a greater part of them, than is usually suspected, are purely about the Signification of Words, and contain nothing in them, but the Use and Application of these Signs.

This, I think, I may lay down for an infallible Rule, That wherever the distinct *Idea* any Word stands for, is not known and consider'd, and something not contain'd in the *Idea* is not affirm'd or deny'd of it; there our Thoughts stick wholly in Sounds, and are able to attain no real Truth or Falshood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might save us a great deal of useless Amusement and Dispute, and very much shorten our trouble and wandring, in the search of real and true Knowledge.

C H A P. IX.

Of our Knowledge of Existence.

General cer-
tain Propositions
concern not
Existence.

§. 1. **H**ITHERTO we have only consider'd the Essences of Things, which being only abstract *Ideas*, and thereby remov'd in our Thoughts from particular Existence (that being the proper Operation of the Mind, in Abstraction, to consider an *Idea* under no other Existence, but what it has in the Understanding) gives us no Knowledge of real Existence at all. Where, by the way we may take notice, that *universal Propositions*, of whose Truth or Falshood we can have certain Knowledge, concern not Existence; and farther, that all particular Affirmations or Negations, that would not be certain if they were made general, are only concerning Existence; they declaring only the accidental Union or Separation of *Ideas* in Things existing, which, in their abstract Natures, have no known necessary Union or Repugnancy.

A threefold
Knowledge of
Existence.

§. 2. But leaving the nature of Propositions, and different ways of Predication to be consider'd more at large in another place, let us proceed now to enquire concerning our Knowledge of the Existence of Things, and how we come by it. I say then, that we have the Knowledge of *our own Existence* by Intuition; of the Existence of GOD by Demonstration; and of other Things by Sensation.

Our Knowledge
of our own Ex-
istence is in-
tuitive.

§. 3. As for *our own Existence*, we perceive it so plainly, and so certainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any Proof. For nothing can be more evident to us, than our own Existence; *I think, I reason, I feel Pleasure and Pain*; Can any of these be more evident to me, than my own Existence? If I doubt of all other things, that very Doubt makes me perceive my own Existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know *I feel Pain*, it is evident I have as certain Perception of my own Existence, as of the Existence of the Pain I feel: Or if I know *I doubt*, I have as certain Perception of the Existence of the thing doubting, as of that Thought which I call *Doubt*. Experience then convinces us, that *we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence*, and an internal infallible Perception that we are. In every Act of Sensation, Reasoning or Thinking, we are conscious to our selves of our own Being; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of Certainty.

C H A P. X.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a GOD.

We are capa-
ble of knowing
certainly that
there is a
GOD.

§. 1. **T**HO' GOD has given us no innate *Ideas* of himself; tho' he has stamp'd no original Characters on our Minds, wherein we may read his Being; yet having furnish'd us with those Faculties our Minds are endow'd with, he hath not left himself without Witness: since we have Sense, Perception and Reason, and cannot want a clear Proof of him, as long as we carry our selves about us. Nor can we justly complain of our Ignorance in this great Point, since he has so plentifully provided us with the means to discover, and know him, so far as is necessary to the end of our Being, and the great Concernment of our Happiness. But tho' this be the most obvious Truth that Reason discovers; and tho' its Evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical Certainty: yet it requires Thought and Attention, and the Mind must apply it self to a regular Deduction of it from some part of our intuitive Knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other Propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear Demonstration. To shew therefore that we are capable of knowing, i. e. being certain that there is a GOD, and how we may come by this Certainty, I think we need go no farther than our selves, and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own Existence.

§. 2.

§. 2. I think it is beyond question, that *Man has a clear Perception of his own Being*; he knows certainly that he exists, and that he is something. He that can doubt, whether he be any thing or no, I speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure Nothing, or endeavour to convince Non-entity, that it were Something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical, as to deny his own Existence (for really to doubt of it is manifestly impossible) let him for me enjoy his beloved Happiness of being Nothing, until Hunger, or some other Pain convince him of the contrary. This then, I think, I may take for a Truth, which everyone's certain Knowledge assures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. That he is something that actually exists.

§. 3. In the next place, Man knows by an intuitive Certainty, that bare Nothing can no more produce any real Being, than it can be equal to two right Angles. If a Man knows that Non-entity, or the Absence of all Being cannot be equal to two right Angles, it is impossible he should know any Demonstration in Euclid. If therefore we know there is some real Being, and that Non-entity cannot produce any real Being, it is an evident Demonstration, that from Eternity there has been Something; since what was not from Eternity, had a Beginning; and what had a beginning, must be produc'd by something else.

§. 4. Next it is evident, that what had its Being and Beginning from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being from another too. All the Powers it has must be owing to, and receiv'd from the same Source. This eternal Source then of all Being must also be the Source and Original of all Power; and so this eternal Being must be also the most powerful.

§. 5. Again, a Man finds in himself Perception and Knowledge. We have then got one step farther; and we are certain now, that there is not only some Being, but some knowing intelligent Being in the World.

There was a time then, when there was no knowing Being, and when Knowledge began to be; or else, there has been also a knowing Being from Eternity. If it be said, there was a time when no Being had any Knowledge, when that eternal Being was void of all Understanding: I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have been any Knowledge: It being as impossible that Things wholly void of Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any Perception, should produce a knowing Being, as it is impossible that a Triangle should make it self three Angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the Idea of senseless Matter, that it should put into it self Sense, Perception and Knowledge, as it is repugnant to the Idea of a Triangle, that it should put into it self greater Angles than two right ones.

§. 6. Thus from the Consideration of our selves, and what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, That there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being; which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not. The Thing is evident, and from this Idea duly consider'd, will easily be deduc'd all those other Attributes, which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being. If nevertheless any one should be found so senselessly arrogant, as to suppose Man alone knowing and wise, but yet the Product of mere Ignorance and Chance; and that all the rest of the Universe acted only by that blind hap-hazard: I shall leave with him that very rational and emphatical Rebuke of Tully, l. 2. de leg. to be consider'd at his Leisure. "What can be more silly arrogant and misbecoming, than for a Man to think that he has a Mind and Understanding in him, but yet in all the Universe beside there is no such thing? Or that those things, which with the utmost stretch of his Reason he can scarce comprehend, should be mov'd and manag'd without any Reason at all?" *Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem & rationem putet inesse, in cælo mundoque; non putet? Aut ea quæ vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet?*

From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more certain Knowledge of the Existence of a GOD, than of any thing our Senses have not immediately discover'd to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a GOD, than that there is any thing else without us. When I say we know, I mean there is such a Knowledge within our reach which we can-

not miss, if we will but apply our Minds to that, as we do to several other Inquiries.

Our Idea of a
most perfect
Being not the
sole Proof of a
G O D.

§. 7. *How far the Idea of a most perfect Being*, which a Man may frame in his Mind, does or does not prove the *Existence of a G O D*, I will not here examine. For, in the different Make of Mens Tempers and Application of their Thoughts, some Arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for the Confirmation of the same Truth. But yet, I think, this I may say, that it is an ill way of establishing this Truth, and silencing Atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a Point as this upon that sole Foundation; and take some Mens having that *Idea of G O D* in their Minds (for 'tis evident some Men have none, and some worse than none, and the most very different) for the only Proof of a Deity; and out of an Over-fondness of that darling Invention, cashier, or at least endeavour to invalidate all other Arguments, and forbid us to hearken to those Proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our own Existence, and the sensible Parts of the Universe offer so clearly and cogently to our Thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering Man to withstand them. For I judge it is as certain and clear a Truth, as can any where be deliver'd, That the invisible Things of G O D are clearly seen from the Creation of the World, being understood by the Things that are made, even his Eternal Power and Godhead. Tho' our own Being furnishes us, as I have shewn, with an evident and incontestable Proof of a Deity; and I believe no body can avoid the Cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it, as to any other Demonstration of so many Parts: yet this being so fundamental a Truth, and of that Consequence, that all Religion and genuine Morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I shall be forgiven by my Reader, if I go over some parts of this Argument again, and enlarge a little more upon them.

Something
from Eternity.

§. 8. There is no Truth more evident, than that *Something* must be from Eternity. I never yet had heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a Contradiction, as a Time wherein there was perfectly nothing. This being of all Absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect Negation and Absence of all Beings, should ever produce any real Existence.

It being then unavoidable for all rational Creatures to conclude, that something has existed from Eternity; let us next see what kind of thing that must be.

Two sorts of
Beings, cogita-
tive and incog-
gitative.

§. 9. There are but two sorts of Beings in the World, that Man knows or conceives.

First, Such as are purely material, without Sense, Perception or Thought, as the clippings of our Beards, and parings of our Nails.

Secondly, Sensible, thinking, perceiving Beings, such as we find our selves to be, which, if you please, we will hereafter call *cogitative* and *incogitative* Beings; which to our present purpose, if for nothing else, are, perhaps, better Terms than material and immaterial.

Incogitative
Being cannot
produce a Co-
gitative.

§. 10. If then there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of Being it must be. And to that, it is very obvious to Reason, that it must necessarily be a *cogitative* Being. For it is as impossible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative Matter should produce a thinking intelligent Being, as that nothing should of it self produce Matter. Let us suppose any parcel of Matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in it self, able to produce nothing. For example; let us suppose the Matter of the next Pebble we meet with, eternal, closely united, and the Parts at firmly at rest together, if there were no other Being in the World, must it not eternally remain so, a dead inactive Lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add Motion to it self, being purely Matter, or produce any thing? Matter then, by its own Strength, cannot produce in it self so much as Motion: the Motion it has must also be from Eternity, or else be produc'd, and added to Matter by some other Being more powerful than Matter; Matter, as is evident, having not power to produce Motion in it self. But let us suppose Motion eternal too; yet Matter, *incogitative* Matter and Motion, whatever changes it might produce of Figure and Bulk, could never produce Thought: Knowledge will still be as far beyond the Power of Motion and Matter to produce, as Matter is beyond the Power of Nothing, or Non-entity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own Thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive Matter produc'd by nothing, as Thought to be produc'd by pure Matter, when before there was

was no such thing as Thought, or an intelligent Being existing. Divide Matter into as minute Parts as you will (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it) vary the Figure and Motion of it as much as you please, a Globe, Cube, Cone, Prism, Cylinder, &c. whose Diameters are but 1000000th part of a Gry (*a*), will operate no otherwise upon other Bodies of proportionable Bulk, than those of an Inch or Foot Diameter; and you may as rationally expect to produce Sense, Thought and Knowledge, by putting together, in a certain Figure and Motion, gross Particles of Matter, as by those that are the very minuteest, that do any where exist. They knock, impel and resist one another, just as the greater do, and that is all they can do. So that if we will suppose nothing first, or eternal; Matter can never begin to be: If we suppose bare Matter, without Motion, eternal; Motion can never begin to be: If we suppose only Mat-

ter and Motion first, or eternal; Thought can never begin to be. For it is impossible to conceive that Matter either with or without Motion could have originally in and from it self Sense, Perception and Knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then Sense, Perception and Knowledge must be a Property eternally inseparable from Matter and every Particle of it. Not to add, that tho' our general or specifick Conception of Matter makes us speak of it as one thing, yet really all Matter is not one individual thing, neither is there any such thing existing as one material Being, or one single Body that we know or can conceive. And therefore if Matter were the eternal first cogitative Being, there would not be one eternal infinite cogitative Being, but an infinite number of eternal finite cogitative Beings, independent one of another, of limited Force and distinct Thoughts, which could never produce that Order, Harmony and Beauty which is to be found in Nature. Since therefore whatsoever is the first eternal Being must necessarily be cogitative; and whatsoever is first of all things, must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the Perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any Perfections that it hath not, either actually in it self, or at least in a higher degree; it necessarily follows, that the first eternal Being cannot be Matter.

§. 11. If therefore it be evident, that *Something* necessarily must exist from Eternity, 'tis also as evident, that *that Something* must necessarily be a cogitative Being: For it is as impossible that incogitative Matter should produce a cogitative Being, as that Nothing, or the Negation of all Being, should produce a positive Being or Matter. *Therefore there has been an eternal Wisdom.*

§. 12. Tho' this Discovery of the necessary Existence of an eternal Mind, does sufficiently lead us into the Knowledge of GOD; since it will hence follow, that all other knowing Beings that have a Beginning must depend on him, and have no other ways of Knowledge, or extent of Power, than what he gives them; and therefore if he made those, he made also the less-excellent Pieces of this Universe, all inanimate Beings, whereby his Omniscience, Power and Providence will be establish'd, and all his other Attributes necessarily follow: Yet to clear up this a little farther, we will see what Doubts can be rais'd against it. *Therefore there has been an eternal Wisdom.*

§. 13. First, Perhaps it will be said, that tho' it be as clear as Demonstration can make it, that there must be an eternal Being, and that Being must also be knowing; yet it does not follow, but that thinking Being may also be material. Let it be so; it equally still follows, that there is a GOD. For if there be an Eternal, Omniscient, Omnipotent Being, it is certain that there is a GOD, whether you imagine that Being to be material or no. But herein, I suppose, lies the Danger and Deceit of that Supposition: There being no way to avoid the Demonstration, that there is an eternal knowing Being, Men, devoted to Matter, would willing have it granted, that this knowing Being is material; and then letting slide out of their Minds, or the Discourse, the Demonstration whereby an eternal knowing Being was prov'd necessarily to exist, would argue all to be Matter, and so deny a GOD, that is, an eternal cogitative Being: whereby they are so far from establishing, that they destroy their own Hypothesis. For, if there can be, in their Opinion, eternal Matter, without any *Whether material or no.*

(a) A Gry is $\frac{1}{10}$ of a Line, a Line $\frac{1}{10}$ of an Inch, an Inch $\frac{1}{10}$ of a philosophical Foot, a philosophical Foot $\frac{1}{10}$ a Pendulum, whose Diadroms, in the Latitude of 45 Degrees, are each equal to one Second of Time, or $\frac{1}{60}$ of a Minute. I have affectedly made use of this measure here, and the parts of it, under a decimal Division, with Names to them; because, I think, it would be of general Convenience, that this should be the common measure in the Commonwealth of Letters.

any eternal cogitative Being, they manifestly separate Matter and Thinking, and suppose no necessary Connection of the one with the other, and so establish the Necessity of an eternal Spirit, but not of Matter; since it has been prov'd already, that an eternal cogitative Being is unavoidably to be granted. Now if Thinking Matter may be separated, *the eternal Existence of Matter will not follow from the eternal Existence of a cogitative Being*, and they suppose it to no purpose.

Not material,
1. Because every Particle of Matter is not cogitative.

§. 14. But now let us see how they can satisfy themselves or others, that this eternal thinking Being is material.

First, I would ask them, whether they imagine, that all Matter, every Particle of Matter, thinks? This, I suppose, they will scarce say; since then there would be as many eternal thinking Beings as there are Particles of Matter, and so an Infinity of Gods. And yet if they will not allow Matter as Matter, that is, every Particle of Matter to be as well cogitative as extended, they will have as hard a Task to make out to their own Reasons, a cogitative Being out of incogitative Particles, as an extended Being out of unextended Parts, if I may so speak.

2. One Particle alone of one Atom that does so? Matter cannot be cogitative.

§. 15. Secondly, If all Matter does not think, I next ask, whether it be only one Atom that does so? This has as many Absurdities as the other; for then this Atom of Matter must be alone eternal or not. If this alone be eternal, then this alone, by its powerful Thought or Will, made all the rest of Matter. And so we have the Creation of Matter by a powerful Thought, which is that the Materialists stick at. For if they suppose one single thinking Atom to have produc'd all the rest of Matter, they cannot ascribe that Pre-eminency to it upon any other account than that of its Thinking, the only suppos'd Difference. But allow it to be by some other way, which is above our Conception, it must be still Creation, and these Men must give up their great Maxim, *Ex nihilo nil fit*. If it be said, that all the rest of Matter is equally eternal, as that thinking Atom, it will be to say any thing at pleasure, tho' ever so absurd: For to suppose all Matter eternal, and yet one small Particle in Knowledge and Power infinitely above all the rest, is without any the least Appearance of Reason to frame any Hypothesis. Every Particle of Matter, as Matter, is capable of all the same Figures and Motions of any other; and I challenge any one in his Thoughts, to add any thing else to one above another.

3. A System of incogitative Matter cannot be cogitative.

§. 16. If then neither one peculiar Atom alone can be this eternal thinking Being; nor all Matter as Matter, i. e. every Particle of Matter, can be it; it only remains, that it is some certain System of Matter duly put together, that is this thinking eternal Being. This is that, which, I imagine, is that Notion which Men are aptest to have of GOD; who would have him a material Being, as most readily suggested to them, by the ordinary Conceit they have of themselves, and other Men, which they take to be material thinking Beings. But this Imagination, however more natural, is no less absurd than the other: For to suppose the eternal thinking Being to be nothing else but a Composition of Particles of Matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to ascribe all the Wisdom and Knowledge of that eternal Being only to the juxtaposition of Parts; than which nothing can be more absurd. For unthinking Particles of Matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new Relation of Position, which 'tis impossible should give Thought and Knowledge to them.

Whether in motion or at rest.

§. 17. But farther, this corporeal System either has all its Parts at rest, or it is a certain Motion of the Parts wherein its Thinking consists. If it be perfectly at rest, it is but one Lump, and so can have no Privileges above one Atom.

If it be the Motion of its Parts, on which its Thinking depends, all the Thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited; since all the Particles that by Motion cause Thought, being each of them in it self without any Thought, cannot regulate its own Motions, much less be regulated by the Thought of the whole; since that Thought is not the cause of Motion (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without it) but the Consequence of it, whereby Freedom, Power, Choice, and all rational and wise Thinking or Acting, will be quite taken away: So that such a thinking Being will be no better

nor wiser than pure blind Matter; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided Motions of blind Matter, or into Thought depending on unguided Motions of blind Matter, is the same thing; not to mention the Narrowness of such Thoughts and Knowledge that must depend on the motion of such Parts. But there needs no Enumeration of any more Absurdities and Impossibilities in this Hypothesis (however full of them it be) than that before-mention'd; since let this thinking System be all, or a part of the Matter of the Universe, it is impossible that any one Particle should either know its own, or the Motion of any other Particle, or the Whole know the Motion of every Particular; and so regulate its own Thoughts or Motions, or indeed have any Thought resulting from such Motion.

§. 18. Others would have Matter to be *eternal*, notwithstanding that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This, tho' it take not away the Being of a GOD, yet since it denies one and the first great Piece of his Workmanship, the Creation, let us consider it a little. Matter must be allow'd eternal; Why? Because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing; why do you not also think your self eternal? You will answer perhaps, Because about twenty or forty Years since you began to be. But if I ask you what that *You* is, which began then to be, you can scarce tell me. The Matter, whereof you are made, began not then to be; for if it did, then it is not eternal: But it began to be put together in such a Fashion and Frame as makes up your Body; but yet that Frame of Particles is not You, it makes not that thinking Thing you are; (for I have now to do with one who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking Being, but would have unthinking Matter eternal too) therefore when did that thinking Thing begin to be? If it did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking Thing from Eternity? the Absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one who is so void of Understanding as to own it. If therefore you can allow a thinking Thing to be made out of nothing (as all Things that are not eternal must be) why also can you not allow it possible, for a material Being to be made out of nothing, by an equal Power, but that you have the Experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Tho', when well consider'd, Creation of a Spirit will be found to require no less Power than the Creation of Matter. Nay possibly, if we would emancipate our selves from vulgar Notions, and raise our Thoughts as far as they could reach, to a closer Contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming Conception how Matter might at first be made, and begin to exist, by the Power of that eternal first Being: But to give Beginning and Being to a Spirit, would be found a more inconceivable Effect of Omnipotent Power. But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the Notions on which the Philosophy now in the World is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them; or to enquire, so far as Grammar it self would authorize, if the common settled Opinion opposes it: especially in this place, where the receiv'd Doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose, and leaves this past doubt, that the Creation or Beginning of any one SUBSTANCE out of nothing, being once admitted, the Creation of all other, but the CREATOR himself, may, with the same ease, be suppos'd.

*Matter not con-
eternal with
an eternal
Mind.*

§. 19. But you will say, It is not impossible to admit of the making any thing out of nothing, since we cannot possibly conceive it? I answer, No: 1. Because it is not reasonable to deny the Power of an infinite Being, because we cannot comprehend its Operations. We do not deny other Effects upon this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive the manner of their Production. We cannot conceive how any thing but Impulse of Body can move Body; and yet that is not a Reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constant Experience we have of it in our selves, in all our voluntary Motions, which are produc'd in us only by the free Action or Thought of our own Minds; and are not, nor can be the Effects of the Impulse or Determination of the Motion of blind Matter in or upon our Bodies; for then it could not be in our Power or Choice to alter it. For example: My right Hand writes, whilst my left Hand is still: What causes Rest in one, and Motion in the other? Nothing but my Will, a Thought of my Mind; my Thought only changing, the right Hand

*Matter not con-
eternal with
an eternal
Mind.*

Hand rests, and the left Hand moves. This is matter of Fact, which cannot be deny'd: Explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to understand Creation. For the giving a new Determination to the Motion of the animal Spirits (which some make use of to explain voluntary Motion) clears not the Difficulty one jot: To alter the Determination of Motion, being in this case no easier nor less, than to give Motion it self; since the new Determination given to the animal Spirits, must be either immediately by Thought, or by some other Body put in their way by Thought, which was not in their way before, and so must owe its Motion to Thought; either of which leaves voluntary Motion as unintelligible as it was before. In the mean time, 'tis an over-valuing our selves, to reduce all to the narrow measure of our Capacities; and to conclude all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds our Comprehension. This is to make our Comprehension infinite, or G O D finite, when what he can do is limited to what we can conceive of it. If you do not understand the Operations of your own finite Mind, that thinking Thing within you, do not deem it strange, that you cannot comprehend the Operations of that eternal infinite Mind, who made and governs all things, and whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain.

C H A P. XI.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.

*It is to be had
only by Sensa-
tion.*

§. 1. **T**HE Knowledge of our own Being, we have by Intuition. The Existence of a G O D, Reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shewn.

The Knowledge of the Existence of any other thing, we can have only by Sensation: For there being no necessary Connection of real Existence with any Idea a Man hath in his Memory, nor of any other Existence but that of G O D, with the Existence of any particular Man; no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only when by actual operating upon him, it makes it self perceiv'd by him. For the having the Idea of any thing in our Mind, no more proves the Existence of that thing, then the Picture of a Man evidences his being in the World, or the Visions of a Dream make thereby a true History.

*Instance,
Whiteness of
this Paper.*

§. 2. 'Tis therefore the actual receiving of Ideas from without, that gives us notice of the Existence of other things, and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us, which causes that Idea in us, tho' perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it: For it takes not from the Certainty of our Senses, and the Ideas we receive by them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produc'd: v. g. whilst I write this, I have, by the Paper affecting my Eyes, that Idea produc'd in my Mind, which, whatever Object causes, I call *White*; by which I know that that Quality or Accident (*i. e.* whose Appearance before my Eyes always causes that Idea) doth really exist, and hath a Being without me. And of this, the greatest Assurance I can possibly have, and to which my Faculties can attain, is the Testimony of my Eyes, which are the proper and sole Judges of this thing, whose Testimonies I have reason to rely on as so certain, that I can no more doubt, which I write this, that I see White and Black, and that something really exists, that causes that Sensation in me, than that I write or move my Hand: which is a certainty as great as human Nature is capable of, concerning the Existence of any thing, but a Man's self alone, and of G O D.

*This tho' not so
certain as De-
monstration,
yet may be
call'd Know-
ledg, and
proves the Ex-
istence of
things with-
out us.*

§. 3. The notice we have by our Senses, of the existing of things without us, tho' it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive Knowledge, or the Deductions of our Reason, employ'd about the clear abstract Ideas of our own Minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the Name of Knowledge. If we persuade our selves, that our Faculties act and inform us right, concerning the Existence of those Objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded Confidence: For I think no body can, in earnest, be so sceptical, as to be uncertain of the Existence of those things he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far

far (whatever he may have with his own Thoughts) will never have any controversy with me; since he can never be sure I say any thing contrary to his Opinion. As to my self, I think GOD has given me Assurance enough of the Existence of things without me; since by their different Application I can produce in my self both Pleasure and Pain, which is one great Concernment of my present state. This is certain, the Confidence that our Faculties do not herein deceive us, is the greatest Assurance we are capable of, concerning the Existence of material Beings. For we cannot act any thing, but by our Faculties; nor talk of Knowledge it self, but by the help of those Faculties, which are fitted to apprehend even what Knowledge is. But besides the Assurance we have from our Senses themselves, that they do not err in the Information they give us of the Existence of things without us, when they are affected by them, we are farther confirm'd in this Assurance by other concurrent Reasons.

§. 4. *First*, 'Tis plain those Perceptions are produc'd in us by exterior Causes affecting our Senses; because *those that want the Organs of any Sense, never can have the Ideas belonging to that Sense* produc'd in their Minds. This is too evident to be doubted: and therefore we cannot but be assur'd, that they come in by the Organs of that Sense, and no other way. The Organs themselves, 'tis plain, do not produce them; for then the Eyes of a Man in the dark would produce Colours, and his Nose smell Roses in the Winter: but we see no body gets the Relish of a Pine-Apple, till he goes to the *Indies*, where it is, and tastes it.

1. Because we cannot have them but by the Inlet of the Senses.

§. 5. *Secondly*, Because sometimes I find, that I cannot avoid the having those Ideas produc'd in my Mind. For tho' when my Eyes are shut, or Windows fast, I can at pleasure recal to my Mind the Ideas of Light, or the Sun, which former Sensations had lodg'd in my Memory; so I can at pleasure lay by that Idea, and take into my view that of the Smell of a Rose, or Taste of Sugar. But if I turn my Eyes at Noon towards the Sun, I cannot avoid the Ideas, which the Light, or Sun, then produces in me. So that there is a manifest difference between the Ideas laid up in my Memory, (over which, if they were there only, I should have constantly the same Power to dispose of them, and lay them by at pleasure) and those which force themselves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And therefore it must needs be some exterior cause, and the brisk acting of some Objects without me, whose Efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those Ideas in my Mind, whether I will or no. Besides, there is no body who doth not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the Sun, as he hath the Idea of it in his Memory, and actually looking upon it: of which two, his Perception is so distinct, that few of his Ideas are more distinguishable one from another. And therefore he hath certain Knowledge, that they are not both Memory, or the Actions of his Mind, and Fancies only within him; but that actual Seeing hath a Cause without.

2. Because an Idea from actual Sensations, and another from Memory, are very distinct Perceptions.

§. 6. *Thirdly*, Add to this, that many of those Ideas are produced in us with Pain, which afterwards we remember without the least Offence. Thus the Pain of Heat or Cold, when the Idea of it is reviv'd in our Minds, gives us no disturbance; which, when felt, was very troublesome, and is again, when actually repeated: which is occasion'd by the disorder the external Object causes in our Bodies when apply'd to it. And we remember the Pain of Hunger, Thirst, or the Head-ach, without any Pain at all; which would either never disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but Ideas floating in our Minds, and Appearances entertaining our Fancies, without the real Existence of things affecting us from abroad. The same may be said of Pleasure, accompanying several actual Sensations: And tho' mathematical Demonstration depends not upon Sense, yet the examining them by Diagrams gives great Credit to the Evidence of our Sight, and seems to give it a Certainty approaching to that of Demonstration it self. For it would be very strange, that a Man should allow it for an undeniable Truth, that two Angles of a Figure, which he measures by Lines and Angles of a Diagram, should be bigger one than the other; and yet doubt of the Existence of those Lines and Angles, which, by looking on, he makes use of to measure that by.

3. Pleasure or Pain which accompanies actual Sensation, accompanies not the returning of those Ideas without the external Objects.

§. 7. *Fourthly*, Our Senses in many cases bear witness to the Truth of each other's Report, concerning the Existence of sensible things without us. He

4. Our Senses assist one another's Testimony of the Existence of outward things.

that sees a *Fire*, may, if he doubt whether it be any thing more than a bare *Fancy*, feel it too; and be convinc'd, by putting his *Hand* in it. Which certainly could never be put into such exquisite Pain, by a bare *Idea* or *Phantom*, unless the Pain be a *Fancy* too: which yet he cannot, when the *Burn* is well, by raising the *Idea* of it, bring upon himself again.

Thus I see, whilst I write this, I can change the Appearance of the *Paper*; and by designing the *Letters*, tell before-hand what new *Idea* it shall exhibit the very next moment, barely by drawing my *Pen* over it: which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will) if my *Hands* stand still; or tho' I move my *Pen*, if my *Eyes* be shut: nor when those *Characters* are once made on the *Paper*, can I chuse afterwards but see them as they are; that is, have the *Ideas* of such *Letters* as I have made. Whence it is manifest, that they are not barely the Sport and Play of my own *Imagination*, when I find that the *Characters*, that were made at the pleasure of my own *Thoughts*, do not obey them; nor yet cease to be, whenever I shall fancy it, but continue to affect my *Senses* constantly and regularly, according to the *Figures* I made them. To which if we will add, that the *Sight* of those shall, from another *Man*, draw such *Sounds*, as I before-hand design they shall stand for; there will be little reason left to doubt, that those *Words* I write, do really exist without me, when they cause a long *Series* of regular *Sounds* to affect my *Ears*, which could not be the effect of my *Imagination*, nor could my *Memory* retain them in that order.

This Certainty
is as great as
our Condition
needs.

§. 8. But yet, if after all this any one will be so sceptical, as to distrust his *Senses*, and to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole *Being*, is but the *Series* and deluding *Appearances* of a long *Dream*, whereof there is no reality; and therefore will question the *Existence* of all things, or our *Knowledge* of any thing: I must desire him to consider, that if all be a *Dream*, then he doth but dream that he makes the question; and so it is not much matter, that a waking *Man* should answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I make him this Answer, That the Certainty of Things existing in *rerum Natura*, when we have the *Testimony* of our *Senses* for it, is not only as great as our *Frame* can attain to, but as our *Condition* needs. For our *Faculties* being suited not to the full extent of *Being*, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive *Knowledge* of things, free from all *Doubt* and *Scruple*; but to the *Preservation* of us in whom they are; and accommodated to the use of *Life*; they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a *Candle* burning, and hath experimented the *Force* of its *Flame*, by putting his *Finger* in it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great pain: which is Assurance enough, when no *Man* requires greater Certainty to govern his *Actions* by, than what is as certain as his *Actions* themselves. And if our *Dreamer* pleases to try, whether the glowing *Heat* of a *Glass Furnace*, be barely a wandering *Imagination* in a drowsy *Man's* *Fancy*; by putting his *Hand* into it, he may perhaps be waken'd into a Certainty greater than he could wish, that it is something more than bare *Imagination*. So that this Evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our *Pleasure* or *Pain*, i. e. *Happiness* or *Misery*; beyond which we have no *Concernment*, either of *Knowing* or *Being*. Such an Assurance of the *Existence* of things without us, is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the *Good*, and avoiding the *Evil*, which is caus'd by them; which is the important *Concernment* we have of being made acquainted with them.

But reaches no
farther than
actual Sensa-
tion.

§. 9. In fine then, when our *Senses* do actually convey into our *Understandings* any *Idea*, we cannot but be satisfy'd that there doth something at that time really exist without us, which doth affect our *Senses*, and by them give notice of it self to our apprehensive *Faculties*, and actually produce that *Idea* which we then perceive: and we cannot so far distrust their *Testimony*, as to doubt, that such *Collections* of simple *Ideas*, as we have observ'd by our *Senses* to be united together, do really exist together. But this *Knowledge* extends as far as the present *Testimony* of our *Senses*, employ'd about particular *Objects* that do then affect them, and no farther. For if I saw such a *Collection* of simple *Ideas*, as is wont to be call'd *Man*, existing together one minute since, and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same *Man* exists now, since there is no necessary

cessary Connexion of his Existence a Minute since, with his Existence now: by a thousand ways he may cease to be, since I had the Testimony of my Senses for his Existence. And if I cannot be certain, that the Man I saw last to day is now in Being, I can less be certain that he is so, who hath been longer remov'd from my Senses, and I have not seen since yesterday, or since the last Year: and much less can I be certain of the Existence of Men that I never saw. And therefore tho' it be highly probable, that Millions of Men do now exist, yet whilst I am alone writing this, I have not that Certainty of it which we strictly call Knowledge; tho' the great Likelihood of it puts me past doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon the confidence that there are Men (and Men also of my Acquaintance, with whom I have to do) now in the World: But this is but Probability, not Knowledge.

§. 10. Whereby yet we may observe, how foolish and vain a thing it is, for a Man of narrow Knowledge, who having Reason given him to judge of the different Evidence and Probability of things, and to be sway'd accordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect Demonstration and Certainty in things not capable of it; and refuse Assent to very rational Propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear Truths, because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the least (I will not say Reason, but) Pretence of doubting. He that in the ordinary Affairs of Life would admit of nothing but direct plain Demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this World, but of perishing quickly. The Wholesomeness of his Meat or Drink would not give him reason to venture on it: And I would fain know, what 'tis he could do upon such grounds, as are capable of no Doubt, no Objection.

§. 11. As when our Senses are actually employ'd about any Object, we do know that it does exist; so by our Memory we may be assur'd, that heretofore, things that affected our Senses, have existed: And thus we have Knowledge of the past Existence of several things, whereof our Senses having inform'd us, our Memories still retain the Ideas; and of this we are past all doubt, so long as we remember well. But this Knowledge also reaches no farther than our Senses have formerly assur'd us. Thus seeing Water at this instant, 'tis an unquestionable Truth to me, that Water doth exist: and remembering that I saw it yesterday, it will also be always true; and as long as my Memory retains it, always an undoubted Proposition to me, that Water did exist the 10th of July 1688. as it will also be equally true, that a certain number of very fine Colours did exist, which at the same time I saw upon a Bubble of that Water: But being now quite out of the sight both of the Water and Bubbles too, it is no more certainly known to me that the Water doth now exist, than that the Bubbles or Colours therein do so; it being no more necessary that Water should exist to day, because it existed yesterday, than that the Colours or Bubbles exist to day, because they existed yesterday; tho' it be exceedingly much more probable, because Water hath been observ'd to continue long in Existence, but Bubbles and the Colours on them quickly cease to be.

§. 12. What Ideas we have of Spirits, and how we come by them, I have already shewn. But tho' we have those Ideas in our Minds, and know we have them there, the having the Ideas of Spirits does not make us know, that any such things do exist without us, or that there are any finite Spirits, or any other spiritual Beings but the Eternal GOD. We have ground from Revelation, and several other Reasons, to believe with assurance, that there are such Creatures: but our Senses not being able to discover them, we want the means of knowing their particular Existences. For we can no more know, that there are finite Spirits really existing; by the Idea we have of such Beings in our Minds, than by the Ideas any one has of Fairies, or Centaurs, he can come to know that things answering those Ideas do really exist.

And therefore concerning the Existence of finite Spirits, as well as several other things, we must content our selves with the Evidence of Faith; but universal certain Propositions concerning this matter, are beyond our reach. For however true it may be, v. g. that all the intelligent Spirits that GOD ever created, do still exist; yet it can never make a part of our certain Knowledge. These and the like Propositions we may assent to as highly probable, but are not, I fear, in this state capable of knowing. We are not then to put others

Folly to expect Demonstration on in every thing.

Past Existence is known by Memory.

The Existence of Spirits not knowable.

upon demonstrating, nor our selves upon search of universal Certainty in all those matters, wherein we are not capable of any other Knowledg, but what our Senses give us in this or that particular.

Particular
Propositions
concerning Ex-
istence are
knowable.

§. 13. By which it appears, that there are two sorts of *Propositions*. 1. There is one sort of Propositions concerning the *Existence* of any thing answerable to such an *Idea*: as having the *Idea* of an *Elephant*, *Phoenix*, *Motion*, or an *Angel*, in my Mind, the first and natural Enquiry is, Whether such a thing does any where exist? And this Knowledg is only of *Particulars*. No Existence of any thing without us, but only of GOD, can certainly be known farther than our Senses inform us. 2. There is another sort of *Propositions*, wherein is express'd the Agreement or Disagreement of our abstract *Ideas*, and their Dependence one on another. Such Propositions may be *universal* and certain. So, having the *Idea* of GOD and my self, of Fear and Obedience, I cannot but be sure that GOD is to be fear'd and obey'd by me: And this Proposition will be certain, concerning *Man* in general, if I have made an abstract *Idea* of such a Species, whereof I am one particular. But yet this Proposition, how certain soever, That Men ought to fear and obey GOD, proves not to me the Existence of Men in the World, but will be true of all such Creatures, whenever they do exist: which Certainty of such general Propositions, depends on the Agreement or Disagreement to be discover'd in those abstract *Ideas*.

And general
Propositions
concerning ab-
stract Ideas.

§. 14. In the former case, our Knowledg is the Consequence of the Existence of things producing *Ideas* in our Minds by our Senses: in the latter, Knowledg is the Consequence of the *Ideas* (be they what they will) that are in our Minds producing there general certain Propositions. Many of these are call'd *eternæ veritates*, and all of them indeed are so; not from being written all or any of them in the Minds of all Men, or that they were any of them Propositions in any one's Mind, till he, having got the abstract *Ideas*, join'd or separated them by Affirmation or Negation. But wheresoever we can suppose such a Creature as *Man* is, endow'd with such Faculties, and thereby furnish'd with such *Ideas* as we have, we must conclude, he must needs, when he applies his Thoughts to the Consideration of his *Ideas*, know the truth of certain Propositions, that will arise from the Agreement or Disagreement which he will perceive in his own *Ideas*. Such Propositions are therefore call'd *Eternal Truths*, not because they are *Eternal Propositions* actually form'd, and antecedent to the Understanding, that at any time makes them; nor because they are imprinted on the Mind from any Patterns, that are any where of them out of the Mind, and existed before: but because being once made about abstract *Ideas*, so as to be true, they will, whenever they can be suppos'd to be made again at any time past or to come, by a Mind having those *Ideas*, always actually be true. For Names being suppos'd to stand perpetually for the same *Ideas*, and the same *Ideas* having immutably the same Habitudes one to another; Propositions concerning any abstract *Ideas*, that are once true, must needs be *eternal Verities*.

C H A P. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledg.

Knowledg is
not from Max-
ims.

§. 1. **I**T having been the common receiv'd Opinion amongst Men of Letters, that *Maxims* were the Foundation of all Knowledg; and that the Sciences were each of them built upon certain *Præcognita*, from whence the Understanding was to take its rise, and by which it was to conduct it self, in its enquiries into the matters belonging to that Science; the beaten Road of the Schools has been, to lay down in the beginning one or more general Propositions, as Foundations whereon to build the Knowledg that was to be had of that Subject. These Doctrines thus laid down for Foundations of any Science, were call'd *Principles*, as the Beginnings from which we must set out, and look no farther backwards in our Enquiries, as we have already observ'd.

(The occasion
of that Opini-
on)

§. 2. One thing, which might probably give an occasion to this way of proceeding in other Sciences, was (as I suppose) the good Success it seem'd to have in

in *Mathematicks*, wherein Men, being observ'd to attain a great Certainty of Knowledge, these Sciences came by Pre-eminence to be call'd *μαθηματικά* and *μάθησις*, Learning, or things Learn'd, thorowly learn'd, as having of all others the greatest Certainty, Clearness and Evidence in them.

§. 3. But if any one will consider, he will (I guess) find that the great Advancement and Certainty of real Knowledge, which Men arriv'd to in these Sciences, was not owing to the Influence of these Principles, nor deriv'd from any peculiar Advantage they receiv'd from two or three general Maxims, laid down in the beginning; but from the clear, distinct, compleat Ideas their Thoughts were employ'd about, and the Relation of Equality and Excess so clear between some of them, that they had an intuitive Knowledge, and by that a way to discover it in others, and this without the help of those Maxims. For I ask, Is it not possible for a young Lad to know, that his whole Body is bigger than his little Finger, but by virtue of this Axiom, that *the whole is bigger than a Part*; nor be assur'd of it, till he has learn'd that Maxim? Or cannot a Country-Wench know, that having receiv'd a Shilling from one that owes her three, and a Shilling also from another that owes her three, the remaining Debts in each of their Hands are equal? Cannot she know this, I say, unless she fetch the Certainty of it from this Maxim, That if you take Equals from Equals, the Remainder will be Equals, a Maxim which possibly the never heard or thought of? I desire any one to consider, from what has been elsewhere said, which is known first and clearest by most People, the particular Instance, or the general Rule; and which it is that gives Life and Birth to the other. These general Rules are but the comparing our more general and abstract Ideas, which are the Workmanship of the Mind made, and Names given to them, for the easier dispatch in its Reasonings, and drawing into comprehensive Terms, and short Rules, its various and multiply'd Observations. But Knowledge began in the Mind, and was founded on Particulars; tho' afterwards, perhaps, no notice be taken thereof: It being natural for the Mind (forward still to enlarge its Knowledge) most attentively to lay up those general Notions, and make the proper use of them, which is to disburden the Memory of the cumbersome Load of Particulars. For I desire it may be consider'd what more Certainty there is to a Child, or any one, that his Body, little Finger and all, is bigger than his little Finger alone, after you have given to his Body the name *Whole*, and to his little Finger the name *Part*, than he could have had before; or what new Knowledge concerning his Body, can these two relative Terms give him, which he could not have without them? Could he not know that his Body was bigger than his little Finger, if his Language were yet so imperfect, that he had no such relative Terms as *Whole* and *Part*? I ask farther, when he has got these Names, how is he more certain that his Body is a *Whole*, and his little Finger a *Part*, than he was or might be certain, before he learnt those Terms, that his Body was bigger than his little Finger? Any one may as reasonably doubt or deny that his little Finger is a part of his Body, as that it is less than his Body. And he that can doubt whether it be less, will as certainly doubt whether it be a Part. So that the Maxim, *The Whole is bigger than a Part*, can never be made use of to prove the little Finger less than the Body, but when it is useless, by being brought to convince one of a Truth which he knows already. For he that does not certainly know that any parcel of Matter, with another parcel of Matter join'd to it, is bigger than either of them alone, will never be able to know it by the help of these two relative Terms, *Whole* and *Part*, make of them what Maxim you please.

§. 4. But be it in the *Mathematicks* as it will, whether it be clearer, that taking an Inch from a black Line of two Inches, and an Inch from a red Line of two Inches, the remaining Parts of the two Lines will be equal, or that if you take Equals from Equals, the remainder will be Equals: Which, I say, of these two is the clearer and first known, I leave to any one to determine, it not being material to my present occasion. That which I have here to do, is to enquire, whether if it be the readiest way to Knowledge to begin with general Maxims, and build upon them, it be yet a safe way to take the Principles, which are laid down in any other Science as unquestionable Truths; and so receive them without Examination, and adhere to them, without suffering to be doubted of, because

But from the comparing clear and distinct Ideas.

Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles.

cause Mathematicians have been so happy, or so fair, to use none but self-evident and undeniable. If this be so, I know not what may not pass for Truth in Morality, what may not be introduc'd and prov'd in Natural Philosophy.

Let that principle of some of the Philosophers, That all is Matter, and that there is nothing else, be receiv'd for certain and indubitable, and it will be easy to be seen by the Writings of some that have reviv'd it again in our Days, what Consequences it will lead us into. Let any one, with *Polemo*, take the World; or with the *Stoicks*, the *Æther*, or the Sun; or with *Anaximenes*, the Air to be God; and what a Divinity, Religion and Worship must we needs have! Nothing can be so dangerous as Principles thus taken up without questioning or examination; especially if they be such as concern Morality, which influence Mens Lives, and give a Bias to all their Actions. Who might not justly expect another kind of Life in *Aristippus*, who plac'd Happiness in bodily Pleasure; and in *Antisthenes*, who made Virtue sufficient to Felicity? And he who, with *Plato*, shall place Beatitude in the Knowledge of G O D, will have his Thoughts rais'd to other Contemplations than those who look not beyond this Spot of Earth, and those perishing things which are to be had in it. He that, with *Archelaus*, shall lay it down as a Principle, That Right and Wrong, Honest and Dishonest, are defin'd only by Laws, and not by Nature, will have other measures of moral Rectitude and Pravity, than those who take it for granted, that we are under Obligations antecedent to all human Constitutions.

This is no certain way to Truth.

§. 5. If therefore those that pass for Principles, are not certain (which we must have some way to know, that we may be able to distinguish them from those that are doubtful) but are only made so to us by our blind Assent, we are liable to be misled by them; and instead of being guided into Truth, we shall, by Principles, be only confirm'd in Mistake and Error.

But to compare clear compleat Ideas under steady Names.

§. 6. But since the Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles, as well as of all other Truths, depends only upon the Perception we have of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas, the way to improve our Knowledge, is not, I am sure, blindly, and with an implicit Faith, to receive and swallow Principles; but is, I think, to get and fix in our Minds clear, distinct and compleat Ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them proper and constant Names. And thus, perhaps, without any other Principles, but barely considering those Ideas, and by comparing them one with another, finding their Agreement and Disagreement, and their several Relations and Habitues; we shall get more true and clear Knowledge, by the Conduct of this one Rule, than by taking up Principles, and thereby putting our Minds into the disposal of others.

The true Method of advancing Knowledge is by considering our abstract Ideas.

§. 7. We must therefore, if we will proceed, as Reason advises, adapt our Methods of Inquiry to the nature of the Ideas we examine, and the Truth we search after. General and certain Truths are only founded in the Habitues and Relations of abstract Ideas. A sagacious and methodical Application of our Thoughts, for the finding out these Relations, is the only way to discover all that can be put, with Truth and Certainty concerning them, into general Propositions. By what Steps we are to proceed in these, is to be learned in the Schools of the Mathematicians, who from very plain and easy Beginnings, by gentle degrees, and a continu'd Chain of Reasonings, proceed to the Discovery and Demonstration of Truths, that appear at first sight beyond human Capacity. The Art of finding Proofs, and the admirable Methods they have invented for the singling out, and laying in order those intermediate Ideas, that demonstratively shew the Equality or Inequality of unapplicable Quantities, is that which has carry'd them so far, and produc'd such wonderful and unexpected Discoveries: but whether something like this, in respect of other Ideas, as well as those of Magnitude, may not in time be found out, I will not determine. This, I think, I may say, that if other Ideas, that are the real as well as nominal Essences of their Species, were pursu'd in the way familiar to Mathematicians, they would carry our Thoughts farther, and with greater Evidence and Clearness than possibly we are apt to imagine.

By which Morality also may be made clearer.

§. 8. This gave me the confidence to advance that Conjecture, which I suggest, chap. 3. viz. That Morality is capable of Demonstration, as well as Mathematicks. For the Ideas that Ethicks are conversant about being all real Essences, and such as I imagine have a discoverable Connection and Agreement one with

with another; so far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations, so far we shall be possess'd of certain, real and general Truths: and I doubt not, but if a right Method were taken, a great part of Morality might be made out with that Clearness, that could leave, to a considering Man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the Truth of Propositions in Mathematicks, which have been demonstrated to him.

§. 9. In our search after the Knowledge of *Substances*, our want of *Ideas*, that are suitable to such a way of proceeding, obliges us to a quite different Method. We advance not here as in the other (where our abstract *Ideas* are real as well as nominal Essences) by contemplating our *Ideas*, and considering their Relations and Correspondencies; that helps us very little, for the Reasons, that in another place we have at large set down. By which, I think it is evident, that *Substances* afford Matter of very little general Knowledge; and the bare Contemplation of their abstract *Ideas*, will carry us but a very little way in the Search of Truth and Certainty. What then are we to do for the Improvement of our Knowledge in *Substantial Beings*? Here we are to take a quite contrary Course; the want of *Ideas* of their real *Essences*, sends us from our own Thoughts, to the things themselves, as they exist. *Experience here must teach me*, what Reason cannot; and 'tis by trying alone, that I can certainly know, what other Qualities co-exist with those of my complex *Idea*, v. g. whether that *yellow, heavy, fusible Body*, I call *Gold*, be *malleable*, or no; which Experience (which way ever it prove, in that particular Body, I examine) makes me not certain, that it is so in all, or any other *yellow, heavy, fusible Bodies*, but that which I have try'd. Because it is no Consequence one way or t'other from my complex *Idea*; the Necessity or Inconsistence of *Malleability* hath no visible Connection with the Combination of that *Colour, Weight and Fusibility* in any Body. What I have said here of the nominal Essence of *Gold*, suppos'd to consist of a Body of such a determinate *Colour, Weight and Fusibility*, will hold true, if *Malleableness, Fixedness, and Solubility* in *Aqua Regia* be added to it. Our Reasonings from these *Ideas* will carry us but a little way in the certain Discovery of the other Properties in those Masses of Matter wherein all these are to be found. Because the other Properties of such Bodies, depending not on these, but on that unknown real Essence, on which these also depend, we cannot by them discover the rest; we can go no farther than the simple *Ideas* of our nominal Essence will carry us, which is very little beyond themselves; and so afford us but very sparingly any certain, universal and useful Truths. For upon trial having found that particular Piece (and all others of that *Colour, Weight and Fusibility* that I ever try'd) *malleable*, that also makes now perhaps a part of my complex *Idea*, part of my nominal Essence of *Gold*: Whereby tho' I make my complex *Idea*, to which I affix the name *Gold*, to consist of more simple *Ideas* than before; yet still, it not containing the real Essence of any Species of Bodies, it helps me not certainly to know (I say to know, perhaps it may to conjecture) the other remaining Properties of that Body, farther than they have a visible Connection with some or all of the simple *Ideas*, that make up my nominal Essence. For example, I cannot be certain from this complex *Idea*, whether *Gold* be fix'd, or no; because as before, there is no necessary Connection or Inconsistence to be discover'd betwixt a complex *Idea* of a Body, *yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable*; betwixt these, I say, and *Fixedness*: So that I may certainly know, that in whatsoever body these are found, there *Fixedness* is sure to be. Here again for Assurance, I must apply my self to *Experience*; as far as that reaches, I may have certain Knowledge, but no farther.

But Knowledge of Bodies is to be improv'd only by Experience.

§. 10. I deny not but a Man, accusom'd to rational and regular Experiments, shall be able to see farther into the nature of Bodies, and guess righter at their yet unknown Properties, than one that is a Stranger to them: But yet, as I have said, this is but Judgment and Opinion, not Knowledge and Certainty. This way of getting, and improving our Knowledge in *Substances* only by Experience and History, which is all that the Weakness of our Faculties in this State of *Mediocrity*, which we are in in this World, can attain to, makes me suspect, that natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science. We are able, I imagine, to reach very little general Knowledge concerning the Species of Bodies, and their several Properties. Experiments and Historical Observations

This may procure us Convenience, not Science.

we

We are fitted
for moral
Knowledge and
natural Im-
provements.

we may have, from which we may draw Advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase our Stock of Conveniences for this Life ; but beyond this I fear our Talents reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I guess, able to advance.

§. 11. From whence it is obvious to conclude, that since our Faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal Fabrick and real Essences of Bodies ; but yet plainly discover to us the Being of a G O D, and the Knowledge of our selves, enough to lead us into a full and clear Discovery of our Duty, and great Concernment ; it will become us, as rational Creatures, to imploy those Faculties we have about what they are adapted to, and follow the Direction of Nature, where it seems to point us out the way. For 'tis rational to conclude, that our proper Employment lies in those Enquiries, and in that sort of Knowledge which is most suited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it our greatest Interest, *i. e.* the Condition of our eternal Estate. Hence I think I may conclude, that *Morality is the proper Science, and Business of Mankind in general ;* (who are both concern'd, and fitted to search out their *Summum Bonum*) as several Arts, conversant about several Parts of Nature, are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men, for the common use of human Life, and their own particular Subsistence in this World. Of what Consequence the Discovery of one natural Body, and its Properties may be to human Life, the whole great Continent of *America* is a convincing Instance : whose Ignorance in useful Arts, and want of the greatest part of the Conveniences of Life, in a Country that abounded with all sorts of natural Plenty, I think, may be attributed to their Ignorance, of what was to be found in a very ordinary despicable Stone, I mean the Mineral of *Iron*. And whatever we think of our Parts or Improvements in this part of the World, where Knowledge and Plenty seem to vie each with other ; yet to any one, that will seriously reflect on it, I suppose, it will appear past doubt, that were the use of *Iron* lost among us, we should in a few Ages be unavoidably reduc'd to the Wants and Ignorance of the antient savage *Americans*, whose natural Endowments and Provisions come no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite Nations. So that he who first made known the use of that one contemptible Mineral, may be truly stild the Father of Arts, and Author of Plenty.

But must be
ware of Hypo-
theses and
wrong Prin-
ciples.

§. 12. I would not therefore be thought to disesteem, or dissuade the Study of *Nature*. I readily agree the Contemplation of his Works gives us occasion to admire, revere, and glorify their Author : and it rightly directed, may be of greater Benefit to Mankind, than the Monuments of exemplary Charity, that have at so great Charge been rais'd by the Founders of Hospitals and Alms-houses. He that first invented Printing, discover'd the Use of the Compass, or made publick the Virtue and right Use of *Kin Kina*, did more for the Propagation of Knowledge, for the supplying and increase of useful Commodities, and sav'd more from the Grave, than those who built Colleges, Work-houses and Hospitals. All that I would say, is, that we should not be too forwardly possess'd with the Opinion, or Expectation of Knowledge, where it is not to be had ; or by ways that will not attain to it : That we should not take doubtful Systems for compleat Sciences, nor unintelligible Notions for scientific Demonstrations. In the knowledge of Bodies, we must be content to glean what we can from particular Experiments : Since we cannot, from a Discovery of their real Essences, grasp at a time whole Sheaves ; and in Bundles comprehend the Nature and Properties of whole Species together. Where our Inquiry is concerning Co-existence, or Repugnancy to co-exist, which by Contemplation of our *Ideas* we cannot discover ; there Experience, Observation and Natural History must give us by our Senses, and by Retail, an Insight into corporeal Substances. The Knowledge of Bodies we must get by our Senses, warily imploy'd in taking notice of their Qualities and Operations on one another : And what we hope to know of separate Spirits in this World, we must, I think, expect only from Revelation. He that shall consider how little general Maxims, precarious Principles, and Hypotheses laid down at Pleasure, have promoted true Knowledge, or help'd to satisfy the Inquiries of rational Men after real Improvements ; how little, I say, the setting out at that end has, for many Ages together, advanc'd Mens Progress towards the knowledge of Natural Philosophy, will think we have reason to thank those, who in this latter Age have taken another Course,

and have trod out to us, tho' not an easier way to learned Ignorance, yet a surer way to profitable Knowledg.

§. 13. Not that we may not, to explain any *Phænomena* of Nature, make use of any probable *Hypothesis* whatsoever: *Hypotheses*, if they are well made, are at least great Helps to the Memory, and often direct us to new Discoveries. But my Meaning is, that we should not take up any one too hastily (which the Mind, that would always penetrate into the Causes of Things, and have Principles to rest on, is very apt to do) till we have very well examin'd Particulars, and made several Experiments, in that thing which we would explain by our Hypothesis, and see whether it will agree to them all; whether our Principles will carry us quite thro', and not be as inconsistent with one *Phænomenon* of Nature, as they seem to accommodate, and explain another. And at least that we take care, that the name of *Principles* deceive us not, nor impose on us, by making us receive that for an unquestionable Truth, which is really, at best, but a very doubtful Conjecture, such as are most (I had almost said all) of the *Hypotheses* in natural Philosophy.

§. 14. But whether Natural Philosophy be capable of Certainty or no, the ways to enlarge our Knowledg, as far as we are capable, seem to me, in short, to be these two:

First, The First is to get and settle in our Minds determin'd Ideas of those things, whereof we have general or specifick Names; at least of so many of them as we would consider and improve our Knowledg in, or reason about. And if they be specifick Ideas of Substances, we should endeavour also to make them as compleat as we can, whereby I mean, that we should put together as many simple Ideas, as being constantly observ'd to co-exist, may perfectly determine the Species: And each of those simple Ideas, which are the Ingredients of our complex ones, should be clear and distinct in our Minds. For it being evident, that our Knowledg cannot exceed our Ideas; as far as they are either imperfect, confus'd, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect or clear Knowledg.

Secondly, The other is the Art of finding out those intermediate Ideas, which may shew us the Agreement or Repugnancy of other Ideas, which cannot be immediately compar'd.

§. 15. That these two (and not the relying on Maxims, and drawing Consequences from some general Propositions) are the right Method of improving our Knowledg in the Ideas of other Modes besides those of Quantity, the Consideration of Mathematical Knowledg will easily inform us. Where first we shall find, that he that has not a perfect and clear Idea of those Angles, or Figures of which he desires to know any thing, is utterly thereby incapable of any Knowledg about them. Suppose but a Man, not to have a perfect exact Idea of a right Angle, a Scalenum, or Trapezium; and there is nothing more certain, than that he will in vain seek any Demonstration about them. Farther, it is evident, that it was not the Influence of those Maxims, which are taken for Principles in Mathematicks, that hath led the Masters of that Science into those wonderful Discoveries they have made. Let a Man of good Parts know all the Maxims generally made use of in Mathematicks ever so perfectly, and contemplate their Extent and Consequences as much as he pleases, he will by their Assistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know that the Square of the Hypotenuse in a right angled Triangle, is equal to the Squares of the two other Sides. The Knowledg, that the Whole is equal to all its Parts, and if you take Equals from Equals, the Remainder will be Equal, &c. help'd him not, I presume, to this Demonstration: And a Man may, I think, pore long enough on those Axioms, without ever seeing one jot the more of Mathematical Truths. They have been discover'd by the Thoughts otherwise apply'd: The Mind had other Objects, other Views before it, far different from those Maxims, when it first got the Knowledg of such kind of Truths in Mathematicks, which Men well enough acquainted with those receiv'd Axioms, but ignorant of their Method, who first made these Demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire. And who knows what Methods, to enlarge our Knowledg in other Parts of Science, may hereafter be invented, answering that of Algebra in Mathematicks, which so readily finds out Ideas of Quantities to measure others by; whose Equality or Proportion we could otherwise very hardly, or, perhaps, never come to know?

CHAP. XIII.

Some farther Considerations concerning our Knowledge.

Our Knowledge
partly necessary,
partly voluntary.

§. 1. **O**UR Knowledge, as in other things, so in this, has a great Conformity with our Sight, that it is *neither wholly necessary, nor wholly voluntary*. If our Knowledge were altogether necessary, all Mens Knowledge would not only be alike, but every Man would know all that is knowable: and if it were wholly voluntary, some Men so little regard or value it, that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men that have Senses cannot chuse but receive some *Ideas* by them; and if they have Memory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they have any distinguishing Faculty, cannot but perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of some of them one with another: As he that has Eyes, if he will open them by day, cannot but see some Objects, and perceive a difference in them. But tho' a Man, with his Eyes open in the Light, cannot but see; yet there be certain Objects, which he may chuse whether he will turn his Eyes to; there may be in his reach a Book containing Pictures and Discourses, capable to delight or instruct him, which yet he may never have the Will to open, never take the Pains to look into.

The Application
voluntary; but we know
as things are,
not as we
please.

§. 2. There is also another thing in a Man's Power, and that is, tho' he turns his Eyes sometimes towards an Object, yet he may chuse whether he will curiously survey it, and with an intent Application endeavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it. But yet what he does see, he cannot see otherwise than he does. It depends not on his Will to see that *Black*, which appears *Yellow*; nor to persuade himself, that what actually *scalds* him, feels *cold*. The Earth will not appear painted with Flowers, nor the Fields cover'd with Verdure, whenever he has a mind to it: In the cold Winter, he cannot help seeing it white and hoary, if he will look abroad. Just thus is it with our Understanding all that is *voluntary* in our Knowledge, is the *employing* or *with-holding* any of our *Faculties* from this or that sort of Objects, and a more or less accurate Survey of them: But they being imploy'd, *our Will hath no Power to determine the Knowledge of the Mind* one way or other; that is done only by the Objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discover'd. And therefore, as far as Mens Senses are conversant about external Objects, the Mind cannot but receive those *Ideas*, which are presented by them, and be inform'd of the Existence of things without: and so far as Mens Thoughts converse with their own determin'd *Ideas*, they cannot but, in some measure, observe the Agreement and Disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them, which is so far Knowledge: and if they have Names for those *Ideas* which they have thus consider'd, they must needs be assur'd of the Truth of those Propositions, which express that Agreement or Disagreement they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinc'd of those Truths. For what a Man sees, he cannot but see; and what he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.

Instance, in
Numbers.

§. 3. Thus he that has got the *Ideas* of Numbers, and hath taken the pains to compare *One*, *Two* and *Three* to *Six*, cannot chuse but know that they are equal: He that hath got the *Idea* of a *Triangle*, and found the ways to measure its Angles, and their Magnitudes, is certain that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; and can as little doubt of that, as of this Truth, that *it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*.

In Natural Religion.

He also that hath the *Idea* of an intelligent, but frail and weak Being, made by and depending on another, who is eternal, omnipotent, perfectly wise and good, will as certainly know that Man is to honour, fear and obey GOD, as that the Sun shines when he sees it. For if he hath but the *Ideas* of two such Beings in his Mind, and will turn his Thoughts that way, and consider them, he will as certainly find that the Inferior, Finite and Dependant, is under an Obligation to obey the Supreme and Infinite, as he is certain to find, that *Three*, *Four* and *Seven* are less than *Fifteen*, if he will consider and compute those Numbers; nor can he be surer in a clear Morning that the Sun is risen, if he will but open his Eyes, and turn them that way. But yet these Truths, being ever so certain, ever so clear, he may be ignorant of either, or all of them, who will never take the pains to imploy his Faculties, as he should, to inform himself about them.

CHAP.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Judgment.

§. 1. **T**HE understanding Faculties being given to Man, not barely for Speculation, but also for the Conduct of his Life, Man would be at a great loss, if he had nothing to direct him but what has the Certainty of true Knowledge. For that being very short and scanty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the Actions of his Life, perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the Absence of clear and certain Knowledge. He that will not eat, till he has Demonstration that it will nourish him; he that will not stir, till he infallibly knows the Business he goes about will succeed; will have little else to do, but sit still and perish.

Our Knowledge being short, we want something else.

§. 2. Therefore as God has set some things in broad Day-light; as he has given us some certain Knowledge, tho' limited to a few things in comparison, probably as a Taste of what intellectual Creatures are capable of, to excite in us a Desire and Endeavour after a better State: So in the greatest part of our Concernment, he has afforded us only the Twilight, as I may so say, of Probability; suitable, I presume, to that State of Mediocrity and Probationership, he has been pleas'd to place us in here; wherein, to check our Over-confidence and Presumption, we might by every day's Experience be made sensible of our Short-sightedness and Liableness to Error; the Sense whereof might be a constant Admonition to us, to spend the Days of this our Pilgrimage with Industry and Care, in the search and following of that way, which might lead us to a State of greater Perfection: It being highly rational to think, even were Revelation silent in the case, That as Men employ those Talents God has given them here, they shall accordingly receive their Rewards at the Close of the Day, when their Sun shall set, and Night shall put an end to their Labours.

What use to be made of this twilight State.

§. 3. The Faculty which God has given Man to supply the want of clear and certain Knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is *Judgment*, whereby the Mind takes its *Ideas* to agree or disagree; or which is the same, any Proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative Evidence in the Proofs. The Mind sometimes exercises this *Judgment* out of necessity, where demonstrative Proofs, and certain Knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes out of Laziness, Unskilfulness, or Haste, even where demonstrative and certain Proofs are to be had. Men often stay not warily to examine the Agreement or Disagreement of two *Ideas*, which they are desirous or concern'd to know; but either incapable of such Attention as is requisite in a long Train of Gradations, or impatient of Delay, lightly cast their Eyes on, or wholly pass by the Proofs; and so without making out the Demonstration, determine of the Agreement or Disagreement of two *Ideas*, as it were by a View of them as they are at a distance, and take it to be the one or the other, as seems most likely to them upon such a loose Survey. This Faculty of the Mind, when it is exercis'd immediately about things, is call'd *Judgment*; when about Truths deliver'd in Words, is most commonly call'd *Assent* or *Dissent*: which being the most usual way, wherein the Mind has occasion to employ this Faculty, I shall under these Terms treat of it, as least liable in our Language to Equivocation.

Judgment supplies the want of Knowledge.

§. 4. Thus the Mind has two Faculties, conversant about Truth and Falseness.

Judgment is the presuming things to be so, without perceiving it.

First, *Knowledge*, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfy'd of the Agreement or Disagreement of any *Ideas*.

Secondly, *Judgment*, which is the putting *Ideas* together, or separating them from one another in the Mind, when their certain Agreement or Disagreement is not perceiv'd, but presum'd to be so; which is as the Word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears. And if it so unites, or separates them, as in reality Things are, it is *right Judgment*.

C H A P. XV.

Of Probability.

Probability is
the Appearance
of Agreement
upon fallible
Proofs.

§. 1. **A**S Demonstration is the shewing the Agreement or Disagreement of two *Ideas*, by the Intervention of one or more Proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible Connection one with another; so *Probability* is nothing but the Appearance of such an Agreement or Disagreement, by the Intervention of Proofs, whose Connection is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceiv'd to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the Mind to *judg* the Proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary. For Example: In the Demonstration of it, a Man perceives the certain immutable Connection there is of Equality between the three Angles of a *Triangle*, and those intermediate ones which are made use of to shew their Equality to two right ones, and so by an intuitive Knowledge of the Agreement or Disagreement of the intermediate *Ideas* in each Step of the Progress, the whole Series is continu'd with an Evidence, which clearly shews the Agreement or Disagreement of those three Angles in Equality to two right ones: And thus he has certain Knowledge that it is so. But another Man, who never took the pains to observe the Demonstration, hearing a Mathematician, a Man of Credit, affirm the three Angles of a *Triangle* to be equal to two right ones, *assents* to it, *i. e.* receives it for true. In which case the Foundation of his Assent is the Probability of the thing, the Proof being such as for the most part carries Truth with it: the Man, on whose Testimony he receives it, not being wont to affirm any thing contrary to, or besides his Knowledge, especially in Matters of this kind. So that That which causes his Assent to this Proposition, that the three Angles of a *Triangle* are equal to two right ones, that which makes him take these *Ideas* to agree, without knowing them to do so, is the wonted Veracity of the Speaker in other cases, or his suppos'd Veracity in this.

It is to supply
the want of
Knowledge.

§. 2. Our Knowledge, as has been shewn, being very narrow, and we not happy enough to find certain Truth in every thing which we have occasion to consider; most of the Propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay act upon, are such, as we cannot have undoubted Knowledge of their Truth: yet some of them border so near upon Certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them; but *assent* to them as firmly, and act, according to that Assent, as resolutely as if they were infallibly demonstrated, and that our Knowledge of them was perfect and certain. But there being degrees herein from the very Neighbourhood of Certainty and Demonstration, quite down to Improbability and Unlikeliness, even to the Confines of Impossibility; and also degrees of *Assent* from full *Assurance* and Confidence, quite down to *Conjecture*, Doubt, and *Distrust*: I shall come now (having, as I think, found out the Bounds of Human Knowledge and Certainty) in the next place, to consider *the several Degrees and Grounds of Probability, and Assent or Faith.*

Being that
which makes
us presume
things to be
true before we
know them to
be so.

§. 3. *Probability* is Likelihood to be true, the very Notation of the Word signifying such a Proposition, for which there be Arguments or Proofs, to make it pass or be receiv'd for true. The Entertainment the Mind gives this sort of Propositions, is call'd *Belief*, *Assent*, or *Opinion*, which is the admitting or receiving any Proposition for true, upon Arguments or Proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain Knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the *Difference between Probability and Certainty, Faith and Knowledge*, that in all the Parts of Knowledge there is Intuition; each immediate *Idea*, each Step has its visible and certain Connection; in *Belief*, not so. That which makes me believe, is something extraneous to the thing I believe; something not evidently join'd on both sides to, and so not manifestly shewing the Agreement or Disagreement of those *Ideas* that are under consideration.

§. 4. *Probability* then, being to supply the Defect of our Knowledge, and to guide us where that fails, is always conversant about Propositions, whereof we have

have no certainty, but only some Inducements to receive them for true. The Grounds of it are, in short, these two following.

First, The Conformity of any thing with our own Knowledge, Observation, and Experience.

Secondly, The Testimony of others, vouching their Observation and Experience. In the Testimony of others is to be considered, 1. The Number. 2. The Integrity. 3. The Skill of the Witnesses. 4. The Design of the Author, where it is a Testimony out of a Book cited. 5. The Consistency of the Parts, and Circumstances of the Relation. 6. Contrary Testimonies.

§. 5. Probability wanting that intuitive Evidence, which infallibly determines the Understanding, and produces certain Knowledge, *the Mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the Grounds of Probability*, and see how they make more or less, *for or against* any Proposition, before it assents to or dissents from it; and upon a due ballancing the whole, reject, or receive it, with a more or less firm Assent, proportionably to the Preponderancy of the greater Grounds of Probability on one side or the other. For example:

If I myself see a Man walk on the Ice, it is past Probability, 'tis Knowledge: but if another tells me he saw a Man in *England* in the midst of a sharp Winter, walk upon Water harden'd with Cold; this has so great Conformity with what is usually observ'd to happen, that I am dispos'd by the Nature of the thing itself to assent to it, unless some manifest Suspicion attend the Relation of that Matter of Fact. But if the same thing be told to one born between the Tropicks, who never saw nor heard, of any such thing before, there the whole Probability relies on Testimony: And as the Relators are more in Number, and of more Credit, and have no Interest to speak contrary to the Truth; so that Matter of Fact is like to find more or less Belief. Tho' to a Man, whose Experience has been always quite contrary, and has never heard of any thing like it, the most untainted Credit of a Witness will scarce be able to find Belief. As it happen'd to a *Dutch* Ambassador, who entertaining the King of *Siam* with the Particularities of *Holland*, which he was inquisitive after, among other things told him, that the Water in his Country would sometimes, in cold Weather, be so hard, that Men walk'd upon it, and that it would bear an Elephant if he were there. To which the King reply'd, *Hitherto I have believ'd the strange things you have told me, because I look upon you as a sober fair Man, but now I am sure you lye.*

§. 6. Upon these Grounds depends the Probability of any Proposition: And as the Conformity of our Knowledge, as the Certainty of Observations, as the Frequency and Constancy of Experience, and the Number and Credibility of Testimonies, do more or less agree or disagree with it, so is any Proposition in itself more or less probable. There is another, I confess, which tho' by itself it be no true Ground of Probability, yet is often made use of for one, by which Men most commonly regulate their Assent, and upon which they pin their Faith more than any thing else, and that is the Opinion of others: Tho' there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one; since there is much more Falshood and Error among Men, than Truth and Knowledge. And if the Opinions and Persuasions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a Ground of Assent, Men have reason to be Heathens in *Japan*, Mahometans in *Turkey*, Papists in *Spain*, Protestants in *England*, and Lutherans in *Sweden*. But of this wrong Ground of Assent, I shall have occasion to speak more at large in another place.

The Grounds of Probability are two; Conformity with our own Experience, or the Testimony of others Experience.

In this all the Agreements pro and con ought to be examin'd before we come to a Judgment.

They being capable of great Variety.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Degrees of Assent.

*Our Assent
ought to be re-
gulated by the
Grounds of
Probability.*

§. 1. **T**HE Grounds of Probability we have laid down in the foregoing Chapter; as they are the Foundation on which our *Assent* is built, so are they also the Measure whereby its several Degrees are, or ought to be regulated: only we are to take notice, that whatever Grounds of Probability there may be, they yet operate no farther on the Mind, which searches after Truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear, at least in the first Judgment or Search that the Mind makes. I confess, in the Opinions Men have, and firmly stick to, in the World, their *Assent* is not always from an actual View of the Reasons that at first prevail'd with them: It being in many cases almost impossible, and in most very hard, even for those who have very admirable Memories, to retain all the Proofs, which upon a due Examination made them embrace that side of the Question. It suffices that they have once with Care and Fairness sifted the Matter as far as they could; and that they have search'd into all the Particulars, that they could imagine to give any light to the Question; and with the best of their Skill cast up the account upon the whole Evidence: and thus having once found, on which side the Probability appear'd to them, after as full and exact an Enquiry, as they can make, they lay up the Conclusion in their Memories, as a Truth they have discover'd; and for the future they remain satisfy'd with the Testimony of their Memories, that this is the Opinion, that by the Proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of their *Assent* as they afford it.

*These cannot
always be ac-
tually in view
and then we
must content
our selves
with the re-
membrance
that we once
saw ground
for such a de-
gree of Assent.*

§. 2. This is all that the greatest part of Men are capable of doing, in regulating their *Opinions* and Judgments; unless a Man will exact of them, either to retain distinctly in their Memories all the Proofs concerning any probable Truth, and that too in the same order, and regular deduction of Consequences in which they have formerly plac'd or seen them; which sometimes is enough to fill a large Volume upon one single Question: Or else they must require a Man, for every Opinion that he embraces, every day to examine the Proofs: both which are impossible. It is unavoidable therefore, that the Memory be rely'd on in the case, and that Men be persuaded of several *Opinions*, whereof the Proofs are not actually in their Thoughts; nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recal. Without this the greatest part of Men must be either very Scepticks, or change every moment, and yield themselves up to whoever, having lately study'd the Question, offers them Arguments; which, for want of Memory, they are not able presently to answer.

*The ill Conse-
quence of this,
if our former
Judgment
were not
rightly made.*

§. 3. I cannot but own, that Mens sticking to their past Judgment, and adhering firmly to Conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of great Obstinacy in Error and Mistake. But the Fault is not that they rely on their Memories, for what they have before well judg'd; but because they judg'd before they had well examin'd. May we not find a great Number (not to say the greatest part) of Men that think they have form'd right Judgment of several Matters; and that for no other reason, but because they never thought otherwise? who imagine themselves to have judg'd right, only because they never question'd, never examin'd their own Opinions? Which is indeed to think they judg'd right, because they never judg'd at all: And yet these of all Men hold their Opinions with the greatest Stiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their Tenets, who have least examin'd them. What we once know, we are certain is so: and we may be secure, that there are no latent Proofs undiscover'd, which may overturn our Knowledge, or bring it in doubt. But in Matters of Probability, 'tis not in every case we can be sure that we have all the Particulars before us, that any way concern the Question; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, which may cast the Probability on the other side, and outweigh all that at present seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that hath the Leisure, Patience, and Means, to col-
lect

left together all the Proofs concerning most of the Opinions he has, so as safely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view ; and that there is no more to be alledg'd for his better Information ? And yet we are forc'd to determine our selves on the one side or other. The Conduct of our Lives, and the Management of our great Concerns, will not bear Delay : for those depend, for the most part, on the Determination of our Judgment in Points, wherein we are not capable of certain and demonstrative Knowledge, and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the one side or the other.

§. 4. Since therefore it is unavoidable to the greatest part of Men, if not all, to have several *Opinions*, without certain and indubitable Proofs of their Truths ; and it carries too great an Imputation of Ignorance, Lightness, or Folly, for Men to quit and renounce their former Tenets presently upon the Offer of an Argument, which they cannot immediately answer, and shew the Insufficiency of : it would methinks become all Men to maintain Peace, and the common Offices of Humanity and Friendship, in the Diversity of Opinions ; since we cannot reasonably expect, that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his own Opinion, and embrace our's with a blind Resignation to an Authority, which the Understanding of Man acknowledges not. For however it may often mistake, it can own no other Guide but Reason, nor blindly submit to the Will and Dictates of another. If he, you would bring over to your Sentiments, be one that examines before he assents, you must give him leave at his leisure to go over the Account again, and recalling what is out of his Mind, examine all the Particulars, to see on which side the Advantage lies : And if he will not think our Arguments of weight enough to engage him a-new in so much Pains, 'tis but what we do often our selves in the like Case ; and we should take it amiss, if others should prescribe to us what Points we should study. And if he be one who takes his Opinions upon trust, How can we imagine that he should renounce those Tenets which Time and Custom have so settled in his Mind, that he thinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionable Certainty ; or which he takes to be Impressions he has received from GOD Himself, or from Men sent by Him ? How can we expect, I say, that Opinions thus settled should be given up to the Arguments or Authority of a Stranger, or Adversary ; especially if there be any Suspicion of Interest or Design, as there never fails to be, where Men find themselves ill-treated ? We should do well to commiserate our mutual Ignorance, and endeavour to remove it in all the gentle and fair Ways of Information ; and not instantly treat others ill, as obstinate and perverse, because they will not renounce their own, and receive our Opinions, or at least those we would force upon them, when 'tis more than probable, that we are no less obstinate in not embracing some of their's. For where is the Man that has uncontestable Evidence of the Truth of all that he holds, or of the Falseness of all he condemns ; or can say, that he has examin'd to the Bottom, all his own, or other mens Opinions ? The Necessity of believing without Knowledge, nay, often upon very slight Grounds, in this fleeting State of Action and Blindness we are in, should make us more busy and careful to inform our selves, than constrain others. At least those, who have not thorowly examin'd to the bottom all their own Tenets, must confess they are unfit to prescribe to others ; and are unreasonable in imposing that as Truth on other Mens Belief, which they themselves have not search'd into, nor weigh'd the Arguments of Probability, on which they should receive or reject it. Those who have fairly and truly examin'd, and are thereby got past doubt in all the Doctrines they profess and govern themselves by, would have a juster Pretence to require others to follow them : But these are so few in Number, and find so little reason to be magisterial in their Opinions, that nothing insolent and imperious is to be expected from them : And there is reason to think, that if Men were better instructed themselves, they would be less imposing on others.

*The right use
of it, mutual
Charity and
Forbearance.*

§. 5. But to return to the Grounds of Assent, and the several Degrees of it : *Probability is* We are to take notice, that the Propositions we receive upon Inducements of *either of Mat-
ter of Fact or
Speculation.* Probability, are of two sorts ; either concerning some particular Existence, or as it is usually term'd, Matter of Fact, which falling under Observation, is capable

The concurrent Experience of all other Men with ours, produces Assurance approaching to Knowledge.

capable of human Testimony; or else concerning things, which being beyond the Discovery of our Senses, are not capable of any such Testimony.

§. 6. Concerning the *first* of these, viz. *Particular Matter of Fact*.

First, Where any particular thing, consonant to the constant Observation of our selves and others in the like case, comes attested by the concurrent Reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain Knowledge; and we reason and act thereupon with as little doubt, as if it were perfect Demonstration. Thus, if all *Englishmen*, who have occasion to mention it, should affirm that it froze in *England* the last Winter, or that there were Swallows seen there in the Summer; I think a Man could almost as little doubt of it, as that Seven and Four are Eleven. The first therefore, and *highest Degree of Probability*, is, when the general Consent of all Men, in all Ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a Man's constant and never-failing Experience in like cases, to confirm the Truth of any particular Matter of Fact attested by fair Witnesses: such are all the stated Constitutions and Properties of Bodies, and the regular Proceedings of Causes and Effects in the ordinary Course of Nature. This we call an Argument from the Nature of things themselves. For what our own and other Mens constant Observation has found always to be after the same manner, that we with reason conclude to be the Effects of steady and regular Causes, tho' they come not within the reach of our Knowledge. Thus, that Fire warm'd a Man, made Lead fluid, and chang'd the Colour or Consistency in Wood or Charcoal; that Iron sunk in Water, and swam in Quicksilver: These and the like Propositions about particular Facts, being agreeable to our constant Experience, as often as we have to do with these matters; and being generally spoke of (when mention'd by others) as things found constantly to be so, and therefore not so much as controverted by any body; we are put past doubt, that a Relation affirming any such thing to have been, or any Predication that it will happen again in the same manner, is very true. These *Probabilities* rise so near to *Certainty*, that they govern our Thoughts as absolutely, and influence all our Actions as fully, as the most evident Demonstration; and in what concerns us, we make little or no difference between them and certain Knowledge. Our Belief thus grounded, rises to *Assurance*.

Unquestionable Testimony and Experience for the most part produce Confidence.

§. 7. *Secondly*, The next degree of Probability is, when I find by my own Experience, and the Agreement of all others that mention it, a thing to be, for the most part, so; and that the particular instance of it is attested by many and undoubted Witnesses, v. g. History giving us such an account of Men in all Ages; and my own Experience, as far as I had an Opportunity to observe, confirming it, that most Men prefer their private Advantage to the publick: If all Historians that write of *Tiberius*, say that *Tiberius* did so, it is extremely probable. And in this case, our Assent has a sufficient foundation to raise it self to a degree, which we may call *Confidence*.

Fair Testimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, produces also confident Belief.

§. 8. *Thirdly*, In things that happen indifferently, as that a Bird should fly this or that way; that it should thunder on a Man's right or left Hand, &c. when any particular matter of fact is vouch'd by the concurrent Testimony of unsuspected Witnesses, there our Assent is also unavoidable. Thus, That there is such a City in *Italy* as *Rome*; That about 1700 Years ago, there lived in it a Man, call'd *Julius Caesar*; that he was a General, and that he won a Battel against another, call'd *Pompey*: This, tho' in the nature of the thing there be nothing for nor against it, yet being related by Historians of credit, and contradicted by no one Writer, a Man cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it, as he does of the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance, whereof he himself is a Witness.

Experiences and Testimonies clashing, infinitely vary the degrees of Probability.

§. 9. Thus far the matter goes easy enough. Probability upon such grounds carries so much Evidence with it, that it naturally determines the Judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe or disbelieve, as a Demonstration does, whether we will know, or be ignorant. The difficulty is, when Testimonies contradict common Experience, and the Reports of History and Witnesses clash with the ordinary course of Nature, or with one another; there it is, where Diligence, Attention, and Exactness is requir'd, to form a right Judgment, and to proportion the Assent to the different Evidence and Probability of the thing;

thing; which rises and falls, according as those two Foundations of Credibility, viz. common Observation in like cases, and particular Testimonies in that particular Instance, favour or contradict it. These are liable to so great variety of contrary Observations, Circumstances, Reports, different Qualifications, Tempers, Designs, Oversights, &c. of the Reporters, that 'tis impossible to reduce to precise Rules the various degrees wherein Men give their Assent. This only may be said in general, That as the Arguments and Proofs *pro* and *con*, upon due Examination, nicely weighing every particular Circumstance, shall to any one appear, upon the whole matter, in a greater or less degree, to preponderate on either side; so they are fitted to produce in the Mind such different Entertainment, as we call *Belief, Conjecture, Guess, Doubt, Wavering, Distrust, Disbelief, &c.*

§. 10. This is what concerns *Assent* in matters wherein Testimony is made use of: concerning which, I think, it may not be amiss to take notice of a Rule observ'd in the Law of *England*; which is, That tho' the attested Copy of a Record be good Proof, yet the Copy of a Copy ever so well attested, and by ever so credible Witnesses, will not be admitted as a proof in Judicature. This is so generally approv'd as reasonable, and suited to the Wisdom and Caution to be used in our Enquiry after material Truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This Practice, if it be allowable in the Decisions of Right and Wrong, carries this Observation along with it, viz. That any Testimony, the farther off it is from the original Truth, the less force and proof it has. The Being and Existence of the thing it self, is what I call the original Truth. A credible Man vouching his Knowledge of it, is a good proof: But if another equally credible to witness it from his Report, the Testimony is weaker; and a third that attests the Hear-say of an Hear-say, is yet less considerable. So that in traditional Truths, each Remove weakens the Force of the Proof: And the more hands the Tradition has successively pass'd thro', the less strength and evidence does it receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of, because I find amongst some Men the quite contrary commonly practis'd, who look on Opinions to gain force by growing older; and what a thousand years since would not, to a rational Man, contemporary with the first Voucher, have appear'd at all probable, is now urged as certain beyond all question, only because several have since, from him, said it one after another. Upon this ground, Propositions evidently false or doubtful enough in their first beginning, come by an inverted Rule of Probability to pass for authentick Truths; and those which found or deserv'd little credit from the mouths of their first Authors, are thought to grow venerable by Age, and are urg'd as undeniable.

Traditional Testimonies, the farther remov'd, the less their Proof.

§. 11. I would not be thought here to lessen the Credit and Use of *History*: Yet *History* is 'tis all the light we have in many cases, and we receive from it a great part of the useful Truths we have, with a convincing Evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the Records of Antiquity: I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But this Truth it self forces me to say, That no Probability can arise higher than its first Original. What has no other Evidence than the single Testimony of one only Witness, must stand or fall by his only Testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; and tho' cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is so far from receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker. Passion, Interest, Inadvertency, Mistake of his Meaning, and a thousand odd Reasons, or Capricio's, Mens Minds are acted by (impossible to be discover'd) may make one Man quote another Man's Words or Meaning wrong: He that has but ever so little examin'd the Citations of Writers, cannot doubt how little Credit the Quotations deserve, where the Originals are wanting; and consequently how much less, Quotations of Quotations can be rely'd on. This is certain, that what in one Age was affirm'd upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future Ages, by being often repeated. But the farther still it is from the Original, the less valid it is, and has always less force in the mouth or writing of him that last made use of it, than in his from whom he receiv'd it.

§. 12. The Probabilities we have hitherto mention'd, are only such as concern matter of fact, and such things as are capable of Observation and Testimony. There remains that other sort, concerning which Men entertain Opinions with

In things which Sense cannot discover, Analogy is the great Rule of Probability.

variety of Assent, tho' the Things be such, that falling not under the reach of our Senses, they are not capable of Testimony. Such are, 1. The Existence, Nature, and Operations of finite immaterial Beings without us; as Spirits, Angels, Devils, &c. or the Existence of material Beings; which either for their Smallness in themselves, or Remoteness from us, our Senses cannot take notice of, as whether there be any Plants, Animals, and intelligent Inhabitants in the Planets, and other Mansions of the vast Universe. 2. Concerning the manner of Operation in most parts of the Works of Nature: wherein tho' we see the sensible Effects, yet their Causes are unknown, and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produc'd. We see Animals are generated, nourish'd, and move; the Load-stone draws Iron; and the parts of a Candle successively melting, turn into Flame, and give us both Light and Heat. These and the like Effects we see and know: but the Causes that operate, and the Manner they are produc'd in, we can only guess, and probably conjecture. For these and the like coming not within the Scrutiny of human Senses, cannot be examin'd by them, or be attested by any body; and therefore can appear more or less probable, only as they more or less agree to Truths that are establish'd in our Minds, and as they hold proportion to other parts of our Knowledge and Observation. *Analogy* in these matters is the only help we have, and 'tis from that alone we draw all our grounds of Probability. Thus observing that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently one upon another, produces Heat, and very often Fire it self, we have reason to think, that what we call Heat and Fire, consists in a violent Agitation of the imperceptible minute Parts of the burning Matter: observing likewise that the different Refractions of pellucid Bodies produce in our Eyes the different Appearances of several Colours; and also that the different ranging and laying the superficial Parts of several Bodies, as of Velvet, water'd Silk, &c. does the like, we think it probable that the Colour and shining of Bodies, is in them nothing but the different Arrangement and Refraction of their minute and insensible Parts. Thus finding in all parts of the Creation, that fall under human Observation, that there is a gradual Connection of one with another, without any great or discernible Gaps between, in all that great variety of things we see in the World, which are so closely link'd together, that in the several Ranks of Beings, it is not easy to discover the Bounds betwixt them; we have reason to be persuaded, that by such gentle steps things ascend upwards in Degrees of Perfection. 'Tis a hard matter to say where Sensible and Rational begin, and where Insensible and Irrational end: and who is there quick-sighted enough to determine precisely, which is the lowest Species of living things, and which the first of those which have no Life? Things, as far as we can observe, lessen and augment, as the Quantity does in a regular Cone; where tho' there be a manifest odds betwixt the Bigness of the Diameter at a remote distance, yet the difference betwixt the upper and under, where they touch one another, is hardly discernible. The difference is exceeding great between some Men, and some Animals: But if we will compare the Understanding and Abilities of some Men and some Brutes, we shall find so little difference, that 'will be hard to say, that that of the Man is either clearer or larger. Observing, I say, such gradual and gentle Descents downwards in those Parts of the Creation that are beneath Men, the Rule of Analogy may make it probable, that it is so also in things above us and our Observation; and that there are several Ranks of intelligent Beings, excelling us in several Degrees of Perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite Perfection of the Creator, by gentle Steps and Differences, that are every one at no great distance from the next to it. This sort of Probability, which is the best Conduct of rational Experiments, and the Rise of Hypotheses, has also its Use and Influence; and a wary Reasoning from Analogy, leads us often into the Discovery of Truths and useful Productions, which would otherwise lie conceal'd.

One Case
where contra-
ry Experience
lessens not the
Testimony.

§. 13. Tho' the common Experience and the ordinary Course of things have justly a mighty influence on the Minds of Men, to make them give or refuse Credit to any thing propos'd to their Belief; yet there is one Case, wherein the Strangeness of the Fact lessens not the Assent to a fair Testimony given of it. For where such supernatural Events are suitable to Ends aim'd at by him, who has the power to change the Course of Nature, there, under such Circumstances, they

they may be the fitter to procure Belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordinary Observation. This is the proper case of *Miracles*, which well attested do not only find credit themselves, but give it also to other Truths, which need such Confirmation.

§. 14. Besides those we have hitherto mention'd, there is one sort of Propositions that challenge the highest degree of our Assent upon bare Testimony, whether the thing propos'd agree or disagree with common Experience, and the ordinary Course of things, or no. The reason whereof is, because the Testimony is of such an one, as cannot deceive, nor be deceiv'd, and that is of God himself. This carries with it Assurance beyond doubt, Evidence beyond exception. This is call'd by a peculiar name, *Revelation*; and our Assent to it, *Faith*: which as absolutely determines our Minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering, as our Knowledge it self; and we may as well doubt of our own Being, as we can, whether any Revelation from GOD be true. So that Faith is a settled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance, and leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Hesitation. Only we must be sure, that it be a divine Revelation, and that we understand it right: else we shall expose our selves to all the Extravagancy of Enthusiasm, and all the Error of wrong Principles, if we have Faith and Assurance in what is not divine Revelation. And therefore in those cases our Assent can be rationally no higher than the Evidence of its being a Revelation, and that this is the meaning of the Expressions it is deliver'd in. If the Evidence of its being a Revelation, or that this its true Sense be only on probable Proofs, our Assent can reach no higher than an Assurance or Diffidence, arising from the more or less apparent Probability of the Proofs. But of Faith, and the precedency it ought to have before other Arguments of Persuasion, I shall speak more hereafter, where I treat of it, as it is ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to Reason; tho' in truth it be nothing else but an Assent founded on the highest Reason.

The bare Testimony of Revelation is the highest Certainty.

C H A P. XVII.

Of Reason.

§. 1. **T**HE word *Reason* in the *English* Language has *different Significations*: Sometimes it is taken for true and clear Principles; sometimes for clear and fair Deductions from those Principles; and sometimes for the Cause, and particularly the final Cause. But the Consideration I shall have of it here, is in a Signification different from all these; and that is, as it stands for a Faculty in Man, that Faculty whereby Man is suppos'd to be distinguish'd from Beasts, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them.

§. 2. If general Knowledge, as has been shewn, consists in a Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own *Ideas*; and the Knowledge of the Existence of all things without us (except only of a GOD, whose Existence every Man may certainly know and demonstrate to himself from his own Existence) be had only by our Senses: what room then is there for the Exercise of any other Faculty, but outward Sense and inward Perception? What need is there of Reason? Very much; both for the enlargement of our Knowledge, and regulating our Assent: For it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion, and is necessary and assisting to all our other intellectual Faculties, and indeed contains two of them, *viz. Sagacity and Illation*. By the one, it finds out; and by the other, it so orders the intermediate *Ideas*, as to discover what Connection there is in each Link of the Chain, whereby the Extremes are held together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the Truth sought for, which is that we call *Illation* or *Inference*, and consists in nothing but the Perception of the Connection there is between the *Ideas*, in each step of the Deduction, whereby the Mind comes to see either the certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas* as in Demonstration, in which it arrives at Knowledge; or their probable Connection, on which it gives or with-holds its Assent, as in Opinion. Sense and Intuition reach but a very little way. The greatest part of our Knowledge depends

Wherein Reasoning consists.

pend upon Deductions and intermediate *Ideas*: And in those cases, where we are fain to substitute Assent instead of Knowledge, and take Propositions for true, without being certain they are so, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the grounds of their Probability. In both these cases, the Faculty which finds out the Means, and rightly applies them to discover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the other, is that which we call Reason. For as Reason perceives the necessary and indubitable Connection of all the *Ideas* or Proofs one to another, in each Step of any Demonstration that produces Knowledge; so it likewise perceives the probable Connection of all the *Ideas* or Proofs one to another, in every Step of a Discourse, to which it will think Assent due. This is the lowest Degree of that, which can be truly call'd Reason. For where the Mind does not perceive this probable Connection, where it does not discern whether there be any such Connection or no; there Mens Opinions are not the Product of Judgment, or the Consequence of Reason, but the Effects of Chance and Hazard, of a Mind floating at all adventures, without Choice, and without Direction.

its four Parts.

§. 3. So that we may in Reason consider these *four Degrees*: the first and highest, is the discovering and finding out of Proofs; the second, the regular and methodical Disposition of them, and laying them in a clear and fit Order, to make their Connection and Force be plainly and easily perceiv'd; the third is the perceiving their Connection; and the fourth, a making a right Conclusion. These several degrees may be observ'd in any mathematical Demonstration; it being one thing to perceive the Connection of each Part, as the Demonstration is made by another; another to perceive the Dependence of the Conclusion on all the Parts; a third, to make out a Demonstration clearly and neatly one's self; and something different from all these, to have first found out those intermediate *Ideas* or Proofs by which it is made.

*Syllogism not
the great In-
strument of
Reason.*

§. 4. There is one thing more, which I shall desire to be consider'd concerning Reason; and that is, whether *Syllogism*, as is generally thought, be the proper Instrument of it, and the usefulest way of exercising this Faculty. The Causes I have to doubt, are these:

First, Because Syllogism serves our Reason, but in one only of the fore-mention'd Parts of it; and that is, to shew the Connection of the Proofs in any one Instance, and no more: but in this it is of no great use, since the Mind can perceive such Connection where it really is, as easily, nay perhaps better, without it.

If we will observe the Actings of our Minds, we shall find that we reason best and clearest, when we only observe the Connection of the Proof, without reducing our Thoughts to any Rule of Syllogism. And therefore we may take notice, that there are many Men that reason exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a Syllogism. He that will look into many Parts of *Asia* and *America*, will find Men reason there perhaps as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a Syllogism, nor can reduce any one Argument to those Forms: And I believe scarce any one ever makes Syllogisms in reasoning within himself. Indeed Syllogism is made use of on occasion, to discover a Fallacy hid in a rhetorical Flourish, or cunningly wrap'd up in a smooth Period; and stripping an Absurdity of the Cover of Wit and good Language, shew it in its naked Deformity. But the Weakness or Fallacy of such a loose Discourse, it shews, by the artificial Form it is put into, only to those who have thorowly study'd *Mode* and *Figure*, and have so examin'd the many ways that three Propositions may be put together, as to know which of them does certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what grounds it is that they do so. All who have so far consider'd *Syllogism*, as to see the reason why in three Propositions laid together in one Form, the Conclusion will be certainly right, but in another, not certainly so; I grant are certain of the Conclusion they draw from the Premises in the allow'd *Modes* and *Figures*. But they who have not so far look'd into those Forms, are not sure by virtue of Syllogism, that the Conclusion certainly follows from the Premises; they only take it to be so by an implicit Faith in their Teachers, and a Confidence in those Forms of Argumentation; but this is still but believing, not being certain. Now if, of all Mankind, those who can make Syllogisms are extremely few in comparison of those who cannot; and

if of those few who have been taught Logick, there is but a very small Number, who do any more than believe that Syllogisms in the allow'd *Modes* and *Figures* do conclude right, without knowing certainly that they do so; if Syllogisms must be taken for the only proper Instrument of Reason and Means of Knowledge, it will follow, that before *Aristotle* there was not one Man that did or could know any thing by Reason; and that since the Invention of Syllogisms, there is not one of ten thousand that doth.

But God has not been so sparing to Men to make them barely two-leg'd Creatures, and left it to *Aristotle* to make them Rational, *i. e.* those few of them that he could get so to examine the Grounds of Syllogisms, as to see, that in above threescore ways that three Propositions may be laid together, there are but about fourteen, wherein one may be sure that the Conclusion is right, and upon what ground it is, that in these few the Conclusion is certain, and in the other not. God has been more bountiful to Mankind than so. He has given them a Mind that can reason, without being instructed in Methods of syllogizing: The understanding is not taught to reason by these Rules; it has a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incoherence of its *Ideas*, and can range them right, without any such perplexing Repetitions. I say not this any way to lessen *Aristotle*, whom I took on as one of the greatest Men amongst the Antients; whose large Views, Acuteness and Penetration of Thought, and Strength of Judgment, few have equal'd: And who in this very Invention of Forms of Argumentation, wherein the Conclusion may be shewn to be rightly infer'd, did great Service against those who were not ashamed to deny any thing. And I readily own, that all right Reasoning may be reduc'd to his Forms of Syllogism. But yet I think without any Diminution to him I may truly say, that they are not the only, nor the best way of Reasoning, for the leading of those into Truth who are willing to find it, and desire to make the best Use they may of their Reason, for the Attainment of Knowledge. And he himself, it is plain, found out some Forms to be conclusive, and others not, not by the Forms themselves, but by the original Way of Knowledge, *i. e.* by the visible Agreement of *Ideas*. Tell a Country Gentlewoman that the Wind is South-West, and the Weather lowering, and like to rain, and she will easily understand, 'tis not safe for her to go abroad thin clad, in such a day, after a Fever: she clearly sees the probable Connection of all these, *viz.* South-West-Wind, and Clouds, Rain, Wetting, taking Cold, Relapse, and Danger of Death, without tying them together in those artificial and cumberfom Fetters of several Syllogisms, that clog and hinder the Mind, which proceeds from one part to another quicker and clearer without them; and the Probability which she easily perceives in things thus in their native State would be quite lost, if this Argument were manag'd learnedly, and propos'd in Mode and Figure. For it very often confounds the Connection: And, I think, every one will perceive in mathematical Demonstrations, that the Knowledge gain'd thereby comes shortest and clearest without Syllogisms.

Inference is look'd on as the great Act of the Rational Faculty, and so it is when it is rightly made; but the Mind, either very desirous to enlarge its Knowledge, or very apt to favour the Sentiments it has once imbib'd, is very forward to make Inferences, and therefore often makes too much haste before it perceives the Connection of the *Ideas* that must hold the Extremes together.

To infer, is nothing but by virtue of one Proposition laid down as true, to draw in another as true, *i. e.* to see or suppose such a Connection of the two *Ideas* of the infer'd Proposition. *v. g.* Let this be the Proposition laid down, *Men shall be punish'd in another World*, and from thence be infer'd this other, *then Men can determine themselves*. The Question now is to know whether the Mind has made this Inference right or no; if it has made it by finding out the intermediate *Ideas*, and taking a view of the Connection of them, plac'd in a due order, it has proceeded rationally, and made a right Inference. If it has done it without such a view, it has not so much made an Inference that will hold, or an Inference of right Reason, as shewn a Willingness to have it be, or be taken for such. But in neither Case is it *Syllogism* that discover'd those *Ideas*, or shew'd the Connection of them, for they must be both found out, and

and the Connection every where perceiv'd, before they can rationally be made use of in *Syllogism*: unless it can be said, that any *Idea*, without considering what Connection it hath with the two other, whose Agreement should be shewn by it, will do well enough in a *Syllogism*, and may be taken at a venture for the *Medius Terminus*, to prove any Conclusion. But this no body will say, because it is by virtue of the perceiv'd Agreement of the intermediate *Idea* with the Extremes, that the Extremes are concluded to agree; and therefore each intermediate *Idea* must be such, as in the whole Chain hath a visible Connection with those two it is plac'd between, or else thereby the Conclusion cannot be infer'd or drawn in: for wherever any Link of the Chain is loose, and without Connection, there the whole Strength of it is lost, and it hath no Force to infer or draw in any thing. In the Instance above-mention'd, what is it shews the Force of the Inference, and consequently the Reasonableness of it, but a view of the Connection of all the intermediate *Ideas* that draw in the Conclusion, or Proposition infer'd? v. g. *Men shall be punish'd, — God the Punisher, — just Punishment, — the Punish'd guilty — could have done otherwise — Freedom — Self-determination*: By which chain of *Ideas* thus visibly link'd together in train, i. e. each intermediate *Idea* agreeing on each side with those two it is immediately plac'd between, the *Ideas* of Men and Self-determination appear to be connected, i. e. this Proposition *Men can determine themselves* is drawn in, or infer'd from this, *that they shall be punish'd in the other World*. For here the Mind seeing the Connection there is between the *Idea* of *Mens Punishment in the other World*, and the *Idea* of *God punishing*, between *God punishing* and the *Justice of the Punishment*; between *Justice of Punishment* and *Guilt*, between *Guilt* and a *Power to do otherwise*, between a *Power to do otherwise* and *Freedom*, and between *Freedom* and *Self-determination*; sees the Connection between Men and Self-determination.

Now I ask whether the Connection of the Extremes be not more clearly seen in this simple and natural Disposition, than in the perplex'd Repetitions, and Jumble of five or six *Syllogisms*. I must beg pardon for calling it Jumble, till some body shall put these *Ideas* into so many *Syllogisms*, and then say, that they are less jumbled, and their Connection more visible, when they are transpos'd and repeated, and spun out to the greater length in artificial Forms; than in that short natural plain Order they are laid down in here, wherein every one may see it; and wherein they must be seen before they can be put into a Train of *Syllogisms*. For the natural Order of the connecting *Ideas* must direct the Order of the *Syllogisms*, and a Man must see the Connection of each intermediate *Idea* with those that it connects, before he can with reason make use of it in a *Syllogism*. And when all those *Syllogisms* are made, neither those that are, nor those that are not Logicians will see the Force of the Argumentation, i. e. the Connection of the Extremes, one jot the better. [For those that are not Men of Art, not knowing the true Forms of *Syllogism*, nor the Reasons of them, cannot know whether they are made in right and conclusive Modes and Figures or no, and so are not at all help'd by the Forms they are put into; tho' by them the natural Order, wherein the Mind could judge of their respective Connection, being disturb'd, renders the Illation much more uncertain than without them.] And as for Logicians themselves, they see the Connection of each intermediate *Idea* with those it stands between (on which the Force of the Inference depends) as well before as after the *Syllogism* is made, or else they do not see it at all. For a *Syllogism* neither shews nor strengthens the Connection of any two *Ideas* immediately put together, but only by the Connection seen in them, shews what Connection the Extremes have one with another. But what Connection the intermediate has with either of the Extremes in that *Syllogism*, that no *Syllogism* does or can shew. That the Mind only doth or can perceive, as they stand there in that *juxta-position*, by its own view, to which the *Syllogistical* Form it happens to be in gives no help or light at all; it only shews that if the intermediate *Idea* agrees with those it is on both sides immediately apply'd to; then those two remote ones, or as they are call'd Extremes, do certainly agree, and therefore the immediate Connection of each *Idea* to that which it is apply'd to on each side, on which the Force of the Reasoning depends, is as well seen before as after the *Syllogism* is made, or else he that

that makes the Syllogism could never see it at all. This, as has been already observ'd, is seen only by the Eye, or the perceptive Faculty of the Mind, taking a view of them laid together in a *juxta position*; which View of any two it has equally, whenever they are laid together in any Proposition, whether that Proposition be plac'd as a *Major*, or a *Minor*, in a *Syllogism* or no.

Of what use then are *Syllogisms*? I answer, their chief and main use is in the Schools, where Men are allow'd without shame to deny the Agreement of *Ideas* that do manifestly agree; or out of the Schools to those who from thence have learned without shame to deny the Connection of *Ideas*, which even to themselves is visible. But to an ingenuous Searcher after Truth, who has no other aim than to find it, there is no need of any such Form to force the allowing of the Inference: the Truth and Reasonableness of it is better seen in ranging of the *Ideas* in a simple and plain Order: And hence it is, that Men, in their own Enquiries after Truth, never use *Syllogisms* to convince themselves, [or in teaching others to instruct willing Learners.] Because, before they can put them into a *Syllogism*, they must see the Connection that is between the intermediate *Idea* and the two other *Ideas* it is set between and apply'd to, to shew their Agreement; and when they see that, they see whether the Inference be good or no, and so *Syllogism* comes too late to settle it. For to make use again of the former Instance; I ask whether the Mind, considering the *Idea* of Justice, plac'd as an intermediate *Idea* between the *Punishment* of Men, and the *Guilt* of the punish'd, (and, till it does so consider it, the Mind cannot make use of it as a *medius terminus*) does not as plainly see the Force and Strength of the Inference, as when it is form'd into *Syllogism*? To shew it in a very plain and easy Example; let *Animal* be the intermediate *Idea* or *medius terminus* that the Mind makes use of to shew the Connection of *Homo* and *Vivens*: I ask whether the Mind does not more readily and plainly see that Connection in the simple and proper Position of the connecting *Idea* in the middle; thus,

Homo ——— *Animal* ——— *Vivens*;

than in this perplex'd one,

Animal ——— *Vivens* ——— *Homo* ——— *Animal* :

Which is the Position these *Ideas* have in a *Syllogism*, to shew the Connection between *Homo* and *Vivens* by the intervention of *Animal*.

Indeed *Syllogism* is thought to be of necessary use, even to the Lovers of Truth, to shew them the Fallacies that are often conceal'd in florid, witty or involv'd Discourses. But that this is a Mistake, will appear, if we consider, that the reason why sometimes Men, who sincerely aim at Truth, are impos'd upon by such loose, and as they are call'd Rhetorical Discourses, is, that their Fancies being struck with some lively metaphorical Representations, they neglect to observe, or do not easily perceive what are the true *Ideas*, upon which the Inference depends. Now to shew such Men the Weakness of such an Argumentation, there needs no more but to strip it of the superfluous *Ideas*, which blended and confounded with those on which the Inference depends, seem to shew a Connection where there is none; or at least do hinder the Discovery of the want of it; and then to lay the naked *Ideas*, on which the Force of the Argumentation depends, in their due Order, in which Position the Mind, taking a view of them, sees, what Connection they have, and so is able to judge of the Inference, without any need of a *Syllogism* at all.

I grant that *Mode* and *Figure* is commonly made use of in such cases, as if the Detection of the Incoherence of such loose Discourses were wholly owing to the *Syllogistical* Form; and so I my self formerly thought, till upon a stricter Examination I now find, that laying the intermediate *Ideas* naked in their due Order, shews the Incoherence of the Argumentation better than *Syllogism*; not only as subjecting each Link of the Chain, to the immediate view of the Mind in its proper place, whereby its Connection is best observ'd; but also because *Syllogism* shews the Incoherence only to those (who are not one of

ten

ren thousand) who perfectly understand *Mode* and *Figure*, and the Reason upon which those Forms are establish'd: whereas a due and orderly placing of the *Ideas*, upon which the Inference is made, makes every one, whether Logician or not Logician, who understands the Terms, and hath the Faculty to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of such *Ideas* (without which, in or out of Syllogism, he cannot perceive the Strength or Weakness, Coherence or Incoherence of the Discourse) see the want of Connection in the Argumentation, and the Absurdity of the Inference.

And thus I have known a Man unskilful in Syllogism, who at first hearing could perceive the Weakness and Inconclusiveness of a long artificial and plausible Discourse, wherewith others better skill'd in Syllogism have been misled. And I believe there are few of my Readers who do not know such. And indeed if it were not so, the Debates of most Princes Councils, and the Business of Assemblies would be in danger to be mismanag'd, since those who are rely'd upon, and have usually a great stroke in them, are not always such, who have the good luck to be perfectly knowing in the Forms of *Syllogism*, or expert in *Mode* and *Figure*. And if Syllogism were the only, or so much as the surest way to detect the Fallacies of artificial Discourses; I do not think that all Mankind, even Princes in Matters that concern their Crowns and Dignities, are so much in love with Falshood and Mistake, that they would every where have neglected to bring Syllogism into the Debates of moment; or thought it ridiculous so much as to offer them in Affairs of consequence: a plain Evidence to me, that Men of Parts and Penetration, who were not idly to dispute at their ease, but were to act according to the Result of their Debates, and often pay for their Mistakes with their Heads or Fortunes, found those scholastick Forms were of little use to discover Truth or Fallacy, whilst both the one and the other might be shewn, and better shewn without them to those who would not refuse to see what was visibly shewn them.

Secondly, Another Reason that makes me doubt whether Syllogism be the only proper Instrument of Reason in the Discovery of Truth, is, that of whatever use *Mode* and *Figure* is pretended to be in the laying open of Fallacy (which has been above consider'd) those scholastick Forms of Discourse are not less liable to Fallacies than the plainer ways of Argumentation: And for this I appeal to common Observation, which has always found these artificial Methods of Reasoning more adapted to catch and intangle the Mind, than to instruct and inform the Understanding. And hence it is, that Men even when they are baffl'd and silenc'd in this scholastick way, are seldom or never convinc'd, and so brought over to the conquering side: they perhaps acknowledge their Adversary to be the more skilful Disputant; but rest nevertheless persuaded of the Truth on their side; and go away, worsted as they are, with the same Opinion they brought with them, which they could not do, if this way of Argumentation carry'd Light and Conviction with it, and made Men see where the Truth lay. And therefore Syllogism has been thought more proper for the attaining Victory in Dispute, than for the Discovery or Confirmation of Truth in fair Enquiries. And if it be certain, that Fallacy can be couch'd in Syllogism, as it cannot be deny'd, it must be something else, and not Syllogism that must discover them.

I have had Experience how ready some Men are, when all the Use which they have been wont to ascribe to any thing is not allow'd, to cry out, that I am for laying it wholly aside. But to prevent such unjust and groundless Imputations, I tell them, that I am not for taking away any Helps to the Understanding, in the attainment of Knowledge. And if Men skill'd in, and us'd to Syllogisms, find them assisting to their Reason in the discovery of Truth, I think they ought to make use of them. All that I aim at is, that they should not ascribe more to these Forms than belongs to them; and think that Men have no use, or not so full a use of their reasoning Faculty without them. Some Eyes want Spectacles to see things clearly and distinctly; but let not those that use them therefore say, nobody can see clearly without them: Those who do so will be thought in favour with Art (which perhaps they are beholden to) a little too much to depress and discredit Nature. Reason, by its own Penetration where it is strong and exercis'd, usually sees quicker and clearer without Syllogism.

If use of those Spectacles has so dimm'd its Sight, that it cannot without them see Consequences or Inconsequences in Argumentation, I am not so unreasonable as to be against the using them. Every one knows what best fits his own Sight. But let him not hence conclude all in the dark, who use not just the same Helps that he finds a need of.

§. 5. But however it be in Knowledge, I think I may truly say, it is of far less, or no use at all in Probabilities. For the Assent there, being to be determin'd by the Preponderancy, after a due weighing of all the Proofs, with all Circumstances on both sides, nothing is so unfit to assist the Mind in that, as Syllogism; which running away with one assum'd Probability, or one topical Argument, pursues that, till it has led the Mind quite out of sight of the thing under Consideration; and forcing it upon some remote Difficulty, holds it fast there, entangled perhaps, and as it were manacled in the Chain of Syllogisms, without allowing it the liberty, much less affording it the Helps requisite to shew on which side, all things consider'd, is the greater Probability.

§. 6. But let it help us (as perhaps may be said) in convincing Men of their Errors and Mistakes: (and yet I would fain see the Man that was forc'd out of his Opinion by dint of Syllogism) yet still it fails our Reason in that Part, which, if not its highest Perfection, is yet certainly its hardest Task, and that which we most need its help in; and that is the finding out of Proofs, and making new Discoveries. The Rules of Syllogism serve not to furnish the Mind with those intermediate Ideas that may shew the Connection of remote ones. This way of reasoning discovers no new Proofs, but is the Art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already. The 47th Proposition of the first Book of Euclid is very true; but the Discovery of it, I think, not owing to any Rules of common Logick. A Man knows first, and then he is able to prove syllogistically. So that Syllogism comes after Knowledge, and then a Man has little or no need of it. But 'tis chiefly by the finding out those Ideas that shew the Connection of distant ones, that our Stock of Knowledge is increas'd, and that useful Arts and Sciences are advanc'd. Syllogism at best is but the Art of Fencing with the little Knowledge we have, without making any Addition to it. And if a Man should employ his Reason all this way, he will not do much otherwise than he, who having got some Iron out of the Bowels of the Earth, would have it beaten up all into Swords, and put it into his Servants Hands to fence with, and bang one another. Had the King of Spain employ'd the Hands of his People, and his Spanish Iron so, he had brought to light but little of that Treasure that lay so long hid in the dark Entrails of America. And I am apt to think, that he who shall employ all the Force of his Reason only in brandishing of Syllogisms, will discover very little of that Mass of Knowledge, which lies yet conceal'd in the secret Recesses of Nature; and which I am apt to think, native rustick Reason (as it formerly has done) is likelier to open a way to, and add to the common stock of Mankind, rather than any scholastick Proceeding by the strict Rules of Mode and Figure.

§. 7. I doubt not nevertheless, but there are ways to be found to assist our Reason in this most useful Part; and this the judicious Hooker encourages me to say, who in his Eccl. Pol. l. 1. §. 6. speaks thus: *If there might be added the right Helps of true Art and Learning (which Helps I must plainly confess, this Age of the World carrying the name of a learned Age, doth neither much know, nor generally regard) there would undoubtedly be almost as much difference in Maturity of Judgment between Men therewith imur'd, and that which now Men are, as between Men that are now, and Innocents.* I do not pretend to have found, or discover'd here any of those right Helps of Art, this great Man of deep Thought mentions; but this is plain, that Syllogism, and the Logick now in use, which were as well known in his days, can be none of those he means. It is sufficient for me, if by a Discourse, perhaps something out of the way, I am sure as to me wholly new and unborrow'd, I shall have given occasion to others, to cast about for new Discoveries, and to seek in their own Thoughts, for those right Helps of Art, which will scarce be found, I fear, by those who servilely confine themselves to the Rules and Dictates of others. For beaten Tracks lead these sort of Cattle (as an observing Roman calls them) whose Thoughts reach only to imitation, *non quo eundum est, sed quo itur.* But I can be bold to say, that

Helps little in
Demonstrati-
on, less in
Probability.

Serves not to
increase our
Knowledge, but
fence with it.

Other Helps
should be
sought.

We reason about Particulars.

this Age is adorn'd with some Men of that Strength of Judgment, and Largeness of Comprehension, that if they would imploy their Thoughts on this Subject, could open new and undiscover'd ways to the Advancement of Knowledg.

§. 8. Having here had an occasion to speak of *Syllogism* in general, and the Use of it in Reasoning, and the Improvement of our Knowledg; 'tis fit, before I leave this Subject, to take notice of one manifest Mistake in the Rules of *Syllogism*, viz. That no Syllogistical Reasoning can be right and conclusive, but what has, at least, one general Proposition in it. As if we could not reason, and have Knowledg about Particulars: Whereas, in truth, the Matter rightly consider'd, the immediate Object of all our Reasoning and Knowledg, is nothing but Particulars. Every Man's Reasoning and Knowledg is only about the *Ideas* existing in his own Mind, which are truly, every one of them, particular Existences; and our Knowledg and Reasoning about other things, is only as they correspond with those our particular *Ideas*. So that the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our particular *Ideas*, is the whole and utmost of all our Knowledg. Universality is but accidental to it, and consists only in this, That the particular *Ideas*, about which it is, are such, as more than one particular thing can correspond with, and be represented by. But the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, and consequently our Knowledg is equally clear and certain, whether either, or both, or neither of those *Ideas* be capable of representing more real Beings than one, or no. One thing more I crave leave to offer about *Syllogism*, before I leave it, viz. May one not upon just Ground enquire whether the Form *Syllogism* now has, is that which in Reason it ought to have? For the *Medius Terminus* being to join the Extremes, i. e. the intermediate *Ideas* by its Intervention, to shew the Agreement or Disagreement of the two in question, would not the Position of the *Medius Terminus* be more natural, and shew the Agreement or Disagreement of the Extremes clearer and better, if it were plac'd in the middle between them? Which might be easily done by transposing the Propositions, and making the *Medius Terminus* the Predicate of the First, and the Subject of the Second. As thus,

*Omnis Homo est Animal,
Omne Animal est vivens,
Ergo omnis Homo est vivens.*

*Omne Corpus est extensum & solidum,
Nullum extensum & solidum est pura extensio,
Ergo corpus non est pura extensio.*

I need not trouble my Reader with Instances in *Syllogisms*, whose Conclusions are particular. The same Reason holds for the same Form in them, as well as in the general.

1. Reason fails us for want of Ideas.

§. 9. Reason, tho' it penetrates into the Depths of the Sea and Earth, elevates our Thoughts as high as the Stars, and leads us thro' the vast Spaces and large Room of this mighty Fabrick, yet it comes far short of the real Extent of even corporeal Being; and there are many Instances wherein it fails us: As,

First, It perfectly fails us, where our *Ideas* fail. It neither does, nor can extend it self farther than they do. And therefore wherever we have no *Ideas*, our Reasoning stops, and we are at an end of our Reckoning: And if at any time we reason about Words, which do not stand for any *Ideas*, 'tis only about those Sounds, and nothing else.

2. Because of obscure and imperfect Ideas.

§. 10. Secondly, Our Reason is often puzzled, and at a loss, because of the Obscurity, Confusion or Imperfection of the *Ideas* it is imploy'd about; and there we are involv'd in Difficulties and Contradictions. Thus not having any perfect *Idea* of the least Extension of Matter, nor of Infinity, we are at a loss about the Divisibility of Matter; but having perfect, clear and distinct *Ideas* of Number, our Reason meets with none of those inextricable Difficulties in Numbers, nor finds it self involv'd in any Contradictions about them. Thus, we having but imperfect *Ideas* of the Operations of our Minds, and of the beginning of Motion or Thought, how the Mind produces either of them in us, and much im-

perfecter

perfecter yet, of the Operation of GOD, run into great Difficulties about free created Agents, which Reason cannot well extricate it self out of.

§. 11. *Thirdly*, Our Reason is often at a stand, *because it perceives not those Ideas, which could serve to shew the certain or probable Agreement or Disagreement of any two other Ideas*: and in this, some Mens Faculties far outgo others. Till Algebra, that great Instrument and Instance of human Sagacity, was discover'd, Men, with Amazement, look'd on several of the Demonstrations of antient Mathematicians, and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those Proofs to be something more than human.

§. 12. *Fourthly*, The Mind, *by proceeding upon false Principles*, is often engag'd in Absurdities and Difficulties, brought into Straits and Contradictions, without knowing how to free it self: And in that case it is in vain to implore the help of Reason, unless it be to discover the Falshood, and reject the Influence of those wrong Principles. Reason is so far from clearing the Difficulties which the building upon false Foundations brings a Man into, that if he will pursue it, it entangles him the more, and engages him deeper in Perplexities.

§. 13. *Fifthly*, As obscure and imperfect Ideas often involve our Reason, so, upon the same Ground, do *dubious Words*, and uncertain Signs, often in Discourses and Arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle Mens Reason, and bring them to a *Non-plus*. But these two latter are our Fault, and not the Fault of Reason. But yet the Consequences of them are nevertheless obvious; and the Perplexities or Errors they fill Mens Minds with, are every where observable.

§. 14. Some of the Ideas that are in the Mind, are so there, that they can be by themselves immediately compar'd one with another: And in these the Mind is able to perceive, that they agree or disagree as clearly, as that it has them. Thus the Mind perceives, that an Arch of a Circle is less than the whole Circle, as clearly as it does the Idea of a Circle: And this therefore, as has been said, I call *intuitive Knowledge*; which is certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no Probation, nor can have any; this being the highest of all human Certainty. In this consists the Evidence of all those *Maxims*, which no Body has any Doubt about, but every Man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) knows to be true, as soon as ever they are propos'd to his Understanding. In the Discovery of, and Assent to these Truths, there is no use of the discursive Faculty, *no need of Reasoning*, but they are known by a superior and higher degree of Evidence. And such, if I may guess at things unknown, I am apt to think, that Angels have now, and the Spirits of just Men made perfect shall have, in a future State, of Thousands of Things, which now either wholly escape our Apprehensions, or which, our short-sighted Reason having got some faint Glimpse of, we, in the dark, grope after.

§. 15. But tho' we have, here and there, a little of this clear Light, some Sparks of bright Knowledge; yet the greatest part of our Ideas are such, that we cannot discern their Agreement or Disagreement by an immediate comparing them. And in all these we have *need of Reasoning*, and must, by Discourse and Inference, make our Discoveries. Now of these there are two sorts, which I shall take the liberty to mention here again.

First, Those whose Agreement or Disagreement, tho' it cannot be seen by an immediate putting them together, yet may be examin'd by the Intervention of other Ideas, which can be compar'd with them. In this Case when the Agreement or Disagreement of the intermediate Idea on both sides, with those which we would compare, is plainly discern'd, there it amounts to Demonstration, whereby Knowledge it produc'd; which tho' it be certain, yet it is not so easy, nor altogether so clear as *intuitive Knowledge*. Because in that there is barely one simple Intuition, wherein there is no room for any the least Mistake or Doubt; the Truth is seen all perfectly at once. In Demonstration, 'tis true, there is Intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there must be a Remembrance of the Intuition of the Agreement of the Medium, or intermediate Idea, with that we compar'd it with before, when we compare it with the other; and where there be many Mediums, there the Danger of the Mistake is the greater. For each Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas must be observ'd and seen in each Step of the whole Train, and retain'd in the Memory, just as it is; and the Mind must be sure that no part of what is necessary to

3. For want of intermediate Ideas.

4. Because of wrong Principles.

5. Because of doubtful Terms.

Our highest degree of Knowledge is intuitive, without Reasoning.

The next is Demonstration by Reasoning.

make up the Demonstration is omitted or overlook'd. This makes some Demonstrations long and perplex'd, and too hard for those who have not Strength of Parts distinctly to perceive, and exactly carry so many Particulars orderly in their Heads. And even those, who are able to master such intricate Speculations, are fain sometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one Review before they can arrive at Certainty. But yet where the Mind clearly retains the Intuition it had of the Agreement of any *Idea* with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c. there the Agreement of the first and the fourth is a Demonstration, and produces certain Knowledge, which may be call'd *Rational Knowledge*, as the other is *Intuitive*.

To supply the
Narrowness of
this, we have
nothing but
Judgment up-
on probable
Reasoning.

§. 16. Secondly, There are other *Ideas*, whose Agreement or Disagreement can no otherwise be judg'd of, but by the Intervention of others, which have not a certain Agreement with the Extremes, but an usual or likely one: And in these it is that the *Judgment* is properly exercis'd, which is the acquiescing of the Mind, that any *Ideas* do agree, by comparing them with such probable *Mediums*. This, tho' it never amounts to Knowledge, no not to that which is the lowest degree of it; yet sometimes the intermediate *Ideas* tie the Extremes so firmly together, and the Probability is so clear and strong, that Assent as necessarily follows it, as Knowledge does Demonstration. The great Excellency and Use of the Judgment is to observe right, and take a true Estimate of the Force and Weight of each Probability; and then casting them up all right together, chuse that side which has the Over-balance.

Intuition, De-
monstration,
Judgment.

§. 17. *Intuitive Knowledge* is the Perception of the certain Agreement or Disagreement of two *Ideas* immediately compar'd together.

Rational Knowledge is the Perception of the certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, by the intervention of one or more other *Ideas*.

Judgment is the thinking or taking two *Ideas* to agree or disagree, by the intervention of one or more *Ideas*, whose certain Agreement or Disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observ'd to be frequent and usual.

Consequences
of Words, and
Consequences
of Ideas.

§. 18. Tho' the deducing one Proposition from another, or making *Inference* in Words, be a great part of Reason, and that which it is usually employ'd about; yet the principal Act of Ratiocination is the finding the Agreement or Disagreement of two *Ideas* one with another, by the intervention of a third. As a Man, by a Yard, finds two Houses to be of the same Length, which could not be brought together to measure their Equality by *Juxta-Position*. Words have their Consequences, as the Signs of such *Ideas*: and things agree or disagree, as really they are; but we observe it only by our *Ideas*.

Four sorts of
Arguments.

§. 19. Before we quit this Subject, it may be worth our while a little to reflect on four Sorts of Arguments, that Men, in their Reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of, to prevail on their Assent; or at least so to awe them, as to silence their Opposition.

1. Ad Vere-
cundiam.

First, The first is, to alledge the Opinions of Men, whose Parts, Learning, Eminency, Power, or some other Cause has gain'd a Name, and settled their Reputation in the common Esteem with some kind of Authority. When Men are establish'd in any kind of Dignity, 'tis thought a breach of Modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the Authority of Men who are in possession of it. This is apt to be censur'd, as carrying with it too much of Pride, when a Man does not readily yield to the Determination of approv'd Authors, which is wont to be receiv'd with Respect and Submission by others: and 'tis look'd upon as Insolence for a Man to set up, and adhere to his own Opinion, against the current Stream of Antiquity; or to put it in the ballance against that of some learned Doctor, or otherwise approv'd Writer. Whoever backs his Tenets with such Authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the Cause, and is ready to stile it Impudence in any one who shall stand out against them. This, I think, may be call'd *Argumentum ad Verecundiam*.

2. Ad Ignorantiam.

§. 20. Secondly, Another way that Men ordinarily use to drive others, and force them to submit their Judgments, and receive the Opinion in Debate, is to require the Adversary to admit what they alledge as a Proof, or to assign a better. And this I call *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*.

3. Ad Hominem.

§. 21. Thirdly, A third way is, to press a Man with Consequences drawn from his own Principles, or Concessions. This is already known under the name of *Argumentum ad Hominem*.

§. 22.

§. 22. *Fourthly*, The fourth is, the using of Proofs drawn from any of the Foundations of Knowledge or Probability. This I call *Argumentum ad Judicium*. This alone of all the four, brings true Instruction with it, and advances us in our way to Knowledge. For, 1. It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right, because I out of Respect, or any other Consideration but that of Conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another Man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another Man is in the right way, because he has shewn me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose another Man's Persuasion: I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an Error, and another may shew me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the Reception of Truth, but helps me not to it; that must come from Proofs and Arguments, and Light arising from the Nature of Things themselves, and not from my Shamefacedness, Ignorance or Error.

§. 23. By what has been before said of *Reason*, we may be able to make some guesses at the Distinction of Things, into those that are according to, above, and contrary to Reason. 1. *According to Reason* are such Propositions, whose Truth we can discover, by examining and tracing those *Ideas* we have from *Sensation* and *Reflection*; and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable. 2. *Above Reason* are such Propositions, whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles. 3. *Contrary to Reason* are such Propositions, as are inconsistent with, or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct *Ideas*. Thus the Existence of one GOD is according to Reason; the Existence of more than one GOD, contrary to Reason; the Resurrection of the Dead, above Reason. Farther, as *Above Reason* may be taken in a double Sense, *viz.* either as signifying above Probability, or above Certainty; so in that large Sense also, *Contrary to Reason*, is, I suppose, sometimes taken.

§. 24. There is another use of the word *Reason*, wherein it is oppos'd to *Faith*; *Reason* and which tho' it be in it self a very improper way of speaking, yet common Use has so authoriz'd it, that it would be Folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it: Only I think it may not be amiss to take notice, that however *Faith* be oppos'd to Reason, *Faith* is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind: which if it be regulated, as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good Reason; and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes, without having any Reason for believing, may be in love with his own Fancies; but neither seeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has given him, to keep him out of Mistake and Error. He that does not this to the best of his Power, however he sometimes lights on Truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the Luckiness of the Accident will excuse the Irregularity of his Proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever Mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the Light and Faculties GOD has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover Truth by those Helps and Abilities he has, may have this Satisfaction in doing his Duty as a rational Creature, that tho' he should miss Truth, he will not miss the Reward of it. For he governs his Assent right, and places it as he should, who in any Case or Matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves according as Reason directs him. He that does otherwise, transgresses against his own Light, and misuses those Faculties which were given him to no other End but to search and follow the clearer Evidence, and greater Probability. But since Reason and Faith are by some Men oppos'd, we will so consider them in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces.

Necessary to
know their
Boundaries.

§. 1. **I**T has been above shewn, 1. That we are of necessity ignorant, and want Knowledge of all sorts, where we want *Ideas*. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational Knowledge, where we want Proofs. 3. That we want general Knowledge and Certainty, as far as we want clear and determin'd specifick *Ideas*. 4. That we want Probability to direct our Assent in Matters where we have neither Knowledge of our own, nor Testimony of other Men, to bottom our Reason upon.

From these things thus premis'd, I think we may come to lay down the Measures and Boundaries between Faith and Reason; the want whereof may possibly have been the cause, if not of great Disorders, yet at least of great Disputes, and perhaps Mistakes in the World. For till it be resolv'd how far we are to be guided by Reason, and how far by Faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one another in Matters of Religion.

Faith and Reason
what, as
contradistinction'd.

§. 2. I find every Sect, as far as Reason will help them, make use of it gladly: and where it fails them, they cry out, 'Tis matter of Faith, and above Reason. And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a Gainsayer who makes use of the same Plea, without setting down strict Boundaries between Faith and Reason; which ought to be the first Point establish'd in all Questions, where Faith has any thing to do.

Reason therefore here, as contradistinction'd to Faith, I take to be the Discovery of the Certainty or Probability of such Propositions or Truths, which the Mind arrives at by Deduction made from such *Ideas*, which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties, viz. by Sensation or Reflection.

Faith, on the other side, is the Assent to any Proposition, not thus made out by the Deductions of Reason; but upon the Credit of the Proposer, as coming from GOD, in some extraordinary way of Communication. This way of discovering Truths to Men we call Revelation.

No new simple
Idea can be
convey'd by
Traditional
Revelation.

§. 3. First then I say, That no Man inspir'd by GOD, can by any Revelation communicate to others any new simple *Ideas*, which they had not before from Sensation or Reflection. For whatsoever Impressions he himself may have from the immediate Hand of GOD, this Revelation, if it be of new simple *Ideas*, cannot be convey'd to another, either by Words, or any other Signs. Because Words by their immediate Operation on us, cause no other *Ideas*, but of their natural Sounds: and 'tis by the custom of using them for Signs, that they excite and revive in our Minds latent *Ideas*; but yet only such *Ideas* as were there before. For Words seen or heard, recal to our Thoughts those *Ideas* only, which to us they have been wont to be Signs of; but cannot introduce any perfectly new, and formerly unknown simple *Ideas*. The same holds in all other Signs, which cannot signify to us things, of which we have before never had any *Idea* at all.

Thus whatever things were discover'd to St. Paul, when he was wrap'd up into the third Heaven, whatever new *Ideas* his Mind there receiv'd, all the Description he can make to others of that Place, is only this, That there are such things, as Eye hath not seen, nor Ear heard, nor hath it enter'd into the Heart of Man to conceive. And supposing GOD should discover to any one, supernaturally, a Species of Creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter, or Saturn, (for that it is possible there may be such, no body can deny) which had six Senses; and imprint on his Mind the *Ideas* convey'd to theirs by that sixth Sense; he could no more, by Words, produce in the Minds of other Men those *Ideas*, imprinted by that sixth Sense, than one of us could convey the *Idea* of any Colour by the Sounds of Words into a Man, who having the other four Senses perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth of Seeing. For our simple *Ideas* then, which are the Foundation and sole Matter of all our Notions and Knowledge, we must depend wholly on our Reason, I mean our natural Faculties; and

and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from *Traditional Revelation*; I say, *Traditional Revelation*, in distinction to *Original Revelation*. By the one, I mean that first Impression, which is made immediately by GOD, on the Mind of any Man, to which we cannot set any bounds; and by the other, those Impressions deliver'd over to others in Words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another.

§. 4. Secondly, I say, that the same Truths may be discover'd, and convey'd down from Revelation, which are discoverable to us by Reason, and by those Ideas we naturally may have. So GOD might, by Revelation, discover the Truth of any Proposition in *Euclid*; as well as Men, by the natural use of their Faculties, come to make the Discovery themselves. In all things of this kind, there is little need or use of Revelation, GOD having furnish'd us with natural and surer means to arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatsoever Truth we come to the clear discovery of, from the Knowledge and Contemplation of our own Ideas, will always be certainer to us, than those which are convey'd to us by *Traditional Revelation*. For the Knowledge we have, that this Revelation came at first from GOD, can never be so sure, as the Knowledge we have from the clear and distinct Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own Ideas, v. g. if it were reveal'd some Ages since, That the three Angles of a Triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the Truth of that Proposition, upon the Credit of the Tradition, that it was reveal'd: But that would never amount to so great a Certainty, as the Knowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my own Ideas of two right Angles, and the three Angles of a Triangle. The like holds in Matter of Fact, knowable by our Senses, v. g. the History of the Deluge is convey'd to us by Writings, which had their Original from Revelation: And yet no body, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a Knowledge of the Flood, as *Noah* that saw it; or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive, and seen it. For he has no greater an Assurance than that of his Senses, that it is writ in the Book suppos'd writ by *Moses* inspir'd: but he has not so great an Assurance that *Moses* writ that Book, as if he had seen *Moses* write it. So that the Assurance of its being a Revelation, is less still than the Assurance of his Senses.

Traditional Revelation may make us know Propositions knowable also by Reason, but not with the same Certainty that Reason doth.

§. 5. In Propositions then, whose Certainty is built upon the clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas, attain'd either by immediate Intuition, as in self-evident Propositions, or by evident Deductions of Reason in Demonstrations, we need not the Assistance of Revelation, as necessary to gain our Assent, and introduce them into our Minds. Because the natural ways of Knowledge could settle them there, or had done it already; which is the greatest Assurance we can possibly have of any thing, unless where GOD immediately reveals it to us: And there too our Assurance can be no greater, than our Knowledge is, that it is a Revelation from GOD. But yet nothing, I think, can under that title, shake or over-rule plain Knowledge; or rationally prevail with any Man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear Evidence of his own Understanding. For since no Evidence of our Faculties, by which we receive such Revelations, can exceed, if equal, the Certainty of our intuitive Knowledge, we can never receive for a Truth any thing, that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge; v. g. the Ideas of one Body, and one Place, do so clearly agree, and the Mind has so evident a Perception of their Agreement, that we can never assent to a Proposition, that affirms the same Body to be in two distant places at once, however it should pretend to the Authority of a divine Revelation: Since the Evidence, First, That we deceive not our selves, in ascribing it to GOD; Secondly, That we understand it right; can never be so great, as the Evidence of our own intuitive Knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same Body to be in two places at once. And therefore no Proposition can be receiv'd for Divine Revelation, or obtain the Assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive Knowledge. Because this would be to subvert the Principles and Foundations of all Knowledge, Evidence, and Assent whatsoever: And there would be left no difference between Truth and Falshood, no Measures of Credible and Incredible in the World, if doubtful Propositions shall take place before self-evident; and what we certainly know, give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In Propositions therefore contrary to the clear

Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear Evidence of Reason.

clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our *Ideas*, 'twill be in vain to urge them as Matters of *Faith*. They cannot move our Assent, under that or any other title whatsoever. For *Faith* can never convince us of any thing, that contradicts our Knowledge. Because tho' *Faith* be founded on the Testimony of GOD (who cannot lye) revealing any Proposition to us; yet we cannot have an Assurance of the Truth of its being a Divine Revelation, greater than our own Knowledge: Since the whole strength of the Certainty depends upon our Knowledge that GOD reveal'd it, which in this case, where the Proposition suppos'd reveal'd contradicts our Knowledge or Reason, will always have this Objection hanging to it, *viz.* that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from GOD, the bountiful Author of our Being, which if receiv'd for true, must overturn all the Principles and Foundations of Knowledge he has given us, render all our Faculties useless, wholly destroy the most excellent part of his Workmanship, our Understandings; and put a Man in a condition, wherein he will have less Light, less Conduct than the Beast that perishes. For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear) Evidence of any thing to be a divine *Revelation*, as it has of the Principles of its own Reason, it can never have a ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reason, to give place to a Proposition, whose *Revelation* has not a greater Evidence than those Principles have.

Traditional
Revelation
much less.

§. 6. Thus far a Man has use of Reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original *Revelation*, where it is suppos'd to be made to himself: But to all those who pretend not to immediate *Revelation*, but are requir'd to pay Obedience, and to receive the Truths reveal'd to others, which by the Tradition of Writings, or Word of Mouth, are convey'd down to them; Reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For Matter of *Faith* being only Divine Revelation, and nothing else; *Faith*, as we use the word, (call'd commonly *Divine Faith*) has to do with no Propositions, but those which are suppos'd to be divinely reveal'd. So that I do not see how those, who make Revelation alone the sole Object of *Faith*, can say that it is a Matter of *Faith*, and not of Reason, to believe that such or such a Proposition, to be found in such or such a Book, is of Divine Inspiration; unless it be reveal'd, that that Proposition, or all in that Book, was communicated by Divine Inspiration. Without such a *Revelation*, the believing, or not believing that Proposition or Book to be of Divine Authority, can never be Matter of *Faith*, but Matter of Reason; and such as I must come to an Assent to, only by the use of my Reason, which can never require or enable me to believe that, which is contrary to it self: it being impossible for Reason ever to procure any Assent to that, which to it self appears unreasonable.

In all things therefore, where we have clear Evidence from our *Ideas*, and those Principles of Knowledge I have above mention'd, Reason is the proper Judge; and *Revelation*, tho' it may in consenting with it confirm its Dictates, yet cannot in such cases invalidate its Decrees: Nor can we be oblig'd, where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reason, to quit it for the contrary Opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of *Faith*; which can have no Authority against the plain and clear Dictates of Reason.

Things above
Reason,

§. 7. But, *Thirdly*, there being many things, wherein we have very imperfect Notions, or none at all; and other things, of whose past, present, or future Existence, by the natural Use of our Faculties we can have no Knowledge at all: These, as being beyond the Discovery of our natural Faculties, and above Reason, are, when reveal'd, the proper matter of *Faith*. Thus, that part of the Angels rebel'd against GOD, and thereby lost their first happy State; and that the Dead shall rise, and live again: these, and the like, being beyond the Discovery of Reason, are purely matters of *Faith*; with which Reason has directly nothing to do.

Or not contrary
to Reason, if
reveal'd, are
matter of
Faith.

§. 8. But since GOD in giving us the Light of Reason has not thereby tied up his own Hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the Light of *Revelation* in any of those matters, wherein our natural Faculties are able to give a probable Determination; *Revelation*, where God has been pleas'd to give it, must carry it, against the probable Conjectures of Reason. Because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the Probability

bility that appears in it, is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony; which, it is satisfy'd, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it still belongs to *Reason* to judg of the Truth of its being a Revelation, and of the Signification of the Words wherein it is deliver'd. Indeed, if any thing shall be thought *Revelation*, which is contrary to the plain Principles of Reason, and the evident Knowledge the Mind has of its own clear and distinct *Ideas*; there *Reason* must be hearken'd to, as to a Matter within its Province: since a Man can never have so certain a Knowledge, that a Proposition which contradicts the clear Principles and Evidence of his own Knowledge, was divinely reveal'd, or that he understands the Words rightly wherein it is deliver'd; as he has, that the contrary is true: and so is bound to consider and judg of it as a matter of *Reason*, and not swallow it, without Examination, as a matter of *Faith*.

§. 9. First, Whatever Proposition is reveal'd, of whose Truth our Mind, by its natural Faculties and Notions, cannot judg; that is purely matter of *Faith*, and above *Reason*. *Revelation in Matters where Reason cannot judg, or but probably, ought to be hearken'd to.*

Secondly, All Propositions, whereof the Mind, by the use of its natural Faculties, can come to determine and judg from naturally acquir'd *Ideas*, are matter of *Reason*; with this difference still, that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence, and so is persuaded of their Truth only upon probable grounds, which still admit a Possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain Evidence of its own Knowledge, and overturning the Principles of all Reason; in such probable Propositions, I say, an evident *Revelation* ought to determine our Assent even against Probability. For where the Principles of Reason have not evidenc'd a Proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear *Revelation*, as another Principle of Truth, and Ground of Assent, may determine; and so it may be matter of *Faith*, and be also above *Reason*. Because *Reason*, in that particular matter, being able to reach no higher than Probability, *Faith* gave the Determination, where *Reason* came short; and *Revelation* discover'd on which side the Truth lay.

§. 10. Thus far the Dominion of *Faith* reaches, and that without any Violence or Hindrance to *Reason*; which is not injur'd or disturb'd, but assisted and improv'd, by new Discoveries of Truth coming from the eternal Fountain of all Knowledge. Whatever GOD hath reveal'd, is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of *Faith*: But whether it be a divine Revelation or no, *Reason* must judg; which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence, to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain Probability in opposition to Knowledge and Certainty. There can be no Evidence, that any traditional Revelation is of divine Original, in the Words we receive it, and in the Sense we understand it, so clear and so certain, as that of the Principles of Reason; and therefore, *Nothing that is contrary to and inconsistent with the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason, has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of Faith, wherein Reason hath nothing to do.* Whatsoever is divine *Revelation*, ought to over-rule all our Opinions, Prejudices, and Interests, and hath a right to be receiv'd with full Assent. Such a Submission as this, of our *Reason* to *Faith*, takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge: This shakes not the Foundations of Reason, but leaves us that Use of our Faculties, for which they were given us. *In Matters where Reason can afford certain knowledge that is to be hearken'd to.*

§. 11. If the Provinces of *Faith* and *Reason* are not kept distinct by these Boundaries, there will, in matter of Religion, be no room for *Reason* at all; and those extravagant Opinions and Ceremonies that are to be found in the several Religions of the World, will not deserve to be blamed. For, to this crying-up of *Faith*, in opposition to *Reason*, we may, I think, in good measure ascribe those Absurdities that fill almost all the Religions which possess and divide Mankind. For Men having been principled with an Opinion, that they must not consult *Reason* in the things of Religion, however apparently contradictory to common Sense, and the very Principles of all their Knowledge, have let loose their Fancies and natural Superstition; and have been by them led into so strange Opinions and extravagant Practices in Religion, that a considerate Man cannot but stand amaz'd at their Follies, and judg them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise GOD, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous, and offensive. *If the Boundaries be not set between Faith and Reason, no Enthusiasm or Extravagancy in Religion can be contradicted.*

offensive to a sober good Man. So that in effect Religion, which should most distinguish us from Beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational Creatures, above Brutes, is that wherein Men often appear most irrational, and more senseless than Beasts themselves. *Credo, quia impossibile est; I believe, because it is impossible*, might in a good Man pass for a Sally of Zeal; but would prove a very ill Rule for Men to chuse their Opinions or Religion by.

C H A P. XIX.

Of Enthusiasm.

Love of Truth
necessary.

§. 1. **H**E that would seriously set upon the Search of Truth, ought in the first place to prepare his Mind with a Love of it. For he that loves it not, will not take much pains to get it, nor be much concerned when he misses it. There is no body in the Commonwealth of Learning, who does not profess himself a Lover of Truth; and there is not a rational Creature, that would not take it amiss to be thought otherwise of. And yet for all this, one may truly say, there are very few Lovers of Truth for Truth-sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a Man may know whether he be so in earnest, is worth enquiry: And I think there is this one unerring Mark of it, *viz.* The not entertaining any Proposition with greater Assurance, than the Proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of Assent, 'tis plain receives not Truth in the love of it; loves not Truth for Truth-sake, but for some other By-end. For the Evidence that any Proposition is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the Proofs a Man has of it, whatsoever Degrees of Assent he affords it beyond the Degrees of that Evidence, 'tis plain that all the Surplusage of Assurance is owing to some other Affection, and not to the Love of Truth: it being as impossible, that the Love of Truth should carry my Assent above the Evidence there is to me that it is true, as that the Love of Truth should make me assent to any Proposition for the sake of that Evidence, which it has not, that it is true; which is in effect to love it as a Truth, because it is possible or probable that it may not be true. In any Truth that gets not possession of our Minds by the irresistible Light of Self-evidence, or by the force of Demonstration, the Arguments that gain it Assent are the Vouchers and Gage of its Probability to us; and we can receive it for no other, than such as they deliver it to our Understandings: Whatsoever Credit or Authority we give to any Proposition, more than it receives from the Principles and Proofs it supports it self upon, is owing to our Inclinations that way, and is so far a Derogation from the Love of Truth as such: which, as it can receive no Evidence from our Passions or Interests, so it should receive no Tincture from them.

A Forward-
ness to dictate,
from whence.

§. 2. The assuming an Authority of dictating to others, and a Forwardness to prescribe to their Opinions, is a constant Concomitant of this Byass and Corruption of our Judgments. For how almost can it be otherwise, but that he should be ready to impose on others Belief, who has already impos'd on his own? Who can reasonably expect Arguments and Conviction from him, in dealing with others, whose Understanding is not accustom'd to them in his dealing with himself? Who does violence to his own Faculties, tyrannizes over his own Mind, and usurps the Prerogative that belongs to Truth alone, which is to command Assent by only its own Authority, *i. e.* by and in proportion to that Evidence which it carries with it.

Force of En-
thusiasm.

§. 3. Upon this occasion I shall take the liberty to consider a third Ground of Assent, which with some Men has the same Authority, and is as confidently rely'd on as either *Faith* or *Reason*; I mean *Enthusiasm*: which laying by Reason, would set up Revelation without it. Whereby in effect it takes away both Reason and Revelation, and substitutes in the room of it the ungrounded Fancies of a Man's own Brain, and assumes them for a Foundation both of Opinion and Conduct.

§. 4.

§. 4. *Reason* is natural *Revelation*, whereby the eternal Father of Light, and Fountain of all Knowledge, communicates to Mankind that Portion of Truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural Faculties: *Revelation* is natural *Reason* enlarg'd by a new Set of Discoveries communicated by GOD immediately, which *Reason* vouches the Truth of, by the Testimony and Proofs it gives that they come from GOD. So that he that takes away *Reason*, to make way for *Revelation*, puts out the Light of both, and does much-what the same, as if he would persuade a Man to put out his Eyes, the better to receive the remote Light of an invisible Star by a Telescope.

§. 5. Immediate *Revelation* being a much easier way for Men to establish their Opinions, and regulate their Conduct, than the tedious and not always successful Labour of strict Reasoning, it is no wonder that some have been very apt to pretend to *Revelation*, and to persuade themselves that they are under the peculiar Guidance of Heaven in their Actions and Opinions, especially in those of them which they cannot account for by the ordinary Methods of Knowledge, and Principles of Reason. Hence we see, that in all Ages, Men, in whom Melancholy has mix'd with Devotion, or whose Conceit of themselves has rais'd them into an Opinion of a greater Familiarity with GOD, and a nearer Admittance to his Favour than is afforded to others, have often flatter'd themselves with a Persuasion of an immediate Intercourse with the Deity, and frequent Communications from the Divine Spirit. GOD, I own, cannot be deny'd to be able to enlighten the Understanding by a Ray darted into the Mind immediately from the Fountain of Light: This they understand he has promis'd to do, and who then has so good a Title to expect it as those who are his peculiar People, chosen by him, and depending on him?

§. 6. Their Minds being thus prepar'd, whatever groundless Opinion comes to settle it self strongly upon their Fancies, is an Illumination from the Spirit of GOD, and presently of divine Authority: and whatsoever odd Action they find in themselves a strong Inclination to do, that impulse is concluded to be a Call or Direction from Heaven, and must be obey'd; 'tis a Commission from above, and they cannot err in executing it.

§. 7. This I take to be properly Enthusiasm, which, tho' founded neither on Reason nor Divine Revelation, but rising from the Conceits of a warm'd or over-weening Brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the Persuasions and Actions of Men, than either of those two, or both together: Men being most forwardly obedient to the Impulses they receive from themselves; and the whole Man is sure to act more vigorously, where the whole Man is carry'd by a natural Motion. For strong Conceit, like a new Principle, carries all easily with it, when got above common Sense, and freed from all Restraint of Reason, and Check of Reflection, it is heighten'd into a Divine Authority, in concurrence with our own Temper and Inclination.

§. 8. Tho' the odd Opinions and extravagant Actions Enthusiasm has run Men into, were enough to warn them against this wrong Principle, so apt to misguide them both in their Belief and Conduct; yet the Love of something extraordinary, the Ease and Glory it is to be inspir'd, and be above the common and natural ways of Knowledge, so flatters many Mens Laziness, Ignorance and Vanity, that when once they are got into this way of immediate Revelation, of Illumination without Search, and of Certainty without Proof, and without Examination, 'tis a hard matter to get them out of it. Reason is lost upon them, they are above it: they see the Light infus'd into their Understandings, and cannot be mistaken; 'tis clear and visible there, like the Light of bright Sun-shine; shews it self, and needs no other Proof but its own Evidence: they feel the Hand of GOD moving them within, and the Impulses of the Spirit, and cannot be mistaken in what they feel. Thus they support themselves, and are sure Reason hath nothing to do with what they see and feel in themselves: what they have a sensible Experience of, admits no Doubt, needs no Probation. Would he not be ridiculous, who should require to have it prov'd to him that the Light shines, and that he sees it? It is its own Proof, and can have no other. When the Spirit brings Light into our Minds, it dispels Darkness. We see it, as we do that of the Sun at noon, and need not the Twilight of Reason to shew it us. This Light from Heaven is strong, clear, and pure,

carries its own Demonstration with it; and we may as rationally take a Glow-worm to assist us to discover the Sun, as to examine the Celestial Ray by our dim Candle, Reason.

§. 9. This is the way of talking of these Men: they are sure, because they are sure: and their Persuasions are right, only because they are strong in them. For, when what they say is strip'd of the Metaphor of seeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to: and yet these Similes so impose on them, that they serve them for Certainty in themselves, and Demonstration to others.

*Enthusiasm
how to be
discover'd.*

§. 10. But to examine a little soberly this internal Light, and this Feeling on which they build so much. These Men have, they say, clear Light, and they see; they have an awaken'd Sense, and they feel: this cannot, they are sure, be disputed them. For when a Man says he sees or feels, no body can deny it him that he does so. But here let me ask: This seeing, is it the Perception of the Truth of the Proposition, or of this, that it is a Revelation from GOD? This feeling, is it a Perception of an Inclination or Fancy to do something, or of the Spirit of GOD moving that Inclination? These are two very different Perceptions, and must be carefully distinguish'd, if we would not impose upon our selves. I may perceive the Truth of a Proposition, and yet not perceive that it is an immediate Revelation from GOD. I may perceive the Truth of a Proposition in *Euclid*, without its being, or my perceiving it to be a Revelation: Nay, I may perceive I came not by this Knowledge in a natural way, and so may conclude it reveal'd, without perceiving that it is a Revelation from GOD; because there be Spirits, which, without being divinely commission'd, may excite those *Ideas* in me, and lay them in such order before my Mind, that I may perceive their Connection. So that the Knowledge of any Proposition coming into my Mind I know not how, is not a Perception that it is from GOD. Much less is a strong Persuasion, that it is true, a Perception that it is from GOD, or so much as true. But however it be call'd Light and Seeing, I suppose it is at most but Belief and Assurance: and the Proposition taken for a Revelation, is not such as they know to be true, but take to be true. For where a Proposition is known to be true, Revelation is needless: and it is hard to conceive how there can be a Revelation to any one of what he knows already. If therefore it be a Proposition which they are persuaded, but do not know, to be true, whatever they may call it, it is not seeing, but believing. For these are two ways, whereby Truth comes into the Mind, wholly distinct, so that one is not the other. What I see, I know to be so by the Evidence of the thing it self: what I believe, I take to be so upon the Testimony of another: But this Testimony I must know to be given, or else what ground have I of believing? I must see that 'tis GOD that reveals this to me, or else I see nothing. The question then here is, How do I know that GOD is the Revealer of this to me; that this Impression is made upon my Mind by his holy Spirit, and that therefore I ought to obey it? If I know not this, how great soever the Assurance is that I am possess'd with, it is groundless; whatever Light I pretend to, it is but *Enthusiasm*. For whether the Proposition suppos'd to be reveal'd, be in it self evidently true, or visibly probable, or by the natural ways of Knowledge uncertain, the Proposition that must be well grounded, and manifest'd to be true, is this, That GOD is the Revealer of it, and that what I take to be a Revelation is certainly put into my Mind by him, and is not an Illusion drop'd in by some other Spirit, or rais'd by my own Fancy. For if I mistake not, these Men receive it for true, because they presume GOD reveal'd it. Does it not then stand them upon, to examine on what grounds they presume it to be a Revelation from GOD? or else all their Confidence is mere Presumption: and this Light, they are so dazzled with, is nothing but an *ignis fatuus* that leads them continually round in this Circle; *It is a Revelation, because they firmly believe it, and they believe it because it is a Revelation.*

*Enthusiasm
fails of Evi-
dence, that the
Proposition is
from GOD.*

§. 11. In all that is of Divine Revelation, there is need of no other Proof but that it is an Inspiration from GOD: For he can neither deceive, nor be deceiv'd. But how shall it be known that any Proposition in our Minds is a Truth infus'd by GOD; a Truth that is reveal'd to us by him, which he declares to us, and therefore we ought to believe? Here it is that *Enthusiasm* fails of the Evidence it pretends to. For Men thus possess'd boast of a Light where-
by

by they say they are enlighten'd, and brought into the Knowledge of this or that Truth. But if they know it to be a Truth, they must know it to be so, either by its own Self evidence to natural Reason, or by the rational Proofs that make it out to be so. If they see and know it to be a Truth, either of these two ways, they in vain suppose it to be a Revelation. For they know it to be true by the same way, that any other Man naturally may know that it is so without the help of Revelation. For thus all the Truths, of what kind soever, that Men uninspir'd are enlighten'd with, came into their Minds, and are establish'd there. If they say they know it to be true, because it is a Revelation from GOD, the Reason is good: but then it will be demanded how they know it to be a Revelation from GOD? If they say, by the Light it brings with it, which shines bright in their Minds, and they cannot resist: I beseech them to consider whether this be any more than what we have taken notice of already, viz. That it is a Revelation because they strongly believe it to be true. For all the Light they speak of is but a strong, tho' ungrounded, Persuasion of their own Minds, that it is a Truth. For rational Grounds from Proofs that it is a Truth, they must acknowledg to have none; for then it is not receiv'd as a Revelation, but upon the ordinary grounds that other Truths are receiv'd: And if they believe it to be true, because it is a Revelation, and have no other reason for its being a Revelation, but because they are fully persuaded without any other reason that it is true, they believe it to be a Revelation only because they strongly believe it to be a Revelation; which is a very unsafe ground to proceed on, either in our Tenets or Actions. And what readier way can there be to run our selves into the most extravagant Errors and Miscarriages, than thus to set up Fancy for our supreme and sole Guide, and to believe any Proposition to be true, any Action to be right, only because we believe it to be so? The Strength of our Persuasions are no Evidence at all of their own Rectitude: Crooked things may be as stiff and unflexible as straight: and Men may be as positive and peremptory in Error as in Truth. How come else the untractable Zealots in different and opposite Parties? For if the Light, which every one thinks he has in his Mind, which in this case is nothing but the Strength of his own Persuasion, be an Evidence that it is from GOD, contrary Opinions may have the same Title to be Inspirations; and GOD will be not only the Father of Lights, but of opposite and contradictory Lights, leading Men contrary ways; and contradictory Propositions will be Divine Truths, if an ungrounded Strength of Assurance be an Evidence, that any Proposition is a Divine Revelation.

§. 12. This cannot be otherwise, whilst Firmness of Persuasion is made the Cause of believing, and Confidence of being in the right is made an Argument of Truth. St. Paul himself believ'd he did well, and that he had a Call to it when he persecuted the Christians, whom he confidently thought in the wrong: But yet it was he, and not they, who were mistaken. Good Men are Men still, liable to Mistakes; and are sometimes warmly engag'd in Errors, which they take for Divine Truths, shining in their Minds with the clearest Light.

§. 13. Light, true Light in the Mind is, or can be nothing else but the Evidence of the Truth of any Proposition; and if it be not a self-evident Proposition, all the Light it has, or can have, is from the Clearness and Validity of those Proofs, upon which it is receiv'd. To talk of any other Light in the Understanding, is to put our selves in the dark, or in the power of the Prince of Darkness, and by our own Consent to give our selves up to Delusion to believe a Lye. For if Strength of Persuasion be the Light which must guide us; I ask how shall any one distinguish between the Delusions of Satan, and the Inspirations of the Holy Ghost? He can transform himself into an Angel of Light. And they who are led by this Son of the Morning, are as fully satisfy'd of the Illumination, i. e. are as strongly persuaded, that they are enlighten'd by the Spirit of God, as any one who is so: They acquiesce and rejoice in it, are acted by it: and no Body can be more sure, nor more in the right (if their own strong Belief may be judg'd) than they.

§. 14. He therefore that will not give himself up to all the Extravagancies of Delusion and Error, must bring this Guide of his Light within to the Trial. GOD, when he makes the Prophet, does not unmake the Man. He leaves all his

Firmness of Persuasion no Proof that any Proposition is from GOD.

Light in the Mind, what?

Revelation must be judg'd of by Reason.

Faculties

Faculties in the natural State, to enable him to judge of his Inspirations, whether they be of Divine Original or no. When he illuminates the Mind with supernatural Light, he does not extinguish that which is natural. If he would have us assent to the Truth of any Proposition, he either evidences that Truth by the usual Methods of natural Reason, or else makes it known to be a Truth which he would have us assent to, by his Authority; and convinces us that it is from him, by some Marks which Reason cannot be mistaken in. *Reason* must be our last Judge and Guide in every thing. I do not mean that we must consult Reason, and examine whether a Proposition reveal'd from GOD can be made out by natural Principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: but consult it we must, and by it examine, whether it be a Revelation from GOD or no. And if *Reason* finds it to be reveal'd from GOD, *Reason* then declares for it, as much as for any other Truth, and makes it one of her Dictates. Every Conceit that thoroughly warms our Fancies must pass for an Inspiration, if there be nothing but the Strength of our Persuasions, whereby to judge of our Persuasions: If *Reason* must not examine their Truth by something extrinsic to the Persuasions themselves, Inspirations and Delusions, Truth and Falshood, will have the same Measure, and will not be possible to be distinguish'd.

Belief no Proof
of Revelati-
on.

§. 15. If this internal Light, or any Proposition which under that Title we take for inspir'd, be conformable to the Principles of Reason, or to the Word of GOD, which is attested Revelation, *Reason* warrants it, and we may safely receive it for true, and be guided by it in our Belief and Actions: if it receive no Testimony nor Evidence from either of these Rules, we cannot take it for a Revelation, or so much as for true, till we have some other Mark that it is a Revelation, besides our believing that it is so. Thus we see the holy Men of old, who had Revelations from GOD, had something else besides that internal Light of Assurance in their own Minds, to testify to them that it was from GOD. They were not left to their own Persuasions alone, that those Persuasions were from GOD; but had outward Signs to convince them of the Author of those Revelations. And when they were to convince others, they had a Power given them to justify the Truth of their Commission from Heaven; and by visible Signs to assert the Divine Authority of a Message they were sent with. *Moses* saw the Bush burn without being consumed, and heard a Voice out of it. This was something besides finding an Impulse upon his Mind to go to *Pharaoh*, that he might bring his Brethren out of *Egypt*: and yet he thought not this enough to authorize him to go with that Message, till GOD, by another Miracle of his Rod turn'd into a Serpent, had assur'd him of a Power to testify his Mission, by the same Miracle repeated before them, whom he was sent to. *Gideon* was sent by an Angel to deliver *Israel* from the *Midianites*, and yet he desir'd a Sign to convince him that this Commission was from GOD. These, and several the like Instances to be found among the Prophets of old, are enough to shew that they thought not an inward Seeing or Persuasion of their own Minds, without any other Proof, a sufficient Evidence that it was from GOD, tho' the Scripture does not every where mention their demanding or having such Proofs.

§. 16. In what I have said, I am far from denying, that GOD can, or doth sometimes enlighten Mens Minds in the apprehending of certain Truths, or excite them to good Actions by the immediate Influence and Assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary Signs accompanying it. But in such cases too we have Reason and Scripture, unerring Rules to know whether it be from GOD or no. Where the Truth embrac'd is consonant to the Revelation in the written Word of GOD, or the Action conformable to the Dictates of right Reason or Holy Writ, we may be assur'd that we run no risk in entertaining it as such; because tho' perhaps it be not an immediate Revelation from GOD, extraordinarily operating on our Minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that Revelation which he has given us of Truth. But it is not the Strength of our private Persuasion within our selves, that can warrant it to be a Light or Motion from Heaven: Nothing can do that but the written Word of GOD without us, or that Standard of Reason which is common to us with all Men. Where Reason or Scripture is express for any Opinion or
Action,

Assent, we may receive it as of Divine Authority: But 'tis not the Strength of our own Persuasions which can by it self give it that Stamp. The bent of our own Minds may favour it as much as we please; that may shew it to be a Fondling of our own, but will by no means prove it to be an Offspring of Heaven, and of Divine Original.

CHAP. XX.

Of Wrong Assent, or Error.

§. 1. **K**NOWLEDG being to be had only of visible certain Truth, Error *Causes of Error.* is not a Fault of our Knowledg, but a Mistake of our Judgment, giving Assent to that which is not true.

But it Assent be grounded on Likelyhood, if the proper Object and Motive of our Assent be Probability, and that Probability consists in what is laid down in the foregoing Chapters, it will be demanded how Men come to give their Assents contrary to Probability. For there is nothing more common than Contrariety of Opinions; nothing more obvious than that one Man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third stedfastly believes, and firmly adheres to. The Reasons whereof, tho' they may be very various, yet, I suppose, may all be reduc'd to these four.

1. *Want of Proofs.*
2. *Want of Ability to use them.*
3. *Want of Will to use them.*
4. *Wrong Measures of Probability.*

§. 2. First, By *Want of Proofs*, I do not mean only the Want of those Proofs which are no where extant, and so are no where to be had; but the Want even of those Proofs which are in being, or might be procur'd. And thus Men want Proofs who have not the Convenience or Opportunity to make Experiment and Observations themselves tending to the Proof of any Proposition; nor likewise the Convenience to enquire into, and collect the Testimonies of others: And in this state are the greatest part of Mankind, who are given up to Labour, and enslav'd to the Necessity of their mean Condition; whose Lives are worn out only in the Provisions for living. These Mens Opportunity of Knowledg and Enquiry are commonly as narrow as their Fortunes; and their Understandings are but little instructed, when all their whole Time and Pains is laid out to still the Croaking of their own Bellies, or the Cries of their Children. 'Tis not to be expected that a Man, who drudges on all his Life in a laborious Trade, should be more knowing in the variety of Things done in the World, than a Pack-horse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards in a narrow Lane, and dirty Road, only to Market, should be skill'd in the Geography of the Country. Nor is it at all more possible, that he who wants Leisure, Books, and Languages, and the Opportunity of conversing with Variety of Men, should be in a Condition to collect those Testimonies and Observations which are in being, and are necessary to make out many, nay most of the Propositions that, in the Societies of Men, are judg'd of the greatest moment; or to find out grounds of Assurance so great as the Belief of the Points he would build on them, is thought necessary; so that a great part of Mankind are, by the natural and unalterable State of things in this World, and the Constitution of human Affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of those Proofs on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those Opinions: The greatest part of Men, having much to do to get the Means of Living, are not in a Condition to look after those of learned and laborious Enquiries.

§. 3. What shall we say then? Are the greatest part of Mankind, by the Necessity of their Condition, subjected to unavoidable Ignorance in those things which are of greatest Importance to them? (for of these 'tis obvious to enquire.) Have the Bulk of Mankind no other Guide but Accident, and blind Chance, to conduct them to their Happiness or Misery? Are the current Opinions,

1. *Want of Proofs.*

Ob. *what shall become of those who want them, answered.*

nions, and licens'd Guides of every Country, sufficient Evidence and Security to every Man to venture his greatest Concernments on; nay, his everlasting Happiness or Misery? Or can those be the certain and infallible Oracles and Standards of Truth, which teach one thing in *Christendom*, and another in *Turkey*? Or shall a poor Country-man be eternally happy for having the Chance to be born in *Italy*; or a Day-labourer be unavoidably lost, because he had the ill luck to be born in *England*? How ready some Men may be to say some of these things, I will not here examine: but this I am sure, that Men must allow one or other of these to be true, (let them chuse which they please) or else grant, That GOD has furnish'd Men with Faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that way, when their ordinary Vocations allow them the leisure. No Man is so wholly taken up with the Attendance on the Means of Living, as to have no spare time at all to think of his Soul, and inform himself in Matters of Religion. Were Men as intent upon this, as they are on things of lower Concernment, there are none so enslav'd to the Necessities of Life, who might not find many Vacancies that might be husbanded to this Advantage of their Knowledg.

People binder-
ed from En-
quiry.

§. 4. Besides those, whose Improvements and Informations are straiten'd by the narrowness of their Fortunes, there are others whose Largeness of Fortune would plentifully enough supply Books and other Requisites for clearing of Doubts, and discovering of Truth: But they are *cooped in close*, by the Laws of their Countries, and the strict Guards of those whose Interest it is to keep them ignorant, lest, knowing more, they should believe the less in them. These are as far, nay farther from the Liberty and Opportunities of a fair Enquiry, than those poor and wretched Labourers we before spoke of. And, however they may seem high and great, are confin'd to Narrowness of Thought, and enslav'd in that which should be the freest Part of Man, their Understandings. This is generally the Case of all those who live in Places where care is taken to propagate Truth without Knowledg; where Men are forc'd, at a venture, to be of the Religion of the Country; and must therefore swallow down Opinions, as silly People do Empirick Pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do but believe that they will do the Cure: but in this are much more miserable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refuse swallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone; or to chuse the Physician, to whose Conduct they would trust themselves.

2. Want of
Skill to use
them.

§. 5. Secondly, Those who want Skill to use those Evidences they have of Probabilities; who cannot carry a Train of Consequences in their Heads, nor weigh exactly the Preponderancy of contrary Proofs and Testimonies, making every Circumstance its due Allowance, may be easily misled to assent to Positions that are not probable. There are some Men of one, some but of two Syllogisms, and no more; and others that can but advance one step farther. These cannot always discern that side on which the strongest Proofs lie; cannot constantly follow that which in it self is the more probable Opinion. Now that there is such a difference between Men, in respect of their Understandings, I think no body, who has had any Conversation with his Neighbours, will question: tho' he never was at *Westminster-Hall*, or the *Exchange* on the one hand; nor at *Alms-Houses*, or *Bedlam* on the other. Which great difference in Mens Intellectuals, whether it rises from any Defect in the Organs of the Body, particularly adapted to Thinking; or in the Dulness or Untractableness of those Faculties for want of Use; or, as some think, in the natural Differences of Mens Souls themselves; or some, or all of these together; it matters not here to examine: Only this is evident, that there is a difference of Degrees in mens Understandings, Apprehensions, and Reasonings, to so great a Latitude, that one may, without doing injury to Mankind, affirm, that there is a greater distance between some Men and others, in this respect, than between some Men and some Beasts. But how this comes about is a Speculation, tho' of great Consequence, yet not necessary to our present Purpose.

3. Want of Will
to use them.

§. 6. Thirdly, There are another sort of People that want Proofs, not because they are out of their reach, but because they will not use them: who tho' they have Riches and Leisure enough, and want neither Parts nor other Helps, are yet never the better for them. Their hot pursuit of Pleasure, or constant Drudgery

Drudgery in Business, engages some Mens Thoughts elsewhere: Laziness and Oseitancy in general, or a particular Aversion for Books, Study and Meditation, keep others from any serious Thoughts at all: and some out of Fear, that an impartial Enquiry would not favour those Opinions which best suit their Prejudices, Lives, and Designs, content themselves without Examination to take upon trust what they find convenient and in fashion. Thus most Men, even of those that might do otherwise, pass their Lives without an acquaintance with, much less a rational Assent to Probabilities they are concern'd to know, tho' they lie so much within their View, that to be convinc'd of them, they need but turn their Eyes that way. But we know some Men will not read a Letter which is suppos'd to bring ill News; and many Men forbear to cast up their Accounts, or so much as think upon their Estates, who have reason to fear their Affairs are in no very good Posture. How Men, whose plentiful Fortunes allow them leisure to improve their Understandings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot tell: But methinks they have a low Opinion of their Souls, who lay out all their Incomes in Provisions for the Body, and employ none of it to procure the Means and Helps of Knowledge; who take great care to appear always in a neat and splendid Outside, and would think themselves miserable in coarse Clothes, or a patch'd Coat, and yet contentedly suffer their Minds to appear abroad in a pie-bald Livery of coarse Patches, and borrow'd Shreds, such as it has pleas'd Chance, or their Country-Taylor (I mean the common Opinion of those they have convers'd with) to clothe them in. I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for Men that ever think of a future State, and their Concernment in it, which no rational Man can avoid to do sometimes: nor shall I take notice what a Shame and Confusion it is, to the greatest Contemners of Knowledge, to be found ignorant in things they are concern'd to know. But this at least is worth the Consideration of those who call themselves Gentlemen, That however they may think Credit, Respect, Power and Authority, the Concomitants of their Birth and Fortune; yet they will find all these still carry'd away from them, by Men of lower Condition, who surpass them in Knowledge. They who are blind will always be led by those that see, or else fall into the Ditch: and he is certainly the most subjected, the most enslav'd, who is so in his Understanding. In the foregoing Instances, some of the Causes have been shewn of wrong Assent, and how it comes to pass, that probable Doctrines are not always receiv'd with an Assent proportionable to the Reasons which are to be had for their Probability; but hitherto we have consider'd only such Probabilities, whose Proofs do exist, but do not appear to him who embraces the Error.

§. 7. *Fourthly*, There remains yet the last sort, who, even where the real Probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the Conviction, nor yield unto manifest Reasons, but do either ἐπέχεν, suspend their Assent, or give it to the less probable Opinion: And to this Danger are those expos'd, who have taken up *wrong Measures of Probability*; which are,

1. *Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for Principles.*

2. *Receiv'd Hypotheses.*

3. *Predominant Passions or Inclinations.*

4. *Authority.*

§. 8. *First*, The first and firmest Ground of Probability, is the Conformity any thing has to our own Knowledge; especially that Part of our Knowledge which we have embrac'd, and continue to look on as *Principles*. These have so great an Influence upon our Opinions, that 'tis usually by them we judg of Truth, and measure Probability to that degree, that what is inconsistent with our *Principles*, is so far from passing for probable with us, that it will not be allow'd possible. The Reverence borne to these *Principles* is so great, and their Authority so paramount to all other, that the Testimony not only of other Men, but the Evidence of our own Senses are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these establish'd Rules. How much the Doctrine of innate *Principles*, and that *Principles* are not to be prov'd or question'd, has contributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that one Truth cannot contradict another: but withal I take leave also to say, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a *Principle*, to examine

amine it strictly, and see whether he certainly knows it to be true of it self by its own Evidence, or whether he does only with Assurance believe it to be so upon the Authority of others. For he hath a strong Bias put into his Understanding, which will unavoidably misguide his Assent, who hath imbib'd *wrong Principles*, and has blindly given himself up to the Authority of any Opinion in it self not evidently true.

§. 9. There is nothing more ordinary, than *Childrens* receiving into their Minds Propositions (especially about Matters of Religion) from their Parents, Nurses, or those about them: which being insinuated into their unwary, as well as unbiass'd Understandings, and fasten'd by degrees, are at last (equally, whether true or false) riveted there by long Custom and Education, beyond all Possibility of being pull'd out again. For Men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their Opinions, and finding those of this sort to be as ancient in their Minds as their very Memories, not having observed their early Insinuation, nor by what Means they got them, they are apt to reverence them as sacred things, and not to suffer them to be profan'd, touch'd, or question'd: They look on them as the *Urim* and *Thummim* set up in their Minds immediately by GOD Himself, to be the great and unerring Deciders of Truth and Falshood, and the Judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of Controversies.

§. 10. This Opinion of his *Principles* (let them be what they will) being once establish'd in any one's Mind, it is easy to be imagin'd what Reception any Proposition shall find, how clearly soever prov'd, that shall invalidate their Authority, or at all thwart with these internal Oracles; whereas the grossest Absurdities and Improbabilities, being but agreeable to such Principles, go down glibly, and are easily digested. The great Obstinacy that is to be found in Men firmly believing quite contrary Opinions, tho' many times equally absurd, in the various Religions of Mankind, are as evident a Proof as they are an unavoidable Consequence of this way of Reasoning from receiv'd traditional Principles. So that Men will disbelieve their own Eyes, renounce the Evidence of their Senses, and give their own Experience the lye, rather than admit of any thing disagreeing with the sacred Tenets. Take an intelligent *Romanist*, that from the very first dawning of any Notions in his Understanding, hath had this Principle constantly inculcated, *viz.* That he must believe as the Church (*i. e.* those of his Communion) believes, or that the Pope is infallible; and this he never so much as heard question'd, till at forty or fifty Years old he met with one of other Principles: how is he prepar'd easily to swallow, not only against all Probability, but even the clear Evidence of his Senses, the Doctrine of *Transubstantiation*? This Principle has such an Influence on his Mind, that he will believe that to be Flesh which he sees to be Bread. And what way will you take to convince a Man of any improbable Opinion he holds, who, with some Philosophers, hath laid down this as a Foundation of Reasoning, That he must believe his Reason (for so Men improperly call Arguments drawn from their Principles) against his Senses? Let an *Embulsiast* be principled, that he or his Teacher is inspir'd, and acted by an immediate Communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vain bring the Evidence of clear Reasons against his Doctrine. Whoever therefore have imbibed *wrong Principles*, are not, in things inconsistent with these Principles, to be mov'd by the most apparent and convincing Probabilities, till they are so candid and ingenuous to themselves, as to be persuaded to examine even those very Principles, which many never suffer themselves to do.

2. Receiv'd
Hypotheses.

§. 11. Secondly, Next to these are Men whose Understandings are cast into a Mold, and fashion'd just to the size of a *receiv'd Hypothesis*. The difference between these and the former, is, that they will admit of Matter of Fact, and agree with Dissenters in that; but differ only in assigning of Reasons, and explaining the Manner of Operation. These are not at that open defiance with their Senses, as the former: they can endure to hearken to their Information a little more patiently, but will by no means admit of their Reports in the Explanation of Things; nor be prevail'd on by Probabilities, which would convince them that things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are. Would it not be an insufferable thing for a learned Professor, and that which his Scarlet would blush

blush at, to have his Authority of forty Years standing wrought out of hard Rock-Greek and Latin, with no small Expence of Time and Candle, and confirm'd by general Tradition and a Reverend Beard, in an instant over-turn'd by an upstart Novelist? Can any one expect that he should be made to confess, That what he taught his Scholars thirty Years ago, was all Error and Mistake; and that he sold them hard Words and Ignorance at a very dear rate? What Probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such a case? And who ever by the most cogent Arguments will be prevail'd with, to disrobe himself at once of all his old Opinions, and Pretences to Knowledge and Learning, which with hard Study he hath all his time been labouring for; and turn himself out stark naked, in quest a-fresh of new Notions? All the Arguments can be used, will be as little able to prevail, as the Wind did with the Traveller to part with his Cloke, which he held only the faster. To this of wrong Hypothesis, may be reduc'd the Errors that may be occasion'd by a true Hypothesis, or right Principles, but not rightly understood. There is nothing more familiar than this. The Instances of Men contending for different Opinions, which they all derive from the infallible Truth of the Scripture, are an undeniable Proof of it. All that call themselves Christians, allow the Text, that says, *Mélançoisse*, to carry in it the Obligation to a very weighty Duty. But yet however erroneous will one of their Practices be, who understanding nothing but the *French*, take this Rule with one Translation to be *repentez vous*, repent; or with the other, *faitiez Penitence*, do Penance.

§. 12. *Thirdly*, Probabilities, which cross Mens Appetites and prevailing Passions, run the same fate. Let ever so much Probability hang on one side of a covetous Man's Reasoning, and Money on the other; it is easy to foresee which will outweigh. Earthly Minds, like Mud-Walls, resist the strongest Batteries: and tho' perhaps sometimes the Force of a clear Argument may make some Impression; yet they nevertheless stand firm, keep out the Enemy Truth, that would captivate or disturb them. Tell a Man, passionately in love, that he is jilted; bring a score of Witnesses of the Falshood of his Mistress, 'tis ten to one but three kind Words of her's shall invalidate all their Testimonies. *Quod volumus, facile credimus*; What suits our Wishes, is forwardly believ'd; is, I suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented: and tho' Men cannot always openly gain-say or resist the Force of manifest Probabilities that make against them, yet yield they not to the Argument. Not but that it is the Nature of the Understanding constantly to close with the more probable side; but yet a Man hath a power to suspend and restrain its Enquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory Examination, as far as the matter in question is capable, and will bear it to be made. Until that be done, there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent Probabilities.

3. Predominant Passions.

§. 13. *First*, That the Arguments being (as for the most part they are) brought in words, there may be a Fallacy latent in them: and the Consequences being, perhaps, many in train, they may be some of them incoherent. There are very few Discourses so short, clear, and consistent, to which most Men may not, with Satisfaction enough to themselves, raise this doubt; and from whose Conviction they may not, without reproach of Disingenuity or Unreasonableness, set themselves free with the old Reply, *Non persuadebis, etiamsi persuaseris*; Tho' I cannot answer, I will not yield.

The means of evading Probabilities:
1. Suppos'd Fallacy.

§. 14. *Secondly*, Manifest Probabilities may be evaded, and the Assent withheld upon this Suggestion, That I know not yet all that may be said on the contrary side: And therefore tho' I be beaten, 'tis not necessary I should yield, not knowing what Forces there are in reserve behind. This is a Refuge against Conviction so open and so wide, that it is hard to determine, when a Man is quite out of the Verge of it.

2. Suppos'd Arguments for the contrary.

§. 15. But yet there is some end of it; and a Man having carefully enquir'd into all the Grounds of Probability and Unlikeliness, done his utmost to inform himself in all particulars fairly, and cast up the Sum total on both sides, may in most cases come to acknowledg, upon the whole matter, on which side the Probability rests: wherein some Proofs in matter of Reason, being Suppositions upon universal Experience, are so cogent and clear; and some Testimonies in matter of Fact so universal, that he cannot refuse his Assent. So that, I think,

What Probabilities determine the Assent.

we may conclude, that in Propositions where tho' the Proofs in view are of most moment, yet there are sufficient grounds to suspect that there is either Fallacy in Words, or certain Proofs as considerable to be produc'd on the contrary side, there Assent, Suspence, or Dissent are often voluntary Actions: But where the Proofs are such as make it highly probable, and there is not sufficient ground to suspect, that there is either Fallacy of Words (which sober and serious Consideration may discover) nor equally valid Proofs, yet undiscover'd, latent on the other side (which also the nature of the thing may, in some cases, make plain to a considerate Man) there, I think, a Man, who has weigh'd them, *can scarce refuse his Assent* to the side, on which the greater Probability appears. Whether it be probable, that a promiscuous Jumble of Printing Letters should often fall into a method and order, which should stamp on Paper a coherent Discourse; or that a blind fortuitous Concourse of Atoms, not guided by an understanding Agent, should frequently constitute the Bodies of any Species of Animals: in these and the like cases, I think, no body that considers them can be one jot at a stand which side to take, nor at all waver in his Assent. Lastly, when there can be no Supposition (the thing in its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the Testimony of Witnesses) that there is as fair Testimony against, as for the Matter of Fact attested; which by Enquiry is to be learned, *v. g.* whether there was 1700 Years ago such a Man at Rome as *Julius Caesar*: in all such cases, I say, I think it is not in any rational Man's power to refuse his Assent; but that it necessarily follows, and closes with such Probabilities. In other less clear cases, I think, it is in a Man's power to suspend his Assent; and perhaps content himself with the Proofs he has, if they favour the Opinion that suits with his Inclination or Interest, and so stop from farther search. But that a Man should afford his Assent to that side, on which the less Probability appears to him, seems to me utterly impracticable, and as impossible, as it is to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the same time.

Where it is in
our power to
suspend it.

§. 16. As Knowledge is no more arbitrary than Perception; so, I think, Assent is no more in our power than Knowledge. When the Agreement of any two Ideas appears to our Minds, whether immediately, or by the assistance of Reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid seeing those Objects which I turn my Eyes to, and look on in Day-light: And what upon full examination I find the most probable, I cannot deny my Assent to. But tho' we cannot hinder our Knowledge, where the Agreement is once perceiv'd; nor our Assent, where the Probability manifestly appears upon due Consideration of all the Measures of it: yet we can hinder both Knowledge and Assent, by stopping our Enquiry, and not employing our Faculties in the Search of any Truth. If it were not so, Ignorance, Error, or Infidelity could not in any case be a Fault. Thus in some cases we can prevent or suspend our Assent: But can a Man, vers'd in modern or antient History, doubt whether there be such a Place as Rome, or whether there was such a Man as *Julius Caesar*? Indeed there are millions of Truths, that a Man is not, or may not think himself concern'd to know; as whether our King *Richard* the Third was crook-back'd, or no; or whether *Roger Bacon* was a Mathematician, or a Magician. In these and such-like cases, where the Assent one way or other is of no importance to the Interest of any one; no Action, no Concernment of his following or depending thereon; there 'tis not strange, that the Mind should give it self up to the common Opinion, or render it self to the first Comer. These and the like Opinions are of so little weight and moment, that, like Motes in the Sun, their Tendencies are very rarely taken notice of. They are there, as it were, by Chance, and the Mind lets them float at liberty. But where the Mind judges that the Proposition has concernment in it; where the Assent or not Assenting is thought to draw Consequences of moment after it, and Good and Evil to depend on chusing or refusing the right side, and the Mind sets it self seriously to enquire and examine the Probability: there, I think, it is not in our choice to take which side we please, if manifest odds appear on either. The greater Probability, I think, in that case will determine the Assent: and a Man can no more avoid assenting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives the greater

greater Probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas.

If this be so, the Foundation of Error will lie in wrong Measures of Probability; as the Foundation of Vice in wrong Measures of Good.

§. 17. *Fourthly*, The fourth and last *wrong Measure of Probability* I shall take notice of, and which keeps in Ignorance or Error more People than all the other together, is that which I have mention'd in the fore-going Chapter; I mean, the giving up our Assent to the common receiv'd Opinions, either of our Friends or Party, Neighbourhood or Country. How many Men have no other ground for their Tenets, than the suppos'd Honesty, or Learning, or Number of those of the same Profession? As if honest or bookish Men could not err, or Truth were to be establish'd by the Vote of the Multitude: yet this with most Men serves the turn. The Tenet has had the Attestation of reverend Antiquity, it comes to me with the Passport of former Ages, and therefore I am secure in the Reception I give it: other Men have been, and are of the same Opinion (for that is all is said) and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A Man may more justifiably throw up Cross and Pile for his Opinions, than take them up by such Measures. All Men are liable to Error, and most Men are in many points, by Passion or Interest, under Temptation to it. If we could but see the secret Motives that influenc'd the Men of Name and Learning in the World, and the Leaders of Parties, we should not always find that it was the embracing of Truth for its own sake, that made them espouse the Doctrines they own'd and maintain'd. This at least is certain, there is not an Opinion so absurd, which a Man may not receive upon this ground: There is no Error to be nam'd, which has not had its Professors: And a Man shall never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, wherever he has the Footsteps of others to follow.

§. 18. But notwithstanding the great noise is made in the World about Errors and Opinions, I must do Mankind that right, as to say, *There are not so many Men in Errors and wrong Opinions, as is commonly suppos'd.* Not that I think they embrace the Truth; but indeed, because concerning those Doctrines they keep such a stir about, they have no Thought, no Opinion at all. For if any one should a little catechize the greatest part of the Partizans of most of the Sects in the World, he would not find, concerning those matters they are so zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their own: much less would he have reason to think, that they took them upon the Examination of Arguments, and Appearance of Probability. They are resolv'd to stick to a Party, that Education or Interest has engag'd them in; and there, like the common Soldiers of an Army, shew their Courage and Warmth as their Leaders direct, without ever examining or so much as knowing the Cause they contend for. If a Man's Life shews, that he has no serious Regard for Religion; for what reason should we think, that he beats his Head about the Opinions of his Church, and troubles himself to examine the Grounds of this or that Doctrine? 'Tis enough for him to obey his Leaders, to have his Hand and his Tongue ready for the Support of the common Cause, and thereby approve himself to those, who can give him Credit, Preferment or Protection in that Society. Thus Men become Professors of, and Combatants for those Opinions, they were never convinc'd of, nor Profelytes to; no, nor ever had so much as floating in their Heads: And tho' one cannot say, there are fewer improbable or erroneous Opinions in the World than there are; yet this is certain, there are fewer that actually assent to them, and mistake them for Truths, than is imagin'd.

Men not in so many Errors as is imagin'd.

C H A P. XXI.

Of the Division of the Sciences.

Three sorts. §. 1. **A**LL that can fall within the compass of Human Understanding, being either, *First*, The Nature of things as they are in themselves, their Relations, and their Manner of Operation: Or, *Secondly*, That which Man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary Agent, for the Attainment of any End, especially Happiness: Or, *Thirdly*, The ways and means, whereby the Knowledge of both the one and the other of these are attain'd and communicated: I think, *Science* may be divided properly into these *three sorts*.

1. *Physica.* §. 2. *First*, The Knowledge of things, as they are in their own proper Beings, their Constitutions, Properties, and Operations; whereby I mean not only Matter and Body, but Spirits also, which have their proper Natures, Constitutions, and Operations, as well as Bodies. This in a little more enlarged Sense of the Word, I call φυσικῇ, or *Natural Philosophy*. The End of this, is bare speculative Truth; and whatsoever can afford the Mind of Man any such, falls under this branch, whether it be God himself, Angels, Spirits, Bodies, or any of their Affections, as Number, and Figure, &c.

2. *Practica.* §. 3. *Secondly*, πρακτικῇ, The Skill of right applying our own Powers and Actions, for the attainment of things good and useful. The most considerable under this head, is *Ethicks*, which is the seeking out those Rules and Measures of human Actions, which lead to Happiness, and the means to practise them. The End of this is not bare Speculation, and the Knowledge of Truth; but Right, and a Conduct suitable to it.

§. 4. *Thirdly*, The third Branch may be call'd σημειωτικῇ, or the *Doctrine of Signs*, the most usual whereof being Words, it is aptly enough term'd also λογικῇ, *Logick*; the Business whereof, is to consider the Nature of Signs the Mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its Knowledge to others. For since the things the Mind contemplates, are none of them, besides it self, present to the Understanding, 'tis necessary that something else, as a Sign or Representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are *Ideas*. And because the Scene of *Ideas* that makes one Man's Thoughts, cannot be laid open to the immediate View of another, nor laid up any where but in the Memory, a no very sure Repository: Therefore to communicate our Thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own use, Signs of our *Ideas* are also necessary. Those which Men have found most convenient, and therefore generally make use of, are articulate Sounds. The Consideration then of *Ideas* and *Words*, as the great Instruments of Knowledge, makes no despicable part of their Contemplation, who would take a view of human Knowledge in the whole extent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly weigh'd, and duly consider'd, they would afford us another sort of Logick and Critick, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.

This is the first Division of the Objects of Knowledge. §. 5. This seems to me the first and most general, as well as natural Division of the Objects of our Understanding. For a Man can employ his Thoughts about nothing, but either the Contemplation of *Things* themselves for the Discovery of Truth; or about the things in his own power, which are his own *Actions*, for the attainment of his own Ends; or the *Signs* the Mind makes use of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them for its clearer Information. All which three, viz. *Things* as they are in themselves knowable; *Actions* as they depend on us, in order to Happiness; and the right Use of *Signs* in order to Knowledge, being *toto cælo* different, they seem'd to me to be the three great Provinces of the intellectual World, wholly separate and distinct one from another.

ΤΑ ΗΟ The End of the Essay of Human Understanding.



A

LETTER

To the Right Reverend

Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester,

Concerning some Passages relating to

Mr. LOCKE's Essay of Human Understanding:

IN A

Late DISCOURSE of his Lordship's, in
Vindication of the TRINITY.

My Lord,

I Cannot but look upon it as a great Honour that your Lordship, who are so thorowly acquainted with the incomparable Writings of Antiquity, and know so well how to entertain your Self with the Great Men in the Commonwealth of Letters, should at any time take into your Hand my mean Papers; and so far bestow any of your valuable Minutes on my *Essay of Human Understanding*, as to let the World see you have thought my Notions worth your Lordship's Consideration. My Aim in that, as well as every thing else written by me, being purely to follow Truth as far as I could discover it; I think my self beholden to whoever shews me my Mistakes, as to one who, concurring in my Design, helps me forward in my way.

Your Lordship has been pleas'd to favour me with some Thoughts of your's in this kind, in your late *Learned Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*; and I hope I may say, have gone a little out of your way to do me that Kindness; for the Obligation is thereby the greater. And if your Lordship has brought in the mention of my Book in a Chapter, entitled, *Objections against the Trinity in Point of Reason, answer'd*; when in my whole Essay, I think there is not to be found any thing like an Objection against the Trinity: I have

have the more to acknowledg to your Lordship, who would not let the Foreigness of the Subject hinder your Lordship from endeavouring to set me right, as to some Errors your Lordship apprehends in my Book; when other Writers using some Notions like mine, gave you that which was occasion enough for you to do me the Favour to take notice of what you dislike in my *Essay*.

Your Lordship's Name is of so great Authority in the Learned World, that I who profess my self more ready, upon Conviction, to recant, than I was at first to publish my Mistakes, cannot pay that Respect is due to it, without telling the Reasons why I still retain any of my Notions, after your Lordship's having appear'd dissatisfy'd with them. This must be my Apology, and I hope such a one as your Lordship will allow, for my examining what you have printed against several Passages in my Book, and my shewing the Reasons why it has not prevail'd with me to quit them.

That your Lordship's Reasonings may lose none of their Force by my misapprehending or misrepresenting them, (a way too familiarly us'd in Writings that have any appearance of Controversy) I shall crave leave to give the Reader your Lordship's Arguments in the full strength of your own Expressions; that so in them he may have the Advantage to see the Deficiency of my Answers, in any Point where I shall be so unfortunate as not to perceive, or not to follow the Light your Lordship affords me.

Your Lordship having in the two or three preceding Pages, justly, as I think, found fault with the account of Reason, given by the Unitarians and a late Writer, in those Passages you quote out of them; and then coming to the *Nature of Substance*, p. 233. and relating what that Author has said concerning the Mind's getting of simple Ideas, and those simple Ideas being the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasonings, your Lordship thus concludes, p. 234.

Then it follows, That we can have no Foundation of Reasoning, where there can be no such Ideas from Sensation or Reflection.

Now this is the Case of Substance; it is not intromitted by the Senses, nor depends upon the Operation of the Mind; and so it cannot be within the compass of our Reason. And therefore I do not wonder, that the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning, have almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World. For they not only tell us, &c.

This, as I remember, is the first place where your Lordship is pleas'd to quote any thing out of my *Essay of Human Understanding*, which your Lordship does in these Words following.

P. 234.

"That we can have no Idea of it by Sensation or Reflection; but that nothing is signify'd by it, only an uncertain Supposition of we know not what." and therefore it is parallel'd more than once, with the Indian Philosopher's He-knew-not-what, which supported the Tortoise, that supported the Elephant, that supported the Earth: so Substance was found out only to support Accidents. And, that when we talk of Substances, we talk like Children; who being ask'd a Question about somewhat which they knew not, readily give this satisfactory Answer, That it is something."

These Words of mine, your Lordship brings to prove, That I am one of the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning, that have almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World. An Accusation which your Lordship will pardon me, if I do not readily know what to plead to, because I do not understand what is almost to discard Substance out of the reasonable part of the World. If your Lordship means by it, That I deny or doubt that there is in the World any such Thing as Substance, that your Lordship will acquit me of, when your Lordship looks again into that Chapter, which you have cited more than once, where your Lordship will find these Words.

Human Understanding,
B. 2. C. 23.

§. 4.

"When we talk or think of any particular sort of Corporeal Substances, as Horse, Stone, &c. tho' the Idea we have of either of them, be but the Complication or Collection of those several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities, which we use to find united in the thing called Horse or Stone; yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common Subject, which Sup-

"port we denote by the name Substance; tho' it be certain, we have no clear
"or distinct Idea of that thing we suppose a Support." And again,

"The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, viz. §. 5.

"Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, &c. which we considering not to subsist of
"themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be pro-
"duc'd by it, we are apt to think these the Actions of some other Sub-
"stance, which we call Spirit: Whereby yet it is evident, that having no o-
"ther Idea or Notion of Matter, but something wherein those many sensi-
"ble Qualities, which affect our Senses, do subsist; by supposing a Substance,
"wherein Thinking, Knowing, Doubting, and a Power of Moving, &c. do
"subsist, we have as clear a Notion of the Nature or Substance of Spirit,
"as we have of Body; the one being suppos'd to be (without knowing what
"it is) the *Substratum* to those simple Ideas we have from without; and the
"other supposed (with a like Ignorance of what it is) to be the *Substratum*
"to those Operations, which we experiment in our selves within." And
again,

"Whatever therefore be the secret Nature of Substance in general, all §. 6.
"the Ideas we have of particular distinct Substances, are nothing but sever-
"al Combinations of simple Ideas, co-existing in such, tho' unknown, Cause
"of their Union, as makes the whole subsist of it self."

And I further say in the same Section, "That we suppose these Combina-
"tions to rest in, and to be adherent to that unknown, common Subject,
"which inheres not in any Thing else. And that our Complex Ideas of
"Substances, besides all those simple Ideas they are made up of, have always
"the confus'd Idea of something to which they belong, and in which they
"subsist: And therefore when we speak of any sort of Substance, we say it is a
"thing having such and such Qualities; a Body is a thing that is extended,
"figur'd and capable of Motion; a Spirit, a thing capable of Thinking."

These, and the like Fashions of speaking, intimate, That the Substance is
supposed *always something*, besides the Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion,
Thinking, or other observable Idea, tho' we know not what it is.

"Our Idea of Body, I say, is an extended, solid Substance; and our Idea B. 2. c. 23.
"of our Souls, is of a Substance that thinks." So that as long as there is §. 22:

any such thing as Body or Spirit in the World, I have done nothing to-
wards the *discarding Substance out of the reasonable part of the World*. Nay,
as long as there is any simple Idea or sensible Quality left, according to my
way of arguing, Substance cannot be discarded; because all simple Ideas, all
sensible Qualities, carry with them a Supposition of a *Substratum* to exist
in, and of a Substance wherein they inhere: and of this that whole Chap-
ter is so full, that I challenge any one who reads it, to think I have *almost*,
or one jot *discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World*. And of this,
Man, Horse, Sun, Water, Iron, Diamond, &c. which I have mention'd of dis-
tinct sorts of Substances, will be my Witnesses as long as any such thing re-
mains in being; of which I say, "That the Ideas of Substances are such Com- B. 2. c. 12.
"binations of simple Ideas, as are taken to represent distinct, particular Things, §. 6.
"subsisting by themselves, in which the suppos'd or confus'd Idea of Sub-
"stance is always the first and chief."

If by *almost discarding Substance out of the reasonable part of the World*, your
Lordship means, That I have destroy'd, and *almost discarded* the true Idea we
have of it, by calling it a *Substratum*, *A supposition of we know not what Sup-* B. 2. c. 23.
port of such Qualities as are capable of producing simple Ideas in us, an obscure §. 1.
and relative Idea: That without knowing what it is, it is that which supports Ac- §. 2.
cidents; so that of Substance we have no Idea of what it is, but only a confus'd, §. 3.
obscure one, of what it does: I must confess this, and the like I have said of B. 2. c. 13.
our Idea of Substance; and should be very glad to be convinc'd by your §. 19.
Lordship, or any body else, that I have spoken too meanly of it. He that
would shew me a more clear and distinct Idea of Substance, would do me a Kind-
ness I should thank him for. But this is the best I can hitherto find, either
in my own Thoughts, or in the Books of Logicians: For their Account or
Idea of it is, that it is *Ens* or *res per se subsistens* & *substantia accidentibus*;
which in effect is no more, but that Substance is a *Being* or *Thing*; or in
Vol. I. Y y short,

short, *something* they know not what, or of which they have no clearer Idea, than that it is *something* which supports Accidents, or other simple Ideas or Modes, and is not supported it self as a Mode or an Accident. So that I do not see but *Burgesdicus*, *Sanderfon*, and the whole Tribe of Logicians, must be reckon'd with the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*, who have almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World.

But supposing, my Lord, that I or these Gentlemen, Logicians of Note in the Schools, should own, that we have a very imperfect, obscure, inadequate Idea of Substance; would it not be a little too hard to charge us with discarding Substance out of the World? For what *almost* discarding, and *reasonable part* of the World, signifies, I must confess I do not clearly comprehend: But let *almost* and *reasonable part* signify here what they will, for I dare say your Lordship meant something by them, would not your Lordship think you were a little hardly dealt with, if for acknowledging your self to have a very imperfect and inadequate Idea of God, or of several other things which in this very Treatise, you confess our Understandings come short in and cannot comprehend, you should be accus'd to be one of these *Gentlemen that have almost discarded God*, or those other mysterious Things, whereof you contend we have very imperfect and inadequate Ideas, *out of the reasonable World*? For I suppose your Lordship means by *almost discarding out of the reasonable World*, something that is blameable, for it seems not to be inserted for a Commendation; and yet I think he deserves no Blame, who owns the having imperfect, inadequate, obscure Ideas, where he has no better: however, if it be infer'd from thence, that either he *almost excludes* those Things out of Being, or out of rational Discourse, if that be meant by the *reasonable World*; for the first of these will not hold, because the Being of Things in the World depends not on our Ideas: The latter indeed is true, in some degree, but is no Fault; for it is certain, that where we have imperfect, inadequate, confus'd, obscure Ideas, we cannot discourse and reason about those things so well, fully and clearly, as if we had perfect, adequate, clear and distinct Ideas.

Your Lordship, I must own, with great Reason, takes notice that I *parallel'd more than once*, our Idea of Substance, with the *Indian Philosopher's He-knew-not-what*, which supported the Tortoise, &c.

This Repetition is, I confess, a Fault in exact Writing: But I having acknowledg'd and excus'd it in these Words in my Preface; "I am not ignorant how little I herein consult my own Reputation, when I knowingly let my Essay go with a Fault so apt to disgust the most judicious, who are always the nicest Readers. And there further add, That I did not publish my Essay for such great Masters of Knowledge as your Lordship; but fitted it for Men of my own Size, to whom Repetitions might be sometimes useful." It would not therefore have been besides your Lordship's Generosity (who were not intended to be provok'd by this Repetition) to have pass'd by such a Fault as this, in one who pretends not beyond the lower Rank of Writers. But I see your Lordship would have me exact and without any Faults; and I wish I could be so, the better to deserve your Lordship's Approbation.

My saying, "That when we talk of Substance, we talk like Children, who, being ask'd a Question about something which they know not, readily give this satisfactory Answer, That it is something;" your Lordship seems mightily to lay to Heart, in these Words that follow.

P. 235.

If this be the Truth of the Case, we must still talk like Children, and I know not how it can be remedied. For if we cannot come at a rational Idea of Substance, we can have no Principle of Certainty to go upon in this Debate.

If your Lordship has any better and distincter Idea of Substance than mine is, which I have given an account of, your Lordship is not at all concern'd in what I have there said. But those whose Idea of Substance, whether a rational or not rational Idea, is like mine, something they know not what, must in that, with me, talk like Children, when they speak of something they know not what. For a Philosopher that says, That which supports Accidents is *something* he knows not what; and a Country-man that says, The Foundation

dation of the great Church at *Harlem*, is supported by *something* he knows not what; and a Child that stands in the Dark upon his Mother's Muff, and says he stands upon *something* he-knows not-what, in this respect talk all Three alike. But if the Country-man knows, that the Foundation of the Church at *Harlem* is supported by a Rock, as the Houses about *Bristol* are; or by Gravel, as the Houses about *London* are; or by wooden Piles, as the Houses in *Amsterdam* are; it is plain, that then, having a clear and distinct Idea of the thing that supports the Church, he does not talk of this matter as a Child; nor will he of the support of Accidents, when he has a clearer and more distinct Idea of it, than that it is barely *something*. But as long as we think like Children, in Cases where our Ideas are no clearer, nor distincter than their's, I agree with your Lordship, *That I know not how it can be remedied*, but that we must talk like them.

Your Lordship's next Paragraph begins thus: *I do not say, That we can have* P. 235.
a clear Idea of Substance, either by Sensation or Reflection; but from hence I argue, That this is a very insufficient distribution of the Ideas necessary to Reason.

Your Lordship here argues against a Proposition that I know no body that holds: I am sure the Author of *The Essay of Human Understanding* never thought, nor in that *Essay* hath any where said, That the Ideas that come into the Mind by *Sensation and Reflection*, are all the Ideas that are necessary to Reason, or that Reason is exercis'd about; for then he must have laid by all the Ideas of simple and mix'd Modes and Relations, and the complex Ideas of the Species of Substances, about which he has spent so many Chapters; and must have deny'd that these complex Ideas are the Objects of Mens Thoughts or Reasonings, which he is far enough from. All that he has said about *Sensation and Reflection* is, That all our *simple Ideas* are receiv'd by them, and that these simple Ideas are the Foundation of all our Knowledg, for as much as all our complex, relative, and general Ideas are made by the Mind, abstracting, enlarging, comparing, compounding and referring, &c. these simple Ideas, and their several Combinations, one to another, whereby complex and general Ideas are formed of Modes, Relations, and the several Species of Substances, all which are made use of by Reason, as well as the other Faculties of the Mind.

I therefore agree with your Lordship, That the Ideas of Sensation or Reflection is a very insufficient distribution of the Ideas necessary to Reason. Only my Agreement with your Lordship had been more intire to the whole Sentence, if your Lordship had rather said *Ideas made use of by Reason*; because I do not well know what is meant by *Ideas necessary to Reason*. For Reason being a Faculty of the Mind, nothing, in my poor Opinion, can properly be said to be necessary to that Faculty, but what is requir'd to its being. As nothing is necessary to Sight in a Man, but such a Constitution of the Body and Organ, that a Man may have the power of Seeing; so I submit it to your Lordship, whether any thing can properly be said to be necessary to Reason in a Man, but such a Constitution of Body or Mind, or both, as may give him the Power of Reasoning. Indeed such a particular sort of Objects or Instruments may be sometimes said necessary to the Eye, but that is never said in reference to the Faculty of Seeing, but in reference to some particular end of Seeing; and then a Microscope and a Mite may be necessary to the Eye, if the End propos'd be to know the Shape and Parts of that Animal. And so if a Man would reason about Substance, then the Idea of Substance is necessary to his Reason: But yet I doubt not but that many a Rational Creature has been, who, in all his Life, never bethought himself of any necessity his Reason had of an Idea of Substance.

Your Lordship's next Words are; *For besides these, there must be some general* P. 233.
Ideas which the Mind doth form, not by mere comparing those Ideas it has got from Sense or Reflection; but by forming distinct general Notions of Things from particular Ideas.

Here, again, I perfectly agree with your Lordship, that besides the particular Ideas received from Sensation and Reflection, the Mind forms general Ideas, not by mere comparing those Ideas it has got by Sensation and Reflection; for this I do not remember I ever said. But this I say, "Ideas become general, B.3. c.3. §.6.
" by

B. 1. c. 11. §. 9. "by separating from them the Circumstances of Time and Place, and any other Ideas that may determine them to this or that particular Existence. By this way of Abstraction they are made, &c." And to the same purpose I explain my self in another place.

Your Lordship says, *The Mind forms general Ideas, by forming general Notions of Things from particular Ideas.* And I say, "The Mind forms general Ideas, by abstracting from particular ones." So that there is no difference that I perceive between us in this Matter, but only a little in Expression.

P. 235. It follows, *And among these general Notions, or rational Ideas, Substance is one of the first; because we find, that we can have no true Conceptions of any Modes or Accidents (no matter which) but we must conceive a Substratum, or Subject wherein they are. Since it is a Repugnancy to our first Conceptions of Things, that Modes or Accidents should subsist by themselves; and therefore the rational Idea of Substance, is one of the first and most natural Ideas in our Minds.*

Whether the general Idea of Substance be one of the first or most natural Ideas in our Minds, I will not dispute with your Lordship, as not being, I think, very material to the matter in hand. But as to the Idea of Substance, what it is, and how we come by it, your Lordship says, *It is a Repugnancy to our Conceptions of Things, that Modes and Accidents should subsist by themselves; and therefore we must conceive a Substratum wherein they are.*

B. 2. c. 23. §. 4. And, I say, "Because we cannot conceive how simple Ideas of sensible Qualities should subsist alone, or one in another, we suppose them existing in and supported by some common Subject." Which I, with your Lordship, call also *Substratum*.

§. 1.

What now can be more consonant to it self, than what your Lordship and I have said in these two Passages is consonant to one another? Whereupon, my Lord, give me leave, I beseech you, to boast to the World, That what I have said concerning our general Idea of Substance, and the way how we come by it, has the Honour to be confirm'd by your Lordship's Authority. And that from hence I may be sure the saying, That the general Idea we have of Substance is, that it is a *Substratum* or Support to Modes or Accidents, wherein they do subsist: and that the Mind forms it, because it cannot conceive how they should subsist of themselves, has no Objection in it against the Trinity; for then your Lordship would not, I know, be of that Opinion, nor own it in a Chapter where you are answering Objections against the Trinity, however my Words, which amount to no more, have been (I know not how) brought into that Chapter: Tho' what they have to do there, I must confess to your Lordship, I do not yet see.

P. 236. In the next Words your Lordship says, *But we are still told, That our Understandings can have no other Ideas, but either from Sensation or Reflection.*

B. 2. c. 1. §. 5. The Words of that Section your Lordship quotes, are these; "The Understanding seems to me, not to have the least glimmering of any Ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two. External Objects furnish the Mind with the Ideas of sensible Qualities, which are all those different Perceptions they produce in us: And the Mind furnishes the Understanding with Ideas of its own Operations. These, when we have taken a full Survey of them, and their several Modes, and the Compositions made out of them, we shall find to contain all our whole Stock of Ideas; and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of those two ways. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and thoroughly search into his Understanding, and then let him tell me, whether all the original Ideas he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his Senses, or of the Operations of his Mind, consider'd as Objects of his Reflection: And how great a Mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be lodg'd there, he will, upon taking a strict View, see, that he has not any Idea in his Mind but what one of these two have imprinted, tho', perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the Understanding, as we shall see hereafter."

These Words seem to me to signify something different from what your Lordship has cited out of them; and if they do not, were intended, I am sure,

sure, by me, to signify all those complex Ideas of Modes, Relations and Specifick Substances; which how the Mind it self forms out of simple Ideas, I have shewn in the following part of my Book, and intended to refer to it by these Words, "As we shall see hereafter," with which I close that Paragraph. But if by *Ideas* your Lordship signifies *simple Ideas*, in the Words you have set down, I grant then they contain my Sense, viz. *That our Understandings can have (i. e. in the natural exercise of our Faculties) no other simple Ideas, but either from Sensation or Reflection.*

Your Lordship goes on: *And [we are still told] that herein chiefly lies the Excellency of Mankind above Brutes, That these cannot abstract and enlarge Ideas, as Men do.*

Had your Lordship done me the Favour to have quoted the Place in my Book, from whence you had taken these Words, I should not have been at a loss where to find them. Those in my Book, which I can remember any where come nearest to them, run thus.

"This, I think, I may be positive in, that the power of abstracting is B. 2. c. 11.
"not at all in Brutes; and that the having of general Ideas, is that which S. 10.
"puts a perfect distinction betwixt Man and Brutes; and is an Excellency
"which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to."

Tho', speaking of the Faculties of the Human Understanding, I took occasion, by the bye, to conjecture how far Brutes partook with Men in any of the intellectual Faculties; yet it never enter'd into my Thoughts, on that occasion, to compare the utmost Perfections of Human Nature with that of Brutes, and therefore was far from saying, *Herein chiefly lies the Excellency of Mankind above Brutes, that these cannot abstract and enlarge their Ideas, as Men do.* For it seems to me an Absurdity I would not willingly be guilty of, to say, *That the Excellency of Mankind lies chiefly, or any ways in this, that Brutes cannot abstract.* For Brutes being not able to do any thing, cannot be any Excellency of Mankind. The Ability of Mankind does not lie in the Impotency or Disabilities of Brutes. If your Lordship had charg'd me to have said, *That herein lies one Excellency of Mankind above Brutes, viz. That Men can, and Brutes cannot abstract;* I must have own'd it to be my Sense: But what I ought to say, to what your Lordship approved or disapproved of in it, I shall better understand, when I know to what purpose your Lordship was pleas'd to cite it.

The immediately following Paragraph runs thus: *But how comes the general Idea of Substance to be fram'd in our Minds? Is this by "abstracting and P. 236.
"enlarging simple Ideas? No, "But it is by a Complication of many simple B. 2. c. 23.
"Ideas together: Because not imagining how these simple Ideas can subsist S. 1.
"by themselves, we accustom our selves to suppose some Substratum wherein
"they do subsist, and from whence they do result, which therefore we call
"Substance." And is this all indeed, that is to be said for the being of Substance, "That we accustom our selves to suppose a Substratum?" Is that Custom ground'd upon true Reason, or not? If not, then Accidents or Modes must subsist of themselves, and these simple Ideas need no Tortoise to support them: For Figures and Colours, &c. would do well enough of themselves, but for some Fancies Men have accustomed themselves to.*

Herein your Lordship seems to charge me with two Faults: One, that I make the *general Idea of Substance to be fram'd, not by abstracting and enlarging simple Ideas, but by a Complication of many simple Ideas together:* The other, as if I had said, *The being of Substance had no other foundation but the Fancies of Men.*

As to the first of these, I beg leave to remind your Lordship, that I say in more places than one, and particularly those above quoted, where *ex professo* I treat of Abstraction and general Ideas, that they are all made by abstracting; and therefore could not be understood to mean, that that of Substance was made any other way; however my Pen might have slip'd, or the negligence of Expression, where I might have something else than the general Idea of Substance in view, might make me seem to say so.

That I was not speaking of the *general Idea of Substance* in the Passage your Lordship quotes, is manifest from the Title of that Chapter, which is, *Of the Complex*

Complex Ideas of Substances. And the first Section of it, which your Lordship cites for those Words you have set down, stands thus :

B. 2. c. 23.
§. 1.

"The Mind being, as I have declar'd, furnish'd with a great number of the simple Ideas convey'd in by the Senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by Reflections on its own Operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple Ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and Words being suited to common Apprehension, and made use of for quick Dispatch, are call'd, so united in one Subject, by one Name; which, by Inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of, and consider as one simple Idea, which indeed is a Complication of many Ideas together: Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple Ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves to suppose some *Substratum* wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which therefore we call *Substance*."

In which words, I do not observe any that deny the *general Idea of Substance* to be made by Abstraction; nor any that say, it is made by a *Complication of many simple Ideas together*. But speaking in that place of the Ideas of distinct Substances, such as Man, Horse, Gold, &c. I say they are made up of certain Combinations of simple Ideas; which Combinations are look'd upon, each of them, as one simple Idea, tho' they are many; and we call it by one Name of *Substance*, tho' made up of Modes, from the custom of supposing a *Substratum*, wherein that Combination does subsist. So that in this Paragraph I only give an account of the Idea of distinct Substances, such as Oak, Elephant, Iron, &c. how, tho' they are made up of distinct Complications of Modes, yet they are look'd on as one Idea, call'd by one Name, as making distinct sorts of Substances.

B. 2. c. 23.
§. 2.

But that my Notion of *Substance in general* is quite different from these, and has no such Combination of simple Ideas in it, is evident from the immediate following words, where I say, "The Idea of *pure Substance in general*, is only a Supposition of we know not what Support of such Qualities as are capable of producing simple Ideas in us." And these two I plainly distinguish all along, particularly where I say, "Whatever therefore be the secret and abstract Nature of Substance in general, all the Ideas we have of particular distinct Substances, are nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas, co-existing in such, tho' unknown, cause of their Union, as makes the whole subsist of it self."

§. 6.

Ib. §. 29.

The other thing laid to my charge, is, as if I took the *Being of Substance* to be doubtful, or render'd it so by the imperfect and ill-grounded Idea I have given of it. To which I beg leave to say, That I ground not the *Being*, but the *Idea* of Substance, on our accustoming our selves to suppose some *Substratum*; for 'tis of the *Idea* alone I speak there, and not of the *Being of Substance*. And having every where affirm'd and built upon it, That a *Man* is a Substance; I cannot be suppos'd to question or doubt of the *Being of Substance*, till I can question or doubt of my own *Being*. Further I say, "Sensation convinces us that there are solid extended Substances; and Reflection, that there are thinking ones". So that I think the *Being of Substance* is not shaken by what I have said: And if the Idea of it should be, yet (the *Being* of things depending not on our *Ideas*) the *Being of Substance* would not be at all shaken by my saying, We had but an obscure imperfect *Idea* of it, and that that *Idea* came from our accustoming our selves to suppose some *Substratum*; or indeed if I should say, We had no *Idea* of Substance at all. For a great many things may be and are granted to have a *Being*, and be in Nature, of which we have no *Ideas*. For example; It cannot be doubted but there are distinct Species of separate Spirits, of which yet we have no distinct *Ideas* at all: It cannot be question'd but Spirits have ways of communicating their Thoughts, and yet we have no *Idea* of it at all.

P. 236.

B. 2. c. 23.
§. 4.

The *Being* then of *Substance* being safe and secure, notwithstanding any thing I have said, let us see whether the *Idea* of it be not so too. Your Lordship asks, with concern, *And is this all indeed that is to be said for the Being* (if your Lordship please, let it be the *Idea*) of *Substance*, that we accustom our selves to suppose a *Substratum*? Is that Custom ground'd upon true Reason, or no? I have said, that it is ground'd upon this, "That we cannot conceive how simple *Ideas* of
" sensible

"sensible Qualities should subsist alone, and therefore we suppose them to exist in, and to be supported by some common Subject, which Support we denote by the name *Substance*." Which I think is a *true Reason*, because it is the same your Lordship grounds the Supposition of a *Substratum* on, in this very Page; even on the *Repugnancy to our Conceptions, that Modes and Accidents should subsist by themselves*. So that I have the good luck here again to agree with your Lordship: And consequently conclude, I have your Approbation in this, That the *Substratum* to Modes or Accidents, which is our *Idea* of Substance in general, is founded in this, "That we cannot conceive how Modes or Accidents can subsist by themselves."

The Words next following, are: *If it be grounded upon plain and evident Reason, then we must allow an Idea of Substance, which comes not in by Sensation or Reflection; and so we may be certain of something which we have not, by those Ideas*. P. 237.

These Words of your Lordship's contain nothing as I see in them, against me: for I never said, that the *general Idea of Substance comes in by Sensation and Reflection*; or, that it is a simple *Idea of Sensation or Reflection*, tho' it be ultimately founded in them: for it is a complex *Idea*, made up of the *general Idea of Something, or Being*, with the Relation of a Support to Accidents. For general *Ideas* come not into the Mind by Sensation or Reflection, but are the Creatures or Inventions of the Understanding, as, I think, I have shewn; and also, how the Mind makes them from *Ideas*, which it has got by Sensation and Reflection: And as to the *Ideas of Relation*, how the Mind forms them, and how they are deriv'd from, and ultimately terminate in *Ideas of Sensation and Reflection*, I have likewise shewn. B. 3. c. 3.

But that I may not be mistaken what I mean, when I speak of *Ideas of Sensation and Reflection*, as the Materials of all our Knowledge; give me leave, my Lord, to set down here a place or two out of my Book, to explain my self; as, I thus speak of *Ideas of Sensation and Reflection*. B. 2. c. 25. & c. 28. §. 18.

"That these, when we have taken a full Survey of them, and their several Modes, and the Compositions made out of them, we shall find to contain all our whole Stock of *Ideas*; and we have nothing in our Minds, which did not come in one of these two ways." This Thought, in another place, I express thus: B. 2. c. 1. §. 5.

"These simple *Ideas*, the Materials of all our Knowledge, are suggested and furnish'd to the Mind only by those two ways above-mention'd, viz. Sensation and Reflection." And again. B. 2. c. 2. §. 2.

"These are the most considerable of those simple *Ideas* which the Mind has, and out of which is made all its other Knowledge; all which it receives by the two fore-mention'd ways of Sensation and Reflection." And, B. 2. c. 7. §. 10.

"Thus I have, in a short Draught, given a View of our original *Ideas*, from whence all the rest are deriv'd, and of which they are made up." B. 2. c. 21. §. 73.

This, and the like said in other places, is what I have thought concerning *Ideas of Sensation and Reflection*, as the Foundation and Materials of all our *Ideas*, and consequently of all our Knowledge. I have set down these Particulars out of my Book, that the Reader having a full view of my Opinion herein, may the better see what in it is liable to your Lordship's Reprehension. For that your Lordship is not very well satisfy'd with it, appears not only by the Words under consideration, but by these also: *But we are still told, That our Understanding can have no other Ideas, but either from Sensation or Reflection*. And, *Let us suppose this Principle to be true, That the simple Ideas, by Sensation or Reflection, are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning*. P. 236. P. 240.

Your Lordship's Argument, in the Passage we are upon, stands thus: *If the general Idea of Substance be grounded upon plain and evident Reason, then we must allow an Idea of Substance, which comes not in by Sensation or Reflection*. This is a Consequence which, with Submission, I think will not hold, because it is founded upon a Supposition which, I think, will not hold, viz. That Reason and *Ideas* are inconsistent; for if that Supposition be not true, then the *general Idea of Substance* may be grounded on plain and evident Reason: and yet it will not follow from thence, that it is not ultimately grounded on and deriv'd from *Ideas which come in by Sensation or Reflection*, and so cannot be said to come in by Sensation or Reflection.

To

P. 236. To explain my self, and clear my Meaning in this Matter : All the *Ideas* of all the sensible Qualities of a Cherry come into my Mind by Sensation ; the *Ideas* of *Perceiving*, *Thinking*, *Reasoning*, *Knowing*, &c. come into my Mind by *Reflection* : The *Ideas* of these Qualities and Actions, or Powers, are perceiv'd by the Mind, to be by themselves inconsistent with Existence ; or, as your Lordship well expresses it, *We find that we can have no true Conception of any Modes or Accidents, but we must conceive a Substratum or Subject, wherein they are ; i.e. That they cannot exist or subsist of themselves.* Hence the Mind perceives their necessary Connection with Inherence or being supported ; which being a relative *Idea* superadded to the red Colour in a Cherry, or to *Thinking* in a Man, the Mind frames the correlative *Idea* of a *Support*. For I never deny'd, That the Mind could frame to it self *Ideas* of Relation, but have shew'd the quite contrary in my Chapters about *Relation*. But because a Relation cannot be founded in nothing, or be the Relation of nothing, and the thing here related as a *Supporter* or a *Support*, is not represented to the Mind by any clear and distinct *Idea* ; therefore the obscure, indistinct, vague *Idea* of *Thing* or *Something*, is all that is left to be the positive *Idea*, which has the relation of a *Support* or *Substratum* to Modes or Accidents ; and that general indetermin'd *Idea* of *Something*, is, by the abstraction of the Mind, deriv'd also from the simple *Ideas* of Sensation and Reflection : And thus the Mind, from the positive simple *Ideas* got by Sensation or Reflection, comes to the general relative *Idea* of *Substance* ; which, without these positive simple *Ideas*, it would never have.

This your Lordship (without giving by Retail all the particular Steps of the Mind in this Business) has well express'd in this more familiar way.
P. 236. *We find we can have no true Conception of any Modes or Accidents, but we must conceive a Substratum or Subject wherein they are ; since it is a Repugnancy to our Conceptions of Things, that Modes or Accidents should subsist by themselves.*

Ibid. Hence your Lordship calls it the rational *Idea* of *Substances* : And says, *I grant that by Sensation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of things ; but our Reason is satisfied that there must be something beyond these, because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves.* So that if this be that which your Lordship means by the rational *Idea* of *Substance*, I see nothing there is in it against what I have said, that it is founded on simple *Ideas* of Sensation or Reflection, and that it is a very obscure *Idea*.
P. 253.

P. 273. Your Lordship's Conclusion from your foregoing Words, is, *And so we may be certain of some things which we have not by those Ideas : which is a Proposition, whose precise meaning your Lordship will forgive me, if I profess, as it stands there, I do not understand.* For it is uncertain to me, whether your Lordship means, We may certainly know the Existence of something which we have not by those *Ideas* ; or certainly know the distinct Properties of something which we have not by those *Ideas* ; or certainly know the Truth of some Proposition which we have not by those *Ideas* : for to be certain of something, may signify either of these. But in which soever of these it be meant, I do not see how I am concern'd in it.

Your Lordship's next Paragraph is as followeth :
P. 273. " The *Idea* of *Substance*, we are told again, is nothing but the supposed, but unknown Support of those Qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist *sine re substante* ; which, according to the true Impott of the Word, is in plain *English* standing under or upholding." But very little weight is to be laid upon a bare Grammatical Etymology, when the Word is used in another Sense by the best Authors, such as Cicero and Quintilian ; who take *Substance* for the same as *Essence*, as Valla hath prov'd ; and so the Greek Word imports : But Boetius in translating Aristotle's Predicaments, rather chose the word *Substance*, as more proper to express a compound Being, and reserv'd *Essence* for what was more simple and immaterial. And in this sense, *Substance* was not apply'd to God, but only *Essence*, as St. Augustine observes.

Your Lordship here seems to dislike my taking notice, That the Derivation of the Word *Substance* favours the *Idea* we have of it : And your Lordship tells me, *That very little weight is to be laid on a bare Grammatical Etymology.* Tho' little weight were to be laid on it, if there were nothing else to be said for it ; yet when it is brought to confirm an *Idea* which your Lordship allows of, nay, calls

calls a *Rational Idea*, and says is founded in *evident Reason*, I do not see what your Lordship had to blame in it. For tho' *Cicero* and *Quintilian* take *Substantia* for the same with *Essence*, as your Lordship says; or for *Riches* and *Estare*, as I think they also do; yet I suppose it will be true, that *Substantia* is deriv'd à *Substando*, and that that shews the original import of the word. For, My Lord, I have been long of Opinion, as may be seen in my Book, that if we knew the Original of all the Words we meet with, we should thereby be very much help'd to know the *Ideas* they were first apply'd to, and made to stand for; and therefore I must beg your Lordship to excuse this Conceit of mine, this *Etymological* Observation, especially since it hath nothing in it against the Truth, nor against your Lordship's *Idea* of *Substance*.

But your Lordship opposes to this Etymology, the use of the Word *Substance* by the best Authors in another Sense; and thereupon give the World a learned Account of the use of the Word *Substance*, in a Sense wherein it is not taken for the *Substratum* of Accidents: However, I think it a sufficient Justification of my self to your Lordship, that I use it in the same Sense your Lordship does, and that your Lordship thinks not fit to govern your self by those Authorities; for then your Lordship could not apply the Word *Substance* to God, as *Boethius* did not, and as your Lordship has prov'd out of *St. Augustine*, that it was not apply'd. Tho' I guess 'tis the Consideration of *Substance*, as it is apply'd to God, that brings it into your Lordship's present Discourse. But if your Lordship and I (if without Presumption I may join my self with you) have in the use of the Word *Substance*, quitted the Example of the best Authors, I think the Authority of the Schools, which has a long time been allow'd in Philosophical Terms, will bear us out in this matter.

In the remaining part of this Paragraph it follows: *But afterwards the* P. 238. *Names of Substance and Essence were promiscuously used, with respect to God and his Creatures; and do imply, that which makes the real Being, as distinguish'd from Modes and Properties. And so the Substance and Essence of a Man are the same; not being taken for the individual Substance, which cannot be understood without particular Modes and Properties; but the general Substance or Nature of Man abstractly from all the Circumstances of Persons.*

Here your Lordship makes these Terms *general Substance*, *Nature* and *Essence*, to signify the same thing; how properly, I shall not here inquire. Your Lordship goes on.

And I desire to know, whether according to true Reason, that be not a clear Idea of P. 238. *Man; not of Peter, James or John, but of a Man as such.*

This, I think, no body denies: Nor can any one deny it, who will not say, That the general abstract *Idea* which he has in his Mind of a Sort or Species of Animals that he calls *Man*, ought not to have that general Name *Man* applied to it: For that is all (as I humbly conceive) which these Words of your Lordship here amount to.

This, your Lordship says, *is not a mere universal Name, or Mark, or Sign.* Your P. 238. Lordship says it is an *Idea*, and every Body must grant it to be an *Idea*; and therefore it is, in my Opinion, safe enough from being thought a *mere Name, or Mark, or Sign of that Idea*. For he must think very oddly, who takes the general Name of any *Idea*, to be the general *Idea* it self: It is a *mere Mark or Sign* of it without doubt, and nothing else. Your Lordship adds,

But there is as clear and distinct a Conception of this in our Minds, as we can have P. 238. *from any such simple Ideas as are conveyed by our Senses.*

If your Lordship means by this, (as the Words seem to me to import) that we have as clear and distinct an *Idea* of the general *Substance*, or *Nature*, or *Essence* of the Species *Man*, as we have of the particular Colour and Figure of a Man when we look on him, or of his Voice when we hear him speak, I must crave leave to dissent from your Lordship. Because the *Idea* we have of the Substance, wherein the Properties of a Man do inhere, is a very obscure *Idea*: So in that part, our general *Idea* of *Man* is obscure and confused: As also, how that Substance is differently modify'd in the different Species of Creatures, so as to have different Properties and Powers whereby they are distinguish'd, that also we have very obscure, or rather no distinct *Ideas* of at all. But there is no Obscurity or Confusion at all in the *Idea* of a Figure that I clearly see, or of

a Sound that I distinctly hear; and such are, or may be, the *Ideas* that are conveyed in by Sensation or Reflection. It follows:

P. 238. I do not deny that the Distinction of particular Substances, is by the several Modes and Properties of them, (which they may call a Complication of simple Ideas if they please) but I do assert, That the general Idea which relates to the Essence, without these, is so just and true an Idea, that without it the Complication of simple Ideas will never give us a right Notion of it.

Here, I think, that your Lordship asserts, That the general Idea of the real Essence (for so I understand general Idea which relates to the Essence) without the Modes and Properties, is a just and true Idea. For example: The real Essence of a Thing, is that internal Constitution on which the Properties of that Thing depend. Now your Lordship seems to me to acknowledg, that that internal Constitution or Essence we cannot know; for your Lordship says, That from the Powers and Properties of Things which are knowable by us, we may know as much of the internal Essence of Things, as these Powers and Properties discover. That is unquestionably so; but if those Powers and Properties discover no more of those internal Essences, but that there are internal Essences, we shall know only that there are internal Essences, but shall have no Idea or Conception at all of what they are; as your Lordship seems to confess in the next Words of the same 256th page, where you add; I do not say, that we can know all Essences of Things alike, nor that we can attain to a perfect Understanding of all that belong to them; but if we can know so much, as that there are certain Beings in the World, endued with such distinct Powers and Properties, what is it we complain of the want of? Wherein your Lordship seems to terminate our Knowledge of those internal Essences in this, That there are certain Beings indued with distinct Powers and Properties. But what these Beings, these internal Essences are, that we have no distinct Conceptions of; as your Lordship confesses yet plainer a little after, in these Words: For altho' we cannot comprehend the internal Frame and Constitution of things. So that we having, as is confess'd, no Idea of what this Essence, this internal Constitution of Things on which their Properties depend, is; how can we say it is any way a just and true Idea? But your Lordship says, It is so just and true an Idea, that without it the Contemplation of simple Ideas will never give us a right Notion of it. All the Idea we have of it, which is only that there is an internal, tho' unknown Constitution of Things on which their Properties depend, simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection, and the Contemplation of them have alone help'd us to; and because they can help us no further, that is the Reason we have no perfecter Notions of it.

That which your Lordship seems to me principally to drive at, in this and the foregoing Paragraph, is, to assert, That the general Substance of Man, and so of any other Species, is that which makes the real Being of that Species abstractly from the Individuals of that Species. By general Substance here, I suppose, your Lordship means the general Idea of Substance: And that which induces me to take the liberty to suppose so, is, that I think your Lordship is here discoursing of the Idea of Substance, and how we come by it. And if your Lordship should mean otherwise, I must take the liberty to deny there is any such thing in *rerum Natura*, as a general Substance that exists it self, or makes any thing.

Taking it then for granted that your Lordship says; that this is the general Idea of Substance, viz. That it is that which makes the real Being of any thing; your Lordship says, That it is as clear and distinct a Conception in our Minds, as we can have from any such simple Ideas as are convey'd by our Senses. Here I must crave leave to dissent from your Lordship. Your Lordship says in the former part of this Page, That Substance and Essence do imply that which makes the real Being. Now what I beseech your Lordship, do these Words That which, here signify more than something? And the Idea express'd by something, I am apt to think your Lordship will not say is as clear and distinct a Conception or Idea in the Mind, as the Idea of the red Colour of a Cherry, or the bitter Taste of Wormwood, or the Figure of a Circle brought into the Mind by the Senses.

Your

Your Lordship farther says, *It makes* (whereby, I suppose, your Lordship means, *constitutes* or is) the *real Being*, as *distinguish'd from Modes and Properties*.

For example, my Lord, strip this suppos'd general *Idea* of a *Man* or *Gold*, of all its *Modes* and *Properties*, and then tell me whether your Lordship has as clear and distinct an *Idea* of what remains, as you have of the *Figure* of the one, or the *yellow Colour* of the other. I must confess the remaining *something* to me affords so vague, confus'd and obscure an *Idea*, that I cannot say I have any distinct Conception of it; for barely by being *something*, it is not in my Mind clearly distinguish'd from the *Figure* or *Voice* of a *Man*, or the *Colour* or *Taste* of a *Cherry*, for they are *something* too. If your Lordship has a clear and distinct *Idea* of that *something*, which makes the *real Being* as distinguished from all its *Modes* and *Properties*, your Lordship must enjoy the privilege of the *Sight* and clear *Ideas* you have: Nor can you be deny'd them, because I have not the like; the dimness of my Conceptions must not pretend to hinder the clearness of your Lordship's, any more than the want of them in a blind *Man* can debar your Lordship of the clear and distinct *Ideas* of *Colours*. The obscurity I find in my own Mind, when I examine what positive, general, simple *Idea* of *Substance* I have, is such as I profess, and further than that I cannot go: But what, and how clear it is in the Understanding of a *Seraphim*, or of an elevated Mind, that I cannot determine. Your Lordship goes on.

I must do that right to the ingenious Author of *The Essay of Human Understanding* (from whence these Notions are borrow'd to serve other Purposes than he intended them) that he makes the Case of *Spiritual* and *Corporeal Substances* to be alike, as to their *Ideas*. And "That we have as clear a Notion of a *Spirit*, as we have of a *Body*; the one being suppos'd to be the *Substratum* to those simple *Ideas* we have from without, and the other of those *Operations* we find within our selves. And that it is as rational to affirm, there is no *Body*, because we cannot know its *Essence*, as 'tis called, or have no *Idea* of the *Substance* of *Matter*; as to say there is no *Spirit*, because we know not its *Essence*, or have no *Idea* of a *spiritual Substance*." P. 239.

From hence it follows, that we may be certain that there are both *Spiritual* and *Bodily Substances*, altho' we can have no clear and distinct *Ideas* of them. But if our Reason depend upon our clear and distinct *Ideas*, how is this possible? We cannot reason without clear *Ideas*, and yet we may be certain without them: Can we be certain without Reason? Or, doth our Reason give us true Notions of Things, without these *Ideas*? If it be so, this new Hypothesis about Reason must appear to be very unreasonable.

That which your Lordship seems to argue here, is, That we may be certain without clear and distinct *Ideas*. Who your Lordship here argues against, under the Title of this new Hypothesis about Reason, I confess I do not know. For I do not remember that I have any where plac'd Certainty only in clear and distinct *Ideas*, but in the clear and visible Connection of any of our *Ideas*, be those *Ideas* what they will; as will appear to any one who will look into B. 4. c. 4. §. 18. and B. 4. c. 6. §. 3. of my Essay, in the latter of which he will find these Words: "Certainty of Knowledge is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of *Ideas*, as express'd in any Proposition." As in the Proposition your Lordship mentions, v. g. That we may be certain there are *Spiritual* and *Bodily Substances*; or, That *Bodily Substances* do exist, is a Proposition of whose Truth we may be certain; and so of *Spiritual Substances*. Let us now examine wherein the certainty of these Propositions consists.

First, As to the Existence of *bodily Substances*, I know by my Senses that something extended, and solid, and figur'd does exist; for my Senses are the utmost Evidence and Certainty I have of the Existence of extended, solid, figur'd Things. These *Modes* being then known to exist by our Senses, the Existence of them (which I cannot conceive can subsist without something to support them) makes me see the Connection of those *Ideas* with a Support, or, as it is called, a Subject of Inhesion, and so consequently the Connection

of that Support (which cannot be nothing) with Existence. And thus I come by a certainty of the Existence of that *something* which is a Support of those sensible Modes, tho' I have but a very confus'd, loose, and undetermin'd *Idea* of it, signify'd by the name *Substance*. After the same manner experimenting Thinking in my self by the Existence of *Thought* in me, to which *something* that thinks is evidently and necessarily connected in my Mind; I come to be certain that there exists in me *something* that thinks, tho' of that *something* which I call *Substance* also, I have but a very obscure imperfect *Idea*.

Before I go any farther, it is fit I return my Acknowledgments to your Lordship, for the good Opinion you are pleas'd here to express of the Author of *The Essay of Human Understanding*, and that you do not impute to him the ill Use some may have made of his Notions. But he craves leave to say, That he should have been better preserv'd from the hard and sinister Thoughts which some Men are always ready for, if in what you have here publish'd, your Lordship had been pleas'd to have shewn where you directed your Discourse against him, and where against others, from p. 234. to p. 262. of your *Vindication of the Trinity*. For nothing but my Book and my Words being quoted, the World will be apt to think that I am the Person who argue against the Trinity, and deny Mysteries against whom your Lordship directs those Pages. And indeed, my Lord, tho' I have read them over with great Attention, yet, in many places, I cannot discern whether it be against me or any body else, that your Lordship is arguing. That which often makes the difficulty is, That I do not see how what I say, does at all concern the Controversy your Lordship is engag'd in, and yet I alone am quoted. Your Lordship goes on.

P. 240.

Let us suppose this Principle to be true, that the simple Ideas by Sensation or Reflection, are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning: I ask then how we come to be certain, that there are Spiritual Substances in the World, since we can have no clear and distinct Ideas concerning them? Can we be certain, without any Foundation of Reason? This is a new sort of Certainty, for which we do not envy these Pretenders to Reason. But methinks, they should not at the same time assert the absolute necessity of these Ideas to our Knowledge, and declare that we may have certain Knowledge without them. If there be any other Method, they overthrow their own Principle; if there be none, how come they to any certainty that there are both Bodily and Spiritual Substances?

This Paragraph, which continues to prove, that we may have Certainty without clear and distinct Ideas, I would flatter my self is not meant against me, because it opposes nothing that I have said; and so shall not say any thing to it, but only set it down to do your Lordship right, that the Reader may judge. Tho' I do not find how he will easily over-look me, and think I am not at all concern'd in it, since my Words alone are quoted in several Pages immediately preceding and following: And in the very next Paragraph it is said, *How THEY come to know*; which word *They* must signify some body besides the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious*; and then I think, by the whole Tenor of your Lordship's Discourse, no Body will be left but me that can possibly be taken to be the other: for in the same Paragraphy our Lordship says, *The same PERSONS say, That notwithstanding THEIR Ideas, it is possible for Matter to think.*

I know not what other Person says so but I; but if any one does, I am sure no Person but I say so in my Book, which your Lordship has quoted for them, viz. *Human Understanding*, B. 4. c. 3. This which is a Riddle to me, the more amazes me, because I find it in a Treatise of your Lordship's, who so perfectly understands the Rules and Methods of Writing, whether in Controversy or any other way. But this which seems wholly new to me, I shall better understand when your Lordship pleases to explain it. In the mean time I mention it as an Apology for my self, if sometimes I mistake your Lordship's Aim, and so misapply my Answer. What follows in your Lordship's next Paragraph, is this:

P. 240.

As to these latter (which is my Business) I must enquire farther, how THEY come to know there are such? The answer is, by Self-Reflection on those Powers we find in our selves, which cannot come from a mere bodily Substance. I

allow

allow the Reason to be very good; but the Question I ask, is, Whether this Argument be from the clear and distinct Idea or not? We have Ideas in our selves of the several Operations of our Minds, of Knowing, Willing, Considering, &c. which cannot come from a bodily Substance. Very true; but is all this contained in the simple Idea of these Operations? How can that be, when the same PERSONS say, That notwithstanding their Ideas, it is possible for Matter to think? For it is said, "That we have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any material Being thinks or not; it being impossible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Ideas, without Revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency hath not given to some Systems of Matter, fitly disposed, a Power to perceive or think." *Human Understanding, L. 4. c. 3. §. 6. 2d Edit. p. 310.*

If this be true, then for all that we can know by our Ideas of Matter and Thinking, Matter may have a Power of Thinking: And if this hold, then it is impossible to prove a spiritual Substance in us, from the Idea of Thinking: For how can we be assur'd by our Ideas, that God hath not given such a Power of Thinking to Matter so dispos'd as our Bodies are? Especially since it is said, "That in respect of our Notions, it is not much more remote from our Comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, super-add to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should super-add to it another Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking." *Whoever asserts this, can never prove a spiritual Substance in us from a Faculty of Thinking; because he cannot know from the Idea of Matter and Thinking, that Matter so dispos'd cannot think. And he cannot be certain, that God hath not fram'd the Matter of our Bodies so as to be capable of it.*

These Words, my Lord, I am forced to take to my self; for tho' your Lordship has put it *The same Persons say*, in the Plural Number, yet there is no body quoted for the following Words but my *Essay*; nor do I think any body but I has said so. But so it is in this present Chapter, I have the good luck to be join'd with others for what I do not say, and others with me for what I imagine they do not say; which, how it came about, your Lordship can best resolve. But to the Words themselves: In them your Lordship argues, That upon my Principles it cannot be prov'd that there is a spiritual Substance in us. To which give me leave, with Submission, to say, That I think it may be prov'd from my Principles, and I think I have done it; and the Proof in my Book stands thus. First, We experiment in our selves Thinking. The Idea of this Action or Mode of Thinking, is inconsistent with the Idea of Self-Subsistence, and therefore has a necessary Connection with a Support or Subject of Inhesion: The Idea of that Support is what we call Substance; and so from Thinking experimented in us, we have a proof of a thinking Substance in us, which in my sense is a Spirit. Against this your Lordship will argue, that by what I have said of the possibility that God may, if he pleases, super-add to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, it can never be prov'd that there is a spiritual Substance in us, because upon that Supposition, it is possible it may be a material Substance that thinks in us. I grant it; but add, That the general Idea of Substance being the same every where, the Modification of Thinking, or the Power of Thinking joined to it, makes it a Spirit, without considering what other Modifications it has, as whether it has the Modification of Solidity or no. As on the other side, Substance, that has the Modification of Solidity, is Matter, whether it has the Modification of Thinking or no. And therefore, if your Lordship means by a Spiritual, an immaterial Substance, I grant I have not prov'd, nor upon my Principles can it be prov'd (your Lordship meaning as I think you do, demonstratively proved) That there is an immaterial Substance in us that thinks. Tho' I presume, from what I have said about the supposition of a System of Matter, Thinking (which there demonstrates that God is immaterial) will prove it in the highest degree probable, that the thinking Substance in us is immaterial. But your Lordship thinks not Probability enough; and by charging the want of Demonstration upon my Principles, that the thinking Thing in us is immaterial, your Lordship seems to conclude it demonstrable from Principles of Philosophy. That Demonstration I should with Joy receive from your Lordship, or any one. For tho' all the great ends of

Morality

B. 4. c. 10.
§. 16.

B. 4. c. 3. §. 6. Morality and Religion are well enough secur'd without it, as I have shewn, yet it would be a great advance of our Knowledge in Nature and Philosophy.

To what I have said in my Book, to shew that all the great Ends of Religion and Morality are secur'd barely by the Immortality of the Soul, without a necessary Supposition that the Soul is immaterial, I crave leave to add, That Immortality may and shall be annex'd to that, which in its own nature is neither immaterial nor immortal, as the Apostle expressly declares in these words; *For this Corruptible must put on Incorruption, and this Mortal must put on Immortality.*

1 Cor. 15. 53.

Perhaps my using the word *Spirit* for a thinking Substance, without excluding Materiality out of it, will be thought too great a Liberty, and such as deserves Censure, because I leave Immateriality out of the *Idea* I make it a sign of. I readily own, that words should be sparingly ventur'd on in a Sense wholly new; and nothing but absolute necessity can excuse the Boldness of using any Term, in a Sense whereof we can produce no Example. But in the present Case, I think I have great Authorities to justify me. The Soul is agreed, on all hands, to be that in us which thinks. And he that will look into the first Book of *Cicero's Tusculan Questions*, and into the sixth Book of *Virgil's Aeneids*, will find that these two great Men, who of all the *Romans* best understood Philosophy, thought, or at least did not deny the Soul to be a subtil matter, which might come under the name of *Aura*, or *Ignis*, or *Æther*; and this Soul they both of them call'd *Spiritus*: In the Notion of which, 'tis plain they included only Thought and active Motion, without the total Exclusion of Matter. Whether they thought right in this, I do not say, that is not the question; but whether they spoke properly, when they call'd an active, thinking, subtil Substance, out of which they excluded only gross and palpable Matter, *Spiritus*, *Spirit*: I think that no body will deny, That if any among the *Romans* can be allow'd to speak properly, *Tully* and *Virgil* are the two who may most securely be depended on for it: And one of them speaking of the Soul, says *Dum Spiritus hos regit artus*; and the other, *Vita continetur Corpore & Spiritu*. Where 'tis plain, by *Corpus* he means (as generally every where) only gross Matter that may be felt and handled; as appears by these words: *Si Cor aut Sanguis, aut Cerebrum est Animus, certe, quoniam est Corpus, interibit cum reliqua corpore; si Anima est, forte dissipabitur; si Ignis, extinguetur.* *Tusc. Quæst. l. 1. c. 11.* Here *Cicero* opposes *Corpus* to *Ignis* and *Anima*, i. e. *Aura* or *Breath*: And the Foundation of that his distinction of the Soul, from that which he calls *Corpus* or Body, he gives a little lower in these words; *Tanta ejus tenuitas ut fugiat aciem*, ib. c. 22.

Nor was it the Heathen World alone that had this Notion of *Spirit*; the most enlighten'd of all the antient People of God, *Solomon* himself, speaks after the same manner: *That which befalleth the Sons of Men befalleth Beasts, even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth, so dieth the other, yea they have all one Spirit.* So I translate the Hebrew word *רוח*, here, for so I find it translated the very next Verse but one; *Who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth upward, and the Spirit of a Beast that goeth down to the Earth.* In which places it is plain that *Solomon* applies the word *רוח*, and our Translators of him the word *Spirit* to a Substance, out of which Immateriality was not wholly excluded, unless the *Spirit* of a Beast that goeth downwards to the Earth be immaterial. Nor did the way of speaking in our Saviour's time vary from this: *St. Luke* tells us, That when our Saviour, after his Resurrection, stood in the midst of them, *They were affrighted, and suppos'd that they had seen πνεῦμα*, the Greek word which always answers *Spirit* in English; and so the Translators of the Bible render it here, *They suppos'd that they had seen a Spirit.* But our Saviour says to them, *Behold my Hands and my Feet, that it is I my self, handle me and see; for a Spirit hath not Flesh and Bones, as you see me have.* Which words of our Saviour put the same distinction between Body and *Spirit*, that *Cicero* did in the place above-cited, viz. That the one was a gross Compages that could be felt and handled; and the other such as *Virgil* describes the Ghost or Soul of *Anchises*,

Lib. vi.

*Ter conatus ibi collo dare brachia circum,
Ter frustra comprehensa manus effugit imago,
Par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno.*

I would

I would not be thought hereby to say, That *Spirit* never does signify a purely immaterial Substance. In that sense the Scripture, I take it, speaks, when it says, *God is a Spirit*: and in that Sense I have us'd it; and in that sense I have prov'd from my Principles, that there is a *spiritual Substance*; and am certain that there is a *spiritual immaterial Substance*: which is, I humbly conceive, a direct Answer to your Lordship's Question in the beginning of this Argument, viz. *How come we to be certain that there are spiritual Substances, supposing this Principle to be true, That the simple Ideas by Sensation and Reflection, are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning?* But this hinders not, but that if God, that infinite, omnipotent, and perfectly immaterial Spirit, should please to give a System of very subtil Matter, Sense and Motion, it might, with Propriety of Speech, be call'd *Spirit*; tho' Materiality were not excluded out of its complex *Idea*. Your Lordship proceeds:

It is said indeed elsewhere, "That it is repugnant to the *Idea* of senseless Matter, that it should put into it self Sense, Perception and Knowledge." But this doth not reach the present Case; which is not what Matter can do of it self, but what Matter prepar'd by an Omnipotent Hand can do. And what Certainty can we have that he hath done it? We can have none from the *Ideas*, for those are given up in this Case; and consequently, we can have no Certainty upon these Principles, whether we have any *spiritual Substance* within us or not. P. 242. B. 4. c. 10. §. 5.

Your Lordship in this Paragraph proves, that from what I say, we can have no Certainty whether we have any *spiritual Substance* in us or not. If by *spiritual Substance* your Lordship means an immaterial Substance in us, as you speak, p. 246. I grant what your Lordship says is true, That it cannot, upon these Principles, be demonstrated. But I must crave leave to say at the same time, That upon these Principles it can be prov'd, to the highest degree of probability. If by *spiritual Substance* your Lordship means a thinking Substance, I must dissent from your Lordship, and say, That we can have a certainty, upon my Principles, that there is a *spiritual Substance* in us. In short, my Lord, upon my Principles, i. e. from the *Idea* of Thinking, we can have a Certainty that there is a thinking Substance in us; from hence we have a Certainty that there is an eternal thinking Substance. This thinking Substance, which has been from Eternity, I have prov'd to be immaterial. This eternal, immaterial, thinking Substance, has put into us a thinking Substance, which whether it be a material or immaterial Substance, cannot be infallibly demonstrated from our *Ideas*; tho' from them it may be prov'd, that it is to the highest degree probable that it is immaterial. This in short, my Lord, is what I have to say on this point; which may, in good measure, serve for an Answer to your Lordship's next Leaf or two; which I shall set down, and then take notice of some few Particulars which I wonder to find your Lordship accuse me of. Your Lordship says:

But we are told, "That from the Operations of our Minds, we are able to frame a complex *Idea* of a Spirit." How can that be, when we cannot from those *Ideas* be assured, but that those Operations may come from a material Substance? If we frame an *Idea* on such grounds, it is at most but a possible *Idea*; for it may be otherwise, and we can have no assurance from our *Ideas*, that it is not: So that the most Men may come to in this way of *Ideas*, is, That it is possible it may be so, and it is possible it may not; but that it is impossible for us, from our *Ideas*, to determine either way. And is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reason? P. 242. B. 2. c. 23. §. 15.

I am very glad to find the *Idea* of a *spiritual Substance* made as consistent and intelligible, as that of a corporeal: "For as the one consists of a Cohesion of solid Parts, and the Power of communicating Motion by Impulse, so the other consists in a Power of Thinking, and Willing, and moving the Body; and that the Cohesion of solid Parts, is as hard to be conceiv'd as Thinking: And we are as much in the dark about the Power of communicating Motion by Impulse, as in the Power of exciting Motion by Thought. We have by daily Experience clear Evidence of Motion, produc'd both by Impulse and by Thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our Comprehension; we are equally at a loss in both." §. 27. §. 28.

From whence it follows, That we may be certain of a Being of a *spiritual Substance*, altho' we have no clear and distinct *Idea* of it, nor are able to comprehend the manner of

of its Operations: And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend, that all our Reason and Certainty is founded on clear and distinct Ideas; and that they have Reason to reject any Doctrine which relates to spiritual Substances, because they cannot comprehend the manner of it. For the same thing is confess'd by the most inquisitive Men, about the manner of Operation, both in material and immaterial Substances. It is affirmed, That "the very Notion of Body implies something very hard, if not impossible to be explain'd or understood by us; and that the natural Consequence of it, viz. Divisibility, involves us in Difficulties impossible to be explicated, or made consistent; That we have but some few superficial Ideas of Things; That we are destitute of Faculties to attain to the true Nature of them; and that when we do that, we fall presently into Darknes and Obscurity, and can discover nothing further but our own Blindness and Ignorance."

§. 31.

§. 32.

§. 33, 34, 35.

§. 36.

These are very fair and ingenuous Confessions of the shortness of Human Understanding, with Respect to the nature and manner of such Things which we are most certain of the Being of, by constant and undoubted Experience. I appeal now to the Reason of Mankind, whether it can be any reasonable Foundation for rejecting a Doctrine propos'd to us as of Divine Revelation, because we cannot comprehend the manner of it; especially when it relates to the Divine Essence. For as the same Author observes, "Our Idea of God is fram'd from the Complex Ideas of those Perfections we find in our selves, but enlarging them so, as to make them suitable to an infinite Being, as Knowledge, Power, Duration, &c. And the Degrees or Extent of these which we ascribe to the Sovereign Being, are all boundless and infinite. For it is Infinity, which joined to our Ideas of Existence, Power, Knowledge, &c. makes that Complex Idea, whereby we represent to our selves the best we can, the supreme Being."

Now when our knowledge of gross material Substances is so dark; when the Notion of spiritual Substances is above all Ideas of Sensation; when the higher any Substance is, the more remote from our Knowledge; but especially when the very Idea of a supreme Being implies its being Infinite and Incomprehensible; I know not whether it argues more Stupidity or Arrogance, to expose a Doctrine relating to the Divine Essence, because they cannot comprehend the manner of it: But of this more afterwards. I am yet upon the Certainty of our Reason, from clear and distinct Ideas: And if we can attain to Certainty without them, and where it is confess'd we cannot have them, as about Substance; then these cannot be the sole Matter and Foundation of our Reasoning, which is peremptorily asserted by this late Author.

Here, after having argu'd, that notwithstanding what I say about our Idea of a Spirit, 'tis impossible, from our Ideas, to determine whether that Spirit in us be a material Substance or no, your Lordship concludes the Paragraph thus: And is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reason?

P. 243.

I answer; I think it is a way to bring us to a Certainty in these Things which I have offer'd as certain; but I never thought it a way to Certainty, where we cannot reach Certainty; nor shall I think the worse of it, if your Lordship should instance in an hundred other things, as well as the Immateriality of the Spirit in us, wherein this way does not bring us to a Certainty; unless, at the same time, your Lordship shall shew us another way that will bring us to a Certainty in those Points, wherein this way of Ideas failed. If your Lordship, or any body else, will shew me a better way to a Certainty in them, I am ready to learn, and will lay by that of Ideas. The way of Ideas will not, from Philosophy, afford us a Demonstration, that the thinking Substance in us is immaterial. Whereupon your Lordship asks, And is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reason? The way of Argument which your Lordship opposes to the way of Ideas, will, I humbly conceive, from Philosophy, as little afford us a Demonstration, that the thinking Substance in us is immaterial. Whereupon, may not any one likewise ask, And is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reason? Is any way, I beseech your Lordship, to be condemn'd as an ill way to bring us to Certainty, demonstrative Certainty, because it brings us not to it in a Point where Reason cannot attain to such Certainty? Algebra is a way to bring us to Certainty in Mathematicks; but must it be presently condemn'd as an ill way, because there are some Questions in Mathematicks, which a Man cannot come to Certainty in by the way of Algebra? In

In page 247. after having set down several Confessions of mine, of the shortness of Human Understanding, your Lordship adds these Words: *I appeal now to the Reason of Mankind, whether it can be any reasonable Foundation for rejecting a Doctrine propos'd to us as of Divine Revelation, because we cannot comprehend the manner of it; especially when it relates to the Divine Essence.* And I beseech you, my Lord, where did I ever say so, or any thing like it? And yet it is impossible for any Reader but to imagine, that that Proposition which your Lordship appeals to the Reason of Mankind against, is a Proposition of mine, which your Lordship is confuting out of Confessions of my own, great Numbers whereof stand quoted out of my Essay, in several Pages of your Lordship's Book, both before and after this your Lordship's Appeal to the Reason of Mankind. And now I must appeal to your Lordship, Whether you find any such Proposition in my Book? If your Lordship does not, I too must then appeal to the Reason of Mankind, Whether it be reasonable for your Lordship to bring so many Confessions out of my Book to confute a Proposition that is no where in it? There is no doubt, Reason for it; which since your Lordship does not, that I see, declare, and I have not Wit enough to discover, I shall therefore leave to the Reason of Mankind to find out.

Your Lordship has, in this part of your Discourse, spoke very much of Reason; as, *Is not this an admirable way to bring us to a Certainty of Reason?* P. 243. *And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend, That all our Reason and Certainty is founded on clear and distinct Ideas.* I appeal now to the Reason of P. 244. Mankind. I am yet upon the certainty of our Reason. The Certainty is not plac'd P. 245. in the Idea, but in good and sound Reason. Allowing the Argument to be good, P. 246. yet it is not taken from the Idea, but from Principles of true Reason. P. 250. P. 251.

What your Lordship says at the beginning of this Chapter, in these Words, *We must consider what we understand by Reason,* made me hope I should here P. 230. find what your Lordship understands by Reason explain'd, that so I might rectify my Notion of it, and might be able to avoid the Obscurity and Confusion which very much perplex most of the Discourses, wherein it is appeal'd to or from as Judg. But notwithstanding the Explication I flatter'd my self with the hopes of, from what I thought your Lordship had promis'd, I find no other account of Reason, but in Quotations out of others, which your Lordship justly blames. Had I been so happy as to have been enlighten'd in this Point by your Lordship's learned Pen, so as to have seen distinctly what your Lordship understands by Reason, I should possibly have excus'd my self from giving your Lordship the trouble of these Papers, and been able to have perceiv'd, without applying my self any farther to your Lordship, how so much of my Essay came into a Chapter, which was designed to answer Objections against the Trinity, in Point of Reason. It follows:

But I go yet farther: And as I have already shew'd, we can have no Certainty P. 246. of an immaterial Substance within us, from these simple Ideas; so I shall now shew, that there can be no sufficient Evidence brought from them, by their own Confession, concerning the Existence of the most spiritual and infinite Substance, even God himself. And then your Lordship goes on to give an account of my Proof of a God; which your Lordship closes with these Words:

That which I design is to shew, that the Certainty of it is not placed upon any P. 252. clear and distinct Ideas, but upon the force of Reason distinct from it; which was the thing I intended to prove.

If this be the thing your Lordship designed, I am then at a loss who your Lordship design'd it against: For I do not remember that I have any where said, that we could not be convinc'd by Reason of any Truth, but where all the Ideas concerned in that Conviction were clear and distinct; for Knowledge and Certainty in my Opinion, lies in the Perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, such as they are, and not always in having perfectly clear and distinct Ideas. Tho' those, I must own, the clearer and more distinct they are, contribute very much to our more clear and distinct reasoning and discoursing about them. But in some Cases we may have Certainty about obscure Ideas; v.g. by the clear Idea of Thinking in me, I find the Agreement of the clear Idea of Existence, and the obscure Idea of a Substance in me, because I perceive

the necessary Agreement of *Thinking*, and the relative *Idea* of a *Support*; which *Support*, without having any clear and distinct *Idea* of what it is, beyond this relative one of a *Support*, I call *Substance*.

P. 251. If your Lordship intended this against another, who has said, *Clear and distinct Ideas are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning*; it seems very strange to me, that your Lordship should intend it against one, and quote only the Words of another. For above ten Pages before, your Lordship had quoted nothing but my Book; and in the immediate preceding Paragraph bring a large Quotation out of the tenth Section of the tenth Chapter of my fourth Book; of which your Lordship says, *This is the Substance of the Argument used, to prove an infinite spiritual Being, which I am far from weakning the force of; but that which I design is to shew, That the Certainty of it is not plac'd upon clear and distinct Ideas.* Whom now, I beseech your Lordship, can this be understood to be intended against, but me? For how can my using an *Argument*, whose *Certainty is not plac'd upon clear and distinct Ideas*, prove any thing against another Man, who says, *That clear and distinct Ideas are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning*? This proves only against him that uses the *Argument*; and therefore either I must be supposed here to hold, *That clear and distinct Ideas are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning*, (which I do not remember that I ever said) or else that your Lordship here proves against no Body.

But tho' I do not remember that I have any where said, *That clear and distinct Ideas are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning*; yet I do own, that simple *Ideas* are the Foundations of all our *Knowledge*, if that be it which your Lordship questions: And therefore I must think my self concern'd in what your Lordship says in this very place, p. 246 in these Words, *I shall now shew, that there can be no sufficient Evidence brought from these simple Ideas, by THEIR own Confession, concerning the Existence of God himself.*

This being spoken in the Plural Number, cannot be understood to be meant of the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious*, and no body else: And whom can any Reader reasonably apply it to, but the Author of *The Essay of Human Understanding*; since, besides that it stands in the midst of a great many Quotations out of that Book, without any other Person being named, or any one's Words but mine quoted, my Proof alone of a Deity is brought out of that Book, to make good what your Lordship here says; and no body else is any where mention'd or quoted concerning it?

P. 238. The same way of speaking of the Persons you are arguing against in the Plural Number, your Lordship uses in other places; as, *Which THEY may call a Complikation of simple Ideas, if THEY please.*

P. 240. *We do not envy THESE Pretenders to Reason; but methinks THEY should not at the same time assert the absolute necessity of these Ideas to our Knowledge, and declare that we may have certain Knowledge without them.* And all along in that Page THEY. And in the very next Page my Words being quoted,

P. 241. your Lordship asks, *How that can be, when the same PERSONS say, That notwithstanding THEIR Ideas, it is possible for Matter to think?* So that I do not see how I can exempt my self from being meant to be one of those Pretenders to Reason, wherewith we can be certain without any Foundation of Reason; which your Lordship, in the immediate foregoing Page, does not envy for this new sort of Certainty. How can it be understood but that I am one of those Persons, that at the same time assert the absolute necessity of these Ideas to our Knowledge, and declare that we may have certain Knowledge without them? Tho' your Lordship very civilly says, p. 239. *That you must do that right to the ingenious Author of The Essay of Human Understanding (from whence these Notions are borrow'd, to serve other Purposes than he intended them) that, &c.* yet, methinks, it is the Author himself, and his use of these Notions, that is blamed and argued against; but still in the Plural Number, which he confesses himself not to understand.

My Lord, if your Lordship can shew me where I pretend to Reason or Certainty, without any Foundation of Reason; or where it is I assert the absolute Necessity of any Ideas to our Knowledge, and declare that we may have certain Knowledge without them, your Lordship will do me a great Favour;

Favour: for this, I grant, is a new sort of Certainty which I long to be rid of, and to disown to the World. But truly, my Lord, as I pretend to no new sort of Certainty, but just such as Human Understanding was possess'd of before I was born; and should be glad I could get more out of the Books and Writings that come abroad in my Days: so, my Lord, if I have any where pretended to any new sort of Certainty, I beseech your Lordship shew me the place, that I may correct the Vanity of it, and unsay it to the World.

Again, your Lordship says thus, *I know not whether it argues more Stupidity P. 246. or Arrogance, to expose a Doctrine relating to the Divine Essence, because THEY cannot comprehend the manner of it.*

Here, my Lord, I find the same THEY again, which some Pages back, evidently involv'd me: and since that you have nam'd no body besides me, nor alledg'd any body's Writings but mine; give me leave, therefore to ask your Lordship, Whether I am one of these THEY here also, that I may know whether I am concern'd to answer for my self? I am asham'd to importune your Lordship so often about the same Matter; but I meet with so many places in your Lordship's (I had almost said new) way of Writing, that put me to a stand, not knowing whether I am meant or no, that I am at a loss whether I should clear my self from what possibly your Lordship does not lay to my Charge; and yet the Reader, thinking it meant of me, should conclude that to be in my Book which is not there, and which I utterly disown.

Tho' I cannot be joined with those who expose a Doctrine relating to the Divine Essence, because they cannot comprehend the manner of it; unless your Lordship can shew where I have so exposed it, which I deny that I have any where done: yet your Lordship, before you come to the bottom of the same Page, has these Words, *I shall now shew, that there can be no sufficient Evidence brought P. 246. from them, by THEIR own Confession, concerning the Existence of the most spiritual and infinite Substance, even God himself.*

If your Lordship did mean me in that THEY which is some Lines backwards, I must complain to your Lordship that you have done me an Injury, in imputing that to me which I have not done. And if THEIR here were not meant by your Lordship to relate to the same persons, I ask by what shall the Reader distinguish them? And how shall any body know who it is your Lordship means? for that I am comprehended here is apparent, by your quoting my Essay in the very next Words, and arguing against it in the following Pages.

I enter not here into your Lordship's Argument; that which I am now considering is your Lordship's peculiar way of Writing in this part of your Treatise, which makes me often in a doubt, whether the Reader will not condemn Book upon your Lordship's Authority, where he thinks me concern'd, if I say nothing: and yet your Lordship may look upon my Defence as superfluous, when I did not hold what your Lordship argued against.

But to go on with your Lordship's Argument, your Lordship says, *I shall P. 246. now shew that there can be no sufficient Evidence brought from simple Ideas by their own Confession, concerning the Existence of the most spiritual and infinite Substance, even God himself.*

Your Lordship's way of proving it, is this: Your Lordship says, *We are told, Book IV. Chap. 10. Sect. 1. "That the Evidence of it is equal to Ma- P. 246. thematical Certainty;" and very good Arguments are brought to prove it, in a Chapter on purpose: But that which I take notice of, is, that the Argument from the clear and distinct Idea of a God, is pass'd over.* Supposing all this to be so, your Lordship, methinks, with Submission, does not prove the Proposition you undertook, which was this; *There can be no sufficient Evidence brought from simple Ideas, by their own Confession concerning [i. e. to prove] the Existence of a God.* For if I did in that Chapter, as your Lordship says, *Pass over the Proof from the clear and distinct Idea of God,* that I presume, is no Confession that there can be no sufficient Evidence brought from clear and distinct Ideas, much less from simple Ideas, concerning the Existence of a God; because the using of one Argument brought from one Foundation, is no Confession that

there is not another Principle or Foundation. But, my Lord, I shall not insist upon this, whether it be a *Confession* or no.

Leaving *Confessions* out of the Proposition, I humbly conceive your Lordship's Argument does not prove. Your Lordship's Proposition to be prov'd, is, *There can be no sufficient Evidence brought from simple Ideas to prove the Existence of a God*; and your Lordship's Reason is, because the Argument from the CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEA OF GOD, is omitted in my Proof of a God. I will suppose, for the strengthening your Lordship's Reasoning in the case, that I had said (which I am far enough from saying) That there was no other Argument to prove the Existence of God, but what I had used in that Chapter; yet, my Lord, with all this, your Lordship's Argument, I humbly conceive, would not hold: for I might bring Evidence from simple Ideas, tho' I brought none from the Idea of God; for the Idea we have of God is a complex, and no simple Idea. So that the Terms being chang'd from simple Ideas to a clear and distinct complex Idea of God, the Proposition which was undertaken to be prov'd, seems to me unprov'd.

P. 247. Your Lordship's next words are, *How can this be consistent with deducing our Certainty of Knowledge from clear and simple Ideas?*

Here your Lordship joins something that is mine, with something that is not mine. I do say, That all our Knowledge is founded in simple Ideas; but I do not say, it is all deduced from clear Ideas; much less that we cannot have any certain Knowledge of the Existence of any thing, whereof we have not a clear, distinct, complex Idea; or, that the complex Idea must be clear enough to be in it self the Evidence of the Existence of that thing; which seems to be your Lordship's meaning here. Our Knowledge is all founded on simple Ideas, as I have before explain'd, tho' not always about simple Ideas; for we may know the Truth of Propositions which include complex Ideas, and those complex Ideas may not always be perfectly clear Ideas.

P. 247. In the remaining part of this Page, it follows: *I do not go about to justify those who lay the whole stress upon that Foundation, which I grant to be too weak to support so important a Truth; and that those are very much to blame, who go about to invalidate other Arguments for the sake of that: but I doubt all that Talk about clear and distinct Ideas being made the Foundation of Certainty, came originally from these Discourses or Meditations, which are aim'd at. The Author of them was an ingenious thinking Man, and he endeavour'd to lay the Foundation of Certainty, as well as he could. The first thing he found any Certainty in, was his own Existence; which he founded upon the Perceptions of the Acts of his Mind, which some call an internal infallible Perception that we are. From hence he proceeded to enquire, How we came by this Certainty? And he resolv'd it into this, That he had a clear and distinct Perception of it; and from hence he form'd this general Rule, That what he had a clear and distinct Perception of, was true. Which in Reason ought to go no farther than where there is the like degree of Evidence.*

This Account which your Lordship gives here, what it was wherein Descartes laid the Foundation of Certainty, containing nothing in it to shew what your Lordship propos'd here, viz. *That there can be no sufficient Evidence brought from Ideas, by my own Confession, concerning the Existence of God himself*; I willingly excuse my self from troubling your Lordship concerning it. Only I crave leave to make my Acknowledgment to your Lordship, for what you are pleas'd, by the way, to drop in these words: *But I doubt all this Talk about clear and distinct Ideas being made the Foundation of Certainty, came originally from these Discourses or Meditations, which are aim'd at.*

B. 4. c. 10. S. 7. By the Quotations in your Lordship's immediately preceding words taken out of my Essay, which relate to that ingenious thinking Author, as well as by what in your following words is said of his founding Certainty in his own Existence; it is hard to avoid thinking that your Lordship means, that I borrow'd from him my Notions concerning Certainty. And your Lordship is so great a Man, and every way so far above my Meanness, that it cannot be suppos'd that your Lordship intended this for any thing but a Commendation of me to the World, as the Scholar of so great a Master. But tho' I must always acknowledg to that justly admir'd Gentleman, the great Obligation of my first Deliverance from the unintelligible way of talking of the Philosophy in use in the Schools in his time;

time; yet I am so far from entitling his Writings to any of the Errors or Imperfections which are to be found in my Essay, as deriving their *Original* from him, that I must own to your Lordship they were spun barely out of my own Thoughts, reflecting as well as I could on my own Mind, and the *Ideas* I had there, and were not, that I know, deriv'd from any other *Original*. But, possibly, I all this while assume to my self an Honour which your Lordship did not intend to me by this Intimation; for tho' what goes before and after, seems to appropriate those Words to me, yet some part of them brings me under my usual Doubt, which I shall remain under, till I know whom these Words, viz. *This Talk about clear and distinct Ideas being made the Foundation of Certainty*, belong to.

The remaining part of this Paragraph contains a discourse of your Lordship's upon *Descartes's* general Rule of Certainty, in these Words: *For the Certainty here was not grounded on the Clearness of the Perception, but on the Plainness of the Evidence, which is of that nature, that the very doubting of it proves it; since it is impossible, that any thing should doubt or question its own Being, that had it not.* So that here it is not the Clearness of the Idea, but an immediate Act of Perception, which is the true Ground of Certainty. And this cannot extend to things without our selves, of which we can have no other Perception, than what is caus'd by the Impressions of outward Objects. But whether we are to judg according to these Impressions, doth not depend on the Ideas themselves, but upon the Exercise of our Judgment and Reason about them, which put the difference between true and false, and adequate and inadequate Ideas. So that our Certainty is not from the Ideas themselves, but from the Evidence of Reason, that those Ideas are true and just, and consequently that we may build our Certainty upon them. P. 248.

Granting all this to be so, yet I must confess, my Lord, I do not see how it any ways tends to shew either your Lordship's Proof, or my Confession, that my Proof of an infinite spiritual Being is not placed upon Ideas; which is what your Lordship professes to be your Design here.

But tho' we are not yet come to your Lordship's Proof, That the Certainty in my proof of a Deity is not placed on Ideas; yet I crave leave to consider what your Lordship says here concerning Certainty, about which one cannot employ too many Thoughts to find wherein it is placed. Your Lordship says, That *Descartes's* Certainty was not grounded on the Clearness of the Perception, but on the Plainness of the Evidence. And a little lower; Here (i. e. in *Descartes's* Foundation of Certainty) it is not the Clearness of the Idea, but an immediate Act of Perception, on which is the true Ground of Certainty. And a little lower, That in things without us, our Certainty is not from the Ideas, but from the Evidence of Reason that those Ideas are true and just.

Your Lordship, I hope, wil pardon my Dulness, if after your Lordship has placed the Grounds of Certainty of our own Existence, sometimes in the Plainness of the Evidence, in opposition to the Clearness of the Perception; sometimes in the immediate Act of Perception, in opposition to the Clearness of the Idea, and the Certainty of other things without us, in the Evidence of Reason that these Ideas are true and just, in opposition to the Ideas themselves: I know not, by these Rules, wherein to place Certainty; and therefore stick to my own plain way, by Ideas, deliver'd in these Words: "Wherever we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas, there is certain Knowledge; and wherever we are sure those Ideas agree with the Reality of things, there is certain real Knowledge. Of which Agreement of our Ideas with the Reality of things, I think I have shewn wherein it is that Certainty, real Certainty, consists." Whereof more may be seen in Chap. 6. in which, if your Lordship find any Mistakes, I shall take it as a great Honour to be set right by you. P. 248.

Your Lordship, as far as I can guess your Meaning (for I must own I do not clearly comprehend it) seems to me, in the foregoing Passage, to oppose this Assertion, That the Certainty of the Being of any thing, might be made out from the Idea of that thing. Truly, my Lord, I am so far from saying (or thinking) so, that I never knew any one of that mind but *Descartes*, and some that have follow'd him in his Proof of a God, from the Idea which we have of God in us; which I was so far from thinking a sufficient Ground of Certainty, that

that your Lordship makes use of my denying or doubting of it, against me, as we shall see in the following Words, p. 248.

But th Idea of an infinite Being has this peculiar to it, that necessary Existence is imply'd in it. This is a clear and distinct Idea, and yet it is deny'd that this doth prove the Existence of God. How then can the Grounds of our Certainty arise from clear and distinct Ideas, when in one of the clearest Ideas of our Minds, we can come to no Certainty by it?

Your Lordship's Proof here, as far as I comprehend it, seems to be, that it is confess'd, *That Certainty does not arise from clear and distinct Ideas*, because it is deny'd that the clear and distinct Idea of an infinite Being, that implies necessary Existence in it, does prove the Existence of a God.

Here your Lordship says, it is deny'd; and in five Lines after you recal that Saying, and use these words, *I do not say that it is deny'd, to prove it*: Which of these two Sayings of your Lordship's must I now answer to? If your Lordship says it is deny'd, I fear that will not hold to be so in matter of Fact, which made your Lordship unsay it; tho' that being most to your Lordship's purpose, occasion'd, I suppose, its dropping from your Pen. For if it be not deny'd, I think the whole Force of your Lordship's Argument fails. But your Lordship helps that out as well as the thing will bear, by the Words that follow in the Sentence, which altogether stands thus: *I do not say, that it is deny'd to prove it; but this is said, that it is a doubtful thing*, "from the different Make of Mens Tempers, and Application of their Thoughts." *What can this mean, unless it be to let us know that even clear and distinct Ideas may lose their effect, by the difference of Mens Tempers and Studies? So that besides Ideas, in order to a right Judgment, a due Temper and Application of the Mind is requir'd.*

If I meant in those words of mine, quoted here by your Lordship, just as your Lordship concludes they mean, I know not why I should be ashamed of it; for I never thought that Ideas, even the most clear and distinct, would make Men certain of what might be demonstrated from them, unless they were of a Temper to consider, and would apply their Minds to them. There are no Ideas more clear and distinct than those of Numbers, and yet there are a thousand Demonstrations concerning Numbers, which Millions of Men do not know, (and so have not the Certainty about them they might have) for want of Application.

B. 4. c. 10.
§. 7.

I could not avoid here to take this to my self: For this Passage of your Lordship's is pinn'd down upon me so close, by your Lordship's citing the 7th Sect. of the 10th Chapter of my 4th Book, that I am forc'd here to answer for my self; which I shall do, after having first set down my words, as they stand in the place quoted by your Lordship: "How far the Idea of a most perfect Being, which a Man may frame in his Mind, does or does not prove the Existence of a God, I will not here examine. For in the different Make of Mens Tempers and Application of their Thoughts, some Arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for the Confirmation of the same Truth. But yet, I think, this I may say, That it is an ill way of establishing this Truth, and silencing Atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a Point as this, upon that sole Foundation, and take some Mens having that Idea of God in their Minds (for 'tis evident, some Men have none, and some a worse than none, and the most very different) for the only Proof of a Deity; and out of an Over-fondness of that darling Invention, cashier, or at least endeavour to invalidate all other Arguments, and forbid us to hearken to those Proofs, as being weak, or fallacious, which our own Existence, and the sensible Parts of the Universe, offer so clearly and cogently to our Thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering Man to withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a Truth, as can any where be deliver'd, That the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the Creation of the World, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead."

The meaning of which Words of mine, were not to deny that the Idea of a most perfect Being doth prove a God, but to blame those who take it for the only Proof, and endeavour to invalidate all others. For the Belief of a God being, as I say in the same Section, the Foundation of all Religion and genuine Morality,

lity, I thought no *Arguments* that are made use of to work the Persuasion of a God into Mens Minds, should be invalidated. And the Reason I give why they should all be left to their full Strength, and none of them rejected as unfit to be hearken'd to, is this: Because "in the different make of Mens Tempers and Application of their Thoughts, some *Arguments* prevail more on one, and some on another, for the Confirmation of the same Truth." So that my meaning here was not, as your Lordship supposes, to ground Certainty on the different Make of Mens Tempers, and Application of their Thoughts, in opposition to clear and distinct Ideas, as is very evident from my Words; but to shew of what ill Consequence it is, to go about to invalidate any *Argument*, which hath a tendency to settle the Belief of a God in any one's Mind; because in the difference of Mens Tempers and Application, some *Arguments* prevail more on one, and some on another: so that I speaking of Belief, and your Lordship, as I take it, speaking in that place of Certainty, nothing can (I crave leave to say) be infer'd from these Words of mine to your Lordship's purpose. And that I meant Belief, and not Certainty, is evident from hence, That I look upon the *Argument* there spoke of, as not conclusive, and so not able to produce Certainty in any one, tho' I did not know how far it might prevail on some Mens Persuasions to confirm them in the Truth. And since not all, nor the most of those that believe a God, are at the Pains, or have the Skill, to examine and clearly comprehend the Demonstrations of his Being; I was unwilling to shew the weakness of the *Argument* there spoke of; since possibly by it, some Men might be confirmed in the Belief of a God, which is enough to preserve in them true Sentiments of Religion and Morality.

Your Lordship hereupon asks, *Wherein is this different from what all Men of Understanding have said?* P. 249.

Answer: In nothing that I know; nor did I ever that I remember, say that it was. Your Lordship goes on to demand,

Why then should these clear and simple Ideas be made the sole Foundation of Reason? P. 249.

I answer: That I know not: They must give your Lordship a Reason for it, who have made CLEAR Ideas the sole Foundation of Reason. Why I have made simple ones the Foundation of all Knowledge, I have shewn. Your Lordship goes on;

One would think by this—

P. 249.

By what, I beseech your Lordship?

That these Ideas would presently satisfy Mens Minds, if they attended to them.

What *those Ideas* are from which your Lordship would expect such present Satisfaction, and upon what Grounds your Lordship expects it, I do not know. But this I will venture to say, That all the Satisfaction Mens Minds can have in their Enquiries after Truth and Certainty, is to be had only from considering, observing, and rightly laying together of Ideas, so as to find out their Agreement or Disagreement, and no other way.

But I do not think Ideas have Truth and Certainty always so ready to satisfy the Mind in its Enquiries, that there needs no more to be satisfy'd, than to attend to them, as one does to a Man whom one asks a Question to be satisfied; which your Lordship's way of Expression seems to me to intimate. But they must be consider'd well, and their Habitudes examin'd; and where their Agreement or Disagreement cannot be perceiv'd by an immediate Comparison, other Ideas must be found out to discover the Agreement or Disagreement of those under Consideration, and then all laid in a due order, before the Mind can be satisfy'd in the Certainty of that Truth, which it is seeking after. This, my Lord, requires often a little more Time and Pains, than attending to a Tale that is told for present Satisfaction. And I believe some of the incomparable Mr. Newton's wonderful Demonstrations cost him so much Pains, that tho' they were all founded in nothing but several Ideas of Quantity, yet those Ideas did not presently satisfy his Mind, tho' they were such that with great application and labour of Thought, they were able to satisfy him with Certainty, i. e. produce Demonstration. Your Lordship adds,

But even this will not do as to the Idea of an infinite Being.

P. 249.

Tho'

Tho' the complex *Idea* for which the Sound *God* stands (whether containing in it the *Idea* of necessary Existence or no, for the Case is the same) will not prove the real Existence of a Being answering that *Idea*, any more than any other *Idea* in any one's Mind will prove the Existence of any real Being answering that *Idea*; yet, I humbly conceive, it does not hence follow, but that there may be other *Ideas* by which the Being of a *God* may be proved. For no body that I know, ever said, that every *Idea* would prove every thing, or that an *Idea* in Men's Minds would prove the Existence of such a real Being: And therefore if this *Idea* fails to prove what is propos'd to be prov'd by it, it is no more an Exception against the way of *Ideas*, than it would be an Exception against the way of a *medium terminus*, in arguing that some body us'd one that did not prove. It follows:

P. 249.

It is not enough to say THEY will not examine how far it will hold; for THEY ought either to say, That it doth hold, or give up this Ground of Certainty from clear and distinct Ideas.

Here, my Lord, I am got again into the Plural Number: But not knowing any body but my self who has us'd these Words which are set down out of my *Essay*, and which you are in this and the foregoing Paragraph arguing against, I am forc'd to beg your Lordship to let me know, who those Persons are whom your Lordship, joining with me, entitles with me to these Words of my Book; or to whom your Lordship joining me, intitles me by these Words of mine, to what they have publish'd, that I may see how far I am answerable for them.

Now as to the Words themselves, viz. *I will not examine how far the Idea propos'd does or does not prove the Existence of a God*, because they are mine; and your Lordship excepts against them, and tells me, *It was not enough to say, "I will not examine, &c." For I ought either to have said, That it doth hold, or give up this ground of Certainty from clear and distinct Ideas.* I will answer as well as I can.

I could not then, my Lord, well say, *That that doth hold*, which I thought did not hold; but I imagin'd I might, without entring into the *examen*, and shewing the weakness of that Argument, pass it by with saying, *I would not examine*, and so left it with this Thought, *Valeat quantum valere potest*.

But tho' I did this, and said not then, *It will hold*, nay think now it will not hold, yet I do not see how from thence I was then, or am now under any Necessity to give up the *Ground of Certainty from Ideas*; because the *Ground of Certainty from Ideas* may be right, tho' in the present Instance a right use were not made of them, or a right *Idea* was not made use of to produce the Certainty sought. *Ideas* in Mathematicks are a sure Ground of Certainty; and yet every one may not make so right a use of them, as to attain to Certainty by them: But yet any one's failing of Certainty by them, is not the overturning of this Truth, That Certainty is to be had by them. *Clear and distinct* I have omitted here to join with *Ideas*, not because *clear and distinct* make any *Ideas* unfit to produce Certainty, which have all other fitness to do it; but because I do not limit Certainty to *clear and distinct Ideas* only, since there may be Certainty from *Ideas* that are not in all their parts perfectly *clear and distinct*.

Your Lordship, in the following Paragraph, endeavours to shew, That I have not prov'd the Being of a *God* by *Ideas*; and from thence, with an Argument not unlike the preceding, you conclude, that *Ideas* cannot be the *Grounds of Certainty*, because I have not grounded my Proof of a *God* on *Ideas*. To which way of Argumentation I must crave leave here again to reply, That your Lordship's supposing, as you do, that there is another way to Certainty, which is not that of *Ideas*, does not prove that Certainty may not be had from *Ideas*, because I make use of that other way. This being premis'd, I shall endeavour to shew, that my Proof of a Deity is all grounded on *Ideas*, however your Lordship is pleas'd to call it by other Names. Your Lordship's Words are:

P. 249.

§. 6.

But instead of the proper Argument from Ideas, we are told, That "from the " Consideration of our Selves, and what we find in our own Constitutions, " our

"our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth; "That there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being." *All which I readily yield; but we see plainly, the Certainty is not plac'd in the Idea, but in good and sound Reason, from the Consideration of our Selves and our Constitutions. What! in the Idea of our Selves? no certainly.*

Give me leave, my Lord, to ask where I ever said, That *Certainty was plac'd in the Idea*, which your Lordship urges my words as a Contradiction of? I think I never said so. 1. Because I do not remember it. 2. Because your Lordship has not quoted any place where I have said so. 3. Because I all along in my Book, which has the Honour to be so often quoted here by your Lordship, say the quite contrary. For I place Certainty where I think every body will find it, and no where else, viz. in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*; so that in my Opinion, it is impossible to be plac'd in any one single *Idea*, simple or complex. I must own, that I think Certainty grounded on *Ideas*: And therefore to make your Lordship's Words here, as I think they are meant, in opposition to what I say, I shall take the liberty to change your Lordship's Words here, *What! in the Idea of our selves? No certainly*; into Words us'd by your Lordship in the foregoing Page, to the same purpose, *What! can the Grounds of our Certainty arise from the Idea of our selves? No certainly.*

To which permit me, my Lord, with due respect to reply, Yes *Certainly*. The Certainty of the Being of a God in my Proof, is grounded on the *Idea of our selves*, as we are thinking Beings. But your Lordship urges my own Words, which are, That, "from the Consideration of our selves, and what we find in our Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth."

My Lord, I must confess I never thought, that the Consideration of our selves, and what we find in our own Constitutions, excluded the Consideration of the *Idea* either of *Being* or of *Thinking*, two of the *Ideas* that make a part of the complex *Idea* a Man has of himself. If Consideration of our selves excludes those *Ideas*, I may be charg'd with speaking improperly: but 'tis plain, nevertheless, that I ground the Proof of a God on those *Ideas*, and I thought I spoke properly enough; when meaning, That the Consideration of those *Ideas*, which our own Being offer'd us, and so finding their agreement or disagreement with others, we were thereby, i. e. by thus reasoning, led into the Knowledge of the Existence of the first infinite Being, i. e. of God. I express'd it as I did, in the more familiar way of speaking: For my purpose, in that Chapter, being to make out the Knowledge of the Existence of a God, and not to prove that it was by *Ideas*, I thought it most proper to express my self in the most usual and familiar way, to let it the easier into Mens Minds, by common Words and known Ways of Expression: And therefore, as I think, I have scarce us'd the Word *Idea* in that whole Chapter, but only in that one place, where my speaking against laying the whole Proof only upon our *Idea* of a most perfect Being, obliged me to it.

But your Lordship says, that in this way of coming to a certain Knowledge of the Being of a God, "from the Consideration of our selves, and what we find in our own Constitutions," the *Certainty is placed in good and sound Reason*. I hope so. *But not in the Idea.*

What your Lordship here means by not placed in the *Idea*, I confess I do not well understand; but if your Lordship means that it is not grounded on the *Ideas* of *Thinking* and *Existence* before-mention'd, and the comparing of them, and finding their Agreement or Disagreement with other *Ideas*; that I must take the liberty to dissent from: For in this sense it may be placed in *Ideas*, and in *good and sound Reason* too, i. e. in Reason rightly managing those *Ideas*, so as to produce Evidence by them. So that, my Lord, I must own I see not the force of the Argument, which says, not in *Ideas* but in *sound Reason*; since I see no such opposition between them, but that *Ideas* and *sound Reason* may consist together. For instance: When a Man would shew the certainty of this Truth, That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones; the first thing probably that he does, is to draw

a Diagram. What is the use of that Diagram? but steddily to suggest to his Mind those several *Ideas* he would make use of in that Demonstration. The considering and laying these together in such Order, and with such Connection, as to make the Agreement of the *Ideas* of the three Angles of the Triangle, with the *Ideas* of two right ones, to be perceiv'd, is call'd *right Reasoning*, and is the business of that Faculty which we call *Reason*; which when it operates rightly, by considering and comparing *Ideas* so as to produce Certainty, this shewing or Demonstration that the thing is so, is call'd *good and sound Reason*. The Ground of this Certainty lies in *Ideas* themselves, and their agreement or disagreement, which Reason neither does nor can alter, but only lays them so together as to make it perceivable; and without such a due consideration and ordering of the *Ideas*, Certainty could not be had: and thus Certainty is plac'd both in *Ideas*, and in *good and sound Reason*.

This affords an easy Answer to your Lordship's next Words, brought to prove, That the Certainty of a God is not placed on the *Idea* of our selves. They stand thus:

P. 250. *For let our Idea be taken which way we please, by Sensation or Reflection, yet it is not the Idea that makes us certain, but the Argument from that which we perceive in and about our selves.*

Nothing truer than that it is not the *Idea* that makes us certain without Reason, or without the Understanding: But it is as true, that 'tis not Reason, 'tis not the Understanding, that makes us certain without *Ideas*. 'Tis not the Sun makes me certain it is Day, without my Eyes; nor 'tis not my Sight makes me certain it is Day, without the Sun; but the one employ'd about the other. Nor it is one *Idea* by it self, that in this or any Case, makes us certain; but Certainty consists in the perceiv'd agreement or disagreement of all the *Ideas*, that serve to shew the agreement or disagreement of distinct *Ideas*, as they stand in the Proposition, whose Truth or Falshood we would be certain of. The using of intermediate *Ideas* to shew this, is called *Argumentation*, and the *Ideas* so us'd in train, an *Argument*; so that in my poor Opinion, to say, That the Argument makes us certain, is no more than saying, The *Ideas* made use of, make us certain.

The *Idea* of Thinking in our selves, which we receive by Reflection, we may by intermediate *Ideas*, perceive to have a necessary agreement and connection with the *Idea* of the Existence of an eternal, thinking Being. This, whether your Lordship will call placing of Certainty in the *Idea*, or placing the Certainty in Reason; whether your Lordship will say, it is not the *Idea* that gives us the Certainty, but the Argument, is indifferent to me; I shall not be so unmannerly as to prescribe to your Lordship what way you should speak, in this or any other Matter. But this your Lordship will give me leave to say, That let it be called how your Lordship pleases, there is no Contradiction in it to what I have said concerning Certainty, or the way how we came by it, or the Ground on which I place it. Your Lordship farther urges my Words out of the fifth Section of the same Chapter.

P. 250. But, "we find in our selves Perception and Knowledge." It's very true. But how doth this prove there is a God? is it from the clear and distinct *Idea* of it? No, but from this Argument, That "either there must have been a knowing Being from Eternity, or an unknowing, for something must have been from Eternity: But if an unknowing Being, then it was impossible there ever should have been any Knowledge; it being as impossible that a thing without Knowledge should produce it, as that a Triangle should make it self three Angles bigger than two right ones." Allowing the Argument to be good, yet it is not taken from the *Idea*, but from the Principles of true Reason; as, That no Man can doubt his own Perception; That every thing must have a Cause; That this Cause must either have Knowledge or not; if it have, the Point is gain'd: of it hath not, nothing can produce nothing; and consequently a not knowing Being cannot produce a knowing.

Your Lordship here contends, That my Argument is not taken from the *Idea*, but from true Principles of Reason. I do not say it is taken from any one *Idea*, but from all the *Ideas* concerned in it. But your Lordship, if you herein oppose any thing I have said, must, I humbly conceive, say, Not from *Ideas*, but from

from true Principles of Reason; several whereof your Lordship has here set down. And whence, I beseech your Lordship, comes the Certainty of any of those Propositions, which your Lordship calls *true Principles of Reason*, but from the perceivable agreement or disagreement of the *Ideas* contain'd in them? Just as it is express'd in those Propositions, v. g. *a Man cannot doubt of his own Perception*, is a true Principle of Reason, or a true Proposition, or a certain proposition: But to the Certainty of it we arrive, only by perceiving the necessary agreement of the two *Ideas* of *Perception* and *Self-consciousness*.

Again, *Every thing must have a Cause*: Tho' I find it so set down for one by your Lordship, yet, I humbly conceive, is not a true Principle of Reason, nor a true Proposition; but the contrary. The Certainty whereof we attain by the Contemplation of our *Ideas*, and by perceiving that the *Idea* of Eternity, and the *Idea* of the Existence of something do agree, and the *Idea* of Existence from Eternity and of having a Cause do not agree, or are inconsistent within the same thing. But every Thing that has a Beginning must have a Cause, is a true Principle of Reason, or a Proposition certainly true; which we come to know by the same way, i. e. by contemplating our *Ideas*, and perceiving that the *Idea* of beginning to be, is necessarily connected with the *Idea* of some Operation; and the *Idea* of Operation, with the *Idea* of something Operating, which we call a Cause; and so the beginning to be, is perceiv'd to agree with the *Idea* of a Cause, as is express'd in the Proposition: And thus it comes to be a certain Proposition; and so may be call'd a Principle of Reason, as every true Proposition is to him that perceives the Certainty of it.

This, my Lord, is my way of *Ideas*, and of coming to Certainty by them; which, when your Lordship has again consider'd, I am apt to think your Lordship will no more condemn, that I do except against your Lordship's way of Arguments or Principles of Reason. Nor will it, I suppose any longer offend your Lordship, under the Notion of a New way of Reasoning; since I flatter myself, both these ways will be found to be equally old, one as the other, tho' perhaps formerly they have not been so distinctly taken notice of, and the Name of *Ideas* is of later date in our English Language.

If your Lordship says, as I think you mean, viz. That my Argument to prove a God is not taken from *Ideas*, your Lordship will pardon me, if I think otherwise. For I beseech your Lordship, are not *Ideas*, whose agreement or disagreement as they are express'd in Propositions is perceiv'd, immediately or by Intuition, the Principles of true Reason? And does not the Certainty we have of the Truth of these Propositions, consist in the Perception of such agreement or disagreement? And does not the agreement or disagreement depend upon the *Ideas* themselves? Nay, so intirely depend upon the *Ideas* themselves, that it is impossible for the Mind, or Reason, or Argument, or any thing to alter it? All that Reason or the Mind does, in Reasoning or Arguing, is to find out and observe that agreement or disagreement: And all that Argument does, is by an intervening *Idea*, to shew it, where an immediate putting the *Ideas* together will not do it.

As for example, in the present Case: The Proposition, of whose Truth I would be certain, is this: *A knowing Being has eternally existed*. Here the *Ideas* joined, are eternal Existence with a knowing Being. But does my mind perceive any immediate connection or repugnancy in these *Ideas*? No. The Proposition then at first view affords me no Certainty; or, as our English Idiom phrases it, *It is not certain, or I am not certain of it*. But tho' I am not, yet I would be certain whether it is true or no. What then must I do? Find Arguments to prove that it is true, or the contrary. And what is that, but to cast about and find out intermediate *Ideas*, which may shew me the necessary connection or inconsistency of the *Ideas* in the Proposition? Either of which, when by these intervening *Ideas* I am brought to perceive, I am then certain that the Proposition is true, or I am certain that it is false. As in the present Case, I perceive in my self Thought and Perception; the *Idea* of actual Perception has an evident connection with an actual Being, that doth perceive and think: The *Idea* of an actual thinking Being, hath a

perceivable connection with the eternal Existence of some knowing Being, by the intervention of the negation of all Being, or the *Idea* of *nothing*, which has a necessary Connection with *no Power, no Operation, no Causality, no Effect*, i. e. with *nothing*. So that the *Idea* of once actually *nothing*, has a visible Connection with *nothing* to Eternity, for the future; and hence the *Idea* of an actual Being, is perceiv'd to have a necessary Connection with some actual Being from Eternity. And by the like way of *Ideas*, may be perceiv'd the actual Existence of a knowing Being, to have a Connection with the Existence of an actual knowing Being from Eternity; and the *Idea* of an eternal, actual, knowing Being, with the *Idea* of Immateriality, by the intervention of the *Idea* of Matter, and of its actual Division, Divisibility and want of Perception, &c. which are the *Ideas*, or, as your Lordship is pleas'd to call them, *Arguments*, I make use of in this Proof, which I need not here go over again; and which is partly contain'd in these following Words, which your Lordship thus quotes out of the 10th Section of the same Chapter.

P. 251. Again, "If we suppose nothing to be first, Matter can never begin to be; if bare matter without Motion to be eternal, Motion can never begin to be; if Matter and Motion be suppos'd eternal, Thought can never begin to be: For if Matter could produce Thought, then Thought must be in the power of Matter; and if it be in Matter as such, it must be the inseparable Property of all Matter; which is contrary to the Sense and Experience of Mankind. If only some parts of Matter have a power of Thinking, how comes so great a difference in the Properties of the same Matter? What Disposition of Matter is requir'd to Thinking? And from whence comes it? Of which no account can be given in Reason." To which your Lordship subjoins:

P. 251. *This is the Substance of the Argument used, to prove an infinite spiritual Being, which I am far from weakening the force of: But that which I design, is to shew, That the Certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and distinct Ideas, but upon the Force of Reason distinct from it; which was the thing I intended to prove.*

Your Lordship says, That the Certainty of it (I suppose your Lordship means the Certainty produc'd by my Proof of a Deity) is not placed upon clear and distinct Ideas. It is placed, among others, upon the Ideas of Thinking, Existence, and Matter, which I think are all clear and distinct Ideas; so that there are some clear and distinct Ideas in it: And one can hardly say there are not any clear and distinct Ideas in it, because there is one obscure and confused one in it, viz. That of Substance; which yet hinders not the Certainty of the Proof.

P. 252. The Words which your Lordship subjoins to the former, viz. *But upon the Force of REASON distinct from it*; seem to me to say, as far as I can understand them, That the Certainty of my Argument for a Deity, is placed not on clear and distinct Ideas, but upon the Force of Reason.

This, among other Places before set down, makes me with your Lordship had told us, what you understand by REASON, for in my acceptance of the word REASON, I do not see but the same Proof may be placed upon clear and distinct Ideas, and upon Reason too. As I said before, I can perceive no Inconsistency or Opposition between them, no more than there is any Opposition between a clear Object and my Faculty of Seeing, in the Certainty of any thing I receive by my Eyes; for this Certainty may be placed very well on both the Clearness of the Object, and the Exercise of that Faculty in me.

P. 245. • Your Lordship's next words, I think, should be read thus; *Distinct from them*: For if they were intended as they are printed, *Distinct from it*, I confess I do not understand them. Certainty not placed on clear and distinct Ideas, but upon the Force of Reason distinct from them, my Capacity will reach the Sense of: But then I cannot but wonder what distinct from them do there; for I know no body that does not think that Reason, or the Faculty of Reasoning, is distinct from the Ideas it makes use of or is employ'd about, whether those Ideas be clear and distinct, or obscure and confus'd. But if that Sentence be to be read as it is printed, viz. *The Certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and distinct Ideas, but upon the force of Reason distinct from it*; I acknowledg your Lordship's meaning is above my Comprehension. Upon the whole matter, my Lord, I must confess, That I do not see that what your Lordship says you intended here to prove, is prov'd, viz. That Certainty in my proof of a God is not placed on Ideas. And next,

next, if it were prov'd, I do not see how it answers any *Objection against the Trinity, in point of Reason.*

Before I go on to what follows, I must beg leave to confess, I am troubled to find these Words of your Lordship, among those I have above set down out of the foregoing Page, *viz. Allowing the Argument to be good*; and cannot forbear to P. 250. wish, That when your Lordship was writing this Passage, you had had in your Mind what you are pleas'd here to say, *viz. That you are far from weakening the Force of my Argument which I used to prove an infinite spiritual Being.*

My Lord, your Lordship is a great Man, not only by the Dignity your Merits are invest'd with, but more by the Merits of your Parts and Learning. Your Lordship's Words carry Weight and Authority with them; and he that shall quote but a Saying or a Doubt of your Lordship's, that questions the Force of my Argument for the Proof of a God, will think himself well founded and to be hearken'd to, as gone a great way in the Cause. These Words *Allowing the Argument to be good*, in the receiv'd way of speaking, are usually taken to signify, That he that speaks them, does not judge the *Argument to be good*; but that for Discourse-sake he at present admits it. Truly, my Lord, till I read these Words in your Lordship, I always took it for a *good Argument*; and was so fully persuaded of its Goodness, that I spoke higher of it than of any Reasoning of mine any where, because I thought it equal to a Demonstration. If it be not so, it is fit I recall my Words, and that I do not betray so important and fundamental a Truth, by a weak, but over-valu'd Argument: And therefore I cannot, upon this occasion, but importune your Lordship, That if your Lordship (as your Words seem to intimate) sees any Weakness in it, your Lordship would be pleas'd to shew it me; that either I may amend that Fault, and make it conclusive, or else retract my Confidence, and leave that Cause to those who have Strength suitable to its Weight. But to return to what follows in your Lordship's next Paragraph.

2. *The next thing necessary to be clear'd in this Dispute, is, the Distinction between Nature and Person; and of this we can have no clear and distinct Idea from Sensation or Reflection. And yet all our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right understanding of it. For we must talk unintelligibly about this Point, unless we have clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction. But that these come not into our Minds by these simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection, I shall now make it appear.*

By this it is plain, that the Business of the following Pages is to make it appear, That we have no clear and distinct Idea of the Distinction of Nature and Person, from Sensation or Reflection: Or, as your Lordship expresses it a little lower, *The Apprehension concerning Nature and Person, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction, come not into our Minds by the simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection.*

And what, pray my Lord, can be infer'd from hence, if it should be so? Your Lordship tells us,

All our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right Understanding of the Distinction between Nature and Person; and we must talk unintelligibly about this Point, unless we have clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction.

If it be so, the Inference I should draw from thence (if it were fit for me to draw any) would be this, That it concerns those who write on that Subject to have themselves, and to lay down to others, *clear and distinct Apprehensions*, or *Notions*, or *Ideas* (call them what you please) of what they mean by *Nature and Person*, and of the *Grounds of Identity and Distinction*.

This seems, to me, the natural Conclusion flowing from your Lordship's Words; which seem here to suppose *clear and distinct Apprehensions* (something like *clear and distinct Ideas*) necessary for the avoiding unintelligible Talk in the *Doctrine of the Trinity*. But I do not see how your Lordship can, from the necessity of *clear and distinct Apprehensions* of *Nature and Person*, &c. in the *Dispute of the Trinity*, bring in one, who has perhaps mistaken the way to clear and distinct *Notions* concerning *Nature and Person*, &c. as fit to be answer'd among those, who bring *Objections against the Trinity in point of Reason*. I do not see why an Unitarian may not as well bring him in, and argue against his *Essay*, in a Chapter

Chapter that he should write, to answer Objections against the Unity of God in point of Reason or Revelation: For upon what ground soever any one writes in this Dispute or any other, it is not tolerable to talk unintelligibly on either side.

If by the way of *Ideas*, which is that of the Author of *The Essay of Human Understanding*, a Man cannot come to clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person; if, as he proposes from the simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection, such Apprehensions cannot be got; it will follow from thence, that he is a mistaken Philosopher: But it will not follow from thence, That he is not an Orthodox Christian; for he might (as he did) write his *Essay of Human Understanding*, without any Thought of the Controversy between the Trinitarians and Unitarians: nay, a Man might have writ all that is in his Book, that never heard one Word of any such Dispute.

There is in the World a great and fierce Contest about Nature and Grace: 'Twould be very hard for me, if I must be brought in as a Party on either side, because a Disputant, in that Controversy, should think the clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Grace, come not into our Minds by the simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection. If this be so, I may be reckon'd among the Objectors against all Sorts and Points of Orthodoxy, whenever any one pleases: I may be call'd to account as one Heterodox, in the Points of Free Grace, Free will, Predestination, Original Sin, Justification by Faith, Transubstantiation, the Pope's Supremacy, and what not? as well as in the Doctrine of the Trinity; and all because they cannot be furnish'd with clear and distinct Notions of Grace, Free-Will, Transubstantiation, &c. by Sensation or Reflection. For in all these, or any other Points, I do not see but there may be Complaint made, that they have not always a right Understanding and clear Notions of those things, on which the Doctrine they dispute of, depends. And 'tis not altogether unusual, for Men to talk unintelligibly to themselves and others, in these and other Points of Controversy, for want of clear and distinct Apprehensions, or (as I would call them, did not your Lordship dislike it) Ideas: For all which unintelligible Talking, I do not think my self accountable, tho' it should so fall out that my way, by Ideas, would not help them to what it seems is wanting, clear and distinct Notions. If my way be ineffectual to that purpose, they may, for all me, make use of any other more successful, and leave me out of the Controversy, as one useless to either Party, for deciding of the Question.

Supposing, as your Lordship says, and as you have undertaken to make appear, That the clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction, should not come into the Mind by the simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection; what, I beseech your Lordship, is this to the Dispute concerning the Trinity, on either side? And if after your Lordship has endeavour'd to give clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person, the Disputants in this Controversy should still talk unintelligibly about this Point, for want of clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person; ought your Lordship to be brought in among the Partisans on the other side, by any one who writ a *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*? In good earnest, my Lord, I do not see how the clear and distinct Notions of Nature and Person, not coming into the Mind by the simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection, any more contains any Objection against the Doctrine of the Trinity, than the clear and distinct Apprehensions of Original Sin, Justification or Transubstantiation, not coming to the Mind by the simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection, contains any Objection against the Doctrine of Original Sin, Justification or Transubstantiation, and so of all the rest of the Terms used in any Controversy in Religion; however your Lordship, in a *Treatise of the Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, and in the Chapter where you make it your business to answer Objections in point of Reason, set your self seriously to prove, That clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction, come not into our Minds by these simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection. In order to the making this appear, we read as followeth:

P. 252. As to Nature, that is sometimes taken for the essential Property of a thing: as, when we say, That such a thing is of a different nature from another; we mean no more, than that it is differenced by such Properties as come to our Knowledge. Sometimes Nature is taken for the thing it self in which these Properties are; and so Aristotle

took

took Nature for a Corporeal Substance, which had the Principles of Motion in it self: But Nature and Substance are of an equal extent; and so that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties, is the Nature, whether it be meant of bodily or spiritual Substances.

Your Lordship, in this Paragraph, gives us two Significations of the Word Nature; 1. That it is sometimes taken for essential Properties, which I easily admit. 2. That sometimes it is taken for the thing it self in which these Properties are, and consequently for Substance it self. And this your Lordship proves out of Aristotle.

Whether Aristotle call'd the thing it self wherein the Essential Properties are, Nature, I will not dispute: But that your Lordship thinks fit to call Substance Nature, is evident. And from thence I think your Lordship endeavours to prove in the following Words, That we can have from Ideas no clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature. Your Lordship's Words are:

I grant, That by Sensation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of things; but our Reason is satisfy'd that there must be something beyond these, because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves. So that the NATURE of things properly belongs to our Reason, and not to mere Ideas. P. 252.

How we come by the Idea of Substance, from the simple ones of Sensation and Reflection, I have endeavour'd to shew in another place, and therefore shall not trouble your Lordship with here again. But what your Lordship infers, in these Words, So that the Nature of Things properly belongs to our Reason, and not to mere Ideas; I do not well understand. Your Lordship indeed here again seems to oppose Reason and Ideas; and to that I say, mere Ideas are the Objects of the Understanding, and Reason is one of the Faculties of the Understanding employ'd about them; and that the Understanding, or Reason, which-ever your Lordship pleases to call it, makes or forms, out of the simple ones that come in by Sensation and Reflection, all the other Ideas, whether general, relative, or complex, by abstracting, comparing and compounding its positive simple Ideas, whereof it cannot make or frame any one, but what it receives by Sensation or Reflection. And therefore, I never deny'd that Reason was employ'd about our particular simple Ideas, to make out of them Ideas general, relative, and complex; nor about all our Ideas, whether simple or complex, positive or relative, general or particular: it being the proper business of Reason, in the search after Truth and Knowledge, to find out the Relations between all these sorts of Ideas, in the perception whereof Knowledge and Certainty of Truth consists.

These, my Lord, are, in short, my Notions about Ideas, their Original and Formation, and of the use the Mind, or Reason, makes of them in Knowledge. Whether your Lordship thinks fit to call this a new way of Reasoning, must be left to your Lordship; whether it be a right way, is that alone which I am concern'd for. But your Lordship seems all along (I crave leave here once for all to take notice of it) to have some particular Exception against Ideas, and particularly clear and distinct Ideas, as if they were not to be used, or were of no use in Reason and Knowledge; or, as if Reason were oppos'd to them, or leads us into the Knowledge and Certainty of things without them; or, the Knowledge of things did not at all depend on them. I beg your Lordship's pardon for expressing my self so variously and doubtfully in this matter; the reason whereof is, because I must own, That I do not every where clearly understand what your Lordship means, when you speak, as you do, of Ideas; as if I ascrib'd more to them, than belong'd to them; or expected more of them, than they could do; v. g. where your Lordships says,

But is all this contain'd in the simple Idea of these Operations? And again, So that here it is not the Clearness of the Idea, but an immediate Act of Perception, which is the true Ground of Certainty. And farther, So that our Certainty is not from the Ideas themselves, but from the Evidence of Reason. And in another place, It is not the Ideas that makes us certain, but the Argument from that which we perceive in and about our selves. Is it from the clear and distinct Idea of it? No! but from this Argument. And here, P. 253. The Nature of things belongs to our Reason, and not to mere Ideas. P. 241. P. 248. P. 250.

These, and several the like Passages, your Lordship has against what your Lordship calls This new way of Ideas, and an admirable way to bring us to the Certainty of Reason. P. 243.

I never

I never said nor thought *Ideas*, or any thing else, could bring us to the Certainty of Reason, without the Exercise of Reason. And then my Lord, if we will imploy our Minds, and exercise our Reasons, to bring us to Certainty; what, I beseech you, shall they be imploy'd about but *Ideas*? For *Ideas*, in my Sense of the Word, are, "Whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding, when a Man thinks; Or, Whatsoever it is the Mind can be imploy'd about in thinking." And again, I have these Words, "Whatsoever is the immediate Object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call *Idea*." So that my way of *Ideas*, and of coming to Certainty by them, is to imploy our Minds in thinking upon something; and I do not see but your Lordship your self, and every body else, must make use of my way of *Ideas*, unless they can find out a way that will bring them to Certainty, by thinking on nothing. So that let Certainty be placed as much as it will on Reason, let the Nature of Things belong as properly as it will to our Reason, it will nevertheless be true, That Certainty consists in the Perception of the agreement or disagreement of *Ideas*; and that the complex *Idea* the word Nature stands for, is ultimately made up of the simple *Ideas* of Sensation and Reflection. Your Lordship proceeds.

P. 253.

But we must yet proceed farther: For Nature may be consider'd two ways:

1. As it is in distinct Individuals; as the Nature of a Man is equally in Peter, James and John; and this is the common Nature, with a particular Subsistence proper to each of them. For the Nature of Man, as in Peter, is distinct from the same Nature, as it is in James and John; otherwise, they would be but one Person, as well as have the same Nature. And this distinction of Persons in them, is discern'd both by our Senses, as to their different Accidents; and by our Reason, because they have a separate Existence; not coming into it at once, and in the same manner.

2. Nature may be consider'd abstractly, without respect to individual Persons; and then it makes an intire Notion of it self. For however the same Nature may be in different Individuals, yet the Nature in it self remains one and the same; which appears from this evident Reason, that otherwise every Individual must make a different kind.

P. 253.

P. 254.

I am so little confident of my own Quickness, and of having got, from what your Lordship has said here, a clear and distinct Apprehension concerning Nature, that I must beg your Lordship's pardon, if I should happen to dissatisfy your Lordship, by talking unintelligible, or besides the purpose about it. I must then confess to your Lordship, 1. That I do not clearly understand whether your Lordship, in these two Paragraphs, speaks of Nature, as standing for Essential Properties; or of Nature, as standing for Substance: and yet it is of great moment in the Case, because your Lordship allows, That the Notion of Nature in the former of these Senses, may be had from Sensation and Reflection; but of Nature in the latter Sense, your Lordship says, It properly belongs to Reason, and not mere Ideas. 2. Your Lordship's saying in the first of these Paragraphs, That the Nature of Man, as in Peter, is distinct from the same Nature as it is in James and John; and in the second of them, That however the SAME Nature may be in different Individuals, yet the Nature it self remains ONE AND THE SAME; does not give me so clear and distinct an Apprehension concerning Nature, that I know which, in your Lordship's Opinion, I ought to think, either that one and the same Nature is in Peter and John; or that a Nature distinct from that in John, is in Peter: And the Reason is, because I cannot, in my way by Ideas, well put together one and the same and distinct. My Apprehension concerning the Nature of Man, or the common Nature of Man) if your Lordship will, upon this Occasion, give me leave to trouble your Lordship with it) is, in short, this; That it is a Collection of several Ideas, combined into one complex, abstract Idea, which when they are found united in any Individual existing, tho' joined in that Existence with several other Ideas, that individual or particular Being is truly said to have the Nature of a Man, or the Nature of a Man to be in him; for as much as all these simple Ideas are found united in him, which answer the complex, abstract Idea, to which the specifick Name Man is given by any one: which abstract, specifick Idea, he keeps the same, when he applies the specifick

specifick Name standing for it, to distinct Individuals; *i. e.* no body changes his *Idea* of a *Man*, when he says *Peter* is a *Man*, from that *Idea* which he makes the Name *Man* to stand for, when he calls *John* a *Man*. This short way by *Ideas*, has not, I confess, those different, and more learned and scholastick Considerations set down by your Lordship. But how they are necessary, or at all tend to prove what your Lordship has propos'd to prove, *viz.* That we have no clear and distinct *Idea* of *Nature*, from the simple *Ideas* got from Sensation and Reflection, I confess I do not yet see. But your Lordship goes on to it:

Let us now see how far these Things can come from our simple Ideas, by Reflection and Sensation. And I shall lay down the Hypothesis of THOSE, who resolve our Certainty into Ideas, as plainly and intelligibly as I can. P. 254

Here I am got again into the Plural Number: Fortho' it be said the *Hypothesis* of *THOSE*, yet my Words alone are quoted for that *Hypothesis*, and not a word of any body else in this whole Business concerning *Nature*. What they are, I shall give the Reader, as your Lordship has set them down.

1. *We are told*, "That all simple *Ideas* are true and adequate. Not, that they are the true Representations of things without us; but that they are the true Effects of such Powers in them, as produce such Sensation within us." So that really we can understand nothing certainly by them, but the Effects they have upon us. *Human Understanding, L. 2. ch. 30, 31.*

For these Words of mine, I find *Human Understanding*, L. 2. ch. 30, 31. quoted; but I crave leave to observe to your Lordship, That in neither of these Chapters do I find the Words, as they stand here in your Lordship's Book. In B. 2. Ch. 31. Sect. 2. of my Essay, I find these Words, "That all our simple *Ideas* are adequate, because being nothing but the Effects of certain Powers in things fitted or ordained by God, to produce such Sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those Powers." And in Chap. 30. Sect. 2. I say, That "our simple *Ideas* are all real, all agree to the reality of Things. Not that they are all of them the Images or Representations of what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary Qualities of Bodies, hath been already shew'd."

These are the Words in my Book, from whence those in your Lordship's seem to be gather'd, but with some difference; For I do not remember that I have any where said, of all our simple *Ideas*, That they are none of them true Representations of Things without us; as the Words I find in your Lordship's Book, seem to make me say. The contrary whereof, appears from the Words which I have set down, out of Chap. 30. where I deny only the simple *Ideas* of secondary Qualities, to be Representations; but do every where affirm, That the simple *Ideas* of primary Qualities, are the Images or Representation of what does exist without us. So that my Words, in the Chapters quoted by your Lordship, not saying that all our simple *Ideas* are only Effects, and none of them Representations, your Lordship, I humbly conceive, cannot, upon that account, infer from my Words, as you do here, *viz.* So that really we can understand nothing certainly by them. P. 245.

The remaining Words of this Sentence, I must beg your Lordship's Pardon, if I profess I do not understand: They are these; *But the Effects they have upon us.* They here, and *Them* in the preceding Words to which they are joined, signify simple *Ideas*; for 'tis of those your Lordship infers, So that really we can understand nothing certainly by them, but the Effects they have upon us. And then your Lordship's Words import thus much, So that really we can understand nothing certainly by simple *Ideas*, but the Effects simple *Ideas* have upon us: which I cannot understand to be what your Lordship intended to infer from the preceding Words taken to be mine. For, I suppose your Lordship argues, from my Opinion concerning the simple *Ideas* of secondary Qualities, the little real Knowledge we should receive from them, if it be true, that they are not Representations or Images of any thing in Bodies, but only Effects of certain Powers in Bodies to produce them in us: And in that Sense I take the liberty to read your Lordship's words thus; So that really we can understand nothing certainly by [these *Ideas*] but the Effects [those Powers] have upon us. To which I answer,

1. That we as certainly know and distinguish Things by *Ideas*, supposing them nothing but Effects produc'd in us by these Powers, as if they were Representations. I can as certainly, when I have occasion for either, distinguish Gold from Silver by the Colour, or Wine from Water by the Taste; if the Colour of the one, or the Taste of the other, be only an effect of their Powers on me, as if that Colour and that Taste were Representations and Resemblances of something in those Bodies.

2. I answer; That we have certainly as much Pleasure and Delight by those *Ideas*, one way as the other. The Smell of a Violet or Taste of a Peach, gives me as real and certain Delight, if it be only an Effect, as if it were the true Resemblance of something in that Flower and Fruit. And I a little the more wonder, to hear your Lordship complain so much of want of Certainty in this Case, when I read these Words of your Lordship in another place:

P. 256. *That from the Powers and Properties of Things which are knowable by us, we may know as much of the internal Essence of Things, as those Powers and Properties discover. I do not say, That we can know all Essences of Things alike; nor that we can attain to a perfect Understanding of all that belong to them: But if we can know so much, as that there are certain Beings in the World, endued with such distinct Powers and Properties; What is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of Things? But we do not see the bare Essence of Things. What is that bare Essence, without the Powers and Properties belonging to it? It is that internal Constitution of Things, from whence those Powers and Properties flow. Suppose we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be, for any Discoveries that have been yet made) that is a good Argument, to prove the uncertainty of Philosophical Speculations, about the real Essence of Things; but it is no prejudice to us, who enquire after the Certainty of such Essences. For altho' we cannot comprehend the internal Frame or Constitution of Things, nor in what manner they do flow from the Substance; yet by them we certainly know, that there are such Essences, and that they are distinguish'd from each other by their Powers and Properties.*

Give me leave, if your Lordship please, to argue after the same manner in the present Case: *That from these simple Ideas which are knowable by us, we know as much of the Powers and internal Constitutions of Things, as these Powers discover; and if we can know so much as that there are such Powers, and that there are certain Beings in the World, endued with such Powers and Properties, that by these simple Ideas that are but the Effects of these Powers, we can as certainly distinguish the Beings wherein those Powers are, and receive as certain Advantage from them, as if those simple Ideas were Resemblances: What is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of Things? But we do not see that internal Constitution from whence those Powers flow. Suppose we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be for any Discoveries that have been yet made) that is a good Argument, to shew how short our Philosophical Speculations are about the real, internal Constitutions of Things; but is no prejudice to us, who by those simple Ideas search out, find and distinguish Things for our Uses. For tho', by those Ideas which are not Resemblances, we cannot comprehend the internal Frame or Constitution of Things, nor in what manner these Ideas are produc'd in us by those Powers; yet by them we certainly know, That there are such Essences or Constitutions of these Substances, that have those Powers, whereby they regularly produce those Ideas in us; and that they are distinguish'd from each other by those Powers.*

The next Words your Lordship sets down, as out of my Book, are:
P. 254. 2. "All our *Ideas* of Substances are imperfect and inadequate, because they refer to the real Essences of Things of which we are ignorant, and no Man knows what Substance is in it self: And they are all false, when look'd on as the Representations of the unknown Essences of Things."

In these too, my Lord, you must give me leave to take notice, That there is a little Variation from my Words: For I do not say, *That all our Ideas of Substances are imperfect and inadequate, because they refer to the real Essences of Things*; for some People may not refer them to real Essences. But I do say,

B. 2. c. 21. "That all *Ideas* of Substances, which are refer'd to real Essences, are in "that

"that respect inadequate:" As may be seen more at large in that Chapter. Your Lordship's next Quotation has in it something of a like Slip. The Words which your Lordship sets down, are, P. 254.

3. *Abstract Ideas are only general Names, made by separating Circumstances of Time and Place, &c. from them, which are only the Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding.*

For these your Lordship quotes Chap. 3. Sect. 6. of my third Book; where my Words are, "The next thing to be consider'd, is, how general Words come to be made. For since all things that exist are only Particulars, how come we by general Terms? or where find we those general Natures they are suppos'd to stand for? Words become general, by being made Signs of general Ideas; and Ideas become general, by separating from them the Circumstances of Time or Place, and any other Ideas that may determine them to this or that particular Existence. By this way of Abstraction, they are made capable of representing more Individuals than one; each of which, having in it a Conformity to that abstract Idea, is (as we call it) of that sort." By which Words it appears, that I am far enough from saying, *That abstract Ideas are only general Names.* Your Lordship's next Quotation out of my Book, is,

4. "Essence may be taken two ways. 1. For the real, internal, unknown Constitutions of Things; and in this sense it is understood as to particular Things. 2. For the abstract Idea; and one is said to be the nominal, the other the real Essence. And the nominal Essences only are immutable, and are Helps to enable them to consider things, and to discourse of them." P. 255.

Here too, I think, there are some Words left out, which are necessary to make my Meaning clearly understood; which your Lordship will find, if you think fit to give your self the trouble to cast your eye again on that Chapter, which you here quote. But not discerning clearly what use your Lordship makes of them, as they are either in your Lordship's Quotation, or in my Book, I shall not trouble your Lordship about them. Your Lordship goes on:

But two Things are granted, which tend to clear this matter.

P. 255.

1. *That there is a real Essence, which is the Foundation of Powers and Properties.*

2. *That we may know these Powers and Properties, altho' we are ignorant of the real Essence.*

If by that indefinite Expression, *We may know these Powers and Properties*, your Lordship means, *That we may know some of the Powers and Properties that depend on the real Essences of Substances*; I grant it to be my Meaning. If your Lordship, in those Words, comprehends all their Powers and Properties, that goes beyond my Meaning. From these two things, which I grant your Lordship says, you infer,

1. *That from those true and adequate Ideas, which we have of the Modes and Properties of Things, we have sufficient Certainty of the real Essence of them: For these Ideas are allow'd to be true; and either by them we may judge of the Truth of Things, or we can make no Judgment at all of any thing without our selves.* P. 255.

If our Ideas be only the Effects we see of the Powers of Things without us; yet our Reason must be satisfy'd, That there could be no such Powers, unless there were some real Beings which had them. So that either we may be certain, by these Effects, of the real Being of Things; or it is not possible, as we are fram'd, to have any Certainty at all of any thing without our selves.

All this, if I mistake not your Lordship, is only to prove, That by the Ideas of Properties and Powers which we observe in things, our Reason must be satisfy'd that there are without us real Beings, with real Essences: which being that which I readily own and have said in my Book, I cannot but acknowledg my self oblig'd to your Lordship, for being at the pains to collect Places out of my Book, to prove what I hold in it; and the more, because your Lordship does it by ways and steps, which possibly I should never have thought of. Your Lordship's next Inference is,

2. *That from the Powers and Properties of things, which are knowable by us, we may know as much of the internal Essence of things, as those Powers and Properties discover. I do not say, That we can know all Essences of things alike; nor that we can attain to a perfect Understanding of all that belong to them: But if we can know so much, as that there are certain Beings in the World, endu'd with such distinct Powers* P. 256.

and Properties; what is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of Things? But we do not see the bare Essence of Things. What is that bare Essence without the Powers and Properties belonging to it? It is that internal Constitution of things, from whence those Powers and Properties flow. Suppose we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be, for any Discoveries that have been yet made) that is a good Argument to prove the Uncertainty of Philosophical Speculations, about the real Essences of things; but it is no prejudice to us, who inquire after the Certainty of such Essences. For altho' we cannot comprehend the internal Frame or Constitution of Things, nor in what manner they do flow from the Substance; yet, by them, we certainly know that there are such Essences, and that they are distinguish'd from each other by their Powers and Properties.

This second Inference seems to be nothing but a Reproof to those who complain, That they do not see the bare Essences of Things. Complaining that God did not make us otherwise than he has, and with larger Capacities than he has thought fit to give us, is, I confess, a Fault worthy of your Lordship's Reproof. But to say, That if we knew the real Essences or internal Constitutions of those Beings, some of whose Properties we know, we should have much more certain Knowledge concerning those Things and their Properties, I am sure is true, and I think no faulty complaining; and if it be, I must own my self to your Lordship to be one of those Complainers.

But your Lordship asks, *What is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of things?*

If your Lordship means, as your Words seem to import, *What is it we complain of, in order to our Certainty*, that those Properties are the Properties of some Beings, or that something does exist when those Properties exist? I answer, *We complain of the want of nothing in order to that Certainty*, or such a Certainty as that is. But there are other very desirable Certainties, or other parts of Knowledge concerning the same things, which we may want when we have those Certainties. Knowing the Colour, Figure, and Smell of Hyssop, I can, when I see Hyssop, know so much, as that there is a certain Being in the World, endu'd with such distinct Powers and Properties; and yet I may justly complain, that I want something in order to Certainty, that Hyssop will cure a Bruise or a Cough, or that it will kill Moths; or, used in a certain way, harden Iron; or an hundred other useful Properties that may be in it, which I shall never know; and yet might be certain of, if I knew the real Essences, or internal Constitution of Things, on which all their Properties depend.

Your Lordship agreeing with me, That the real Essence is that internal Constitution of Things, from whence their Powers and Properties flow; adds farther, *Suppose we be ignorant of this [Essence] as we are like to be for any Discoveries have been yet made, that is a good Argument to prove the Uncertainty of Philosophical Speculations about the real Essences of Things; but it is no prejudice to us, who enquire after the Certainty of such Essences.*

I know no body that ever deny'd the Certainty of such real Essences or internal Constitutions, in things that do exist, if it be that that your Lordship means by Certainty of such Essences. If it be any other Certainty that your Lordship enquires after, relating to such Essences, I confess I know not what it is, since your Lordship acknowledges, *We are ignorant of those real Essences, those internal Constitutions, and are like to be so; and seem to think it the incurable Cause of Uncertainty in Philosophical Speculations.*

Your Lordship adds, *For altho' we cannot comprehend the internal Frame and Constitution of Things, nor in what manner they do flow from the Substance.*

Here I must acknowledg to your Lordship, That my Notion of these Essences differs a little from your Lordship's; for I do not take them to flow from the Substance in any created Being, but to be in every thing that internal Constitution, or Frame, or Modification of the Substance, which God in his Wisdom and good Pleasure thinks fit to give to every particular Creature, when he gives it a Being: And such Essences I grant there are in all things that exist. Your Lordship's third Inference begins thus:

P. 257. 3. *The Essences of Things, as they are knowable by us, have a Reality in them: For they are founded on the natural Constitution of Things.*

I think

I think the real *Essences of Things* are not so much founded on, as that they are the very real *Constitutions of Things*, and therefore I easily grant there is *Reality* in them; and 'twas from that *Reality* that I call'd them real *Essences*. But yet from hence, I cannot agree to what follows.

And however the abstracted *Ideas* are the *Work of the Mind*, yet they are not mere *Creatures of the Mind*; as appears by an instance produc'd of the "Essence of the Sun, being in one single Individual; in which case it is granted, That the Idea may be so abstracted, that more Suns might agree in it, and it is as much a sort, as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars." So that here we have a real *Essence* subsisting in one Individual, but capable of being multiply'd into more and the same *Essence* remaining. But in this one Sun there is a real *Essence*, and not a mere nominal or abstracted *Essence*: But suppose there were more Suns; would not each of them have the real *Essence* of the Sun? For what is it makes the second Sun, but having the same real *Essence* with the first? If it were but a nominal *Essence*, then the second would have nothing but the Name. P. 257.

This, my Lord, as I understand it, is to prove, That the abstract general *Essence* of any sort of things, or things of the same Denomination, v. g. of *Man* or *Murigolds*, hath a real *Being* out of the Understanding; which I confess, my Lord, I am not able to conceive. Your Lordship's Proof here brought out of my *Essay*, concerning the Sun, I humbly conceive will not reach it: Because what is said there, does not at all concern the real, but nominal *Essence*; as is evident from hence, That the *Idea* I speak of there, is a complex *Idea*; but we have no complex *Idea* of the internal Constitution, or real *Essence*, of the Sun. Besides, I say expressly, That our distinguishing Substances into Species by Names, is not at all founded on their real *Essences*. So that the Sun being one of these Substances, I cannot, in the place quoted by your Lordship, be suppos'd to mean by *Essence of the Sun*, the real *Essence* of the Sun, unless I had so express'd it. But all this Argument will be at an End, when your Lordship shall have explain'd what you mean by these words, *True Sun*. In my sense of them, any thing will be a *True Sun*, to which the name *Sun* may be truly and properly apply'd; and to that Substance or Thing, the name *Sun* may be truly and properly apply'd, which has united in it that Combination of sensible Qualities, by which any thing else that is call'd *Sun* is distinguish'd from other Substances, i. e. by the nominal *Essence*: And thus our Sun is denominated and distinguish'd from a fixed Star; not by a real *Essence*, that we do not know (for if we did, 'tis possible we should find the real *Essence* or Constitution of one of the fix'd Stars, to be the same with that of our Sun) but by a complex *Idea* of sensible Qualities coexisting; which, wherever they are found, make a true Sun. And thus I crave leave to answer your Lordship's Question, For what is it makes the second Sun to be a true Sun, but having the same real *Essence* with the first? If it were but a nominal *Essence*, then the second would have nothing but the Name.

I humbly conceive, if it had the Nominal *Essence*, it would have something besides the Name, viz. That Nominal *Essence*, which is sufficient to denominate it truly a Sun, or to make it be a true Sun, tho' we know nothing of that real *Essence* whereon that nominal one depends. Your Lordship will then argue, That that real *Essence* is in the second Sun, and makes the second Sun. I grant it, when the second Sun comes to exist, so as to be perceiv'd by us to have all the *Ideas* contain'd in our complex *Idea*, i. e. in our Nominal *Essence* of a Sun. For should it be true (as is now believ'd by Astronomers) that the real *Essence* of the Sun were in any of the fix'd Stars, yet such a Star could not for that be by us call'd a Sun, whilst it answers not our complex *Idea* or nominal *Essence* of a Sun. But how far that will prove, That the *Essences of Things*, as they are knowable by us, have a *Reality* in them, distinct from that of abstract *Ideas* in the Mind, which are merely *Creatures of the Mind*, I do not see; and we shall farther enquire, in considering your Lordship's following words:

Therefore there must be a real *Essence* in every Individual of the same kind. Yes, P. 258. and I beg leave of your Lordship to say, of a different kind too. For that alone is it which makes it to be what it is.

That every individual Substance has a real, internal, individual Constitution, i. e. a real *Essence*, that makes it to be what it is, I readily grant. Upon this your Lordship says,

Peter,

P. 258. Peter, James and John are all true and real Men. *Answ.* Without doubt supposing them to be Men, they are true and real Men, *i. e.* supposing the Name of that Species belongs to them. And so three *Bobaques* are all true and real *Bobaques*, supposing the Name of that Species of Animals belongs to them.

For I beseech your Lordship to consider, whether in your way of Arguing, by naming them *Peter, James and John*, Names familiar to us, as appropriated to Individuals of the Species *Man*, your Lordship does not first suppose them *Men*; and then very safely ask, Whether they be not all true and real Men? But if I should ask your Lordship, Whether *Weweena, Chuckery and Cousheda*, were true and real Men or no? Your Lordship would not be able to tell me, till I having pointed out to your Lordship the Individuals called by those Names; your Lordship by examining whether they had in them those sensible Qualities, which your Lordship has combined into that Complex *Idea*, to which you give the specifick Name *Man*, determin'd them all, or some of them, to be of the Species which you call *Man*, and so to be true and real Men: which when your Lordship has determin'd, 'tis plain you did it by that which is only the nominal Essence, as not knowing the real one. But your Lordship farther asks,

P. 258. What is it makes Peter, James, and John, real Men? Is it the attributing the general Name to them? No certainly; but that the true and real Essence of a Man is in every one of them.

If when your Lordship asks, What makes them Men? your Lordship us'd the word *making* in the proper Sense for the efficient Cause, and in that Sense it were true, that the Essence of a Man, *i. e.* the specifick Essence of that Species, made a Man; it would undoubtedly follow, that this specifick Essence had a reality beyond that of being only a general abstract *Idea* in the Mind. But when it is said, That it is the true and real Essence of a Man in every one of them, that makes Peter, James and John, true and real Men; the true and real meaning of these Words is no more, but that the Essence of that Species, *i. e.* the Properties answering the complex abstract *Idea*, to which the specifick Name is given, being found in them, that makes them be properly and truly called Men, or is the Reason why they are called Men. Your Lordship adds,

P. 258. And we must be as certain of this, as we are that they are Men.

How, I beseech your Lordship, are we certain, that they are Men, but only by our Senses, finding those Properties in them which answer the abstract complex *Idea*, which is in our Minds of the specifick *Idea*, to which we have annexed the specifick Name *Man*? This I take to be the true meaning of what

P. 258. your Lordship says in the next Words, *viz.* They take their denomination of being Men from that common Nature or Essence which is in them; and I am apt to think, these Words will not hold true in any other Sense.

Your Lordship's fourth Inference begins thus:

P. 258. That the general *Idea* is not made from the simple *Ideas*, by the mere Act of the Mind abstracting from Circumstances, but from Reason and Consideration of the Nature of Things.

I thought, my Lord, That Reason and Consideration had been Acts of the Mind, mere Acts of the Mind, when any thing was done by them. Your Lordship gives a Reason for it, *viz.*

P. 258. For when we see several Individuals that have the same Powers and Properties, we thence infer, that there must be something common to all, which makes them of one kind.

I grant the Inference to be true; but must beg leave to deny that this proves, That the general *Idea* the Name is annexed to, is not made by the Mind. I have said, and it agrees with what your Lordship here says, That "the Mind, in making its complex *Ideas* of Substances, only follows "Nature, and puts no *Ideas* together, which are not supposed to have an "Union in Nature: nobody joins the Voice of a Sheep, with the Shape "of an Horse; nor the Colour of Lead, with the Weight and Fixedness of "Gold, to be the complex *Ideas* of any real Substances; unless he has a "mind to fill his Head with Chimeras, and his Discourse with unintelligible "Words.

“ Words. Men observing certain Qualities always joined and existing together, therein copied Nature, and of *Ideas* so united, made their complex ones of Substances, &c.” Which is very little different from what your Lordship here says, That ’tis from our Observation of *Individuals*, that we come to infer, That there is something common to them all. But I do not see how it will thence follow, that the general or specifick *Idea* is not made by the mere Act of the Mind. No, says your Lordship;

There is something common to them all, which makes them of one Kind; and if the difference of Kinds be real, that which makes them all of one Kind, must not be a nominal, but real Essence. P. 259.

This may be some Objection to the Name of *Nominal Essence*; but is, as I humbly conceive, none to the Thing designed by it. There is an internal Constitution of things, on which their Properties depend. This your Lordship and I are agreed of, and this we call the *real Essence*. There are also certain complex *Ideas*, or Combinations of these Properties in Men’s Minds, to which they commonly annex specifick Names, or Names of sorts or kinds of Things. This, I believe, your Lordship does not deny. These Complex *Ideas*, for want of a better Name, I have called *Nominal Essences*; how properly, I will not dispute. But if any one will help me to a better Name for them, I am ready to receive it; till then I must, to express my self, use this. Now, my Lord, *Body, Life*, and the Power of *Reasoning*, being not the *real Essence* of a *Man*, as I believe your Lordship will agree; will your Lordship say, That they are not enough to make the Thing wherein they are found of the kind called *Man*, and not of the kind called *Baboon*, because the difference of these Kinds is real? If this be not real enough to make the Thing of one kind and not of another, I do not see how *Animal rationale* can be enough really to distinguish a *Man* from an *Horse*: For that is but the nominal, not *real Essence* of that kind, designed by the name *Man*. And yet, I suppose, every one thinks it real enough, to make a real difference between that and other Kinds. And if nothing will serve the turn, to MAKE Things of one Kind and not of another, (which as I have shew’d, signifies no more but ranking of them under different specifick Names) but their real, unknown Constitutions, which are the *real Essences* we are speaking of, I fear it would be a long while before we should have really different kinds of Substances, or distinct Names for them; unless we could distinguish them by these differences, of which we have no distinct Conceptions. For I think it would not be readily answer’d me, if I should demand, Wherein lies the real difference in the internal Constitution of a *Stag* from that of a *Buck*, which are each of them very well known to be of one Kind, and not of the other; and no body questions but that the Kinds whereof each of them is, are really different. Your Lordship farther says,

And this difference doth not depend upon the complex Ideas of Substances, whereby Men arbitrarily join Modes together in their Minds. P. 259.

I confess, my Lord, I know not what to say to this, because I do not know what these complex *Ideas* of Substances are, whereby Men arbitrarily join Modes together in their Minds. But I am apt to think there is a mistake in the Matter, by the Words that follow, which are these:

For let them mistake in their Complication of Ideas, either in leaving out or putting in what doth not belong to them; and let their Ideas be what they please, the real Essence of a Man, and an Horse, and a Tree, are just what they were. P. 259.

The mistake I spoke of, I humbly suppose is this, That things are here taken to be distinguish’d by their *real Essences*; when by the very way of speaking of them, it is clear, that they are already distinguish’d by their nominal Essences, and are so taken to be. For what, I beseech your Lordship, does your Lordship mean, when you say, The *real Essence* of a *Man*, and an *Horse*, and a *Tree*, but that there are such Kinds already set out by the signification of these Names, *Man, Horse, Tree*? And what, I beseech your Lordship, is the signification of each of these specifick Names, but the complex *Idea* it stands for? And that complex *Idea* is the nominal Essence, and nothing else. So that taking *Man*, as your Lordship does here, to stand for a kind or sort of *Individuals*, all which agree in that common, complex *Idea*, which

which that specifick Name stands for; it is certain that the real Essence of all the Individuals, comprehended under the specifick name *Man*, in your use of it, would be just the same, let others leave out or put into their complex *Idea* of *Man* what they please; because the real Essence on which that unalter'd complex *Idea*, *i. e.* those Properties depend, must necessarily be concluded to be the same.

For I take it for granted, That in using the Name *Man*, in this place, your Lordship uses it for that complex *Idea* which is in your Lordship's Mind of that Species. So that your Lordship, by putting it for, or substituting it in the place of that complex *Idea*, where you say, the *real Essence* of it is just as it was, or the very same it was, does suppose the *Idea* it stands for, to be steddily the same. For if I change the signification of the word *Man*, whereby it may not comprehend just the same Individuals which in your Lordship's Sense it does, but shut out some of those that to your Lordship are *Men* in your signification of the Word *Man*, or take in others to which your Lordship does not allow the Name *Man*: I do not think your Lordship will say, That the real Essence of *Man*, in both the Senses, is the same; and yet your Lordship seems to say so, when you say, *Let Men mistake in the Complication of their Ideas, either in leaving out or putting in what does not belong to them; and let their Ideas be what they please, the real Essence of the Individuals comprehended under the Names annexed to these Ideas, will be the same*: For so, I humbly conceive, it must be put, to make out what your Lordship aims at. For as your Lordship puts it by the Name of *Man*, or any other specifick Name, your Lordship seems to me to suppose, that that Name stands for, and not for the same *Idea* at the same time.

For example, my Lord, let your Lordship's *Idea*, to which you annex the sign *Man*, be a rational Animal: Let another *Man's Idea* be a rational Animal of such a Shape; let a third *Man's Idea* be of an Animal of such a Size and Shape, leaving out Rationality; let a fourth's be an Animal with a Body of such a Shape, and an immaterial Substance, with a Power of Reasoning; let a fifth leave out of his *Idea*, an immaterial Substance: 'Tis plain every one of these will call his a *Man*, as well as your Lordship; and yet 'tis as plain that *Man*, as standing for all these distinct, complex *Ideas*, cannot be supposed to have the same internal Constitution, *i. e.* the same *real Essence*. The truth is, every distinct, abstract *Idea*, with a Name to it, makes a real, distinct Kind, whatever the *real Essence* (which we know not of any of them) be.

And therefore I grant it true, what your Lordship says in the next Words,
 P. 259. *And let the nominal Essences differ never so much, the real, common Essence or Nature of the several Kinds, are not at all alter'd by them; i. e.* that our Thoughts or *Ideas* cannot alter the real Constitutions that are in Things that exist; there is nothing more certain. But yet 'tis true, That the change of *Ideas* to which we annex them, can and does alter the signification of their Names, and thereby alter the Kinds, which by these Names we rank and sort them into. Your Lordship farther adds,

P. 259. *And these real Essences are unchangeable, i. e.* the internal Constitutions are unchangeable. Of what, I beseech your Lordship, are the internal Constitutions unchangeable? Not of any Thing that exists, but of God alone; for they may be changed all as easily by that Hand that made them, as the internal Frame of a Watch. What then is it that is unchangeable? The internal Constitution or real Essence of a Species: Which, in plain English, is no more but this, whilst the same specifick Name, *v. g.* of *Man*, *Horse* or *Tree*, is annexed to, or made the Sign of the same abstract, complex *Idea*, under which I rank several Individuals, it is impossible but the real Constitution on which that unalter'd, complex *Idea*, or nominal Essence depends, must be the same; *i. e.* in other Words, where we find all the same Properties, we have reason to conclude there is the same real, internal Constitution, from which those Properties flow.

But your Lordship proves the real Essences to be unchangeable, because God makes them, in these following Words:

P. 259. *For however there may happen some variety in Individuals by particular Accidents, yet the Essences of Men and Horses, and Trees, remain always the same; because they do not depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator, who hath made several sorts of Beings*

'Tis true, the real Constitutions or Essences of particular Things existing, do not depend on the Ideas of Men, but on the Will of the Creator; but their being ranked into sorts, under such and such Names, does depend, and wholly depend upon the Ideas of Men.

Your Lordship here ending your four Inferences, and all your Discourse about Nature; you come, in the next place to treat of *Person*, concerning which your Lordship discourseth thus:

2. Let us now come to the Idea of a Person. For altho' the common Nature in Man-kind be the same, yet we see a difference in the several Individuals, from one another: So that Peter, and James, and John, are all of the same kind; yet Peter is not James, and James is not John. But what is this Distinction founded upon? They may be distinguish'd from each other by our Senses as to difference of Features, distance of Place, &c. but that is not all; for supposing there were no such external Difference, yet there is a Difference between them, as several Individuals in the same Nature. And here lies the true common Idea of a Person, which arises from that manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual, and is not communicable to another. An individual, intelligent Substance, is rather suppos'd to the making of a Person, than the proper Definition of it: for a Person relates to something, which doth distinguish it from another intelligent Substance in the same Nature; and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subsistence, which agrees to one, and to none else of the Kind: and this is it which is called Personality. P. 259.

But then your Lordship asks, But how do our simple Ideas help us out in this Matter? Can we learn from them the difference of Nature and Person?

If Nature and Person are taken for two real Beings, that do or can exist any where, without any relation to these two Names, I must confess I do not see how simple Ideas, or any thing else, can help us out in this matter; nor can we from simple Ideas, or any thing else that I know, learn the difference between them, nor what they are.

The reason why I speak thus, is, because your Lordship, in your fore-cited Words, says, Here lies the true Idea of a Person; and in the foregoing Discourse speaks of Nature, as if it were some steady, establish'd Being, to which one certain precise Idea necessarily belongs to make it a true Idea: whereas, my Lord, in the way of Ideas, I begin at the other end, and think that the Word Person in it self signifies nothing; and so no Idea belonging to it, nothing can be said to be the true Idea of it. But as soon as the common use of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea, then that is the true Idea of a Person, and so of Nature: but because the Propriety of Language, i. e. the precise Idea that every Word stands for, is not always exactly known, but is often disputed, there is no other way for him that uses a Word which is in Dispute, but to define what he signifies by it; and then the Dispute can be no longer verbal, but must necessarily be about the Idea which he tells us he puts it for.

Taking therefore Nature and Person for the Signs of two Ideas they are put to stand for, there is nothing, I think, that helps us so soon, nor so well to find the difference of Nature and Person, as simple Ideas; for by enumerating all the simple Ideas, that are contain'd in the complex Idea that each of them is made to stand for, we shall immediately see the whole difference that is between them.

Far be it from me to say there is no other way but this: Your Lordship proposing to clear the distinction between Nature and Person; and having declared, We can have no clear and distinct Idea of it by Sensation or Reflection, and that the Grounds of Identity and Distinction come not into our Minds by the simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection; gave me some hopes of getting farther insight into these Matters, so as to have more clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, than was to be had by Ideas. But after having, with Attention, more than once read over what your Lordship with so much Application has writ thereupon; I must, with regret, confess, That the Way is too delicate, and the Matter too abstruse, for my Capacity; and that I have learned nothing out of your Lordship's elaborate Discourse, but this, That I must content my self with the condemn'd way by Ideas, and despair of ever attaining any Knowledge by any other than that, or farther than that will lead me to it. P. 252. P. 251.

The remaining part of the Chapter containing no Remarks of your Lordship, upon any thing in my Book, I am glad I have no occasion to give your

Mr. LOCKE's Letter to the

Lordship any farther Trouble, but only to beg your Lordship's Pardon for this, and to assure your Lordship, that I am,

My LORD,

Your Lordship's most humble

and most obedient Servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

P O S T S C R I P T.

My Lord,

UPON a Review of these Papers, I can hardly forbear wondering at myself what I have been doing in them; since I can scarce find upon what Ground this Controversy with me stands, or whence it rose, or whether it tends. And I should certainly repent my Pains in it, but that I conclude that your Lordship, who does not throw away your Time upon slight Matters and Things of small moment, having a quicker Sight and larger Views than I have, would not have troubled yourself so much with my Book, as to bestow on it Seven and Twenty Pages together of a very learned Treatise, and that on a very weighty Subject; and in those Twenty seven Pages, bring Seven and twenty Quotations out of my Book, unless there were something in it wherein it is very material that the World should be set right; which is what I earnestly desire should be done. And to that purpose alone, have taken the liberty to trouble your Lordship with this Letter.

If I have any where omitted any Thing of moment in your Lordship's Discourse concerning my Notions, or any where mistaken your Lordship's Sense in what I have taken notice of, I beg your Lordship's Pardon; with this Assurance, That it was not wilfully done. And if any where, in the warm pursuit of an Argument, Over-attention to the Matter should have made me let slip any Form of Expression, in the least Circumstance not carrying with it the utmost Marks of that Respect that I acknowledg due, and shall always pay to your Lordship's Person and known great Learning, I disown it; and desire your Lordship to look on it as not coming from my Intention, but Inadvertency.

No body's Notions, I think, are the better or truer, for ill Manners joined with them; and I conclude your Lordship, who so well knows the different Cast of Mens Heads, and of the Opinions that possess them, will not think it ill Manners in any one, if his Notions differ from your Lordship's, and that he owns that difference, and explains the Grounds of it as well as he can. I have always thought, that Truth and Knowledg, by the ill and over-eager management of Controversies, lose a great deal of the Advantages they might receive from the variety of Conceptions there is in Mens Understandings. Could the Heats, and Passion, and ill Language be left out of them, they would afford great Improvements to those who could separate them from by-Interests and personal Prejudices. These I look upon your Lordship to be altogether above.


It is not for me, who have so mean a Talent in it myself, to prescribe to any one how he should write; for when I have said all I can, he, 'tis like, will follow his own Method, and perhaps cannot help it. Much less would it be good Manners in me, to offer any thing that way to a Person of your Lordship's high Rank above me in Parts and Learning, as well as Place and Dignity. But yet your Lordship will excuse it to my short sightedness, if I wish sometimes that your Lordship would have been pleas'd, in this Debate, to have kept every one's part separate to himself; that what I am concerned in, might not have been so mingled with the Opinions of others, which are no Tenets of mine; nor, as I think, does what I have written any way relate to; but that I, and every one might have seen whom your Lordship's Arguments bore upon, and what Interest he had in the Controversy, and how far. At least, my Lord, give me leave to wish, that your Lordship had shewn what Connection any thing I have said about *Ideas*, and particularly about the *Idea of Substance*,

Substance, about the possibility that God, if he pleas'd, might indue some Systems of Matter with a Power of Thinking; or what I have said to prove a God, &c. has with any *Objections*, that are made by others against the Doctrine of the Trinity, or against *Mysteries*: For many Passages concerning *Ideas*, *Substances*, the Possibility of God's bestowing *Thought* on some Systems of Matter, and the *Proof of a God*, &c. your Lordship has quoted out of my Book, in a Chapter wherein your Lordship professes to answer *Objections against the Trinity in point of Reason*. Had I been able to discover in these Passages of my Book, quoted by your Lordship, what tendency your Lordship had observed in them to any such *Objections*, I should perhaps have troubled your Lordship with less impertinent Answers. But the uncertainty I was very often in, to what purpose your Lordship brought them, may have made my Explications of my self less apposite, than what your Lordship might have expected. If your Lordship had shewed me any thing in my Book, that contained or implied any opposition in it to any Thing revealed in Holy Writ concerning the Trinity, or any other Doctrine contain'd in the Bible, I should have been thereby oblig'd to your Lordship for freeing me from that Mistake, and for affording me an opportunity to own to the World that Obligation, by publicly retracting my Error. For I know not any thing more disingenuous, than not publicly to own a Conviction one has receiv'd concerning any Thing erroneous in what one has printed; nor can there, I think, be a greater Offence against Mankind, than to propagate a Falshood whereof one is convinced, especially in a Matter wherein Men are highly concerned not to be misled.

The Holy Scripture is to me, and always will be, the constant Guide of my Assent; and I shall always hearken to it, as containing infallible Truth, relating to Things of the highest Concernment. And I wish I could say, there were no Mysteries in it: I acknowledg there are to me, and I fear always will be. But where I want the Evidence of Things, there yet is Ground enough for me to believe, because God has said it: And I shall presently condemn and quit any Opinion of mine, as soon as I am shewn that it is contrary to any Revelation in the Holy Scripture. But I must confess to your Lordship, that I do not yet perceive any such Contrariety in any Thing in my *Essay of Human Undersstanding*.

Oates, Jan. 7.
1697.





Mr. LOCKE's REPLY

To the Right Reverend the
Lord Bishop of *Worcester's* Answer to his Letter,

Concerning some PASSAGES relating to

Mr. LOCKE's *Essay of Human Understanding*:

IN A

Late DISCOURSE of his Lordship's, in
Vindication of the TRINITY.

My LORD,



OUR Lordship having done my Letter the Honour to think it worth your Reply, I think my self bound in good Manners publicly to acknowledg the Favour, and to give your Lordship an Account of the Effect it has had upon me, and the Grounds upon which I yet differ from you in those Points, wherein I am still under the mortification of not being able to bring my Sentiments wholly to agree with your Lordship's. And this I the more readily do, because it seems to me, that that wherein the great difference now lies between us, is founded only on your Fears; which, I conclude, upon a sedate Review, your Lordship will either part with, or else give me other Reasons, besides your Apprehensions, to convince me of Mistakes in my Book, which your Lordship thinks to be of consequence even in Matters of Religion.

Your Lordship makes my Letter to consist of two Parts: my *Complaint* of your Lordship, and my *Vindication of myself*. You begin with my Complaint; one part whereof was, That I was brought into a Controversy, wherein I had never meddled, nor knew how I came to be concern'd in. To this your Lordship is pleas'd to promise me *Satisfaction*.

Since your Lordship has condescended so far, as to be at the pains to give me and others *Satisfaction* in this *Matter*, I crave leave to second your Design herein, and to premise a Remark or two for the clearer understanding the nature of my Complaint, which is the only way to *Satisfaction* in it.

1. Then it is to be observ'd, That the Proposition which you dispute against, as opposite to the Doctrine of the Trinity, is this, That *clear and distinct Ideas are necessary*

necessary to Certainty. This is evident not only from what your Lordship subjoins Vindica. to the Account of Reason, given by the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious*; P. 232. but also by what your Lordship says here again in your Answer to me, in these words: *To lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct Ideas, was the Opinion I oppos'd.* P. 14.

2. It is to be observ'd, That this you call a new way of Reason; and those that build upon it, Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning. Vindicat. P. 233, 234.

3. It is to be observ'd, that a great part of my Complaint was, That I was made one of the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning, without any reason at all. To this Complaint of mine, your Lordship has had the Goodness to make this Answer:

Now to give you, and others, Satisfaction as to this matter, I shall first give an account of the Occasion of it; and then shew what Care I took to prevent Misunderstanding about it. Answ. p. 4.

The first part of the Satisfaction your Lordship is pleas'd to offer, is contain'd in these Words.

The Occasion was this: Being to answer the Objections in point of Reason (which had not been answer'd before) the first I mention'd was; That it was above Reason, and therefore not to be believ'd. In answer to this, I propos'd two things to be consider'd: 1. What we understand by Reason. 2. What ground in Reason there is to reject any Doctrine above it, when it is propos'd as a Matter of Faith. P. 4. P. 5.

As to the former I observ'd, That the Unitarians, in their late Pamphlets, talk'd very much about clear and distinct Ideas and Perceptions, and that the Mysteries of Faith were repugnant to them; but never went about to state the Nature and Bounds of Reason, in such a manner as they ought to have done, who make it the Rule and Standard of what they are to believe. But I added, That a late Author, in a Book call'd, *Christianity not Mysterious*, had taken upon him to clear this matter, whom for that cause I was bound to consider: The Design of his Discourse related wholly to Matters of Faith, and not to Philosophical Speculations; so that there can be no dispute about his Application of those he calls Principles of Reason and Certainty.

"When the Mind makes use of intermediate Ideas, to discover the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas receiv'd into them; this Method of Knowledge, he saith, is properly call'd Reason or Demonstration.

"The Mind, as he goes on, receives Ideas two ways.

"1. By Intromission of the Senses.

"2. By considering its own Operations.

"And these simple and distinct Ideas are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning."

And so all our Certainty is resolv'd into two things, either "immediate Perception, which is Self-evidence: or the use of intermediate Ideas, which discovers the Certainty of any thing dubious:" which is what he calls Reason.

Now this, I said, did suppose, That we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds (by Reason) and that the only way to attain this Certainty, is by comparing these Ideas together; which excludes all Certainty of Faith or Reason, where we cannot have such clear and distinct Ideas.

From hence I proceeded to shew, That we could not have such clear and distinct Ideas as were necessary in the present Debate, either by Sensation or Reflection, and consequently we could not attain to any Certainty about it; for which I instanc'd in the Nature of Substance and Person, and the Distinction between them.

And by virtue of these Principles, I said, That I did not wonder that the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning had almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World. P. 7.

This is all your Lordship says here, to give me, and others, Satisfaction, as to the Matters of my Complaint: For what follows, to the 35th Page of your Answer, is nothing but your Lordship's arguing against what I have said concerning Substance.

In these words therefore, above quoted, I am to find the Satisfaction your Lordship has promis'd, as to the Occasion why your Lordship made me One of the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, and in that join'd me with the Unitarians, and the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious*. But I crave leave to represent to your Lordship, wherein the Words above-quoted come short of giving me Satisfaction. In

In the first place, 'tis plain they were intended for a short Narrative of what was contain'd in the tenth Chapter of your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, relating to this matter. But how could your Lordship think, that the repeating the same things over again, could give me or any body else Satisfaction, as to my being made one of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*?

Indeed I cannot say it is an exact Repetition of what is to be found in the beginning of that tenth Chapter; because your Lordship said, in that tenth Chapter, That the Author of *Christianity not Mysteious* gives an Account of Reason, which supposes that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to a Certainty of in our Minds. But here in the Passage above set down, out of your Answer to my Letter, I find it is not to his Account of Reason, but to something taken out of that, and something borrow'd by him out of my Book, to which your Lordship annexes this Supposition. For your Lordship says, *Now THIS, I said, did suppose that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds (by Reason.)*

If your Lordship did say so in your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, your Printer did your Lordship two manifest Injuries, The one is, That he omitted these words [*by Reason*]: And the other, That he annex'd your Lordship's words to the Account of Reason, there given by the Author of *Christianity not Mysteious*; and not to those words your Lordship here says you annex'd them to. For THIS here refers to other Words, and not barely to that Author's Account of Reason; as any one may satisfy himself, who will but compare these two Places together.

One thing more seems to me very remarkable in this matter, and that is, That the laying all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct Ideas, should be the Opinion which you oppose, as your Lordship declares; and that this should be it for which the Unitarians, the Author of *Christianity not Mysteious*, and I, are jointly brought on the Stage, under the title of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*: and yet no one Quotation be brought out of the Unitarians, to shew it to be their Opinion; nor any thing alledg'd out of the Author of *Christianity not Mysteious*, to shew it to be his; but only some things quoted out of him, which are said to suppose all Foundation of Certainty to be laid upon clear and distinct Ideas: which that they do suppose it, is not, I think, self-evident, nor yet prov'd. But this I am sure, as to my self, I do no where lay all Foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas; and therefore am still at a loss, why I was made One of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*.

Another thing wherein your Lordship's Narrative, intended for my Satisfaction, comes short of giving it me, is this; That at most it gives but an Account of the Occasion why the Unitarians, and the Author of *Christianity not Mysteious* were made by your Lordship the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*. But it pretends not to say a word why I was made One of them; which was the thing wherein I needed Satisfaction. For your Lordship breaks off your Report of the Matter of Fact, just when you were come to the Matter of my Complaint; which you pass over in silence, and turn your Discourse to what I have said in my Letter: For your Lordship ends the Account of the Occasion, in these words: *The Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning had almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World.* And there your Lordship stops. Whereas, 'tis in the words that immediately follow, that I am brought in as One of those Gentlemen, of which I would have been glad to have known the Occasion; and 'tis in this that I needed Satisfaction. For that which concerns the others, I meddle not with; I only desire to know upon what Occasion, or why I was brought into this Dispute of the Trinity? But of that, in this Account of the Occasion, I do not see that your Lordship says any thing.

I have been forc'd therefore to look again a little closer into this whole matter: And, upon a fresh Examination of what your Lordship has said, in your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, and in your Answer to my Letter, I come now to see a little clearer, that the Matter, in short, stands thus. The Author of *Christianity not mysteious*, was One of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*, because he had laid down a Doctrine concerning Reason, which suppos'd clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty. But that Doctrine of his tied me not at all to him, as may be seen by comparing his Account of Reason with what

what I have said of Reason in my *Essay*, which your Lordship accuses of no such Supposition; and so I stood clear from his Account of Reason, or any thing it supposes. But he having given an Account of the Original of our *Ideas*, and having said something about them conformable to what is in my *Essay*, that has tied him and me so close together, that by this sort of Connection I came to be one of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*, which consists in making clear and distinct *Ideas necessary to Certainty*, tho' I no where say, or suppose, clear and distinct *Ideas necessary to Certainty*.

How your Lordship came to join me with the Author of *Christianity not Myste-rious*, I think is now evident. And he being the Link whereby your Lordship joins me to the Unitarians, in *Objections against the Trinity in point of Reason*, answer'd; give me leave, my Lord, a little to examine the Connection of this Link on that side also, i. e. What has made your Lordship join him and the Unitarians in this point, viz. making clear and distinct *Ideas necessary to Certainty*; that great Battery, it seems, which they make use of against the *Doctrine of the Trinity in point of Reason*.

Now as to this, your Lordship says, *That the Unitarians having not explain'd Vindic. vi the Nature and Bounds of Reason, as they ought; the Author of Christianity not 231. Myste-rious hath endeavour'd to make amends for this, and takes upon him to make this matter clear. And then your Lordship sets down his Account of Reason at large.*

I will not examine how it appears, that the Author of *Christianity not Myste-rious* gave this account of Reason, to supply the defect of the Unitarians herein, or to make amends for their not having done it. Your Lordship does not quote any thing out of him, to shew that it was to make amends for what the Unitarians had neglected. I only look to see how the Unitarians and he come to be united, in this dangerous Principle of *the necessity of clear and distinct Ideas to Certainty*: which is that which makes him a *Gentleman of this new and dangerous way of Reasoning*; and consequently me too, because he agrees in some Particulars with my *Essay*.

Now, my Lord, having look'd over his Account of Reason, as set down by your Lordship; give me leave to say, That he that shall compare that Account of Reason, with your Lordship's Animadversion annex'd to it, in these words, *This is offer'd to the World as an account of Reason; but to shew how very loose and Vindic. p. unsatisfactory it is, I desire it may be consider'd, that this Doctrine supposes that we 232. must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds; and that the only way to attain this Certainty, is by comparing these Ideas together; which excludes all Certainty of Faith or Reason, where we cannot have such clear and distinct Ideas: will, I fear, hardly defend himself from wondering at the way your Lordship has taken to shew, how loose and unsatisfactory an Account of Reason his is; but by imagining that your Lordship had a great mind to say something against clear and distinct Ideas, as necessary to Certainty; or that your Lordship had some reason for bringing them in, that does not appear in that Account of Reason; since in it, from one end to the other, there is not the least mention of clear and distinct Ideas. Nor does he, (that I see) say any thing that supposes that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds.*

But whether he and the Unitarians do or do not lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct Ideas, I concern not my self: All my Enquiry, is, How he and I and the Unitarians come to be join'd together, as *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*? Which, in short, as far as I can trace and observe the Connection, is only thus.

The Unitarians are the Men of this new way of Reasoning, because they speak of Vindic. p. clear and distinct Perceptions, in their Answer to your Lordship's Sermon, as your 231. Lordship says. The Author of *Christianity not Myste-rious*, is join'd to the Unitarians, as a *Gentleman of this new way of Reasoning*, because his *Doctrine*, concerning Reason, supposes we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Minds: And I am join'd to that Author, because he says, "That the using of intermediate Ideas to discover the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas receiv'd into our Minds, is Reason; and that the Mind receives Ideas by the intromission of the Senses, and by considering its own
"Opera-

Operations. And these simple and distinct *Ideas* are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning." This, because it seems to be borrow'd out of my Book, is that which unites me to him, and by him consequently to the Unitarians.

And thus I am come to the end of the Thred of your Lordship's Discourse, whereby I am brought into the Company of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*, and thereby bound up in the Bundle and Cause of the Unitarians arguing against the Doctrine of the Trinity, by *Objections in point of Reason*.

I have been longer upon this, than I thought I should be: But the Thred that ties me to the Unitarians being spun very fine and subtil, is, as it naturally falls out, the longer for it, and the harder to be follow'd, so as to discover the Connection every where. As for example; The Thred that ties me to the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious*, is so fine and delicate, that without laying my Eyes close to it, and poring a good while, I can hardly perceive how it hangs together; that because he says what your Lordship charges him to say, in the 234th Page of your *Vindication*, &c. and because I say what your Lordship quotes out of my *Essay*, in the same Page, that therefore I am one of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*, which your Lordship opposes in the Unitarians, as dangerous to the Doctrine of the Trinity. This Connection of me with the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious*; and by him, with the Unitarians; (being in a Point wherein I agree with your Lordship, and not with them, if they do lay all the Foundation of Knowledge in clear and distinct *Ideas*) is, I say, pretty hard for me clearly to perceive now, tho' your Lordship has given me, in your Letter, that end of the Clue which was to lead me to it, for my Satisfaction; but was impossible for me, or (as I think) any body else to discover, whilst it stood as it does in your Lordship's *Vindication*, &c.

And now, my Lord, 'tis time I ask your Lordship's pardon for saying in my first Letter, "That I hoped I might say, you had gone a little out of your way to do me a kindness;" which your Lordship, by so often repeating of it, seems to be displeas'd with. For, besides that there is nothing out of the way to a willing Mind, I have now the Satisfaction to be join'd to the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious*, for his agreeing with me in the Original of our *Ideas* and the Materials of our Knowledge (tho' I agree not with him, or any body else, in laying all Foundation of Certainty in Matters of Faith, in clear and distinct *Ideas*;) and his being join'd with the Unitarians, by giving an account of Reason, which supposes clear and distinct *Ideas* as necessary to all Knowledge and Certainty: I have now, I say, the Satisfaction to see how I lay directly in your Lordship's way, in opposing these Gentlemen, who lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct *Ideas*; i. e. the Unitarians, the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning*; so dangerous to the Doctrine of the Trinity. For the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious* agreeing with them in some things, and with me in others; he being join'd to them on one side by an account of Reason, that supposes clear and distinct *Ideas* necessary to Certainty; and to me on the other side, by saying, *The Mind has its Ideas from Sensation and Reflection, and that those are the Materials and Foundations of all our Knowledge*, &c. Who can deny, but so rang'd in a Row, your Lordship may place your self so, that we may seem to you but one Object, and so one Shot be aim'd at us all together? Tho', if your Lordship should be at the pains to change your Station a little, and view us on the other side, we should visibly appear to be very far asunder; and I, in particular, be found, in the matter controverted, to be nearer to your Lordship, than to either of them, or any body else, who lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct *Ideas*. For I perfectly assent to what your Lordship saith, *That there are many things of which we may be certain, and yet can have no clear and distinct Ideas of them*.

Besides this Account of the Occasion of bringing me into your Lordship's Chapter, wherein *Objections against the Trinity in point of Reason* are answer'd, which we have consider'd; your Lordship promises to shew what Care you took to prevent being misunderstood about it, to give me and others Satisfaction, as to this Matter: which I find about the end of the first quarter of your Lordship's Answer to me. All the Pages between, being taken up in a Dispute against what I have said about Substance, and our Idea of it, that I think has now no more

Vind. p. 233.

P. 4.

Your Lordship says, *I come therefore now to shew the care I took to prevent being misunderstood; which will best appear by my own words, viz. I must do that right to the Ingenious Author of the Essay of Human Understanding (from whence these Notions are borrow'd, to serve other Purposes than he intended them) that he makes the case of Spiritual and Corporeal Substances to be alike.* P. 35.

Vindic. p.
234.

P. 35.

P. 58.

Vol. I

E e e

"against

"against me, or any body else, that your Lordship is arguing. That which
 "often makes the difficulty, is, that I do not see how what I say does at all
 "concern the Controversy your Lordship is engag'd in, and yet I alone am
 "quoted." To which *Complaint* of mine, your Lordship returns no other Answer, but refers me to the same Passage again for *Satisfaction*; and tells me, that therein *you took care not to be misunderstood*. Your Lordship might see that those words did not satisfy me in that point, when I did my self the honour to write to your Lordship; and how your Lordship should think the repetition of them in your Answer, should satisfy me better, I confess I cannot tell.

P. 60. I make the like Complaint in these words: "This Paragraph, which continues to prove, that we may have Certainty without clear and distinct *Ideas*, I would flatter my self is not meant against me, because it opposes nothing that I have said, and so shall not say any thing to it; but only set it down to do your Lordship right, that the Reader may judge. Tho' I do not find how he will easily overlook me, and think I am not at all concern'd in it, since my words alone are quoted in several Pages immediately preceding and following: And in the very next Paragraph it is said, how *THEY* come to know; which word *THEY* must signify some body, besides the Author of *Christianity not mysterious*: and then, I think, by the whole Tenour of your Lordship's Discourse, no Body will be left but me, possible to be taken to be the other; for in the same Paragraph your Lordship says, the same *PERSONS* say, that notwithstanding *THEIR* Ideas, it is possible for Matter to think."

"I know not what other *Person* says so but I; but if any one does, I am sure no *Person* but I say so in my Book, which your Lordship has quoted for them, viz. *Human Understanding*, B. 4. Ch. 3. This, which is a Riddle to me, the more amazes me, because I find it in a Treatise of your Lordship's, who so perfectly understand the Rules and Methods of Writing, whether in Controversy or any other way: But this which seems wholly new to me, I shall better understand, when your Lordship pleases to explain it. In the mean time, I mention it as an Apology for my self, if sometimes I mistake your Lordship's Aim, and so misapply my Answer."

To this also your Lordship answers nothing, but for *Satisfaction* refers me to the *Care you took to prevent being misunderstood*; which, you say, appears by those words of your's above-recited. But what there is in those words that can prevent the Mistake I complain'd I was expos'd to; what there is in them, that can hinder any one from thinking that I am one of the *THEY* and *THEM* that oppose the Doctrine of the Trinity, with *Arguments in point of Reason*; that I must confess, my Lord, I cannot see, tho' I have read them over and over again to find it out.

The like might be said in respect of all those other Passages, where I make the like Complaint, which your Lordship takes notice I was frequent in; nor could I avoid it, being almost every Leaf perplex'd to know whether I was concern'd, and how far, in what your Lordship said, since my words were quoted, and others argu'd against. And for *Satisfaction* herein, I am sent to a Compliment of your Lordship's. I say not this, my Lord, that I do not highly value the Civility and good Opinion your Lordship has express'd of me therein; but to let your Lordship see, that I was not so rude as to complain of want of Civility in your Lordship: but my Complaint was of something else; and therefore it was something else wherein I wanted *Satisfaction*.

P. 351 Indeed your Lordship says, in that Passage; *From the Author of the Essay of Human Understanding, THESE NOTIONS are borrow'd, to serve other Purposes than he intended them*. But, my Lord, how this helps in the case to prevent my being mistaken to be one of *THOSE* whom your Lordship had to do with in this Chapter, in answering *Objections in point of Reason against the Trinity*, I must own, I do not yet perceive: for these Notions, which your Lordship is there arguing against, are all taken out of my Book, and made use of by no body that I know, but your Lordship, or my self: And which of us two it is, that hath borrow'd them to serve other Purposes than I intended them, I must leave to your Lordship to determine. I, and I think every body else with me, will be at a loss to know who they are, till either their Words, and not mine, are produc'd

produc'd to prove, that they do use those Notions of mine, which your Lordship there calls *THESE NOTIONS*, to Purposes to which I intended them not.

But to those Words in your Lordship's *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, you, in your Answer to my Letter, for farther Satisfaction, add as followeth: *It was too plain, that the bold Writer against the Mysteries of our Faith, took his Notions and Expressions from thence: And what could be said more for your Vindication, than that he turn'd them into other Purposes than the Author intended them?* P. 35.

With Submission, my Lord, it is as plain as Print can make it, that whatever Notions and Expressions that Writer took from my Book; those in question, which your Lordship there calls *These Notions*, my Book is only quoted for; nor does it appear, that your Lordship knew that that Writer had any where made use of them: or, if your Lordship knew them to be any where in his Writings, the Matter of Astonishment and Complaint is still the greater, that your Lordship should know where they were in his Writings used to serve other Purposes than I intended them; and yet your Lordship should quote only my Book, where they were used to serve only those Purposes I intended them. Vind. p. 239.

How much this is for my *Vindication*, we shall presently see: But what it can do to give Satisfaction to me or others, as to the Matters of my Complaint, for which it is brought by your Lordship, that I confess I do not see. For my Complaint was not against those Gentlemen, that they had cast any Aspersions upon my Book, against which I desir'd your Lordship to vindicate me; but my Complaint was of your Lordship, that you had brought me into a Controversy, and so join'd me with those against whom you were disputing in defence of the *Trinity*, that those who read your Lordship's Book, would be apt to mistake me for one of them.

But your Lordship asks, *What could be said more for my Vindication?* My Lord, I shall always take it for a very great Honour, to be vindicated by your Lordship against others. But in the present Case, I wanted no *Vindication* against others: If my Book or Notions had need of any *Vindication*, it was only against your Lordship; for it was your Lordship, and not others, who had in your Book disputed against Passages quoted out of mine, for several Pages together.

Nevertheless, my Lord, I gratefully acknowledg the Favour you have done me, for being Guarantee for my Intentions, which you can have no reason to repent of. For as it was not in my Intention to write any thing against Truth, much less against any of the Sacred Truths contain'd in the Scriptures; so I will be answerable for it, that there is nothing in my Book, which can be made use of to other purposes, but what may be turn'd upon them, who so use it, to shew their Mistake and Error. No Body can hinder but that Syllogism, which was intended for the Service of Truth, will sometimes be made use of against it. But it is nevertheless of Truth's side, and always turns upon the Adversaries of it.

Your Lordship adds, *And the true Reason why the Plural Number was so often used by me, was, because he [i. e. the Author of Christianity not Mystrious] built upon those which he imagin'd had been your Grounds.* P. 36.

Whether 'twas your Lordship, or he, that imagin'd those to be my Grounds, which were not my Grounds, I will not pretend to say. Be that as it will; 'tis plain from what your Lordship here says, That all the Foundation of your Lordship's so positively, and in so many Places, making me One of the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, was but an Imagination of an Imagination. Your Lordship says, he built upon those which he imagin'd had been my Grounds; but it is but an Imagination in your Lordship, that he did so imagine; and with all due respect, give me leave to say, a very ill-grounded Imagination too. For it appears to me no Foundation to think, that because he or any body agrees with me in things that are in my Book, and so appear to be my Opinion; therefore he imagines he agrees with me in other things, which are not in my Book, and are not my Opinion. As in the matter before us; what reason is there to imagine, that the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious* imagin'd, that he built on my Grounds, in laying all foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas, (if he does so) which is no where laid down in my Book; because he builds on my Grounds,

concerning the Original of our *Ideas*, or any thing else he finds in my Book, or quotes out of it? for this is all the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious* has done in this Case, or can be brought to support such an Imagination.

P. 36. But supposing it true, That he imagin'd he built upon my Grounds; what Reason, I beseech your Lordship, is that for using the *Plural Number*, in quoting words which I alone spoke, and he no where makes use of? To this your Lordship says, That he imagin'd he built upon my Grounds; and your Lordship's Business was to shew those Expressions of mine, which seem'd most to countenance his Method of Proceeding, could not give any reasonable Satisfaction: which, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much. The Author of *Christianity not Mystrious*, writes something which your Lordship disapproves: Your Lordship imagines, he builds upon my Grounds; and then your Lordship picks out some Expressions of mine, which you imagine do most countenance his Method of Proceeding, and quote them, as belonging in common to us both; tho' it be certain he no where used them. And this your Lordship tells me (to give me Satisfaction, what Care you took not to be misunderstood) was the true Reason, why you so often used the *Plural Number*: Which, with Submission, my Lord, seems to me to be no Reason at all; unless in can be a Reason to ascribe my Words to another Man, and me together, which he never said; because your Lordship imagines he might, if he would, have said them. And ought not this, my Lord, to satisfy me of the Care you took, not to be misunderstood?

Your Lordship goes on to shew your care to prevent your being misunderstood: P. 36. Your Words are, But you [i. e. the Author of the Letter to your Lordship] say, you don't "place Certainty only in clear and distinct *Ideas*, but in the clear and "visible Connection of any of our *Ideas*. And, Certainty of Knowledg, you "tell us, is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, as express'd "in any Proposition." Whether this be a true Account of the Certainty of Knowledg, or not, will be presently consider'd. But it is very possible he might mistake, or misapply your Notions; but there is too much Reason to believe, he thought them the same: And we have no reason to be sorry, that he hath given you this occasion for explaining your meaning, and for the Vindication of your self, in the matters you apprehend I had charg'd you with.

Your Lordship herein says, It is very possible the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious* might mistake, or misapply my Notions. I find it indeed very possible, that my Notions may be mistaken and misapply'd; if by misapply'd, be meant drawing Inferences from thence, which belong not to them. But if that Possibility be Reason enough to join me, in the *Plural Number*, with the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious*, or with the Unitarians; it is as much a reason to join me in the *Plural Number* with the Papists, when your Lordship has an occasion to write against them next; or with the Lutherans, or Quakers, &c. for 'tis possible, that any of these may mistake, or in that sense misapply my Notions. But if mistaking, or misapplying my Notions, does actually join me to any body, I know no body that I am so strictly join'd to, as your Lordship: For, as I humbly conceive, no body has so much mistaken and misapply'd my Notions, as your Lordship. I should not take the liberty to say this, were not my thinking so the very Reason and Excuse for my troubling your Lordship with this second Letter. For, my Lord, I do not so well love Controversy, especially with so great and so learned a Man as your Lordship, as to say a Word more; had I not hopes to shew, for my Excuse, that it is my Misfortune to have my Notions to be mistaken or misapply'd by your Lordship.

P. 36. Your Lordship adds, But there is too much Reason to believe, that he thought them the same; i. e. That the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious* thought that I had laid all Foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct *Ideas*, as well as he did; for that is it, upon which all this Dispute is rais'd. Whether he himself laid all Foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct *Ideas*, is more than I know. But what that too much Reason is to believe, that he thought that I did, I am sure is hard for me to guess, till your Lordship is pleas'd to name it. For that there is not any such thing in my Book, to give him, or any body else, reason to think so, I suppose your Lordship is now satisfy'd: And I would not willingly suppose the Reason to be, that unless he, or somebody else thought so, my Book could not be brought into the dispute; tho' it be not easy to find any other. It follows in your Lordship's Letter.

And we have no Reason to be sorry, that he hath given you this Occasion for the P. 36. explaining your meaning, and for the Vindication of your self in the matter you apprehended, I had charged you with.

My Lord, I know not any Occasion he has given Me, of vindicating my self: Your Lordship was pleased to join me with the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, who laid all Foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas. All the Vindication I make, or need to make in the Case, is, That I lay not all Foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas; and so there was no Reason to join me with those that do. And for this Vindication of my self, your Lordship alone gives me Occasion: But whether your Lordship has Reason to be sorry, or not sorry, your Lordship best knows.

Your Lordship goes on, in what is designed for my Satisfaction, as followeth:

And if your Answer doth not come fully up in all Things, to what I could wish; yet P. 37. I am glad to find, that in general you own the Mysteries of the Christian Faith, and the Scriptures to be the Rule and Foundation of it.

Which words, my Lord, seem to me rather to shew, that your Lordship is not willing to be satisfy'd with my Book, than to shew any Care your Lordship took to prevent Peoples being led by your Lordship's Book into a Mistake, that I was One of the Gentlemen of that new way of Reasoning, who argued against the Doctrine of the Trinity.

The Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, whom your Lordship sets your self to answer in that 10th Chapter Of your Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, are those who lay all Foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas; and from that Foundation, raise Objections against the Trinity in point of Reason. Your Lordship joins me with these Gentlemen in that Chapter, and calls me One of them. Of this I complain; and tell your Lordship, in the Place and Words you have quoted out of my Letter, "That I do not place Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas." I expected upon this, that your Lordship would have assailed me, and said, that then I was none of them; nor should have been joined with them. But instead of that, your Lordship tells me, *My Answer doth not come fully up in all things, to what your Lordship could wish.* The Question is, Whether I ought to be listed with these, and ranked on their side; who place Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas? What more direct and categorical Answer could your Lordship wish for, to decide this Question, than that which I give? To which nothing can be reply'd, but that it is not true: But that your Lordship does not object to it; but says, *It does not come fully up in all Things, to what your Lordship could wish.* What other Things there can be wish'd for in an Answer, which, if it be true, decides the Matter, and which is not doubted to be true, comes not within my guess. But tho' my Answer be an unexceptionable Answer, as to the Point in Question, yet, it seems, my Book is not an unexceptionable Book, because I own, that in it I say, "That Certainty of Knowledge is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any Ideas, as expressed in any Proposition." Whether it be true, that Certainty of Knowledge lies in such a Perception, is nothing to the Question here; that, perhaps, we may have an occasion to examine in another place. The Question here is, Whether I ought to have been ranked with those, who lay all Foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas? And to that, I think my Answer is a full and decisive Answer; and there is nothing wanting in it, which your Lordship could wish for, to make it fuller.

But 'tis natural the Book should be found fault with, when the Author, it seems, has had the ill Luck to be under your Lordship's ill Opinion. This I could not but be surpriz'd to find in a Paragraph, which your Lordship declares was designed to give me satisfaction. Your Lordship says, *Tho' my Answer doth not come up in all Things to what you could wish; yet you are glad to find, that in general I own the Mysteries of the Christian Faith, and the Scriptures to be the Foundation and Rule of it.*

My Lord, I do not remember that ever I declar'd to your Lordship, or any body else, that I did not own all the Doctrines of the Christian Faith, and the Scriptures to be the sole Rule and Foundation of it. And therefore I know no more Reason your Lordship had to say, *That you are glad to find, that in general I own, &c.* than I have Reason to say, *That I am glad to find, that in general*

general your Lordship owns the *Mysteries of the Christian Faith, and the Scriptures to be the Foundation and Rule of it.* Unless it be taken for granted that those who do not write and appear in Print, in Controversies of Religion, do not own the Christian Faith, and the Scriptures as the Rule of it.

I know, my Lord, of what weight a Commendation from your Lordship's Pen is in the World: And I perceive your Lordship knows the Value of it, which has made your Lordship temper your's of me with so large an Alloy, for fear possibly lest it should work too strongly on my Vanity. For whether I consider where these words stand, or how they are brought in, or what Intimation they carry with them; which way soever I turn them, I do not find they were intended to puff me up, tho' they are in a Paragraph purposely written to give me Satisfaction; and grounded on Words of mine, which seem to be approv'd by your Lordship before any in my Letter; but which yet have nothing to do in this Place (whether your Lordship has been at the pains to fetch them from my Postscript) unless it be to give vent to so extraordinary a sort of Compliment: For they are, I think, in their Subject, as well as Place, the remotest of any in my Letter, from the Argument your Lordship was then upon; which was to shew what Care you had taken not to be misunderstood to my Prejudice. For what, I beseech you, my Lord, would you think of him, who from some Words of your Lordship's, that seem'd to express much of a Christian Spirit and Temper (for so your Lordship is pleas'd to say, of these of mine) should seek occasion to tell your Lordship, and the World, That he was glad to find that your Lordship was a Christian, and that you believed the Bible? For this, common Humanity, as well as Christian Charity, obliges us to believe of every one who calls himself a Christian, till he manifests the contrary. Whereas the saying, *I am glad to find such an one believes the Scripture,* is understood to intimate, That I knew the Time when he did not; or, at least, when I suspected he did not. But perhaps your Lordship had some other meaning in it, which I do not see. The Largeness of your Lordship's Mind, and the Charity of a Father of our Church, makes me hope that I pass'd not in your Lordship's Opinion for a Heathen, till your Lordship read that Passage in the Postscript of my late Letter to you.

P. 37. But to return to the Satisfaction your Lordship is giving me. To those Words quoted out of my Postscript, your Lordship subjoins: *Which words seem to express so much of a Christian Spirit and Temper, that I cannot believe you intended to give any Advantage to the Enemies of the Christian Faith; but whether there hath not been too just occasion for them to apply THEM in that manner, is a Thing very fit for you to consider.*

Your Lordship here again expresses a favourable Opinion of my Intentions, which I gratefully acknowledg: But you add, *That it is fit for me to consider, whether there hath not been too just occasion for them to apply THEM in that manner.* My Lord, I shall do what your Lordship thinks is fit for me to do, when your Lordship does me the Favour to tell me, who those Enemies of the Faith are, who have applied those Words of my Postscript, (for to those alone, by any kind of Construction, can I make your Lordship's Word THEM refer) and the manner which they have apply'd them in, and the too just occasion they have had so to apply them. For I confess, my Lord, I am at a loss as to all these; and thereby unable to obey your Lordship's Commands, till your Lordship does me the Favour to make me understand all these Particulars better.

But if by any new way of Construction, unintelligible to me, the Word THEM here shall be apply'd to any Passages of my *Essay of human Understanding*; I must humbly crave leave to observe this one Thing, in the whole course of what your Lordship has designed for my Satisfaction, That tho' my Complaint be of your Lordship's manner of applying what I had publish'd in my *Essay*, so as to interest me in a Controversy wherein I meddled not; your Lordship all along tells me of others, that have misapply'd I know not what Words in my Book, after I know not what manner. Now as to this matter, I beseech your Lordship to believe, that when any one, in such a manner, applies my Words contrary to what I intended them, so as to make them opposite to the Doctrine of the Trinity, and me a Party in that Controversy against the Trinity, as your Lordship knows I complain your Lordship has done

done, I shall complain of them too ; and consider, as well as I can, what Satisfaction they give me and others in it.

Your Lordship's next Words are : *For in an Age, wherein the Mysteries of Faith are so much expos'd, by the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity ; it is a thing of dangerous Consequence, to start such new Methods of Certainty, as are apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before ; as will soon appear from your own Confession.* P. 37.

These Words contain a farther Accusation of my Book, which shall be consider'd in its due place. What I am now upon, is the Satisfaction your Lordship is giving me, in reference to my Complaint. And as to that, what follows to the 46th Page, is brought only to shew that your Lordship had reason to say, *That my Notions were carry'd beyond my Intentions* : For, in these words your Lordship winds up all the following eight or nine Pages, viz. *Thus far I have endeavour'd, with all possible Brevity and Clearness, to lay down your Sense about this Matter ; by which it is sufficiently prov'd, that I had Reason to say, That your Notions were carry'd beyond your Intention.* P. 45.

I beg leave to mind your Lordship, that my Complaint was not that your Lordship said, *That my Notions were carry'd beyond my Intentions*. I was not so absurd, as to turn what was matter of Acknowledgement into matter of Complaint. And therefore, in shewing the Care you had taken of me for my Satisfaction, your Lordship needed not to have been at so much Pains, in so long a Deduction, to prove to me, that you had Reason for saying what was so manifestly in my favour, whether you had Reason for saying it or no. But my Complaint was, *That the new way of Reason, accus'd by your Lordship, as opposite to the Doctrine of the Trinity, being in laying all Foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas, your Lordship rank'd me amongst the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning, tho' I laid not all Foundation of Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas.* And this being my Complaint, 'tis for this that there needs a Reason. Your Lordship subjoins.

But you still seem concern'd that I quote your Words ; altho' I declare they were us'd to other Purposes than you intended them. I do confess to you, that the Reason of it was, that I found your Notions as to Certainty, by Ideas, was the main Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysteries went upon ; and that he had nothing which look'd like Reason, if that Principle were remov'd ; which made me so much endeavour to shew that it would not hold. And so, I suppose, the Reason of my mentioning your Words so often, is no longer a Riddle to you. P. 46. P. 47.

My Lord, he that will give himself the trouble to look into the 61st Page of my former Letter, where I speak of your Lordship's way of proceeding as a Riddle to me ; or in the 59th Page, which your Lordship here quoted, for my seeming concern'd at it ; will find my Complaint, in both Places, as well as several others, was, *That I was so every where join'd with others under the comprehensive Words of They and Them, &c. tho' my Book alone was every where quoted, " That the world would be apt to think I was the Person " who argued against the Trinity and deny'd Mysteries ; "* against whom your Lordship directed these very Pages. For so I express my self in that very 59th Page, which your Lordship here quotes. And as to this, your Lordship's way of Writing (which is the Subject of my Complaint) is (for any thing your Lordship has in your Answer said to give me Satisfaction) as much still a Riddle to me as ever.

For that which your Lordship here says, and is the only thing I can find your Lordship has said to clear it, seems to me to do nothing towards it. Your Lordship says, *The Reason of it was, that you found my Notions, as to Certainty by Ideas, was the main Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysteries went upon, &c.* P. 47.

With Submission, I thought your Lordship had found, *That the Foundation, which the Author of Christianity not Mysteries went upon, and for which he was made One of the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, opposite to the Doctrine of the Trinity, was, That he made, or suppos'd, clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty ; but that is not my Notion as to Certainty by Ideas.* Vindicat. p. 232 and Ansl. My Notion of Certainty by Ideas is, *That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, such as we have, whether they be in all their* P. 14.

their Parts perfectly clear and distinct or no: Nor have I any *Notions* of Certainty more than this one. And if your Lordship had for this call'd me a *Gentleman of a new way of Reasoning*, or made me One of the Opposers of the Doctrine of the Trinity, I should perhaps have wonder'd; but should not at all have complain'd of your Lordship, for directly questioning this or any of my Opinions: I should only have examin'd what your Lordship had said to support, or have desir'd you to make out that Charge against me; which is what I shall do by and by, when I come to examine what your Lordship now charges this Opinion with: But I shall not add any *Complaints* to my Defence.

That which I complain'd of, was, that I was made One of the *Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning*, without being guilty of what made them so; and so was brought into a Chapter, wherein I thought my self not concern'd: which was manag'd so, that my Book was all along quoted, and others argu'd against: Others were entitl'd to what I said, and I to what others said, without knowing why, or how. Nor am I yet, I must own, much enlighten'd in the Reason of it: That was the Cause why I then thought it a new way of Writing; and that must be my Apology for thinking so still, till I light upon, or am directed to some Author who has ever writ thus before.

And thus I come to the end of what your Lordship has said to that part of my Letter which your Lordship calls my *Complaint*; wherein, I think, I have omitted nothing which your Lordship has alledged for the *Satisfaction* of others, or my self, under those two Heads, of the *Occasion* of your Lordship's way of Writing as you did, and the *Cave you took not to be misunderstood*. And if, my Lord, as to me, it has not possibly had all the success your Lordship propos'd; I beg your Lordship to attribute it to my Dulness, or any thing rather than an Unwillingness to be satisfy'd.

My Lord, I so little love Controversy, that I never began a Dispute with any body; nor shall ever continue it, where others begin with me, any longer than the appearance of Truth, which first made me write, obliges me not to quit it. But least of all, would I have any Controversy with your Lordship, if I had any Design in writing, but the Defence of Truth. I do not know my own Weakness, or your Lordship's Strength so little, as to enter the Lists with your Lordship only for a Tryal of Skill, or the vain and ridiculous hopes of Victory. Nothing, I know, but Truth on my Side, can support me against so great a Man; whose very Name in Writing, and Authority in the learned World, is of Weight enough to crush and sink whatever Opinion has not that solid Basis to bear it up.

There are Men that enter into Disputes to get a Name in Controversy, or for some little By-ends of a Party: Your Lordship has been so long in the first Rank of the Men of Letters, and by common consent settl'd at the top of this learned Age, that it must pass for the utmost Folly, not to think, that if your Lordship condescended so far, as to meddle with any of the Opinions of so inconsiderable a Man as I am, it was with a Design to convince me of my Errors, and not to gain Reputation on one so infinitely below your Match. 'Tis upon this Ground that I still continue to offer my Doubts to your Lordship, in those Parts wherein I am not yet so happy as to be convinc'd; and 'tis with this satisfaction, I return this Answer to your Lordship, that if I am in a Mistake, your Lordship will certainly detect it, and lead me into the Truth; which I shall embrace, with the acknowledgment of the Benefit I have received from your Lordship's Instructions. And, that your Lordship, in the mean time, will have the Goodness to allow me, as becomes a Scholar, willing to profit by the Favour you do me, to shew your Lordship where I stick, and in what Points your Lordship's Arguments have fail'd to work upon me. For, as on the one Side it would not become one that would learn of your Lordship to acknowledg himself convinc'd, before he is convinc'd: and I know your Lordship would blame me for it, if I should do so: So on the other side, to continue to dissent from your Lordship, where you have done me the Honour to take Pains with me, without giving you my Reasons for it, would, I think, be an ungrateful and unmannerly Sullenness.

Your

Your Lordship has had the Goodness to write several Leaves, to give me satisfaction as to the Matter of my Complaints. I return your Lordship my most humble Thanks for this great condescension; which I take as a Pledge, that your will bear with the representation of my Doubts, in other Points, wherein I am so unlucky as not to be yet thorowly enlighten'd by your Lordship. And so I go on to the remaining parts of your Letter, which, I think, may be comprehended under these two, viz. those things in my *Essay*, which your Lordship now charges, as concern'd in the Controversy of the Trinity; and others, as faulty in themselves, whether we consider them with respect to any Doctrines of Religion or no.

In the close of your Lordship's Letter, after some other Expressions of Civility to me, for which I return your Lordship my thanks, I find these Words: *I do assure you, that it is out of no Disrespect, or the least Ill-will to you, that I have again consider'd this Matter; but because I am further convinc'd, that as you have stated your Notion of Ideas, it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Christian Faith, which I endeavour'd to defend.* P. 133.

This now is a direct Charge against my Book; and I must own it a great satisfaction to me, that I shall now be no longer at a loss, who it is your Lordship means; that I shall stand by my self, and by my self answer for my own Faults, and not be so plac'd in such an Association with others, that will hinder me from knowing what is my particular Guilt and Share in the Accusation. Had your Lordship done me the Favour to have treated me so before, you had heard nothing of all those *Complaints* which have been so troublesome to your Lordship.

To take now a right view of this matter, it is fit to consider the Beginning and Progress of it: Your Lordship had a Controversy with the Unitarians; they, in their Answer to your Lordship's Sermons, and elsewhere, talk of *Ideas*; the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious* (whether an Unitarian or no, your Lordship says not, neither do I enquire,) gives an account of Reason, which, as your Lordship says, supposes Certainty to consist only in clear and distinct Ideas; and because he expresses himself in some other Things conformable to what I had said in my Book, my Book is brought into the Controversy, tho' there be no such Opinion in it, as your Lordship oppos'd. For what that was, is plain both from what has been observ'd out of the beginning of the tenth Chapter of your *Vindication of the Trinity*, and the fourteenth Page of your Letter, viz. this Proposition, *That Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, is founded upon clear and distinct Ideas*: But my Book not having that Proposition in it, which your Lordship then oppos'd, as overthrowing *Mysteries Faith*, at that time, fell, by I know not what Chance and Misfortune, into the Unitarian Controversy.

Upon examination, my Book being not found guilty of that Proposition, which your Lordship, in your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, oppos'd, because it overthrows the *Mysteries of Faith*; I thought it acquitted, and clear from that Controversy. No, it must not 'scape so: Your Lordship, having again consider'd this Matter, has found new Matter of Accusation, and a new Charge is brought against my Book; and what now is it? even this, *That as I have stated my Notion of Ideas, it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of the Christian Faith, which your Lordship has endeavour'd to defend.*

The Accusation then, as it now stands, is, *That my Notion of Ideas may be of dangerous Consequence, &c.*

Such an Accusation as this brought in any Court in England, would, no doubt, be thought to shew a great Inclination to have the Accused be suspected, rather than any Evidence of being guilty of any thing; and so would immediately be dismiss'd, without hearing any Plea to it. But in Controversies in print, wherein an Appeal is made to the Judgment of Mankind, the strict Rules of proceeding in Justice, are not always thought necessary to be observ'd; and the Sentence of those who are appeal'd to, being never formally pronounc'd, a Cause can never be dismiss'd as long as the Prosecutor is pleas'd to continue or renew his Charge.

As to the Matter in hand, tho' what your Lordship says here against my Book, be nothing but your Apprehension of what may be; yet no body will

think it strange, or unsuitable to your Lordship's Character and Station, to be watchful over any *Article of the Christian Faith*, especially one that you have endeavour'd to defend; and to warn the World of any thing your Lordship may suspect to be of dangerous consequence to it, as far as you can spy it. And to this give me leave, my Lord, to attribute the Trouble your Lordship has been at, to write again in this matter.

Another thing I must take notice of, in this your Lordship's new Charge against my Book, That it is against my *Notion of Ideas*, as I have stated it. This containing all that I have said in my *Essay concerning Ideas*, which as your Lordship takes notice, is not a little; your Lordship, I know, would not be thought to leave so general an Accusation upon my Book, as you could receive no answer to: and therefore tho' your Lordship has not been pleas'd plainly to specify here the Particulars in my *Notion of Ideas*, which your Lordship apprehends to be of dangerous consequence to that Article which your Lordship has defended; I shall endeavour to find them, in other parts of your Letter.

P. 132. Your Lordship's words, in the immediately preceding Page, run thus: *I can easily bear the putting of Philosophical Notions into a modern and fashionable Dress.*

Let Men express their Minds by Ideas, if they please; and take pleasure in sorting, and comparing, and connecting of them, I am not forward to condemn them: For every Age must have its new Modes; and it is very well, if Truth and Reason be receiv'd in any Garb. I was therefore far enough from condemning your way of Ideas, till I found it made the only Ground of Certainty, and made use of to overthrow the Mysteries of our Faith, as I told you in the beginning.

These words, leading to your Lordship's Accusation, I thought the likeliest to shew me what it was in my Book, that your Lordship now declar'd against, as what might be of dangerous consequence to that Article you have defended; and that seem'd to me, to lie in these two Particulars, viz. The making so much use of the word *Ideas*; and my placing, as I do, Certainty in *Ideas*, i. e. in the things signify'd by them. And these two seem here to be the Particulars which your Lordship comprehends under my way by *Ideas*. But that I might not be led into Mistake by this Passage, which seem'd a little more obscure and doubtful to me, than I could have wish'd; I consulted those other places, wherein your Lordship seem'd to express what it was that your Lordship now accus'd in my Book, in reference to the Unitarian Controversy; and which your Lordship apprehends may be of Dangerous consequence to that Article.

Your Lordship, in the close of the words above-quoted, out of the 132d Page of your Answer, tells me: You were far enough from condemning my way of *Ideas*, till your Lordship found it made the only Ground of Certainty, and made use of to overthrow the Mysteries of our Faith, as you told me in the beginning.

My Lord, the way of *Ideas* which your Lordship oppos'd at first, was the way of Certainty only by clear and distinct *Ideas*; as appears by your words above-quoted, out of your 14th Page: But that, your Lordship now knows, was not my way of Certainty by *Ideas*; and therefore that, and all the use can be made of it, to overthrow the Mysteries of our Faith, be that as it will, cannot any more be charg'd on my Book, but is quite out of doors: And therefore what you said in the beginning gave me no light into what was your Lordship's present Accusation.

P. 23. But, Page the 23d, I found these Words: *When new Terms are made use of by ill Men, to promote Scepticism and Infidelity, and to overthrow the Mysteries of our Faith, we have then reason to enquire into them, and to examine the Foundation and Tendency of them. And this was the true and only Reason of my looking into this way of Certainty by Ideas, because I found it apply'd to such Purposes.*

Here, my Lord, your Lordship seems to lay your Accusation wholly against new Terms and their Tendency.

And in another place, your Lordship has these Words:

P. 93. *The world hath been strangely amus'd with Ideas of late; and we have been told, that strange things might be done by the help of Ideas; and yet these Ideas, at last, come to be only common Notions of things, which we must make use of in our Reasoning. You [i. e. the Author of the Essay concerning Human Understanding] say in that Chapter about the Existence of God, You thought it most proper to express your self, in the most usual and familiar way, by common Words and Expressions. I would*

you

you had done so quite thro' your Book; for then you had never given that occasion to the Enemies of our Faith, to take up your new way of Ideas, as an effectual Battery (as they imagin'd) against the Mysteries of the Christian Faith. But you might have enjoy'd the Satisfaction of your Ideas long enough, before I had taken notice of them, unless I had found them employ'd about doing mischief.

By which places 'tis plain, That that which your Lordship apprehends in my Book may be of dangerous consequence to the Article which your Lordship has endeavour'd to defend, is my introducing new Terms; and that which your Lordship instances in, is that of Ideas. And the Reason your Lordship gives, in every of these places, why your Lordship has such an apprehension of Ideas, as that they may be of dangerous consequence to that Article of Faith, which your Lordship has endeavour'd to defend, is, because they have been apply'd to such Purposes. And I might (your Lordship says) have enjoy'd the Satisfaction of my Ideas long enough, before you had taken notice of them, unless your Lordship had found them employ'd in doing mischief. Which, at last, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much, and no more, viz. That your Lordship fears Ideas, i. e. the Term Ideas, may, sometime or other, prove of very dangerous consequence to what your Lordship has endeavour'd to defend, because they have been made use of in arguing against it. For I am sure your Lordship does not mean, That you apprehended the things, signify'd by Ideas, may be of dangerous consequence to the Article of Faith your Lordship endeavours to defend, because they have been made use of against it: For (besides that your Lordship mentions Terms) that would be to expect that those who oppose that Article, should oppose it without any Thoughts; for the thing signify'd by Ideas, is nothing but the immediate Objects of our Minds in Thinking: So that unless any one can oppose the Article your Lordship defends, without thinking on something, he must use the things signify'd by Ideas: For he that thinks, must have some immediate Object of his Mind in Thinking, i. e. must have Ideas.

But whether it be the Name or the Thing; Ideas in Sound, or Ideas in Signification, that your Lordship apprehends may be of dangerous consequence to that Article of Faith, which your Lordship endeavours to defend; it seems to me, I will not say a new way of Reasoning (for that belongs to me) but were it not your Lordship's, I should think it a very extraordinary way of Reasoning, to write against a Book, wherein your Lordship acknowledges they are not used to bad purposes, nor employ'd to do mischief: Only because that you find that Ideas are, by those who oppose your Lordship, employ'd to do mischief; and so apprehend, they may be of dangerous consequence to the Article your Lordship has engag'd in the defence of. For whether Ideas as Terms, or Ideas as the immediate Objects of the Mind signify'd by those Terms, may be, in your Lordship's Apprehension, of dangerous consequence to that Article; I do not see how your Lordship's writing against the Notion of Ideas, as stated in my Book, will at all hinder your Opposers from employing them in doing mischief as before.

However, be that as it will, so it is, that your Lordship apprehends these new Terms, these Ideas, with which the World hath, of late, been so strangely amus'd (tho' at last they come to be only common Notions of Things, as your Lordship P. 93. owns) may be of dangerous consequence to that Article.

My Lord, if any, in their Answer to your Lordship's Sermons, and in their other Pamphlets, wherein your Lordship complains they have talk'd so much of Ideas, have been troublesome to your Lordship with that Term; it is not strange that your Lordship should be tired with that Sound: But how natural soever it be to our weak Constitutions to be offended with any Sound, wherewith an importunate Din hath been made about our ears; yet, my Lord, I know your Lordship has a better Opinion of the Articles of our Faith, than to think any of them can be overturn'd, or so much as shaken with a Breath, form'd into any Sound or Term whatsoever.

Names are but the Arbitrary Marks of Conceptions; and so they be sufficiently appropriated to them in their Use, I know no other difference any of them have in particular, but as they are of easy or difficult Pronunciation, and of a more or less pleasant Sound: and what particular Antipathies there may be in Men, to some of them upon that account, is not easy to be foreseen. This I am sure, no Term whatsoever in it self bears, one more than another;

any opposition to Truth of any kind; they are only Propositions that do, or can oppose the Truth of any Article or Doctrine: And thus no *Term* is privileged from being set in opposition to Truth.

- There is no Word to be found, which may not be brought into a Proposition, wherein the most sacred and most evident Truths may be oppos'd; but that is not a fault in the *Term*, but him that uses it. And therefore I cannot easily persuade my self (whatever your Lordship hath said in the Heat of your Concern) that you have bestow'd so much pains upon my Book, because the word *Idea* is so much used there. For tho' upon my saying, in my Chapter about the Existence of God, "That I scarce used the word *Idea* in that whole Chapter;" your Lordship wishes, That *I had done so quite thro' my Book*: Yet I must rather look upon that as a Compliment to me, wherein your Lordship wish'd, That my Book had been all through suited to vulgar Readers, not used to that and the like *Terms*, than that your Lordship has such an apprehension of the word *Idea*; or that there is any such harm in the use of it, instead of the word *Notion* (with which your Lordship seems to take it to agree in Signification) that your Lordship would think it worth your while to spend any part of your valuable Time and Thoughts about my Book, for having the word *Idea* so often in it: For this would be to make your Lordship to write only against an Impropriety of Speech. I own to your Lordship, it is a great Condescension in your Lordship to have done it, if that word have such a share in what your Lordship has writ against my Book, as some Expressions would persuade one; and I would, for the Satisfaction of your Lordship, change the *Term* of *Idea* for a better, if your Lordship, or any one, could help me to it. For that *Notion* will not so well stand for every immediate Object of the Mind in Thinking, as *Idea* does, I have (as I guess) somewhere given a Reason in my Book, by shewing that the *Term* *Notion* is more peculiarly appropriated to a certain sort of those Objects, which I call mix'd Modes: And, I think, it would not sound altogether so well, to say, the *Notion* of *Red*, and the *Notion* of a *Horse*; as the *Idea* of *Red*, and the *Idea* of a *Horse*. But if any one thinks it will, I contend not; for I have no Fondness for, nor Antipathy to any particular Articulate Sounds: Nor do I think there is any Spell or Fascination in any of them.

But be the word *Idea* proper or improper, I do not see how it is the better or worse, because *ill Men* have made use of it, or because it has been made use of to *bad Purposes*; for if that be a Reason to condemn, or lay it by, we must lay by the *Terms* of *Scripture*, *Reason*, *Perception*, *Distinct*, *Clear*, &c. nay, the Name of *God* himself will not scape: For I do not think any one of these, or any other *Term*, can be produc'd, which has not been made use of by such Men, and to such Purposes. And therefore, if the Unitarians, in their late Pamphlets, have talk'd very much of, and strangely amus'd the World with *Ideas*; I cannot believe your Lordship will think that Word one jot the worse, or the more dangerous, because they use it; any more than, for their use of them, you will think *Reason* or *Scripture*, *Terms* ill or dangerous. And therefore what your Lordship says, in the bottom of this 93d Page, That *I might have enjoy'd the Satisfaction of my Ideas long enough, before your Lordship had taken notice of them, unless you had found them employ'd in doing mischief*; will, I presume, when your Lordship has consider'd again of this matter, prevail with your Lordship to let me enjoy still the Satisfaction I take in my *Ideas*, i. e. as much Satisfaction as I can take in so small a matter, as is the using of a proper *Term*, notwithstanding it should be employ'd by others in doing mischief.

For, my Lord, if I should leave it wholly out of my Book, and substitute the word *Notion* every where in the room of it; and every body else do so too (tho' your Lordship does not, I suppose, suspect that I have the Vanity to think they would follow my Example) my Book would, it seems, be the more to your Lordship's liking: But I do not see how this would one jot abate the Mischief your Lordship complains of. For the Unitarians might as much employ *Notions*, as they do now *Ideas*, to do Mischief: unless they are such Fools as to think, they can conjure with this notable Word *Idea*; and that the force of what they say lies in the Sound, and not the Signification of their *Terms*.

This I am sure of, that the Truths of the Christian Religion can be no more batter'd by one word than another; nor can they be beaten down nor endanger'd by any Sound whatsoever. And I am apt to flatter my self, that your Lordship is satisfy'd there is no harm in the word *Ideas*, because you say you should not have taken any notice of my *Ideas*, if the *Enemies of our Faith* had not taken up my new way of *Ideas*, as an effectual Battery against the Mysteries of the Christian Faith. In which Place, by new way of *Ideas*, nothing, I think, can be constru'd to be meant, but my expressing my self by that of *Ideas*; and not by other more common Words, and of antienter standing in the *English* Language.

My new way by *Ideas*, or my way by *Ideas*, which often occurs in your Lordship's Letter, is, I confess, a very large and doubtful Expression; and may, in the full latitude, comprehend my whole *Essay*: because treating in it of the Understanding, which is nothing but the Faculty of Thinking, I could not well treat of that Faculty of the Mind, which consists in Thinking, without considering the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, which I call *Ideas*: And therefore in treating of the Understanding, I guess it will not be thought strange, that the greatest Part of my Book has been taken up, in considering what these Objects of the Mind, in Thinking, are; whence they come; what use the Mind makes of them, in its several ways of Thinking; and what are the outward Marks, whereby it signifies them to others, or records them for its own use. And this, in short, is my way by *Ideas*, that which your Lordship calls my new way by *Ideas*: which, my Lord, if it be new, it is but a new History of an old thing. For I think it will not be doubted, that Men always perform'd the Actions of Thinking, Reasoning, Believing and Knowing, just after the same manner that they do now: Tho', whether the same account has heretofore been given of the way how they perform'd these Actions, or wherein they consisted, I do not know. Were I as well read as your Lordship, I should have been safe from that gentle Reprimand of your Lordship's for thinking my way of *Ideas* P. 81. NEW, for want of looking into other Mens Thoughts, which appear in their Books.

Your Lordship's Words, as an Acknowledgment of your Instructions in the case, and as a Warning to others, who will be so bold Adventurers as to spin any thing barely out of their own Thoughts; I shall set down at large: and they run thus; Whether you took this way of *Ideas* from the modern Philosophers, mention'd by you, is not at all material; but I intended no Reflection upon you in it (for that you mean by my commending you as a Scholar of so great a Master) I never meant to take from you the Honour of your own Inventions; And I do believe you, when you say, That you wrote from your own Thoughts, and the *Ideas* you had there. But many things may seem New to one that converses only with his own Thoughts, which really are not so; as he may find, when he looks into the Thoughts of other Men, which appear in their Books. And therefore, altho' I have a just Esteem for the Invention of such, who can spin Volumes barely out of their own Thoughts; yet I am apt to think, they would oblige the World more, if, after they have thought so much themselves, they would examine what Thoughts others have had before them, concerning the same things: that so those may not be thought their own Inventions, which are common to themselves and others. If a Man should try all the Magnetical Experiments himself, and publish them as his own Thoughts, he might take himself to be the Inventor of them: But he that examines and compares them with what Gibbert and others have done before him, will not diminish the Praise of his Diligence, but may wish he had compar'd his thoughts with other Mens; by which the World would receive greater Advantage, altho' he lost the Honour of being an Original.

To alleviate my Fault herein, I agree with your Lordship, That many things may seem NEW to one that converses only with his own Thoughts, which really are not so: But I must crave leave to suggest to your Lordship, That if in the spinning them out of his own Thoughts, they seem new to him, he is certainly the Inventor of them; and they may as justly be thought his own Invention, as any one's; and he is as certainly the Inventor of them, as any one who thought on them before him: The Distinction of Invention, or not Invention, lying not in thinking first or not first, but in borrowing or not borrowing your Thoughts from another: And he to whom, spinning them out of his own Thoughts, they seem new, could not certainly borrow them from another. So he truly invented

invented Printing in *Europe*, who, without any Communication with the *Chineses*, spun it out of his own Thoughts; tho' it were ever so true, that the *Chineses* had the use of Printing, nay, of Printing in the very same way among them many Ages before him. So that he that spins any thing out of his own Thoughts, that *seems new to him*, cannot cease to think it his own Invention, should he *examine* ever so far *what Thoughts others have had before him, concerning the same thing*; and should find, by examining, that they had the same Thoughts too.

But what great *Obligation this would be to the World*, or weighty Cause of turning over and looking into *Books*, I confess I do not see. The great End to me, in conversing with my own or other Mens Thoughts, in Matters of Speculation, is to find Truth, without being much concern'd whether my own spinning of it out of mine, or their spinning of it out of their own Thoughts, helps me to it. And how little I affect the *Honour of an Original*, may be seen in that place of my Book, where, if any where, that Itch of Vain-glory was likeliest to have shewn it self, had I been so over-run with it, as to need a Cure. It is where I speak of Certainty, in these following words, taken notice of by your Lordship in another place: "I think I have shewn wherein it is that Certainty, real Certainty, consists; which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess, to me heretofore one of those *Desiderata* which I found great want of."

Here, my Lord, however *new this seem'd to me*, and the more so because possibly I had in vain hunted for it in the *Books of others*; yet I spoke of it as new only to my self; leaving *others* in the undisturb'd Possession of what either by Invention or Reading was their's before; without assuming to my self any other Honour, but that of my own Ignorance till that time, if others before had shewn wherein Certainty lay. And yet, my Lord, if I had upon this occasion been forward to assume to my self the *Honour of an Original*, I think I had been pretty safe in it; since I should have had your Lordship for my Guarantee and *Vindicator* in that point, who are pleas'd to call it *New*; and, as such, to write against it.

And truly, my Lord, in this respect my Book has had very unlucky Stars, since it hath had the misfortune to displease your Lordship, with many things in it, for their Novelty; as *New way of Reasoning*; *New Hypothesis about Reason*; *New sort of Certainty*; *New Terms*; *New way of Ideas*; *New Method of Certainty*, &c. And yet in other places your Lordship seems to think it worthy in me of your Lordship's Reflection, for saying but what others have said before. As where I say, "In the different Make of Mens Tempers and Application of their Thoughts, some Arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for the Confirmation of the same Truth:" Your Lordship asks, *What is this different from what all Men of Understanding have said?* Again, I take it, your Lordship meant not these words for a Commendation of my Book, where you say; *But if no more be meant by* "the simple *Ideas* that come in by Sensation or Reflection, and their being the Foundation of our Knowledge;" *but that our Notions of things come in, either from our Senses, or the Exercise of our Minds: As there is nothing extraordinary in the Discovery, so your Lordship is far enough from opposing that, wherein you think all Mankind are agreed.*

And again, *But what need all this great noise about Ideas and Certainty, true and real Certainty by Ideas*; if, after all, it comes only to this, *That our Ideas only represent to us such things, from whence we bring Arguments to prove the Truth of things?*

And, *The World hath been strangely amus'd with Ideas of late*; and we have been told, *That strange things might be done by the help of Ideas*; and yet these Ideas, at last, come to be only common Notions of things, which we must make use of in our Reasoning. And to the like purpose, in other places.

Whether therefore at last your Lordship will resolve, That it is *New* or no, or more faulty by its being *new*, must be left to your Lordship. This I find by it, that my Book cannot avoid being condemn'd on the one side or the other; nor do I see a possibility to help it. If there be Readers that like only *New Thoughts*; or, on the other side, others that can bear nothing but what can be justify'd by receiv'd Authorities in Print; I must desire them to make themselves amends in that part which they like, for the displeasure they receive in the

the other: But if many should be so exact as to find fault with both, truly I know not well what to say to them. The Case is a plain Case, the Book is all over naught, and there is not a Sentence in it that is not, either for its Antiquity or Novelty, to be condemn'd; and so there is a short end of it. From your Lordship indeed in particular, I can hope for something better; for your Lordship thinks the *general Design of it so good*, that that, I flatter my self, P. 35: would prevail on your Lordship to preserve it from the Fire.

But as to the way your Lordship thinks I should have taken to prevent the *having it thought my Invention, when it was common to me with others*; it unluckily so fell out, in the Subject of my *Essay of Human Understanding*, that I could not look into the thoughts of other Men to inform my self. For my Design being, as well as I could, to copy Nature, and to give an account of the Operations of the Mind in Thinking, I could look into no body's Understanding but my own, to see how it wrought; nor have a Prospect into other Mens Minds to view their Thoughts there, and observe what Steps and Motions they took, and by what Gradations they proceeded in their acquainting themselves with Truth, and their Advance to Knowledg. What we find of their Thoughts in Books, is but the Result of this, and not the Progress and Working of their Minds, in coming to the Opinions or Conclusions they set down and publish'd.

All therefore that I can say of my Book, is, That it is a Copy of my own Mind, in its several ways of Operation. And all that I can say for the publishing of it, is, That I think the intellectual Faculties are made, and operate alike in most Men; and that some, that I shew'd it to before I publish'd it, liked it so well, that I was confirm'd it that Opinion. And therefore if it should happen, that it should not be so, but that some Men should have ways of Thinking, Reasoning, or arriving at Certainty, different from others, and above those that I find my Mind to use and acquiesce in, I do not see of what use my Book can be to them. I can only make it my humble Request, in my own Name, and in the Name of those that are of my size, who find their Minds work, reason and know in the same low way that mine does, that those Men of more happy Genius would shew us the way of their nobler Flights; and particularly would discover to us their shorter or surer way to Certainty, than by *Ideas*, and the observing their Agreement or Disagreement.

In the mean time, I must acknowledg, that if I had been guilty of affecting to be thought an *Original*, a Correction could not have come from any body so disinterested in the Case, as your Lordship; since your Lordship so much declines being thought an *Original*, for writing in a way wherein it is hard to avoid thinking that you are the first, till some other can be produc'd that writ so before you.

But to return to your Lordship's present Charge against my Book: In the 38th Page of your Lordship's Answer, I find these words; *In an Age, wherein the Mysteries of Faith are so much expos'd by the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity; it is a thing of dangerous consequence, to start such new Methods of Certainty, as are apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before.*

By which Passage, and some Expressions that seem to look that way, in the places above quoted; I take it for granted, that another Particular in my Book, which your Lordship suspects *may be of dangerous consequence to that Article of Faith which your Lordship has endeavour'd to defend*, is my placing of Certainty as I do, in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas*.

Tho' I cannot conceive how any Term new or old, *Idea* or not *Idea*, can have any Opposition, or Danger in it, to any *Article of Faith*, or any Truth whatsoever; yet I easily grant, that Propositions are capable of being opposite to Propositions, and may be such as, if granted, may overthrow *Articles of Faith*, or any other Truth they are opposite to. But your Lordship not having, as I remember, shewn, or gone about to shew, how this Proposition, *viz. That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas*, is opposite or inconsistent with *that Article of Faith which your Lordship has endeavour'd to defend*: 'tis plain, 'tis but your Lordship's fear that it *may be of dangerous consequence to it*; which, as I humbly conceive, is no proof that it is any way inconsistent with that Article:

Mr. LOCKE's Reply to the

No body, I think, can blame your Lordship, or any one else, for being concern'd for any Article of the Christian Faith: But if that Concern (as it may, and as we know it has done) makes any one apprehend Danger, where no Danger is; are we therefore, to give up and condemn any Proposition, because any one, tho' of the first Rank and Magnitude, fears it may be of dangerous Consequence to any Truth of Religion, without shewing that it is so? If such Fears be the Measures whereby to judge of Truth and Falsehood, the affirming that there are Antipodes would be still a Heresy; and the Doctrine of the Motion of the Earth must be rejected, as overthrowing the Truth of the Scripture: For of that dangerous Consequence it has been apprehended to be, by many learned and pious Divines, out of their great Concern for Religion. And yet, notwithstanding those great Apprehensions of what dangerous Consequence it might be, it is now universally receiv'd by learned Men, as an undoubted Truth; and writ-for by some, whose Belief of the Scriptures is not at all question'd; and particularly, very lately, by a Divine of the Church of England, with great strength of Reason, in his wonderfully ingenious new Theory of the Earth.

The Reason your Lordship gives of your Fears, that it may be of such dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith which your Lordship endeavours to defend, tho' it occurs in more Places than one, is only this, viz. That it is made use of by ill Men to do Mischief, i. e. to oppose that Article of Faith, which your Lordship has endeavour'd to defend. But, my Lord, if it be a Reason to lay by any thing as bad, because it is, or may be us'd to an ill Purpose; I know not what will be innocent enough to be kept. Arms, which were made for our Defence, are sometimes made use of to do Mischief; and yet they are not thought of dangerous Consequence for all that. No body lays-by his Sword and Pistols, or thinks them of such dangerous Consequence as to be neglected, or thrown away, because Robbers, and the worst of Men, sometimes make use of them to take away honest Mens Lives or Goods. And the Reason is, because they were design'd, and will serve to preserve them. And who knows but this may be the present Case? If your Lordship thinks, that placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, be to be rejected as false, because you apprehend it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith; on the other side, perhaps others, with me, may think it a Defence against Error, and so, (as being of good use) to be receiv'd and adhered to.

I would not, my Lord, be hereby thought to set up my own, or any one's Judgment against your Lordship's: But I have said this only to shew, while the Argument lies for or against the Truth of any Proposition, barely in an Imagination that it may be of Consequence to the supporting or overthrowing of any remote Truth; it will be impossible, that way, to determine of the Truth or falshood of that Proposition. For Imagination will be set up against Imagination, and the stronger probably will be against your Lordship; the strongest Imaginations being usually in the weakest Heads. The only way, in this Case, to put it past doubt, is to shew the Inconsistency of the two Propositions; and then it will be seen, that one overthrows the other; the true the false one.

Your Lordship says indeed, this is a New Method of Certainty. I will not say so my self, for fear of deserving a second Reproof from your Lordship, for being too forward to assume to my self the honour of being an Original. But this, I think, gives me occasion, and will excuse me from being thought impertinent, if I ask your Lordship, Whether there be any other, nor older Method of Certainty? and what it is? For if there be no other, nor older than this, either this was always the Method of Certainty, and so mine is no New one; or else the World is oblig'd to me for this New one, after having been so long in the want of so necessary a thing, as a Method of Certainty. If there be an older, I am sure your Lordship cannot but know it; your condemning mine as New, as well as your thorow Insight into Antiquity, cannot but satisfy every body that you do. And therefore to set the World right in a thing of that great Concernment, and to overthrow mine, and thereby prevent the dangerous Consequence there is in my having unseasonably started it, will not, I humbly conceive, misbecome your Lordship's Care of that Article

icle you have endeavour'd to defend; nor the good Will you bear to Truth in general. For I will be answerable for my self, that I shall; and I think I may be for all others, that they all will give off the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, if your Lordship will be pleas'd to shew that it lies in any thing else.

But truly, not to ascribe to my self an Invention of what has been as old as Knowledg is in the World, I must own, I am not guilty of what your Lordship is pleas'd to call *starting new Methods of Certainty*. Knowledg, ever since there has been any in the World, has consisted in one particular Action of the Mind; and so, I conceive, will continue to do to the end of it: And to *start new Methods of Knowledg or Certainty*, (for they are to me the same thing) i. e. to find out and propose new Methods of attaining Knowledg, either with more Ease and Quickness, or in Things yet unknown, is what I think no body could blame: But this is not that which your Lordship here means by *new Methods of Certainty*. Your Lordship, I think, means by it, the placing of Certainty in something, wherein either it does not consist, or else wherein it was not placed before now; if this be to be call'd a *new Method of Certainty*: As to the latter of these, I shall know whether I am guilty or no, when your Lordship will do me the Favour to tell me, wherein it was plac'd before: which your Lordship knows I profess'd my self ignorant of, when I writ my Book, and so am still. But if *starting of new Methods of Certainty*, be the placing of Certainty in something wherein it does not consist; whether I have done that or no, I must appeal to the Experience of Mankind.

There are several Actions of Mens Minds that they are conscious to themselves of performing, as *Willing, Believing, Knowing, &c.* which they have so particular a Sense of, that they can distinguish them one from another; or else they could not say when they *Willed*, when they *Believed*, and when they *Knew* any Thing. But tho' these Actions were different enough from one another, not to be confounded by those who spoke of them; yet no Body, that I had met with, had, in their writings, particularly set down wherein the Act of *Knowing* precisely consisted.

To this Reflection, upon the Actions of my own Mind, the Subject of my *Essay concerning Human Understanding* naturally led me; wherein, if I have done any thing *New*, it has been to describe to others more Particularly than had been done before, what it is their Minds do, when they perform that Action which they call *Knowing*: and if, upon Examination, they observe I have given a true Account of that Action of their Minds in all the Parts of it; I suppose it will be in vain to dispute against what they find and feel in themselves. And if I have not told them right, and exactly what they find and feel in themselves, when their Minds perform the Act of *Knowing*, what I have said will be all in vain; Men will not be persuaded against their Senses. Knowledg is an internal Preception of their Minds; and if, when they reflect on it, they find it is not what I have said it is, my groundless Conceit will not be hearken'd to, but be exploded by every Body, and die of it self: and no Body need to be at any Pains to drive it out of the World. So impossible is it to find out, or *start new Methods of Certainty*, or to have them receiv'd. if any one places it in any thing, but in that wherein it really consists: much less can any one be in danger to be misled into Error, by any such *new*, and to every one visibly senseless Project. Can it be suppos'd, that any one could *start a new Method of seeing*, and persuade Men thereby, that they do not see what they do see? Is it to be fear'd, that any one can cast such a Mist over their Eyes that they should not know when they see, and so be led out of their Way by it?

Knowledg, I find, in my self, and, I conceive, in others, consists in the Preception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, which I call *Ideas*: But whether it does so in others or no, must be determin'd by their own Experience, reflecting upon the Action of their Mind in *Knowing*; for that I cannot alter, nor I think they themselves. But whether they will call those immediate Objects of their Minds in thinking *Ideas* or no, is perfectly in their own Choice. If they dislike that Name, they may call them *Notions* or *Conceptions*, or how they please; it matters not, if

if they use them so as to avoid Obscurity and Confusion. If they are constantly us'd in the same and a known Sense, every one has the liberty to please himself in his *Terms*; there lies neither Truth, nor Error, nor Science, in that: tho' those that take them for Things, and not for what they are, bare arbitrary Signs of our *Ideas*, make a great deal of doe often about them, as if some great Matter lay in the use of this or that Sound. All that I know or can imagine of difference about them, is, that those Words are always best, whose Significations are best known in the Sense they are us'd; and so are least apt to breed Confusion.

My Lord, your Lordship has been pleas'd to find fault with my use of the new Term, *Ideas*, without telling me a better Name for the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking. Your Lordship has also been pleas'd to find fault with my Definition of Knowledge, without doing me the Favour to give me a better. For it is only about my Definition of Knowledge, that all this stir, concerning *Certainty*, is made. For with me, to know and be certain, is the same thing; what I know, that I am certain of; and what I am certain of, that I know. What reaches to Knowledge, I think may be call'd *Certainty*; and what comes short of *Certainty*, I think cannot be call'd Knowledge; as your Lordship could not but observe in the 18th Sect. of Ch. 4. of my 4th Book, which you have quoted.

My Definition of Knowledge, in the beginning of the 4th Book of my *Essay*, stands Thus: "Knowledge seems to me to be nothing but the Perception of the Connection, and Agreement or Disagreement, and Repugnancy of any of our *Ideas*." This Definition your Lordship dislikes, and apprehends it may be of dangerous Consequence as to that Article of Christian Faith, which your Lordship has endeavour'd to defend. For this there is a very easy Remedy: It is but for your Lordship to set aside this Definition of Knowledge, by giving us a better, and this Danger is over. But your Lordship chuses rather to have a Controversy with my Book, for having it in it, and to put me upon the Defence of it; for which I must acknowledg my self oblig'd to your Lordship, for affording me so much of your Time, and for allowing me the Honour of conversing so much with one so far above me in all respects.

Your Lordship says, *It may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Christian Faith, which you have endeavour'd to defend.* Tho' the Laws of disputing allow bare Denial as a sufficient Answer to Sayings, without any offer of a Proof; yet, my Lord, to shew how willing I am to give your Lordship all Satisfaction, in what you apprehend may be of dangerous Consequence in my Book, as to that Article, I shall not stand still sullenly, and put your Lordship upon the difficulty of shewing wherein that Danger lies; but shall, on the other side, endeavour to shew your Lordship that that Definition of mine, whether true or false, right or wrong, can be of no dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith. The Reason which I shall offer for it, is this; Because it can be of no Consequence to it at all.

That which your Lordship is afraid it may be dangerous to, is an Article of Faith: That which your Lordship labours and is concern'd for, is the *Certainty of Faith*. Now, my Lord, I humbly conceive the *Certainty of Faith*, if your Lordship thinks fit to call it so, has nothing to do with the *Certainty of Knowledge*. And to talk of the *Certainty of Faith*, seems all one to me, as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing; a way of speaking not easy to me to understand.

Place Knowledge in what you will, *start what new Methods of Certainty* you please, that are apt to leave *Mens Minds* more doubtful than before; place *Certainty* on such Grounds as will leave little or no Knowledge in the World: (for these are the Arguments your Lordship uses against my Definition of Knowledge) this shakes not at all, nor in the least concerns the Assurance of Faith; that is quite distinct from it, neither stands nor falls with Knowledge.

Faith stands by it self, and upon Grounds of its own; nor can be remov'd from them, and plac'd on those of Knowledge. Their Grounds are so far from being the same, or having any thing common, that when it is brought to *Certainty*, *Faith* is destroy'd; 'tis Knowledge then, and Faith no longer.

With what assurance soever of Believing, I assent to any *Article of Faith*, so that I steadfastly venture my All upon it, it is still but *Believing*. Bring it to *Certainty*, and it ceases to be *Faith*. I believe, that Jesus Christ was crucify'd, dead and buried, rose again the third Day from the Dead, and ascended into Heaven: Let now *such Methods* of Knowledge or *Certainty* be started, as leave *Mens Minds* more doubtful than before: Let the grounds of Knowledge be resolv'd into what any one pleases, it touches not my *Faith*; the Foundation of that stands as sure as before, and cannot be at all shaken by it: and one may as well say, that any thing that weakens the Sight, or casts a Mist before the Eyes, endangers the Hearing; as that any thing which alters the nature of Knowledge (if that could be done) should be of dangerous Consequence to an *Article of Faith*.

Whether then I am or am not mistaken, in the placing *Certainty* in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*; whether this Account of Knowledge be true or false, enlarges or straitens the Bounds of it more than it should; *Faith* still stands upon its own Basis, which is not at all alter'd by it; and every *Article* of that has just the same unmov'd Foundation, and the very same Credibility that it had before. So that, my Lord, whatever I have said about *Certainty*, and how much soever I may be out in it; if I am mistaken, your Lordship has no reason to apprehend any *Danger* to any *Article of Faith* from thence; every one of them stands upon the same bottom it did before, out of the reach of what belongs to Knowledge and *Certainty*. And thus much of my way of *Certainty* by *Ideas*; which, I hope, will satisfy your Lordship, how far it is from being dangerous to any *Article of the Christian Faith* whatsoever.

I find one thing more your Lordship charges on me, in reference to the *Unitarian* Controversy; and that is, where your Lordship says, That if these [*i. e.* my *Notions of Nature and Person*] hold, your Lordship does not see how it is possible to defend the *Doctrine of the Trinity*. P. 103.

My Lord, since I have a great Opinion that your Lordship sees as far as any one, and I shall be justify'd to the World in relying upon your Lordship's Foresight more than on any one's; these discomfiting Words of your Lordship's would dishearten me so, that I should be ready to give up what your Lordship confesses so untenible; with this acknowledgment however to your Lordship, as its great Defender,

— Si Pergama dextra
Defendi possint, etiam hac defensa fuissent.

This, I say, after such a Declaration of your Lordship's, I should think, out of a due value for your Lordship's great Penetration and Judgment, I had reason to do, were it in any other Cause but that of an *Article of the Christian Faith*. For these, I am sure, shall All be defended and stand firm to the World's end; tho' we are not always sure what hand shall defend them. I know as much may be expected from your Lordship's in the Case, as any body's; and therefore I conclude, when you have taken a View of this Matter again, out of the Heat of Dispute, you will have a better Opinion of the *Articles of the Christian Faith*, and of your own Ability to defend them, than to pronounce, that if my *Notions of Nature and Person* hold, your Lordship cannot see how it is possible to defend that *Article of the Christian Faith*, which your Lordship has endeavour'd to defend. For 'tis, methinks, to put that Article upon a very ticklish Issue, and to render it as suspected and as doubtful as is possible to Mens Minds, that your Lordship should declare it not possible to be defended, if my *Notions of Nature and Person* hold; when all that I can find that your Lordship excepts against in my *Notions of Nature and Person*, is nothing but this, viz. That these are two Sounds which in themselves signify nothing.

But before I come to examine how by *Nature and Person* your Lordship, at present in your Answer, engages me in the *Unitarian* Controversy; it will not be besides the Matter to consider, how by them your Lordship at first brought my Book into it.

Vind. p. 252.

In your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, your Lordship says, *The next thing to be cleared in THIS DISPUTE, is the Distinction between Nature and Person. And of this we have no clear and distinct Idea from Sensation or Reflection: And yet all our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right understanding of it. For we must talk unintelligibly about this Point, unless we have clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction: But that these come not into our Minds by these simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection.*

P. 148.

To this I reply'd, " If it be so, the Inference I should draw from thence (if it were fit for me to draw any) would be this; That it concerns those who write on that Subject, to have themselves, and to lay down to others, clear and distinct Apprehensions, or Notions, or *Ideas* (call them what you please) of what they mean by *Nature and Person*, and of the Grounds of Identity and Distinction.

" This appears to me to be the natural Conclusion flowing from your Lordship's Words; which seems here to suppose clear and distinct Apprehensions (something like clear and distinct *Ideas*) necessary for the avoiding unintelligible Talk in the Doctrine of the Trinity. But I do not see how your Lordship can, from the Necessity of clear and distinct Apprehensions of *Nature and Person*, &c. in the Dispute of the Trinity, being in one, who has perhaps mistaken the way to clear and distinct Notions concerning *Nature and Person*, &c. as fit to be answer'd among those, who bring Objections against the Trinity in Point of Reason. I do not see why an Unitarian may not as well bring him in, and argue against his *Essay*, in a Chapter that he should write to answer Objections against the Unity of God, in point of Reason or Revelation: For upon what ground soever any one writes in this Dispute or any other, it is not tolerable to talk unintelligibly on either side.

" If by the way of *Ideas*, which is that of the Author of the *Essay of Human Understanding*, a Man cannot come to clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning *Nature and Person*; if, as he opposes, from the simple *Ideas* of Sensation and Reflection, such Apprehensions cannot be got; it will follow from thence that he is a mistaken Philosopher: but it will not follow from thence, that he is not an Orthodox Christian; for he might (as he did) write his *Essay of Human Understanding*, without any Thought of the Controversy between the *Trinitarians* and the *Unitarians*. Nay, a Man might have writ all that is in his Book, that never heard one word of any such Dispute.

" There is in the World a great and fierce Contest about *Nature and Grace*: 'Twould be very hard for me, if I must be brought in as a Party on either side, because a Disputant in that Controversy should think, the clear and distinct Apprehensions of *Nature and Grace* come not into our Minds by these simple *Ideas* of Sensation and Reflection. If this be so, I may be reckon'd among the Objectors against all sorts and points of Orthodoxy, whenever any one pleases: I may be call'd to account as one Heterodox in the points of Free-grace, Free-will, Predestination, Original Sin, Justification by Faith, Transubstantiation, the Pope's Supremacy, and what not; as well as in the Doctrine of the Trinity; and all because they cannot be furnish'd with clear and distinct Notions of Grace, Free-will, Transubstantiation, &c. by Sensation or Reflection. For in all these, or any other Points, I do not see but there may be a Complaint made, That they have not always a right Understanding and clear Notions of those things on which the Doctrine they dispute of depends. And 'tis not altogether unusual for Men to talk unintelligibly to themselves, and others, in these and other Points in Controversy, for want of clear and distinct Apprehensions, or (as I would call them, did not your Lordship dislike it) *Ideas*: For all which unintelligible Talking, I do not think my self accountable, tho' it should so fall out, that my way by *Ideas* would not help them to what it seems is wanting, clear and distinct Notions. If my way be ineffectual to that purpose, they may, for all me, make use of any other more successful; and leave me out of the Controversy, as one useless to either Party, for deciding of the Question.

" Supposing, as your Lordship says, and as you have undertaken to make appear, that the clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning *Nature and Person*,

"son, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction, should not come into the Mind by simple *Ideas* of Sensation and Reflection; what, I beseech your Lordship, is this to the Dispute concerning the Trinity, on either side? And if, after your Lordship has endeavour'd to give clear and distinct Apprehensions of *Nature* and *Person*, the Disputants in this Controversy should still talk unintelligibly about this Point, for want of clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning *Nature* and *Person*; ought your Lordship to be brought in among the Partisans on the other side, by any one who writ a *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*? In good earnest, my Lord, I do not see how the clear and distinct Notions of *Nature* and *Person*, not coming into the Mind by the simple *Ideas* of Sensation and Reflection, any more contains any Objection against the Doctrine of the Trinity, than the clear and distinct Apprehensions of Original Sin, Justification, or Transubstantiation, not coming into the Mind by the simple *Ideas* of Sensation and Reflection, contains any Objection against the Doctrine of Original Sin, Justification, or Transubstantiation: And so of all the rest of the Terms used in any Controversy in Religion."

All that your Lordship answers to this, is in these Words: *The next thing I undertook to shew, was, That we can have no clear and distinct Idea of Nature and Person, from Sensation or Reflection. Here you spend many Pages to shew, that this doth not concern you. Let it be so. But it concerns the Matter I was upon; which was to shew, That we must have Ideas [I think, my Lord, it should be clear and distinct Ideas] of these things, which we cannot come to by Sensation and Reflection.* Answ. p. 100.

But be that as it will; I have troubled your Lordship here, with this large Repetition out of my former Letter, because I think it clearly shews, That my Book is no more concern'd in the Controversy about the Trinity, than any other Controversy extant; nor any more opposite to that side of the Question that your Lordship has endeavour'd to defend, than to the contrary: And also because, by your Lordship's Answer to it in these Words, *Let it be so*, I thought you had not only agreed to all that I had said, but that by it I had been dismiss'd out of that Controversy.

It is an Observation I have somewhere met with, That whoever is once got into the Inquisition, guilty or not guilty, seldom ever gets clear out again. I think your Lordship is satisfy'd there is no Heresy in my Book. The Suspicion it was brought into, upon the account of placing *Certainty only upon clear and distinct Ideas*, is found groundless, there being no such thing in my Book; and yet it is not dismiss'd out of the Controversy. 'Tis allerdg'd still, That my *Notion of Ideas*, as I have stated it, may be of dangerous consequence as to that Article of the Christian Faith, which your Lordship has endeavour'd to defend; and so I am bound over to another Tryal. *Clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction, so necessary in the Dispute of the Trinity, cannot be had from Sensation and Reflection*, was another Accusation. To this, whether true or false, I pleaded, that it makes me no Party in this Dispute of the Trinity, more than in any Dispute that can arise; nor of one side of the Question more than another. My Plea is allowed, *Let it be so*; and yet *Nature* and *Person* are made use of again, to hook me into the heretical side of the Dispute: and what is now the Charge against me, in reference to the Unitarian Controversy, upon the account of *Nature* and *Person*? Even this new one, viz. That if my *Notions of Nature and Person* hold, your Lordship does not see how it is possible to defend the *Doctrine of the Trinity*. How is this new Charge prov'd? even thus, in these Words annex'd to it: *For if these Terms really signify nothing in themselves, but are only abstract and complex Ideas, which the common use of Language hath appropriated to be the Signs of two Ideas; then it is plain, that they are only Notions of the Mind, as all abstracted and complex Ideas are; and so One Nature and Three Persons can be no more.* P. 103.

My Lord, I am not so conceited of my *Notions*, as to think that they deserve that your Lordship should dwell long upon the Consideration of them. But pardon me, my Lord, if I say, that it seems to me that this Representation which your Lordship here makes to your self, of my *Notions of Nature and Person*, and the Inference from it, were made a little in haste: And that if it had not been so, your Lordship would not, from the preceding words, have drawn this Conclusion; *And so One Nature and Three Persons can be no more*; nor charg'd it upon me.

For

Mr. LOCKE's Reply to the

For as to that part of your Lordship's Representation of my Notions of *Nature* and *Person*, wherein 'tis said, *If these Terms in themselves signify nothing*; tho' I grant that to be my Notion of the Terms *Nature* and *Person*, That they are two Sounds that naturally signify not one thing more than another, nor in themselves signify any thing at all, but have the Signification which they have, barely by Imposition; yet in this my Notion of them give me leave to presume, that upon more leisurely Thoughts I shall have your Lordship, as well as the rest of Mankind that ever thought of this Matter concurring with me. So that if your Lordship continues positive in it, That you cannot see how it is possible to defend the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, if this my Notion of *Nature* and *Person* hold; I, as far as my Eye-sight will reach in the Case (which possibly is but a little way) cannot see, but it will be plain to all Mankind, that your Lordship gives up the *Doctrine of the Trinity*: since this Notion of *Nature* and *Person* that are two words that signify by Imposition, is what will hold in the common Sense of all Mankind. And then, my Lord, all those who think well of your Lordship's Ability to defend it, and believe that you see as far into that Question as any body (which I take to be the common Sentiment of all the Learned World, especially of those of our Country and Church) will be in great danger to have an ill Opinion of the Evidence of that Article: since, I imagine, there is scarce one of them, who does not think this Notion will hold, viz. That these Terms *Nature* and *Person* signify what they do signify by Imposition, and not by Nature.

Tho', if the contrary were true, viz. That these two Words, *Nature* and *Person*, had this particular Privilege, above other Names of Things, that they did naturally and in themselves signify what they do signify, and that they receiv'd not their significations from the arbitrary Imposition of Men; I do not see how the Defence of the *Doctrine of the Trinity* should depend hereon: unless your Lordship concludes, that it is necessary to the Defence of the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, that these two articular Sounds should have natural Significations, and that unless they are used in those Significations, it were impossible to defend the *Doctrine of the Trinity*. Which is in Effect to say, That where these two words are not in use and in their natural Signification, the *Doctrine of the Trinity* cannot be defended. And if this be so, I grant your Lordship had reason to say, That if it hold, that the Terms *Nature* and *Person* signify by Imposition, your Lordship does not see how it is possible to defend the *Doctrine of the Trinity*. But then, my Lord, I beg your Lordship to consider, whether this be not mightily to prejudice that *Doctrine*, and to undermine the Belief of that Article of Faith, to make so extraordinary a Supposition necessary to the Defence of it; and of more dangerous Consequence to it, than any thing your Lordship can imagine deducible from my Book?

As to the remaining part of what your Lordship has, in the foregoing Passages, set down as some of my Notions of *Nature* and *Person*, viz. That these Terms are only abstract or complex Ideas: I crave leave to plead, That I never said any such thing; and I should be ashamed if I ever had said, that these, or any other Terms, were Ideas: which is all one as to say, that the Sign is the thing signify'd. Much less did I ever say, That these Terms are only abstract and complex Ideas, which the common Use of Language hath appropriated to be the Signs of two Ideas. For to say, That the common Use of Language has appropriated abstract and complex Ideas to be the Signs of Ideas, seems to me so extraordinary a way of Talking, that I can scarce persuade my self it would be of credit to your Lordship, to think it worth your while to answer a Man, whom you could suppose to vent such gross Jargon.

This therefore containing none of my Notions of *Nature* and *Person*, nor indeed any thing that I understand: whether your Lordship rightly deduces from it this Consequence, viz. And so One Nature and Three Persons can be no more; is what I neither know nor am concern'd to examine.

Your Lordship has been pleas'd to take my *Essay of Human Understanding* to task, in your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*; because the *Doctrine* of it will not furnish your Lordship with clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning *Nature* and *Person*, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction. For, says your Lordship,

Lordship, we must talk unintelligibly about this Point [of the Trinity] unless we have clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person, &c.

Whether, by my way of *Ideas*, one can have clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person, I shall not now dispute, how much soever I am of the mind one may. Nor shall I question the Reasonableness of this Principle your Lordship goes upon, viz. That my Book is to be disputed against, as opposite to the Doctrine of the Trinity, because it fails to furnish your Lordship with clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person, and the Distinction between them; tho' I promis'd no such clear and distinct Apprehensions, nor have treated in my Book any where of Nature at all. But upon this Occasion I cannot but observe, That your Lordship your self, in that Place, makes clear and distinct *Ideas* necessary to that Certainty of Faith, which your Lordship thinks requisite, tho' it be that very thing for which you blame the Men of the new way of Reasoning, and is the very ground of your disputing against the Unitarians, the Author of Christianity not Mystrious, and me, jointly under that Title.

Your Lordship, to supply that Defect in my Book, of clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person, for the Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, without which it cannot be talk'd of intelligibly, nor defended, undertook to clear the Distinction between Nature and Person. This, I told your Lordship, gave me hopes of getting farther insight into these Matters, and more clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, than was to be had by *Ideas*; but that after all the Attention and Application I could use, in reading what your Lordship had writ of it, I found my self so little enlighten'd concerning Nature and Person, by what your Lordship had said, that I found no other Remedy, but that I must be content with the condemn'd way by *Ideas*.

Vindict. p. 252.

This, which I thought not only an innocent, but a respectful Answer, to what your Lordship had said about Nature and Person, has drawn upon me a more severe Reflection than I thought it deserv'd. Scepticism is a pretty hard Word, which I find dropt in more places than one: but I shall refer the Consideration of that to another place. All that I shall do now, shall be to mark out (since your Lordship forces me to it) more particularly than I did before, what I think very hard to be understood, in that which your Lordship has said to clear the Distinction between Nature and Person; which I shall do, for these two Ends:

P. 125.

First, As an Excuse for my saying, "That I had learnt nothing out of your Lordship's elaborate Discourse of them, but this; That I must content my self with my condemn'd way by *Ideas*."

And next to shew, why not only I, but several others, think, That if my Book deserv'd to be brought-in, and taken notice of among the Anti-Trinitarian Writers, for want of clear and distinct *Ideas* of Nature and Person; what your Lordship has said upon these Subjects, will more justly deserve, by him that writes next in Defence of the Doctrine of the Trinity, to be brought-in among the Opposers of the Doctrine of the Trinity, as of dangerous consequence to it, for want of giving clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person; unless the same thing ranks one Man among the Unitarians, and another among the Trinitarians.

What your Lordship had said for clearing of the Distinction of Nature and Person, having surpass'd my Understanding, as I told your Lordship in my former Letter; I was resolv'd not to incur your Lordship's Displeasure a second time, by confessing I found not my self enlighten'd by it, till I had taken all the Help I could imagine, to find out these clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person, which your Lordship had so much declar'd for. To this Purpose, I consulted others upon what you had said; and desir'd to find some body, who understanding it himself, would help me out, where my own Application and Endeavours had been used to no Purpose. But my Misfortune has been, my Lord, that among several whom I have desir'd to tell me their Sense of what your Lordship has said for clearing the Notions of Nature and Person, there has not been one who own'd, that he understood your Lordship's meaning; but confess'd, the farther he look'd into what your Lordship had there said about Nature and Person, the more he was at a Loss about them.

Vindic. p.
252.

One said, Your Lordship began with giving two Significations of the Word *Nature*. One of them, as it stood for *Properties*, he said he understood: But the other, wherein *Nature* was taken for the Thing it self wherein those *Properties* were, he said, he did not understand. But that, he added, I was not to wonder at, in a Man who was not very well acquainted with *Greek*: and therefore might well be allow'd not to have Learning enough to understand an *English* Word, that *Aristotle* was brought to explain and settle the Sense of. Besides, he added, that which puzzl'd him the more in it, was the very Explication which was brought of it out of *Aristotle*, viz. That *Nature* was a *Corporeal Substance*, which had the Principles of Motion in it self; because he could not conceive a *Corporeal Substance*, having the Principles of Motion in it self. And if *Nature* were a *Corporeal Substance*, having the Principles of Motion in it self; it must be good sense to say, that a *Corporeal Substance*, or, which is the same thing, a *Body* having the Principles of Motion in it self, is *Nature*; which he confess'd, if any *Body* should say to him, he could not understand.

Another thing he said, that perplex'd him in this Explication of *Nature*, was, That if *Nature* was a *Corporeal Substance*, which had the Principles of Motion in it self, he thought it might happen that there might be no *Nature* at all. For *Corporeal Substances* having all equally Principles, or no Principles of Motion in themselves; and all Men who do not make Matter and Motion eternal, being positive in it, that a *Body*, at rest, has no Principle of Motion in it: must conclude, that *Corporeal Substance* has no Principle of Motion in it self: From hence it will follow, that to all those who admit not Matter and Motion to be eternal, no *Nature* in that Sense, will be left at all, since *Nature* is said to be a *Corporeal Substance*, which hath the Principles of Motion in it self; but such a Sort of *Corporeal Substance* those Men have no Notion of at all, and consequently none of *Nature*, which is such a *Corporeal Substance*.

Now, said he, if this be that clear and distinct Apprehension of *Nature*, which is so necessary to the Doctrine of the Trinity; they who have found it out for that Purpose, and find it clear and distinct, have reason to be satisfy'd with it upon that account: But how they will reconcile it to the Creation of Matter, I cannot tell. I, for my part, said he, can make it consist neither with the Creation of the World, nor with any other Notions; and so, plainly, cannot understand it.

Vindic. p.
252.

He farther said, in the following Words, which are these, *But Nature and Substance are of an equal extent; and so that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties is the Nature, whether it be meant of Bodily or Spiritual Substances*; hence neither understood the Connection nor Sense: First, he understood not, he said, that *Nature and Substance were of the same Extent*. *Nature*, he said, in his Notion if it, extended to things that were not Substances; as he thought it might properly be said, the *Nature* of a *Rectangular Triangle* was, That the Square of the Hypotenuse, was equal to the Square of the two other Sides; or, it is the *Nature* of Sin, to offend God: Tho' it be certain, that neither *Sin*, nor a *Rectangular Triangle*, to which *Nature* is attributed in these Propositions, are either of them Substances.

Further, he said, that he did not see how the Particle *But*, connects this to the preceding Words. But least of all, could he comprehend the Inference from hence: *And so that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties is Nature, whether it be meant of Bodily or Spiritual Substances*. Which Deduction, said he, stands thus: *Aristotle* takes *Nature* for a *Corporeal Substance*, which has the Principle of Motion in it self; therefore *Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent*, and so both *Corporeal and Incorporeal Substances are Nature*. This is the very Connection, said he, of the whole Deduction, in the foregoing Words; which I understand not, if I understand the Words: And if I understand not the Words, I am yet farther from understanding any thing of this Explication of *Nature*, whereby we are to come to clear and distinct Apprehensions of it.

Methinks, said he, going on, I understand how by making *Nature* and *Substance* one and the same thing, that may serve to bring *Substance* into this Dispute; but for all that, I cannot, for my Life, understand *Nature* to be *Substance*, nor *Substance* to be *Nature*.

There

There is another Inference, said he, in the close of this Paragraph, which both for its Connection and Expression seems to me very hard to be understood, it being set down in these words: *So that the nature of things properly belongs to our Reason, and not to mere Ideas.* For when a Man knows what it is for the Nature of Things properly to belong to Reason, and not to mere Ideas, there will, I guess, some Difficulty remain, in what sense soever he shall understand that Expression, to deduce this Proposition as an Inference from the foregoing words, which are these: *I grant, that by Sensation and Reflection, we come to know the Powers and Properties of Things; but our Reason is satisfy'd that there must be something beyond those, because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves: So that the Nature of Things properly belongs to our Reason, and not to mere Ideas.* Vind. p. 253.

'Tis true, said I; but his Lordship, upon my taking Reason in that place for the power of Reasoning, hath, in his Answer, with a little kind of Warmth, corrected my Mistake, in these Words: *Still you are at it, That "you can find no opposition between Ideas and Reason: But Ideas are Objects of the Understanding, and the Understanding is one of the Faculties employ'd about them." No doubt of it. But you might easily see that by Reason, I understood Principles of Reason, allow'd by Mankind; which, I think, are very different from Ideas. But I perceive Reason, in this Sense, is a thing you have no Idea of; or one as obscure as that of Substance.* Ans. p. 101.

I imagine, said the Gentleman, that if his Lordship should be ask'd, How he perceives you have no Idea of Reason in that Sense, or one as obscure as that of Substance; he would scarce have a Reason ready to give for his saying so: And what we say which Reason cannot account for, must be ascrib'd to some other Cause.

Now truly, said I, my Mistake was so innocent and so unaffected, that if I had had these very Words said to me then, which his Lordship sounds in my Ears now, to awaken my Understanding, viz. *That the principles of Reason are very different from Ideas; I do not yet find how they would have help'd me to see what, it seems, was no small Fault, that I did not see before. Because, let Reason, taken for Principles of Reason, be as different as it will from Ideas; Reason taken as a Faculty, is as different from them, in my apprehension: And in both Senses of the word Reason, either as taken for a Faculty, or for the Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind, Reason and Ideas may consist together.*

Certainly, said the Gentleman, Ideas have something in them that you do not see; or else such a small Mistake as you made in endeavouring to make them consistent with Reason, as a Faculty, would not have mov'd so great a Man as my Lord Bishop of W. so as to make him tell you, *That Reason, taken for the common Principles of Reason, is a thing whereof you have no Idea, or one as obscure as that of Substance.* For, if I mistake not, you have in your Book, in more places than one, spoke, and that pretty largely, of self-evident Propositions and Maxims: So that, if his Lordship has ever read those parts of your Essay, he cannot doubt, but that you have Ideas of those common Principles of Reason.

It may be so, I reply'd; but such things are to be borne from great Men, who often use them as Marks of Distinction: Tho' I should less expect them from my Lord Bishop of W. than from almost any one; because he has the solid and interior Greatness of Learning, as well as that of outward Title and Dignity. But since he expects it from me, I will do what I can to see what he says is his meaning here by Reason. I will repeat it just as his Lordship says, *I might easily have seen what he understood by it. My Lord's words immediately following those above taken notice of, are: And so that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties is the Nature, whether it be meant of Bodily or Spiritual Substances. And then follow these, which to be rightly understood his Lordship says must be read thus: I grant, that by Sensation and Reflection we come to know the Properties of Things; but our Reason, i. e. the Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind, are satisfy'd that there must be something beyond these, because it is impossible they should subsist by themselves: So that the nature* Vind. p. 152.

of things properly belongs to our Reason, i. e. to the Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind; and not to mere Ideas. This Explication of it, reply'd the Gentleman, which my Lord Bishop has given of this Passage, makes it more unintelligible to me than it was before; and I know him to be so great a Master of Sense, that I doubt whether he himself will be better satisfy'd with this Sense of his Words, than with that which you understood it in. But let us go on to the two next Paragraphs, wherein his Lordship is at farther pains to give us clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature: And, that we may not mistake, let us first read his words, which run thus:

Vind. p. 253. But we must yet proceed farther; For Nature may be consider'd two ways:

1. As it is in distinct Individuals; as the Nature of a Man is equally in Peter, James, and John; and this is the common Nature, with a particular Subsistence proper to each of them. For the Nature of a Man, as in Peter, is distinct from that same Nature, as it is in James and John; otherwise they would be but one Person, as well as have the same Nature. And this Distinction of Persons in them, is discern'd both by our Senses, as to their different Accidents; and by our Reason, because they have a separate Existence, not coming into it at once, and in the same manner.

2. Nature may be consider'd abstractly, without respect to individual Persons; and then it makes an intire Notion of it self. For, however the same Nature may be in different Individuals, yet the Nature in it self remains one and the same; which appears from this evident Reason, That otherwise every Individual must make a different Kind.

In these words, said he, having read them, I find the same Difficulties you took notice of in your Letter. As first, That it is not declar'd whether his Lordship speaks here of Nature, as standing for Essential Properties, or of Nature, as standing for Substance; which Dubiousness casts an Obscurity on the whole place. And next, I can no more tell than you, whether it be his Lordship's Opinion that I ought to think, That one and the same Nature is in Peter and John; or, That a Nature distinct from that in John, is in Peter; and that for the same reason which left you at a loss, viz. Because I cannot put together one and the same and distinct. But since his Lordship, in his Answer to you, has said nothing to give us light in these matters, we must be content to be in the dark; and if he has not thought fit to explain it, so as to make himself to be understood by us, we may be sure he has a Reason for it. But pray tell me, Did you understand the rest of these two Paragraphs that you mention'd, only those two Difficulties? For I must profess to you, That I understand so little of either of them, that they contribute nothing at all to give me those clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person, which I find, by his Lordship, it is necessary to have, before one can have a right Understanding of the Doctrine of the Trinity. Nay, I am so far from gaining by his Lordship's Discourse those clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person, that what he objects to your new Method of Certainty, I found verify'd in this his clearing the Distinction between Nature and Person, that it left me in more doubt than I was in before.

Truly, Sir, reply'd I, that was just my Case; but minding then only what I thought immediately related to the Objections to my Book, which follow'd; I pass'd by what I might have retorted concerning the Obscurity and Difficulty in his Lordship's Doctrine about Nature and Person, and contented my self to tell his Lordship, in as respectful Terms as I could find, that I could not understand him: which drew from him that severe Reflection, That I obstinately stick to a way that leads to Scepticism, which is the way of Ideas. But now that, for the Vindication of my Book, I am shewing that his Lordship's way, without Ideas, does as little (I will not say less) furnish us with clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, as my Essay does; I do not see but that his Lordship's Vindication of the Trinity is as much against the Doctrine of the Trinity, as my Essay of Human Understanding; and may, with as much reason on that account, be animadverted on by another, who vindicates the Doctrine of the Trinity, as my Book is by his Lordship.

Indeed, saith he, if failing of clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, render any Book obnoxious to one that vindicates the Doctrine of the Trinity, and gives him sufficient Cause to write against it, as opposite to that Doctrine; I know no Book of more dangerous consequence to that Article of Faith,

Faith, nor more necessary to be writ against by a Defender of that Article, than that part of his Lordship's Vindication, which we are now upon. For to my thinking, I never met with any thing more unintelligible about that Subject, nor that is more remote from *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*. For what more effectual method could there be to confound the Notions of *Nature and Person*, instead of clearing their *Distinction*, than to discourse of them without first defining them? Is this a way, to give *clear and distinct Apprehensions* of two Words, upon a right Understanding of which, all our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity depend; and without which, we must talk unintelligibly about that Point?

His Lordship tells us here, *Nature may be consider'd two ways*. What is it the near to be told, *Nature may be consider'd two* or twenty ways, till we know what that is which is to be consider'd two ways? *i. e.* till he defines the Term *Nature*, that we may know what precisely is the thing meant by it. Vind. p. 253.

He tells us, *Nature may be consider'd,*

1. *As it is in Individuals.*

2. *Abstractly.*

1. His Lordship says, *Nature may be consider'd, as in distinct Individuals*. 'Tis true, by those that know what Nature is. But his Lordship having not yet told me what Nature is, nor what he here means by it, it is impossible for me to consider *Nature* in or out of *Individuals*, unless I can consider I know not what: So that this Consideration is, to me, as good as no Consideration; neither does or can it help at all to any *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*. Indeed he says, *Aristotle* by *Nature* signify'd a *Corporeal Substance*; and from thence his Lordship takes occasion to say, that *Nature and Substance are of an equal extent*: *Tho' Aristotle, taking Nature for a Corporeal Substance, gave no ground for such a Saying, because Corporeal Substance and Substance are not of an equal extent*. But to pass by that: If his Lordship would have us understand here, that by *Nature* he means *Substance*, this is but substituting one Name in the place of another; and, which is worse, a more doubtful and obscure Term, in the place of one that is less so: which will, I fear, not give us very *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*. His Lordship goes on:

As the Nature of a Man is equally in Peter, James, and John; and this is the common Nature, with a particular Subsistence proper to each of them.

Here his Lordship does not tell us what Consideration of *Nature* there may be, but actually affirms and teaches something. I wish I had the Capacity to learn by it the *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*, which is the Lesson he is upon here. He says, *That the Nature of a Man is equally in Peter, James, and John*. That's more than I know: Because I do not know what things *Peter, James, and John*, are. They may be Drills, or Horses, for ought I know; as well as *Weweena, Cuchiye, and Cousbeda, may be Drills*, as his Lordship says, *for ought he knows*. For I know no Law of Speech that more necessarily makes these three Sounds, *Peter, James, and John*, stand for three Men; than *Weweena, Cuchiye, and Cousbeda*, stand for three Men: For I knew a Horse that was call'd *Peter*; and I do not know but the Master of the same Team might call other of his Horses, *James* and *John*. Indeed if *Peter, James, and John*, are suppos'd to be the Names only of a Men, it cannot be question'd but the nature of Man is equally in them; unless one can suppose each of them to be a Man, without having the Nature of Man in him: that is, suppose him to be a Man, without being a Man. But then this to me, I confess, gives no manner of *clear or distinct Apprehensions concerning nature* in general, or the *Nature* of Man in particular; it seeming to me to say no more but this, *That a Man is a Man, and a Drill is a Drill, and a Horse is a Horse*: Or, which is all one, what has the Nature of a Man, has the Nature of a Man, or is a Man; and what has the Nature of a Drill, has the Nature of a Drill, or is a Drill; and what has the Nature of a Horse, has the Nature of a Horse, or is a Horse; whether it be call'd *Peter*, or not call'd *Peter*. But if any one should repeat this a thousand times to me, and go over all the Species of Creatures, with such an unquestionable Assertion of every one of them; I do not find, that thereby I should get one jot clearer or distincter Apprehensions either of *Nature* in general, or of the Nature of a Man, a Horse, or a Drill, &c. in particular.

His Lordship adds, *And this is the common Nature, with a particular Subsistence proper to each of them.* I do not doubt but his Lordship set down these words with a very good Meaning; but such is my Misfortune, that I, for my Life, cannot find it out. I have repeated *And this* twenty times to my self; and my weak Understanding always revolts, And what? To which I am always ready to answer, *The Nature of a Man in Peter, and the Nature of a Man in James, and the Nature of a Man in John, is the common Nature;* and there I stop, and can go no farther to make it coherent to my self, till I add of *Man*: and then it must be read thus; *The Nature of Man in Peter is the common Nature of Man, with a particular Subsistence proper to Peter.* That the *Nature of Man in Peter*, is the *Nature of a Man*, if *Peter* be suppos'd to be a *Man*, I certainly know, let the *Nature of Man* be what it will, of which I yet know nothing: But if *Peter* be not suppos'd to be the Name of a *Man*, but be the Name of a *Horse*, all that Knowledge vanishes, and I know nothing. But let *Peter* be ever so much a *Man*, and let it be impossible to give that Name to a *Horse*; yet I cannot understand these words, That the *common Nature of Man* is in *Peter*; for whatsoever is in *Peter*, exists in *Peter*; and whatever exists in *Peter*, is particular: But the *common Nature of Man*, is the *general Nature of Man*, or else I understand not what is meant by *common Nature*. And it confounds my Understanding, to make a *General* a *Particular*.

But to help me to conceive this matter, I am told, *It is the common Nature, with a particular Subsistence proper to Peter.* But this helps not my Understanding in the case: For first, I do not understand what *Subsistence* is, if it signify any thing different from *Existence*; and if it be the same with *Existence*, then it is so far from loosening the Knot, that it leaves it just as it was, only cover'd with the obscure and less known Term *Subsistence*. For the difficulty to me, is, to conceive an *Universal Nature*, or *Universal Any-thing*, to exist; which would be, in my mind, to make an *Universal* a *Particular*: which, to me, is impossible.

No, said another who was by, 'tis but using the word *Subsistence* instead of *Existence*, and there is nothing easier; if you will consider this *common* or *universal Nature*, with a *particular Existence*, under the name of *Subsistence*, the Business is done.

Just as easy, reply'd the former, I find it in my self, as to consider the *Nature of a Circle with four Angles*; for to consider a *Circle with four Angles*, is no more impossible to me, than to consider a *Universal with a particular Existence*; which is to consider a *Universal really existing*, and in effect a *Particular*. But the words *Proper to each of them*, follow to help me out. I hoped so, till I consider'd them; and then I found I understood them as little as all the rest. For I know not what is a *Substance proper to Peter*, more than to *James* or *John*, till I know *Peter* himself; and then indeed my Senses will discern him from *James* or *John*, or any *Man* living.

His Lordship goes on: *For the Nature of Man, as in Peter, is distinct from that same Nature as it is in James and John; otherwise they would be but one Person, as well as have the same Nature.* These words, by the causal Particle *For*, which introduces them, should be a Proof of something that goes before: but what they are meant for a Proof of, I confess I understand not. For the Proposition preceding, as far as I can make any thing of it, is this; That the *general Nature of a Man* has a *particular Existence* in each of the three, *Peter, James, and John*. But then how the saying, *That the Nature of Man, as in Peter, is distinct from the same Nature as it is in James and John*, does prove that the *general Nature of Man* does or can exist in either of them, I cannot see.

The words which follow, *Otherwise they would be but one Person, as well as have the same Nature*, I see the Connection of; for it is visible they were brought to prove, that the *Nature in Peter* is *distinct* from the *Nature in James and John*. But with all that, I do not see of what Use or Significancy they are here: because, to me, they are more obscure and doubtful, than the Proposition they are brought to prove. For I scarce think there can be a clearer Proposition than this, *viz.* That three *Natures*, that have three distinct *Existences* in three *Men*, are, as his Lordship says, three distinct *Natures*, and so needs no Proof. But to prove it by this, *That otherwise they could not be three Persons*, is to prove it by a Pro-

Proposition unintelligible to me; because his Lordship has not yet told me, what the *clear and distinct Apprehension of Person* is, which I ought to have. For his Lordship supposing it, as he does, to be a Term, which has in it self a certain Signification; I, who have no such Conception of it should in vain look for it in the Propriety of our Language, which is establish'd upon arbitrary Imposition; and so can, by no means, imagine what *Person* here signifies, till his Lordship shall do me the favour to tell me.

To this I reply'd, That Page 259, which is but six Pages farther, your Lordship explains the Notion of *Person*.

To which the Gentleman answer'd, Whether I can get clear and distinct Apprehensions of *Person*, by what his Lordship says there of *Person*, I shall see when I come to it. But this, in the mean time must be confess'd, That *Person* comes in here six Pages too soon for those who want his Lordship's Explication of it, to make them have *clear and distinct Apprehensions* of what he means when he uses it.

For we must certainly talk *unintelligibly* about *Nature* and *Person*, as well as about the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, unless we have *clear and distinct Apprehensions* concerning *Nature* and *Person*; as his Lordship says, in the foregoing Page.

It follows, *And this Distinction of Person in them, is discern'd both by our Senses, as to their different Accidents; and by our Reason, because they have a separate Existence; not coming into it at once and in the same manner.*

These Words, said he, which conclude this Paragraph, tell us how *Persons* are distinguish'd; but, as far as I can see, serve not at all to give us any *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*, by considering it in *distinct Individuals*: which was the Business of this Paragraph.

His Lordship says, *We may consider Nature as in distinct Individuals*: And so I do as much, when I consider it in three distinct Physical Atoms or Particles, of *Air* or *Æther*, as when I consider it in *Peter*, *James* and *John*. For three distinct Physical Atoms are three distinct Individuals, and have three distinct *Natures* in them, as certainly as three distinct *Men*; tho' I cannot discern the *Distinction* between them by my *Senses*, as to their different *Accidents*; nor is their *separate Existence* discernible to my *Reason*, by their not coming into it at once and in the same manner: For they did, for ought I know, or at least might, come into Existence at once and in the same manner, which was by *Creation*. I think it will be allow'd, That God did, or might, create more than one Physical Atom of Matter at once: So that here *Nature may be consider'd in distinct Individuals*, without any of those ways of *Distinction* which his Lordship here speaks of: And so I cannot see how these last Words contribute ought to give us *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*, by considering *Nature in distinct Individuals*.

But to try what *clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature*, his Lordship's way of considering *Nature* in this Paragraph carries in it; let me repeat his Lordship's Discourse to you here, only changing one *common Nature* for another, viz. putting the *common Nature of Animal*, for the *common Nature of Man*, which his Lordship has chose to instance in; and then his Lordship's Words would run thus: *Nature may be consider'd two ways; First, As it is in distinct Individuals; as the Nature of an Animal is equally in Alexander, Bucephalus, and Podargus: And this is the common Nature, with a particular Subsistence, proper to each of them. For the Nature of Animal, as in Bucephalus, is distinct from the same Nature, as in Podargus and Alexander; otherwise they would be but one Person, as well as have the same Nature. And this Distinction of Persons in them, is discern'd both by our Senses, as to their different Accidents; and by our Reason, because they have a separate Existence, not coming into it at once and in the same manner.*

To this I said, I thought he did violence to your Lordship's Sense, in applying the word *Person*, which signifies an intelligent Individual, to *Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, which were two irrational Animals.

To which the Gentleman reply'd, That he fell into this Mistake, by his thinking your Lordship had somewhere spoken, as if an individual intelligent Substance were not the proper Definition of *Person*. But, continu'd he, I lay no stress

stress on the word *Person*, in the Instance wherein I have us'd his Lordship's Words, and therefore, if you please, put *Individual* for it; and then reading it so, let me ask you, Whether that way of considering it contributes any thing to the giving you *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*? which it ought to do, if his Lordship's way of considering *Nature* in that Paragraph, were of any use to that purpose: Since the *common Nature* of Animal is as much the same; or, as his Lordship says in the next Paragraph, *as much an entire Notion of it self*, as the *common Nature* of Man. And the *common Nature* of Animal is as equally in *Alexander, Bucephalus, and Podargus*, with a *particular Subsistence proper to each of them*, as the *common Nature* of Man is equally in *Peter, James, and John*, with a *particular Subsistence proper to each of them*, &c. But pray what does all this do towards the giving you *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*?

I reply'd, Truly neither the Consideration of *Nature*, as in his Lordship's distinct Individuals, viz. in *Peter, James, and John*; nor the Consideration of *Nature*, as in your distinct Individuals, viz. in *Alexander, Bucephalus, and Podargus*; did any thing towards the giving me *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*. Nay, they were so far from it, that after having gone over both the one and the other several times in my Thoughts, I seem to have less *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*, than I had before, but whether it will be so with other People, as I perceive it is with you, and me, and some others, none of the dullest, whom I have talk'd with upon this Subject, that must be left to Experience; and if there be others that do hereby get such *clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature*, which may help them in their *Notions* of the Trinity, that cannot be deny'd them.

That's true, said he: But if that be so, I must necessarily conclude, That the *Notionists* and the *Ideists* have their apprehensive Faculties very differently turn'd; since in their explaining themselves (which they on both sides think *clear and intelligible*) they cannot understand one another.

But let us go on to *Nature, consider'd abstractly*, in the next Words.

Secondly, *Nature may be consider'd*, says his Lordship, *abstractly, without respect to individual Persons*.

I do not see, said he, what *Persons* do here, more than any other Individuals. For *Nature, consider'd abstractly*, has no more respect to *Persons*, than any other sort of Individuals.

And then, says his Lordship, *it makes an entire Notion of it self*. To make an *entire Notion of it self*, being an Expression I never met with before, I shall not, I think, be much blam'd if I be not confident, that I perfectly understand it. To guess therefore, as well as I can, what can be meant by it, I consider, That whatever the Mind makes an Object of its Contemplation at any time, may be call'd one *Notion*, or as you perhaps would call it, one *Idea*; which may be an *entire Notion* or *Idea*, tho' it be but the half of what is the Object of the Mind at another time. For methinks the Number Five is as much an *entire Notion of it self*, when the Mind contemplates the Number Five by it self; as the Number Ten is an *entire Notion by it self*, when the Mind contemplates that alone and its Properties: And in this Sense I can understand an *entire Notion by it self*. But if it mean any thing else, I confess I do not understand it. But then the Difficulty remains; For I cannot see how in this Sense, *Nature abstractly consider'd makes an entire Notion*, more than the *Nature of Peter makes an entire Notion*. For if the *Nature in Peter* be consider'd by it self, or if the *abstract Nature of Man* be consider'd by it self, or if the *Nature of Animal* (which is yet more abstract) be consider'd by it self; every one of these, being made the whole Object that the Mind at any time contemplates, seems to me, as much an *entire Notion* as either of the other.

But farther, What the calling *Nature abstractly consider'd an entire Notion in it self*, contributes to our having or not having *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature*, is yet more remote from my Comprehension.

Vind. p. 254. His Lordship's next Words are; For however the same *Nature* may be in different Individuals; yet the *Nature in it self* remains one and the same: Which appears from this evident Reason, That otherwise every Individual must make a different kind.

The Coherence of which Discourse, continu'd he, tending, as it seems, to prove, That *Nature*, consider'd abstractly, makes an entire Notion of it self; stands, as far as I can comprehend it, thus: Because every Individual must not make a different Kind; therefore *Nature*, however it be in different Individuals, yet in it self it remains one and the same. And because *Nature*, however it be in different Individuals, yet in it self remains one and the same; therefore, consider'd abstractly, it makes an entire Notion of it self. This is the Argument of this Paragraph; and the Connection of it, if I understand the connecting Words, *For*, and *from this evident Reason*. But if they are us'd for any thing else but to tie those Propositions together, as the Proofs one of another, in that way I have mention'd them; I confess, I understand them not, nor any thing that is meant by this whole Paragraph. And in that Sense I understand it in, what it does towards the giving us clear and distinct Apprehensions of *Nature*, I must confess I do not see at all.

Thus far, said he, we have consider'd his Lordship's Explication of *Nature*; and my understanding what his Lordship has discours'd upon it, under several Heads, for the giving us clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning it.

Let us now read what his Lordship has said concerning *Person*; that I may, since you desire it of me, let you see how far I have got any clear and distinct Apprehension of *Person* from his Lordship's Explications of that. His Lordship's Words are; *Let us now come to the Idea of a Person. For, altho' the common Nature of Mankind be the same, yet we see a difference in the several Individuals from one another: So that Peter, and James, and John, are all of the same kind; yet Peter is not James, and James is not John. But what is this Distinction founded upon? They may be distinguished from each other by our Senses, as to Difference of Features, Distance of Place, &c. but that is not all; for supposing there were no external Difference, yet there is a Difference between them, as several Individuals in the same common Nature. And here lies the true Idea of a Person, which arises from the manner of Substance, which is in one Individual, and is not communicable to another. An Individual intelligent Substance is rather suppos'd to the making of a Person, than the proper Definition of it; for a Person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another Intelligent Substance in the same Nature; and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subsistence, which agrees to one, and to none else, of the kind; and this is it which is call'd Personality.*

Vindiciæ.
259.

In these Words, this I understand very well, That supposing *Peter, James and John* to be all three Men; and *Man* being a Name for one Kind of Animals, they are all of the same Kind. I understand too very well, That *Peter* is not *James*, and *James* is not *John*, but that there is a Difference in these several Individuals. I understand also, That they may be distinguish'd from each other by our Senses, as to different Features and distance of Place, &c. But what follows, I do confess I do not understand, where his Lordship says, *But that is not all; for supposing there were no such external difference, yet there is a difference between them, as several Individuals in the same Nature.* For first, whatever Willingness I have to gratify his Lordship in whatever he would have me suppose, yet I cannot, I find, suppose, That there is no such external difference between *Peter* and *James*, as difference of Place; for I cannot suppose a Contradiction: And it seems to me to imply a Contradiction to say, *Peter* and *James* are not in different Places. The next thing I do not understand, is what his Lordship says in these Words; *For supposing there were no such external difference, yet there is a difference between them, as several Individuals in the same Nature.* For these words being here to shew what the Distinction of *Peter, James and John* is founded upon, I do not understand how they at all do it.

His Lordship says, *Peter is not James, and James is not John.* He then asks, *But what is this Distinction founded upon?* And to resolve that, he answers, *Not by difference of Features, or distance of Place, with an &c. Because, Supposing there were no such external difference, yet there is a difference between them.* In which Passage, by these Words, *Such external difference*, must be meant all other difference but what his Lordship, in the next Words, is going to name; or else I do not see how his Lordship shews what this Distinction is founded upon. For if, supposing such external differences away, there may be other differences

ferences on which to found their Distinction, besides that other which his Lordship subjoins, *viz. The difference that is between them, as several Individuals in the same Nature*: I cannot see that his Lordship has said any thing to shew what the Distinction between those Individuals is founded on; because if he has not, under the Terms *external difference*, compriz'd all the differences besides that his chief and fundamental one, *viz. The difference between them as several Individuals, in the same common Nature*; it may be founded on what his Lordship has not mention'd. I conclude then it is his Lordship's meaning (or else I can see no meaning in his Words) That *supposing no Difference between them, of Features or distance of Place, &c. i. e. no other difference between them, yet there would be still the true Ground of Distinction, in the difference between them, as several Individuals in the same common Nature.*

Let us then understand, if we can, what is the *difference between things*, barely as *several Individuals in the same common Nature*, all other differences laid aside.

Truly, said I, that I cannot conceive.

Nor I neither, reply'd the Gentleman: For considering them as several Individuals, was what his Lordship did, when he said, *Peter was not James and James was not John*; and if that were enough to shew on what the Distinction between them was founded, his Lordship needed have gone no farther in his Enquiry after that, for that he had found already: And yet methinks thither are we at last come again, as to the Foundation of the Distinction between them, *viz. That they are several Individuals in the same common Nature.* Nor can I here see any other Ground of the Distinction between those, that are *several Individuals in the same common Nature*, but this, That they are *several Individuals in the same common Nature*. Either this is all the meaning that his Lordship's Words, when consider'd, carry in them; or else I do not understand what they mean: And either way, I must own, they do not much towards the giving me *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person.*

One thing more I must remark to you, in his Lordship's way of expressing himself here; and that is, in the former part of the Words last read he speaks, as he does all along, of the *same common Nature being in Mankind*, or in the several Individuals: And in the latter part of them, he speaks of *several Individuals being in the same common Nature*. I do by no means find fault with such figurative and common way of speaking, in popular and ordinary Discourses, where inaccurate Thoughts allow inaccurate ways of speaking: but I think I may say, That Metaphorical Expressions (which seldom terminate in precise Truth) should be as much as possible avoided, when Men undertake to deliver *clear and distinct Apprehensions*, and exact Notions of Things: Because, being taken strictly and according to the Letter, (as we find they are apt to be) they always puzzle and mislead, rather than enlighten and instruct.

I do not say this (continued he) with an Intention to accuse his Lordship of inaccurate Notions; but yet, I think, his sticking so close all along to that vulgar way of speaking of the *same common Nature being in several Individuals*, has made him less easy to be understood. For to speak truly and precisely of this Matter, as in reality it is, there is no such thing as *one and the same common Nature in several Individuals*: For all that in Truth is in them, is particular, and can be nothing but particular. But the true meaning (when it has any) of that metaphorical and popular Phrase, I take to be this, and no more, That every particular individual Man or Horse, &c. has such a Nature or Constitution, as agrees, and is conformable to that Idea which that general Name stands for.

His Lordship's next Words are; *And here lies the true Idea of a Person, which arises from that manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual, and is not communicable to another.* The reading of these Words, said he, makes me wish, That we had some other way of communicating our Thoughts, than by Words; for, no doubt, it would have been as much a Pleasure to have seen what his Lordship's Thoughts were when he writ this, as it is now an Uneasiness to pudder in Words and Expressions, whose meaning one does not

not comprehend. But let us do the best we can. *And here, says his Lordship, lies the true Idea of Person.*

Person being a Dis-syllable that in it self signifies nothing; what is meant by the *true Idea* of it (it having no *Idea*, one more than another, that belongs to it, but the *Idea* of the articulate Sound, that those two Syllables make in pronouncing) I do not understand. If by *true Idea* be meant true Signification, then these words will run thus; *Here lies the true Signification of the word Person*; and then to make it more intelligible, we must change *Here* into *Herein*, and then the whole Comma will stand thus; *Herein lies the true Signification of the word Person*: which reading *Herein*, must refer to the preceding words: And then the meaning of these words will be, The true Signification of *Person* lies in this, that supposing there were no other difference in the several Individuals of the same kind; yet there is a difference between them, as several Individuals in the same common Nature. Now, if in this lies the true Signification of the word *Person*, he must find it here that can. For if he does find it in these words, he must find it to be such a Signification as will make the word *Person* agree as well to *Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, as to *Alexander*: For let the difference between *Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, as several Individuals in the same common Nature, be what it will; 'tis certain, 'twill always be as great, as the difference between *Alexander* and *Hector*, as several Individuals in the same common Nature. So that, if the true Signification of *Person* lies in that difference, it will belong to *Bucephalus* and *Podargus*, as well as to *Alexander* and *Hector*. But let any one reason ever so subtilty or profoundly about the *true Idea*, or true Signification of the Term *Person*, he will never be able to make me understand, That *Bucephalus* and *Podargus* are *Persons*, in the true Signification of the word *Person*, as commonly us'd in the *English* Tongue.

But that which more certainly and for ever will hinder me from finding the true Signification of *Person*, lying in the foregoing words, is, That they require me to do what I find is impossible for me to do, *i. e.* find a difference between two Individuals, as several Individuals in the same common Nature, without any other difference. For if I never found any other difference, I should never find two Individuals. For first, we find some difference, and by that we find they are two or several Individuals; but in this way we are bid to find two Individuals, without any difference: But that, I find, is too subtil and sublime for my weak Capacity. But when by any difference of Time, or Place, or any thing else, I have once found them to be two, or several, I cannot for ever after consider them but as several. They being once, by some difference, found to be two, 'tis unavoidable for me from thenceforth to consider them as two. But to find several where I find no difference; or, as his Lordship is pleas'd to call it, *external difference* at all; is, I confess, too hard for me.

This his Lordship farther tells us, in these words which follow; *Which arises from the manner of Subsistence, which is in one Individual, which is not communicable to another*: Which is, I own, a learned way of speaking, and is suppos'd to contain some refin'd Philosophick Notion in it, which to me is either wholly incomprehensible, or else may be express'd in these plain and common Words, *viz.* That every Thing that exists has, in the Time or Place, or other perceivable differences of its Existence, something incommunicable to all those of its own kind, whereby it will eternally be kept several from all the rest. This, I think, is that which the Learned have been pleas'd to term a *peculiar manner of Subsistence*; but if this *manner of Subsistence* be any thing else, it will need some farther Explication to make me understand it.

His Lordship's next words which follow, I must acknowledg are also wholly incomprehensible to me: They are, *An individual intelligent Substance is rather suppos'd to the making of a Person, than the proper Definition of it.*

Person is a Word; and the *Idea* that Word stands for, or the proper Signification of that Word, is what I take his Lordship is here giving us. Now what is meant by saying, *An individual intelligent Substance is rather suppos'd to the making the Signification of the word Person, than the proper Definition*

of it, is beyond my reach. And the Reason his Lordship adjoins, puts it in that, or any other Sense, farther from my Comprehension. For a Person relates to something which does distinguish it from another intelligent Substance in the same Nature; and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subsistence, which agrees to one, and none else, of the kind: and this is that which is call'd Personality.

These words, if nothing else, convince me that I am *Davus*, and not *Oedipus*; and so I must leave them.

Vind. p. 261. His Lordship, at last, gives us what, I think, he intends for a Definition of Person, in these words: *Therefore a Person is a compleat intelligent Substance, with a peculiar manner of Subsistence.* Where I cannot but observe, That what was, as I think, deny'd or half-deny'd to be the proper Definition of Person; in saying, *It was rather suppos'd to the making of a Person, than the proper Definition of it,* is yet here got into his Lordship's Definition of Person; which I cannot suppose, but his Lordship takes to be a proper Definition. There is only one word chang'd in it; and instead of *individual intelligent Substance*, his Lordship has put it *compleat intelligent Substance*: which, whether it makes his the more proper Definition, I leave to others; since possibly some will be apt to think, That a proper Definition of Person cannot be well made, without the Term *individual*, or an equivalent. But his Lordship has, as

Vind. p. 216. appears by the Place, put in *compleat*, to exclude the Soul from being a Person; which, whether it does it or no, to me seems doubtful: Because possibly many may think, that the Soul is a *compleat intelligent Substance* by it self, whether in the Body or out of the Body; because every Substance that has a Being, is a *compleat Substance*, whether join'd or not join'd to another. And as to the Soul's being intelligent, no body, I guess, thinks, that the Soul is compleated in that, by its Union with the Body; for then it would follow, that it would not be equally intelligent out of the Body; which, I think, no body will say.

And thus I have, at your Request, gone over all that his Lordship has said, to give us *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*, which are so necessary to the understanding the Doctrine of the Trinity, and talking intelligibly about it. And if I should judge of others by my own Dulness, I should fear that by his Lordship's Discourse, Few would be helped to think or talk intelligibly about it. But I measure not others by my narrow Capacity: I wish others may profit by his Lordship's Explication of *Nature and Person*, more than I have done. And so the Conversation ended.

Vind. p. 254. My Lord, I should not have troubled your Lordship with a Dialogue of this kind, had not your Lordship forc'd me to it in my own Defence. Your Lordship, at the end of your above-mention'd Explication of *Nature*, has these words: *Let us now see how far these Things can come from our Ideas, by Sensation and Reflection.* And to the like purpose, in the close of your Explication of *Person*, your Lordship says, *But how do our simple Ideas help us out in this Matter? Can we learn from them the difference of Nature and Person?* Your Lordship concludes we cannot. But you say, what makes a Person, must be understood some other way. And hereupon, my Lord, my Book is thought worthy by your Lordship, to be brought into the Controversy and argu'd against, in your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*; because, as your Lordship conceives, *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person* cannot be had from it.

I humbly crave leave to represent to your Lordship, That if want of affording *clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person*, make any Book Anti-trinitarian, and, as such, fit to be writ against by your Lordship; your Lordship ought, in the Opinion of a great many Men, in the first place, to write against your own *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*: since, among the many I have consulted concerning your Lordship's Notions of *Nature and Person*, I do not find any one that understands them better, or has got from them any *clearer or more distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person*, than I my self; which indeed is none at all.

The owning of this to your Lordship in my former Letter, I find, displeas'd your Lordship: I therefore here laid before your Lordship some part

part of those Difficulties which appear to me, and others, in your Lordship's Explication of *Nature and Person*, as my Apology for saying, I had not learn'd any thing by it. And to make it evident, that if want of *clear and distinct Apprehensions of Nature and Person*, involve any Treatise in the Unitarian Controversy; your Lordship's upon that account, is, I humbly conceive, as guilty as mine; and may be reckon'd one of the first that ought to be charg'd with that Offence against the *Doctrine of the Trinity*.

This, my Lord, I cannot help thinking, till I understand better. Whether the not being able to get *clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person*, from what your Lordship has said of them, be the want of Capacity in my Understanding, or want of Clearness in that which I have endeavour'd to understand, I shall not presume to say; of that the World must judge. If it be my Dulness (as I cannot presume much upon my own Quickness, having every Day experience how short-sighted I am) I have this yet to defend me from any very severe Censure in the Case, That I have as much endeavour'd to understand your Lordship, as I ever did to understand any Body. And if your Lordship's Notions, laid down about *Nature and Person*, are plain and intelligible, there are a great many others, whose Parts lie under no Blemish in the World, who find them neither plain nor intelligible.

Pardon me therefore, I beseech you, my Lord, if I return your Lordship's Question, *How do your Lordship's Notions help us out in this Matter? Can we learn from them, clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person, and the Grounds of Identity and Distinction?* To which the Answer will stand, No; till your Lordship has explain'd your Notions of them a little clearer, and shewn what ultimately they were founded on, and made up of, if they are not ultimately founded on and made up of our simple *Ideas*, receiv'd from Sensation and Reflection; which is that for which, in this Point, you except against my Book: And yet, tho' your Lordship sets your self to prove, that they can not be had from *our simple Ideas by Sensation and Reflection*; tho' your Lordship lays down several Heads about them; yet you do not, that I see, offer any thing to instruct us from what other Original they come, or whence they are to be had. Vind. p. 254; 255.

But perhaps this may be my want of Understanding what your Lordship has said about them: And, possibly, from the same cause it is, that I do not see how the four Passages your Lordship subjoins, as out of my Book, (tho' there be no such Passages in my Book; as, I think, your Lordship acknowledges, since your Lordship answers nothing to what I said thereupon;) the two things your Lordship says are granted, that tend to the clearing this matter; and the four Inferences your Lordship makes; are all or any of them, apply'd by your Lordship, to shew that *clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning Nature and Person* cannot be had upon my Principles; at least as clear as can be had upon your Lordship's, when you please to let us know them. Vind. p. 254; 255. P. 255. P. 255. 259.

Hitherto, my Lord, I have consider'd only what is charg'd upon my Book by your Lordship, in reference to the Unitarian Controversy, viz. The Manner and Grounds on which my Book has been, by your Lordship, endeavour'd to be brought into the Controversy concerning the Trinity, with which it hath nothing to do: nor has your Lordship, as I humbly conceive, yet shewn that it has.

There remains to be consider'd several things, which your Lordship thinks faulty in my Book; which, whether they have any thing to do or no with the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, I think my self oblig'd to give your Lordship Satisfaction in, either by acknowledging my Errors, or giving your Lordship an account wherein your Lordship's Discourse comes short of convincing me of them. But these Papers being already grown to a Bulk that exceeds the ordinariness of a Letter, I shall respite your Lordship's farther trouble in this matter for the present, with this Promise, That I shall not fail to return my Acknowledgments to your Lordship, for those other parts of the Letter you have honour'd me with.

Before I conclude, 'tis fit, with due Acknowledgment, I take notice of these Words, in the close of your Lordship's Letter: *I hope, that in the managing this Debate, I have not either transgress'd the Rules of Civility, or mistaken your Meaning; both which I have endeavour'd to avoid.* And I return you Thanks for the Civilities P. 133.

you have Express'd to me, through your Letter: And I do assure you, That it is out of no Disrespect, or the least Ill-will to you, that I have again consider'd this matter, &c.

Your Lordship hopes you have not mistaken my Meaning: And I, my Lord, hope that where you have (as I humbly conceive I shall make it appear you have) mistaken my Meaning, I may, without offence, lay it before your Lordship. And I the more confidently ground that Hope upon this Expression of your Lordship here, which I take to be intended to that Purpose: since, in those several Instances I gave in my former Letter, of your Lordship's mistaking not only my Meaning, but the very Words of my Book which you quoted, your Lordship has had the Goodness to bear with me, without any manner of Reply.

Anf. p. 133.

Your Lordship assures me, *That it is out of no Disrespect or the least Ill-will to me, that you have again consider'd this matter.*

My Lord, my never having, by any Act of mine, deserv'd otherwise of your Lordship, is a strong Reason to keep me from questioning what your Lordship says. And, I hope, my part in the Controversy has been such, that I may be excus'd from making any such Profession, in reference to what I write to your Lordship. And I shall take care to continue to defend my self so, in this Controversy, which your Lordship is pleas'd to have with me, that I shall not come within the need of any Apology, That what I say is out of no Disrespect or the least Ill-will to your Lordship. But this must not hinder me any where, from laying the Argument in its due light, for the Advantage of Truth.

This, my Lord, I say not to your Lordship, who proposing to your self, as you say in this very Page, nothing but Truth, will not, I know, take it amiss, that I endeavour to make every thing as plain and as clear as I can: But this I say, upon occasion of some Exceptions of this kind, which I have heard others have made against the former Letter I did my self the Honour to write to your Lordship, as if I did therein *bear too hard upon your Lordship*. Tho' your Lordship, who knows very well the End of Arguing, as well as Rules of Civility, finds nothing to blame in my way of writing; and I should be very sorry it should deserve any other Character, than what your Lordship has been pleas'd to give it in the Beginning of your *Postscript*. It is my Misfortune to have any Controversy with your Lordship; but since the Concern of Truth alone engages me in it, as I know your Lordship will expect that I should omit nothing that should make for Truth, for that is the End we both profess to aim at; so I shall take care to avoid all foreign, passionate, and unmannerly Mixtures, which do no way become a Lover of Truth in any Debate, especially with one of your Lordship's Character and Dignity.

My Lord, the Imputation of a *Tendency to Scepticism*, and to the overthrowing any Article of the Christian Faith, are no small Charge; and all Censures of that high nature, I humbly conceive, are with the more Caution to be pass'd, the greater the Authority is of the Person they come from. But whether to pronounce so hardly of the Book, merely upon Surmises, be to be taken for a Mark of Good-will to the Author, I must leave to your Lordship. This I am sure, I find the World thinks me oblig'd to vindicate my self. I have taken leave to say, merely upon Surmises, because I cannot see any Argument your Lordship has any where brought, to shew its Tendency to Scepticism, beyond what your Lordship has in these Words in this Page, *viz. That it is your Lordship's great Prejudice against it that it leads to Scepticism; or, That your Lordship can find no way to attain to Certainty in it, upon my Grounds.*

I confess, my Lord, I think that there is a great part of the visible, and a great deal more of the yet much larger intellectual World, wherein our poor and weak Understandings, in this State, are not capable of Knowledge; and this, I think, a great part of Mankind agrees with me in. But whether or no my way of Certainty by Ideas comes short of what it should, or your Lordship's way, with or without Ideas, will carry us to clearer and larger degrees of Certainty; we shall see, when your Lordship pleases to let us know wherein your way of Certainty consists. Till then, I think, to avoid Scepticism, it is better to have some way of Certainty (tho' it will not lead us to it in every thing) than no way at all.

The necessity your Lordship has put upon me of vindicating my self, must be my Apology for giving your Lordship this second Trouble; which, I assure my self,

Bishop of Worcester.

429

self, you will not take amiss, since your Lordship was so much concern'd for my *Vindication*, as to declare, You had no reason to be sorry, that the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious* had given me occasion to vindicate my self. I return your Lordship my humble Thanks for affording me this second Opportunity to do it; and am, with the utmost Respect,

London, 29 June,
1697.

My LORD,

Your Lordship's most Humble


And most Obedient Servant,

JOHN LOCKE.


P O S T S C R I P T.

My LORD,

TH O' I have so great a Precedent, as your Lordship has given me in the Letter you have honour'd me with; yet, I doubt, whether even your Lordship's Example will be enough to justify me to the World, if, in a Letter writ to one, I should put a Postscript in answer to another Man, to whom I do not speak in my Letter: I shall therefore only beg, That your Lordship will be pleas'd to excuse it, if you find a short Answer to the Paper of another Man, not big enough to be publish'd by it self, appear under the same Cover with my Answer to your Lordship. The Paper it self came to my hands, at the same time that your Lordship's Letter did; and, containing some Exceptions to my *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, is not wholly foreign in the matter of it.



AN



A N
A N S W E R
T O
R E M A R K S
U P O N

An Essay concerning Human Understanding, &c.

BEFORE any thing came out against my *Essay concerning Human Understanding* the last Year, I was told, That I must prepare my self for a Storm that was coming against it; it being resolv'd by some Men, That it was necessary that Book of mine should, as 'tis phras'd, be run down. I do not say, that the Author of these *Remarks* was one of those Men: but I premise this as the Reason of the Answer I am about to give him. And tho' I do not say he was one of them, yet in this, I think, every indifferent Reader will agree with me, That his Letter does not very well suit with the Character he takes upon himself, or the Design he pretends in writing it.

P. 4. He pretends, the Business of his Letter is *to be inform'd*: But if that were in earnest so, I suppose he would have done two things quite otherwise than he has. The first is, That he would not have thought it necessary, for his particular Information, that his Letter (that pretends Inquiry in the Body of it, tho' it carries *Remarks* in the Title) should have been publish'd in Print: Whereby I am apt to think, that however in it he puts on the Person of a Learner, yet he would miss his Aim, if he were not taken notice of as a Teacher; and particularly, that his *Remarks* shew'd the World great Faults in my Book.

The other is, That he has not set his Name to his Letter of Inquiries; whereby I might, by knowing the Person that inquires, the better know how to suit my Answer to him. I cannot much blame him in another respect, for concealing his Name: for, I think, any one who appears among Christians, may be well asham'd of his Name, when he raises such a Doubt as this, *viz.* Whether an infinitely powerful and wise Being, be *veracious* or no; unless Falshood be in such reputation with this Gentleman, that he concludes Lying to be no Mark of Weakness and Folly. Besides, this Author might, if he had pleas'd, have taken notice, that in more places than one I speak of the *Goodness* of God; another Evidence, as I take it, of his *Veracity*.

P. 6. He seems concern'd to know upon what Ground I will build the Divine Law, when I pursue Morality to a Demonstration?

If he had not been very much in haste, he would have seen, that his Questions, in that Paragraph, are a little too forward; unless he thinks it necessary

I should write, when and upon what he thinks fit. When I know him better, I may perhaps think I owe him great Observance; but so much as that, very few Men think due to themselves.

I have said indeed in my Book, That I thought Morality capable of Demonstration, as well as Mathematicks: But I do not remember where I promis'd this Gentleman to demonstrate it to him.

He says, *If he knew upon what Grounds I would build my Demonstration of Morality, he could make a better Judgment of it.* His Judgment who makes such Demands as this, and is so much in haste to be a Judge, that he cannot stay till what he has such a Mind to be sitting upon, be born; does not seem of that consequence, that any one should be in haste to gratify his Impatience.

And since *he thinks the illiterate part of Mankind (which is the greatest) must have a more compendious way to know their Duty, than by long Deductions;* he may do well to consider, whether it were for their sakes he publish'd this Question, *viz. What is the Reason and Ground of the Divine Law?*

Whoever sincerely acknowledges any Law to be the Law of God, cannot fail to acknowledg also, That it hath all that Reason and Ground that a just and wise Law can or ought to have; and will easily persuade himself to forbear raising such Questions and Scruples about it.

A Man that insinuates, as he does, as if I held, that the *Distinction of Virtue and Vice, was to be pick'd up by our Eyes, our Ears, or our Nostrils;* shews so much Ignorance, or so much Malice, that he deserves no other Answer but Pity.

The Immortality of the Soul is another thing, he says, he cannot clear to himself upon my Principles. It may be so. The Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester, in the Letter he has lately honour'd me with in Print, has undertaken to prove, upon my Principles, the Soul's Immateriality; which, I suppose, this Author will not question to be a Proof of its Immortality. And to his Lordship's Letter, I refer him for it. But if that will not serve his turn, I will tell him a Principle of mine that will clear it to him; and that is, The Revelation of Life and Immortality by Jesus Christ, thro' the Gospel.

He mentions other Doubts he has, unresolv'd by my Principles. If my Principles do not reach them, the World I think will, I am sure I shall be oblig'd to him to direct me to such as will supply that Defect in mine. For I never had the Vanity to hope to out-do all other Men. Nor did I propose to my self, in publishing my Essay, to be an Answerer of Questions; or expect that all Doubts should go out of the World, as soon as my Book came into it.


The World has now my Book, such as it is: If any one finds, that there be many Questions that my Principles will not resolve, he will do the World more Service to lay down such Principles as will resolve them, than to quarrel with my Ignorance (which I readily acknowledg) and possibly for that which cannot be done. I shall never think the worse of mine, because they will not resolve every one's Doubts, till I see those Principles, laid down by any one, that will; and then I will quit mine.

If any one finds any thing in my Essay to be corrected, he may, when he pleases, write against it; and when I think fit, I will answer him. For I do not intend my Time shall be wasted at the Pleasure of every one, who may have a mind to pick holes in my Book, and shew his Skill in the Art of Confutation.

To conclude; Were there nothing else in it, I should not think it fit to trouble my self about the Questions of a Man, which he himself does not think worth the owning.



Mr.



Mr. LOCKE's REPLY

TO THE

Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of *Worcester's*
ANSWER to his Second *LETTER*:

Wherein, besides other incident Matters, what his Lordship has said concerning Certainty by Reason, Certainty by Ideas, and Certainty of Faith; the Resurrection of the same Body; the Immateriality of the Soul; the Inconsistency of Mr. LOCKE's Notions with the Articles of the Christian Faith, and their Tendency to *Scepticism*; is examin'd.

My LORD,

YOUR Lordship, in the Beginning of the last Letter you honour'd me with, seems so uneasy and displeas'd at my having said too much already in the Question between us, that I think I may conclude, you would be well enough pleas'd if I should say no more; and you would dispense with me, for not keeping my Promise I made you, to answer the other Parts of your first Letter. If this proceeds from any Tenderness in your Lordship for my Reputation, that you would not have me expose my self by an Overflow of Words, in many places void of Clearness, Coherence, and Argument, and that therefore might have been spar'd; I must acknowledg it is a piece of great Charity, and such wherein you will have a lasting Advantage over me, since good Manners will not permit me to return you the like. Or should I, in the *Ebullition of Thoughts*, which in me your Lordship finds as impetuous as the *Springs of Modena* mention'd by Ramazzini, be in danger to forget my self, and to think I had some Right to return the general Complaint of Length and Intricacy without Force; yet you have secur'd yourself from the Suspicion of any such Trash on your Side, by making *Cobwebs* the easy Product of those who write out of their own Thoughts, which it might be a Crime in me to impute to your Lordship.

P. 4.

If this Complaint of your's be not a charitable Warning to me, I cannot well guess at the Design of it; for I would not think that in a Controversy, which you, my Lord, have drag'd me into, you would assume it as a Privilege due to your

2d Lett. p.
167.

your self to be as copious as you please, and say what you think fit, and expect I should reply only so, and so much, as would just suit your good liking, and serve to set the Cause right on that side which your Lordship contends for.

My Lord, I shall always acknowledg the great distance that is between your Lordship and my self, and pay that Deference that is due to your Dignity and Person. But Controversy, tho' it excludes not good Manners, will not be manag'd with all that Submission which one is ready to pay in other Cases. Truth, which is inflexible, has here its Interest, which must not be given up in a Compliment. *Plato* and *Aristotle*, and other great Names must give way, rather than make us renounce Truth, or the Friendship we have for her.

This possibly your Lordship will allow, for it is not spun out of my own Thoughts; I have the Authority of others for it, and I think it was in Print before I was born. But you will say however, I am too long in my Replies. It is not impossible but it may be so. But with all due Respect to your Lordship's Authority (the Greatness whereof I shall always readily acknowledg) I must crave leave to say, that in this case you are by no means a proper Judge. We are now, as well your Lordship as my self, before a Tribunal to which you have appeal'd, and before which you have brought me: 'Tis the Publick must be judg, whether your Lordship has enlarg'd too far in accusing me, or I in defending my self. Common Justice makes great Allowance to a Man pleading in his own Defence, and a little length (if he should be guilty of it) finds Excuse in the Compassion of By-Standers, when they see a Man causelessly attack'd, after a new way, by a potent Adversary; and, under various Pretences, Occasions sought, and Words wrested to his Disadvantage.

This, my Lord, you must give me leave to think to be my Case, whilst this strange way your Lordship has brought me into this Controversy; your gradual Accusations of my Book, and the different Causes your Lordship has assign'd of them; together with Quotations out of it, which I cannot find there, and other things I have complain'd of (to some of which your Lordship has not vouchsaf'd any Answer) shall remain unaccounted for, as I humbly conceive they do.

I confess my Answers are long, and I wish they could have been shorter. But the Difficulty I have to find out, and set before others your Lordship's meaning, that they may see what I am answering to, and so be able to judg of the Pertinency of what I say, has unavoidably enlarg'd them. Whether this be wholly owing to my Dulness, or whether a little Perplexedness both as to Grammar and Coherence, caus'd by those numbers of Thoughts, whether of your own or others, that crowd from all Parts to be set down when you write, may not be allow'd to have some share in it, I shall not presume to say. I am at the mercy of your Lordship, and my other Readers in the point, and know not how to avoid a Fault that has no Remedy.

Your Lordship says, *The World soon grows weary of Controversies, especially when they are about personal Matters; which made your Lordship wonder, that one who understands the World so well, should spend above fifty Pages in renewing and enlarging a Complaint wholly concerning himself.* P. 4.

To which give me leave to say, That if your Lordship had so much consider'd the World, and what it is not much pleas'd with, when you publish'd your Discourse in Vindication of the Trinity, perhaps your Lordship had not so personally concern'd me in that Controversy, as it appears now you have, and continue still to do.

Your Lordship wonders that I spend above fifty Pages in renewing and enlarging my Complaint concerning my self. Your Wonder, I humbly conceive, will not be so great, when you recollect, That your Answer to my Complaint, and the Satisfaction you propos'd to give me and others in that personal Matter, began the first Letter you honour'd me with, and ended in the 47th Page of it; where you said, *You suppose the Reason of your mentioning my Words so often, was now no longer a Riddle to me; and so you proceeded to other Particulars of my Vindication.* If therefore I have spent fifty Pages of my Answer, in shewing that what you offer'd in forty seven Pages for my Satisfaction, was none, but that the Riddle was a Riddle still; the disproportion in the number of Pages is not so great as to be the Subject of much wonder; especially to those who consider, that in

what you call *Personal Matter*, I was shewing that my *Essay*, having in it nothing contrary to the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, was yet brought into that Dispute; and that therefore I had reason to complain of it, and of the manner of its being brought in: And if you had pleas'd not to have mov'd other Questions, nor brought other Charges against my Book till this, which was the Occasion and Subject of my first Letter, had been clear'd; by making out that the Passages you had, in your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, quoted out of my Book, had something in them against the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, and so were, with just reason, brought by you, as they were, into that Dispute; there had been no other but that *Personal Matter*, as you call it, between us.

In the Examination of those Pages meant, as you said, for my Satisfaction, and of other Parts of your Letter, I found (contrary to what I expected) Matter of renewing and enlarging my Complaint, and this I took notice of and set down in my Reply, which it seems I should not have done: *The Knowledge of the World* should have taught me better; and I should have taken that for Satisfaction which you were pleas'd to give, in which I could not find any, nor, as I believe, any intelligent or impartial Reader. So that your Lordship's Care of the *World*, that it should not grow weary of this Controversy, and the Fault you find of my misemploying fifty Pages of my Letter, reduces it self at last in effect to no more but this, That your Lordship should have a liberty to say what you please, pay me in what Coin you think fit; my part should be, to be satisfy'd with it, rest content, and say nothing. This indeed might be a way not to weary the *World*, and to save fifty Pages of clean Paper, and put such an end to the Controversy, as your Lordship would not dislike.

P. 178. I learn from your Lordship, that it is the first part of Wisdom, in some Mens Opinions, not to begin in such Disputes. What the knowledge of the World (which is a sort of Wisdom) should in your Lordship's Opinion make a Man do, when one of your Lordship's Character begins with him, is very plain: He is not to reply, so far as he judges his Defence and the Matter requires, but as your Lordship is pleas'd to allow; which some may think no better than if one might not reply at all.

After having thus rebuk'd me for having been too copious in my Reply, in the next words your Lordship instructs me what I should have answer'd; That
P. 4. I should have clear'd my self by declaring to the *World*, that I own'd the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, as it has been receiv'd in the *Christian Church*.

This, as I take it, is a mere *Personal Matter*, of the same Woof with a *Spanish Sam-Benito*, and, as it seems to me, design'd to sit close to me. What must I do now, my Lord? Must I silently put on and wear this Badg of your Lordship's Favour, and, as one well understanding the *World*, say not a word of it, because the *World* soon grows weary of *Personal Matters*? If in Gratitude for this *Personal Favour* I ought to be silent; yet I am forc'd to tell you, that in what you require of me here, you possibly have cut out too much Work for a poor ordinary Layman, for whom it is too hard to know how a *Doctrine* so disputed has been receiv'd in the *Christian Church*, and who might have thought it enough to own it as deliver'd in the Scriptures. Your Lordship herein lays upon me what I cannot do, without owning to know what I am sure I do not know: For how the *Doctrine of the Trinity* has been always receiv'd in the *Christian Church*, I confess my self ignorant. I have not had time to examine the History of it, and to read those Controversies that have been writ about it: And to own a *Doctrine* as receiv'd by others, when I do not know how those others receiv'd it, is perhaps a short way to Orthodoxy, that may satisfy some Men: But he that takes this way to give Satisfaction, in my Opinion makes a little bold with Truth; and it may be question'd whether such a Profession be pleasing to that God, who requires Truth in the inward Parts, however acceptable it may in any Man be to his Diocesan.

I presume your Lordship, in your *Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, intends to give it us as it has been receiv'd in the *Christian Church*. And
P. 87. I think your words, viz. It is the Sense of the *Christian Church* which you are bound to defend, and no particular Opinions of your own, authorize one to think so. But if I am to own it as your Lordship has there deliver'd it, I must own what I do not understand; for I confess your Exposition of the Sense of the Church wholly transcends my Capacity. If

If you require me to own it with an implicit Faith, I shall pay that Defe-
rence as soon to your Lordship's Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church, as
any one's. But if I must understand and know what I *own*, it is my Misfortune,
and I cannot deny it, that I am as far from owning what you in that Discourse
deliver, as I can be from professing the most unintelligible thing that ever I
read, to be the Doctrine that I *own*.

Whether I make more use of my poor understanding in the Case, than you
are willing to allow every one of your Readers, I cannot tell: but such an Un-
derstanding as God has given me, is the best I have, and that which I must use
in the apprehending what others say, before I can *own* the Truth of it: and for
this there is no help that I know.

That which keeps me a little in countenance, is, That, if I mistake not,
Men of no mean Parts, even Divines of the Church of *England*, and those of
neither the lowest Reputation nor Rank, find their Understandings fail them on
this occasion; and stick not to *own*, that they understand not your Lordship in
that *Discourse*, and particularly that your sixth Chapter is unintelligible to them
as well as me; whether the fault be in their or my Understanding, the World
must be Judg. But this is only by the bye, for this is not the Answer I here in-
tend your Lordship.

Your Lordship tells me, that to *clear myself*, I should have *own'd to the World*
the Doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been receiv'd, &c. Answer. I know not whether
in a Dispute manag'd after a new way, wherein one Man is argu'd against, and
another Man's words are all along quoted, it may not also be a good, as well as
a new Rule, for the Answerer to reply to what was never objected, and *clear*
himself from what was never laid to his charge. If this be not so, and that this
new way of attacking requires not this new way of Defence, your Lordship's
Prescription to me here what I should have done, will, *amongst the most intelligent*
and impartial Readers, pass for a strange Rule in Controversy, and such as the learn-
edest of them will not be able to find in all Antiquity; and therefore must be
imputed to something else than your Lordship's great Learning.

Did your Lordship in the *Discourse of the Vindication of the Trinity*, wherein you
first fell upon my Book, or in your Letter (my Answer to which you are here
correcting) did your Lordship, I say, any where object to me, That I did
not *own the Doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been receiv'd in the Christian Church,*
&c? If you did, the Objection was so secret, so hidden, so artificial, that your
words declar'd quite the contrary. In the *Vindication of the Doctrine of the*
Trinity, your Lordship says, That my *Notions were borrow'd to serve other Purposes*
[whereby, if I understand you right, you meant against the Doctrine of the Trinity
] *than I intended them*; which you repeat again * for my *Satisfaction*, and insist †
upon for my *Vindication*.

You having so solemnly more than once profess'd to *clear* me and my Intentions
from all Suspicion of having any part in that Controversy, as appears farther in
the close of your first Letter, where all you charge on me, is the ill use that o-
thers had made, or might make of my Notions; how could I suppose such an Ob-
jection made by your Lordship, which you declare against, without accusing
your Lordship of manifest Prevarication?

If your Lordship had any thing upon your Mind, any secret Aims, which you
did not think fit to own, but yet would have me divine and answer to, as if I
knew them; this, I confess, is too much for me, who *look no farther into Mens*
Thoughts, than as they appear in their Books. Where you have given your
Thoughts vent in your Words, I have not, I think, omitted to take notice of
them, not wholly passing by those Insinuations, which have been drop'd from
your Lordship's Pen; which from another, who had not profess'd so much per-
sonal Respect, would have shewn no exceeding good Disposition of Mind to-
wards me.

When your Lordship shall go on to accuse me of not believing the *Doctrine of*
the Trinity, as receiv'd in the Christian Church, or any other Doctrine you shall
think fit, I shall answer as I would to an Inquisitor. For tho' your Lordship
tells me, That *I need not be afraid of the Inquisition, or that you intended to charge*
me with Heresy in denying the Trinity; yet he that shall consider your Lordship's
Proceeding with me from the beginning, as far as it is hitherto gone, may have

reason to think, that the Methods and Management of that *Holy Office* are not wholly unknown to your Lordship, nor have escaped your great reading. Your Proceedings with me have had these steps:

1. Several Passages of my *Essay of Human Understanding*, and some of them relating barely to the Being of a God, and other Matters wholly remote from any Question about the Trinity, were brought into the *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, and there argu'd against as containing the Errors of *Those* and *Them*; which *Those* and *Them*, are not known to this day.

Answ. 1. p.
133.

2. In your Lordship's Answer to my first Letter, when what was given as the great reason why my *Essay* was brought into that Controversy, viz. because in it *Certainty* was founded upon clear and distinct Ideas; was found to fail, and was only a Supposition of your own; other Accusations were fought out against it, in relation to the Doctrine of the Trinity: viz. That it might be of dangerous consequence, to that Doctrine, to introduce the new Term of Ideas, and to place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas. What are become of these Charges, we shall see in the Progress of this Letter, when we come to consider what your Lordship has reply'd to my Answer upon these Points.

Answ. 2. Title-page.

3. These Accusations not having, it seems, weight enough to effect what you intended, my Book has been rumaged again to find new and more important Faults in it; and now at last, at the third Effort, my *Notions of Ideas* are found inconsistent with the Articles of the Christian Faith. This indeed carries some Sound in it, and may be thought worthy the Name and Pains of so great a Man, and zealous a Father of the Church, as your Lordship.

That I may not be too bold in affirming a thing I was not privy to, give me leave, my Lord, to tell your Lordship why I presume my Book has upon this occasion been look'd over again, to see what could be found in it capable to bear a deeper Accusation, that might look like something in a Title-Page. Your Lordship, by your Station in the Church, and the Zeal you have shewn in defending its Articles, could not be suppos'd, when you first brought my Book into this Controversy, to have omitted these great Enormities that it now stands accus'd of, and to have cited it for smaller Mistakes, some whereof were not found, but only imagin'd to be, in it; if you had then known these great Faults, which you now charge it with, to have been in it. If your Lordship had been appriz'd of its being guilty of such dangerous Errors, you would not certainly have pass'd them by: and therefore, I think, one may reasonably conclude, that my *Essay* was new look'd into on purpose.

- P. 177. Your Lordship says, *That what you have done herein, you thought it your Duty to do, not with respect to your self, but to some of the Mysteries of our Faith, which you do not charge me with opposing, but by laying such Foundations as do tend to the overthrow of them.* It cannot be doubted but your Duty would have made you at the first warn the World, that my *Notions* were inconsistent with the Articles of the Christian Faith, if your Lordship had then known it: Tho' the excessive Respect and Tenderness you express towards me personally, in the immediately preceding words, would be enough utterly to confound me, were I not a little acquainted with your Lordship's Civilities in this kind. For you tell me, *That these things laid together, made your Lordship think it necessary to do that which you was unwilling to do, till I had driven you to it; which was to shew the Reasons you had why you look'd on my Notion of Ideas and of Certainty by them, as inconsistent with it self, and with some important Articles of the Christian Faith.*

What must I think now, my Lord of these words? Must I take them as a mere Compliment, which is never to be interpreted rigorously, according to the precise meaning of the Words? Or must I believe that your Unwillingness to do so hard a thing to me, restrain'd your Duty, and you could not prevail on your self (how much soever the Mysteries of Faith were in danger to be overthrown) to get out these harsh Words, viz. *That my Notions were inconsistent with the Articles of the Christian Faith*, till your third Onset, after I had forc'd you to your Duty by two Replies of mine?

It will not become me, my Lord, to make my self a Compliment from your words, which you did not intend me in them. But on the other side, I would not willingly neglect to acknowledg any Civility from your Lordship in the full extent of it. The Business is a little nice, because what is contain'd in those

two Passages, cannot by a less skilful Hand than your's be well put together, tho' P. 177.
they immediately follow one another. This, I am sure, falls out very untowardly, that your Lordship should *drive* me (who had much rather have been otherwise employ'd) to *drive* your Lordship to do that which you were *unwilling* to do. The World sees how much I was *driven* : for what Censures, what Imputations must my Book have lain under, if I had not clear'd it from those Accusations your Lordship brought against it ; when I am charg'd now with *Evasions*, for not *clearing* my self from an Accusation which you never brought against me ? But if it be an *Evasion*, not to answer to an Objection that has not been made, what is it, I beseech you, my Lord, to make no Reply to Objections that have been made ? Of which I promise to give your Lordship a List, whenever you shall please to call for it.

I forbear it now, for fear that, if I should say all that I might upon this new Accusation, it would be more than would suit with your Lordship's liking ; and you should complain again that you have *open'd a Passage* which brings to your mind *Ramazzini and his springs of Modena*. But your Lordship need not be afraid of being overwhelm'd with the *Ebullition of my Thoughts*, nor much trouble your self to find a way to give check to it : *Mere Ebullition of Thoughts never overwhelms* or sinks any one but the Author himself ; but if it carries Truth with it, that I confess has force, and it may be troublesome to those that stand in its way.

Your Lordship says, *You see how dangerous it is to give occasion to one of such a P. 3.*
fruitful Invention as I am, to write.

I am oblig'd to your Lordship, that, you think my *Invention* worth concerning your self about, tho' it be so unlucky as to have your Lordship and me always differ about the measure of its *Fertility*. In your first Answer, you thought I too P. 30.
much extended the *Fertility* of my *Invention*, and ascrib'd to it what it had no title to ; and here, I think, you make the *Fertility* of my *Invention* greater than it is. For in what I have answered to your Lordship, there seems to me no need at all of a *Fertile Invention*. 'Tis true it has been hard for me to find out whom you writ against, or what you meant in many Places. As soon as that was found, the Answer lay always so obvious and so easy, that there needed no labour of *Invention* to discover what one should reply. The things themselves (where there were any) strip'd of the Ornaments of scholastick Language, and the less obvious ways of learned Writings, seem'd to me to carry their Answers visibly with them. This permit me, my Lord, to say, that however *fertile* my *Invention* is, it has not in all this Controversy produc'd one Fiction or wrong Quotation.

But before I leave the Answer you dictate, permit me to observe that I am so unfortunate to be blamed for *owning* what I was not accus'd to disown ; and here for not *owning* what I was never charg'd to disown. The like misfortune have my poor Writings : They offend your Lordship in some Places, because they are *New* ; and in others, because they are not *New*. Answ. 1. p. 8.

Your next Words, which are a new Charge, I shall pass over till I come to your Proof of them, and proceed to the next Paragraph. Your Lordship tells me, *You shall wave all unnecessary Repetitions, and come Immediately to the matter of P. 5.*
my Complaint, as it is renew'd in my second Letter.

What your Lordship means by *unnecessary Repetitions* here, seems to be of a piece with your blaming me in the foregoing Page, for having said too much in my own defence ; and this, taken all together, confirms my Opinion, That in your thoughts it would have been better I should have reply'd nothing at all. For you having set down here near twenty Lines as a *necessary Repetition* out of your former Letter, your Lordship omits my Answer to them as wholly *unnecessary* to be seen ; and consequently you must think was at first *unnecessary* to have been said. For when the same words are *necessary* to be repeated again, if the same Reply which was made to them be not thought fit to be repeated too, it is plainly judg'd to be nothing to the purpose, and should have been spared at first.

'Tis true, your Lordship has set down some few Expressions taken out of several parts of my Reply ; but in what manner, the Reader cannot clearly see, without going back to the Original of this matter. He must therefore pardon me the trouble of a Deduction, which cannot be avoided where Controversy is manag'd

manag'd at this rate; which necessitates, and so excuses the length of the Answer.

My Book was brought into the Trinitarian Controversy by these steps. Your Lordship says, That,

- Vind. p. 231. 1. *The Unitarians have not explain'd the Nature and Bounds of Reason.*
 Ibid. 2. *The Author of Christianity not Mysterious, to make amends for this, has offer'd an Account of Reason.*
 Ibid. p. 232. 3. *His Doctrine concerning Reason, supposes that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Mind.*
 Ibid. p. 233. 4. *Your Lordship calls this a new way of Reasoning.*
 5. *This Gentleman of this new way of Reasoning, in his first Chapter, says something which has a Conformity with some of the Notions in my Book. But it is to be observ'd he speaks them as his own Thoughts, and not upon my Authority, nor with taking any Notice of me.*
 Vind. p. 234. 6. *By Virtue of this, he is presently entitled to I know not how much of my Book; and divers Passages of my Essay are quoted, and attributed to him under the title of The Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning (for he is by this time turn'd into a Troop) and certain unknown (if they are not all contain'd in this one Author's Doublet) They and These are made by your Lordship to lay about them shrewdly for several Pages together in your Lordship's Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, &c. with Passages taken out of my Book, which your Lordship was at the Pains to quote as Theirs, i. e. certain unknown Anti-Trinitarians.*

Of this your Lordship's way, strange and new to me, of dealing with my Book, I took notice.

P. 5. To which your Lordship tells me here you reply'd in these following words, which your Lordship has set down as no unnecessary Repetition. Your words are: *It was because the Person who oppos'd the Mysteries of Christianity went upon my Grounds, and made use of my Words; altho' your Lordship declar'd withal, That they were used to other purposes than I intended them: and your Lordship confess'd, that the Reason why you quoted my Words so much, was, because your Lordship found my Notions as to Certainty by Ideas, was the main foundation on which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went; and that he had nothing that look'd like Reason, if that Principle were remov'd, which made your Lordship so much endeavour to shew, that it would not hold; and so you suppos'd the Reason why your Lordship so often mention'd my Words, was no longer a Riddle to me. And to this Repetition your*

P. 6. *Lordship subjoins, That I set down these Passages in my Second Letter, but with these words annex'd, "That all this seems to me to do nothing to the clearing of this matter."*

Answer. I say so indeed in the place quoted by your Lordship, and if I had said no more, your Lordship had done me justice in setting down barely these words as my reply, which being set down when your Lordship was in the way of repeating your own words with no sparing Hand, as we shall see by and by, these few of mine set down thus, without the least Intimation that I had said any thing more, cannot but leave the Reader under an Opinion, that this was my whole Reply.

Let. 2. p. 48, &c. But if your Lordship will please to turn to that Place of my Second Letter, out of which you take these Words, I presume you will find that I not only said, but prov'd, "That what you had said in the Words above repeated, to clear the Riddle in your Lordship's way of writing, did nothing towards it."

That which was the Riddle to me, was, That your Lordship writ against others, and yet quoted only my words; and that you pinn'd my words, which you argued against, upon a certain Sort of *These* and *Them* that no where appear'd, or were to be found; and by this way brought my Book into the Controversy.

To this your Lordship says, *You told me it was because the Person who oppos'd the Mysteries of Christianity, went upon my Grounds, and made use of my Words.*

Answer. He that will be at the Pains to compare this, which you call a Repetition here, with the Place you quote for it, viz. *Answ. 1. p. 46.* will, I humbly conceive, find it a new Sort of Repetition; unless the setting down of Words and

to the Bishop of Worcester.

439

and Expressions not to be found in it, be the *Repetition* of any Passage. But for a *Repetition*, let us take it of what your Lordship had said before.

The Reason, and the only Reason there given why you quoted my words after the manner you did, was, *Because you found my Notions as to Certainty by Ideas, was the main Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went upon.* These are the Words in your Lordship's first Letter, and this the only Reason there given, tho' it hath grown a little by *Repetition*. And to this my Reply was; "That I thought your Lordship had found, that that which the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious* went upon, and for which he was made one of the *Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning*, opposite to the Doctrine of the Trinity, was, that he made or suppos'd clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty: But that was not my Notion as to Certainty by Ideas, &c." Which Reply, my Lord, did not barely say, but shew'd the Reason why I said, That what your Lordship had offer'd as the Reason of your manner of proceeding, did nothing towards the clearing of it: unless it could clear the Matter, to say you join'd me with the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious* who goes upon a different Notion of Certainty from mine, because he goes upon the same with me. For he (as your Lordship supposes) making Certainty to consist in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of clear and distinct Ideas; and I, on the contrary, making it consist in the perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of such Ideas as we have, whether they be perfectly in all their parts clear and distinct or no: it is impossible he should go upon my Grounds, whilst they are so different, or that his going upon my Grounds should be the Reason of your Lordship's joining me with him. And now I leave your Lordship to judge, how you had clear'd this matter; and whether what I had answered, did not prove, that what you said did nothing towards the clearing of it.

This one thing, methinks, your Lordship has made very clear, That you thought it necessary to find some way to bring in my Book, where you were arguing against that Author, that he might be the Person, and mine the Words you would argue against together. But 'tis as clear that the particular matter which your Lordship made use of to this purpose, happen'd to be somewhat unluckily chosen. For your Lordship having accus'd him of supposing clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty, which you declar'd to be the Opinion you oppos'd, and for that Opinion having made him a Gentleman of the new way of Reasoning, your Lordship imagin'd that was the Notion of Certainty I went on. But it falling out otherwise, and I denying it to be mine, the imaginary Tie between that Author and me was unexpectedly dissolv'd; and there was no appearance of Reason for bringing Passages out of my Book, and arguing against them as your Lordship did, as if they were that Author's.

To justify this (since my Notion of Certainty could not be brought to agree with what he was charg'd with, as opposite to the Doctrine of the Trinity) he at any rate must be brought to agree with me, and to go upon my Notion of Certainty. Pardon me, my Lord, that I say at any rate. The Reason I have to think so, is this: Either that Author does make clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty, and so does not go upon my Notion of Certainty; and then your assigning his going upon my Notion of Certainty, as the Reason for your joining us as you did, shews no more but a Willingness in your Lordship to have us join'd: Or he does not lay all Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas, and so possibly, for ought I know, may go upon my Notion of Certainty. But then, my Lord, the Reason of your first bringing him and me into this Dispute, will appear to have been none. All your arguing against the Gentleman of this new way of Reasoning, will be found to be against no body, since there is no body to be found that lays all Foundation of Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas; no body to be found, that holds the Opinion that your Lordship opposes.

Having thus given you an Account of some part of my Reply (to what your Lordship really answer'd in that 46th Page of your first Letter) to shew that my Reply contain'd something more than these Words here set down by your Lordship, viz. "That all this seems to me to do nothing to the clearing this matter:" I come now to those Parts of your *Repetition*, as your Lordship is pleas'd to call it, wherein there is nothing repeated.

Your

P. 5. Your Lordship says, *That you told me the Reason why I was brought into the Controversy after the manner I had complain'd of, was because the Person who oppos'd the Mysteries of Christianity, went upon my Grounds*; and for this you quote the 46th Page of your first Letter. But having turn'd to that place, and finding there these Words, *That you found my Notions as to Certainty by Ideas was the main Foundation which that Author went upon*; which are far from being repeated in the words set down here, unless *Grounds* in general be the same with *Notions as to Certainty by Ideas*: I beg leave to consider what you here say as new to me, and not repeated.

Your Lordship says, that you brought me into the Controversy as you did, *because that Author went upon my Grounds*. 'Tis possible he did, or did not; But it cannot appear that he did *go upon my Grounds*, till those *Grounds* are assign'd, and the Places both out of him and me produc'd to shew, that we agree in the same *Grounds*, and go both *upon them*; when this is done, there will be Room to consider whether it be so or no.

In the mean time, you have brought me into the Controversy, for his going upon this particular Ground, suppos'd to be mine, *That clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty*. It can do nothing towards the clearing this, to say

P. 6. in general, as your Lordship does, *That he went upon my Grounds*; because tho' he should agree with me in several other things, but differ from me in this one *Notion of Certainty*, there could be no reason for your dealing with me as you have done: That *Notion of Certainty* being your very Exception against his *Account of Reason*, and the sole Occasion you took of bringing in Passages out of my Book, and the very Foundation of arguing against them.

P. 6. You Lordship farther says here, in this *Repetition*, which you did not say before in the Place refer'd to as repeated, *That he made use of my Words*. I think he did of Words something like mine. But as I humbly conceive also, *he made use of them*, as his own, and not *as my Words*; for I do not remember that he quotes me for them. This I am sure, That in the Words quoted out of him by your Lordship, upon which my Book is brought in, there is not one Syllable of *Certainty by Ideas*.

No doubt whatever he or I, or any one have said, if your Lordship disapproves of it, you have a Right to question him that said it. But I do not see how this gives your Lordship any Right to entitle any body to what he does not say, whoever else says it.

The Author of *Christianity not Mysteries* says in his Book something suitable to what I had said in mine; borrow'd or not borrow'd from mine, I leave your Lordship to determine for him. But I do not see what ground that gives your Lordship to concern me in the Controversy you have with him, for things I say which he does not; and which I say to a different Purpose from his. Let that Author and I agree in this one *Notion of Certainty* as much as you please, what Reason, I beseech your Lordship, could this be, to quote my Words as his, who never us'd them; and to Purposes, as you say more than once, to which I never intended them? This was that which I complain'd was a Riddle to me. And since your Lordship can give no other Reason for it, than those we have hitherto seen, I think it sufficiently unriddled, and you are in the right when you say, *you think it is no longer a Riddle to me*.

I easily grant my little Reading may not have instructed me, what has been, or what may be done, in the several ways of writing and managing of Controversy, which like War always produces new Stratagems: Only I beg my Ignorance may be my Apology, for saying, that this appears a new way of writing to me, and this is the first time I ever met with it.

Vind. p. 234. But let the ten Lines which your Lordship has set down out of him be, if you please, suppos'd to be precisely my Words, and that he quoted my Book for them: I do not see how even this entitles him to any more of my Book than he has quoted; or how any words of mine, in other parts of my Book, can be ascrib'd to him; or argued against as his, or rather, as I know not whose, which was the thing I complain'd of: for the *These* and *They*, those Passages of my Book were ascrib'd to, could not be that Author, for he us'd them not; nor the Author of the *Essay of Human Understanding*, for he was not argued against, but was discharg'd from the Controversy under Debate. So that neither he

nor

nor I being the *They* and *Those*, that so often occur, and deserv'd so much Pains from your Lordship; I could not but complain of this, to me, incomprehensible way of bringing my Book into that Controversy.

Another Part of your Lordship's *Repetition*, which I humbly conceive, is no P. 6. *Repetition*, because this also I find not in that Passage quoted for it, is this, That your Lordship *confess'd that the Reason why you quoted my Words* so much.

My Lord, I do not remember any need your Lordship had to give a *Reason why you quoted my Words so much*, because I do not remember that I made that the matter of my Complaint. That which I complain'd of, was not the quantity of what was quoted out of my Book, but the manner of quoting it, viz. "That I was so every where join'd with others, under the comprehension of five Words *They* and *Them*, tho' my Book alone were every where quoted, that the World would be apt to think, I was the Person who argu'd against the Trinity." And again, "That which I complain'd of was, That I was made One of the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, without being guilty of what made them so, and so was brought into a Chapter wherein I thought my self not concern'd; which was manag'd so, that my Book was all along quoted, and others argu'd against; others were entitled to what I said, and I to what others said, without knowing why or how." Nay, I told your Lordship in that very Reply, "That if your Lordship had directly question'd any of my Opinions, I should not have complain'd." Thus your Lordship sees my Complaint was not of the largeness, but of the manner of your Quotations. But of that, in all these many Pages employ'd by your Lordship for my *Satisfaction*, you, as I remember, have not been pleas'd to offer any reason, nor can I hitherto find it any way clear'd: When I do, I shall readily acknowledg your great Mastery in this, as in all other ways of writing.

Lett. 2. p. 49.

Ibid. p. 51.

Lett. 2. p. 50.

I have in the foregoing Pages, for the clearing this matter, been oblig'd to take notice of *Them* and *Those*, as directly signifying no body. Whether your Lordship will excuse me for so doing, I know not, since I perceive such slight words as *Them* and *Those*, are not to be minded in your Lordship's Writings: Your Lordship has a Privilege to use such trifling *Particles*, without taking any great care what or whom they refer to.

To shew the Reader that I do not talk without Book in the case, I shall set down your Lordship's own Words: *What a hard Fate doth that Man lie under, that falls into the hands of a severe Critick! He must have a care of his But, and For, and Them, and It. For the least Ambiguity in any of these, will fill up Pages in an Answer, and make a Book look considerable for the Bulk of it. And what must a Man do, who is to answer all such Objections about the use of Particles?* I humbly conceive 'tis not without Reason, that your Lordship here claims an Exemption from having a care of your *But*, and your *For*, and your *Them*, and other *Particles*. The Sequel of your Letter will shew, That 'tis a Privilege your Lordship makes great use of, and therefore have reason to be tender of it, and to cry out against those unmannerly *Criticks*, who question it. Upon this Consideration, I cannot but look on it as a Misfortune to me, that it should fall in my way to displease your Lordship, by disturbing you in the quiet, and perhaps antient Possession of so convenient a Privilege. But how great soever the Advantages of it may be to a Writer, I, upon Experience, find it is very troublesome and perplexing, to a Reader, who is concern'd to understand what is written, that he may answer to it. But to return to the Place we were upon:

Your Lordship goes on and says, *Whether it doth or no, i. e. Whether what your Lordship had said doth clear this Matter or no, you are content to leave it to any Indifferent Reader; and there it must rest at last, altho' I should write Volumes about it.* P. 6.

Upon the reading of these last Words of your Lordship's, I thought you had quite done with this *Personal Matter*, so apt, as you say, to weary the World. But whether it be that your Lordship is not much satisfy'd in the handling of it, or in the letting it alone; whether your Lordship meant by these last Words, that what I write about it is *Volumes*, i. e. too much, as your Lordship has told me in the first Page; but what your Lordship says about

it, is but necessary : whether these or any other be the cause of it, *Personal Matter*, as it seems, is very importunate and troublesome to your Lordship, as it is to the World. You turn it going in the end of one Paragraph, and *Personal Matter* thrusts it self in again in the beginning of the next, whether of it self, without your Lordship's notice or Consent, I examine not. But thus stands the immediate following words, wherein your Lordship asks me, *But for what Cause do I continue so unsatisfy'd?* To which you make me give this Answer, *That* "the Cause why I continue so unsatisfy'd, is, *That* "the Author mention'd went upon this Ground, *That* clear and distinct *Ideas* "are necessary to Certainty, but that is not my Notion as to Certainty by "Ideas; which is, *That* Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agree- "ment or Disagreement of Ideas, such as we have, whether they be in all "their Parts perfectly clear and distinct or no; and that I have no Notions "of Certainty more than this one."

These Words, which your Lordship has set down for mine, I have printed in a distinct Character, that the Reader may take particular notice of them; not that there is any thing very remarkable in this Passage it self, but because it makes the business of the fourscore following Pages. For the three several Answers that your Lordship says you have given to it, and that which you call your *Defence* of them, reach, as I take it, to the 87th Page. But another particular Reason why this Answer, which your Lordship has made for me to a Question of your own putting, is distinguish'd by a particular Character, is to save frequent Repetitions of it; that the Reader, by having recourse to it, may see whether those things, which your Lordship says of it, be so or no, and judg whether I am in the wrong, when I assure him, that I cannot find them to be as you say.

Only before I come to what your Lordship positively says of this which you call my Answer, I crave leave to observe that it supposes I *continue unsatisfy'd*: To which I reply, *That* I no where say that I *continue unsatisfy'd*. I may say, *That* what is offer'd for Satisfaction, gives none to me or any body else; and yet I, as well as other People, may be satisfy'd concerning the matter.

I now come to what your Lordship says positively of it.

1. You say that *I tell you, That* "the Cause why I continu'd unsatisfy'd, is, *That* the Author mention'd went upon this Ground: *That* clear and "distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty; but that is not my Notion of "Certainty by Ideas, &c."

To which I crave leave to reply, *That* neither in the 50th Page of my second Letter, which your Lordship quotes for it, nor any where else, did I tell your Lordship any such thing. Neither could I assign, *That* Author's going upon that Ground, there mention'd, as any Cause of dissatisfaction to me; because I know not that he went upon this Ground, *That* clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty: for I have met with nothing produc'd by your Lordship out of him, to prove that he did so. And if it be true, that he goes upon Grounds of Certainty that are not mine, I know no body that ought to be dissatisfy'd with it but your Lordship, who have taken so much Pains to make his Grounds mine, and my Grounds his, and to entitle us both to what each has set apart.

2. Your Lordship says, *THIS is no more than what I had said before in my former Letter.* Answ. For this I appeal to the 57th, or rather (as I think you writ) 87th Page quoted for it by your Lordship; where any one must have very good Eyes, to find all that is set down here in *this Answer* (as you a little lower call it) which you have been pleas'd to put into my Mouth. For neither in the one nor the other of those Pages, is there any such Answer of mine. Indeed in the 87th Page there are these Words; *That* Certainty, "in my Opinion, lies in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of "Ideas, such as they are, and not always in having perfectly clear and distinct "Ideas." But these words there are not given as an Answer to this Question, *Why do I continue so unsatisfy'd?* And the remarkable Answer above set down, is, as I take it, more than these Words, as much more in proportion as your Lordship's whole Letter is more than the half of it.

3. Your

3. Your Lordship says of the remarkable Answer above set down, that you took particular notice of it.

To which I crave leave to reply, that your Lordship no where before took notice of *this Answer*, as you call it; for it was no where before extant, tho' it be true some part of the words of it were. But some part of the words of *this Answer* (which too were never given as an Answer to the Question propos'd) can never be *this Answer* it self.

4. Your Lordship farther says, that you gave three several Answers to it.

To which I must crave leave further to reply, that never an one of the three Answers, which you here say you gave to *this my Answer*, were given to *this Answer*; which, in the words above set down, you made me give to your Question, why I continued so unsatisfy'd?

To justify this my Reply, there needs no more but to set down these your Lordship's three Answers, and to turn to the Places where you say you gave them.

The first of your three Answers is this, *That those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do (according to this Answer) and speak more agreeably to my Original Grounds of Certainty.* The place you quote for this, is, *Ans. 1. p. 80.* but in that place it is not given as an Answer to my saying, That "the Cause why I continue unsatisfy'd, is, That the Author mention'd, went upon this Ground, that clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty, but," &c. And if it be given for Answer to it here, it seems a very strange one. For I am supposed to say, That "the Cause why I continue unsatisfy'd, is, that the Author mention'd, went upon a Ground different from mine;" and to satisfy me, I am told his way is better than mine; which cannot but be thought an Answer very likely to satisfy me. P. 7.

Your second Answer, which you say you gave to that remarkable Passage above set down, is this; *That it is very possible the Author of Christianity not Mistaken might mistake or misapply my Notions; but there is too much reason to believe he thought them the same, and we have no reason to be sorry, that he hath given me this occasion for the explaining my meaning, and for the Vindication of my self in the matters I apprehend he had charg'd me with: and for this you quote your first Letter, p. 36.* But neither are these words in that place an Answer to my saying, "That the Cause why I continu'd dissatisfy'd, is, That that Author went upon this Ground, that clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty, but, &c." P. 15.

Your third Answer, which you say you gave to that Passage above set down, is, *That my own Grounds of Certainty tend to Scepticism, and that in an Age wherein the Mysteries of Faith are too much expos'd by the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity, it is a thing of dangerous Consequence to start such new Methods of Certainty, as are apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before: For this you refer the Reader to your first Letter. But I must crave leave also to observe, that these words are not all to be found in that place, and those of them which are there, are by no means an Answer to my saying, "That the Cause why I continue unsatisfy'd, is, &c."* P. 20.

What the words which your Lordship has here set down as your three Answers, are brought in for in those three places quoted by your Lordship, any one that will consult them may see; it would hold me too long in *Personal Matter* to explain that here, and therefore for your Lordship's Satisfaction I pass by those Particulars. But this I crave leave to be positive in, That in neither of them they are given in Reply to that which is above set down, as my Answer to your Lordship's Question, *For what Cause do I continue so unsatisfy'd?* Tho' your Lordship here says, That to *this Answer* they were given as a Reply, and it was it you had taken notice of, and given these three several Replies to. As Answers therefore to what you make me say here, viz. *That the Cause of my continuing unsatisfy'd, is, That the Author mention'd, went upon a Ground of Certainty that is none of mine;* I cannot consider them. For to this neither of them is given as an Answer; tho' *this* and *it*, in ordinary Construction, make them have that reference. But these are some of your priviledg'd Particles, and may be apply'd how and to what you please. P. 7.

But tho' neither of these Passages be any manner of Answer to what your Lordship calls them Answers to; yet you laying such stress on them, that well-

nigh half your Letter, as I take it, is spent in the Defence of them; 'tis fit I consider what you say under each of them.

- I say, *as I take it*, near half your Letter is in defence of these three Passages.
- P. 7. One reason why I speak so doubtfully, is, that tho' you say here, that *you will lay them together, and defend them*, and that in effect all that is said to the 87th Page is rang'd under these three Heads; yet they being brought in as *Answers* to what I am made to say, is *the Cause why I continu'd unsatisfy'd*. I should scarce think your Lordship should spend so many Pages in this *Personal Matter*, after you had but two or three Pages before so openly blam'd me for spending a less number of Pages in my Answer, concerning *Personal Matters*, to what your Lordship had in your Letter concerning them.

Another reason why I speak so doubtfully, is, because I do not see how these three Passages need so long, or any *Defences*, where they are not attack'd; or if they be attack'd, methinks the *Defences* of them should have been apply'd to the Answers I had made to them; or if I have made none, and they be of such moment that they require Answers, your Lordship's minding me that they did so, would either, by my continu'd Silence, have left to your Lordship all that you can pretend to for my granting them, or else my Answers to them have given your Lordship an occasion to *defend* them, and perhaps to have defended them otherwise than you have done. This is certain, that these *Defences* had come time enough when they had been attack'd, and then it would have been seen, whether what was said did defend them or no. The truth is, my Lord, if you will give me leave to speak my Thoughts freely, when I consider these *three*, as you call them, *Answers*, how they themselves are brought in, and what relation that which is brought under each of them has to them, and to the Matter in question; methinks they look rather like Texts chosen to be discours'd on, than as Answers to be *defended* in a Controversy. For the Connection of that which in train is tack'd on to them, is such that makes me see I am wholly mistaken in what I thought the establish'd Rule of Controversy. This was also another Reason why I said you spent, *as I take it*, near half of your Letter in defence of them. For when I consider how one thing hangs on to another, under the third Answer, from pag. 20. where it is brought in, to pag. 87. where I think that which you call your defending it ends; 'tis a hard matter by the Relation and Dependency of the Parts of that Discourse (contain'd in those Pages) one on another, to tell where it ends.

But to consider the Passages themselves, and the Defence of them.

- That which you call your *first Answer*, and which you say you will *defend*, is
- P. 7. in these words: *Those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do (according to this Answer) and speak more agreeably to my Original Grounds of Certainty.* These words being brought in at first as a Reply to what was call'd my Answer, but was not my Answer, as may be seen, *Lett. 1. pag. 87.* I took no notice of them in my second Letter, as being nothing at all to the point in hand; and therefore what need they have of a farther Defence, when nothing is objected to them, I do not see. To what purpose is it to spend seven or eight Pages to shew, that another's Notion about Certainty is better than mine; when that tends not to shew how your saying, *That the Certainty of my Proof of a God is not plac'd upon any clear and distinct Ideas, but upon the force of Reason distinct from it*, concerns me; which was the thing there to be shewn, as is visible to any one who will vouchsafe to look into that 87th Page of my first Letter? And indeed why should your Lordship trouble your self to prove, which of two different ways of Certainty by *Ideas* is the best, when you have so ill an Opinion of the whole way of Certainty by *Ideas*, that you accuse it of Tendency to *Scepticism*? But it seems your Lordship is resolv'd to have all the Faults in my Book clear'd or corrected, and so you go on to defend these words: *That those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do.* I could have wish'd that your Lordship had pleas'd a little to explain them, before you had defended them; for they are not, to me, without some Obscurity. However, to guess as well as I can, I think the Proposition that you intend here, is this, That those who place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of only clear and distinct *Ideas*, are more in the right than I am, who place it in the Perception of the Agreement

or Disagreement of *Ideas*, such as we have, tho' they be not in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct.

Whether your Lordship has prov'd this, or no, will be seen when we come to consider what you have said in the *Defence* of it. In the mean time, I have no reason to be sorry to hear your Lordship say so; because this supposes, that Certainty can be attain'd by the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of clear and distinct *Ideas*. For if Certainty cannot be attain'd by the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of clear and distinct *Ideas*, how can they be more in the right, who place Certainty in one sort of *Ideas*, that it cannot be had in, than those who place it in another sort of *Ideas*, that it cannot be had in?

I shall proceed now to examine what your Lordship has said in Defence of the Proposition you have here set down to *defend*, which you may be sure I shall do with all the Favourableness that Truth will allow; since, if your Lordship makes it out to be true, it puts an end to the Dispute you have had with me. For it confutes that main Proposition, which you have so much contended for; *That to lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to Matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct Ideas, does Certainly overthrow all Mysteries of Faith*: unless you will say, that Mysteries of Faith cannot consist with what you have prov'd to be true.

To prove that they are more in the right than I, who place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of clear and distinct *Ideas* only, your Lordship says, *That it is a wonderful thing, in Point of Reason, for me to pretend to Certainty by Ideas, and not allow these Ideas to be clear and distinct*. This, my Lord, looks as if I plac'd Certainty only in obscure and confus'd *Ideas*, and did not allow it might be had by clear and distinct ones. But I have declar'd my self so clearly and so fully to the contrary, that I doubt not but your Lordship would think I deserv'd to be ask'd, whether *this were fair and ingenuous dealing to represent this Matter as this Expression does?* But the Instances are so many, how apt my unlearned way of writing is to mislead your Lordship, and that always on the Side least favourable to my Sense, that if I should cry out as often as I think I meet with occasion for it, your Lordship would have reason to be uneasy at the *Ebullition* and *Inlarging* of my Complaints.

Your Lordship farther asks, *How can I clearly perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, if I have not clear and distinct Ideas?* For how is it possible for a Man's Mind to know whether they agree or disagree, if there be some Parts of those *Ideas*, we have only general and confus'd *Ideas* of. I would rather read these latter words, if your Lordship please, *If there be some Parts of those Ideas that are only general and confus'd; for Parts of Ideas that we have only general and confus'd Ideas of, is not very clear and intelligible to me.* P. 7, & 8:

Taking then your Lordship's Question as clear'd of this Obscurity, it will stand thus: *How is it possible for a Man's Mind to know, whether Ideas agree or disagree, if there be some Parts of those Ideas obscure and confus'd?* In answer to which I crave leave to ask; *Is it possible for a Man's Mind to perceive, whether Ideas agree or disagree, if no Parts of those Ideas be obscure and confus'd, and by that Perception to attain Certainty?* If your Lordship says, No: how do you hereby prove, that they who place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of only clear and distinct *Ideas*, are more in the right than I? For they who place Certainty, where it is impossible to be had, can in that be no more in the right, than he who places it in any other Impossibility. If you say Yes, Certainty may be attain'd by the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of clear and distinct *Ideas*, you give up the main Question: You grant the Proposition, which you declare you chiefly oppose; and so all this great Dispute with me is at an end. Your Lordship may take which of these two you please: if the former, the Proposition here to be prov'd is given up; if the latter, the whole Controversy is given up: one of them, 'tis plain, you must say.

This, and what your Lordship says farther on this Point, seems to me to prove nothing, but that you suppose, that either there are no such things as obscure and confus'd *Ideas*; and then, with submission, the distinction between clear and obscure, distinct and confus'd, is useless; and 'tis in vain to talk of clear and obscure, distinct and confus'd *Ideas*, in opposition to one another: Or else your

your Lordship supposes, that an obscure and confus'd *Idea* is wholly undistinguishable from all other *Ideas*, and so in effect is all other *Ideas*. For if an obscure and confus'd *Idea* be not one and the same with all other *Ideas*, as it is impossible for it to be, then the obscure and confus'd *Idea* may and will be so far different from some other *Ideas*, that it may be perceiv'd whether it agrees or disagrees with them or no. For every *Idea* in the Mind, clear or obscure, distinct or confus'd, is but that one *Idea* that it is, and not another *Idea* that it is not; and the Mind perceives it to be the *Idea* that it is, and not another *Idea* that it is different from.

Essay, B. 2.
c. 29.

P. 24. What therefore I mean by obscure and confus'd *Ideas*, I have at large shewn, and shall not trouble your Lordship with a Repetition of here. For that there are such obscure and confus'd *Ideas*, I suppose the Instances your Lordship gives here evince: to which I shall add this one more; Suppose you should in the Twilight, or in a thick Mist, see two things standing upright, near the size and shape of an ordinary Man; but in so dim a light, or at such a distance, that they appear'd very much alike, and you could not perceive them to be what they really were, the one a Statue, the other a Man; would not these two be obscure and confus'd *Ideas*? And yet could not your Lordship be certain of the Truth of this Proposition concerning either of them, that it was something, or did exist; and that by perceiving the Agreement of that *Idea* (as obscure and confus'd as it was) with that of Existence, as express'd in that Proposition?

This, my Lord, is just the case of *Substance*, upon which you rais'd this Argument concerning obscure and confus'd *Ideas*; which this Instance shews may have Propositions made about them, of whose Truth we may be certain.

Hence I crave Liberty to conclude, That I am nearer the Truth than those who say that *Certainty is founded only in clear and distinct Ideas*, if any body does say so. For no such Saying of any one of those, with whom your Lordship join'd me for so saying, is, that I remember, yet produc'd; tho' this be that for which *They* and *Those*, whoever they be, had from your Lordship the title of the *Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning*; and this be the *Opinion* which your Lordship declares you oppose, as certainly overthrowing all *Mysteries of Faith*, and excluding the *Notion of Substance out of rational Discourse*. Which terrible termagant Proposition, viz. *That Certainty is founded only in clear and distinct Ideas*, which has made such a noise, and been the cause of the spending above ten times fifty Pages, and given occasion to very large *Ebullition of Thoughts*; appears not by any thing that has been yet produc'd, to be any where in their Writings, with whom upon this Score you have had so warm a Controversy, but only in your Lordship's Imagination, and what you have, at least for this once, writ out of your own Thoughts.

Vind. p. 233,
234.
Ans. 1. p. 14.

But if this Paragraph contain too little in *Defence* of the Proposition which your Lordship, in the beginning of it, set down on purpose to defend; what follows is visibly more remote from it. But since your Lordship has been pleas'd to tack it on here, tho' without applying of it any way, that I see, to the defence of the Proposition to be defended, which is already got clean out of sight; I am taught, that 'tis fit I consider it here in this, which your Lordship has thought the proper place for it.

P. 9. In the next Paragraph, your Lordship is pleas'd to take notice of this part of my Complaint, viz. *That I say more than twice or ten times, "That you blame those who place Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas; but I do not: and yet you bring me in amongst them."* And for this, your Lordship quotes seventeen several Pages of my second Letter. Whoever will give himself the trouble to turn to those Pages, will see how far I am in those places from barely saying, *That you blame those who place Certainty, &c.* and what reason you had to point to so many places for my so saying, as a Repetition of my Complaint. And I believe they will find the Proposition about *Placing Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas*, is mention'd in them upon several occasions, and to different purposes, as the Argument requir'd.

Be that as it will, this is a part of my Complaint, and you do me a Favour, that after having, as you say, met with it in so many places, you are pleas'd at last to take notice of it, and promise me a full Answer to it. The first part of P. 9. which full Answer is in these words; *That you do not deny but the first occasion* of

of your Lordship's Charge, was in the Supposition that clear and distinct Ideas were necessary, in order to any Certainty in our Minds. And that the only way "to attain this Certainty, was by comparing these Ideas together."

My Lord, tho' I have faithfully set down these Words out of your second Answer, yet I must own I have printed them in something a different Character P. 9. from that which they stand in, in your Letter. For your Lordship has publish'd this Sentence so, as if the Supposition that clear and distinct Ideas were necessary in order to any Certainty in our Minds, were my Supposition; whereas I must crave leave to let my Reader know, That that Supposition is purely your Lordship's: for you neither in your Defence of the Trinity, nor in your first Answer, produce any thing to prove, that that was either an Assertion or Supposition of mine; but your Lordship was pleas'd to suppose it for me. As to the latter Words, "And that the only way to attain this Certainty, was by comparing these Ideas together:" If your Lordship means by these Ideas, Ideas in general; then I acknowledg these to be my words, or to be my Sense: but then they are not any Supposition in my Book, tho' they are made part of the Supposition here; but their Sense is express'd in my Essay at large in more Places than one. But if by these Ideas your Lordship means only clear and distinct Ideas, I crave leave to deny that to be my Sense, or any Supposition of mine.

Your Lordship goes on; But to prove this. Prove what, I beseech you my Lord? That Certainty was to be attain'd by comparing Ideas, was a Supposition of mine. To prove that, there needed no Words or Principles of mine to be produced, unless your Lordship would prove that which was never deny'd.

But if it were to prove this, viz. That it was a Supposition of mine, That clear and distinct Ideas were necessary to Certainty; and that, to prove this to be a Supposition of mine, my Words were produc'd, and my Principles of Certainty laid down, and none else; I answer, I do not remember any Words or Principles of mine produced to shew any ground for such a Supposition, that I plac'd Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas; and if there had been any such produced, your Lordship would have done me and the Reader a favour, to have mark'd the pages wherein one might have found them produced, unless your Lordship thinks you make amends for quoting so many Pages of my second Letter, which might have been spared, by neglecting wholly to quote any of your own where it needed. When your Lordship shall please to direct me to those Places where such Words and Principles of mine were produced to prove such a Supposition, I shall readily turn to them, to see how far this do really give ground for it. But my bad Memory not suggesting to me any thing like it, your Lordship, I hope, will pardon me if I do not turn over your Defence of the Trinity and your First Letter, to see whether you have any such Proofs, which you your self seem so much to doubt or think so meanly of, that you do not so much as point out the Places where they are to be found; tho' we have in this very Page so eminent an Example, that you are not sparing of your Pains in this kind, where you have the least thought that it might serve your Lordship to the meanest Purpose.

But tho' you produced no Words or Principles of mine to prove this a Supposition of mine; yet in your next words here your Lordship produces a Reason why you your self suppos'd it. For you say, You could not imagine that I could place Certainty in the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, and not suppose those Ideas to be clear and distinct: so that at last the Satisfaction you give me, why my Book was brought into a Controversy wherein it was not concern'd, is, that your Lordship imagin'd I suppos'd in it what I did not suppose in it. And here I crave leave to ask, Whether the Reader may not well suppose that you had a great mind to bring my Book into that Controversy, when the only handle you could find for it, was an Imagination of a Supposition to be in it, which in truth was not there?

Your Lordship adds, That I finding my self join'd in such Company which I did not desire to be seen in, I rather chose to distinguish my self from them, by denying clear and distinct Ideas to be necessary to Certainty. P. 9.

If it might be permitted to another to guess at your Thoughts, as well as you do at mine, he perhaps would turn it thus; That your Lordship finding no readier way, as you thought, to set a Mark upon my Book, than by bringing several Passages of it into a Controversy concerning the Trinity, wherein they had

had nothing to do; and speaking of them under the name of *Those* and *Them*, as if your Adversaries in that Dispute had made use of those Passages against the Trinity, when no one Opposer of the Doctrine of the Trinity, that I know or that you have produc'd, ever made use of one of them: you thought fit to jumble my Book with other Peoples Opinions after a new way, never used by any other Writer that I ever heard of. If any one will consider what your Lordship has said for my *Satisfaction* (wherein you have, as I humbly conceive I have shewn, produc'd nothing but Imaginations of Imaginations, and Suppositions of Suppositions) he will, I conclude, without straining of his Thoughts, be carry'd to this Conjecture.

P. 9. But Conjectures apart, your Lordship says, *That I finding my self join'd in such Company which I did not desire to be seen in, I rather chose to distinguish my self*: If keeping to my Book can be call'd *distinguishing my self*. You say, *I rather chose*: Rather! than what, my Lord, I beseech you? Your learned way of writing, I find, is every where beyond my Capacity; and unless I will guess at your meaning (which is not very safe) beyond what I can certainly understand by your words, I often know not what to answer to. 'Tis certain, you mean here, that I prefer'd *distinguishing my self from them* I found my self join'd with to something; but to what, you do not say. If you mean to owning that for my Notion of Certainty, which is not my Notion of Certainty: this is true, I did and shall always *rather chuse to distinguish my self from any Them*, than own that for my Notion which is not my Notion: If you mean that I prefer'd *my distinguishing my self from them, to my being join'd with them*; you make me *chuse* where there neither is nor can be any Choice. For what is wholly out of one's power, leaves no room for Choice: And I think I should be laugh'd at, if I should say, *I rather chuse to distinguish my self* from the Papists, than that it should rain. For it is no more in my Choice not to be join'd, as your Lordship has been pleas'd to join me, with the unknown *They* and *Them*, than it is in my power that it should not rain.

'Tis like you will say here again, this is a *nice Criticism*; I grant, my Lord, it is about Words and Expressions: But since I cannot know your Meaning but by your Words and Expressions, if this Defect in my Understanding very frequently overtake me in your Writings to and concerning me, 'tis troublesome, I confess; but what must I do? Must I play at Blind-Man's-buff? Catch at what I do not see? Answer to I know not what; to no Meaning, *i. e.* to nothing? Or must I presume to know your Meaning, when I do not?

For example, Suppose I should presume it to be your Meaning here, *That I found my self join'd in Company*, by your Lordship, with the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious*, by your Lordship's imputing the same Notions of Certainty to us both; *That I did not desire to be seen in his Company*, *i. e.* to be thought to be of his Opinion in other things; and therefore *I chuse rather to distinguish my self from him, by denying clear and distinct Ideas to be necessary to Certainty, than to be so join'd with him*: If I should presume this to be the Sense of these your words here, and that by the doubtful Signification of the Expressions of being *join'd in Company* and *seen in company*, used equivocally, your Lordship should mean, that because I was said to be of his Opinion in one thing, I was to be thought to be of his Opinion in all things, and therefore disown'd to be of his Opinion in that wherein I was of his Opinion, because I would not be thought of his Opinion all thro': would not your Lordship be displeas'd with me for supposing you to have such a Meaning as this, and ask me again, whether *I could think you a Man of so little Sense* to talk thus? And yet, my Lord, this is the best I can make of these words, which seem to me rather to discover a Secret in your way of dealing with me, than any thing in me that I am ashamed of.

For I am not, nor ever shall be ashamed to own any Opinion I have, because another Man holds the same; and so far as that brings me *into his Company*, I shall not be troubled to be *seen* in it. But I shall never think, that that entitles me to any other of his Opinions, or makes me of *his Company* in any other Sense, how much soever that be the Design: For your Lordship has used no small Art and Pains to make me of his and the Unitarians Company in all that they say, only because that Author has ten Lines in the beginning of his Book, which agrees with something I have said in mine; from whence we become Com-

panions,

panions, so universally united in Opinion, That *They* must be entitled to all that I say, and I to all that *They* say.

My Lord, when I writ my Book, I could not design to *distinguish my self from the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning*, who were not then in being, nor are, that I see, yet: since I find nothing produc'd out of the *Unitarians*, nor the Author of *Christianity not Mystrious*, to shew, that they make clear and distinct *Ideas* necessary to Certainty. And all that I have done since, has been to shew, That you had no reason to join my Book with Men (let them be what *They* or *Those* you please) who founded Certainty only upon clear and distinct *Ideas*, when my Book did not found it only upon clear and distinct *Ideas*. And I cannot tell why the appealing to my Book now, should be call'd a *chusing* rather to *distinguish my self*.

My Reader must pardon me here for this uncouth Phrase of joining my Book with Men. For as your Lordship order'd the matter (pardon me, if I say in your new way of writing) so as it was, if your own Word may be taken in the case: For, to give me Satisfaction, you insist upon this, That you did not join me with those *Gentlemen* in their Opinions, but tell me they used *my Notions to other purposes than I intended them*; and so there was no need for me to *distinguish my self from them*, when your Lordship had done it for me, as you plead all along: Tho' here you are pleas'd to tell me, 'That I was *join'd* with them, and that I found my self *join'd* in such Company, as I did not desire to be seen in.

My Lord, I could find my self *join'd* in no Company upon this occasion, but what you *join'd* me in. And therefore I beg leave to ask your Lordship, Did you join me in Company with those, in whose Company, you here say, I do not desire to be seen? If you own that you did, how must I understand that Passage where you say, That you must do that Right to the ingenious Author of the Essay of Human Understanding, from whence these Notions were borrow'd, to serve other Purposes than he intended them; which you repeat again as matter of Satisfaction to me, and as a Proof of the care you took not to be misunderstood? If you did join me with them, what is become of all the Satisfaction in the point, which your Lordship has been at so much pains about? And If you did not join me with them, you could not think I found my self *join'd* with them, or chose to *distinguish my self from Men* I was never *join'd* with: for my Book was innocent of what made them *Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning*.

There seems to me something very delicate in this matter. I should be suppos'd *join'd* to them, and your Lordship should not be suppos'd to have *join'd* me to them, upon so slight or no occasion; and yet all this comes solely from your Lordship. How to do this to your Satisfaction, I confess my self to be too dull: And therefore I have been at the pains to examine how far I have this Obligation to your Lordship, and how far you would be pleas'd to own it, that the World might understand your Lordship's, to me, incomprehensible way of writing on this occasion.

For if you had a mind, by a new and very dextrous way, becoming the Learning and Caution of a great Man, to bring me into such Company, which you think I did not desire to be seen in; I thought such a Pattern, set by such a Hand as your Lordship's, ought not to be lost by being pass'd over too slightly. Besides, I hope, that you will not take it amiss, that I was willing to see what Obligation I had to your Lordship in the Favour you design'd me. But I crave leave to assure your Lordship, I shall never be ashamed to own any Opinion I have, because another Man (of whom perhaps your Lordship or others have no very good thoughts) is of it, nor be unwilling to be so far seen in his Company: tho' I shall always think I have a right to demand, and shall desire to be satisfied, why any one makes to himself, or takes an occasion from thence, in manner that favours not too much of Charity; to extend this Society to those Opinions of that Man, with which I have nothing to do; that the World may see the Justice and Good-will of such Endeavours, and judg whether such Arts favour not a little of the Spirit of the Inquisition.

For, if I mistake not, 'tis the method of that holy Office, and the way of those rever'd Guardians of what they call the Christian Faith, to raise Reports or start occasions of suspicion concerning the Orthodoxy of any one they have no very good-will towards, and require him to clear himself; gilding all this

with the Care of Religion, and the Profession of Respect and Tenderneſs to the Perſon himſelf, even when they deliver him up to be burnt by the Secular Power.

I ſhall not, my Lord, ſay, That you have had any ill-will to me; for I never deſerv'd any from you. But I ſhall be better able to answer thoſe, who are apt to think the Method you have taken, has ſome conformity, ſo far as it has gone, with what Proteſtants complain of in the Inquiſition; when you ſhall have clear'd this Matter a little otherwiſe, and aſſign'd a more ſufficient Reaſon for bringing me into the Party of thoſe that oppoſe the Doctrin of the Trinity, than only becauſe the Author of *Chriſtianity not Myſterious* has, in the beginning of his Book, half a ſcore Lines which you gueſs he borrow'd out of mine. For that, in truth, is all the matter of fact upon which all this Duſt is rais'd; and the matter ſo advanc'd by Degrees, that now I am told, I ſhould have clear'd my ſelf, by owning the Doctrin of the Trinity: as if I had been ever accus'd of diſowning it. But that which ſhews no ſmall Skill in this Management, is, That I am call'd upon to clear my ſelf, by the very ſame Perſon who, raiſing the whole Diſpute, has himſelf over and over again clear'd me; and upon that grounds the *Satisfaction* he pretends to give to me and others, in answer to my Complaint of his having, without any reaſon at all, brought my Book into the Controverſy concerning the Trinity. But to go on.

If the preceding part of this Paragraph had nothing in it of Defence of this Proposition, *That thoſe who offer at clear and diſtinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do*, &c. it is certain, that what follows is altogether as remote from any ſuch Defence.

P. 10. Your Lordſhip ſays, That *Certainty by Senſe, Certainty by Reaſon, and Certainty by Remembrance, are to be diſtinguiſh'd from the Certainty under debate*, and to be ſhut out from it: And upon this you ſpend the 11th, 12th, and 13th Pages. Suppoſing it ſo, how does this at all tend to the defence of this Proposition, *That thoſe who offer at clear and diſtinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do*? For whether *Certainty by Senſe, by Reaſon, and by Remembrance*, be or be not comprehended in the *Certainty under debate*, this Proposition, *That thoſe who offer at clear and diſtinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do*, will not at all be confirm'd or invalidated thereby.

The proving therefore, that *Certainty by Senſe, by Reaſon, and by Remembrance*, is to be excluded from the *Certainty under debate*, ſerving nothing to the defence of the Proposition to be defended, and ſo having nothing to do here; let us now conſider it as a Proposition that your Lordſhip has a mind to prove, as ſerving to ſome other great purpoſe of your own, or perhaps in ſome other View againſt my Book: for you ſeem to lay no ſmall ſtreſs upon it, by your way of introducing it. For you very ſolemnly ſet your ſelf to prove, *That the Certainty under debate is the Certainty of Knowledge, and that a Proposition whoſe Ideas are to be compar'd as to their Agreement or Diſagreement, is the proper Object of this Certainty*. From whence your Lordſhip infers, *That therefore this Certainty is to be diſtinguiſh'd from a Certainty by Senſe, by Reaſon, and by Remembrance*.

P. 9, & 10.

P. 10, 11, 12.

But by what Logick this is infer'd, is not eaſy to me to diſcover. For if a Proposition, *whoſe Ideas are to be compar'd as to their Agreement or Diſagreement, be the proper Object of the Certainty under debate*; if Propositions whoſe Certainty we arrive at by *Senſe, Reaſon, or Remembrance*, be of *Ideas*, which may be compar'd as to their Agreement or Diſagreement; then they cannot be excluded from that Certainty, which is to be had by ſo comparing thoſe *Ideas*: unleſs they muſt be ſhut out for the very ſame reaſon, that others are taken in.

I. Then as to *Certainty by Senſe*, or Propositions of that kind:

The Object of the *Certainty under Debate*, your Lordſhip owns, is a Proposition *whoſe Ideas are to be compar'd as to their Agreement or Diſagreement*. The Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* of a Proposition to be compar'd, may be examin'd and perceiv'd by Senſe, and is *Certainty by Senſe*: And therefore how this *Certainty* is to be diſtinguiſh'd and ſhut out from that which conſiſts in the perceiving the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* of any Proposition, will not be eaſy to ſhew; unleſs one *Certainty* is diſtinguiſh'd from another, by having that which makes the other to be Certainty, viz. The Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas*, as expreſs'd in that Proposition: v. g. May I not be certain, that a Ball of Ivory that lies before my Eyes is not ſquare?

And

And is it not my Sense of Seeing, that makes me perceive the Disagreement of that square Figure to that round Matter, which are the *Ideas* express'd in that Proposition? How then is Certainty by Sense excluded or *distinguish'd* from that Knowledge, which consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*?

2. Your Lordship *distinguishes* the Certainty which consists in the perceiving the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, as express'd in any Proposition from P. 11. *Certainty by Reason*. To have made good this distinction, I humbly conceive, you would have done well to have shew'd that the Agreement or Disagreement of two *Ideas* could not be perceiv'd by the intervention of a third, which I, and as I guess other People, call Reasoning, or knowing by Reason. As for example, Cannot the Sides of a given Triangle be known to be equal by the Intervention of two Circles, whereof one of these Sides is a common Radius?

To which, 'tis like, your Lordship will answer, what I find you do here, a- P. 12. bout the Knowledge of the Existence of Substance, by the intervention of the Existence of Modes, *That you grant one may come to Certainty of Knowledge in the case; but not a Certainty by Ideas, but by a Consequence of Reason deduc'd from the Ideas we have by our Senses*. This, my Lord, you have said, and thus you have more than once oppos'd Reason and *Ideas* as inconsistent; which I should be very glad to see prov'd once, after these several occasions I have given your Lordship, by excepting against that Supposition. But since the word *Idea* has the ill luck to be so constantly oppos'd by your Lordship to Reason, permit me, if you please, instead of it, to put what I mean by it, *viz.* the immediate Objects of the Mind in thinking (for that is it which I would signify by the word *Ideas*) and then let us see how your answer will run. You grant that from the sensible Modes of Bodies we may come to a certain Knowledge, that there are *Bodily Substances*; but this you say is not a Certainty by the immediate Objects of the Mind in thinking, *but by a Consequence of Reason deduc'd from the immediate Objects of the Mind in thinking, which we have by our Senses*. When you can prove that we can have a Certainty by a Consequence of Reason, which Certainty shall not also be by the immediate Objects of the Mind in using its Reason; you may say such Certainty is not by *Ideas*, but by *Consequences of Reason*. But that I believe will not be till you can shew, That the Mind can think, or reason, or know, without immediate Objects of Thinking, Reasoning, or Knowing; all which Objects, as your Lordship knows, I call *Ideas*.

You subjoin, *And this can never prove that we have Certainty by Ideas, where the Ideas themselves are not clear and distinct?* The Question is not whether we can have Certainty by *Ideas* that are not clear and distinct? or whether my Words (if by the Particle *This* you mean my words set down in the foregoing Page) prove any such thing, which I humbly conceive they do not: But whether *Certainty by Reason* be excluded from the Certainty under debate? which I humbly conceive you have not from my words, or any other way, prov'd.

3. The third sort of Propositions that your Lordship excludes, are those whose P. 12. Certainty we know by Remembrance, but in these two the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas* contain'd in them is perceiv'd; not always indeed, as it was at first, by an actual View of the Connection of all the intermediate *Ideas*, whereby the Agreement or Disagreement of those in the Proposition was at first perceiv'd; but by other intermediate *Ideas*, that shew the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas* contain'd in the Proposition, whose Certainty we remember.

As in the instance you here make use of, *viz.* That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones: The Certainty of which Proposition we know by Remembrance, tho' the Demonstration hath slipt out of our Minds; but we know it in a different way from what your Lordship supposes. The Agreement of the two *Ideas*, as join'd in that Proposition, is perceiv'd; but it is by the intervention of other *Ideas* than those which at first produc'd that Perception. I remember, *i. e.* I know (for Remembrance is but the reviving of some past Knowledge) that I was once certain of the Truth of this Proposition, That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones. The Immutability of the same Relations between the same immutable things, is now the *Idea* that shews me, that if the three Angles of a Triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones; and hence I come to be certain,

tain, that what was once true in the Case, is always true; what *Ideas* once agreed, will always agree; and consequently what I once knew to be true, I shall always know to be true as long as I can remember that I once knew it.

- P. 9. Your Lordship says, *That the Debate between us is about Certainty of Knowledge, with regard to some Proposition whose Ideas are to be compared as to their Agreement or Disagreement*: Out of this Debate you say, Certainty by *Sense* by *Reason*, and by *Remembrance*, is to be excluded. I desire you then, my Lord, to tell what sort of Propositions will be within the Debate, and to name me one of them; if Propositions, whose Certainty we know by *Sense*, *Reason*, or *Remembrance*, are excluded.

However, from what you have said concerning them, your Lordship in the next Paragraph concludes them out of the Question; your words are, *These things then being out of the Question*.

Out of what Question, I beseech you, my Lord? The Question here, and that of your own proposing to be defended in the Affirmative, is this, *Whether those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas bid much fairer for Certainty than I do?* And how Certainty by *Sense*, by *Reason*, and by *Remembrance* comes to have any particular Exception in reference to this Question, 'tis my misfortune not to be able to find.

- But your Lordship, leaving the Examination of the Question under debate, by a new State of the Question, would pin upon me what I never said. Your P. 13. Words are, *These things then being put out of the Question, which belong not to it; the Question truly stated is, Whether we can attain to any Certainty of Knowledge as to the Truth of a Proposition in the way of Ideas, where the Ideas themselves, by which we came to that Certainty, be not clear and distinct?* With Submission, my Lord, that which I say in the Point, is, That we may be certain of the Truth of a Proposition concerning an Idea which is not in all its Parts clear and distinct; and therefore if your Lordship will have any Question with me concerning this Matter, the Question truly stated is, *Whether we can frame any Proposition concerning a thing whereof we have but an obscure and confus'd Idea, of whose Truth we can be certain.*

That this is the Question, you will easily agree, when you will give your self the trouble to look back to the Rise of it.

- Vind. p. 232. Your Lordship having found out a strange sort of Men, who had broach'd a Doctrine which suppos'd that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to a Certainty of in our Minds, was pleas'd for this to call them the Gentlemen of a new way of Reasoning, and to make me one of them. I answer'd, that I plac'd not Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas, and so ought not to have been made one of them, being not guilty of what made a Gentleman of this new way of Reasoning. 'Tis pretended still, that I am guilty; and endeavour'd to be prov'd. To know now whether I am or no, it must be consider'd what you lay to their Charge, as the Consequence of that Opinion; and that is, That upon this Ground we cannot come to any Certainty that there is such a thing as Substance. This appears by more Places than one. Your Lordship asks, *How is it possible that we may be certain that there are both bodily and spiritual Substances, if our Reason depend upon clear and distinct Ideas?* And again, *How come we to be certain that there are spiritual Substances in the World, since we can have no clear and distinct Ideas concerning them?* And your Lordship having set down some Words out of my Book, as if they were inconsistent with my Principle of Certainty founded only in clear and distinct Ideas, you say, *From whence it follows that we may be certain of the Being of a spiritual Substance, tho' we have no clear and distinct Ideas of it.*

Other Places might be produc'd, but these are enough to shew, That those who held clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty, were accus'd to extend it thus far, that where any Idea was obscure and confus'd, there no Proposition could be made concerning it, of whole Truth we could be certain; v. g. we could not be certain that there was in the World such a thing as Substance, because we had but an obscure and confus'd Idea of it.

In this Sense therefore I deny'd that clear and distinct Ideas were necessary to Certainty, v. g. I deny'd it to be my Doctrine, That where an Idea was obscure

obscure and confus'd, there no Proposition could be made concerning it, of whose Truth we could be certain. For I held we might be certain of the Truth of this Proposition, That there was *Substance* in the World, tho' we have but an obscure and confus'd *Idea* of *Substance*: And your Lordship endeavour'd to prove we could not, as may be seen at large in that 10th Chapter of your *Vindication*, &c.

From all which, 'tis evident, that the Question between us truly stated is this, Whether we can attain Certainty of the Truth of a Proposition concerning any thing whereof we have but an obscure and confus'd *Idea*?

This being the Question, The first thing you say, is, That *Des Cartes* was of your Opinion against me. *Answ.* If the Question were to be decided by Authority, I had rather it should be by your Lordship's than *Des Cartes*'s: And therefore I should excuse my self to you, as not having need, that you should have added his Authority to your's, to shame me into a Submission; or that you should have been at the pains to have transcrib'd so much out of him, for my sake, were it fit for me to hinder the display of the Riches of your Lordship's universal reading; wherein I doubt not but I should take pleasure my self, if I had it to shew. P. 13.

I come therefore to what I think your Lordship principally aim'd at; which, as I humbly conceive, was to shew out of my Book, That I founded Certainty only on clear and distinct *Ideas*. And yet, as you say, I have complain'd of your Lordship in near twenty places of my Second Letter, for charging this upon me. By this the World will judg of the Justice of my Complaints, and the Consistency of my Notion of *Ideas*. P. 15.

Answ. What Consistency of my Notion of *Ideas* has to do here, I know not; for I do not remember that I made any Complaint concerning that. But supposing my Complaints were ill-grounded in this one case concerning Certainty, yet they might be reasonable in other Points; and therefore, with Submission, I humbly conceive the Inference was a little too large, to conclude from this Particular against my Complaints in general.

In the next place I answer, That supposing the places which your Lordship brings out of my Book did prove what they do not, viz. That I founded Certainty only in clear and distinct *Ideas*; yet my Complaints in the Case are very just. For your Lordship at first brought me into the Controversy, and made me one of the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, for founding all Certainty on clear and distinct *Ideas*, only upon a bare Supposition that I did so: which I think your Lordship confesses in these Words, where you say, That you do not deny but the first Occasion of your Charge, was the Supposition that clear and distinct *Ideas* were necessary in order to any Certainty in our Minds; and that the only way to attain this Certainty, was the comparing these, i. e. clear and distinct *Ideas*, together: but to prove this, my Words, your Lordship says, were produc'd, and my Principles of Certainty laid down, and none else. *Answ.* 'Tis strange, that when my Principles of Certainty were laid down, this (if I held it) was not found among them. Having look'd therefore, I do not find in that place, that any Words or Principles of mine were produc'd to prove that I held, That the only way to attain Certainty, was by comparing only clear and distinct *Ideas*; so that all that then made me One of the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, was only your supposing that I suppos'd that clear and distinct *Ideas* are necessary to Certainty. And therefore I had then, and have still, reason to complain, That your Lordship brought me into this Controversy upon so slight Grounds, which I humbly conceive will always shew it to have proceeded not so much from any thing you had then found in my Book, as from a great Willingness in your Lordship at any rate to do it; and of this the Passages which you have here now produc'd out of my *Essay*, are an evident Proof. P. 9.

For if your Lordship had then known any thing that seem'd so much to your purpose, when you produc'd, as you say, my Words and my Principles to prove, That I held clear and distinct *Ideas* necessary to Certainty; it cannot be believ'd that you would have omitted these Passages, either then or in your Answer to my first Letter, and defer'd them to this your Answer to my second. These Passages therefore now quoted here by your Lordship, give me leave,

leave, my Lord, to suppose have been by a new and diligent search found out, and are now at last brought *post factum* to give some colour to your way of proceeding with me; tho' these Passages being, as I suppose, then unknown to you, they could not be the Ground of making me one of *those* who place Certainty only in clear and distinct *Ideas*.

Let us come to the Passages themselves, and see what help they afford you.

- B. 4. C. 13. §. 8. The first Words you set down out of my *Essay* are these; "The Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know." From these Words, that which I infer in that place, is, "That therefore the Mind is bound in such Cases to give up its Assent to an unerring Testimony." But your Lordship from them infers here, *Therefore I make clear Ideas necessary to Certainty*; or therefore, by considering the immediate Objects of the Mind in thinking, we cannot be certain that *Substance* (whereof we have an obscure and confus'd *Idea*) doth exist. I shall leave your Lordship to make good this Consequence when you think fit, and proceed to the next Passage you alledg, which you say proves it *more plainly*. I believe it will be thought it should be prov'd more plainly, or else it will not be prov'd at all.

This plainer Proof is out of B. 4. C. 4. §. 8. in these Words, "That which is requisite to make our Knowledge certain, is the Clearness of our *Ideas*." *Ans.* The Certainty here spoken of, is the Certainty of general Propositions in Morality, and not of the particular Existence of any thing; and therefore tends not at all to any such Position as this, That we cannot be certain of the Existence of any particular sort of Being, tho' we have but an obscure and confus'd *Idea* of it: Tho' it doth affirm, That we cannot have any certain Perception of the Relations of general moral *Ideas* (wherein consists the Certainty of general moral Propositions) any farther than those *Ideas* are clear in our Minds. And that this is so, I refer my Reader to that Chapter for Satisfaction.

- P. 15. The third Place produc'd by your Lordship out of B. 4. C. 12. §. 14 is, "For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our *Ideas*, where they are only imperfect, confus'd or obscure; we cannot expect to have certain perfect or clear Knowledge." To understand these Words aright, we must see in what place they stand, and that is in a Chapter of the Improvement of our Knowledge, and therein are brought as a reason to shew how necessary it is "for the enlarging of our Knowledge, to get and settle in our Minds as far as we can, clear, distinct, and constant *Ideas* of those things we would consider and know." The Reason whereof there given, is this; That as far as they are only imperfect, confus'd, and obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear Knowledge; *i. e.* that our Knowledge will not be clear and certain so far as the *Idea* is imperfect and obscure. Which will not at all reach your Lordship's purpose, who would argue, that because I say our *Idea* of *Substance* is obscure and confus'd, therefore upon my Grounds, we cannot know that such a thing as *Substance* exists; because I plac'd Certainty only in clear and distinct *Ideas*. Now to this I answer'd, That I did not place all Certainty only on clear and distinct *Ideas*, in such a Sense as that; and therefore to avoid being mistaken, I said, "That my Notion of Certainty by *Ideas* is, That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*; such as we have, whether they be in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct or no." *viz.* If they are clear and distinct enough to be capable of having their Agreement or Disagreement with any other *Idea* perceiv'd, so far they are capable of affording us Knowledge, tho' at the same time they are so obscure and confus'd, as that there are other *Ideas*, with which we can by no means so compare them, as to perceive their Agreement or Disagreement with them. This was the Clearness and Distinctness which I deny'd to be necessary to Certainty.

If your Lordship would have done me the honour to have consider'd what I understood by obscure and confus'd *Ideas*, and what every one must understand by them, who thinks clearly and distinctly concerning them, I am apt to imagine you would have spar'd your self the trouble of raising this Question, and omitted these Quotations out of my Book, as not serving to your Lordship's Purpose.

The

The fourth Passage, which you seem to lay most stress on, proves as little to your purpose as either of the former three: The Words are these; "But obscure and confus'd *Ideas* can never produce any clear and certain Knowledge, because as far as any *Ideas* are confus'd or obscure, the Mind can never perceive clearly whether they agree or no." The latter part of these Words are a plain Interpretation of the former, and shew their meaning to be this, *viz.* Our obscure and confus'd *Ideas*, as they stand in contra-distinction to clear and distinct, have all of them something in them, whereby they are kept from being wholly imperceptible and perfectly confounded with all other *Ideas*, and so their Agreement or Disagreement, with at least some other *Ideas*, may be perceiv'd, and thereby produce Certainty, tho' they are obscure and confus'd *Ideas*. But so far as they are obscure and confus'd, so that their Agreement or Disagreement cannot be perceiv'd, so far they cannot produce Certainty; *v. g.* the Idea of *Substance* is clear and distinct enough to have its Agreement with that of *actual Existence* perceiv'd: But yet it is so far obscure and confus'd, that there be a great many other *Ideas*, with which, by reason of its Obscurity and Confusedness, we cannot compare it so, as to produce such a Perception; and in all those Cases we necessarily come short of Certainty. And that this was so, and that I meant so, I humbly conceive you could not but have seen, if you had given your self the trouble to reflect on that Passage which you quoted, *viz.* "That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, such as we have, whether they be in their Parts perfectly clear and distinct or no." To which, what your Lordship has here brought out of the second Book of my Essay, is no manner of Contradiction; unless it be a Contradiction to say, that an *Idea*, which cannot be well compar'd with some *Ideas*, from which it is not clearly and sufficiently distinguishable, is yet capable of having its Agreement or Disagreement perceiv'd with some other *Idea*, with which it is not so confounded, but that it may be compar'd: And therefore I had, and have still reason to complain of your Lordship, for charging that upon me which I never said nor meant.

Essay, B. IV.
c. 2. §. 15.

P. 7.

To make this yet more visible, give me leave to make use of an Instance in the Object of the Eyes in seeing, from whence the Metaphor of obscure and confus'd is transfer'd to *Ideas*, the Objects of the Mind in Thinking. There is no Object which the Eye sees, that can be said to be perfectly obscure, for then it would not be seen at all; nor perfectly confus'd, for then it could not be distinguish'd from any other, no not from a clearer. For Example, one sees in the Dusk something of that Shape and Size, that a Man in that degree of Light and Distance would appear. This is not so obscure, that he sees nothing; nor so confus'd, that he cannot distinguish it from a Steeple or a Star; but it is so obscure, that he cannot, tho' it be a Statue, distinguish it from a Man; and therefore, in regard of a Man, it can produce no clear and distinct Knowledge: But yet as obscure and confus'd an *Idea* as it is, this hinders not but there may many Propositions be made concerning it, as particularly that it exists, of the Truth of which we may be certain. And that without any Contradiction to what I say in my Essay, *viz.* "That obscure and confus'd *Ideas* can never produce any clear and certain Knowledge; because as far as they are confus'd or obscure, the Mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or no." This Reason that I there give, plainly limiting it only to Knowledge, where the Obscurity and Confusion is such, that it hinders the Perception of Agreement or Disagreement, which is not so great in any obscure and confus'd *Idea*; but that there are some other *Ideas*, with which it may be perceiv'd to agree or disagree, and there 'tis capable to produce Certainty in us.

And thus I am come to the end of your *Defence* of your *first Answer*, as you call it, and desire the Reader to consider how much, in the eight Pages employ'd in it, is said to defend this Proposition, *That those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do?*

But your Lordship having, under this Head, taken occasion to examine my making clear and distinct *Ideas* necessary to Certainty, I crave leave to consider here what you say of it in another place. I find one Argument more to prove, that I place Certainty only in clear and distinct *Ideas*. Your Lordship tells me, *P. 63.* and bids me observe my own words, that I positively say, "That the mind not being

"ing certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know:" So that, says your Lordship, *it is plain here, that I place Certainty in evident Knowledg, or in clear and distinct Ideas, and yet my great Complaint of your Lordship was, that you charg'd this upon me, and now you find it in my own words.* Answer. I do observe my own words, but do not find in them *or in clear and distinct Ideas*, tho' your Lordship has set these down as my words. I there indeed say, "The Mind is not certain of what it does not evidently know." Whereby I place Certainty, as your Lordship says, only in *evident Knowledg*, but evident Knowledg may be had in the clear and evident Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*; tho' some of them should not be in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct, as is evident in this Proposition, that *Substance does exist*.

But you give not off this Matter so: For these Words of mine above quoted
P. 15. by your Lordship, *viz.* "It being evident, that our Knowledg cannot exceed our
Ideas, where they are imperfect, confus'd or obscure, we cannot expect to
P. 63. "have certain, perfect or clear Knowledg;" your Lordship has here up again:
And thereupon charge it on me as a Contradiction, that confessing our *Ideas* to
be imperfect, confus'd and obscure, I say, I do not yet place Certainty in clear
and distinct *Ideas*. Answer. The Reason is plain, for I do not say that all our
Ideas are imperfect, confus'd and obscure; nor that obscure and confus'd *Ideas*
are in all their Parts so obscure and confus'd, that no Agreement or Disagree-
ment between them and any other *Idea* can be perceiv'd; and therefore my Con-
fession of imperfect, obscure and confus'd *Ideas*, takes not away all Knowledg,
even concerning those very *Ideas*.

But, says your Lordship, *Can Certainty be had with imperfect and obscure Ideas, and yet no Certainty be had by them?* Add if you please, my Lord, [by those parts of them which are obscure and confus'd:] And then the Question will be right put, and have this easy Answer: Yes, my Lord; and that without any Contradiction, because an *Idea* that is not in all its parts perfectly clear and distinct, and is therefore an obscure and confus'd *Idea*, may yet with those *Ideas*, with which, by any obscurity it has, it is not confounded, be capable to produce Knowledg by the perception of its Agreement or Disagreement with them. And yet it will hold true, that in that part wherein it is imperfect, obscure and confus'd, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect or clear Knowledg.

For Example: He that has the *Idea* of a Leopard, as only of a spotted Animal, must be confess'd to have but a very imperfect, obscure and confus'd *Idea* of that *Species* of Animals; and yet this obscure and confus'd *Idea* is capable by a Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the clear part of it, *viz.* that of *Animal*, with several other *Ideas*, to produce Certainty: Tho' as far as the obscure part of it confounds it with the *Idea* of a Lynx, or other spotted Animal, it can, join'd with them, in many Propositions, produce no Knowledg.

This might easily be understood to be my meaning by these words, which
P. 122. your Lordship quotes out of my *Essay*, *viz.* "That our Knowledg consisting in
the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, its
Clearness or Obscurity consists in the Clearness or Obscurity of that Percep-
tion, and not in the Clearness or Obscurity of the *Ideas* themselves." Upon

which your Lordship asks, *How is it possible for the Mind to have a clear Perception of the Agreement of Ideas, if the Ideas themselves be not clear and distinct?*
P. 122. Answer. Just as the Eyes can have a clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the clear and distinct parts of a Writing, with the clear Parts of another, tho' one, or both of them, be so obscure and blurr'd in other Parts, that the Eye cannot perceive any Agreement or Disagreement they have one with another. And I am sorry that these Words of mine, "My Notion of
Lett. 2. p. 50. "Certainty by *Ideas*, is, that Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agree-
ment or Disagreement of *Ideas*, such as we have, whether they be in all their
Parts perfectly clear and distinct or no;" were not plain enough to make your
Lordship understand my meaning, and save you all this new, and, as it seems
to me, needless trouble.

In your 15th Page, your Lordship comes to your second of the three Answers,
P. 7. which you say you had given, and would lay together and defend.

You say, (2.) you answer'd That it is very possible the Author of Christianity
P. 15. not Mysterious might mistake or misapply my Notions, but there is too much reason

to believe he thought them the same; and we have no reason to be sorry that he hath given me this occasion for the explaining my meaning, and for the Vindication of my self in the Matters I apprehend he had charg'd me with. These words your Lordship quotes out of the 36th Page of your first Letter. But, as I have already observ'd, they are not there given as an Answer to this that you make me here say; and therefore to what purpose you repeat them here is not easy to discern, unless it can be thought that an unsatisfactory Answer in one place can become satisfactory by being repeated in another, where it is, as I humbly conceive, less to the purpose, and no Answer at all. It was there indeed given as an Answer to my saying, That I did not place Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas, which I said to shew that you had no reason to bring me into the Controversy, because the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious* plac'd Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas. To satisfy me for your doing so, your Lordship answers, That it was very possible that Author might mistake or misapply my Notions. A Reason indeed, that will equally justify your bringing my Book into any Controversy: For there is no Author so infallible, write he in what Controversy he pleases, but 'tis possible he may mistake, or misapply my Notions.

That was the force of this your Lordship's Answer in that place of your first Letter, but what it serves for in this place of your second Letter, I have not Wit enough to see. The remainder of it I have answer'd in the 37th and 38th Pages of my second Letter, and therefore cannot but wonder to see it repeated here again, without any notice taken of What I said in answer to it, tho' you set it down here again, as you say, p. 7. on purpose to defend.

But all the Defence made, is only to that part of my Reply, which you set P. 16. down as a fresh Complaint that I make in these words: "This can be no reason why I should be join'd with a Man that had misapply'd my Notions, and that no Man hath so much mistaken and misapply'd my Notions as your Lordship; and therefore I ought rather to be join'd with your Lordship." And then you, with some warmth, subjoin: *But is this fair and ingenuous Dealing, to represent this Matter so, as if your Lordship had join'd us together, because he had misunderstood and misapply'd my Notions? Can I think your Lordship a Man of so little Sense to make that the reason of it?* No, Sir, says your Lordship, *It was because he assign'd no other Grounds but mine, and that in my own words; however, now I would divert the meaning of them another way.*

My Lord, I did set down your words at large in my second Letter, and therefore do not see how I could be liable to any Charge of unfair or disingenuous dealing in representing the Matter; which I am sure you will allow as a Proof of my not misrepresenting, since I find you use it your self as a sure Fence against any such Acculation; where you tell me, *That you have set down my own words at large,* P. 133. *that I may not complain that your Lordship misrepresents my Sense.* The same Answer I must desire my Reader to apply for me to your 73d and 90th Pages, where your Lordship makes Complaints of the like kind with this here.

The Reasons you give for joining me with the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious*, are put down verbatim as you gave them; and if they did not give me that Satisfaction they were design'd for, am I to be blam'd that I did not find them better than they were? You join'd me with that Author, because he plac'd Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas: I told your Lordship I did not do so, and therefore that could be no reason for your joining me with him. You answer, *'Twas possible he might mistake or misapply my Notions:* So that our agreeing in the Notion of Certainty (the pretended Reason for which we were join'd) failing, all the Reason which is left, and which you offer in this Answer for your joining of us, is the possibility of his mistaking my Notions. And I think it a very natural Inference, that if the mere possibility of any one's mistaking me, be a reason for my being join'd with him; any one's actual mistaking me, is a stronger reason why I should be join'd with him. But if such an Inference shews (more than you would have it) the satisfactoriness and force of your Answer, I hope you will not be angry with me, if I cannot change the nature of things.

Your Lordship indeed adds in that Place, *That there is too much reason to believe that the Author thought his Notions and mine the same.* Anf. 1. p. 36.

Ans. When your Lordship shall produce that Reason, it will be seen whether it were too much or too little. 'Till it is produc'd, there appears no Reason at

all; and such conceal'd Reason, tho' it may be *too much*, can be suppos'd, I think, to give very little Satisfaction to me or any body else in the case.

- P. 16. But to make good what you have said in your Answer, your Lordship here replies, That you did not join us together, because he had misunderstood and misapply'd my Notions. *Ans.* Neither did I say, that therefore you did join us. But this I crave leave to say, That all the Reason you there gave for your joining us together, was the possibility of his mistaking and misapplying my Notions.

- P. 16. But your Lordship now tells me, No, Sir, this was not the reason of your joining us; but it was because he assign'd no other Grounds but mine, and in my own Words. *Ans.* My Lord, I do not remember that in that place you give this as a reason for your joining of us; and I could not answer in that place to what you did not there say, but to what you there did say. Now your Lordship does say it here, here I shall take the liberty to answer it.

The Reason you now give for your joining me with that Author, is because he assign'd no other Grounds but mine; which however tenderly express'd, is to be understood, I suppose, that he did assign my Grounds. Of what, I beseech your Lordship, did he assign my Grounds, and in my Words? If it were not my Grounds of Certainty, it could be no manner of Reason for your joining me with him; because the only Reason why at first you made him (and me with him) a Gentleman of the new way of Reasoning, was his supposing clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty, which was the Opinion that you declar'd you oppos'd. Now, my Lord, if you can shew where that Author has in my Words assign'd my Grounds of Certainty, there will be some Grounds for what you say here. But till your Lordship does that, it will be pretty hard to believe that to be the Ground of your joining us together; which being no where to be found, can scarce be thought the true reason of your doing it.

- P. 16. Your Lordship adds, However, now I would divert the meaning of Them [i. e. those my words] another way.

Ans. Whenever you are pleas'd to set down those Words of mine, wherein that Author assigns my Grounds of Certainty, it will be seen how I now divert their meaning another way: till then, they must remain with several other of your Lordship's invisible Them, which are no where to be found.

- P. 17. But to your asking me, whether I can think your Lordship a Man of that little Sense? I crave leave to reply, That I hope it must not be concluded, that as often as in your way of writing I meet with anything that does not seem to me satisfactory, and I endeavour to shew that it does not prove what it is made use of for, that I presently think your Lordship a Man of little Sense: This would be a very hard Rule in defending one's self; especially for me, against so great and learned a Man, whose Reasons and Meaning it is not, I find, always easy for so mean a Capacity as mine to reach: and therefore I have taken great care to set down your words in most places, to secure my self from the Imputation of misrepresenting your Sense, and to leave it fairly before the Reader to judge, whether I mistake it, and how far I am to be blamed if I do. And I would have set down your whole Letter page by page as I answer'd it, would not that have made my Book too big.

If I must write under this fear, that you apprehend I think meanly of you, as often as I think any reason you make use of is not satisfactory in the point it is brought for; the Causes of Uneasiness would return too often, and it would be better once for all to conclude your Lordship infallible, and acquiesce in what ever you say, than in every page to be so rude as to tell your Lordship, I think you have little Sense; if that be the Interpretation of my endeavouring to shew, that your Reasons come short any where.

My Lord, when you did me the honour to answer my first Letter (which I thought might have pass'd for a submissive Complaint of what I did not well understand, rather than a Dispute with your Lordship) you were pleas'd to insert into it direct Accusations against my Book; which look'd as if you had a mind to enter into a direct Controversy with me. This Condescension in your Lordship has made me think my self under the protection of the Laws of Controversy, which allow a free examining and shewing the Weakness of the Reasons brought by the other side, without any offence. If this be not permitted me, I must confess I have been mistaken, and have been guilty in answering you

you any thing at all : for how to answer without answering, I confess, I do not know.

I wish you never had writ any thing that I was particularly concern'd to examine ; and what I have been concern'd to examine, I wish it had given me no occasion for any other Answer, but an Admiration of the Manner and Justness of your Corrections, and an Acknowledgment of an Increase of that great Opinion which I had of your Lordship before. But I hope it is not expected from me in this Debate, that I should admit as good and conclusive all that drops from your Pen, for fear of causing so much displeasure as you seem here to have upon this occasion, or for fear you should object to me the Presumption of thinking you had but *little Sense*, as often as I endeavour'd to shew that what you say is of little force.

When those *Words and Grounds of mine* are produc'd, that the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious* assign'd, which your Lordship thinks a sufficient Reason for your joining me with him, in opposing the Doctrine of the Trinity ; I shall consider them, and endeavour to give you Satisfaction about them, as well as I have already concerning those ten Lines, which you have more than once quoted out of him, as taken out of my Book, and which is all that your Lordship has produc'd out of him of that kind : in all which there is not one syllable of *clear and distinct Ideas*, or of *Certainty* founded in them. In the mean time, in answer to your other Question, *But is this fair and Ingenuous dealing ?* I refer my Reader to p. 35—38. of my second Letter, where he may see at large all this whole matter, and all the *Unfairness* and *Disingenuity* of it, which I submit to him, to judge whether for any fault of that kind it ought to have drawn on me the marks of so much Displeasure. P. 16.

Your Lordship goes on here, and tells me, *That altho' you were willing to allow me all reasonable occasions for my own Vindication, as appears by your Words; yet you were sensible enough that I had given too just an occasion to apply them in that manner, as appears by the next Page.* P. 16.

What was it, I beseech you, my Lord, that I was to vindicate my self from, and what was those *Them I had given too just an occasion to apply in that manner* ; and what was that *Manner* they were apply'd in, and what was the *Occasion* they were so apply'd ? For I can find none of all these in that *next Page* to which your Lordship refers me. When those are set down, the World will be the better able to judge of the Reason you had to join me after the manner you did. However, saying, my Lord, without proving, I humbly conceive, is but saying ; and in such *personal Matter* so turn'd, shews more the Disposition of the Speaker, than any ground for what is said. Your Lordship, as a proof of your great Care of me, tells me at the Top of that Page, *That you had said so much, that nothing could be said more for my Vindication :* And before you come to the Bottom of it, you labour to persuade the World, that I have need to vindicate my self. Another possibly, who could find in his Heart to say two such things, would have taken care they should not have stood in the same Page, where the Juxta-position might enlighten them too much, and surprize the Sight. But possibly your Lordship is so well satisfy'd of the World's Readiness to believe your Professions of Good-will to me, as a Mark whereof you tell me here of your Willingness *to allow me all reasonable occasions to vindicate my self ;* P. 16. that no Body can see any thing but Kindness in whatever you say, tho' it appears in so different Shapes.

In the following Words, your Lordship accuses me of too nice a piece of Criticism ; and tells me *it looks like Chicaning.* *Answ.* I did not expect, in a Controversy begun and manag'd as this which your Lordship has been pleas'd to have with me, to be accus'd of *Chicaning*, without great Provocation ; because the mentioning that Word might perhaps raise in the Reader's Mind some odd Thoughts which were better spar'd. But this Accusation made me look back into the Places you quoted in the Margent, and there find the matter to stand thus : P. 16.

To a pretty large Quotation set down out of the Postscript to my first Letter, you subjoin ; *Which Words seem to express so much of a Christian Spirit and Temper, that your Lordship cannot believe I intended to give any advantage to the Enemies of* *the* *Vol. I.* *N n n 2* *Ans. i. p. 37.*

the Christian Faith; but whether there hath not been too just occasion for them to apply Them in that manner, is a thing very fit for me to consider.

Lett. 2. p. 45.

In my Answer, I take notice that the term *Them*, in this Passage of your Lordship's, can in the ordinary construction of our Language be apply'd to nothing but which Words in the beginning of that Passage, i. e. to my Words immediately preceding. This your Lordship calls *Chicaning*; and gives this reason for it, viz. Because any one that reads without a Design to cavil, would easily interpret Them of my Words and Notions about which the Debate was. Answ. That any one that reads that Passage with or without design to cavil could hardly make it intelligible without interpreting Them so, I readily grant; but that it is easy for me or any body to interpret any one's meaning contrary to the necessary Construction and plain Import of the Words, that I crave leave to deny. I am sure it is not *Chicaning*, to presume that so great an Author as your Lordship writes according to the Rules of Grammar, and as another Man writes, who understands our Language, and would be understood: to do the contrary, would be a Presumption liable to blame, and might deserve the Name of *Chicaning* and *Cavil*. And that in this case it was not easy to avoid the interpreting the term *Them* as I did, the reason you give why I should have done it, is a farther Proof. Your Lordship, to shew it was easy, says the *Postscript* comes in but as a *Parenthesis*: Now I challenge any one living, to shew me where in that Place the *Parenthesis* must begin, and where end, which can make Them applicable to any thing, but the Words of my *Postscript*. I have try'd with more care and pains than is usually requir'd of a Reader in such cases, and cannot, I must own, find where to make a Breach in the Thred of your Discourse, with the imaginary *Parenthesis*, which your Lordship mentions, and was not, I suppose, omitted by the Printer for want of Marks to print it. And if this, which you give as the Key that opens to the Interpretation that I should have made, be so hard to be found, the Interpretation it self could not be so very easy as you speak of.

Lett. 2. p. 45.

But to avoid all blame for understanding that Passage as I did, and to secure my self from being suspected to seek a subterfuge in the natural Import of your words, against what might be conjectur'd to be your Sense, I added; "But if by any new way of Construction, unintelligible to me, the word *Them* here shall be apply'd to any Passages of my *Essay of Human Understanding*; I must humbly crave leave to observe this one thing, in the whole course of what your Lordship has design'd for my *Satisfaction*, That tho' my Complaint be of your Lordship's manner of applying what I had publish'd in my *Essay*, so as to interest me in a Controversy wherein I meddled not; yet your Lordship all along tells me of others, that have misapply'd I know not what words in my Book, after I know not what manner. Now as to this matter, I beseech your Lordship to believe that when any one, in such a manner applies my words contrary to what I intended them, so as to make them opposite to the Doctrine of the Trinity, and me a Party in that Controversy against the Trinity, as your Lordship knows I complain your Lordship has done; I shall complain of them too, and consider, as well as I can, what *Satisfaction* they give me and others in it." This Passage of mine your Lordship here represents thus, viz. P. 17. That I say, that if by an unintelligible new way of Construction the word *Them* be apply'd to any Passages in my Book, *What then? Why then, whoever they are*, I intended to complain of them too. But, says your Lordship, the words just before, tell me who they are, viz. *The Enemies of the Christian Faith*. And then your Lordship asks, *Whether this be all that I intend*, viz. only to complain of them for making me a Party in the Controversy against the Trinity?

My Lord, were I given to *Chicaning*, as you call my being stopt by Faults of Grammar that disturb the Sense, and make the Discourse incoherent and unintelligible, if we are to take it from the words as they are, I should not want matter enough for such an Exercise of my Pen: as for example here again, where your Lordship makes me say, *That if the word Them be apply'd to any Passages in my Book, then whoever they are, I intend to complain, &c.* These being set down for my words, I would be very glad to be able to put them into a Grammatical Construction, and make to my self an intelligible Sense of them. But *They* being not a word that I have an absolute Power over, to place where and for what I will, I confess I cannot do it. For the term *They* in the words here,

here, as your Lordship has set them down, having nothing that it can refer to, but *Passages*, or *Them*, which stand for Words, it must be a very sudden Metamorphosis that must change them into Persons, for 'tis for Persons that the word *They* stands here; and yet I crave leave to say, that as far as I understand *English*, *They* is a Word cannot be us'd without reference to something mention'd before. Your Lordship tells me, *the Words just before tell me who they are*. The Words just mention'd before are these; *If by an unintelligible new way of Construction the Word Them be apply'd to any Passage of my Book*: for 'tis to some Words before indeed, but before in the same Contexture of Discourse, that the Word *They* must refer, to make it any where intelligible. But here are no Persons mention'd in *the Words just before*, tho' your Lordship tells me *the words just before shew who they are*; but this *just before*, where the Persons are mention'd whom your Lordship intends by *They* here, is so far off, that 16 Pages of your Lordship's second Letter, 174 Pages of my second Letter, and above 100 Pages of your Lordship's first Letter, come between: So that one must read above 280 Pages from *the Enemies of the Christian Faith*, in the 37th Page of your first Letter, before one can come to the *They* which refers to them here in the 17th Page of your Lordship's second Letter.

My Lord, 'tis my misfortune that I cannot pretend to any Figure amongst the Men of Learning; but I would not for that reason be render'd so despicable, that I could not write ordinary Sense in my own Language: I must beg leave therefore to inform my Reader, that what your Lordship has set down here as mine, is neither my Words, nor my Sense. For,

1. I say not, if by any *unintelligible new way of Construction*; but I say, "If by any new way of Construction unintelligible to me:" which are far different Expressions. For that may be very intelligible to others, which may be unintelligible to me. And indeed, my Lord, there are so many Passages in your Writing in this Controversy with me, which for their Construction, as well as otherwise, are so unintelligible to me, that if I should be so unmannerly as to measure your Understanding by mine, I should not know what to think of them. In those cases therefore, I presume not to go beyond my own Capacity: I tell your Lordship often (which I hope Modesty will permit) what my weak Understanding will not reach; but I am far from saying it is therefore absolutely *unintelligible*. I leave to others the benefit of their better Judgments, to be enlighten'd by your Lordship, where I am not.

2. The use your Lordship here makes of these Words, "But if by any new way of Construction unintelligible to me, the Word *Them* be apply'd to any Passages in my Book;" is not the principal, nor the only (as your Lordship makes it) use for which I said them: But this; that if your Lordship by *Them* in that Place were to be understood to mean, that there were others that misapply'd Passages of my Book; this was no Satisfaction for what your Lordship had done in that kind. Tho' this, I observ'd, was your way of defence; That when I complain'd of what your Lordship had done, you told me, that others had done so too: as if that could be any manner of Satisfaction. I added in the close, "That when any one in such a manner applies my Words contrary to what I intended them, so as to make them opposite to the Doctrine of the Trinity, and me a Party in that Controversy against the Trinity, as your Lordship knows I complain your Lordship has done; I shall complain of them too, and consider as well as I can, what Satisfaction they give me and others in it." Of this *any one* of mine, your Lordship makes your fore-mention'd *They*, whether with any Advantage of Sense or Clearness to my Words, the Reader must judg. However, this latter part of that Passage, with the particular Turn your Lordship gives to it, is what your Words would persuade your Reader is all that I say here: Would not your Lordship, upon such an occasion from me, cry out again, *Is this fair and ingenuous Dealing?* And would not you think you had reason to do so? But let us see what we must guess your Lordship makes me say, and your Exceptions to it.

Your Lordship makes me say, *whoever they are*, who misapply my Words, as I complain your Lordship has done (for these Words must be supply'd, to make the Sentence to me intelligible) *I intend to complain of them too*: And then you find fault with me for using the indefinite Word *whoever*, and as a Reproof for the

Let. 2. p. 46.

the Unreasonableness of it; you say, *But the Words just before tell me who they are.* But my Words are not *whoever they are*: but my Words are, "When any one in such a manner applies my Words contrary to what I intended them, &c." Your Lordship would here have me understand, that there are those that have done it, and rebukes me that I speak as if I knew not any one that had done it; and that I may not plead Ignorance, you say your Words just before told me *who they were*, viz. *The Enemies of the Christian Faith.*

What must I do now to keep my Word, and satisfy your Lordship? Must I complain of *the Enemies of the Christian Faith* in general, that they have apply'd my Words as aforesaid, and then consider, as well as I can, what Satisfaction they give me and others in it? For that was all I promis'd to do. But this would be strange, to complain of *the Enemies of the Christian Faith*, for doing what 'tis very likely they never all did, and what I do not know that any one of them has done. Or must I, to content your Lordship, read over all the Writings of *the Enemies of the Christian Faith*, to see whether any one of them has apply'd my Words, i. e. in such a manner as I complain'd your Lordship has done, that if they have, I may complain of them too? This truly, my Lord, is more than I have time for; and if it were worth while, when it is done, I perceive I should not content your Lordship in it. For you ask me here, *Is this all I intend, only to complain of them for making me a Party in the Controversy against the Trinity?* No, my Lord, this is not all. I promis'd too, "To consider, as well as I can what Satisfaction (if they offer any) they give me and others for so doing." And why should not this content your Lordship in reference to others, as well as it does in reference to your self? I have but one measure for your Lordship and others. When others treat me after the manner you have done, why should it not be enough to answer them after the same manner I have done your Lordship? But perhaps your Lordship has some dextrous meaning under this, which I am not quick-sighted enough to perceive, and so do not reply right, as you would have me.

I must beg my Reader's Pardon as well as your Lordship's, for using so many Words, about Passages that seem not in themselves of that Importance. I confess, that in themselves they are not; but yet 'tis my Misfortune, that, in this Controversy, your way of writing and representing my Sense forces me to it.

Your Lordship's Name in writing is establish'd above controul, and therefore 'twould be ill-breeding in one, who barely reads what you write, not to take every thing for perfect in its kind, which your Lordship says. Clearness, and Force, and Consistence are to be presum'd always, whatever your Lordship's Words be: And there is no other Remedy for an Answerer, who finds it difficult any where to come at your Meaning or Argument, but to make his Excuse for it, in laying the Particulars before the Reader, that he may be Judge where the Fault lies; especially where any matter of Fact is contested, Deductions from the first Rise are often necessary, which cannot be made in few Words, nor without several Repetitions: an Inconvenience possibly fitter to be endur'd, than that your Lordship, in the run of your learned Notions, should be shackled with the ordinary and strict Rules of Language; and in the Delivery of your sublimer Speculations, be ty'd down to the mean and contemptible Rudiments of Grammar: Tho' your being above these, and freed from a servile Observation in the use of trivial *Particles*, whereon the Connection of Discourse chiefly depends, cannot but cause great Difficulties to the Reader. And however it may be an ease to any great Man, to find himself above the ordinary Rules of Writing, he who is bound to follow the Connection, and find out his Meaning, will have his Task much increas'd by it.

I am very sensible how much this has swell'd these Papers already, and yet I do not see how any thing less than what I have said, could clear those Passages which we have hitherto examin'd, and set them in their due Light.

Your next Words are these, *But whether I have not made myself too much a Party in it* [i. e. the Controversy against the Trinity] *will appear before we have done.* This is an *Item* for me, which your Lordship seems so very fond of, and so careful to inculcate, wherever you bring in any Words it can be tack'd to, that if one can avoid thinking it to be the main end of your writing, one cannot yet

but

but see, that it could not be so much in the Thoughts and Words of a Great Man, who is above such *Personal Matters*, and which he knows *the World soon grows weary of*, unless it had some very particular Business there. Whether it be the Author that has prejudic'd you against his Book, or the Book prejudic'd you against the Author, so it is, I perceive, that both I and my *Essay* are fallen under your Displeasure.

I am not unacquainted what great stress is often laid upon invidious Names by skilful Disputants, to supply the want of better Arguments. But give me leave, my Lord, to say, That 'tis too late for me now to begin to value those Marks of good Will, or a good Cause; and therefore I shall say nothing more to them, as fitter to be left to the examination of the Thoughts within your own breast, from what Source such Reasonings spring, and whither they tend.

I am going, my Lord, to a Tribunal that has a Right to judge of Thoughts, and being secure that I there shall be found of no *Party* but that of Truth (for which there is requir'd nothing but the receiving Truth in the love of it) I matter not much of what *Party* any one shall, as may best serve his turn, denominate me here. Your Lordship's is not the first Pen from which I have receiv'd such Strokes as these, without any great harm; I never found freedom of Style did me any hurt with those who knew me, and if those who know me not will take up borrow'd Prejudices, it will be more to their own harm than mine: So that in this, I shall give your Lordship little other Trouble but my Thanks sometimes, where I find you skilfully and industriously recommending me to the World, under the Character you have chosen for me. Only give me leave to say, That if the *Essay* I shall leave behind me hath no other fault to sink it but Heresy and inconsistency with the *Articles of the Christian Faith*, I am apt to think it will last in the World, and do Service to Truth, even the Truths of Religion, notwithstanding that Imputation laid on it by so mighty a hand as your Lordship's.

In your two next Paragraphs your Lordship accuses me of *cavilling* in the 43d and 44th Pages of my second Letter, whither for shortness I refer my Reader. I shall only add, that tho' in the *Debate about Mysteries of Faith*, your Adversaries, as you say, are not *Heathens*; yet any one among us, whom your Lordship should speak of as not owning the *Scripture to be the Foundation and Rule of Faith*, would, I presume, be thought to receive from you a Character very little different from that of a *Heathen*. Which being a part of your Compliment to me, will, I humbly conceive, excuse what I there said, from being a *cavilling Exception*. P. 18, 19

Hitherto your Lordship, notwithstanding that you understood the *World so well*, has employ'd your Pen in *Personal Matters*, how unacceptable soever to the World you declare it to be: how must I behave my self in the Case? If I answer nothing, my Silence is so apt to be interpreted Guilt or Concession, that even the deferring my Answer to some Points, or not giving it in the proper Place, is reflected on as no small Transgression, whereof there are two Examples in the two following Pages. And if I do answer so at large as your way of Writing requires, and as the Matter deserves, I recal to your Memory the *Springs of Modena*, by the *Ebullition of my Thoughts*. 'Tis hard, my Lord, between these two to manage one's self to your good Liking: However, I shall endeavour to collect the Force of your Reasonings, wherever I can find it, as short as I can, and apply my Answers to that, tho' with the Omission of a great many Incidents deserving to be taken notice of: If my slowness, not able to keep pace every where with your uncommon Flights, shall have miss'd any Argument whereon you lay any stress; if you please to point it out to me, I shall not fail to endeavour to give you satisfaction therein. P. 20, 21

In the next Paragraph your Lordship says, *Those who are not sparing of writing about Articles of Faith, and among them take great care to avoid some which have been always esteemed fundamental, &c.* This seems also to contain something *Personal* in it. But how far I am concern'd in it, I shall know, when you shall be pleas'd to tell me who *those* are, and then it will be time enough for me to answer. P. 19

This is what your Lordship has brought in under your second Answer, in these four Pages, as a Defence of it; and how much of it is a Defence of that second Answer, let the Reader judge.

P. 20. I am now come to the third of those Answers, which you said, pag. 7. you would lay together and defend. And it is this:

That my Grounds of Certainty tend to Scepticism; and that, in an Age wherein the Mysteries of Faith are too much expos'd by the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity; it is a thing of dangerous consequence to start such new Methods of Certainty, as are apt to leave Mens minds more doubtful than before.

This is what you set down here to be defended: the Defence follows, wherein your Lordship tells me that I say, "These Words contain a farther Accusation of my Book, which shall be consider'd in its due place." But this is the proper place of considering it: For your Lordship said, *That hereby I have given too just occasion to the Enemies of the Christian Faith, to make use of my Words and Notions, as was evidently prov'd from my own Concessions.* And if this be so, however you were willing to have had me explain'd my self to the general Satisfaction; yet, since I decline it, you do insist upon it, *That I cannot clear my self from laying that Foundation, which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious built upon.*

In which I crave leave to acquaint your Lordship with what I do not understand.

First, I do not understand what is meant, by *this is the proper place*; for in ordinary Construction, these words seem to denote this 20th Page of your Lordship's second Letter, which you were then writing, tho' the sense would make me think the 46th Page of my second Letter, which you were then answering, should be meant. This perhaps your Lordship may think a nice Piece of Criticism; but till it be clear'd, I cannot tell what to say in my Excuse. For 'tis likely your Lordship would again ask me, whether I could think you a Man of so little Sense, if I should understand these words to mean the 20th Page of your second Letter, which no body can conceive your Lordship should think a proper place for me to consider and answer what you had writ in your first? 'Twould be as hard to understand *this is*, to mean a place in my former Letter, which was past and done; but 'tis no wonder for me to be mistaken in your Privileg-word *This*. Besides, there is this farther Difficulty to understand *this is the proper place*, of the 46th Page of my former Letter; because I do not see why the 82d Page of that Letter, where I did consider and answer it, was not as proper a place of considering it as the 46th, where I give a reason why I defend it. Farther, if I understood what you meant here by *this is the proper place*, I should possibly apprehend better the force of your Argument subjoin'd to prove *this*, whatever it be, to be the proper place; the causal Particle *FOR*, which introduces the following Words, making them a Reason of those preceding. But in the present Obscurity of this matter, I confess I do not see how your having said that *I gave occasion to the Enemies of the Christian Faith, &c.* proves any thing concerning the proper place at all.

Another thing that I do not understand in this Defence, is your Inference in the next Period, where you tell me, *If this be so, you insist upon it that I should clear my self*: For I do not see how your having said what you there said (for that is it which *This* here, if it be not within Priviledg, must signify) can be a reason for your insisting on my clearing my self of any thing, tho' I allow this to be your Lordship's ordinary way of proceeding, to insist upon your Suggestions and Suppositions in one place, as if they were Foundations to build what you pleas'd on in another.

Thus then stands your Defence: *My Grounds of Certainty tend to Scepticism, and to start new Methods of Certainty is of dangerous Consequence.* Because I did not consider this your Accusation in the proper place of considering it, *this is the proper place of considering it*: Because your Lordship said *I had given too just occasion to the Enemies of the Christian Faith to make use of my Words and Notions*; and because your Lordship said so, therefore you insist upon it that I clear my self, &c. This appears, to me, to be the Connection and Force of your Defence hitherto: If I am mistaken in it, your Lordship's words are set down, the Reader must judg whether the Construction of the words do not make it so.

But before I leave them, there are some things that I crave permission to represent to your Lordship more particularly.

1. That to the Accusation of Scepticism, I have answered in another, and, as I think, a proper Place.

2. That

2. That the Accusation of *dangerous consequence*, I have consider'd and answer'd in my former Letter; but that being, it seems, not the *proper place of considering it*, you have not in this your Defence thought fit to take any notice of it. Lett. 2. p. 82—95, 109.

3. That your Lordship has not any where prov'd, That my placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, is apt to leave *Mens Minds* more doubtful than they were before; which is what your Accusation supposes.

4. That you set down those words of mine, "These words contain a farther Accusation of my Book, which shall be consider'd in its due place;" as all the Answer which I gave to that new Accusation, except what you take notice of out of my 95th Page; and take no notice of what I say from Page 82 to 95; where I consider'd it as I promis'd, and, as I thought, fully answer'd it.

5. That the too *just occasion*, you say, *I have given to the Enemies of the Christian Faith to make use of my Words and Notions*, wants to be prov'd.

6. That what *use the Enemies of the Christian Faith have made of my Words and Notions*, is no where shewn, tho' often talk'd of.

7. That if *the Enemies of the Christian Faith have made use of my Words and Notions*, yet that, as I have shewn, is no proof, that they are of dangerous consequence: Much less is it a proof, that this Proposition, "Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*," is of dangerous consequence. For some *Words or Notions* in a Book, that are of dangerous consequence, do not make all the Propositions of that Book to be of dangerous consequence. Lett. 2. p. 69. & 85.

8. That your Lordship tells me, *You were willing to have had me explain'd my self to the general Satisfaction*; which is what in the place from which the former words are taken, you express'd thus: That *my Answer did not come fully up in all things to that which you could wish*. To which I have given an Answer: and methinks your Defence here should have been apply'd to that, and not the same thing (which has been answer'd) set down again as part of your Defence. But pray my Lord, give me leave to ask, Is not this meant for a *Personal Matter*? which tho' the *World*, as you say, is soon weary of, your Lordship, it seems, is not. Answ. 1. p. 37. Lett. 2. p. 38—41.

9. That you say, *You insist upon it, that I cannot clear my self from laying that Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious built upon*. Certainly this *Personal Matter* is of some very great consequence, that your Lordship, who understands the *World* so well, insists so much upon it. But if it be true, that he built upon my Foundation, and it be of such moment to your Lordship's business in the present Controversy; methinks, without so much Intricacy, it should not be hard to shew it: It is but proving what *Foundation* of Certainty (for 'tis of that all this dispute is) he went upon, which, as I humbly conceive, your Lordship has not done; and then shewing that to be my *Foundation* of Certainty; and the business is ended. But instead of this your Lordship says, That *his Account of Reason* supposes clear and distinct *Ideas* necessary to Certainty; That he imagin'd he built upon my Grounds; That he thought his and my *Notions* of Certainty to be the same; That there has been too just occasion given, for the *Enemies of the Christian Faith* to apply my *Words* in I know not what manner. These and the like Arguments, to prove that he goes upon my Grounds, your Lordship has used; but they are, I confess, too subtle and too fine for me to feel the force of them, in a Matter of Fact wherein it was so easy to produce both his and my Grounds out of our Books (without all this talk about Suppositions and Imaginations, and Occasions so far remote from any direct Proof) if it were a matter of that consequence to be so insisted upon, as your Lordship profess'dly does. Vindic. p. 232. Answ. 1. p. 36. Ibid. p. 37.

Your Lordship has spent a great many Pages to tie me to that Author; and you still insist upon it, that I cannot clear my self from laying that *Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious built upon*. What this great Concern in a matter of so little moment means, I leave the Reader to guess: For, I beseech your Lordship, of what great consequence is it to the *World*? What great interest has any Truth of Religion in this, That I and another Man (be he who he will) make use of the same Grounds to different purposes? This I am sure, it tends not to the clearing or confirming any one material Truth in the *World*. If the *Foundation* I have laid be true, I shall neither disown nor dis-

like it, whatever this or any other Author shall *build* upon it; because, as your Lordship knows, ill things may be built upon a good Foundation, and yet the Foundation never the worse for it. And therefore if that, or any other Author hath *built upon my Foundation*, I see nothing in it, that I ought to be concern'd to *clear myself from*.

If you can shew that my *Foundation* is false, or shew me a better Foundation of Certainty than mine, I promise you immediately to renounce and relinquish mine, with thanks to your Lordship: But till you can prove, That he that first invented Syllogism as a Rule of right Reasoning, or first laid down this Principle, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*; is answerable for all those Opinions which have been endeavour'd to be prov'd by Mode and Figure, or have been built upon that Maxim; I shall not think my self concern'd, whatever any one shall *build upon this Foundation* of mine, That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*, as they are express'd in any Proportion: much less shall I think my self concern'd, for what you shall please to *suppose* (for that, with submission, is all you have done hitherto) any one has *built upon it*, tho' he were ever so opposite to your Lordship in any of the Opinions he should build on it.

In that case, if he should prove troublesome to your Lordship with any Argument pretended to be *built upon my Foundation*, I humbly conceive you have no other Remedy, but to shew either the *Foundation* false, and in that case I confess my self concern'd; or his Deduction from it wrong, and that I shall not be at all concern'd in. But if, instead of this, your Lordship shall find no other way to subvert this Foundation of Certainty, but by saying, *The Enemies of the Christian Faith build on it*, because you suppose one Author *builds on it*; this I fear, my Lord, will very little advantage the Cause you defend, whilst it so visibly strengthens and gives credit to your Adversaries, rather than weakens any Foundation they go upon. For the Unitarians, I imagine, will be apt to smile at such a way of arguing, *viz.* That they go on this Ground, because the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious* goes upon it, or is suppos'd by your Lordship to go upon it: and By-standers will do little less than smile, to find my Book brought into the Socinian Controversy, and the Ground of Certainty laid down in my *Essay* condemn'd, only because that Author is suppos'd by your Lordship to *build upon it*. For this in short is the Case, and this the way your Lordship has used in *answering Objections against the Trinity in point of Reason*. I know your Lordship cannot be suspected of writing booty: but I fear, such a way of arguing in so great a Man as your Lordship, will, in an Age wherein the *Mysteries of Faith* are too much expos'd, give too just an occasion to the *Enemies*, and also to the *Friends, of the Christian Faith*, to suspect that there is a great failure somewhere.

But to pass by that: This I am sure is *personal Matter*, which the World perhaps will think it need not have been troubled with.

Your Defence of your third Answer goes on; and to prove that the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious* *built upon my Foundation*, you tell me, *That my Ground of Certainty is the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas*, as express'd in any Propositions: which are my own words. From hence you urg'd, *That let the Proposition come to us any way, either by human or divine Authority, if our Certainty depend upon this, we can be no more certain, than we have clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas contain'd in it. And from hence the Author of Christianity not Mysterious thought he had reason to reject all Mysteries of Faith, which are contain'd in Propositions, upon my Grounds of Certainty.*

Since this *personal Matter* appears of such weight to your Lordship, that it needs to be farther prosecuted; and you think this your Argument, to prove that that Author *built upon my Foundation*, worth the repeating here again; I am oblig'd to enter again so far into this *personal Matter*, as to examine this Passage, which I formerly pass'd by as of no moment. For it is easy to shew, that what you say visibly proves not that he built upon my Foundation; and next, 'tis evident, that if it were prov'd that he did so; yet this is no Proof that my Method of Certainty is of *dangerous consequence*; which is what was to be defended.

As to the first of these, your Lordship would prove, that the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious* built upon my Ground; and how do you prove it? viz. because he thought he had reason to reject all Mysteries of Faith, which are contain'd in Propositions, upon my Ground. How does it appear, that he rejected them upon my Grounds? Does he any where say so? No! that is not offer'd; there is no need of such an Evidence of matter of Fact, in a case which is only of matter of Fact. But he thought he had reason to reject them upon my Grounds of Certainty. How does it appear that he thought so? Very plainly: Because let the Proposition come to us by human or divine Authority, if our Certainty depend upon the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contain'd in it, we can be no more certain than we have clear Perception of that Agreement. The Consequence, I grant, is good, that if Certainty, i. e. Knowledg, consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, then we can certainly know the Truth of no Proposition further than we perceive that Agreement or Disagreement. But how does it follow from thence, that he thought he had reason upon my Grounds to reject any Proposition, that contain'd a Mystery of Faith; or, as your Lordship expresses it, all Mysteries of Faith which are contain'd in Propositions?

Whether your Lordship by the word *rejecting* accuses him of not knowing, or of not believing some Proposition that contains an Article of Faith; or what he has done or not done, I concern not my self: that which I deny, is the Consequence above-mention'd, which I submit to your Lordship to be prov'd. And when you have prov'd it, and shewn your self to be so familiar with the Thoughts of that Author, as to be able to be positive what he thought, without his telling you; it will remain farther to be prov'd, that because he thought so, therefore he built right upon my Foundation: for otherwise no prejudice will come to my Foundation, by any ill use he made of it; nor will it be made good, that my method or way of Certainty, is of dangerous consequence; which is what your Lordship is here to defend. Methinks your Lordship's Argument here is all one with this: Aristotle's Ground of Certainty (except of first Principles) lies in this, That those things which agree in a third, agree themselves: We can be certain of no Proposition excepting first Principles) coming to us either by divine or human Authority, if our Certainty depend upon this, farther than there is such an Agreement: Therefore the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious* thought he had reason to reject all Mysteries of Faith, which are contain'd in Propositions upon Aristotle's Grounds. This Consequence, as strange as it is, is just the same with what is in your Lordship's repeated Argument against me. For let Aristotle's Ground of Certainty be this that I have named, or what it will, how does it follow, that because my Ground of Certainty is placed in the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, therefore the Author of *Christianity not Mysterious* rejected any Proposition more upon my Grounds than Aristotle's? And will not Aristotle, by your Lordship's way of arguing here, from the use any one may make or think he makes of it, be guilty also of *staring a Method of Certainty of dangerous consequence*, whether his Method be true or false, if that or any other Author whose Writings you dislike, thought he built upon it, or be suppos'd by your Lordship to think so? But, as I humbly conceive, Propositions, speculative Propositions such as mine are, about which all this stir is made, are to be judg'd of by their Truth or Falshood, and not by the use any one shall make of them; much less by the Persons who are suppos'd to build on them. And therefore it may be justly wonder'd, since you say it is dangerous, why you never prov'd or attempted to prove it to be false.

But you complain here again, that I answer'd not a word to this in the proper place. My Lord, if I offended your Lordship by passing it by, because I thought there was no Argument in it; I hope I have now given you some sort of Satisfaction, by shewing there is no Argument in it, and letting you see, that your Consequence here could not be infer'd from your Antecedent. If you think it may, I desire you to try it in a Syllogism. For whatever you are pleas'd to say in another place, my way of Certainty by Ideas will admit of Antecedents P. 120. and Consequents, and of Syllogism, as the proper Form to try whether the Inference be right or no. I shall set down your following words, that the Reader may see your Lordship's manner of Reasoning concerning this matter

in its full Force and Consistency, and try it in a *Syllogism* if he pleases. Your
P. 21. Words are :

By this it evidently appears, that altho' your Lordship was willing to allow me all fair ways of interpreting my own Sense; yet you by no means thought, that my Words were wholly misunderstood or misapply'd by that Author: but rather that he saw into the true Consequence of them, as they lie in my Book. And what answer do I give to this? Not a Word in the proper place for it.

You tell me, you were willing to allow me all fair ways of interpreting my own Sense. If your Lordship had been conscious to your self, that you had herein meant me any kindness, I think I may presume, you would not have minded me here again of a Favour, which you had told me of but in the preceding Page, and to make it an Obligation, need not have been more than once talk'd of; unless your Lordship thought the Obligation was such, that it would hardly be seen, unless I were told of it in words at length, and in more places than one. For what Favour, I beseech you, my Lord, is it to allow me to do that which needed not your Allowance to be done, and I could have done (if it had been necessary) of my self without being blam'd for taking that liberty? Whatsoever therefore your meaning was in these Words, I cannot think you took this way to make me sensible of your Kindness.

Your Lordship says, you were willing to allow me to interpret my own Sense. What you were willing to allow me to do, I have done. My Sense is, that Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas; and my Sense therein I have interpreted to be the Agreement or Disagreement, not only of perfectly clear and distinct Ideas, but such Ideas, as we have, whether they be in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct or no. Farther, in answer to your Objection, that it might be of dangerous Consequence; I so explain'd my Sense, as to shew, that Certainty in that Sense was not, nor could be of dangerous Consequence. This, which was the Point in question between us, your Lordship might have found at large explain'd in the 82d, and ten or twelve following Pages of my second Letter, if you had been pleas'd to have taken notice of them.

But it seems you were more willing to tell me, *That tho' you were willing to allow me all ways of interpreting my own Sense, yet you by no means thought that my Words were wholly misunderstood or misapply'd by that Author, but rather that he saw into the true Consequence of them as they lie in my Book.* I shall here set down your Lordship's Words, where (to give me and others Satisfaction) you say, you took care to prevent being misunderstood, which will best appear by your own Words, viz. *That you must do that right to the ingenious Author of the Essay of Human Understanding, from whom these Notions are borrow'd to serve other purposes than he intended them. It was too plain, that the bold Writer against the Mysteries of our Faith took his Notions and Expressions from thence, and what could be said more for my Vindication, than that he turn'd them to other Purposes than the Author intended them?* This you endeavour to prove, p. 43—46. and then conclude; *By which it is sufficiently prov'd, that you had reason to say, that my Notion was carry'd beyond my Intention.* These Words out of your first Letter, I shall leave here, set by those out of your second, that you may at your leisure, if you think fit (for it will not become me to tell your Lordship that I am willing to allow it) explain your self to the general Satisfaction, that it may be known which of them is now your Sense; for they are, I suppose, too much to be together in any one's Sense at the same time.

My Intention being thus so well vindicated by your Lordship, that you think nothing could be said more for my Vindication, the misunderstanding or not misunderstanding of my Book, by that or any other Author, is what I shall not waste my time about. If your Lordship thinks he saw into the true Consequence of this Position of mine, that Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas (for 'tis from the Inference that you suppose he makes from that my Definition of Knowledge, that you are here proving it to be of dangerous Consequence) he is beholding to your Lordship for your good Opinion of his quick Sight: I take no part in that, one way or other. What Consequences your Lordship's quick Sight (which must be allow'd

low'd to have out-done what you suppose of that Gentleman's) has found and charg'd on that Notion as dangerous, I shall endeavour to give you Satisfaction in.

You farther add, that tho' *I answer'd not a Word in the proper Place*, yet afterwards, Lett. 2. p. 95. (*for you would omit nothing that may seem to help my Cause*) I offer something towards an Answer. P. 21.

I shall be at a loss hereafter, what to do with the 82d and following Pages to the 95th; since what is said in those Pages of my second Letter goes for nothing, because it is not in its proper Place. Tho' if any one will give himself the trouble to look into my second Letter, he will find, that the Argument I was upon in the 46th Page, oblig'd me to defer what I had farther to say to your new Accusation: But that I re-assum'd it in the 82d, and answer'd it in that and the following Pages.

But supposing every Writer had not that Exactness of Method, which shew'd, by the natural and visible Connection of the Parts of his Discourse, that every thing was laid in its proper Place; is it a sufficient Answer, not to take any notice of it? The Reason why I put this Question, is, because if this be a Rule in Controversy, I humbly conceive, I might have pass'd over the greatest part of what your Lordship has said to me, because the Disposition it has under numerical Figures, is so far from giving me a view of the orderly Connection of the Parts of your Discourse, that I have often been tempted to suspect the negligence of the Printer, for misplacing your Lordship's Numbers: since so rank'd as they are, they do to me, who am confounded by them, lose all Order and Connection quite.

The next thing in the Defence, which you go on with, is an Exception to my use of the word *Certainty*. In the Close of the Answer I had made in the Pages you pass over, I add, "That tho' the Laws of Disputation allow bare Denial as a sufficient Answer to Sayings without any offer of a Proof; yet, my Lord, to shew how willing I am to give your Lordship all Satisfaction in what you apprehend may be of dangerous Consequence in my Book, as to that Article, I shall not stand still sullenly, and put your Lordship upon the difficulty of shewing wherein that Danger lies; but shall on the other side endeavour to shew your Lordship, That that Definition of mine, whether True or False, Right or Wrong, can be of no dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith. The Reason which I shall offer for it, is this; because it can be of no Consequence to it at all." And the Reason of it was clear from what I had said before, That *Knowing* and *Believing* were two different Acts of the Mind: And that my placing of *Certainty* in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, i. e. that my Definition of *Knowledge*, one of those Acts of the Mind; would not at all alter or shake the Definition of *Faith*, which was another Act of the Mind distinct from it. And therefore I added, "That the *Certainty of Faith* (if your Lordship thinks fit to call it so) has nothing to do with the *Certainty of Knowledge*. And to talk of the *Certainty of Faith*, seems all one to me, as to talk of the *Knowledge of Believing*; a way of speaking not easy to me to understand." Lett. 2. p. 95.

These and other Words to this Purpose in the following Paragraphs, your Lordship lays hold on, and sets down as liable to no small Exception: tho', as you tell me, the main Strength of my Defence lies in it. Let what Strength you please lie in it, my Defence was strong enough without it. For to your bare saying, my Method of *Certainty* might be of dangerous Consequence to any Article of the Christian Faith, without proving it, it was a Defence strong enough barely to deny, and put you upon shewing wherein that Danger lies; which therefore, this main Strength of my Defence, as you call it, apart, I insist on. P. 23.

But as to your Exception to what I said on this occasion, it consists in this, that there is a *Certainty of Faith*, and therefore you set down my saying, "That to talk of the *Certainty of Faith*, seems all one as to talk of the *Knowledge of Believing*;" as that which shews the Inconsistency of my Notion of Ideas with the Articles of the Christian Faith. These are your Words here, and yet you tell me, That it is not my way of Ideas, but my way of *Certainty by Ideas*, that your Lordship is unsatisfy'd about. What must I do now in the case, when your P. 23. P. 74.

your Words are expressly, that my *Notion of Ideas* have an Inconsistency with the Articles of the Christian Faith? Must I presume that your Lordship means my *Notion of Certainty*? All that I can do, is to search out your meaning the best I can, and then shew where I apprehend it not conclusive. But this Uncertainty, in most places, what you mean, makes me so much work, that a great deal is omitted, and yet my Answer is too long.

P. 23. Your Lordship asks in the next Paragraph, *How comes the Certainty of Faith to be so hard a Point with me?* Answ. I suppose you ask this Question more to give others hard Thoughts of my Opinion of Faith, than to be inform'd your self. For you cannot be ignorant that all along in my *Essay* I use *Certainty* for *Knowledge*; so that for you to ask me, *How comes the Certainty of Faith to become so hard a Point with me?* is the same thing as for you to ask, *How comes the Knowledge of Faith, or if you please, the Knowledge of Believing, to be so hard a Point with me?* A Question which, I suppose, you will think needs no Answer, let your meaning in that doubtful Phrase be what it will.

I us'd in my Book the term *Certainty* for *Knowledge* so generally, that no body that has read my Book, tho' much less attentively than your Lordship, can doubt of it. That I us'd it in that Sense there, I shall refer my Reader
B.4.C.1.§.1. but to two Places amongst many to convince him. This, I am sure, your
& C.11. §.9. Lordship could not be ignorant of, that by *Certainty* I mean *Knowledge*, since I have so us'd it in my Letters to you, Instances whereof are not a few; some
Lett.1.p.81, of them may be found in the Places mark'd in the Margent: And in my second
82, 107, 111, Letter, what I say in the Leaf immediately preceding that which you
115, 118, 131, quote upon this Occasion, would have put it past a Possibility for any one to
138, 158, 171, make shew of a doubt of it, had not that been amongst those Pages of my
185. Answer, which for its being out of its proper Place, it seems you were resolv'd not to take notice of; and therefore I hope it will not be besides my purpose here to mind you of it again.

After having said something to shew why I us'd *Certainty* and *Knowledge* for the same thing, I added, "That your Lordship could not but take notice of
Lett.2.p.93. this in the 18th Sect. of Chap. 4. of my 4th Book, it being a Passage you had
"quoted, and runs thus; Wherever we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our *Ideas*, there is certain *Knowledge*; and wherever we
"are sure those *Ideas* agree with the Reality of things, there is certain real
"Knowledge: of which having given the Marks, I think I have shewn where-
"in *Certainty* real *Certainty*, consists." And I farther add, in the immediately
P. 94. following Words; "That my Definition of *Knowledge*, in the beginning of
"the 4th Book of my *Essay*, stands thus: *Knowledge* seems to be nothing but
"the Perception of the Connection, and Agreement or Disagreement, and
"Repugnancy of any of our *Ideas*." Which is the very Definition of *Certainty*,
that your Lordship is here contesting.

Since then you could not but know that in this Discourse, *Certainty* with me stood for, or was the same thing with *Knowledge*; may not one justly wonder how you come to ask me such a Question as this, *How comes the Knowledge of Believing to become so hard a Point with me?* For that was in effect the Question that you ask'd, when you put in the term *Certainty*, since you knew as undoubtedly that I meant *Knowledge* by *Certainty*, as that I meant *Believing* by *Faith*; i. e. you could doubt of neither. And that you did not doubt of it, is plain from what you say in the next Page, where you endeavour to prove this an improper way of speaking.

Whether it be a proper way of speaking, I allow to be a fair Question. But when you knew what I meant, tho' I express'd it improperly, to put Questions in a Word of mine, us'd in a Sense different from mine, which could not but be apt to insinuate to the Reader, that my *Notion of Certainty* derogated from the *ὑπερβολικὴ* or full Assurance of Faith, as the Scripture calls it; is what, I guess, in another, would make your Lordship ask again, *Is this fair and ingenuous Dealing?*

Heb. 10. 22. My Lord, by Bible expresses the highest Degree of Faith, which the Apostle recommended to Believers in his time by full Assurance. But Assurance of Faith, tho' it be what Assurance soever, will by no means down with your Lordship in

P. 26. my Writing. You say, I allow Assurance of Faith; God forbid I should do otherwise:

otherwise: but then you ask, *Why not Certainty as well as Assurance?* My Lord, I think it may be a Reason not misbecoming a poor Lay-man, and such as he might presume would satisfy a Bishop of the Church of *England*, that he found his Bible to speak so. I find my Bible speaks of the *Assurance of Faith*, but no where, that I can remember, of the *Certainty of Faith*, tho' in many Places it speaks of the *Certainty of Knowledge*, and therefore I speak so too; and shall not, I think, be condemn'd for keeping close to the Expressions of our Bible, tho' the Scripture-Language, as it is, does not so well serve your Lordship's turn in the present Case. When I shall see in an authentick Translation of our Bible, the Phrase chang'd, it will then be time enough for me to change it too, and call it not the *Assurance*, but *Certainty of Faith*: But till then, I shall not be asham'd of it, notwithstanding you reproach me with it, by terming it, The Assurance of Faith, *as I call it*; when you might as well P. 31. have term'd it, The Assurance of Faith, *as our Bibles calls it*.

It being plain, that by *Certainty* I meant Knowledge, and by *Faith* the Act of Believing; that these Words where you ask, *How comes the Certainty of Faith so hard a Point with me?* and where you tell me, *I will allow no Certainty of Faith*; may make no wrong Impression in mens Minds, who may be apt to understand them of the Object, and not merely of the Act of Believing: I crave leave to say with Mr. *Chillingworth*, "That I do heartily acknowledg and C. 6. §. 3. believe the Articles of our Faith, to be in themselves Truths as certain and infallible, as the very common Principles of Geometry or Metaphysicks. But that there is not requir'd of us a Knowledge of them, and an Adherence to them, as certain as that of Sense or Science." And that for this Reason (amongst others given both by Mr. *Chillingworth* and Mr. *Hooker*) viz. "That Faith is not Knowledge, no more than three is four, but eminently contain'd in it: So that he that knows, believes, and something more; but he that believes, many times does not; nay, if he doth barely and merely believe, he doth never know." These are Mr. *Chillingworth's* own Words.

That this Assurance of Faith may approach very near to Certainty, and not come short of it in a sure and steady Influence on the Mind, I have so plainly declar'd, that no body, I think, can question it. In my Chapter of Reason, which has receiv'd the Honour of your Lordship's Animadversions, I say of some Propositions wherein Knowledge [*i. e.* in my sense, Certainty] fails us, "That their Probability is so clear and strong, that Assent as necessarily follows it, as Knowledge does Demonstration." Does your Lordship ascribe any greater Certainty than this to an Article of mere Faith? If you do not, we are it seems agreed in the thing; and so all that you have so emphatically said about it, is but to correct a Mistake of mine in the *English* Tongue, if it prove to be one: A weighty Point, and well worth your Lordship's bestowing so many Pages upon! I say mere Faith, because tho' a Man may be a Christian, who merely believes that there is a God; yet that is not an Article of mere Faith, because it may be demonstrated that there is a God, and so may certainly be known.

Your Lordship goes on to ask, *Have not all Mankind, who have talk'd of Matters of Faith, allow'd a Certainty of Faith as well as a Certainty of Knowledge?* To answer a Question concerning what all Mankind, who have talk'd of Faith, have done, may be within the reach of your great Learning: As for me, my Reading reaches not so far. The Apostles and the Evangelists, I can answer, have talk'd of Matters of Faith, but I do not find in my Bible that they have any where spoke (for 'tis of speaking here the Question is) of the Certainty of Faith; and what they allow, which they do not speak of, I cannot tell. I say, in my Bible, meaning the *English* Translation us'd in our Church: tho' what all Mankind, who speak not of Faith in *English*, can do towards the deciding of this Question, I do not see; it being about the Signification of an *English* Word. And whether in Propriety of Speech it can be apply'd to Faith, can only be decided by those who understand *English*, which all Mankind, who have talk'd of Matters of Faith, I humbly conceive, did not.

To prove that Certainty in *English* may be apply'd to Faith, you say, *That among the Romans it was oppos'd to doubting*; and for that you bring this Latin Sentence,

Sentence, *Nil tam certum est quam quod de dubio certum*. Answ. *Certum*, among the Romans, might be oppos'd to doubting, and yet not be apply'd to Faith, because Knowledge, as well as Believing, is oppos'd to doubting: and therefore unless it had pleas'd your Lordship to have quoted the Author out of which this Latin Sentence is taken, one cannot tell whether *Certum* be not in it spoken of a thing known, and not of a thing believ'd: tho' if it were so, I humbly conceive, it would not prove what you say, viz. That it, i. e. the word *Certainty* (for to that it must refer here, or to nothing that I understand) was among the Romans apply'd to Faith; for as I take it, they never used the English word *Certainty*: and tho' it be true, that the English word *Certainty* be taken from the Latin word *Certus*; yet that therefore *Certainty* in English is used exactly in the same sense that *Certus* is in Latin, that I think you will not say; for then *Certainty* in English must signify Purpose and Resolution of Mind, for to that *Certus* is apply'd in Latin.

P. 24. You are pleas'd here to tell me, *That in my former Letter I said, 'That if we knew the Original of Words, we should be much help'd to the Ideas they were first apply'd to, and made to stand for.'* I grant it true, nor shall I unsay it here. For I said not, that a Word that had its Original in one Language, kept always exactly the same Signification in another Language, into which it was from thence transplanted. But if you will give me leave to remind you of it, I remember that you, my Lord, say in the same place, *That little weight is to be laid upon a bare Grammatical Etymology, when a Word is used in another sense by the best Authors.* And I think you could not have brought a more proper instance to verify that Saying, than that which you produce here.

Vindic. p. 237.

But pray, my Lord, why so far about? Why are we sent to the antient Romans? Why must we consult (which is no easy task) all Mankind, who have talk'd of Faith, to know whether *Certainty* be properly used for Faith or no; when to determine it between your Lordship and me, there is so sure a Remedy, and so near at hand? It is but for you to say wherein *Certainty* consists. This, when I gently offer'd to your Lordship in my first Letter, you interpreted it to be a design to draw you out of your way.

Ans. 1. p. 69.

I am sorry, my Lord, you should think it out of your way to put an end, a short end to a Controversy, which you think of such moment: Methinks it should not be out of your way, with one blow finally to overthrow an Assertion, which you think to be of dangerous consequence to that Article of Faith, which your Lordship has endeavour'd to defend. I propos'd the same again, where I say, "For this there is a very easy Remedy: It is but for your Lordship to set aside this Definition of Knowledge, by giving us a better, and this danger is over. But you chuse rather to have a Controversy with my Book, for having it in it, and to put me upon the Defence of it." This is so express, that your taking no notice of it, puts me at a loss what to think. To say that a Man so great in Letters does not know wherein *Certainty* consists, is a greater Presumption than I will be guilty of; and yet to think that you do know and will not tell, is yet harder. Who can think, or will dare to say, That your Lordship, so much concern'd for the Articles of Faith, and engag'd in this Dispute with me, by your Duty, for the preservation of them, should chuse to keep up a Controversy with me, rather than remove that danger, which my wrong Notion of *Certainty* threatens to the Articles of Faith? For, my Lord, since the Question is mov'd, and it is brought by your Lordship to a publick Dispute, wherein *Certainty* consists, a great many knowing no better, may take up with what I have said; and rather than have no Notion of *Certainty* at all, will stick by mine, till a better be shew'd them. And if mine tends to Scepticism, as you say; and you will not furnish them with one that does not, what is it but to give way to Scepticism, and let it quietly prevail on Men, as either having my Notion of *Certainty*, or none at all? Your Lordship indeed says something in excuse in your 75th Page; which, that my Answer may be in the proper place, shall be consider'd when we come there.

Lett. 2. p. 94.

P. 25. Your Lordship declares, *That you are utterly against any private Mints of Words.* I know not what the Publick may do for your particular Satisfaction in the Case; but till publick Mints of Words are erected, I know no Remedy for it, but that you must patiently suffer this matter to go on in the same course, that

that I think it has gone in ever since Language has been in use. Here in this Island, as far as my Knowledge reaches, I do not find, that ever since the Saxons time, in all the Alterations that have been made in our Language, that any one Word or Phrase has had its Authority from the Great Seal, or pass'd by Act of Parliament.

When the dazzling Metaphor of the *Mint* and *new mill'd Words*, &c. (which mightily, as it seems, delighted your Lordship when you were writing that Paragraph) will give you leave to consider this matter plainly as it is, you will find, that the coining of Money in publickly authoriz'd *Mints*, affords no manner of Argument against private Mens meddling in the introducing new, or changing the Signification of old *Words*; every one of which Alterations always has its rise from some *private Mint*. The Case in short is this; Money, by Virtue of the Stamp receiv'd in the publick *Mint*, which vouches its intrinsic Worth, has Authority to pass. This Use of the publick Stamp would be lost, if private Men were suffer'd to offer Money stamp'd by themselves. On the contrary, Words are offer'd to the Publick by every *private Man*, coin'd in his *private Mint*, as he pleases; but 'tis the receiving of them by others, their very passing, that gives them their Authority and Currency, and not the *Mint* they come out of. *Horace*, I think, has given a true account of this matter, in a Country very jealous of any Usurpation upon the publick Authority :

De Arte
Poet.

*Multa renascentur quæ jam cecidere, cadentque
Quæ nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus,
Quem penes arbitrium est & jus & norma loquendi.*

But yet whatever change is made in the Signification or Credit of any Word by publick use, this change has always its beginning in some *private Mint*; so *Horace* tells us it was in the *Roman Language* quite down to his time :

*—Ego cur acquirere pauca
Si possum inuideor? quum lingua Catonis & Enni
Sermonem patrium ditaverit, & nova rerum
Nomina protulerit? Licuit semperque licebit
Signatum præsentè nota procudere nomen.*

Here we see *Horace* expressly says, That *private Mints of Words* were always licens'd; and, with *Horace*, I humbly conceive so they will always continue, how utterly soever your Lordship may be against them. And therefore he that offers to the Publick *new mill'd Words* from his own *private Mint*, is not always in that so bold an Invader of the publick Authority, as you would make him.

This I say not to excuse my self in the present Case; for I deny, that I have at all chang'd the Signification of the word *Certainty*. And therefore, if you had pleas'd you might, my Lord, have spar'd your saying on this occasion, That it seems our old *Words* must not now pass in the current sense; and those *Persons* assume too much Authority to themselves, who will not suffer common *Words* to pass in their general Acceptation: and other things to the same purpose in this Paragraph, till you had prov'd that in strict Propriety of Speech it could be said, That a Man was certain of that which he did not know, but only believ'd.

P. 24, 25.

If you had had time, in the heat of Dispute, to have made a little Reflection on the use of the *English* word *Certainty* in strict speaking, perhaps your Lordship would not have been so forward to have made my using it only for precise Knowledge, so enormous an Impropriety; at least you would not have accus'd it of weakening the Credibility of any Article of Faith.

'Tis true indeed, People commonly say, they are certain of what they barely believe, without doubting. But 'tis as true, that they as commonly say that they know it too. But no body from thence concludes, that *Believing* is *Knowing*. As little can they conclude from the like vulgar way of speaking, that *Believing* is *Certainty*. All that is meant thereby, is no more but this, that the full Assurance of their Faith as steddily determines their Assent to the embracing of that Truth, as if they actually knew it.

But however such Phrases as these are used to shew the Steadiness and Assurance

- of their Faith, who thus speak; yet they alter not the Propriety of our Language, which I think appropriates *Certainty* only to *Knowledge*, when in strict and philosophical Discourse it is, upon that account, contra-distinguish'd to *Faith*; as in this
- P. 115. case here your Lordship knows it is: whereof there is an express Evidence in my first Letter, where I say, "That I speak of *Belief*, and your Lordship of *Certainty*; and that I meant *Belief*, and not *Certainty*." And that I made not an improper nor unjustifiable use of the word *Certainty*, in contra-distinguishing it thus to *Faith*, I think I have an unquestionable Authority in the learned and cautious Dr. Cudworth, who so uses it: What Essence, says he, is to Generation, the same is *Certainty* of Truth or Knowledge to *Faith*, pag. 455.
- P. 25. Your Lordship says, *Certainty* is common to both *Knowledge* and *Faith*, unless I think it impossible to be certain upon any Testimony whatsoever. I think it is possible to be certain upon the Testimony of God (for that, I suppose, you mean) where I know that it is the Testimony of God; because in such a case, that Testimony is capable not only to make me believe, but, if I consider it right, to make me know the thing to be so; and so I may be certain. For the Veracity of God is as capable of making me know a Proposition to be true, as any other way of Proof can be; and therefore I do not in such a case barely believe, but know such a Proposition to be true, and attain *Certainty*.
- P. 26. The Sum of your Accusation is drawn up thus: *That I have appropriated Certainty to the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas in any Proposition, and now I find this will not hold as to Articles of Faith, and therefore I will allow no Certainty of Faith; which you think is not for the advantage of my Cause.* The truth of the matter of Fact is in short this; That I have placed Knowledge in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*. This Definition of Knowledge, your Lordship said, might be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith, which you have endeavour'd to defend. This I deny'd, and gave this reason for it, viz.
- Lett. 2. p 94. —98. That a Definition of Knowledge, whether a good or bad, true or false Definition, could not be of ill or any Consequence to an Article of Faith: because a Definition of Knowledge, which was one Act of the Mind, did not at all concern Faith, which was another Act of the Mind quite distinct from it. To this then, which was the Proposition in question between us, your Lordship, I humbly conceive, should have answer'd. But instead of that, your Lordship, by the use of the word *Certainty* in a sense that I used it not, (for you knew I used it only for Knowledge) would represent me as having strange Notions of Faith. Whether this be for the advantage of your Cause, your Lordship will do well to consider.
- P. 27—31. Upon such a use of the word *Certainty* in a different Sense from what I use it in, the force of all your Lordship says under your first Head, contain'd in the two or three next Paragraphs, depends, as I think; for I must own (pardon my Dulness) that I do not clearly comprehend the Force of what your Lordship there says: And it will take up too many Pages, to examine it Period by Period. In short therefore, I take your Lordship's meaning to be this:
- P. 27, 28. That there are some Articles of Faith, viz. *The fundamental Principles of natural Religion, which Mankind may attain to a Certainty in by Reason without Revelation; which, because a Man that proceeds upon my Grounds cannot attain to a Certainty in by Reason, their Credibility to him, when they are consider'd as purely Matters of Faith, will be weaken'd.* Those which your Lordship instances in, are the Being of a God, Providence, and the Rewards and Punishments of a future State.
- This is the way, as I humbly conceive, your Lordship takes here to prove my Grounds of *Certainty* (for so you call my Definition of Knowledge) to be of dangerous consequence to the Articles of Faith.
- To avoid Ambiguity and Confusion in the examining this Argument of your Lordship's, the best way, I humbly conceive, will be to lay-by the term *Certainty*; which your Lordship and I using in different Senses, is the less fit to make what we say to one another clearly understood; and instead thereof, to use the term *Knowledge*, which with me, your Lordship knows, is equivalent.
- Your Lordship's Proposition then, as far as it has any opposition to me, is this, That if Knowledge be suppos'd to consist in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, a Man cannot attain to the Knowledge that these Propositions, viz. *That there is a God, a Providence, and Rewards and Punishments in a future State*, are true; and therefore the Credibility of these Articles, consider'd purely as matters of Faith, will be weaken'd to him. Wherein there are these things to be prov'd by your Lordship.
1. That

1. That upon my Grounds of Knowledge, *i. e.* upon a Supposition that Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, we cannot attain to the Knowledge of the Truth of either of those Propositions, *viz.* *That there is a God, Providence, and Rewards and Punishments in a future State.*

2. Your Lordship is to prove, That the not knowing the Truth of any Proposition, lessens the Credibility of it; which, in short, amounts to this, That want of Knowledge lessens Faith in any Proposition propos'd. This is the Proposition to be prov'd, if your Lordship uses *Certainty* in the sense I use it, *i. e.* for Knowledge; in which only use of it, will it here bear upon me.

But since I find your Lordship, in these two or three Paragraphs, to use the word *Certainty* in so uncertain a sense, as sometimes to signify *Knowledge* by it, and sometimes *Believing* in general, *i. e.* any degree of believing; give me leave to add, that if your Lordship means by these words, *Let us suppose a Person by P. 27. natural Reason to attain to a Certainty as to the Being of a God, &c. i. e. attain to a Belief that there is a God, &c. or the Soul's Immortality:* I say, if you take *Certainty* in such a sense, then it will be incumbent upon your Lordship to prove, That if a Man finds the natural Reason whereupon he entertain'd the Belief of a God, or of the Immortality of the Soul, *uncertain*, that will weaken the *Credibility* of those fundamental Articles, as *Matters of Faith*: or which is in effect the same, That the Weakness of the *Credibility* of any Article of Faith from Reason, weakens the *Credibility* of it from Revelation. For 'tis this which these following words of your's import: *For before, there was a natural Credibility in them P. 28. on the account of Reason; but by going on wrong Grounds of Certainty, all that is lost.*

To prove the first of these Propositions, *viz.* That upon the Supposition that Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, we cannot attain to the Knowledge of the Truth of this Proposition, *That there is a God*; your Lordship urges, that I have said, *That no Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self*: which Argument reduc'd to form, will stand thus; If it be true, as I say, that no *Idea* proves the Existence of the thing without it self, then upon the Supposition that Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, we cannot attain to the Knowledge of the Truth of this Proposition, *That there is a God*: which Argument so manifestly proves not, that there needs no more to be said to it, than to desire that Consequence to be prov'd.

Again, as to the Immortality of the Soul, your Lordship urges, that I have said, that I cannot know but that *Matter may think*; therefore upon my Ground P. 28. of Knowledge, *i. e.* upon a Supposition that Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, there is an end of the Soul's Immortality. This Consequence I must also desire your Lordship to prove. Only I crave leave by the bye to point out some things in these Paragraphs, too remarkable to be pass'd over without any notice.

One is, That you *suppose a Man is made certain upon my general Grounds of Cer-* P. 28. *tainty, i. e.* knows by the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, that there is a God; and yet upon a farther Examination of my Method, he finds that the way of *Ideas* will not do. Here, my Lord, if by my Grounds of Certainty, my Method, and my way of *Ideas*, you mean one and the same thing; then your words will have a consistency, and tend to the same Point. But then I must beg your Lordship to consider, that your Supposition carries a Contradiction in it, *viz.* That your Lordship supposes, that by my Grounds, my Method, and my Way of Certainty, a Man is made *certain*, and not *made certain*, that there is a God. If your Lordship means here by my Grounds of Certainty, my Method, and my way of *Ideas*, different things, (as it seems to me you do) then, whatever your Lordship may suppose here, it makes nothing to the Point in hand; which is to shew, that by this my Ground of Certainty, *viz.* That Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*; a Man first attains to a Knowledge that there is a God, and afterwards 'by the same Grounds of Certainty he comes to lose the Knowledge that there is a God; which to me seems little less than a Contradiction.

'Tis likely your Lordship will say you mean no such thing; for you alledg this Proposition, *That no Idea proves the Existence of any thing without it self*, and give

that as an Instance that *my way of Ideas will not do, i.e.* will not prove the Being of a God. 'Tis true, your Lordship does so. But withal, my Lord, 'tis as true, that this Proposition, supposing it to be mine, (for it is not here set down in my words) contains not my *Method, or Way, or Notion of Certainty*; tho' 'tis in that sense alone, that it can here be useful to your Lordship to call it my *Method, or the Way by Ideas*.

Your Lordship undertakes to shew, That my defining Knowledge to consist in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas, weakens the Credibility of this fundamental Article of Faith, That there is a God*: What is your Lordship's proof of it? Just this: The saying that *no Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self*, will not do; *Ergo*, the saying that Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas, weakens the Credibility of this fundamental Article*. This, my Lord, seems to me no Proof; and all that I can find, that is offer'd to make it a Proof, is only your calling these Propositions my *general Grounds of Certainty, my Method of Proceeding, the Way of Ideas, and my own Principles in point of Reason*; as if that made these two Propositions the same thing, and whatsoever were a Consequence of one, may be charg'd as a Consequence of the other: tho' it be visible, that tho' the latter of these be ever so false, or ever so far from being a Proof of a God, yet it will by no means thence follow, that the former of them, *viz.* That Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas, weakens the Credibility of that fundamental Article*. But 'tis but for your Lordship to call them both *the way of Ideas*, and that is enough.

That I may not be accus'd by your Lordship for *unfair or disingenuous Dealing, for representing this matter so*; I shall here set down your Lordship's words at P. 27. large: *Let us now suppose a Person by natural Reason to attain to a Certainty, as to the Being of God, and Immortality of the Soul; and he proceeds upon J. L.'s general Grounds of Certainty, from the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas: and so from the Ideas of God and the Soul, he is made certain of these two Points before mention'd. But let us again suppose that such a Person, upon a farther Examination of J. L.'s method of proceeding, finds that the way of Ideas in these cases will not do: for no Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self, no more than the Picture of a Man proves his Being, or the Visions of a Dream make a true History; (which are J. L.'s own Expressions. And for the Soul he cannot be certain, but that Matter may think, (as J. L. affirms) and then what becomes of the Soul's Immateriality (and consequently Immortality) from its Operations? But for all this, says J. L. his Assurance of Faith remains firm on its own Basis. Now you appeal to any Man of Sense; whether the finding the Uncertainty of his own Principles, which he went upon in point of Reason, doth not weaken the Credibility of these fundamental Articles, when they are consider'd purely as Matters of Faith? For before, there was a natural Credibility in them on the account of Reason; but by going on wrong Grounds of Certainty, all that is lost; and instead of being certain, he is more doubtful than ever. These are your Lordship's own words; and now I appeal to any Man of Sense, whether they contain any other Argument against my placing of Certainty as I do, but this, *viz.* A Man mistakes and thinks that this Proposition, *No Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self*, shews that in the way of Ideas one cannot prove a God; *Ergo*, this Proposition, *Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, weakens the Credibility of this fundamental Article, That there is a God*. And so of the Immortality of the Soul; because I say, I know not but Matter may think: your Lordship would infer, *Ergo*, my Definition of Certainty weakens the Credibility of the Revelation of the Soul's Immortality.*

Your Lordship is pleas'd here to call this Proposition, "That Knowledge or Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas," my *general Grounds of Certainty*; as if I had some more particular Grounds of Certainty. Whereas I have no other Ground or Notion of Certainty, but this one alone; all my Notion of Certainty is contain'd in that one particular Proposition: but perhaps your Lordship did it, that you might make the Proposition above-quoted, *viz.* "No Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self, under the title you give it of the way of Ideas, pass for one of my particular Grounds of Certainty;" whereas it is no more any Ground of

of Certainty of mine, or Definition of Knowledge, than any other Proposition in my Book.

Another thing very remarkable in what your Lordship here says, is, That you make the failing to attain Knowledge by any way of Certainty in some particular Instances, to be the *finding the Uncertainty* of the way it self; which is all one as to say, That if a Man misses by *Algebra*, the certain Knowledge of some Propositions in Mathematicks, therefore he finds the Way or Principles of *Algebra* to be uncertain or false. This is your Lordship's way of reasoning here: Your Lordship quotes out of me, "That I say no *Idea* proves the Existence of the thing without it self;" and that I say, "That one cannot be certain that Matter cannot think:" from whence your Lordship argues, That he who says so, cannot attain to Certainty that there is a God, or that the Soul is immortal; and thereupon your Lordship concludes, *He finds the Uncertainty of the Principles he went upon, in point of Reason, i. e. that he finds this Principle or Ground of Certainty he went upon in reasoning, viz. That Certainty or Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, to be uncertain.* For if your Lordship means here, by *Principles he went upon in point of Reason*, any thing else but that Definition of Knowledge, which your Lordship calls my *Way, Method, Grounds, &c. of Certainty*, which I and others, to the endangering some Articles of Faith, go upon; I crave leave to say, it concerns nothing at all the Argument your Lordship is upon, which is to prove, That the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas may be of dangerous Consequence to any Article of Faith. P. 28.

Your Lordship, in the next place says, *Before we can believe any thing upon the account of Revelation, we must suppose there is a God.* What use does your Lordship make of this? Your Lordship thus argues; But by my way of Certainty, a Man is made uncertain whether there be a God or no: for that to me is the meaning of those Words, *How can his Faith stand firm as to Divine Revelation, when he is made uncertain by his own way, whether there be a God or no?* or they can to me mean nothing to the Question in hand. What is the Conclusion from hence? This it must be, or nothing to the purpose; Ergo, my Definition of Knowledge, or, which is the same thing, my placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, leaves not the Articles of Faith the same Credibility they had before. P. 29, 30.

To excuse my Dulness in not being able to comprehend this Consequence, pray, my Lord, consider, that your Lordship says; *Before we can believe any thing upon the account of Revelation, it must be suppos'd that there is a God.* But cannot he, who places Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement and Disagreement of Ideas, suppose there is a God? Ibid.

But your Lordship means by *suppose*, that one must be certain that there is a God. Let it be so, and let it be your Lordship's Privilege in Controversy to use one Word for another, tho' of a different Signification, as I think to *suppose* and be *certain* are. Cannot one that places Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, be certain there is a God? I can assure you, my Lord, I am certain there is a God; and yet I own, That I place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas: Nay, I dare venture to say to your Lordship, That I have prov'd there is a God, and see no Inconsistency at all between these two Propositions, That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas; and that it is certain there is a God. So that this my Notion of Certainty, this Definition of Knowledge, for any thing your Lordship has said to the contrary, leaves to this fundamental Article the same Credibility, and the same Certainty it had before.

Your Lordship says farther, *To suppose Divine Revelation, we must be certain that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World.* Here again, my Lord, your way of writing makes work for my Ignorance; and before I can either admit or deny this Proposition, or judg what Force it has to prove the Proposition in question, I must distinguish it into these different Senses, which I think your Lordship's way of speaking may comprehend. For your Lordship may mean it thus; *To suppose Divine Revelation, we must be certain,* i. e.

i. e. we must believe that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World. Or your Lordship may mean thus *We must be certain*, *i. e.* we must know that there is something above Matter or Motion in the World. In the next place, your Lordship may mean by something above Matter and Motion, either simply an intelligent Being; for Knowledge, without determining what Being it is in, is a Principle above Matter and Motion: Or your Lordship may mean an immaterial intelligent Being. So that this undetermin'd way of expressing, includes at least four distinct Propositions, whereof some are true, and others not so. For,

1. My Lord, if your Lordship means, *That to suppose a Divine Revelation, a Man must be certain*, *i. e.* must certainly know that there is an intelligent Being in the World, and that that intelligent Being is immaterial from whence that Revelation comes; I deny it. For a Man may suppose Revelation upon the belief of an intelligent Being from whence it comes, without being able to make out to himself, by a scientific Reasoning, that there is such a Being. A Proof whereof, I humbly conceive, are the *Anthropomorphites* among the Christians heretofore, who nevertheless rejected not the Revelation of the New Testament: and he that will talk with illiterate People in this Age, will, I doubt not, find many who believe the Bible to be the Word of God, tho' they imagine God himself in the Shape of an old Man sitting in Heaven; which they could not do, if they knew, *i. e.* had examin'd and understood any Demonstration whereby he is prov'd to be immaterial, without which they cannot know it.

2. If your Lordship means, *That to suppose a Divine Revelation, it is necessary to know, that there is simply an intelligent Being*; this also I deny. For *to suppose a Divine Revelation*, is not necessary that a Man should know that there is such an intelligent Being in the World: I say, know, *i. e.* from things, that he does know, demonstratively deduce the Proof of such a Being: it is enough for the receiving Divine Revelation, to believe that there is such a Being, without having by Demonstration attain'd to the Knowledge that there is a God. Every one that believes right, does not always reason exactly, especially in abstract metaphysical Speculations: and if no body can believe the Bible to be of Divine Revelation, but he that clearly comprehends the whole Deduction, and sees the Evidence of the Demonstration, wherein the Existence of an Intelligent Being, on whose Will all other Beings depend, is scientifically prov'd; there are, I fear, but few Christians among illiterate People, to look no farther. He that believes there is a God, tho' he does no more than believe it, and has not attain'd to the Certainty of Knowledge, *i. e.* does not see the evident Demonstration of it, has Ground enough to admit of Divine Revelation. The Apostle tells us, *That he that will come to God, must believe that he is*; but I do not remember the Scripture any where says, *That he must know that he is*.

3. In the next place, if your Lordship means, *That to suppose Divine Revelation, a Man must be certain*, *i. e.* explicitly believe, that there is a perfectly immaterial Being; I shall leave it to your Lordship's Consideration, whether it may not be Ground enough for the Supposition of Revelation, to believe that there is an all-knowing unerring Being, who can neither deceive nor be deceiv'd, without a Man's precisely determining in his Thoughts, whether that unerring omniscient Being be immaterial or no. 'Tis past all doubt, that every one that examines and reasons right, may come to a Certainty, that God is perfectly immaterial. But it may be a Question, whether every one, who believes a Revelation to be from God, may have enter'd into the Disquisition of the Immateriality of his Being: Whether, I say, every ignorant Day-labourer, who believes the Bible to be the Word of God, has in his Mind consider'd Materiality and Immateriality, and does explicitly believe God to be Immaterial, I shall leave to your Lordship to determine, if you think fit, more expressly than your Words do here.

4. If your Lordship means, *That to suppose a Divine Revelation, a Man must be certain*, *i. e.* believe that there is a supreme intelligent Being, from whence it comes, who can neither deceive nor be deceiv'd; I grant it to be true.

These

These being the several Propositions, either of which may be meant in your Lordship's so general, and to me doubtful, way of expressing your self; to avoid the length, which a particular Answer to each of them would run me into, I will venture (and it is a venture to answer to an ambiguous Proposition in one Sense, when the Author has the liberty of saying he meant it in another; a great Convenience of general, loose, and doubtful Expressions) I will, I say, venture to answer to it in the Sense I guess most suited to your Lordship's purpose; and see what your Lordship proves by it. I will therefore suppose your Lordship's Reasoning to be this; That,

To suppose Divine Revelation, a Man must be certain, i. e. believe that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion, i. e. an immaterial intelligent Being in the World. Let it be so; what does your Lordship infer? *Therefore upon the Principle of Certainty by Ideas, he [i. e. he that places Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas] cannot be certain of [i. e. believe] this.* This Consequence seems a little strange, but your Lordship proves it thus; *Because he does not know but Matter may think:* Which Argument, put into form, will stand thus;

If one who places Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, does not know but Matter may think; then whoever places Certainty so, cannot believe there is an immaterial intelligent Being in the World.

But there is one who, placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, does not know but Matter may think:

Ergo, Whoever places Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, cannot believe that there is an intelligent immaterial Being.

This Argumentation is so defective in every part of it, that for fear I should be thought to make an Argument for your Lordship in requital for the Answer your Lordship made for me, I must desire the Reader to consider, your Lordship says, *We must be certain; He cannot be certain, because he doth not know:* which in short is, *He cannot because he cannot; and he cannot because he doth not.* This consider'd, will justify the Syllogism I have made to contain your Lordship's Argument in its full Force.

I come therefore to the Syllogism it self, and there first I deny the Minor, which is this:

There is one who, placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, doth not know but Matter may think.

I begin with this, because this is the Foundation of all your Lordship's Argument; and therefore I desire your Lordship would produce any one, who, placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, does not know but Matter may think.

The Reason why I press this, is, because, I suppose, your Lordship means me here, and would have it thought that I say, I do not know but that Matter may think: But that I do not say so; nor any thing else from whence may be infer'd what your Lordship adds in the annex'd Words, if they can be infer'd from it; *And consequently all Revelation may be nothing but the Effects of an exalted Fancy, or the Heats of a disorder'd Imagination, as Spinoza affirm'd.*

On the contrary, I do say, "It is impossible to conceive that Matter, either with or without Motion, could have originally in and from it self Perception and Knowledge". And having in that Chapter establish'd this Truth, That there is an eternal, immaterial, knowing Being; I think no body but your Lordship could have imputed to me the doubting, that there was such a Being, because I say in another place, and to another purpose, "It is impossible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Ideas, without Revelation, to discover, whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter, fitly dispos'd, a Power to perceive and think, or else join'd and fix'd to Matter, so dispos'd, a thinking immaterial Substance: It being in respect of our Notions not much more remote from our Comprehensions to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, superadd to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should superadd to it another Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking." From my saying thus, That God, (whom I have

have prov'd to be an immaterial Being) by his Omnipotency, may, for ought we know, superadd to some Parts of Matter a Faculty of Thinking, it requires some Skill for any one to represent me as your Lordship does here, as one ignorant or doubtful whether *Matter may not think*; to that degree, that I am not certain, or I do not believe *that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World*, and consequently all Revelation may be nothing but the Effects of an exalted Fancy, or the Heats of a disorder'd Imagination, as Spinoza affirm'd. For thus I, or some body else (whom I desire your Lordship to produce) stands painted in this your Lordship's Argument from the *Supposition of a Divine Revelation*; which your Lordship brings here to prove, that the defining of Knowledge, as I do, to consist in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, *weakens the Credibility of the Articles of the Christian Faith*.

But if your Lordship thinks it so dangerous a Position to say, "It is not much harder for us to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, superadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should superadd to it another Substance with a Faculty of Thinking;" (which is the utmost I have said concerning the Faculty of Thinking in Matter :) I humbly conceive it would be more to your purpose to prove, That the infinite omnipotent Creator of all things, out of nothing, cannot, if he pleases, superadd to some Parcels of Matter, dispos'd as he sees fit, a Faculty of Thinking, which the rest of Matter has not; rather than to represent me, with that Candour your Lordship does, as one, who so far makes Matter a thinking thing, as thereby to question the Being of a *Principle above Matter and Motion in the World*, and consequently to take away all Revelation: which how natural and genuine a Representation it is of my Sense, express'd in the Passages of my *Essay*, which I have above set down, I humbly submit to the Reader's Judgment and your Lordship's Zeal for Truth to determine; and shall not stay to examine whether Man may not have an exalted Fancy, and the Heats of a disorder'd Imagination, equally overthrowing Divine Revelation, tho' the power of Thinking be plac'd only in an immaterial Substance.

I come now to the Sequel of your Major, which is this:

If any one who places Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, does not know but Matter may think; then whoever places Certainty so, cannot believe there is an immaterial intelligent Being in the World.

The Consequence here is from *does not* to *cannot*, which I cannot but wonder to find in an Argument of your Lordship's. For he that *does not* to day believe or know, that Matter cannot be so order'd by God's Omnipotency, as to think (if that subverts the Belief of an immaterial intelligent Being in the World) may know or believe it to morrow; or if he should never know or believe it, yet others who define Knowledge as he does, may know or believe it. Unless your Lordship can prove, that it is impossible for any one, who defines Knowledge to consist in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, to know or believe that Matter cannot think. But this, as I remember, your Lordship has not any where attempted to prove. And yet without this, your Lordship's way of Reasoning is no more than to argue, that one *cannot* do a thing because another *does not* do it. And yet upon this strange Consequence is built all that your Lordship brings here to prove, That my Definition of Knowledge *weakens the Credibility of Articles of Faith*, v. g.

It weakens the Credibility of this fundamental Article of Faith, That there is a God! How so? Because I who have so defin'd Knowledge, say in my *Essay*, "That the Knowledge of the Existence of any other thing [but of God] we can have only by Sensation: For there being no necessary Connection of real Existence with any Idea a Man hath in his Memory, nor of any other Existence but that of GOD, with the Existence of any particular Man; no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only when, by actual operating upon him, it makes it self perceiv'd by him: For the having the Idea of any thing in our Mind, no more proves the Existence of that thing, than the Picture of a Man evidences his Being in the World, or the Visions of a Dream make thereby a true History." For so are the words of

P. 28. my Book, and not as your Lordship has been pleas'd to set them down here: and

and they were well chosen by your Lordship, to shew, that the way of Ideas would not do; i. e. in my way by Ideas, I cannot prove there is a God.

But supposing I had said in that place, or any other, that which would hinder the Proof of a God, as I have not, might I not see my Error, and alter or renounce that Opinion, without changing my Definition of Knowledge? Or could not another Man, who defin'd Knowledge as I do, avoid Thinking, as your Lordship says I say, *That no Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self*; and so be able, notwithstanding my saying so, to prove that there is a God?

Again, your Lordship argues that my Definition of Knowledge weakens the Credibility of the Articles of Faith, because it takes away Revelation; and your Proof of that is, because *I do not know whether Matter may not think*.

The same sort of Argumentation your Lordship goes on with in the next Page, where you say; *Again, before there can be any such thing as Assurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation, there must be a Certainty as to Sense and Tradition; for there can be no Revelation pretended now, without immediate Inspiration; and the Basis of our Faith is a Revelation contain'd in an ancient Book, whereof the Parts were deliver'd at distant times, but convey'd down to us by an universal Tradition. But now, what if my Grounds of Certainty can give us no Assurance as to these things? Your Lordship says you do not mean, That they cannot demonstrate Matters of Fact, which it were most unreasonable to expect, but that these Grounds of Certainty make all things uncertain; for your Lordship thinks you have prov'd, that this way of Ideas cannot give a satisfactory Account, as to the Existence of the plainest Objects of the Sense; because Reason cannot perceive the Connection between the Objects and the Ideas: How then can we arrive to any Certainty in perceiving those Objects by their Ideas?*

All the force of which Argument lies in this; that I have said (or am suppos'd to have said, or to hold; for that I ever said so, I do not remember) *That Reason cannot perceive the Connection between the Objects and the Ideas: Ergo*, whoever holds that Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, cannot have any Assurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation.

My Lord, let that Proposition, viz. *That Reason cannot perceive the Connection between the Objects and the Ideas*, be mine as much as your Lordship pleases, and let it be as inconsistent as you please, with the Assurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation; how will it follow from thence, that the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas is the Cause that there cannot be any such thing as the Assurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation to any body? Tho' I who hold Knowledge to consist in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, have the Misfortune to run into this Error, viz. *That Reason cannot perceive the Connection between the Objects and the Ideas*, which is inconsistent with the Assurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation; yet it is not necessary that all others who with me hold, that Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, should also hold, *That Reason cannot perceive the Connection between the Objects and the Ideas*, or that I myself should always hold it: Unless your Lordship will say, that whoever places Certainty, as I do, in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, must necessarily hold all the Errors that I do, which are inconsistent with, or weaken the Belief of any Article of Faith, and hold them incorrigibly. Which has as much Consequence, as if I should argue, that because your Lordship, who lives at Worcester, does sometime mistake in quoting me; therefore no body who lives at Worcester can quote my Words right, or your Lordship can never mend your wrong Quotations. For, my Lord, the holding Certainty to consist in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, is no more a necessary Cause of holding those erroneous Propositions, which your Lordship imputes to me, as weakening the Credibility of the mention'd Articles of Faith, than the place of your Lordship's Dwelling is a necessary Cause of wrong quoting.

I shall not here go about to trouble your Lordship, with divining again what may be your Lordship's precise Meaning in several of the Propositions contain'd in the Passage above set down; especially that remarkably ambiguous, and to me obscure one, viz. *There must be a Certainty as to Sense and Tradition*. I fear

I have wasted too much of your Lordship's, and my Reader's time in that Imployment already ; and there would be no end, if I should endeavour to explain whatever I am at a loss about the determin'd Sense of, in any of your Lordship's Expressions.

P. 27—31.

Only I will crave leave to beg my Reader to observe, That in this first Head, which we are upon, your Lordship has us'd the Terms *Certain* and *Certainty* near twenty Times, but without determining in any of them, whether you mean *Knowledg*, or the *full Assurance of Faith*, or any *degree of believing* ; tho' it be evident, that in these Pages your Lordship uses *Certainty* for all these three: Which ambiguous use of the main word in that Discourse, cannot but render your Lordship's Sense clear and perspicuous, and your Argument very cogent ; and no doubt will do so to any one, who will be but at the pains to reduce that one word to a clear determin'd Sense all thro' these few Paragraphs.

P. 23.

Your Lordship says, *Have not all Mankind, who have talk'd of Matters of Faith, allow'd a Certainty of Faith, as well as a Certainty of Knowledg ?* Answ. But did ever any one of all that *Mankind* allow it as a tolerable way of speaking, that *believing in general* (for which your Lordship has us'd it) which contains in it the lowest degree of Faith, should be call'd *Certainty* ? Could he, who said, *I believe, Lord, help my Unbelief !* or any one who is *weak in Faith*, or of *little Faith*, be properly said to be *certain*, or *de dubio certus*, of what he believes but with a weak degree of Assent ? I shall not question what your Lordship's great Learning may authorize ; but I imagine every one hath not Skill, or will not assume the liberty to speak so.

If a Witness before a Judge, ask'd upon his Oath whether he were *certain* of such a thing, should answer, Yes, he was *certain* ; and upon farther Demand, should give this Account of his *Certainty*, that he believ'd it ; would he not make the Court and Auditors believe strangely of him ? For to say, that a Man is *certain*, when he barely believes, and that perhaps with no great Assurance of Faith, is to say that he is *certain*, where he owns an *Uncertainty*. For he that says, he barely believes, acknowledges that he assents to a Proposition as true, upon bare probability. And where any one assents thus to any Proposition, his Assent excludes not a possibility that it may be otherwise ; and where, in any one's Judgment, there is a possibility to be otherwise, there one cannot deny but there is some *Uncertainty* ; and the less cogent the Probabilities appear, upon which he assents, the greater the *Uncertainty*. So that all barely probable Proofs, which procure Assent, always containing some visible possibility that it may be otherwise (or else it would be Demonstration) and consequently the weaker the Probability appears, the weaker the Assent, and the more the *Uncertainty* ; it thence follows, that where there is such a mixture of *Uncertainty*, there a Man is so far uncertain : and therefore to say, That a Man is *certain*, where he barely believes, or assents but weakly, tho' he does believe, seems to me to say, that he is *certain* and *uncertain* together. But tho' bare Belief always includes some degrees of *Uncertainty*, yet it does not therefore necessarily include any degree of wavering ; the evidently strong probability may as steddily determine the Man to assent to the Truth, or make him take the Proposition for true, and act accordingly, as *Knowledg* makes him see or be *certain* that it is true. And he that doth so, as to Truths reveal'd in the Scripture, will shew his Faith by his Works ; and has, for ought I can see, all the Faith necessary to a Christian, and requir'd to Salvation.

My Lord, when I consider the length of my Answer here, to these few Pages of your Lordship's, I cannot but bemoan my own Dulness, and own my Unfitness to deal with so learned an Adversary, as your Lordship, in Controversy : For I know not how to answer but to a Proposition of a determin'd Sense. Whilst it is vague and uncertain in a general or equivocal use of any of the Terms, I cannot tell what to say to it. I know not but such comprehensive ways of expressing one's self, may do well enough in Declamation ; but in Reasoning there can be no Judgment made, till one can get to some positive determin'd Sense of the Speaker. If your Lordship had pleas'd to have condescended so far to my low Capacity, as to have deliver'd your meaning here determin'd to any one of the Senses above set down, or any other that you may have in these words I gather'd them from ; it would have sav'd me a great deal

deal of writing, and your Lordship loss of time in reading. I should not say this here to your Lordship, were it only in this one place that I find this Inconvenience. It is every where in all your Lordship's Reasonings, that my want of Understanding causes me this Difficulty, and against my Will multiplies the words of my Answer: For notwithstanding all that great deal that I have already said to these few Pages of your Lordship's; yet my Defence is not clear, and set in its due light, unless I shew in particular of every one of those Propositions (some whereof I admit as true, others I deny as not so) that it will not prove what is to be prov'd, viz. That my placing of Knowledge in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, lessens the Credibility of any Article of Faith, which it had before.

Your Lordship having done with the *Fundamental Articles of Natural Religion*, you come in the next place to those of Revelation; to enquire, as your Lordship says, *Whether those who embrace the Articles of Faith, in the way of Ideas, P. 31. can retain their Certainty of those Articles, when these Ideas are quitted.* What this Inquiry is, I know not very well, because I neither understand what it is to embrace *Articles of Faith in the way of Ideas*, nor know what your Lordship means by retaining their Certainty of those Articles, when these Ideas are quitted. But 'tis no strange thing for my short Sight, not always distinctly to discern your Lordship's meaning: Yet here I presume to know that this is the thing to be prov'd, viz. That my Definition of Knowledge does not leave to the Articles of the Christian Faith, the same Credibility they had before. The Articles your Lordship instances in, are,

1. *The Resurrection of the Dead.* And here your Lordship proceeds just in the same Method of arguing, as you did in the former: your Lordship brings several Passages concerning Identity out of my *Essay*, which you suppose inconsistent with the Belief of the Resurrection of the same Body; and this is your Argument to prove, that my defining of Knowledge to consist in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, alters the Foundations of this Article of Faith, and leaves it not the same Credibility it had before. Now, my Lord, granting all that your Lordship has here quoted out of my Chapter of P. 32. *Identity and Diversity*, to be as false as your Lordship pleases, and as inconsistent as your Lordship would have it, with the Article of the Resurrection from the Dead; nay, granting all the rest of my whole *Essay* to be false; how will it follow from thence, that the placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, weakens the Credibility of this Article of Faith, that the Dead shall rise? Let it be, that I who place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* am guilty of Errors, that weaken the Credibility of this Article of Faith; others who place Certainty in the same Perception, may not run into those Errors, and so not have their Belief of this Article at all shaken.

Your Lordship therefore, by all the long Discourse you have made here against my Notion of *Personal Identity*, to prove that it weakens the Credibility of the Resurrection of the Dead, should you have prov'd it ever so clearly, has not, I humbly conceive, said therein any one word towards the proving, That my Definition of Knowledge weakens the Credibility of this Article of Faith. For this, my Lord, is the Proposition to be prov'd, as your Lordship cannot but remember, if you please to recollect what is said in your 21st and following Pages, and what, in the 95th Page of my second Letter, quoted by your Lordship, it was design'd as an Answer to. And so I proceed to the next Articles of Faith your Lordship instances in. Your Lordship says,

2. *The next Articles of Faith which my Notion of Ideas is inconsistent with, are P. 44. no less than those of the Trinity, and the Incarnation of our Saviour.* Where I must humbly crave leave to observe to your Lordship, that in this second Head here, your Lordship has chang'd the Question from my Notion of Certainty, to my Notion of Ideas. For the Question, as I have often had occasion to observe to your Lordship, is, whether my Notion of Certainty, i. e. my placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, alters the Foundation, and lessens the Credibility of any Article of Faith? This being the Question between your Lordship and me, ought, I humbly conceive, most especially to have been kept close to in this Article of the Trinity; because 'twas

upon the account of my Notion of *Certainty*, as prejudicial to the Doctrine of the Trinity, that my Book was first brought into this Dispute. But your Lordship offers nothing, that I can find, to prove that my Definition of Knowledge or *Certainty* does any way lessen the Credibility of either of the Articles here mention'd, unless your insisting upon some suppos'd Errors of mine about *Nature* and *Person*, must be taken for proofs of this Proposition, That my Definition of *Certainty* lessens the Credibility of the *Articles of the Trinity, and our Saviour's Incarnation*. And then the Answer I have already given to the same way of Argumentation used by your Lordship, concerning the Articles of a *God, Revelation, and the Resurrection*, I think may suffice.

Having, as I beg leave to think, shewn that your Lordship has not in the least prov'd this Proposition, That the placing of *Certainty* in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, weakens the Credibility of any one Article of Faith, which was your former Accusation against this (as your Lordship is pleas'd to call it) *new Method of Certainty, of so dangerous consequence to that Article of Faith which your Lordship has endeavour'd to defend*; and all that your terrible Representation of it being, as I humbly conceive, come to just nothing: I come now to vindicate my Book from your new Accusation in your last Letter, and to shew that you no more prove the Passages you alledg out of my *Essay* to have any inconsistency with the *Articles of the Christian Faith* you oppose them to, than you have prov'd by them, That my Definition of Knowledge weakens the Credibility of any of those Articles.

1. The Article of the *Christian Faith* your Lordship begins with, is that of the *Resurrection of the Dead*; and concerning that, you say, *The Reason of believing the Resurrection of the same Body, upon my Grounds, is from the Idea of Identity*. Answ. Give me leave, my Lord, to say that the Reason of believing any Article of the Christian Faith (such as your Lordship is here speaking of) to me and upon my Grounds, is its being a part of Divine Revelation. Upon this Ground I believ'd it, before I either writ that Chapter of *Identity and Diversity*, and before I ever thought of those Propositions which your Lordship quotes out of that Chapter, and upon the same Ground I believe it still; and not from my Idea of Identity. This Saying of your Lordship's therefore, being a Proposition neither self-evident, nor allow'd by me to be true, remains to be prov'd. So that your Foundation failing, all your large Superstructure built thereon, comes to nothing.

But, my Lord, before we go any farther, I crave leave humbly to represent to your Lordship, That I thought you undertook to make out that my Notion of *Ideas* was inconsistent with the *Articles of the Christian Faith*. But that which your Lordship instances in here, is not, that I yet know, an Article of the Christian Faith. The *Resurrection of the Dead*, I acknowledg to be an Article of the Christian Faith: But that the *Resurrection of the same Body*, in your Lordship's sense of the *same Body*, is an Article of the Christian Faith, is what, I confess, I do not yet know.

In the New Testament (wherein, I think, are contain'd all the *Articles of the Christian Faith*) I find our Saviour and the Apostles to preach the *Resurrection of the Dead*, and the *Resurrection from the Dead*, in many places: But I do not remember any place, where the *Resurrection of the same Body* is so much as mention'd. Nay, which is very remarkable in the case, I do not remember in any place of the New Testament (where the general Resurrection at the last Day is spoken of) any such Expression as the *Resurrection of the Body*, much less of the *same Body*. And it may seem to be not without some special Reason, that where St. Paul's Discourse was particularly concerning the Body, and so led him to name it; yet when he speaks of the Resurrection, he says, you, and not your Bodies, 1 Cor. 6. 14.

I say, the general Resurrection at the last Day; because where the Resurrection of some particular Persons, presently upon our Saviour's Resurrection, is mention'd, the words are, *The Graves were open'd, and many Bodies of Saints, which slept, arose and came out of the Graves after his Resurrection, and went into the Holy City, and appear'd to many*. Of which peculiar way of speaking of this Resurrection, the Passage it self gives a Reason in these words, *Appear'd to many*; i. e. Those who slept appear'd, so as to be known to be risen. But this could not be known, unless they brought with them the Evidence, that they were those who had been dead, whereof there were these two Proofs; their Graves were open'd, and their Bodies not only gone out of them, but appear'd to be the

the same to those who had known them formerly alive, and knew them to be dead and buried. For if they had been those who had been dead so long, that all who knew them once alive were now gone, those to whom they appear'd might have known them to be Men, but could not have known they were risen from the dead, because they never knew they had been dead. All that by their appearing they could have known, was, that they were so many living Strangers, or whose Resurrection they knew nothing. 'Twas necessary therefore, that they should come in such Bodies, as might in Make and Size, &c. appear to be the same they had before, that they might be known to those of their Acquaintance whom they appear'd to. And it is probable they were such as were newly dead, whose Bodies were not yet dissolv'd and dissipated; and therefore 'tis particularly said here (differently from what is said of the general Resurrection) that their *Bodies arose*: because they were the same, that were then lying in their Graves, the moment before they rose.

But your Lordship endeavours to prove it must be the *same Body*: And let us grant, that your Lordship, nay, and others too, think you have prov'd it *must* be the *same Body*; will you therefore say, that he holds what is inconsistent with an Article of Faith, who having never seen this your Lordship's Interpretation of the Scripture, nor your Reasons for the *same Body*, in your sense of *same Body*; or, if he has seen them, yet not understanding them, or not perceiving the force of them, believes what the Scripture proposes to him, *viz.* That at the last Day *the Dead shall be raised*, without determining whether it shall be with the very same Bodies or no?

I know your Lordship pretends not to erect your particular Interpretations of Scripture, into Articles of Faith; and if you do not, he that believes *the Dead shall be raised*, believes that Article of Faith which the Scripture proposes; and cannot be accus'd of holding any thing *inconsistent* with it, if it should happen, that what he holds is *inconsistent* with another Proposition, *viz.* That *the Dead shall be raised with the same Bodies*, in your Lordship's sense: which I do not find propos'd in Holy Writ as an Article of Faith.

But your Lordship argues, it *must be the same Body*; which as you explain P. 34, 35: *same Body, is not the same individual Particles of Matter, which were united at the point of Death; nor the same Particles of Matter, that the Sinner had at the time of the Commission of his Sins. But that it must be the same material Substance, which was vitally united to the Soul here; i. e. as I understand it, the same individual Particles of Matter, which were, some time or other during his Life here, vitally united to his Soul.*

Your first Argument, to prove that it *must be the same Body* in this sense of P. 37. the *same Body*, is taken from these words of our Saviour: *All that are in the Graves shall hear his Voice, and shall come forth.* From whence your Lordship argues, That these words, *All that are in the Graves*, relate to no other Substance than what was united to the Soul in Life; because *a different Substance cannot be said to be in the Graves, and to come out of them.* Which Words of your Lordship's, if they prove any thing, prove that the Soul too is lodg'd in the Grave, and rais'd out of it at the last Day. For your Lordship says, *Can a different Substance be said to be in their Graves, and come out of them?* So that according to this Interpretation of these words of our Saviour, *no other Substance* being rais'd, but what hears his Voice; and *no other Substance* hearing his Voice, but what being call'd comes out of the Grave; and *no other Substance* coming out of the Grave, but what was in the Grave; any one must conclude, that the Soul, unless it be in the Grave, will make no Part of the Person that is rais'd, unless, as your Lordship argues against me, you can make it out that a Substance P. 37. which never was in the Grave may come out of it, or that the Soul is no Substance.

But setting aside the Substance of the Soul, another thing that will make any one doubt, whether this your Interpretation of our Saviour's words be necessarily to be receiv'd as their true Sense, is, That it will not be very easily reconcil'd to your saying, you do not mean by the *same Body*, the *same individual Particles which were united at the point of Death.* And yet by this Interpretation of our Saviour's words, you can mean no other Particles, but such as were united at the point of Death: because you mean no other Substance, but what comes out of the Grave; and no Substance, no Particles come out, you say, but what

what were in the Grave : and I think your Lordship will not say, that the Particles that were separate from the Body by *Perpiration*, before the point of Death, were laid up in the Grave.

- P. 37. But your Lordship, I find, has an Answer to this; viz. *That by comparing this with other places, you find that the words [of our Saviour above quoted] are to be understood of the Substance of the Body, to which the Soul was united; and not to (I suppose your Lordship writ of) those individual Particles, i. e. those individual Particles that are in the Grave at the Resurrection: For so they must be read, to make your Lordship's Sense entire, and to the purpose of your Answer here. And then methinks this Last Sense of our Saviour's words given by your Lordship wholly overturns the Sense which you have given of them above; where from those words you press the Belief of the Resurrection of the same Body, by this strong Argument, That a Substance could not, upon hearing the Voice of Christ, come out of the Grave, which was never in the Grave. There (as far as I can understand your words) your Lordship argues, that our Saviour's words must be understood of the Particles in the Grave, unless, as your Lordship says, one can make it out that a Substance which never was in the Grave, may come out of it. And here your Lordship expressly says, That our Saviour's words are to be understood of the Substance of that Body, to which the Soul was [at any time] united, and not to those individual Particles that are in the Grave. Which put together, seems to me to say, That our Saviour's words are to be understood of those Particles only that are in the Grave, and not of those Particles only which are in the Grave; but of others also which have at any time been vitally united to the Soul, but never were in the Grave.*

² Cor. 5. 10. The next Text your Lordship brings, to make the Resurrection of the same Body, in your sense, an Article of Faith, are these words of St. Paul: *For we must all appear before the Judgment-Seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his Body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.* To which

- P. 38. your Lordship subjoins this Question; *Can these words be understood of any other material Substance, but that Body in which these things were done?* *Ans.* A Man may suspend his determining the Meaning of the Apostle to be, that a Sinner shall suffer for his Sins in the very same Body wherein he committed them; because St. Paul does not say he shall have the very same Body when he suffers, that he had when he sinn'd. The Apostle says indeed, *done in his Body.* The Body he had, and did things in at Five or Fifteen, was no doubt *HIS* Body, as much as that which he did things in at Fifty was *HIS* Body, tho' his Body were not the very same Body at those different Ages: And so will the Body, which he shall have after the Resurrection, be his Body, tho' it be not the very same with that which he had at Five, or Fifteen, or Fifty. He that at Threescore is broke on the Wheel, for a Murder he committed at Twenty, is punish'd for what he did in his Body; tho' the Body he has, i. e. his Body at Threescore, be not the same, i. e. made up of the same individual Particles of Matter, that that Body was, which he had forty Years before. When your Lordship has resolv'd with your self, what that same immutable *HE* is, which at the last Judgment shall receive the things done in his Body; your Lordship will easily see, that the Body he had, when an Embrio in the Womb, when a Child playing in Coats, when a Man marrying a Wife, and when bed-ridden dying of a Consumption, and at last, which he shall have after his Resurrection; are each of them his Body, tho' neither of them be the same Body, the one with the other.

But farther to your Lordship's Question, *Can these Words be understood of any other material Substance, but that Body in which these things were done?* I answer, these words of St. Paul may be understood of another material Substance, than that Body in which these things were done; because your Lordship teaches me and gives me

- P. 34. a strong Reason so to understand them. Your Lordship says, *That you do not say the same Particles of Matter, which the Sinner had at the very time of the Commission of his Sins, shall be rais'd at the last Day.* And your Lordship gives this Reason for
- P. 35. it: *For then a long Sinner must have a vast Body, considering the continual spending of Particles by Perpiration.* Now, my Lord, if the Apostle's words, as your Lordship would argue, cannot be understood of any other material Substance, but that Body in which these things were done; and no Body, upon the removal or change of some of the Particles that at any time make it up, is the same material Substance,

stance, or the same Body: it will, I think, thence follow, that either the Sinner must have all the same individual Particles vitally united to his Soul when he is rais'd, that he had vitally united to his Soul when he sinn'd: Or else St Paul's Words here cannot be understood to mean the *same Body in which the things were done*. For if there were other Particles of Matter in the Body, wherein the thing was done, than in that which is rais'd, that which is rais'd cannot be the *same Body* in which they were done: Unless that alone, which has just all the same individual Particles when any Action is done, being the same Body wherein it was done, that also, which has not the same individual Particles wherein that Action was done, can be the same Body wherein it was done; which is in effect to make the same Body sometimes to be the same, and sometimes not the same.

Your Lordship thinks it suffices to make the *same Body*, to have not all, but no other Particles of Matter, but such as were some time or other vitally united to the Soul before: But such a Body, made up of part of the Particles some time or other vitally united to the Soul, is no more the same Body wherein the Actions were done in the distant Parts of the *long Sinners's Life*, than that is the same Body in which a quarter, or half, or three quarters, of the same Particles, that made it up, are wanting. For example; A Sinner has acted here in his *Body* an hundred Years; he is rais'd at the last Day, but with what Body? The same, says your Lordship, that he acted in; because St. Paul says, he must *receive the things done in his Body*. What therefore must his Body at the Resurrection consist of? Must it consist of all the Particles of Matter that have ever been vitally united to his Soul? for they, in Succession, have all of them made up *his Body* wherein he did *these things*. No, says your Lordship, That would make his Body too *vast*; P. 35. it suffices to make the same Body in which the things were done, that it consists of some of the Particles, and no other but such as were some time, during his Life, vitally united to his Soul. But according to this account, *his Body* at the Resurrection being, as your Lordship seems to limit it, near the same Size it was in some part of his Life; it will be no more the *same Body* in which *the things were done* in the distant parts of his Life, than that is the *same Body*, in which half, or three quarters, or more of the individual Matter, that then made it up, is now wanting. For example, let *his Body*, at fifty Years old, consist of a Million of Parts; five Hundred Thousand at least of those Parts will be different from those which made up *his Body* at ten Years, and at an hundred. So that to take the numerical Particles that made up *his Body* at fifty, or any other Season of his Life; or to gather them promiscuously out of those which at different times have successively been vitally united to his Soul; they will no more make the same Body, which was *his*, wherein some of his Actions were done, than that is the same Body, which has but half the same Particles: And yet all your Lordship's Argument here for the same Body, is, because St. Paul says it must be *his Body*, in which *these things were done*; which it could not be, if any other Substance were join'd to it, i. e. if any other Particles of Matter made up the Body, which were not vitally united to the Soul, when the Action was done.

Again, your Lordship says, *Tha you do not say the same individual Particles* P. 34. [shall make up the Body at the Resurrection] which were united at the point of Death; for there must be a great Alteration in them in a lingering Disease, as, if a fat Man falls into a Consumption. Because 'tis likely your Lordship thinks these Particles of a decrepit, wasted, withered Body would be too few, or unfit to make such a plump, strong, vigorous, well-siz'd Body, as it has pleas'd your Lordship to proportion out in your Thoughts to Men at the Resurrection; and therefore some small portion of the Particles formerly united vitally to that Man's Soul, shall be re-assum'd to make up his Body to the Bulk your Lordship judges convenient: but the greatest part of them shall be left out, to avoid the making his Body more *vast* than your Lordship thinks will be fit, as appears by these your Lordship's Words immediately following, viz. *That you do not say the same Particles the Sinner* P. 35. *had at the very time of Commission of his Sins, for then a long Sinner must have a vast Body*.

But

But then pray, my Lord, what must an *Embrio* do, who, dying within a few hours after his Body was vitally united to his Soul, has no Particles of Matter, which were formerly vitally united to it, to make up his Body of that Size and Proportion which your Lordship seems to require in Bodies at the Resurrection? or must we believe he shall remain content with that small Pittance of Matter, and that yet imperfect Body to Eternity; because it is an Article of Faith to believe the *Resurrection of the very same Body*? i. e. made up of only such Particles as have been vitally united to the Soul. For if it be so, as your Lordship says, *That Life is the Result of the Union of*

P. 43. *Soul and Body*, it will follow, That the Body of an *Embrio*, dying in the Womb, may be very little, not the thousandth part of any ordinary Man. For since from the first Conception and Beginning of Formation, it has Life, and *Life is the Result of the Union of the Soul with the Body*; an *Embrio*, that shall die either by the untimely Death of the Mother, or by any other accident presently after it has Life, must, according to your Lordship's Doctrine, remain a Man not an inch long to Eternity; because there are not Particles of Matter, formerly united to his Soul, to make him bigger; and no other can be made use of to that purpose: tho' what greater Congruity the Soul hath with any Particles of Matter, which were once vitally united to it, but are now so no longer, than it hath with Particles of Matter, which it was never united to; would be hard to determine, if that should be demanded.

1 Cor. 15.
35, &c.

By these, and not a few other the like Consequences, one may see what service they do to Religion, and the Christian Doctrine, who raise Questions, and make Articles of Faith about the *Resurrection of the same Body*, where the Scripture says nothing of *the same Body*; or if it does, it is with no small Reprimand to those who make such an Enquiry. But some Man will say, *How are the Dead rais'd up? and with what Body do they come?* Thou Fool, that which thou sowest is not quicken'd except it die. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that Body that shall be, but bare Grain; it may chance of Wheat or of some other Grain: but God giveth it a Body as it hath pleas'd him. Words, I should think, sufficient to deter us from determining any thing for or against the same Body being rais'd at the last Day. It suffices, that all the Dead shall be rais'd, and every one appear and answer for the things done in this Life, and receive according to the things he hath done in his Body, whether good or bad. He that believes this, and has said nothing inconsistent herewith, I presume may, and must be acquitted from being guilty of any thing inconsistent with the Article of the Resurrection of the Dead.

But your Lordship, to prove the *Resurrection of the same Body to be an Article of Faith*, farther asks, *How could it be said, if any other Substance be join'd to the Soul at the Resurrection, as its Body, that they were the things done in or by the Body?* Answ. Just as it may be said of a Man at an hundred Years old, that hath then another Substance join'd to his Soul, than he had at twenty, that the Murder or Drunkenness he was guilty of at twenty, were things done in the Body: How by the Body comes in here, I do not see.

Your Lordship adds, *And St. Paul's Dispute about the manner of raising the Body might soon have ended, if there were no necessity of the same Body.* Answ. When I understand what Argument there is in these Words to prove the Resurrection of the same Body, without the mixture of one new Atom of Matter, I shall know what to say to it. In the mean time this I understand, That St. Paul would have put as short an end to all Disputes about this Matter, if he had said, *That there was a necessity of the same Body*, or that it should be the same Body.

2 Cor. 15. 16. The next Text of Scripture you bring for the same Body, is, *If there be no Resurrection of the Dead, then is not Christ rais'd.* From which your Lordship

P. 38. argues. *It seems then other Bodies are to be rais'd as his was.* I grant other Dead, as certainly rais'd as Christ was; for else his Resurrection would be of no use to Mankind. But I do not see how it follows that they should be rais'd with the same Body, as Christ was rais'd with the same Body, as your Lordship infers in these Words annex'd; *And can there be any doubt, whether his Body was the same material Substance which was united to his Soul before?* I answer none

None at all; nor that it had just the same undistinguish'd Lineaments and Marks, yea, and the same Wounds that it had at the time of his Death. If therefore your Lordship will argue from *other Bodies being rais'd as his was*, That they must keep proportion with his in *Sameness*; then we must believe, that every Man shall be rais'd with the same Lineaments and other Notes of Distinction he had at the time of his Death, even with his Wounds yet open, if he had any, because our Saviour was so rais'd; which seems to me scarce reconcilable with what your Lordship says of *a fat Man falling into a Consumption*, and dying. P. 34.

But whether it will consist or no with your Lordship's meaning in that Place, this to me seems a Consequence that will need to be better prov'd, *viz.* That our Bodies must be rais'd the same just as our Saviour's was; because St. Paul says, *If there be no Resurrection of the Dead, then is not Christ risen*. For it may be a good Consequence, Christ is risen, and therefore there shall be a Resurrection of the Dead; and yet this may not be a good Consequence, Christ was rais'd with the same Body he had at his Death, therefore all Men shall be rais'd with the same Body they had at their Death, contrary to what your Lordship says concerning *a fat Man dying of a Consumption*. But the Case I think far different betwixt our Saviour, and those to be rais'd at the last Day.

1. His Body *saw not Corruption*, and therefore to give him another Body, new moulded, mix'd with other Particles, which were not contain'd in it as it lay in the Grave, whole and entire as it was laid there, had been to destroy his Body, to frame him a new one without any need. But why with the remaining Particles of a Man's Body long since dissolv'd and moulder'd into Dust and Atoms (whereof possibly a great part may have undergone variety of Changes, and enter'd into other Concretions even in the Bodies of other Men) other new Particles of Matter mix'd with them, may not serve to make *his* Body again, as well as the mixture of new and different Particles of Matter with the old, did in the Compass of his Life make *his* Body; I think no reason can be given.

This may serve to shew, why, tho' the Materials of our Saviour's Body, were not chang'd at his Resurrection; yet it does not follow, but that the Body of a Man, dead and rotten in his Grave, or burnt, may at the last Day have several new Particles in it, and that without any Inconvenience. Since whatever Matter is vitally united to *his* Soul, is *his* Body, as much as is that, which was united to it when he was born, or in any other part of his Life.

2. In the next place, the Size, Shape, Figure and Lineaments of our Saviour's Body, even to his Wounds into which doubting *Thomas* put his Fingers and his Hand, were to be kept in the rais'd Body of our Saviour, the same they were at his Death, to be a Conviction to his Disciples, to whom he shew'd himself, and who were to be Witnesses of his Resurrection, that their Master, the very same Man, was crucify'd, dead and buried, and rais'd again; and therefore he was handled by them, and ate before them after he was risen, to give them in all Points full Satisfaction that it was really he, the same, and not another, nor a Specter or Apparition of him: Tho' I do not think your Lordship will thence argue, that because *others are to be rais'd as he was*, therefore it is necessary to believe, that because he ate after his Resurrection, others at the last Day shall eat and drink after they are rais'd from the Dead; which seems to me as good an Argument, as because his undissolv'd Body was rais'd out of the Grave, just as it there lay entire, without the Mixture of any new Particles, therefore the corrupted and consum'd Bodies of the Dead at the Resurrection shall be new fram'd only out of those scatter'd Particles, which were once vitally united to their Souls, without the least mixture of any one single Atom of new Matter. But at the last Day, when all Men are rais'd, there will be no need to be assur'd of any one particular Man's Resurrection. 'Tis enough that every one shall appear before the Judgment-seat of Christ, to receive according to what he had done in his former Life; but in what sort of Body he shall appear, or of what Particles made up, the Scripture having said nothing.

but that it shall be a *spiritual Body rais'd in Incorruption*, it is not for me to determine.

P. 39. Your Lordship asks, *Were they* [who saw our Saviour after his Resurrection] *Witnesses only of some material Substance then united to his Soul?* In answer, I beg your Lordship to consider, whether you suppose our Saviour was to be known to be the same Man (to the Witnesses that were to see him, and testify his Resurrection) by his Soul, that could neither be seen, nor known to be the same; or by his Body, that could be seen, and by the discernible Structure and Marks of it, be known to be the same? When your Lordship has resolv'd that, all that you say in that Page will answer it self. But because one Man cannot know another to be the same, but by the outward visible Lineaments, and sensible Marks he has been wont to be known and distinguish'd by; will your Lordship therefore argue, That the great Judge, at the last Day, who gives to each Man, whom he raises, his new Body, shall not be able to know who is who, unless he give to every one of them a Body, just of the same Figure, Size and Features, and made up of the very same individual Particles he had in his former Life? Whether such a way of arguing for the *Resurrection of the same Body to be an Article of Faith*, contributes much to the strengthening the Credibility of the Article of the Resurrection of the Dead, I shall leave to the Judgment of others.

Farther, for the proving the *Resurrection of the same Body to be an Article of Faith*, your Lordship says; *But the Apostle insists upon the Resurrection of Christ, not merely as an Argument of the Possibility of our's, but of the Certainty of it; because he rose, as the First-fruits; Christ the First-fruits, afterwards they that are Christ's at his coming.* *Ans.* No doubt the *Resurrection of Christ* is a Proof of the *Certainty of our Resurrection*. But is it therefore a Proof of the *Resurrection of the same Body*, consisting of the same individual Particles which concurr'd to the making up of our Body here, without the mixture of any one other Particle of Matter? I confess I see no such Consequence.

P. 40. But your Lordship goes on: *St. Paul was aware of the Objections in mens Minds, about the Resurrection of the same Body; and it is of great Consequence as to this Article, to shew upon what Grounds he proceeds.* But some Man will say, *How are the Dead rais'd up, and with what Body do they come?* *First, he shews, That the seminal parts of Plants are wonderfully improv'd by the ordinary Providence of God, in the manner of their Vegetation.* *Ans.* I do not perfectly understand what it is for the seminal parts of Plants to be wonderfully improv'd by the ordinary Providence of God, in the manner of their Vegetation; or else perhaps I should better see how this here tends to the Proof of the *Resurrection of the same Body*, in your Lordship's Sense.

P. 40. It continues, *They sow bare Grain of Wheat, or of some other Grain, but God giveth it a Body, as it hath pleas'd him, and to every Seed his own Body.* *Here, says your Lordship, is an Identity of the material Substance suppos'd.* It may be so. But to me a Diversity of the material Substance, i.e. of the component Particles, is here suppos'd, or in direct Words said. For the

Ver. 37. Words of St. Paul, taken all together, run thus; *That which thou sowest, thou sowest not that Body which shall be, but bare Grain: and so on, as your Lordship has set down the remainder of them.* From which Words of St. Paul, the natural Argument seems to me to stand thus: If the Body that is put in the Earth in sowing, is not that Body which shall be, then the Body that is put in the Grave, is not that, i.e. the same Body that shall be.

P. 40. But your Lordship proves it to be the same Body, by these three Greek Words of the Text, τὸ ἰδίον σῶμα, which your Lordship interprets thus, *That proper Body which belongs to it.* *Ans.* Indeed by those Greek Words, τὸ ἰδίον σῶμα, whether our Translators have rightly render'd them *his own Body*, or your Lordship more rightly, *that proper Body which belongs to it*, I formerly understood no more but this; That in the Production of Wheat and other Grain from Seed, God continu'd every Species distinct; so that from Grains of Wheat sown, Root, Stalk, Blade, Ear and Grains of Wheat were produc'd, and not those of Barley, and so of the rest: which I took to be the meaning of *to every Seed his own Body*. No, says your Lordship, these Words prove, *That to every Plant of Wheat, and to every Grain of Wheat produc'd in*

it,

it, is given *the proper Body that belongs to it*, which is the same Body with the Grain that was sown. *Answ.* This, I confess, I do not understand; because I do not understand how one individual Grain can be the *same* with twenty, fifty, or an hundred individual Grains, for such sometimes is the Increase.

But your Lordship proves it. For, says your Lordship, *Every Seed having P. 40.* that Body in little, which is afterwards so much enlarg'd, and in Grain the Seed is corrupted before its Germination; but it hath its proper organical Parts, which make it the same Body with that which it grows up to. For altho' Grain be not divided into Lobes as other Seeds are, yet it hath been found, by the most accurate Observations, that upon separating the Membranes these seminal Parts are discern'd in them, which afterwards grow up to that Body which we call Corn. In which words I crave leave to observe, that your Lordship supposes, that a Body may be enlarged by the addition of a hundred or a thousand times as much in Bulk as its own Matter, and yet continue the *same Body*; which, I confess, I cannot understand.

But in the next place, if that could be so, and that the Plant in its full Growth at Harvest, increas'd by a thousand or a million of times as much new Matter added to it as it had, when it lay in little conceal'd in the Grain that was sown, was the very same Body; yet I do not think that your Lordship will say, that every minute, insensible and inconceivably small Grain of the hundred Grains, contain'd in that little organiz'd seminal Plant, is every one of them the very same with that Grain which contains that whole little seminal Plant, and all those invisible Grains in it: For then it will follow, That one Grain is the same with an hundred, and an hundred distinct Grains the same with one; which I shall be able to assent to, when I can conceive that all the Wheat in the World is but one Grain.

For I beseech you, my Lord, consider what it is St. Paul here speaks of! It is plain he speaks of *that which is sown and dies*; i. e. the Grain, that the Husbandman takes out of his Barn to sow in his Field. And of this Grain, St. Paul says, that it is *not that Body that shall be*. These two, viz. *That which is sown*, and *that Body that shall be*, are all the Bodies that St. Paul here speaks of, to represent the Agreement or Difference of Mens Bodies after the Resurrection, with those they had before they died. Now I crave leave to ask your Lordship, which of these two is that little invisible seminal Plant, which your Lordship here speaks of? Does your Lordship mean by it the Grain *that is sown*? But that is not what St. Paul speaks of; he could not mean this *embrionated* little Plant, for he could not denote it by these words, *That which thou sowest*, for that he says must *die*; but this little *embrionated* Plant, contain'd in the Seed that is sown, dies not: Or does your Lordship mean by it, *the Body that shall be*? But neither by these words, *The Body that shall be*, can St. Paul be suppos'd to denote this insensible little *embrionated* Plant; for that is already in being, contain'd in the Seed that is sown, and therefore could not be spoke of under the name of *the Body that shall be*. And therefore, I confess, I cannot see of what use it is to your Lordship to introduce here this third Body, which St. Paul mentions not; and to make that the same or not the same with any other, when those which St. Paul speaks of, are, as I humbly conceive, these two visible sensible Bodies, the Grain sown, and the Corn grown up to Ear; with neither of which this insensible *embrionated* Plant can be the same Body, unless an insensible Body can be the same Body with a sensible Body, and a little Body can be the same Body with one ten thousand, or an hundred thousand times as big as it self. So that yet, I confess, I see not the *Resurrection of the same Body* prov'd, from these words of St. Paul, to be an *Article of Faith*.

Your Lordship goes on; St. Paul indeed saith, *That we sow not that Body P. 41.* that shall be; but he speaks not of the Identity, but the Perfection of it. Here my Understanding fails me again: For I cannot understand St. Paul to say, That the same identical sensible Grain of Wheat, which was sown at Seed-time, is the very same with every Grain of Wheat in the Ear at Harvest, that sprang from it: Yet so I must understand it, to make it prove that the same sensible Body, that is laid in the Grave, shall be the very same with that which shall be rais'd at the Resurrection. For I do not know of any seminal *Body in little*, contain'd in the dead Carcase of any Man or Woman; which, as your Lordship

says, in Seeds having its proper Organical Parts, shall afterwards be enlarg'd, and at the Resurrection grow up into the same Man. For I never thought of any Seed or Seminal Parts, either of Plant or Animal, so wonderfully improv'd by the Providence of God, whereby the same Plant or Animal should beget it self; nor ever heard, that it was by Divine Providence design'd to produce the same Individual, but for the producing of future and distinct Individuals, for the continuation of the same Species.

P. 41. Your Lordship's next words are, *And altho' there be such a difference from the Grain it self, when it comes up to be perfect Corn, with Root, Stalk, Blade and Ear, that it may be said to outward Appearance not to be the same Body; yet with regard to the Seminal and Organical Parts, it is as much the same, as a Man grown up is the same with the Embrio in the Womb.* Answ. It does not appear, by any thing I can find in the Text, That St. Paul here compar'd the Body produc'd, with the Seminal and Organical Parts contain'd in the Grain it sprang from, but with the whole sensible Grain that was sown. Microscopes had not then discover'd the little Embrio Plant in the Seed; and supposing it should have been reveal'd to St. Paul (tho' in the Scripture we find little Revelation of Natural Philosophy) yet an Argument taken from a thing perfectly unknown to the Corinthians whom he writ to, could be of no manner of use to them, nor serve at all either to instruct or convince them. But granting that those St. Paul writ to, knew it as well as Mr. Lewenhooke; yet your Lordship thereby proves not the raising of the same Body: Your Lordship says it is as much the same [I leave leave to add Body] as a Man grown up is the same (Same what, I beseech your Lordship?) with the Embrio in the Womb. For that the Body of the Embrio in the Womb, and Body of the Man grown up, is the same Body, I think no one will say; unless he can persuade himself that a Body, that is not the hundredth part of another, is the same with that other; which I think no one will do, till having renounc'd this dangerous way by Ideas of Thinking and Reasoning, he has learnt to say that a Part and the Whole are the same.

P. 41. Your Lordship goes on: *And altho' many Arguments may be us'd to prove, that a Man is not the same, because Life, which depends upon the Course of the Blood, and the manner of Respiration and Nutrition is so different in both States; yet that an would be thought ridiculous, that should seriously affirm that it was not the same Man.* And your Lordship says, *I grant, that the variation of great Parcels of Matter in Plants, alters not the Identity; and that the Organization of the Parts in one coherent Body, partaking of one common Life, makes the Identity of a Plant.* Answ. My Lord, I think the Question is not about the same Man, but the same Body: For tho' I do say (somewhat differently from what your Lordship sets down as my words here) "That that which has such an Organization, as is fit to receive and distribute Nourishment, so as to continue and frame the Wood, Bark and Leaves, &c. of a Plant, in which consists the vegetable Life; continues to be the same Plant, as long as it partakes of the same Life, tho' that Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter, vitally united to the living Plant:" Yet I do not remember that I any where say, that a Plant, which was once no bigger than an Oaten-Straw, and afterwards grows to be above a Fathom about, is the same Body, tho' it be still the same Plant.

The well known Tree in Epping-Forest, call'd the King's-Oak, which, from not weighing an Ounce at first, grew to have many Tuns of Timber in it, was all along the same Oak, the very same Plant; but no body, I think, will say it was the same Body when it weigh'd a Tun, as it was when it weigh'd but an Ounce; unless he has a mind to signalize himself by saying, That that is the same Body, which has a thousand Particles of different Matter in it, for one Particle that is the same: which is no better than to say, That a thousand different Particles are but one and the same Particle, and one and the same Particle is a thousand different Particles; a thousand times a greater Absurdity, than to say half is the whole, or the whole is the same with the half. Which will be improv'd ten thousand times yet farther, if a Man shall say (as your Lordship seems to me to argue here) That that great Oak is the very same Body with the Acorn it sprang from, because there was in that Acorn an Oak in little, which was afterwards (as your Lordship expresses it) so much enlarg'd, as to make that mighty Tree: For this Embrio, if I may so call it, or Oak in little,

tle, being not the hundredth, or perhaps the thousandth part of the Acorn, and the Acorn being not the thousandth part of the grown Oak; 'twill be very extraordinary to prove the Acorn and the grown Oak to be the *same Body*, by a way wherein it cannot be pretended, that above one Particle of an hundred Thousand or a Million, is the same in the one Body that it was in the other. From which way of Reasoning, it will follow, that a Nurse and her Sucking-Child have the same Body; and be past doubt, that a Mother and her Infant have the same Body. But this is a way of *Certainty* found out to establish the Articles of Faith, and to overturn the new *Method of Certainty* that your Lordship says I have started, which is apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before.

And now I desire your Lordship to consider, of what use it is to you in the present Case to quote out of my *Essay* these words, "That partaking of one common Life, makes the Identity of a Plant; " since the Question is not about the *Identity of a Plant*, but about the *Identity of a Body*; it being a very different thing to be the *same Plant*, and to be the *same Body*: For that which makes the same Plant, does not make the same Body; the one being the partaking in the same continu'd vegetable Life, the other the consisting of the same numerical Particles of Matter. And therefore your Lordship's Inference from my words above-quoted, in these which you subjoin, seems to me a very strange one, viz. *So that in things capable of any sort of Life, the Identity is consistent with a continued Succession of Parts; and so the Wheat grown up is the same Body with the Grain that was sown*: For, I believe, if my words, from which you infer, *And so the Wheat grown up is the same Body with the Grain that was sown*, were put into a Syllogism, this would hardly be brought to be the Conclusion.

But your Lordship goes on with Consequence upon Consequence, tho' I have not Eyes acute enough every where to see the Connection, till you bring it to the Resurrection of the *same Body*. The Connection of your Lordship's words is as followeth: *And thus the Alteration of the Parts of the Body, at the Resurrection, is consistent with its Identity, if its Organization and Life be the same; and this is a real Identity of the Body, which depends not upon Consciousness. From whence it follows, that to make the same Body, no more is requir'd, but restoring Life to the organiz'd Parts of it.* If the Question were about raising the same Plant, I do not say but there might be some appearance for making such Inference from my words as this; *Whence it follows, that to make the same Plant, no more is requir'd, but to restore Life to the organiz'd Parts of it.* But this Deduction, wherein from those words of mine, that speak only of the *Identity of a Plant*, your Lordship infers there is no more requir'd to make the *same Body*, than to make the *same Plant*; being too subtle for me, I leave to my Reader to find out.

Your Lordship goes on and says, *That I grant likewise, " That the Identity of the same Man consists in a Participation of the same continu'd Life, by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter in Succession, vitally united to the same organiz'd Body."* *Ans.* I speak in these words of the *Identity of the same Man*; and your Lordship thence roundly concludes, *So that there is no Difficulty of the Sameness of the Body.* But your Lordship knows, that I do not take these two Sounds, *Man* and *Body* to stand for the same thing; nor the Identity of the *Man* to be the same with the Identity of the *Body*.

But let us read out your Lordship's words: *So that there is no Difficulty as to the Sameness of the Body, if Life were continu'd; and if by Divine Power Life be restor'd to that material Substance, which was before united by a Re-union of the Soul to it, there is no reason to deny the Identity of the Body: Not from the Consciousness of the Soul, but from that Life, which is the Result of the Union of the Soul and Body.*

If I understand your Lordship right, you in these words, from the Passages above-quoted out of my Book, argue, that from those words of mine it will follow, that it is or may be the *same Body* that is rais'd at the Resurrection. If so, my Lord, your Lordship has then prov'd, that my Book is not inconsistent with, but conformable to this Article of the *Resurrection of the same Body*, which your Lordship contends for, and will have to be an Article of Faith: For tho' I do by no means deny that the *same Bodies* shall be rais'd at the

the last Day, yet I see nothing your Lordship has said to prove it to be an Article of Faith.

P. 43. But your Lordship goes on with your Proofs, and says; *But St. Paul still supposes that it must be that material Substance to which the Soul was before united. For saith he, It is sown in Corruption, it is rais'd in Incorruption; it is sown in Dishonour; it is rais'd in Glory; it is sown in Weakness, it is rais'd in Power; it is sown a natural Body, it is rais'd a spiritual Body. Can such a material Substance which was never united to the Body, be said to be sown in Corruption, and Weakness, and Dishonour? Either therefore he must speak of the same Body, or his meaning cannot be comprehended.* I answer, *Can such a material Substance which was never laid in the Grave, be said to be sown, &c?* For your Lordship

P. 34. says, *You do not say the same individual Particles, which were united at the point of Death, shall be rais'd at the last Day; and no other Particles are laid in the Grave, but such as are united at the point of Death: either therefore your Lordship must speak of another Body different from that which was sown, which shall be rais'd; or else your meaning, I think, cannot be comprehended.*

But whatever be your meaning, your Lordship proves it to be St. Paul's meaning, That the same Body shall be rais'd which was sown, in these following words; *For what does all this relate to a conscious Principle?* Answ. The Scripture being express, that the same Persons should be rais'd and appear before the Judgment-Seat of Christ, that every one may receive according to what he had done in his Body; it was very well suited to common Apprehensions (which refin'd not about Particles that had been vitally united to the Soul) to speak of the Body which each one was to have after the Resurrection, as he would be apt to speak of it himself. For it being his Body both before and after the Resurrection, every one ordinarily speaks of his Body as the same, tho' in a strict and philosophical sense, as your Lordship speaks, it be not the very same. Thus it is no Impropriety of Speech to say, This Body of mine, which was formerly strong and plump, is now weak and wasted; tho' in such a sense as you are speaking here, it be not the same Body. Revelation declares nothing any where concerning the same Body, in your Lordship's sense of the same Body, which appears not to have been then thought of. The Apostle directly proposes nothing for or against the same Body, as necessary to be believ'd: That which he is plain and direct in, is his opposing and condemning such curious Questions about the Body, which could serve only to perplex, not to confirm what was material and necessary for them to believe, viz. a Day of Judgment and Retribution to Men in a future state; and therefore 'tis no wonder that, mentioning their Bodies, he should use a way of speaking suited to vulgar Notions, from which it would be hard positively to conclude any thing for the determining of this Question (especially against Expressions in the same Discourse that plainly incline to the other side) in a matter which, as it appears, the Apostle thought not necessary to determine, and the Spirit of God thought not fit to gratify any one's Curiosity in.

But your Lordship says, *The Apostle speaks plainly of that Body which was once quicken'd, and afterwards falls to Corruption, and is to be restor'd with more noble Qualities.* I wish your Lordship had quoted the words of St. Paul, wherein he speaks plainly of that numerical Body that was once quicken'd; they would presently decide this Question. But your Lordship proves it by these following words of St. Paul; *For this Corruption must put on Incorruption, and this Mortal must put on Immortality:* to which your Lordship adds, *That you do not see how he could more expressly affirm the Identity of this corruptible Body with that after the Resurrection.* How expressly it is affirm'd by the Apostle, shall be consider'd by and by. In the mean time, it is past doubt that your Lordship best knows what you do or do not see. But this I will be bold to say, that if St. Paul had any where in this Chapter (where there are so many occasions for it, if it had been necessary to have been believ'd) but said in express words, that the same Bodies should be rais'd; every one else who thinks of it, will see he had more expressly affirm'd the Identity of the Bodies which Men now have, with those they shall have after the Resurrection.

P. 44. The remainder of your Lordship's Period, is; *And that without any respect to the Principle of Self-consciousness.* Answ. These words, I doubt not, have some meaning,

meaning, but I must own, I know not what; either towards the proof of the Resurrection of the same Body, or to shew that any thing I have said concerning Self-consciousness is inconsistent: For I do not remember that I have any where said, That the Identity of Body consisted in Self-consciousness.

From your preceding words, your Lordship concludes thus: *And so if the P. 44*
Scripture be the sole Foundation of our Faith, this is an Article of it. My Lord, to make the Conclusion unquestionable, I humbly conceive, the words must run thus: And so if the Scripture, and your Lordship's Interpretation of it, be the sole Foundation of our Faith; the Resurrection of the same Body is an Article of it. For with Submission, your Lordship has neither produc'd express words of Scripture for it, nor so prov'd that to be the meaning of any of those words of Scripture which you have produc'd for it, that a Man who reads and sincerely endeavours to understand the Scripture, cannot but find himself oblig'd to believe, as expressly that the same Bodies of the dead, in your Lordship's Sense, shall be rais'd, as that the dead shall be rais'd. And I crave leave to give your Lordship this one Reason for it:

He who reads with Attention this Discourse of St. Paul, where he discourses of the Resurrection, will see that he plainly distinguishes between the Dead that shall be rais'd, and the Bodies of the Dead. For it is νεκροί, πάντες, οἱ, are the nominative Cases to ἐγερῶμαι, ζωοποιήσωμαι, ἐγερθήσωμαι, all along, and not σώματα, Bodies; which one may with reason think would somewhere or other have been express'd, if all this had been said, to propose it as an Article of Faith, that the very same Bodies should be rais'd. The same manner of speaking the Spirit of God observes all through the New Testament, where it is said, raise * the dead, quicken or make alive the dead, the Resurrection of the dead. Nay, these very words of our † Saviour, urg'd by your Lordship for the Resurrection of the same Body, run thus: Πάντες οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις ἀναστήσονται τῇ φωνῇ αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐκπορεύσονται οἱ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ποιήσαντες εἰς ἀνάσσειν ζωῆς, οἱ δὲ τὰ φαῦλα ποιήσαντες εἰς ἀνάσσειν κολάσεως. Would a well-meaning Searcher of the Scriptures be apt to think, that if the thing here intended by our Saviour were to teach and propose it as an Article of Faith, necessary to be believ'd by every one, that the very same Bodies of the dead should be rais'd; would not, I say, any one be apt to think, that if our Saviour meant so, the words should rather have been, πάντα τὰ σώματα ἃ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις, i. e. all the Bodies that are in the Graves, rather than all who are in the Graves; which must denote Persons, and not precisely Bodies?

Another Evidence, that St. Paul makes a distinction between the Dead and the Bodies of the dead, so that the Dead cannot be taken in this, 1 Cor. 15. to stand precisely for the Bodies of the dead, are these words of the Apostle; *But some Men will say, How are the dead rais'd, and with what Bodies do they come?* Which words Dead and They, if suppos'd to stand precisely for the Bodies of the dead, the Question will run thus: *How are the dead Bodies rais'd, and with what Bodies do the dead Bodies come?* which seems to have no very agreeable Sense.

This therefore being so, that the Spirit of God keeps so expressly to this Phrase or Form of speaking in the new Testament, of Raising, Quickening, Raising, Resurrection, &c. of the dead, where the Resurrection at the last Day is spoken of; and that the Body is not mention'd, but in answer to this Question, *With what Bodies shall those dead who are rais'd come?* so that by the Dead cannot precisely be meant the dead Bodies: I do not see but a good Christian, who reads the Scripture with an Intention to believe all that is there reveal'd to him concerning the Resurrection, may acquit himself of his Duty there n, without entering into the inquiry whether the dead shall have the very same Bodies or no; which sort of inquiry the Apostle, by the Appellation he bestows here on him that makes it, seems not much to encourage. Nor, if he shall think himself bound to determine concerning the Identity of the Bodies of the dead rais'd at the last Day, will he, by the Remainder of St. Paul's Answer, find the Determination of the Apostle to be much in favour of the very same Body; unless the being told, that the Body sown is not that Body that shall be; that the Body rais'd is as different from that which was laid down, as the Flesh of Man is from the Flesh of Beasts, Fishes, and Birds, or as the Sun, Moon, and Stars are different one from another; or as different as a corruptible, weak, natural, mortal Body, is from an incorruptible, powerful, spiritual, immortal Body;

1 Cor. 15.

Ver. 15, 22,
23, 29, 32,
35, 52.*Mat. 22. 31.
Mark 12. 26.
John 5. 21.
Acts 26.
Rom. 4. 17.
2 Cor. 1. 9.
1 Theff. 4. 14,
16.
† Joh. 5. 28,
29.

Ver. 5.

dy; and lastly, as evident as a Body that is *Flesh and Blood*, is from a Body that is not *Flesh and Blood*; for *Flesh and Blood cannot*, says St. Paul in this very place, *inherit the Kingdom of God*: Unless, I say, all this, which is contain'd in St. Paul's words, can be suppos'd to be the way to deliver this as an Article of Faith, which is required to be believ'd by every one, viz. That the *dead should be rais'd with the very same Bodies that they had before in this Life*; which Article, propos'd in these or the like plain and exprefs words, could have left no Room for doubt in the meanest Capacities, nor for contest in the most perverse Minds.

P. 44. Your Lordship adds, in the next Words; *And so it hath been always understood by the Christian Church*, viz. That the *Resurrection of the same Body*, in your Lordship's sense of *same Body*, is an Article of Faith. Answ. What the *Christian Church* has always understood, is beyond my Knowledge. But for those who coming short of your Lordship's great Learning, cannot gather their Articles of Faith from the understanding of all the whole Christian Church, ever since the Preaching of the Gospel (who make the far greater part of Christians, I think I may say, nine hundred ninety and nine of a thousand) but are forc'd to have recourse to the Scripture to find them there; I do not see, that they will easily find there, this propos'd as an Article of Faith, That there shall be a *Resurrection of the same Body*; but that there shall be a *Resurrection of the Dead*, without explicitly determining, that they shall be rais'd with Bodies made up wholly of the same Particles which were once vitally united to their Souls, in their former Life; without the mixture of any one other Particle of Matter, which is that which your Lordship means by the *same Body*.

But supposing your Lordship to have demonstrated this to be an Article of Faith, tho' I crave leave to own, that I do not see that all that your Lordship has said here makes it so much as probable; what is all this to me? Yes, P. 44. says your Lordship in the following words, *My Idea of personal Identity is inconsistent with it, for it makes the same Body which was here united to the Soul, not to be necessary to the Doctrine of the Resurrection. But any material Substance united to the same Principle of Consciousness, makes the same Body.*

This is an Argument of your Lordship's, which I am oblig'd to answer to. But is it not fit I should first understand it, before I answer it? Now here I do not well know, what it is to make a thing not to be necessary to the *Doctrine of the Resurrection*. But to help my self out the best I can with a Guess, I will conjecture (which, in disputing with learned Men, is not very safe) your Lordship's meaning is, That *my Idea of personal Identity makes it not necessary*, that, for the raising the same Person, the Body should be the same.

Your Lordship's next word is *But*; to which I am ready to reply, *But* what? What does *my Idea of personal Identity* do? for something of that kind the adversative Particle *But* should, in the ordinary Construction of our Language, introduce, to make the Proposition clear and intelligible: But here is no such thing; *But* is one of your Lordship's privileg'd Particles, which I must not meddle with, for fear your Lordship complain of me again, as so severe a Critick, that for the least Ambiguity in any Particle, fill up Pages in my Answer, to make my Book look considerable for the bulk of it. But since this Proposition here, *My Idea of personal Identity makes the same Body, which was here united to the Soul, not necessary to the Doctrine of the Resurrection*; BUT any material Substance being united to the same Principle of Consciousness, makes the same Body; is brought to prove *my Idea of personal Identity inconsistent* with the Article of the Resurrection: I must make it out in some direct Sense or other, that I may see whether it be both true and conclusive. I therefore venture to read it thus, *My Idea of personal Identity makes the same Body which was here united to the Soul, not to be necessary at the Resurrection*; but allows, That any material Substance being united to the same Principle of Consciousness, makes the same Body: Ergo, *My Idea of personal Identity is inconsistent with the Article of the Resurrection of the same Body.*

If this be your Lordship's Sense in this Passage, as I here have guess'd it to be; or else I know not what it is: I answer,

1. That *my Idea of personal Identity* does not allow that any material Substance being united to the same Principle of Consciousness, makes the same Body. I say no such thing in my Book, nor any thing from whence it may be infer'd; and your Lordship would have done me a favour, to have set down the words where I say so,

so, or those from which you infer so, and shew'd how it follows from any thing I have said.

2. Granting that it were a Consequence from *my Idea of personal Identity*, that *any material Substance being united to the same Principle of Consciousness, makes the same Body*; this would not prove that *my Idea of personal Identity* was inconsistent with this Proposition, *That the same Body shall be rais'd*; but on the contrary, affirms it: since if I affirm, as I do, *That the same Persons shall be rais'd*, and it be a Consequence of *my Idea of personal Identity*, that *any material Substance being united to the same Principle of Consciousness, makes the same Body*; it follows, that if the same Person be rais'd, the same Body must be: And so I have herein not only said nothing inconsistent with the Resurrection of the same Body, but have said more for it than your Lordship. For there can be nothing plainer, than that in the Scripture it is reveal'd, that the same Persons shall be rais'd, and appear before the Judgment-Seat of Christ, to answer for what they have done in their Bodies. If therefore *whatever Matter* be join'd to the same Principle of Consciousness, makes the same Body; it is demonstration, That if the same Persons are rais'd, they have the same Bodies.

How then your Lordship makes this an Inconsistency with the Resurrection, is beyond my Conception. Yes, says your Lordship, *it is inconsistent with it, for P. 44. it makes the same Body which was here united to the Soul, not to be necessary.*

3. I answer therefore, Thirdly, That this is the first time I ever learnt, that *not necessary* was the same with *inconsistent*. I say, that a Body made up of the same numerical Parts of Matter, is not necessary to the making of the same Person; from whence it will indeed follow, that to the Resurrection of the same Person, the same numerical Particles of Matter are not requir'd. What does your Lordship infer from hence? to wit, this: Therefore he who thinks that the same Particles of Matter are not necessary to the making of the same Person, cannot believe that the same Persons shall be rais'd with Bodies made of the very same Particles of Matter, if God should reveal that it shall be so, *viz.* That the same Persons shall be rais'd with the same Bodies they had before: Which is all one as to say, That he who thought the blowing of Rams-Horns was not necessary in it self to the falling down of the Walls of Jericho, could not believe that they should fall upon the blowing of Rams-Horns, when God had declar'd it should be so.

Your Lordship says, *My Idea of personal Identity is inconsistent with the Article of the Resurrection*; the reason you ground it on, is this, because it makes not the same Body necessary to the making the same Person. Let us grant your Lordship's Consequence to be good, what will follow from it? No less than this, That your Lordship's Notion (for I dare not say your Lordship has any so dangerous things as *Ideas*) of personal Identity, is inconsistent with the Article of the Resurrection. The Demonstration of it is thus; your Lordship says, It is not necessary that the Body, to be rais'd at the last Day, should consist of the same Particles of Matter, which were united at the point of Death; for there must be a great alteration in them in a lingering Disease; as if a fat Man falls into a Consumption: You do not say the same Particles which the Sinner had at the very time of Commission of his Sins; for then a long Sinner must have a vast Body, considering the continual spending of Particles by Perspiration. And again, here your Lordship says, You allow the Notion of personal Identity to belong to the same Man under several Changes of Matter. From which words it is evident, That your Lordship supposes a Person in this World may be continu'd and preserv'd the same, in a Body not consisting of the same individual Particles of Matter; and hence it demonstratively follows, That let your Lordship's Notion of personal Identity be what it will, it makes the same Body not to be necessary to the same Person; and therefore it is, by your Lordship's Rule, inconsistent with the Article of the Resurrection. When your Lordship shall think fit to clear your own Notion of personal Identity from this Inconsistency with the Article of the Resurrection, I do not doubt but my *Idea of personal Identity* will be thereby clear'd too. Till then, all Inconsistency with that Article which your Lordship has here charg'd on mine, will unavoidably fall upon your Lordship's too.

But for the clearing of both, give me leave to say, my Lord, That whatsoever is not necessary, does thereby become inconsistent. It is not necessary to the

same Person, that his Body should always consist of the same numerical Particles; this is Demonstration, because the Particles of the Bodies of the same Persons in this Life change every moment, and your Lordship cannot deny it; and yet this makes it not *inconsistent* with God's preserving, if he thinks fit, to the same Persons, Bodies consisting of the same numerical Particles always from the Resurrection to Eternity. And so likewise, tho' I say any thing that supposes it *not necessary*, that the same numerical Particles, which were vitally united to the Soul in this Life, should be re-united to it at the Resurrection, and constitute the Body it shall then have; yet it is not *inconsistent* with this, That God may, if he pleases, give to every one a Body consisting only of such Particles as were before vitally united to his Soul. And thus, I think, I have clear'd my Book from all that *Inconsistency* which your Lordship charges on it, and would persuade the World it has with the *Article of the Resurrection of the Dead*.

Only before I leave it, I will set down the remainder of what your Lordship says upon this Head, that tho' I see not the Coherence nor Tendency of it, nor the Force of any Argument in it against me; yet nothing may be omitted that your Lordship has thought fit to entertain your Reader with on this new Point, nor any one have reason to suspect, that I have pass'd by any Word of your Lordship's (on this now first introduc'd Subject) wherein he might find your Lordship had prov'd what you had promis'd in

- P. 44. your Title-page. Your remaining Words are these: *The Dispute is not how far personal Identity in it self may consist in the very same material Substance; for we allow the Notion of personal Identity to belong to the same Man under several Changes of Matter; but whether it doth not depend upon a vital Union between the Soul and Body, and the Life which is consequent upon it: and therefore in the Resurrection, the same material Substance must be re-united, or else it cannot be call'd a Resurrection, but a Renovation; i. e. it may be a new Life, but not a raising the Body from the Dead*. I confess, I do not see how what is here usher'd in by the words *and therefore*, is a Consequence from the preceding Words; but as to the Propriety of the Name, I think it will not be much question'd, that if the same Man rise who was dead, it may very properly be call'd the *Resurrection of the Dead*; which is the Language of the Scripture.

- I must not part with this Article of the Resurrection, without returning
 P. 62. my Thanks to your Lordship for making me take notice of a Fault in my *Essay*. When I writ that Book, I took it for granted, as I doubt not but many others have done, that the Scripture had mention'd in express terms, *the Resurrection of the Body*: But upon the Occasion your Lordship has given me in your last Letter to look a little more narrowly into what Revelation has declar'd concerning the *Resurrection*, and finding no such express Words in the Scripture, as that *the Body shall rise or be rais'd*, or the *Resurrection of the Body*; I shall in the next Edition of it change these Words of
 Essay, B. 4. my Book, *The Dead Bodies of Men shall rise*, into these of the Scripture, *The*
 C. 18. §. 7. *Dead shall rise*. Not that I question, that the Dead shall be rais'd with Bodies: But in Matters of Revelation, I think it not only safest, but our Duty, as far as any one delivers it for Revelation, to keep close to the Words of the Scripture; unless he will assume to himself the Authority of one inspir'd, or make himself wiser than the holy Spirit himself: If I had spoke of the Resurrection in precisely Scripture-Terms, I had avoided giving your Lordship
 P. 63. the Occasion of making here such a verbal Reflection on my Words; *What, not if there be an Idea of Identity as to the Body?*

I come now to your Lordship's second Head of Accusation; your Lordship says,

2. *The next Articles of Faith, which my Notion of Ideas is inconsistent with, are no less than those of the Trinity and the Incarnation of our Saviour*. But all the Proof of Inconsistency your Lordship here brings, being drawn from my Notions of *Nature* and *Person*, whereof so much has been said already, the swelling my Answer into too great a Volume, will excuse me from setting down at large all that you have said hereupon, so particularly, as I have done in the precedent Article of the *Resurrection* which is wholly new.

Your

Your Lordship's way of proving, That my Ideas of Nature and Person cannot consist with the Articles of the Trinity and Incarnation, is, as far as I can understand it, this, That, I say, we have no simple Ideas, but by Sensation and Reflection, *But, says your Lordship, we cannot have any simple Ideas of Nature and Person, by Sensation and Reflection; Ergo, We can come to no Certainty about the Distinction of Nature and Person in my way of Ideas.* Answ. If your Lordship had concluded from thence, that therefore in my way of Ideas, we can have no Ideas at all of Nature and Person, it would have had some appearance of a Consequence; but as it is, it seems to me such an Argument as this: No simple Colours in Sir Godfrey Kneller's way of Painting come into his exact and lively Pictures but by his Pencil; but no simple Colours of a Ship and a Man come into his Pictures by his Pencil; *Ergo, We can come to no Certainty about the Distinction of a Ship and a Man, in Sir Godfrey Kneller's way of Painting.*

Your Lordship says, *It is not possible for us to have any simple Ideas of Nature and Person by Sensation and Reflection,* and I say so too; as impossible as it is to have a true Picture of a Rainbow in one simple Colour, which consists in the arrangement of many Colours. The Ideas signify'd by the Sounds *Nature* and *Person*, are each of them complex Ideas; and therefore it is as impossible to have a simple Idea of either of them, as to have a multitude in one, or a Composition in a Simple. But if your Lordship means, that by Sensation and Reflection we cannot have the simple Ideas, of which the complex ones of *Nature* and *Person* are compounded; that I must crave leave to dissent from, till your Lordship can produce a Definition (in intelligible Words, either of *Nature* or *Person*, in which all that is contained cannot ultimately be resolv'd into simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection.

Your Lordship's Definition of *Person*, is, *That it is a compleat intelligent Substance with a peculiar manner of Subsistence.* And my Definition of *Person*, which your Lordship quotes out of my Essay, is, "That *Person* stands for a thinking intelligent Being, that has Reason and Reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places." When your Lordship shall shew any Repugnancy in this my Idea (which I denote by the Sound *Person*) to the Incarnation of our Saviour, with which your Lordship's Notion of *Person* may not be equally charg'd; I shall give your Lordship an answer to it. This I say in answer to these Words, *which is repugnant to the Article of the Incarnation of our Saviour:* For the preceding reasoning, to which they refer, I must own I do not understand.

The word *Person* naturally signifies nothing that you allow; your Lordship, in your Definition of it, makes it stand for a general abstract Idea. *Person* then, in your Lordship, is liable to the same Default which you lay on it in me, viz. That it is no more than a Notion in the Mind. The same will be so of the word *Nature*, whenever your Lordship pleases to define it; without which you can have no Notion of it. And then the Consequence, which you there draw from their being no more than Notion of the Mind, will hold as much in Respect of your Lordship's Notion of *Nature* and *Person* as of mine, viz. *That one Nature and three Persons can be no more.* This I crave leave to say in answer to all that your Lordship has been pleas'd to urge from Page 46, to these words of your Lordship's, p. 52.

General Terms (as *Nature* and *Person* are in their ordinary use in our Language) are the Signs of general Ideas, and general Ideas exist only in the Mind; but particular things (which are the Foundations of these general Ideas, if they are abstracted as they should be) do, or may exist conformable to those general Ideas, and so fall under those general Names; as he that writes this Paper is a *Person* to him, i. e. may be denominated a *Person* by him to whose abstract Idea of *Person* he bears a Conformity; just as what I here write, is to him a *Book* or a *Letter*, to whose abstract Idea of a *Book* or a *Letter* it agrees. This is what I have said concerning this matter all along, and what, I humbly conceive, will serve for an answer to those Words of your Lordship, where you say, *You affirm that those who make Nature and Person to be only abstract and complex Ideas, can neither defend nor reasonably believe the Doctrine of the Trinity;* and to all that you say, p. 52—58. Only

give me leave to wish, that what your Lordship, out of a mistake of what I say concerning the Ideas of *Nature* and *Person*, has urg'd, as you pretend, against them, do not furnish your Adversaries in that Dispute, with such Arguments against you as your Lordship will not easily answer.

- P. 58. Your Lordship sets down these Words of mine, "Person in it self signifies nothing; but as soon as the common use of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea, then that is the true Idea of a Person;" which Words your Lordship interprets thus: i. e. *Men may call a Person what they please, for there is nothing but common use requir'd to it: They may call a Horse, or a Tree, or a Stone, a Person, if they think fit.* Answ. Men, before common use had appropriated this Name to that complex Idea which they now signify by the Sound *Person*, might have denoted it by the Sound *Stone*, and *vice versa*: But can your Lordship thence argue, as you do here, Men are at the same liberty in a Country where those Words are already in common use? There he that will speak properly, and so as to be understood, must appropriate each Sound us'd in that Language to an Idea in his Mind (which to himself is defining the Word) which is in some Degree conformable to the Idea that others apply it to.
- P. 59. Your Lordship, in the next Paragraph, sets down my Definition of the word *Person*, viz. "That Person stands for a thinking intelligent Being that hath Reason and Reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking Being in different times and places;" and then asks many Questions upon
- Vind. p. 261. it. I shall set down your Lordship's Definition of *Person*, which is this; *A Person is a compleat intelligent Substance with a peculiar manner of Subsistence: and then crave leave to ask your Lordship the same Questions concerning it,*
- P. 59. which your Lordship here asks me concerning mine; *How comes Person to stand for this and nothing else? From whence comes compleat Substance, or peculiar manner of Subsistence to make up the Idea of a Person? Whether it be true or false, I am not now to enquire; but how it comes into this Idea of a Person? Has common use of our Language appropriated it to this Sense? If not, this seems to be a mere arbitrary Idea; and may as well be deny'd as affirm'd. And what a fine pass are we come to, in your Lordship's way, if a mere arbitrary Idea must be taken into the only true Method of Certainty?—But if this be the true Idea of a Person, then there can be no Union of two Natures in one Person. For if a compleat intelligent Substance be the Idea of a Person, and the divine and human Natures be compleat intelligent Substances; then the Doctrine of the Union of two Natures and one Person is quite sunk, for here must be two Persons in this way of your Lordship's. Again, if this be the Idea of a Person, then where there are three Persons, there must be three distinct compleat intelligent Substances; and so there cannot be three Persons in the same individual Essence. And thus both these Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation are past recovery gone, if this way of your Lordship's, hold. These, my Lord, are your Lordship's very Words; what Force there is in them, I will not enquire: but I must beseech your Lordship to take them as Objections I make against your Notion of *Person*, to shew the Danger of it, and the Inconsistency it has with the Doctrine of the Trinity and Incarnation of our Saviour; and when your Lordship has remov'd the Objections that are in them, against your own Definition of *Person*, mine also, by the very same Answers, will be clear'd.*
- P. 61—65. Your Lordship's Argument, in the following Words, to Page 65. seems to me (as far as I can collect) to lie thus: Your Lordship tells me, that I say,
- P. 61. "That in Propositions, whose Certainty is built on clear and perfect Ideas, and evident Deductions of Reason, there no Proposition can be receiv'd for divine Revelation which contradicts them." This Proposition, not serving your Lordship's turn so well, for the Conclusion you design'd to draw from
- P. 62. it, your Lordship is pleas'd to enlarge it. For you ask, *But suppose I have Ideas sufficient for Certainty, what is to be done then?* From which Words and your following Discourse, if I can understand it, it seems to me, that your Lordship supposes it reasonable for me to hold, That wherever we are any how certain of any Propositions, whether their Certainty be built on clear and perfect Ideas or no, there no Proposition can be receiv'd for Divine Revelation, which contradicts them. And thence your Lordship concludes, That
- P. 64. because

because I say we may make some Propositions, of whose Truth we may be certain, concerning things whereof, we have not *Ideas* in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct; therefore my *Notion of Certainty by Ideas*, must overthrow the *Credibility of a Matter of Faith in all such Propositions, which are offer'd to be believ'd on the account of Divine Revelation*: A Conclusion which I am so unfortunate as not to find how it follows from your Lordship's Premises, because I cannot any way bring them into Mode and Figure with such a Conclusion. But this being no strange thing to me in my want of Skill in your Lordship's way of writing, I in the mean time crave leave to ask, Whether there be any Propositions your Lordship can be certain of, that are not divinely reveal'd? And here I will presume that your Lordship is not so sceptical, but that you can allow Certainty attainable in many things, by your natural Faculties. Give me leave then to ask your Lordship, Whether, where there be Propositions, of whose Truth you have certain Knowledge, you can receive any Proposition for Divine Revelation, which contradicts that Certainty? Whether that Certainty be built upon the Agreement of *Ideas*, such as we have, or on whatever else your Lordship builds it? If you cannot, as I presume your Lordship will say you cannot, I make bold to return you your Lordship's Questions here to me, in your own words: *Let us now suppose that you are to judg of a Proposition deliver'd as a Matter of Faith, where you have a Certainty by Reason from your Grounds, such as they: Can you, my Lord, assent to this as a Matter of Faith, when you are already certain of the contrary by your way? How is this possible? Can you believe that to be true, which you are certain is not true? Suppose it be, that there are two Natures in one Person, the Question is, Whether you can assent to this as a Matter of Faith? If you should say, where there are only Probabilities on the other side, I grant that you then allow Revelation is to prevail. But when you say you have Certainty by Ideas, or without Ideas to the contrary, I do not see how it is possible for you to assent to a Matter of Faith as true, when you are certain, from your Method, that it is not true. For how can you believe against Certainty — because the Mind is actually determin'd by Certainty. And so your Lordship's Notion of Certainty by Ideas, or without Ideas, be it what it will, must overthrow the Credibility of a Matter of Faith in all such Propositions, which are offer'd to be believ'd on the account of Divine Revelation.* This Argumentation and Conclusion is good against your Lordship, if it be good against me: For Certainty is Certainty, and he that is certain is certain, and cannot assent to that as true, which he is certain is not true, whether he supposes Certainty to consist in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, such as a Man has, or in any thing else. For whether those who have attain'd Certainty, not by the way of *Ideas*, can believe against Certainty, any more than those who have attain'd Certainty by *Ideas*, we shall then see, when your Lordship shall be pleas'd to shew the World your way to Certainty without *Ideas*.

P. 64.

Indeed if what your Lordship insinuates in the beginning of this Passage, which we are now upon, be true, your Lordship is safer (in your way without *Ideas*, i. e. without immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, if there be any such way) as to the understanding Divine Revelation right, than those who make use of *Ideas*: But yet you are still as far as they from assenting to that as true, which you are certain is not true. Your Lordship's Words are: *So great a difference is there between forming Ideas first, and then judging of Revelation by them, and the believing of Revelation on its proper Grounds, and the interpreting the Sense of it by the due measures of Reason.* If it be the Privilege of those alone who renounce *Ideas*, i. e. the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, to believe Revelation on its proper Grounds, and the interpreting the Sense of it, by the due measures of Reason; I shall not think it strange, that any one who undertakes to interpret the Sense of Revelation, should renounce *Ideas*, i. e. That he who would think right of the meaning of any Text of Scripture, should renounce and lay by all immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking.

P. 60.

But perhaps your Lordship does not here extend this Difference of believing Revelation on its proper Grounds, and not on its proper Grounds, to all those who are not, and all those who are for *Ideas*. But your Lordship makes this Comparison here, only between your Lordship and me, who you think am guilty of forming *Ideas* first, and then judging of Revelation by them. Answ. If so, then this

this lays the blame not on my Doctrine of *Ideas*, but on my particular ill use of them. That then which your Lordship would insinuate of me here, as a dangerous way to mistaking the Sense of the Scripture, is, That *I form Ideas first, and then judg of Revelation by them*; i. e. in plain *English*, That I get to my self, the best I can, the signification of the words, wherein the Revelation is deliver'd, and so endeavour to understand the Sense of the Revelation deliver'd in them. And pray, my Lord, does your Lordship do otherwise? Does the *believing of Revelation upon its proper Grounds, and the due measures of Reason*, teach you to judg of *Revelation*, before you understand the words it is deliver'd in; i. e. before you have *form'd the Ideas* in your Mind, as well as you can, which those words stand for? If the *due Measures of Reason* teach your Lordship this, I beg the Favour of your Lordship to tell me those *due Measures of Reason*, that I may leave those *undue Measures of Reason*, which I have hitherto follow'd in the interpreting the Sense of the Scripture, whose Sense it seems I should have interpreted first, and understood the Signification of the words afterwards.

My Lord, I read the Revelation of the Holy Scripture with a full assurance, that all it delivers is true: And tho' this be a submission to the Writings of those inspir'd Authors, which I neither have, nor can have, for those of any other Men; yet I use (and know not how to help it, till your Lordship shew me a better method in those *due measures of Reason*, which you mention) the same way to interpret to my self the Sense of that Book, that I do of any other. First, I endeavour to understand the Words and Phrases of the Language I read it in, i. e. to *form Ideas* they stand for. If your Lordship means any thing else by *forming Ideas first*, I confess I understand it not. And if there be any Word or Expression, which in that Author, or in that place of that Author, seems to have a peculiar meaning, i. e. to stand for an *Idea*, which is different from that, which the common use of that Language has made it a Sign of, that *Idea* also I endeavour to form in my Mind, by comparing this Author with himself, and observing the Design of his Discourse, that so, as far as I can, by a sincere Endeavour, I may have the same *Ideas* in every place when I read the Words, which the Author had when he writ them. But here, my Lord, I take care not to take those for words of Divine Revelation, which are not the words of inspired Writers: Nor think my self concern'd with that Submission to receive the Expressions of fallible Men, and to labour to find out their meaning, or, as your Lordship phrases it, *interpret their Sense*; as if they were the Expressions of the Spirit of God, by the Mouths or Pens of Men inspir'd and guided by that infallible Spirit. This, my Lord, is the Method I use in *interpreting the Sense* of the Revelation of the Scriptures; if your Lordship knows that I do otherwise, I desire you to convince me of it: And if your Lordship does otherwise, I desire you to shew me wherein your Method differs from mine, that I may reform upon so good a Pattern: For as for what you accuse me of in the following words, it is that which either has no Fault in it, or if it has, your Lordship, I humbly conceive, is as guilty as I. Your words are,

P. 60. *I may pretend what I please, That I hold the Assurance of Faith, and the Certainty by Ideas, to go upon very different Grounds; but when a Proposition is offer'd me out of Scripture to be believed, and I doubt about the Sense of it, is not Recourse to be made to my Ideas? Give me leave, my Lord, with all Submission, to return your Lordship the same words. Your Lordship may pretend what you please, that you hold the Assurance of Faith, and the Certainty of Knowledg to stand upon different Grounds (for I presume your Lordship will not say, that believing and knowing stand upon the same Grounds, for that would, I think, be to say, That Probability and Demonstration are the same thing) but when a Proposition is offer'd you out of Scripture to be believ'd, and you doubt about the Sense of it, is not recourse to be made to your Notions? What, my Lord, is the difference here between your Lordship's and my way in the Case? I must have recourse to my Ideas, and your Lordship must have recourse to your Notions. For I think you cannot believe a Proposition contrary to your own Notions; for then you would have the same, and different Notions, at the same time. So that all the difference between your Lordship and me, is, that we do both the same thing; only your Lordship shews a great Dislike to my using the term *Idea*.*

But

But the Instance your Lordship here gives, is beyond my Comprehension. You say, *A Proposition is offer'd me out of Scripture to be believed, and I doubt about the Sense of it.*—As in the present Case, whether there can be three Persons in one Nature, or two Natures and one Person. My Lord, my Bible is faulty again; for I do not remember that I ever read in it either of these Propositions; in these precise words, *There are three Persons in one Nature, or, There are two Natures and one Person.* When your Lordship shall shew me a Bible wherein they are so set down, I shall then think them a good Instance of *Propositions offer'd me out of Scripture*; till then, whoever shall say that they are Propositions in the Scripture, when there are no such words, so put together, to be found in Holy Writ, seems to me to make a new Scripture in Words and Propositions, that the Holy Ghost dictated not. I do not here question their Truth, nor deny that they may be drawn from the Scripture: But I deny that these very Propositions are in express words in my Bible. For that is the only thing I deny here; if your Lordship can shew them me in your's, I beg you to do it.

In the mean time, taking them to be as true as if they were the very words of Divine Revelation; the Question then is, how must we interpret the Sense of them? For supposing them to be Divine Revelation, to ask, as your Lordship here does, *what Resolution I, or any one, can come to about their Possibility*, seems to me to involve a Contradiction in it. For whoever admits a Proposition to be of Divine Revelation, supposes it not only to be possible, but true. Your Lordship's Question then can mean only this, What Sense can I, upon my principles, come to, of either of these Propositions, but in the way of Ideas? And I crave leave to ask your Lordship, what Sense of them can your Lordship upon your Principles come to, but in the way of Notions? Which, in plain English, amounts to no more than this; That your Lordship must understand them according to the Sense you have of those Terms they are made up of, and I according to the Sense I have of those Terms. Nor can it be otherwise, unless your Lordship can take a Term in any Proposition to have one Sense, and yet understand it in another: And thus we see, that in effect Men have differently understood and interpreted the Sense of these Propositions; whether they us'd the way of Ideas or not, i. e. whether they call'd what any word stood for *Notion*, or *Sense*, or *Meaning*, or *Idea*.

I think my self obliged to return your Lordship my Thanks, for the News you write me here, of one who has found a secret way how the same Body may be in distant Places at once. It making no part, that I can see, of the Reasoning your Lordship was then upon, I can take it only for a piece of News: And the Favour was the greater, that your Lordship was pleas'd to stop your self in the midst of so serious an Argument as the *Articles of the Trinity and Incarnation*, to tell it me. And methinks 'tis pity that that Author had not us'd some of the words of my Book, which might have serv'd to have ty'd him and me together. For his *Secret* about a Body in two Places at once, which he does keep up; and my *Secret* about Certainty, which your Lordship thinks had been better kept up too, being all your words; bring me into his Company but very untowardly. If your Lordship would be pleas'd to shew, that my *Secret* about Certainty (as you think fit to call it) is false or erroneous, the World would see a good Reason why you should think it better kept up; till then perhaps they may be apt to suspect, that the Fault is not so much in my publish'd *Secret* about Certainty, as somewhere else. But since your Lordship thinks it had been better kept up, I promise that as soon as you shall do me the Favour to make publick a better Notion of Certainty than mine, I will by a publick Retraction call in mine: Which I hope your Lordship will do, for I dare say no Body will think it good or friendly Advice to your Lordship, if you have such a *Secret*, that you should keep it up.

Your Lordship, with some Emphasis, bids me observe my own Words, that I here positively say, "That the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know." So that it is plain here, that I place Certainty only in evident Knowledge, or in clear and distinct Ideas; and yet my great Complaint of your Lordship was, That you charg'd this upon me, and now your Lordship finds it in my own words. Answ. My own words, in that place, are, *The mind is not certain of what it doth not evidently know*; but in them, or that Passage, as set down

down by your Lordship, there is not the least mention of *clear and distinct* Ideas : and therefore I should wonder to hear your Lordship so solemnly call them *my own words*, when they are but what your Lordship would have to be a Consequence of my words ; were it not, as I humbly conceive, a way not unfrequent with your Lordship to speak of that, which you think a Consequence from any thing said, as if it were the very thing said. It rests therefore upon your Lordship to prove, that *evident Knowledge* can be only where the *Ideas* concerning which it is, are perfectly clear and distinct. I am certain, that I have evident Knowledge, that the *Substance* of my Body and Soul exists, tho' I am as certain that I have but a very obscure and confus'd *Idea* of any *Substance* at all : So that my Complaint of your Lordship, upon that account, remains very well founded, notwithstanding any thing you alledg here.

- P. 65. Your Lordship, *summing up the force of what you have said*, adds, *That you have pleaded*, (1.) *That my Method of Certainty shakes the Belief of Revelation in general.* (2.) *That it shakes the Belief of particular Propositions or Articles of Faith, which depend upon the Sense of Words contain'd in Scripture.*

That your Lordship has *pleaded*, I grant ; but with Submission, I deny that you have prov'd,

(1.) That my Definition of Knowledge, which is that which your Lordship calls my *Method of Certainty*, *shakes the Belief of Revelation in general.* For all that your Lordship offers for Proof of it, is only the alledging some other Passages out of my Book, quite different from that my Definition of Knowledge, which, you endeavour to shew, do shake the Belief of Revelation in general : But indeed have not, nor, I humbly conceive, cannot shew that they do any ways *shake the Belief of Revelation in general.* But if they did, it does not at all follow from thence, that my Definition of Knowledge ; *i. e. my Method of Certainty*, at all *shakes the Belief of Revelation in general*, which was what your Lordship undertook to prove.

- P. 65. (2.) As to the *shaking the Belief of particular Propositions or Articles of Faith, which depend, as you here say, upon the Sense of Words* ; I think I have sufficiently clear'd my self from that Charge, as will yet be more evident from what your Lordship here farther argues.

Your Lordship says, my placing *Certainty* in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, *shakes the Foundations of the Articles of Faith* [above-mention'd] *which depend upon the Sense of Words contain'd in the Scripture* : And the reason your Lordship gives for it, is this, because *I do not say we are to believe all that we find there express'd* : My Lord, upon reading these words, I consulted the *Errata*, to see whether the Printer had injur'd you : For I could not easily believe that your Lordship should reason after a Fashion, that would justify such a conclusion as this, *viz. Your Lordship, in your Letter to me, does not say that we are to believe all that we find express'd in Scripture* ; therefore your Notion of Certainty shakes the Belief of this Article of Faith, that Jesus Christ descended into Hell. This, I think, will scarce hold for a good Consequence, till the *not saying* any Truth, be the denying of it : and then if my *not saying* in my Book, *That we are to believe all there express'd*, be to deny, *That we are to believe all that we find there express'd* ; I fear many of your Lordship's Books will be found to *shake the Belief* of several or all the *Articles of our Faith*. But supposing this Consequence to be good, *viz. I do not say*, therefore I deny, and thereby *I shake the Belief of some Articles of Faith* ; how does this prove, That my placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, shakes any Article of Faith ? unless my saying, that Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, in the 301st Page of my Essay, be a Proof, that *I do not say*, in any other Part of that Book, *that we are to believe all that we find express'd in Scripture.*

- P. 65. But perhaps the remaining words of the Period will help us out in your Lordship's Argument, which all together stands thus : *Because I do not say we are to believe all that we find there express'd ; but [I do say] in case we have any clear and distinct Ideas, which limit the Sense another way than the words seem to carry it ; we are to judg that to be the true Sense.* My Lord, I do not remember where I say, what in the latter part of this Period your Lordship makes me say ; and your Lordship would have done me a Favour to have quoted the place. Indeed

deed I do say, in the Chapter your Lordship seems to be upon, "That no Proposition can be receiv'd for Divine Revelation, or obtain the Assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive Knowledge." This is what I there say, and all that I there say: which in effect is this, That no Proposition can be receiv'd for Divine Revelation, which is contradictory to a self-evident Proposition; and if that be it which your Lordship makes me say here in the foregoing words, I agree to it, and would be glad to know whether your Lordship differs in Opinion from me in it. But this not answering your purpose, your Lordship would, in the following words of this Paragraph, change self-evident Proposition into a Proposition we have attain'd Certainty of, tho' by imperfect Ideas: In which Sense the Proposition your Lordship argues for as mine, will stand thus, That no Proposition can be receiv'd for Divine Revelation, or obtain the Assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to any Proposition, of whose Trnth we are by any way certain. And then I desire your Lordship to name the two contradictory Propositions, the one of Divine Revelation, I do not assent to; the other, that I have attain'd to a Certainty of by my imperfect Ideas, which makes me reject, or not assent to that of Divine Revelation. The very setting down of these two contradictory Propositions, will be Demonstration against me, and if your Lordship cannot (as I humbly conceive you cannot) name any two such Propositions, 'tis an Evidence, that all this Dust, that is rais'd, is only a great deal of talk about what your Lordship cannot prove: For that your Lordship has not yet prov'd any such thing, I am humbly of Opinion I have already shewn. P. 65.

Your Lordship's Discourse of *Des Cartes*, in the following Pages, is, I think, as far as I am concern'd in it, to shew, that Certainty cannot be had by Ideas; because *Des Cartes* using the Term *Idea*, miss'd of it. *Answ.* The Question between your Lordship and me, not being about *Des Cartes's*, but my Notion of Certainty, your Lordship will put an end to my Notion of Certainty by Ideas, whenever your Lordship shall prove, That Certainty cannot be attain'd any way by the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, i.e. by Ideas; or that Certainty does not consist in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas; or lastly, when your Lordship shall shew us what else Certainty does consist in. When your Lordship shall do either of these three, I promise your Lordship to renounce my Notion, or Way, or Method, or Grounds (or whatever else your Lordship has been pleas'd to call it) of Certainty by Ideas. P. 66—69.

The next Paragraph is to shew the Inclination your Lordship has to favour me in the words it may be. I shall be always sorry to have mistaken any one's, especially your Lordship's Inclination to favour me: But since the Press has publish'd this to the World, the World must now be Judg of your Lordship's Inclination to favour me. P. 69, 70.

The three or four following Pages are to shew That your Lordship's Exception against Ideas, was not against the Term Ideas, and that I mistook you in it. *Answ.* My Lord, I must own that there are very few Pages of your Letters, when I come to examine what is the precise meaning of your words, either as making distinct Propositions, or a continu'd Discourse, wherein I do not think my self in danger to be mistaken; but whether, in the present Case, one much more learned than I would not have understood your Lordship as I did, must be left to those who will be at the Pains to consider your words, and my Reply to them. Your Lordship saying, As I have stated my Notion Ideas, it may be of dangerous Consequence; seem'd to me to say no more, but that my Book in general might be of dangerous Consequence. This seeming too general an Accusation, I endeavour'd to find what it was more particularly in it, which your Lordship thought might be of dangerous Consequence. And the first thing I thought you excepted against, was the use of the Term Idea: But your Lordship tells me here, I was mistaken, it was not the Term Idea you excepted against, but the way of Certainty by Ideas. To excuse my Mistake, I have this to say for my self, that reading in your first Letter these express words; When new Terms are made use of by ill Men to promote Scepticism and Infidelity, and to overthrow the Mysteries of our Faith, we have then Reason to enquire into them, and to examine the Foundation and Tendency of them; it could not be very strange, if I understood them to refer to Terms: but it seems I was mistaken, and should have understood

stood by *Them*, my way of Certainty by *Ideas*, and should have read your Lordship's words thus: *When new Terms are made use of by ill Men, to promote Scepticism and Infidelity, and to overthrow the Mysteries of Faith, we have then reason to enquire into Them, i. e. Mr. L's Definition of Knowledge, (for that is my way of Certainty by Ideas) and then to examine the Foundation and Tendency of Them, i. e. this Proposition, viz. That Knowledge or Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas. Them, in your Lordship's words, as I thought (for I am scarce ever sure what your Lordship means by Them) necessarily referring to what ill Men made use of for the promoting of Scepticism and Infidelity, I thought it had refer'd to Terms. Why so? says your Lordship: your Quarrel, you say, was not with the term Ideas. But that which you insisted upon, was the way of Certainty by Ideas, and the new Terms as employ'd to that purpose; and therefore 'tis that which your Lordship must be understood to mean, by what ill Men make use of, &c. Now I appeal to my Reader, whether I may not be excus'd, if I took *Them* rather to refer to *Terms*, a word in the plural Number preceding in the same Period, than to way of Certainty by *Ideas*, which is of the singular Number, and neither preceding, no nor so much as express'd in the same Sentence? And if by my Ignorance in the use of the Pronoun *Them*, 'tis my misfortune to be often at a loss in the understanding of your Lordship's Writing, I hope I shall be excus'd.*

- Another Excuse for my understanding that one of the things in my Book which your Lordship thought might be of dangerous Consequence, was the term *Idea*, may be found in these words of your Lordship: *But what need all this great noise about Ideas and Certainty, true and real Certainty by Ideas; if after all it comes only to this, That our Ideas only present to us such things from whence we bring Arguments to prove the Truth of things? But the World hath been strangely amus'd with Ideas of late; and we have been told, that strange things might be done by the help of Ideas, and yet these Ideas at last come to be common Notions of things, which we must make use of in our Reasoning. I shall offer one Passage more for my excuse, out of the same Page. I had said in my Chapter about the Existence of God, I thought it most proper to express my self in the most usual and familiar way, by common Words and Expressions: Your Lordship wishes I had done so quite thro' my Book; for then I had never given that occasion to the Enemies of our Faith, to take up my new way of Ideas, as an effectual Battery (as they imagin'd) against the Mysteries of the Christian Faith. But I might have enjoy'd the Satisfaction of my Ideas long enough, before your Lordship had taken notice of them, unless you had found them employ'd in doing mischief. Thus this Passage stands in your Lordship's former Letter, tho' here your Lordship gives us but a part of it; and that part your Lordship breaks off into two, and gives us inverted and in other words. Perhaps those who observe this, and better understand the Arts of Controversy than I do, may find some skill in it. But your Lordship breaks off the former Passage at these words, *strange things might be done by the help of Ideas*: and then adding these new ones, *i. e. as to matter of Certainty*, leave out those which contain your wish, *That I had express'd my self in the most usual way by common Words and Expressions quite thro' my Book*, as I had done in my Chapter of the Existence of a God; for then, says your Lordship, *I had not given that occasion to the Enemies of our Faith to take up my new way of Ideas, as an effectual Battery, &c.* which Wish of your Lordship's is, *That I had all along left out the term Idea, as is plain from my Words which you refer to in your Wish, as they stand in my first Letter; viz. "I thought it most proper to express my self in the most usual and familiar way—by common Words and known ways of Expression; and therefore, "as I think, I have scarce used the word Idea in that whole Chapter."* Now I must again appeal to my Reader, whether your Lordship having so plainly wish'd that I had used *common Words and Expressions* in opposition to the term *Idea*, I am not excusable if I took you to mean that Term? tho' your Lordship leaves out the Wish, and instead of it puts in, *i. e. as to matter of Certainty*, words which were not in your former Letter; tho' it be for mistaking you in my Answer to that Letter, that you here blame me. I must own, my Lord, my Dulness will be very apt to mistake you in Expressions seemingly so plain as these, till I can presume my self quick-sighted enough to understand Mens Meaning*
- Ans. 1.
p. 92, 93.
- Ans. 1.
p. 93.
- P. 72, 73.
- P. 72.
- Ans. 1. p. 93.
- Lett. 1. p. 127.

Meaning in their Writings not by their Expressions ; which I confess I am not ; and is an Art I find my self too old now to learn.

But bare Mistake is not all ; your Lordship accuses me also of Unfairness and P. 73. Disingenuity in understanding these words of your's, *The World has been strangely amus'd with Ideas, and yet these Ideas at last come to be only common Notions of things* ; as if in them your Lordship own'd *Ideas to be only common Notions of things*. To this, my Lord, I must humbly crave leave to answer, That there was no Unfairness or Disingenuity in my saying your Lordship own'd *Ideas* for such, because I understood you to speak in that place in your own sense ; and thereby to shew that the new term *Idea* need not be introduc'd, when it signify'd only the common Notion of things, i. e. signify'd no more than *Notion* doth, which is a more usual word. This I took to be your meaning in that place ; and whether I or any one might not so understand it, without deserving to be told, That this is a way of turning things upon your Lordship which you did not expect from me, or P. 73. such a solemn Appeal as this, *Judge now how fair and ingenuous this Answer is* ; I leave to any one, who will but do me the favour to cast his eye on the Passage above-quoted, as it stands in your Lordship's own words in your first Letter. For I humbly beg leave to say, That I cannot but wonder to find, that when your Lordship is charging me with want of Fairness and Ingenuity, you should leave out, in the quoting of your own words, those which serv'd most to justify the Sense I had taken them in, and put others in the stead of them. In your first Letter they stand thus : *But the World hath been strangely amus'd with Ideas of late, and we have been told that strange things might be done by the help of Ideas ; and yet these Ideas at last come to be only common Notions of things, which we must make use of in our Reasoning ; and so on, to the end of what is above set down : all* Answ. 1. p. 92, 93. which I quoted, to secure my self from being suspected to turn things upon your Lordship, in a sense which your words (that the Reader had before him) would not bear : And in your second Letter, in the place now under consideration, they stand thus ; *But the World hath been strangely amus'd with Ideas of late, and we have been told that strange things may be done with Ideas, i. e. as to matter of Certainty : and there your Lordship ends. Will your Lordship give me leave now to use your own words, Judge now how fair and ingenuous this is ! Words which I should not use, but that I find them used by your Lordship in this very Passage, and upon this very Occasion.* Answ. 1. p. 93. Lett. 1. p. 62.

I grant my self a mortal Man very liable to Mistakes, especially in your Writings : but that in my Mistakes, I am guilty of any Unfairness or Disingenuity, your Lordship will, I humbly conceive, pardon me, if I think it will pass for want of Fairness and Ingenuity in any one, without clear Evidence, to accuse me. To avoid any such Suspicion, in my first Letter I set down every word contain'd in those Pages of your Book which I was concern'd in ; and in my second, I set down most of the Passages of your Lordship's first Answer that I reply'd to. But because the doing it all along in this ; would, I find, too much increase the Bulk of my Book ; I earnestly beg every one, who will think this my Reply worth his Perusal, to lay your Lordship's Letter before him, that he may see whether in these Pages I direct my Answer to, without setting them down at large, there be any thing material unanswer'd, or unfairly or disingenuously represented.

Your Lordship, in the next words, gives a reason why I ought to have understood your words, as a Consequence of my Assertion, and not as your own Sense, viz. *Because you all along distinguish the way of Reason, by deducing one thing from another, from my way of Certainty in the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas.* Answ. I know your Lordship does all along talk of Reason, and my way by Ideas, as distinct or opposite : But this is the thing I have and do complain of, That your Lordship does speak of them as distinct, without shewing wherein they are different, since the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, which is my way of Certainty, is also the way of Reason. For the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, is either by an immediate Comparison of two Ideas, as in self-evident Propositions ; which way of Knowledge of Truth, is the way of Reason ; or by the Intervention of intermediate Ideas, i. e. by the Deduction of one thing from another, which is also the way of Reason, as I have shewn ; where I answer to your speaking of Certainty plac'd in good and sound Reason, and Lett. 1. p. 128.

not in Ideas: In which place, as in several others, your Lordship opposes *Ideas* and *Reason*, which your Lordship calls here *distinguishing* them. But to continue to speak frequently of two things as different, or of two ways as opposite, without ever shewing any difference or opposition in them, after it has been press'd for, is a way of Ingenuity which your Lordship will pardon to my Ignorance, if I have not formerly been acquainted with: and therefore, when you shall have shewn, that Reasoning about *Ideas*, or by *Ideas*, is not the same way of Reasoning, as that about or by *Notions* or *Conceptions*, and that what I mean by *Ideas* is not the same that your Lordship means by *Notions*; you will have

P. 73. some reason to blame me for mistaking you in the Passages above-quoted.

For if your Lordship, in those words, does not except against the term *Ideas*, but allows it to have the same Signification with *Notions*, or *Conceptions*, or *Apprehensions*; then your Lordship's words will run thus: *But what need all this great noise about Notions, or Conceptions, or Apprehensions? and the World has been strangely amus'd with Notions, or Conceptions, or Apprehensions of late*: which, whether it be that which your Lordship will own to be your meaning, I must leave to your Consideration.

P. 74. Your Lordship proceeds to examine *my new Method of Certainty*, as you are pleas'd to call it.

To my asking *whether there be any other or older Method of Certainty*, your Lordship answers, *That is not the point; but whether mine be any at all: which your Lordship denies*. Answ. I grant, to him that barely denies it to be *any at all*, it is *not the point*, whether there be any *older*; but to him that calls it a *new Method*, I humbly conceive it will not be thought wholly besides *the point*, to shew an *older*; at least, that it ought to have prevented these following words of your Lordship's, *viz. That your Lordship did never pretend to inform the World of new Methods*: which being in answer to my Desire, that you would be pleas'd to shew me an *older*, or another Method, plainly imply, That your Lordship supposes, that whoever will inform the World of another Method of Certainty than mine, can do it only by *informing* them of a *new one*. But since this is the Answer your Lordship pleases to make to my Request, I crave leave to consider it a little.

Your Lordship having pronounc'd concerning my Definition of Knowledge, which you call *my Method of Certainty*, *That it might be of dangerous consequence to an Article of the Christian Faith*; I desir'd you to shew in what Certainty lies: and desir'd it of your Lordship by these pressing Considerations, That it would secure that Article of Faith against any *dangerous Consequence* from my way, and be a great service to Truth in general. To which your Lordship replies here,

Lett. 2. p. 87, 88.

P. 75. *That you did never pretend to inform the World of New Methods; and therefore, are not bound to go any farther than what you found fault with, which was my new Method*.

Answ. My Lord, I did not desire any *new Method* of you, I observ'd your Lordship in more places than one, reflected on me for *writing out of my own Thoughts*: and therefore I could not expect from your Lordship what you so much condemn in another. Besides, one of the faults you found with my Method, was, That it was *New*: And therefore if your Lordship will look again into that Passage, where I desire you to *set the World right in a thing of that great consequence*, as it is to know wherein Certainty consists; you will not find, that I mention any thing of a *new Method* of Certainty: my words were *another*, whether old or new, was indifferent. In truth, all that I requested, was only such a *Method of Certainty*, as your Lordship approv'd of, and was secure in; and therefore I do not see how your *not pretending to inform the World in any new Methods*, can be any way alledg'd as a Reason for refusing so useful and so charitable a thing.

Lett. 2. p. 88.

P. 75. Your Lordship farther adds, *That you are not bound to go any farther, than what you found fault with*. Answ. I suppose your Lordship means, That you are not bound by the Law of Disputation; nor are you, as I humbly conceive, by this Law forbid: or if you were, the Law of the Schools could not dispense with the eternal Divine Law of Charity. The Law of Disputing, whence had it its so mighty a Sanction? It is at best but the Law of Wrangling, if it shut out the great Ends of Information and Instruction; and serves only to flatter a little guilty Vanity, in a Victory over an Adversary less skilful in this Art of Fencing.

Who

Who can believe, that upon so slight an account your Lordship should neglect your Design of writing against me? The great Motives of your Concern for an *Article of the Christian Faith*, and of that *Duty* which you profess has made you do *what you have done*, will be believ'd to work more uniformly in your Lordship, than to let a Father of the Church, and a Teacher in *Israel*, not tell one who asks him, which is the right and safe way, if he knows it. No, no, my Lord, a Character so much to the prejudice of your Charity, no Body will receive of your Lordship; no, not from your self: Whatever your Lordship may say, the World will believe, That you would have given a better *Method of Certainty*, if you had had one; when thereby you would have secur'd Men from the danger of running into Errors in *Articles of Faith*, and effectually have recall'd them from *my way of Certainty*, which leads, as your Lordship says, to *Scepticism* and *Infidelity*. For to turn Men from a way they are in, the bare telling them it is dangerous, puts but a short Stop to their going on in it: There is nothing effectual to set them a-going right, but to shew them which is the safe and sure way; a piece of Humanity, which when ask'd, no Body, as far as he knows, refuses another; and this I have earnestly ask'd of your Lordship.

Your Lordship represents to me the *Unsatisfactoriness* and *Inconsistency* of my way P. 75. of Certainty, by telling me, That it seems still a strange thing to you, that I should talk so much of a new *Method of Certainty by Ideas*; and yet allow, as I do, such a want of *Ideas*, so much Imperfection in them, and such a want of Connection between our *Ideas*, and the things themselves. *Answ.* This Objection being so visibly against the Extent of our Knowledge, and not the Certainty of it by *Ideas*, would need no other Answer but this, that it prov'd nothing to the Point; which was to shew, that *my way by Ideas*, was no way to Certainty at all; not to true Certainty, which is a Term your Lordship uses here, which I shall be able to conceive what you P. 76. mean by, when you shall be pleas'd to tell me what *false Certainty* is.

But because what you say here, is in short what you ground your Charge of *Scepticism* on, in your former Letter; I shall here, according to my Promise, consider what your Lordship says there, and hope you will allow this to be no unfit Place.

Your Charge of *Scepticism*, in your former Letter, is as followeth.

Your Lordship's first Argument consists in these Propositions, viz.

Answ. i. p. 125—131.

1. That I say, p. 125. That Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*.

2. That I go about to prove, That there are very many more Beings, of which we have no *Ideas*, than those of which we have; from whence your Lordship draws this Conclusion, That we are excluded from attaining any Knowledge, as to the far greatest part of the Universe: which I agree to. But with Submission, this is not the Proposition to be prov'd, but this, viz. That *my way by Ideas*, or *my way of Certainty by Ideas*, for to that your Lordship reduces it; i. e. my placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*; leads to *Scepticism*.

Farther, from my saying, that the intellectual World is greater and more beautiful certainly than the material, your Lordship argues, That if Certainty may be had by general Reasons without particular *Ideas* in one, it may also in other Cases. *Answ.* It may, no doubt: But this is nothing against any thing I have said; for I have neither said, nor suppose, That Certainty by general Reasons, or any Reasons can be had without *Ideas*; no more than I say, or suppose, that we can reason without thinking, or think without immediate Objects of our Minds in thinking, i. e. think without *Ideas*. But your Lordship asks, *Whence comes this Certainty* (for I say certainly) *where there be no particular Ideas*, if Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*? I answer, we have *Ideas* as far as we are certain; and beyond that, we have neither Certainty, no nor Probability. Every thing which we either know or believe, is some Proposition: Now no Proposition can be fram'd as the Object of our Knowledge or Assent, wherein two *Ideas* are not join'd to, or separated from one another. As for Example, when I affirm that *something exists in the World*, whereof I have no *Idea*, Existence is affirm'd of something, some Being: And I have as clear an *Idea* of Existence and Something, the two things join'd in that Proposition, as I have of them in this Proposition, *Something exists in the World*,

Answ. i. p. 126.

Essay, B. 4.
C. 3.

World, whereof I have an Idea. When therefore I affirm, that the intellectual World is greater and more beautiful than the material; whether I should know the truth of this Proposition, either by Divine Revelation, or should assert it as highly probable (which is all I do in that Chapter, out of which this Instance is brought) it means no more but this, *viz.* That there are more, and more beautiful Beings, whereof we have no *Ideas*, than there are of which we have *Ideas*; of which Beings, whereof we have no *Ideas*, we can, for want of *Ideas*, have no farther Knowledge, but that such Beings do exist.

Essay, B. 4.
C. 3.

If your Lordship shall now ask me, how I know there are such Beings; I answer, that in that Chapter of the *Extent of our Knowledge*, I do not say I know, but I endeavour to shew, that it is most highly probable: But yet a Man is capable of knowing it to be true, because he is capable of having it reveal'd to him by God, that this Proposition is true, *viz.* That in the Works of God there are more, and more beautiful Beings, whereof we have no *Ideas*, than there are whereof we have *Ideas*. If God, instead of shewing the very things to St. Paul, had only reveal'd to him, that this Proposition was true, *viz.* That there were things in Heaven, *which neither Eye had seen, nor Ear had heard, nor had enter'd into the Heart of Man to conceive*; would he not have known the Truth of that Proposition of whose Terms he had *Ideas*, *viz.* of *Beings*, whereof he had no other *Ideas*, but barely as something, and of *Existence*; tho' in the want of other *Ideas* of them, he could attain no other Knowledge of them, but barely that they existed? So that in what I have there said, there is no Contradiction nor Shadow of a Contradiction, to my placing Knowledge in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*.

But if I should any where mistake, and say any thing inconsistent with that way of Certainty of mine; how, I beseech your Lordship, could you conclude from thence, that the placing Knowledge in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, tends to Scepticism? That which is the Proposition here to be prov'd, would remain still unprov'd: For I might say things inconsistent with this Proposition, That Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Connection and Agreement or Disagreement and Repugnancy of our *Ideas*; and yet that Proposition be true, and very far from tending to Scepticism, unless your Lordship will argue that every Proposition that is inconsistent with what a Man any where says, tends to Scepticism; and then I should be tempted to infer, that many Propositions in the Letters your Lordship has honour'd me with, will tend to Scepticism.

Ans. 1.
p. 125, 127.

Your Lordship's second Argument is from my saying, "We have no *Ideas* of the mechanical Affections of the minute Particles of Bodies, which hinders our certain Knowledge of universal Truths concerning natural Bodies:" from whence your Lordship concludes, *That since we can attain to no Science, as to Bodies or Spirits, our Knowledge must be confin'd to a very narrow compass.* I grant it; but I crave leave to mind your Lordship again, that this is not the Proposition to be prov'd: A little Knowledge is still Knowledge, and not Scepticism. But let me have affirm'd our Knowledge to be comparatively very little; how, I beseech your Lordship, does that any way prove, that this Proposition, "Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas*," any ways tends to Scepticism? which was the Proposition to be prov'd. But the Inference, your Lordship shuts up this Head with, in these Words: *So that all Certainty is given up in the way of Knowledge, as to the visible and invisible World, or at least the greatest part of them*; shewing in the first part of it what your Lordship should have infer'd, and was willing to infer, does at last by these Words in the Close, *Or at least the greatest part of Them*, I guess, come just to nothing: I say, I guess; for what *Them*, by Grammatical Construction, is to be refer'd to, seems not clear to me.

Ans. 1.
p. 127.

Ans. 1.
p. 128.

Your third Argument being just of the same kind with the former, only to shew, That I reduce our Knowledge to a very narrow Compass, in respect of the whole Extent of *Beings*; is already answered.

Ans. 1.
p. 129.

In the fourth place your Lordship sets down some words of mine concerning Reasoning and Demonstration; and then concludes, *But if there be no way of coming to Demonstration but this, I doubt we must be content without it.* Which being nothing but a Declaration of your Doubt, is, I grant, a very short way of proving

proving any Proposition; and I shall leave to your Lordship the Satisfaction you have in such a Proof, since I think it will scarce convince others.

In the last place, your Lordship argues, That because I say, that the *Idea* in the Mind proves not the Existence of that thing whereof it is an *Idea*, therefore we cannot know the actual Existence of any thing by our Senses: because we know nothing, but by the perceiv'd Agreement of *Ideas*. But if you had been pleas'd to have consider'd my Answer there to the *Scepticks*, whose Cause you here seem, with no small vigour, to manage; you would, I humbly conceive, have found that you mistake one thing for another, viz. The *Idea* that has by a former Sensation been lodg'd in the Mind, for actually receiving any *Idea*, i. e. *actual Sensation*; which, I think, I need not go about to prove are two distinct things, after what you have here quoted out of my Book. Now the two *Ideas*, that in this case are perceiv'd to agree, and do thereby produce Knowledge, are the *Idea* of *actual Sensation* (which is an Action whereof I have a clear and distinct *Idea*) and the *Idea* of *actual Existence* of something without me that causes that Sensation. And what other Certainty your Lordship has by your Senses of the existing of any thing without you, but the perceiv'd Connection of those two *Ideas*, I would gladly know. When you have destroy'd this Certainty, which I conceive is the utmost, as to this matter, which our infinitely Wise and Bountiful Maker has made us capable of in this state; your Lordship will have well assisted the *Scepticks* in carrying their Arguments against Certainty by Sense, beyond what they could have expected.

I cannot but fear, my Lord, that what you have said here in favour of *Scepticism*, against Certainty by Sense (for it is not at all against me, till you shew we can have no *Idea* of *actual Sensation*) without the proper Antidote annex'd, in shewing wherein that Certainty consists (if the account I give be not true) after you have so strenuously endeavour'd to destroy what I have said for it; will, by your Authority, have laid no small Foundation of *Scepticism*: which they will not fail to lay hold of, with advantage to their Cause, who have any Disposition that way. For I desire any one to read this your fifth Argument, and then judg which of us two is a Promoter of *Scepticism*; I who have endeavour'd, and, as I think, prov'd Certainty by our Senses; or your Lordship, who has (in your Thoughts at least) destroy'd these Proofs, without giving us any other to supply their place. All your other Arguments amount to no more but this; That I have given Instances to shew, that the Extent of our Knowledge, in comparison of the whole Extent of *Being*, is very little and narrow: which, when your Lordship writ your *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, were very fair and ingenuous Confessions of the Shortness of Human Understanding, with respect to the Nature and Manner of such things, which we are most certain of the *Being* of, by constant and undoubted Experience: Tho' since you have shew'd your dislike of them in more places than one, particularly p. 33. and again more at large, p. 43. and at last you have thought fit to represent them as Arguments for *Scepticism*. And thus I have acquitted my self, I hope, to your Lordship's Satisfaction, of my Promise to answer your Accusation of a Tendency to *Scepticism*.

Ans. 1.

p. 129—131.

Vindic. p. 244.

Ans. 1. p. 33.

Ib. p. 43—45.

But to return to your second Letter, where I left off. In the following Pages P. 76—78. you have another Argument to prove my way of Certainty to be none, but to lead to *Scepticism*: which, after a serious perusal of it, seems to me to amount to no more but this, That *Des Cartes* and I go both in the way of *Ideas*, and we differ; Ergo, the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, is no way of Certainty, but leads to *Scepticism*: which is a Consequence I cannot admit, and I think is no better than this; Your Lordship and I differ, and yet we both go in the ways of *Ideas*; Ergo, the placing of Knowledge in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*, is no way of Certainty at all, but leads to *Scepticism*.

Your Lordship will perhaps think I say more than I can justify, when I say your Lordship goes in the way of *Ideas*; for you will tell me, you do not place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas*. Ans. No more does *Des Cartes*; and therefore, in that respect, he and I went no more in the same way of *Ideas*, than your Lordship and I do. From whence it follows, That how much soever he and I may differ in other Points, our difference is no more an Argument against this Proposition, That Knowledge or Cer-

Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, than your Lordship's and my Difference in any other Point, is an Argument against the Truth of that my Definition of Knowledge, or that it tends to *Scepticism*.

But you will say, That *Des Cartes* built his System of Philosophy upon Ideas; and so I say does your Lordship too, and every one else as much as he, that has any System of that or any other part of Knowledge. For Ideas are nothing but the immediate Objects of our Minds in thinking; and your Lordship, I conclude, in building your System of any part of Knowledge, thinks on something; and therefore you can no more *build*, or have any System of Knowledge without Ideas, than you can think without some immediate Objects of thinking. Indeed, you do not so often use the word *Ideas* as *Des Cartes* or I have done; but using the things signify'd by that Term as much as either of us (unless you can think without an immediate Object of thinking) your's also is the way of *Ideas*, as much as his or mine. Your condemning the way of *Ideas*, in those general Terms, which one meets with so often in your Writings on this occasion, amounts at last to no more but an Exception against a poor Sound of three Syllables, tho' your Lordship thinks fit not to own that you have any Exception to it.

If, besides this, these ten or twelve Pages have any other Argument in them, which I have not seen, I humbly desire you would be pleas'd to put it into a Syllogism, to convince my Reader that I have silently pass'd by an Argument of Importance; and then I promise an Answer to it: And the same Request and Promise I make to your Lordship, in reference to all other Passages in your Letter, wherein you think there is any thing of moment unanswered.

- P. 87. Your Lordship comes to answer what was in my former Letter, to shew, that what you had said concerning Nature and Person, was to me and several others, whom I had talk'd with about it, hard to be understood. To this purpose the sixteen next Pages are chiefly employ'd, to shew what *Aristotle* and others have said about φύσις and *Natura*, a Greek and a Latin Word; neither of which is the English Word *Nature*, nor can concern it at all, till it be prov'd that *Nature* in English has, in the propriety of our Tongue, precisely the same Signification that φύσις had among the Greeks, and *Natura* among the Romans. For would it not be pretty harsh to an English Ear, to say with *Aristotle*, That *Nature* is a corporeal Substance, or a corporeal Substance is *Nature*? to instance but in this one, among those many various Senses which your Lordship proves he us'd the term φύσις in: or with *Anaximander*, P. 96. That *Nature* is Matter, or Matter *Nature*? or with *Sextus Empiricus*, That P. 98. *Nature* is a Principle of Life, or a Principle of Life is *Nature*? So that tho' the Philosophers of old of all kinds did understand the Sense of the terms φύσις and *Natura*, in the Languages of their Countries; yet it does not follow, P. 99. what you would here conclude from thence, that they understood the proper Signification of the term *Nature* in English. Nor has an English Man any more need to consult those Grecians in their use of the Sound φύσις, to know what *Nature* signifies in English; than those Grecians had need to consult our Writings, or bring Instances of the use of the word *Nature* in English Authors, to justify their using of the term φύσις in any Sense they had us'd it in P. 99, 100. Greek. The like may be said of what is brought out of the Greek Christian Writers; for I think an English Man could scarce be justify'd in saying in English, That the Angels were *Natures*, because *Theodoret* and *St. Basil* calls them φύσις. To these, I think, there might be added other Senses, wherein the word P. 102. φύσις may be found made use of by the Greeks, which are not taken notice of by your Lordship: As particularly *Aristotle*, if I mistake not, uses it for a Plastick Power, or a kind of Anima Mundi, presiding over the material World, and producing the Order and Regularity of Motions, Formations and Generations in it.

Indeed your Lordship brings a Proof from an Authority that is proper in the Case, and would go a great way in it; for it is of an English Man, who, writing of *Nature*, gives an account of the Signification of the word *Nature* in English. But the mischief is, that among eight Significations of the word *Nature*, which he gives, that is not to be found, which you quote him for, and had need of. For he says not that *Nature* in English is us'd for Substance; which is the Sense your Lordship has us'd it in, and would justify by the Authority of that ingenious and honourable Person: and to make

it out, you tell us, *Mr. Boyle says the word Essence is of great affinity to Nature, if not of an adequate import; to which your Lordship adds, But the real Essence of a thing is a Substance.* So that, in fine, the Authority of this excellent Person and Philosopher amounts to thus much, that he says that *Nature* and *Essence* are two Terms that have a great affinity; and you say, that *Nature* and *Substance* are two Terms that have a great affinity. For the learned *Mr. Boyle* says no such thing, nor can it appear, that he ever thought so, till it can be shewn, that he has said that *Essence* and *Substance* have the same Signification.

I humbly conceive, it would have been a strange way in any body but your Lordship, to have quoted an Author for saying that *Nature* and *Substance* had the same Signification, when one of those Terms, viz. *Substance*, he does not, upon that occasion so much as name. But your Lordship has this Privilege, it seems, to speak of your Inferences as if they were other Mens Words, whereof I think I have given several Instances; I am sure I have given one, where you seem to speak of *clear and distinct Ideas* as my Words, P. 63. when they are only your Words, there infer'd from my Words *evident Knowledge*: and other the like Instances might be produc'd, were there any need.

Had your Lordship produc'd *Mr. Boyle's* Testimony, That *Nature*, in our Tongue, had the same Signification with *Substance*, I should presently have submitted to so great an Authority, and taken it for proper *English*, and a clear way of expressing one's self, to use *Nature* and *Substance* promiscuously one for another. But since, I think, there is no Instance of any one who ever did so, and therefore it must be a new, and consequently no very clear way of speaking; give me leave, my Lord, to wonder, why in all this Dispute about the term *Nature*, upon the clear and right understanding whereof, you lay so much stress, you have not been pleas'd to define it: which would put an end to all Disputes about the meaning of it, and leave no Doubtfulness, no Obscurity in your use of it, nor any room for any Dispute what you mean by it. This would have sav'd many Pages of Paper, tho' perhaps it would have made us lose your learned Account of what the Ancients have said concerning *φύσις*, and the several Acceptations they us'd it in.

All the other Authors, *Greek* and *Latin*, your Lordship has quoted, may, for ought I know, have us'd the terms *φύσις* and *Natura*, properly in their Languages; and have discours'd very clearly and intelligibly about what those Terms in their Countries signify'd. But how that proves there were no Difficulties in the Sense or Construction in that Discourse of your's, concerning *Nature*, which I and those I consulted upon it, did not understand; is hard to see. Your Lordship's Discourse was obscure, and too difficult then for me, and so I must own it is still. Whether my Friend be any better enlighten'd by what you have said to him here, out of so many ancient Authors, I am too remote from him at the writing of this to know, and so shall not trouble your Lordship with any Conversation, which perhaps, when we meet again, we may have upon it.

The next Passage of your Vindication, which was complain'd of to be very hard to be understood, was this, where you say, *That you grant that by Sen- Vindic. p. sation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of things; but 253. our Reason is satisfy'd that there must be something beyond these, because it is impossible they should subsist by themselves. So that the nature of things properly belongs to our Reason, and not to mere Ideas.* To rectify the mistake had been made in my first Letter, p. 157. in taking *Reason* here to mean the Faculty of Reason, you tell me, *I might easily have seen, that by Reason your Lordship understood Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind.* To which it was reply'd, *That then this Passage of your's must be read thus, viz. That your Lordship grants that by Sensation and Reflection we come to know the Properties of things; 125, 126. but our Reason, i. e. the Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind, are satisfy'd that there must be something beyond these; because it is impossible they should subsist by themselves. So that the Nature of things properly belongs to our Reason, i. e. to the Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind, and not to mere Ideas; " which " made it seem more unintelligible than it was before."* Ans. 1. p. 101. Lett. 2. p.

To the Complaint was made of the Unintelligibleness of this Passage in this last Sense given by your Lordship, you answer nothing. So that we [*i. e.* my Friends whom I consulted and I] are still excusable, if not understanding what is signify'd by these Expressions; *The Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind are satisfy'd, and the Nature of Things properly belongs to the Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind*; we see not the Connection of the Propositions here ty'd together by the words *so that*, which was the thing complain'd of in these words, *viz.* "That the Inference here, both for its Connection and Expression seem'd hard to be understood;" and more to the same purpose, which your Lordship takes no notice of.

Indeed your Lordship repeats these words of mine, "That in both Senses of the word *Reason*, either taken for a Faculty, or for the *Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind*, Reason and Ideas may consist together;" and then sub-
 P. 105. joins, That this leads your Lordship to the Examination of that which may be of some use, *viz.* To shew the Difference of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reason. Which how it any way justifies your opposing Ideas and Reason, as you here, and elsewhere often do; or shews, that Ideas are inconsistent with the Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind; I leave to the Reader to judg. Your Lordship, for the clearing of what you had said in your *Vindication*, &c. from Obscurity and Unintelligibleness, which were complain'd of in it, is to prove, that Ideas are inconsistent with the Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind; and in answer to this, you say, you will shew the difference of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reason.

My Lord, as I remember, the Expression in question was not, *That the Nature of Things properly belongs to our Reason, and not to my Method of Certainty by Ideas*; but this, *That the Nature of Things belongs to our Reason, and not to mere Ideas*. So that the thing you were here to shew, was, That Reason, *i. e.* the Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind, and Ideas, and not the Principles of Reason; and my Method of Certainty by Ideas, cannot consist together: For the Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind, and Ideas, may consist together; tho' perhaps, my Method of Certainty by Ideas, should prove inconsistent with those Principles. So that if all that you say, from this to the 153d Page, *i. e.* forty eight Pages, were as clear Demonstration, as I humbly conceive it is the contrary; yet it does nothing to clear the Passage in hand, but leaves that part of your Discourse, concerning *Nature*, lying still under the Objection was made against it, as much as if you had not said one word.

But since I am not unwilling that my Method of Certainty should be examin'd, and I should be glad (if there be any Faults in it) to learn the Defects of that my Definition of Knowledge, from so great a Master as your Lordship; I will consider what you here say, to shew the Difference of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reason.

P. 105. Your Lordship says, *That the way of Certainty by Reason lies in two things:*

1. *The Certainty of Principles.*
2. *The Certainty of Deductions.*

I grant, that a part of that which is call'd *Certainty of Reason*, lies in the Certainty of Principles; which Principles, I presume, your Lordship and I are agreed, are several Propositions.

If then these Principles are Propositions, to shew the Difference between your Lordship's way of Certainty by Reason, and my way of Certainty by Ideas; I think it is visible, that you ought to shew wherein the Certainty of those Propositions consists in your way by Reason, different from that wherein I make it consist in my way by Ideas. As for example: Your Lordship and I are agreed, that this Proposition, *Whatever is, is*; is a Principle of Reason, or a Maxim. Now my way of Certainty by Ideas, is, that the Certainty of this Proposition consists in this, that there is a perceivable Connection or Agreement between the Idea of Being and the Idea of Being, or between the Idea of Existence and the Idea of Existence, as is express in that Proposition. But now, in your way of Reason, pray wherein does the Certainty of this Proposition consist? If it be in any thing different from that perceivable Agreement of the Ideas, affirm'd of one another in it, I beseech your Lordship to tell it me; if not, I beg leave to conclude, that your way of Certainty by Reason, and my way of Certainty by Ideas, in this case are just the same. But

But instead of saying any thing, to shew wherein the *Certainty of Principles* is different, in the way of Reason, from the *Certainty of Principles* in the way of *Ideas*, upon my Friend's shewing, that you had no Ground to say as you did, that *I had no Idea of Reason*, as it stands for Principles of Reason; your Lordship takes occasion (as, what will not, in a skilful Hand, serve to introduce any thing one has a mind to?) to tell me, *What Ideas I have of them must appear from my Book, and you do there find a Chapter of self-evident Propositions and Maxims, which you cannot but think extraordinary for the Design of it, which is thus summ'd in the Conclusion, viz. That it was to shew, "That these Maxims, as they are of little use, where we have clear and distinct Ideas, so they are of dangerous use, where our Ideas are not clear and distinct."* And is not this a fair way to convince your Lordship, that my way of Ideas is very consistent with the *Certainty of Reason*, when the way of Reason hath been always suppos'd to proceed upon general Principles, and I assert them to be useless and dangerous? P. 105. B.4.c.7.§.26.

In which words I crave leave to observe,

1. That the Pronoun *Them* here, seems to have reference to *self-evident Propositions*, to *Maxims*, and to *Principles*, as Terms us'd by your Lordship and me; tho' it be certain, that you and I use them in a far different Sense: For, if I mistake not, you use them all three promiscuously one for another; whereas 'tis plain, that in that Chapter, out of which you bring your Quotations here, I distinguish *self-evident Propositions* from those, which I there mention under the name of *Maxims*, which are principally these two, *Whatsoever is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be.* Farther, it is plain, out of the same place, that by *Maxims* I there mean general Propositions, which are so universally receiv'd under the name of *Maxims* or *Axioms*, that they are look'd upon as innate; the two chief whereof, principally there meant, are those above mention'd: But what the Propositions are which you comprehend under *Maxims*, or *Principles of Reason*, cannot be determin'd, since your Lordship neither defines nor enumerates them; and so 'tis impossible, precisely, to know what you mean by *them* here: And that which makes me more at a loss, is, That in this Argument, you set down for Principles or Maxims, Propositions that are not so much as self-evident, viz. this, *That the essential Properties of a Man, are to reason and discourse, &c.* Essay, B. 4. c. 7. P. 108.

2. I crave leave to observe, that you tell me, that in my Book you find a Chapter of *self-evident Propositions and Maxims*, whereas I find no such Chapter in my Book: I have in it indeed a Chapter of *Maxims*, but never an one entitled, *Of self-evident Propositions and Maxims.* This, 'tis possible, your Lordship will call a nice Criticism; but yet it is such an one, as is very necessary in the Case: For in that Chapter I, as is before observ'd, expressly distinguish *self-evident Propositions* from the *receiv'd Maxims or Axioms*, which I there speak of: Whereas it seems to me to be your Design (in joining them in a Title of a Chapter, contrary to what I had done) to have it thought, that I treated of them as one and the same thing; and so all that I said there, of the Uselessness of some few general Propositions, under the Title of *receiv'd Maxims*, might be apply'd to all *self-evident Propositions*; the quite contrary whereof was the Design of that Chapter. For that which I endeavour to shew there, is, That all our Knowledge is not built on those few receiv'd general Propositions, which are ordinarily call'd *Maxims* or *Axioms*; but that there are a great many Truths may be known without them: But that there is any Knowledge, without self-evident Propositions, I am so far from denying, that I am accus'd by your Lordship for requiring in Demonstration, more such than you think are necessary. This seems, I say, to be your Design; and I wish your Lordship, by entitling my Chapter, as I my self did, and not as it would best serve your turn, had not made it necessary for me to make this nice Criticism. This is certain, that without thus confounding *Maxims* and *self-evident Propositions*, what you here say would not so much, as in appearance, concern me: For,

3. I crave leave to observe, That all the Argument your Lordship uses here against me to prove, that my way of Certainty by *Ideas*, is inconsistent with the way of Certainty by Reason, which lies in the Certainty of Principles, is this; That the way of Reason hath been alway suppos'd to proceed upon general Principles, and I assert them to be useless and dangerous. Be pleas'd, my Lord, to define or

enumerate your *general Principles*, and then we shall see whether *I assert them to be useless and dangerous*, and whether they, who *suppos'd the way of Reason was to proceed upon general Principles*, differ'd from me; and if they did differ, whether their's was more the way of Reason than mine: But to talk thus of *general Principles, which have always been suppos'd the way of Reason*, without telling so much as which, or what they are, is not so much as by Authority to shew, that my way of Certainty by *Ideas*, is *inconsistent with the way of Certainty by Reason*; much less is it in reality to prove it. Because admitting I had said any thing contrary to what, as you say, *has been always suppos'd*, its being suppos'd, proves it not to be true; because we know that several things have been for many Ages generally suppos'd, which at last, upon examination, have been found not to be true.

What *hath been always suppos'd*, is fit only for your Lordship's great Reading to declare, But such Arguments, I confess, are wholly lost upon me, who have not Time or Occasion to examine what has *always been suppos'd*; especially in those Questions which concern Truths, that are to be known from the nature of things: Because, I think, they cannot be establish'd by Majority of Votes, not easy to be collected; nor if they were collected, can convey Certainty till it can be *suppos'd*, that the greater part of Mankind are always in the right. In Matters of Fact, I own we must govern our selves by the Testimonies of others; but in Matters of Speculation, *to suppose on*, as others have suppos'd before us, is suppos'd by many to be only a way to learned Ignorance, which enables to talk much, and know but little. The Truths, which the Penetration and Labours of others before us have discover'd and made out, I own we are infinitely indebted to them for; and some of them are of that Consequence, that we cannot acknowledg too much the Advantages we receive from those great Masters in Knowledge: But where they only *suppos'd*, they left it to us to search, and advance farther. And in those things, I think, it becomes our Industry to imploy it self, for the Improvement of the Knowledge, and adding to the Stock of Discoveries left us by our inquisitive and thinking Predecessors.

4. One thing more I crave leave to observe, *viz.* That to these words, "These Maxims, as they are of little use where we have clear and distinct *Ideas*, so they are of dangerous use where our *Ideas* are not clear and distinct,"

P. 106. quoted out of my *Essay*; you subjoin, *And is not this a fair way to convince your Lordship, that my way of Ideas is very consistent with the Certainty of Reason?* Answ. My Lord, my *Essay*, and those words in it, were writ many Years before I dreamt that you or any body else would ever question the Consistency of my way of Certainty by *Ideas*, with the way of Certainty by Reason; and so could not be intended to convince your Lordship in this point: And since you first said, that these two ways are inconsistent, I never brought those words to convince you, That my way is consistent with the Certainty of Reason: and therefore why you ask, whether that be a fair way to convince you, which was never made use of as any way to convince you of any such thing, is hard to imagine.

P. 106, 107.
Essay, B. 4.
c. 7. §. 4.

But your Lordship goes on in the following words with the like kind of Argument, where you tell me that I say, "That my first Design is to prove, that the Consideration of those general Maxims adds nothing to the Evidence or Certainty of Knowledge;" which, says your Lordship, *overthrows all that which hath been accounted Science and Demonstration, and must lay the Foundation of Scepticism*; because our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon some general Principle of Reason. To make this plain, you say, you will put a Case grounded upon my words; which are, That I have discoursed with very rational Men, who have actually deny'd that they are Men. These words J. S. understands as spoken of themselves, and charges them with very ill Consequences; but you think they are capable of another meaning: However, says your Lordship, let us put the Case, That Men did in earnest question, whether they were Men or not; and then you do not see, if I set aside general Maxims, how I can convince them that they are Men. For the way your Lordship looks on as most apt to prevail upon such extraordinary sceptical Men, is by general Maxims and Principles of Reason.

Answ. I can neither in that Paragraph nor Chapter find that I say, That my first Design is to prove, that these general Maxims [i. e. those which your Lordship

ship calls general Principles of Reason] *add nothing to the Evidence and Certainty of Knowledge in general*: for so these words must be understood, to make good the Consequence which your Lordship charges on them, *viz. That they overthrow all that has been accounted Science and Demonstration, and lay the Foundation of Scepticism.*

What my *Design* in that place is, is evident from these words in the foregoing Paragraph; "Let us consider whether this Self-evidence be peculiar only Essay, B. 4. C. 7. §. 3. to those Propositions, which are receiv'd for Maxims, and have the Dignity of Axioms allowed: and here 'tis plain, that several other Truths, not allow'd to be Axioms, partake equally with them in this Self-evidence." Which shews that my *Design* there, was to evince that there were Truths that are not call'd Maxims, that are as self-evident as those receiv'd Maxims. Pursuant to this *Design*, I say, "That the Consideration of these Axioms [*i. e.* §. 4.] whatsoever is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be] can add nothing to the Evidence and Certainty of its [*i. e.* the Mind's] Knowledge;" [*i. e.* of the Truth of more particular Propositions concerning Identity.] These are my words in that place, and that the Sense of them is according to the Limitation annexed to them between those Crotchets, I refer my Reader to that fourth Section; where he will find that all that I say amounts to no more but what is express'd in these words, in the close of it: "I appeal to every one's own Mind, whether this Proposition, *A Circle is a Circle*, be not as self-evident a Proposition, as that consisting of more general Terms, *Whatsoever is, is*: And again, whether this Proposition, *Blue is not Red*, be not a Proposition that the Mind can no more doubt of, as soon as it understands the words, than it does of that Axiom, *It is Impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*: and so of all the like." And now I ask your Lordship, whether you do affirm of this, *That it overthrows all that which hath been counted Science and Demonstration, and must lay the Foundation of Scepticism*? If you do, I shall desire you to prove it; if you do not, I must desire you to consider how fairly my Sense has been represented.

But supposing you had represented my Sense right, and that the little or dangerous use which I there limit to certain Maxims, had been meant of all *Principles of Reason* in general, in your Sense; what had this been, my Lord, to the Question under debate? Your Lordship undertakes to shew, *That your way of Certainty by Reason is different from my way of Certainty by Ideas.* To do this, you say in the preceding Page, *That Certainty by Reason lies, 1. In Certainty of Principles; 2. In Certainty of Deductions.* P. 105. The first of these you are upon here; and if in order to what you had undertaken, your Lordship had shewn, *That in your way by Reason, those Principles were certain; but in my way by Ideas, we could not attain to any Certainty concerning them*: this indeed had been to shew a difference between my way of Certainty, which you call the *way by Ideas*; and your's, which you call the *way by Reason*; in this part of Certainty, that lies in the *Certainty of Principles*. I have said in the words quoted by your Lordship, *That the Consideration of those two Maxims, What is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; are not of use to add any thing to the Evidence or Certainty of our Knowledge of the Truth of Identical Predications*; but I never said those Maxims were in the least uncertain: I may perhaps think otherwise of their use than your Lordship does, but I think no otherwise of their Truth and Certainty than you do; they are left in their full Force and Certainty for your use, if you can make any better use of them, than what I think can be made. So that in respect of the allowed Certainty of those Principles, my way differs not at all from your Lordship's.

Pray, my Lord, look over that Chapter again, and see whether I bring their Truth and Certainty any more into question, than you your self do; and 'tis about their *Certainty*, and not *Use*, that the Question here is between your Lordship and me: We both agree, *That they are both undoubtedly certain*; all then that you bring in the following Pages about their *Use*, is nothing to the present Question about the *Certainty of Principles*, which your Lordship is upon in this place: and you will prove, *That your way of Certainty by Reason, is different from my way of Certainty by Ideas*; when you can shew, *That you are certain* of

of the Truth of those, or any other *Maxims*, any otherwise than by the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* as express'd in them.

But your Lordship, passing by that wholly, endeavours to prove, that my saying, That the Consideration of those two general *Maxims* can add nothing to the Evidence and Certainty of Knowledge in Identical Predications, (for that is all that I there say) *overthrows all that has been accounted Science and Demonstration, and must lay the Foundation of Scepticism*; and 'tis by a very remarkable Proof, viz. *Because our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon some general Principles of Reason*: which is the very thing I there not only deny, but have disprov'd; and therefore should not, I humbly conceive, have been rested on as a Proof of any thing else, till my Arguments against it had been answer'd.

P. 107. But instead of that, your Lordship says, you will put a Case that shall make it plain; which is the Business of the six following Pages, which are spent in this Case.

The Case is founded upon a Supposition, which you seem willing to have thought that you borrow'd either from J. S. or from me: whereas, truly that Supposition is neither that Gentleman's nor mine, but purely your Lordship's own. For however grossly Mr. J. S. has mistaken (which he has since acknowledged in print) the obvious Sense of those Words of my *Essay*, on which you say you ground your Case? yet I must do him right herein, that he himself suppos'd not, that any Man in his Wits ever in earnest question'd whether he himself were a Man or no: tho' by a mistake (which I cannot but wonder at, in one so much exercis'd in Controversy as Mr. J. S.) he charg'd me with saying it.

B. 4. c. 7.
§. 17.

P. 107. Your Lordship indeed says, *That you think my Words there may have another Meaning*. Would you thereby insinuate, That you think it possible they should have that Meaning which J. S. once gave them? If you do not, my Lord, Mr. J. S. and his understanding them so, is in vain brought in here to countenance your making such a Supposition. If you do think those Words of my *Essay* capable of such a Meaning as J. S. gave them, there will appear a strange Harmony between your Lordship's and Mr. J. S.'s Understanding, when he mistakes what is said in my Book; whether it will continue, now Mr. J. S. takes me right, I know not: but let us come to the Case as you put it. Your Words are,

P. 107. *Let us put the Case, That Men did in earnest question whether they were Men or not.* Your Lordship says, *You do not then see, if I set aside general Maxims, how I can convince them that they are Men.* Answ. And do you, my Lord, see that with *Maxims* you can convince them of that or any Thing else? I confess, whatever you should do, I should think it scarce worth while to reason with them about any thing. I believe you are the first that ever suppos'd a Man so much beside himself, as to question whether he were a Man or no, and yet so rational, as to be thought capable of being convinc'd of that or any thing by Discourse of Reason. This, methinks, is little different from supposing a Man in and out of his Wits at the same time.

But let us suppose your Lordship so lucky with your *Maxims*, that you do convince a Man (that doubts of it) that he is a Man; what Proof, I beseech you, my Lord, is that of this Proposition, *That our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon some general Principles of Reason*?

On the contrary, suppose it should happen, as is the more likely, that your setting upon him with your *Maxims*, cannot convince him; are we not by this your Case to take this for a Proof, *That general Principles of Reason are not the Grounds of Certainty*? For 'tis upon the Success, or not Success of your Endeavours to convince such a Man with *Maxims*, that your Lordship puts the Proof of this Proposition, *That our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon general Principles of Reason*; the Issue whereof must remain in suspense, till you have found such a Man to bring it to trial: and so the Proof is far enough off, unless you think the Case so plain, that every one sees such a Man will be presently convinc'd by your *Maxims*, tho' I should think it probable that most People may think he will not.

P. 107. Your Lordship adds, *For the way you look on as most apt to prevail upon such extraordinary sceptical Men, is by general Maxims and Principles of Reason.* Answ. This indeed is a Reason why your Lordship should use *Maxims*, when you have to do with such extraordinary sceptical Men; because you look on it as the likeliest way

way

way to prevail. But pray, my Lord, is your looking on it as the best way to prevail on such extraordinary sceptical Men, any Proof, That our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon some general Principles of Reason? for 'twas to make this plain, that this Case was put.

Farther, my Lord, give me leave to ask, what have we here to do with the ways of convincing others of what they do not know or assent to? Your Lordship and I are not, as I think, disputing of the *Methods* of persuading others of what they are ignorant of, and do not yet assent to; but our Debate here, is about the Ground of *Certainty* in what they do know and assent to.

However, you go on to set down several *Maxims*, which you look on as most apt to prevail upon your extraordinary sceptical Man, to convince him, that he exists, and that he is a Man. The *Maxims* are,

That nothing can have no Operation.

P. 108.

That all different sorts of Being are distinguished by essential Properties.

That the essential Properties of a Man, are to reason, discourse, &c.

That these Properties cannot subsist by themselves, without a real Substance.

I will not question whether a Man cannot know that he exists, or be certain (for 'tis of Knowledge and Certainty the question here is) that he is a Man, without the help of these *Maxims*. I will only crave leave to ask, how you know that these are *Maxims*? For methinks this, *That the essential Properties of a Man are Reason, Discourse, &c.* an imperfect Proposition, with and so forth at the end of it, is a pretty sort of *Maxim*. That therefore which I desire to be informed here, is, how your Lordship knows these, or any other Propositions to be *Maxims*; and how Propositions, that are *Maxims*, are to be distinguish'd from Propositions that are not *Maxims*? And the Reason why I insist upon it, is this: Because this, and this only, would shew, whether what I have said in my Chapter about *Maxims*, overthrows all that has been accounted Science and Demonstration, and lays the Foundation of Scepticism? But I fear my Request, That you would be pleas'd to tell me what you mean by *Maxims*, that I may know what Propositions, according to your Lordship, are, and what are not *Maxims*, will not easily be granted me: because it would presently put an end to all that you impute to me as said in that Chapter against *Maxims*, in a sense that I use not the word there.

Your Lordship makes me, out of my Book, answer to the use you make of P. 109. the four above-mentioned Propositions, which you call *Maxims*, as if I were declar'd of an Opinion, That *Maxims* could not be of any use in arguing with others: which methinks you should not have done, if you had consider'd my Chapter of *Maxims*, which you so often quote. For I there say, " *Maxims* are useful to stop the Mouths of Wranglers—to shew, That wrong Opinions lead to Absurdities, &c." Essay, B. 4. C. 7. §. 11.

Your Lordship nevertheless goes on to prove, That without the help of these Principles or *Maxims*, I cannot prove to any that doubt it, that they are Men, in my way of Ideas. *Answ.* I beseech you, my Lord, to give me leave to mind you again, that the Question is not what I can prove; but whether, in my way by Ideas, I cannot without the Help of these Principles know that I am a Man; and be certain of the Truth of that, and several other Propositions: I say, of several other Propositions; for I do not think you, in your way of Certainty by Reason, pretend to be certain of all Truths; or to be able to prove (to those who doubt) all Propositions, or so much as be able to convince every one of the Truth of every Proposition, that you your self are certain of. There be many Propositions in Mr. Newton's excellent Book, which there are thousands of People, and those a little more rational than such as should deny themselves to be Men, whom Mr. Newton himself would not be able, with or without the use of *Maxims* used in Mathematicks, to convince of the Truth of: And yet this would be no Argument against his Method of Certainty, whereby he came to the Knowledge that they are true. What therefore you can conclude, as to my way of Certainty, from a Supposition of my not being able, in my way by Ideas, to convince those who doubt of it, that they are Men, I do not see. But your Lordship is resolv'd to prove that I cannot, so you go on.

Your Lordship says, That I suppose that we must have a clear and distinct Idea of that we are certain of; and this you prove out of my Chapter of *Maxims*, where

Essay, B. 2.
C. 29. §. 4.
5, 6.

I say, "That every one knows the *Ideas* that he has, and that distinctly and "unconfusedly one from another." *Answ.* I suspected all along, that you mistook what I meant by *confus'd Ideas*. If your Lordship pleases to turn to my Chapter of *distinct and confus'd Ideas*, you will there find, that an *Idea*, which is distinguish'd in the Mind from all others, may yet be *confus'd*: the Confusion being made by a careless Application of distinct Names to *Ideas*, that are not sufficiently distinct. Which having explain'd at large, in that Chapter, I shall not need here again to repeat. Only permit me to set down an Instance: He that has the *Idea* of the Liquor that, circulating thro' the Heart of a Sheep, keeps that Animal alive, and he that has the *Idea* of the Liquor that circulates thro' the Heart of a Lobster, has two different *Ideas*; as distinct as an *Idea* of an aqueous, pellucid, cold Liquor, is from the *Idea* of a red, opaque, hot Liquor: but yet these two may be confounded, by giving the name Blood to this vital circulating Liquor of a Lobster.

This being consider'd, will shew how what I have said there may consist with my saying, That to Certainty, *Ideas* are not requir'd, that are in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct: because Certainty being spoken there of the Knowledge of the Truth of any Proposition; and Propositions being made in Words, it may be true, That notwithstanding all the *Ideas* we have in our Minds, are, as far as we have them there, clear and distinct; yet those which we would suppose the Terms in the Proposition to stand for, may not be clear and distinct: Either:

1. By making the Term stand for an uncertain *Idea*, which we have not yet precisely determined in our Minds, whereby it comes to stand sometimes for one *Idea*, sometimes for another. Which tho', when we reflect on them, they are distinct in our Minds, yet by this use of a Name undetermin'd in its Signification, come to be confounded. Or,

2. By supposing the Name to stand for something more than really is in the *Idea* in our Minds, which we make it a Sign of, *v. g.* let us suppose, That a Man many Years since, when he was young, ate a Fruit, whose Shape, Size, Consistency and Colour, he has a perfect remembrance of; but the particular Taste he has forgot, and only remembers, that it very much delighted him. This complex *Idea*, as far as it is in his Mind, 'tis evident, is there; and as far as he perceives it, when he reflects on it, is in all its Parts clear and distinct: but when he calls it a *Pine-Apple*, and will suppose, that Name stands for the same precise complex *Idea*, for which another Man (who newly ate of that Fruit, and has the *Idea* of the Taste of it also fresh in his Mind) uses it, or for which he himself used it, when he had the Taste fresh in his Memory; 'tis plain his complex *Idea* in that part, which consists in the Taste, is very obscure.

P. 110. To apply this to what your Lordship here makes me suppose, I answer,

1. I do not suppose, That to Certainty it is requisite, that an *Idea* should be in all its Parts clear and distinct. I can be certain, that a *Pine-Apple* is not an Artichoke, tho' my *Idea*, which I suppose that Name to stand for, be in me obscure and *confus'd*, in regard of its Taste.

2. I do not deny, but on the contrary, I affirm, That I can have a clear and distinct *Idea* of a Man (*i. e.* the *Idea* I give the name Man to, may be clear and distinct) tho' it should be true, that Men are not yet agreed on the determin'd *Idea*, that the name Man shall stand for. Whatever Confusion there may be in the *Idea*, to which that Name is indeterminately apply'd; I do allow and affirm, That every one, if he pleases, may have a clear and distinct *Idea* of a Man to himself, *i. e.* which he makes the Word *Man* stand for: which, if he makes known to others in his Discourse with them about *Man*, all verbal Dispute will cease, and he cannot be mistaken when he uses the Term *Man*, and if this were but done with most of the glittering Terms brandish'd in Disputes, it would often be seen how little some Men have to say, who with equivocal Words and Expressions, make no small Noise in Controversy.

P. 114. Your Lordship concludes this Part by saying, *Thus you have shewed how inconsistent my way of Ideas is with true Certainty, and of what use and Necessity these general Principles of Reason are.* *Answ.* By the Laws of Disputation, which

which in another place you express such a regard to, one is *bound* not to change the Terms of the Question. This I crave leave humbly to offer to your Lordship, because, as far as I have look'd into Controversy, I do not remember to have met with any one so apt, shall I say, to forget or change the Question as your Lordship. This, my Lord, I should not venture to say, but upon very good Grounds, which I shall be ready to give you an account of, whenever you shall demand it of me. One Example of it we have here: you say, *You have shew'd how inconsistent my way of Ideas is with true Certainty, and of what Use and Necessity these general Principles of Reason are.* My Lord, if you please to look back to the 105th Page, you will see what you there promis'd, was to *shew the Difference of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reason*: And particularly in the Pages between that and this, the Certainty of Principles, which you say is one of those two things, wherein the way of Certainty by Reason lies. Instead of that, your Lordship concludes here, that you have shew'd two things:

1. *How inconsistent my way of Ideas is with true Certainty.* Whereas it should be to shew the Inconsistency or Difference of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reason; which are two very different Propositions. And before you undertake to shew, That my Method of Certainty is inconsistent with true Certainty; it will be necessary for you to define, and tell us wherein true Certainty consists, which your Lordship hitherto has shewn no great Forwardness to do.

2. Another thing which you say you have done, is, That you have shewn of what Use and Necessity these general Principles of Reason are. *Answ.* Whether by these general Principles you mean those Propositions which you set down, p. 108. and call there *Maxims*, or any other Propositions which you have not any where set down, I cannot tell. But whatsoever they are, that you mean here by these, I know not how the Usefulness of these your general Principles, be they what they will, came to be a Question between your Lordship and me here. If you have a mind to shew any Mistakes of mine in my Chapter of *Maxims*, which, you say, you think extraordinary for the Design of it, I shall not be unwilling to be rectify'd; but that the Usefulness of Principles is not what is here under debate between us, I, with Submission, affirm. That which your Lordship is here to prove, is, That the Certainty of Principles, which is the way of Certainty by Reason, is different from my way of Certainty by Ideas. Upon the whole, I crave leave to say in your Words, That thus I have, I humbly conceive, made it appear, that you have not shew'd any Difference, much less any Inconsistency of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reason, in that first part, which you assign of Certainty by Reason, viz. Certainty of Principles.

I come now to the second part, which you assign of Certainty by Reason, viz. P. 105. Certainty of Deductions. I only crave leave first to set down these Words in the latter end of your Discourse, which we have been considering, where your Lordship says, *You begin to think J. S. was in the right, when he made me say, "That I had discours'd with very rational Men who deny'd themselves to be Men."* *Answ.* I do not know what may be done by those who have such a Command over the Pronouns *They* and *Them*, as to put *they themselves* for *they*. I shall therefore desire my Reader to turn to that Passage of my Book, and see whether he too can be so lucky as your Lordship, and can with you begin to think, that by these Words, "Who have actually deny'd, that they, i. e. Infants and Changelings, are Men;" I meant, *who actually deny'd that they themselves were Men.* *Essay, B. 4. C. 7. §. 17.*

Your Lordship, to prove my Method of Certainty by Ideas to be different from, and inconsistent with your second Part of the Certainty by Reason, which, you say, lies in the Certainty of Deductions, begins thus: That you come now to the Certainty of Reason, in making Deductions; and here you shall briefly lay down the Grounds of Certainty, which the antient Philosophers went upon, and then compare my way of Ideas with them. To which give me leave, my Lord, to reply; (1.) That, I humbly conceive, it should have been Grounds of Certainty [in making Deductions] which the antient Philosophers went upon; or else they will be nothing to the Proposition, which your Lordship has undertaken here to

prove. Now of the Certainty in making Deductions, I see none of the Antients produc'd by your Lordship, who say any thing to shew, wherein it
P. 116. consists, but *Aristotle*; who, as you say, in his *Method of inferring one thing from another, went upon this common Principle of Reason, that what things agree in a third, agree among themselves*. And it so falls out, That so far as he goes towards the shewing wherein the *Certainty of Deductions* consists, he and I agree, as is evident by what I say in my Essay. And if *Aristotle* had gone any farther to shew, how we are certain, that those two things agree with a third, he would have plac'd that Certainty in the Perception of that Agreement, as I have done, and then he and I should have perfectly agreed. I presume to say, if *Aristotle* had gone farther in this matter, he would have plac'd our Knowledge or Certainty of the Agreement of any two things in the Perception of their Agreement. And let not any one from hence think, I attribute too much to my self in saying, That that acute and judicious Philosopher, if he had gone farther in that matter, would have done as I have done. For if he omitted it, I imagine it was not that he did not see it, but that it was so obvious and evident, that it appear'd superfluous to name it. For who can doubt that the Knowledge, or being certain, that any two things agree, consists in the perception of their Agreement? What else can it possibly consist in? It is so obvious, that it would be a little extraordinary to think, that he that went so far could miss it. And I should wonder, if any one should allow the *Certainty of Deduction* to consist in the Agreement of two things in a third, and yet should deny that the Knowledge or Certainty of that Agreement consisted in the Perception of it.

(2.) In the next place, my Lord, supposing my Method of Certainty, in making Deductions, were different from those of the Antients; this, at best, would be only, that which I call, *Argumentum ad Verecundiam*; which proves
Essay, B. 4. C. 17. §. 19. not on which side Reason is, tho' I, in Modesty, should answer nothing to their Authorities.

(3.) The Antients, as it seems by your Lordship, not agreeing one among another about the Grounds of Certainty; what can their Authorities signify in the Case? or, how will it appear, that I differ from Reason, in differing from any of them more than that they differ from Reason, in differing one from another? And therefore, after all the different Authorities produc'd by you out of your great measure of reading, the matter will at last reduce it self to this Point, That your Lordship should tell us wherein the *Certainty of Reason, in making Deductions*, consists; and then shew wherein my *Method of making Deductions*, differs from it: which, whether you have done or no, we shall see in what follows.

Your Lordship closes your very Learned, and to other Purposes very Useful, Account of the Opinions of the Antients, concerning Certainty, with
P. 120. these Words; *That thus you have, in as few Words as you could, laid together those old Methods of Certainty, which have obtain'd greatest Reputation in the World*. Whereupon I must crave leave to mind you again, That the Proposition you are here upon, and have undertaken to prove in this place, is concerning the *Certainty of Deductions*, and not concerning Certainty in general. I say not this, that I am willing to decline the Examination of my *Method of Certainty* in general, any way, or in any place: But I say it to observe, that in Discourses of this nature, the Laws of Disputation have wisely order'd the Proposition under debate, to be kept to, and that in the same Terms, to avoid Wandring, Obscurity and Confusion.

I therefore proceed now to consider what use your Lordship makes of the Antients, against my way of Certainty in general; since you think fit to make no use of them, as to the *Certainty of Reason in making Deductions*: tho' it is under this your second Branch of Certainty by Reason, that you bring them in.

P. 120. Your first Objection here, is that old one again, That my way of Certainty by Ideas is new. *Ans.* Your calling of it New, does not prove it to be different from that of Reason: But your Lordship proves it to be New:

1. *Because here [i. e. in my way] we have no general Principles.* *Ans.* I do, as your Lordship knows, own the Truth and Certainty of the receiv'd general

pal Maxims; and I contend for the Usefulness and Necessity of self-evident Propositions in all Certainty, whether of Institution or Demonstration. What therefore those *general Principles* are, which you have not in my way of Certainty by Ideas, which your Lordship has in your way of Certainty by Reason, I beseech you to tell, and thereby to make good this Assertion against me.

2. Your Lordship says, *That here [i. e. in my way] we have no Antecedents and Consequents, no syllogistical Methods of Demonstration.* *Ans.* If your Lordship here means, That there be no *Antecedents and Consequents* in my Book, or that I speak not, or allow not of *Syllogism* as a Form of Argumentation, that has its use, I humbly conceive the contrary is plain. But if by *here* we have no *Antecedents and Consequents, no syllogistical Methods of Demonstration*, you mean, That I do not place Certainty, in having *Antecedents and Consequents*, or in making of *Syllogisms*, I grant I do not; I have said *Syllogisms* instead of your Words, *Syllogistical Methods of Demonstration*; which examin'd, amount here to no more than *Syllogisms*: For *syllogistical Methods* are nothing but *Mode and Figure*, i. e. *Syllogisms*; and the Rules of *Syllogisms* are the same, whether the *Syllogisms* be us'd in Demonstration or in Probability. But 'twas convenient for you to say, *Syllogistical Methods of Demonstration*, if you would have it thought, that Certainty is plac'd in it: For to have nam'd bare *Syllogisms*, without annexing *Demonstration* to it, would have spoil'd all, since every one, who knows what *Syllogism* is, knows it may as well be us'd in topical or fallacious Arguments, as in *Demonstration*.

Your Lordship charges me then, That in my way by Ideas, I do not place Certainty, in having *Antecedents and Consequents*. And pray, my Lord, do you in your way by Reason do so? If you do, this is certain, That every body has, or may have Certainty in every thing he discourses about: For every one, in any Discourse he makes, has, or may, if he pleases, have *Antecedents and Consequents*.

Again, your Lordship charges me, That I do not place Certainty in *Syllogism*. I crave leave to ask again, And does your Lordship? And is this the difference between your way of Certainty by Reason, and my way of Certainty by Ideas? Why else is it objected to me, That I do not, if your Lordship does not, place Certainty in *Syllogism*? And if you do, I know nothing so requisite, as that you should advise all People, Women and all, to betake themselves immediately to the Universities, and to the learning of Logick; to put themselves out of the dangerous State of *Scepticism*: For there young Lads, by being taught *Syllogism*, arrive at Certainty; whereas, without *Mode and Figure*, the World is in perfect Ignorance and Uncertainty, and is sure of nothing. The Merchant cannot be certain that his Account is right cast up, nor the Lady that her Coach is not a Wheel-barrow, nor her Dairy-maid that one and one Pound of Butter are two Pounds of Butter, and two and two four; and all for want of *Mode and Figure*: Nay, according to this Rule, whoever liv'd before *Aristotle*, or him, whoever it was, that first introduc'd *Syllogism*, could not be certain of any thing; no, not that there was a God, which will be the present State of the far greatest part of Mankind (to pass by whole Nations of the East, as *China* and *Indostan*, &c.) even in the Christian World, who to this day have not the *Syllogistical Methods of Demonstration*, and so cannot be certain of any thing.

3. Your Lordship farther says, That in my way of Certainty by Ideas we have no Criterion. *Ans.* To perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas, and not to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas, is, I think, a Criterion to distinguish what a Man is certain of, from what he is not certain of. Has your Lordship any other or better Criterion to distinguish Certainty from Uncertainty? If you have, I repeat again my earnest Request, That you would be pleas'd to do that Right to your way of Certainty by Reason, as not to conceal it. If your Lordship has not, why is the want of a Criterion, when I have so plain a one, objected to my way of Certainty, and my way so often accus'd of a Tendency to *Scepticism* and *Infidelity*, when you your self have not a better? And I think I may take the liberty to say, if your's be not the same, you have not one so good.

Mr. LOCKE's Second Reply

Pethaps your Lordship will censure me here, and think it is more than becomes me, to press you so hard concerning your own way; and to ask, whether your way of Certainty lies in having *Antecedents* and *Consequents*, and *Syllogisms*; and whether it has any other or better *Criterion*, than what I have given: Your Lordship will possibly think it enough, that you have *laid down the Grounds of Certainty which the ancient Grecians went upon*. My Lord, if you think so, I must be satisfy'd with it: tho' perhaps others will think it strange, that in a Dispute about a *Method of Certainty*, which, for its suppos'd coming short of Certainty, you charge with a Tendency to *Scepticism* and *Infidelity*, you should produce only the different Opinions of other Men, concerning Certainty, to make good this Charge, without declaring any of those different Opinions or Grounds of Certainty to be true or false: And some may be apt to suspect that you your self are not yet resolv'd wherein to place it.

But, my Lord, I know too well what your distance above me requires of me, to say any such thing to your Lordship. Your own Opinions are to your self, and your not discovering them, must pass for a sufficient Reason for your not discovering them: and if you think fit to over-lay a poor infant modern Nation with the great and weighty Names of *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Plutarch*, and the like; and heaps of Quotations out of the Antients; who is not presently to think it dead, and that there is an end of it? Especially when it will have too much Envy for any one to open his Mouth in defence of a Notion, which is declar'd by your Lordship to be different from what those great Men said, whose Words are to be taken without any more ado, and who are not to be thought ignorant or mistaken in any thing. Tho' I crave leave to say, That however infallible Oracles they were, to take things barely upon their, or any Man's Authority, is barely to believe, but not to know or be certain.

Thus your Lordship has sufficiently prov'd my way of Certainty by *Ideas* to be inconsistent with the way of Certainty by Reason, by proving it new; which you prove only by saying, That it is so wholly new, that here we have no general Principles; no Criterion; no Antecedents and Consequents; no syllogistical Methods of Demonstration: And yet we are told of a better way of Certainty to be attain'd merely by the help of *Ideas*; add, if your Lordship pleases, signity'd by Words: which put into Propositions, whereof some are general Principles, some are or may be Antecedents, and some Consequents, and some put together in Mode and Figure, syllogistical Methods of Demonstration. For, pray my Lord, may not Words, that stand for *Ideas*, be put into Propositions as well as any other? And may not those Propositions, wherein the Terms stand for *Ideas*, be as well put into Antecedents and Consequents, or Syllogisms, and make Maxims, as well as any other Propositions, whose Terms stand not for *Ideas*, if your Lordship can find any such? And if thus *Ideas* can be brought into Maxims, Antecedents and Consequents, and syllogistical Methods of Demonstration, what Inconsistency has the way of Certainty by *Ideas*, with those ways of Certainty by Reason; if at last your Lordship will say, That Certainty consists in Propositions put together as Antecedents and Consequents, and in Mode and Figure? For as for Principles or Maxims, we shall know whether your Principles or Maxims are a way to Certainty, when you shall please to tell us what it is that, to your Lordship, makes a Maxim or Principle, and distinguishes it from other Propositions; and whether it be any thing but an immediate Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas*, as express'd in that Proposition. To conclude, by all that your Lordship has alledg'd out of the Antients, you have not, as I humbly conceive, prov'd that my way of Certainty is new, or that they had any way of Certainty different from mine; much less have you prov'd that my way of Certainty by *Ideas* is inconsistent with the way of Certainty by Reason, which was the Proposition to be prov'd.

Your Lordship having thought it enough against my way of Certainty by *Ideas*, thus to prove its Newness, you betake your self presently to your old Topick of obscure and confus'd *Ideas*; and ask, But how comes there to be such a way of Certainty by *Ideas*, and yet the *Ideas* themselves are so uncertain and obscure?

Ans^r.

Answ. No *Idea*, as it is in the Mind, is *uncertain*; tho' to those who use Names uncertainly, it may be *uncertain* what *Idea* that Name stands for. And as to obscure and confus'd *Ideas*, no *Idea* is so obscure in all its Parts, or so confounded with all other *Ideas*, but that one, who, in a Proposition, joins it with another in that part which is clear and distinct, may perceive its Agreement or Disagreement, as express'd in that Proposition: Tho' when Names are us'd for *Ideas*, which are in some part obscure or confounded with other *Ideas*, there can be no Propositions made which can produce Certainty concerning that, wherein the *Idea* is obscure and confus'd. And therefore to your Lordship's Question, *How is it possible for us to have a clear Perception of the Agreement of* P. 122. *Ideas, if the Ideas themselves be not clear and distinct?* I answer, very well; because an obscure or confus'd *Idea*, i. e. that is not perfectly clear and distinct in all its Parts, may be compar'd with another in that Part of it which is clear and distinct: which will, I humbly conceive, remove all those Difficulties, Inconsistencies and Contradictions, which your Lordship seems to be troubled with from my words quoted in those two Pages.

Your Lordship having, as it seems, quite forgot that you were to shew wherein the Certainty of Deductions in the way of *Ideas*, was inconsistent with the Certainty of Deductions in the way of Reason, brings here a new Charge upon my way of Certainty, viz. That I have no Criterion to distinguish false and doubtful *Ideas*, from true and certain. Your Lordship says, the Academicks went upon P. 123. *Ideas*, or Representations of things to their Minds; and pray, my Lord, does not your Lordship do so too? Or has Mr. J. S. so won upon your Lordship, by his solid Philosophy against the Fancies of the Ideists, that you begin to think him in the right in this too; where he says, That Notions are the Materials of our Knowledge; and that a Notion is the very thing it self existing in the Understanding? for since I make no doubt but that, in all your Lordship's Knowledge, you will allow, that you have some immediate Objects of your Thoughts, which are the Materials of that Knowledge, about which it is employ'd, those immediate Objects, if they are not as Mr. J. S. says, the very things themselves, must be *Ideas*. Not thinking your Lordship therefore yet so perfect a Convert of Mr. J. S's that you are persuaded, that as often as you think of your Cathedral Church, or of Des Cartes's Vortices, that the very Cathedral Church at Worcester, or the Motion of those Vortices, it self exists in your Understanding; when one of them never existed but in that one Place at Worcester, and the other never existed any where in *rerum natura*. I conclude your Lordship has immediate Objects of your Mind, which are not the very things themselves existing in your Understanding: which if, with the Academicks, you will please to call Representations, as I suppose you will, rather than with me *Ideas*, it will make no difference. Solid Philosophy, p. 24, & 27.

This being so, I must then make the same Objection against your way of Certainty by Reason, that your Lordship does against my way of Certainty by *Ideas* (for upon the comparison of these two we now are) and then I return your words here again, viz. That you have no Criterion to distinguish false and doubtful Representations from true and certain; how then can any Man be secure, that he is not impos'd upon in your Lordship's way of Representations? P. 122, 123.

Your Lordship says, I tell you of a way of Certainty by *Ideas*, and never offer any such Method for examining them, as the Academicks requir'd for their Probability. P. 124, 125.

Answ. I was not, I confess, so well acquainted with what the Academicks went upon for the Criterion of a greater Probability, as your Lordship is; or if I had, I writing, as your Lordship knows, out of my own thoughts, could not well transcribe out of them. But that you should tell me, I never offer any Criterion to distinguish false from true *Ideas*, I cannot but wonder; and therefore crave leave to beg your Lordship to look again into B. 2. c. 32. of my Essay; and there, I persuade my self, you will find a Criterion, whereby true and false *Ideas* may be distinguished.

Your Lordship brings for Instance the *Idea* of Solidity; but what it is an Instance of, I confess, I do not see: Your Lordship charges on my way of Certainty, that I have no Criterion to distinguish false and doubtful *Ideas* from true and certain; which is follow'd by an Account you give, how the Academicks examin'd their *Ideas* or Representations, before they allow'd them to prevail on them to give an Assent, as to a greater Probability. And then you tell me, that I never offer any such P. 125.

such Method for examining them, as the Academicks requir'd for their Probability: to which your Lordship subjoins these words; *As for Instance, my first Idea, which I go upon, of Solidity.* Would not one now expect, that this should be an Instance to make good your Lordship's Charge, that I had no *Criterion* to distinguish, whether my *Idea* of Solidity were false and doubtful, or true and certain?

P. 125. To shew that I have no such *Criterion*, your Lordship asks me two Questions; the first is, *How my Idea of Solidity comes to be clear and distinct?* I will suppose for once, that I know not *how it comes to be clear and distinct*: How will this prove, that I have no *Criterion* to know whether it be true or false? For the Question here is not about knowing *how an Idea comes to be clear and distinct*; but how I shall know whether it be true or false. But your Lordship's following words seem to aim at a farther Objection; your words altogether are, *How this Idea [i. e. my Idea of Solidity, which consists in Repletion of Space, with an Exclusion of all other solid Substances] comes to be clear and distinct to me, when others who go in the same way of Ideas, have quite another Idea of it?* My Lord, I desire your Lordship to name who those *Others* are, who go in the same way of Ideas with me, who have quite another Idea of this my Idea than I have; for to this Idea I could be sure that *It*, in any other Writer but your Lordship, must here refer: But my Lord, it is one of your privileg'd Particles, and I have nothing to say to it. But let it be so, that *others have quite another Idea of it than I*; how does that prove, that I have no *Criterion* to distinguish whether my Idea of Solidity be true or no?

P. 125. Your Lordship farther adds, *That those other think that they have as plain and distinct an Idea, that Extension and Body are the same*: And then your Lordship asks, *Now what Criterion is there to come to a Certainty in this Matter?* Answ. In what Matter, I beseech your Lordship? If it be whether my Idea of Solidity be a true Idea, which is the Matter here in question, in this Matter I have given a

B. 2. c. 32. *Criterion* to know in my Essay: If it be to decide the Question, whether the word *Body* more properly stands for the simple Idea of Space; or for the complex Idea of Space and Solidity together, that is not the Question here; nor can there be any other *Criterion* to decide it by, but the Propriety of our Language.

P. 126. But your Lordship adds, *Ideas can have no way of Certainty in themselves, if it be possible for even Philosophical and Rational Men to fall into such contrary Ideas about the same thing*; and both sides think their Ideas to be clear and distinct. If this were so, I do not see how this would any way prove, that I had no *Criterion* whereby it might be discerned, whether my Idea of Solidity were true or no; which was to be prov'd.

But at last, this which your Lordship calls *contrary Ideas about the same thing*, is nothing but a difference about a Name. For I think no body will say, That the Idea of Extension, and the Idea of Solidity are the same Ideas: All the difference then between those Philosophical and Rational Men, which your Lordship mentions here, is no more but this, whether the simple Idea of pure Extension shall be call'd *Body*, or whether the complex Ideas of Extension and Solidity join'd together, shall be call'd *Body*; which will be no more than a bare verbal Dispute to any one, who does not take Sounds for Things, and make the word *Body* something more than a Sign of what the Speaker would signify by it. But what the Speaker makes the Term *Body* stand for, cannot be precisely known, till he has determin'd it in his own Mind, and made it known to another; and then there can between them be no longer a Dispute about the signification of the word: v. g. If one of those Philosophical Rational Men tells your Lordship, that he makes the Term *Body* to stand precisely for the simple Idea of pure Extension, your Lordship or he can be in no Doubt or Uncertainty concerning this thing; but whenever he uses the word, *Body* your Lordship must suppose in his Mind the simple Idea of Extension, as the thing he means by *Body*. If, on the other side, another of those Philosophical Rational Men shall tell your Lordship, that he makes the Term *Body* to stand precisely for a complex Idea made up of the simple Ideas of Extension and Solidity join'd together; your Lordship or he can be in no Doubt or Uncertainty concerning this thing: but when-

whenever he uses the word Body, your Lordship must think on, and allow the *Idea* belonging to it, to be that complex one.

As your Lordship can allow this different use of the Term Body in these different Men, without changing any *Idea*, or any thing in your own Mind, but the Application of the same Term to different *Ideas*, which changes neither the Truth nor Certainty of any of your Lordship's *Ideas*, from what it was before: So those two *Philosophical Rational Men* may, in Discourse one with another, agree to use that Term *Body*, for either of those two *Ideas*, which they please, without at all making their *Ideas*, on either side, false or uncertain. But if they will contest which of these *Ideas* the Sound Body ought to stand for, 'tis visible their Difference is not about any Reality of Things, but the Propriety of Speech; and their Dispute and Doubt is only about the signification of a word.

Your Lordship's second Question is, *Whether by this Ideas of Solidity, we may come to know what it is.* *Ans.* I must ask you here again, what you mean by it? If your Lordship by it means *Solidity*, then your Question runs thus: Whether by this [*i. e.* my] *Idea of Solidity, we may come to know what Solidity is?* *Ans.* Without doubt, if your Lordship means by the Term *Solidity*, what I mean by the Term *Solidity*; for then I have told you what it is, in the Chapter above-cited by your Lordship: If you mean any thing else by the Term *Solidity*, when your Lordship will please to tell me what you mean by it, I will tell your Lordship what *Solidity* is. This, I humbly conceive, you will find your self obliged to do, if what I have said of *Solidity* does not satisfy you what it is. For you will not think it reasonable I should tell your Lordship what a thing is, when express'd by you in a Term, which I do not know what your Lordship means by, nor what you make it stand for.

But your Lordship asks, *Wherein it consists*; if you mean wherein the *Idea* of it consists, that I have already told your Lordship, in the Chapter of my *Essay* above-mentioned. If your Lordship means what is the real internal Constitution, that physically makes *Solidity* in things; If I answer I do not know, that will no more make my *Idea of Solidity* not to be true or certain (if your Lordship thinks Certainty may be attributed to single *Ideas*) than the not knowing the physical Constitution, whereby the parts of Bodies are so fram'd as to cohere, makes my *Idea of Cohesion* not true or certain.

To my saying in my *Essay*, "That if any one ask me what this *Solidity* is, I send him to his Senses to inform him;" your Lordship replies, *You thought the Design of my Book would have sent him to his Ideas for Certainty; and are we, says your Lordship, sent back again from our Ideas to our Senses?* *Ans.* I cannot help it, if your Lordship mistakes the Design of my Book: For what concerns Certainty, *i. e.* the Knowledge of the Truth of Propositions, my Book sends every one to his *Ideas*; but for the getting of simple *Ideas* of Sensation, my Book sends him only to his Senses. But your Lordship uses Certainty here, in a Sense I never us'd it, nor do understand it in; for what the Certainty of any simple *Idea* is, I confess I do not know, and shall be glad you would tell me what you mean by it.

However, in this Sense you ask me, and that as if your Question carry'd a Demonstration of my contradicting my self; *And are we sent back again, from our Ideas to our Senses?* *Ans.* My Lord, every one is sent to his Senses to get the simple *Ideas* of Sensation, because they are no other way to be got.

Your Lordship presses on with this farther Question, *What do these Ideas signify then?* *i. e.* if a Man be sent to his Senses for the *Idea* of *Solidity*. I answer, to shew him the Certainty of Propositions, wherein the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* is perceiv'd; which is the Certainty I speak of, and no other: But what the Certainty is which your Lordship speaks of in this and the following Page, I confess I do not understand. For,

Your Lordship adds, that I say farther, "That if this be not a sufficient Explication of *Solidity*, I promise to tell any one what it is, when he tells me what Thinking is; or explains to me, what Extension and Motion are." *Are we not now in the true way to Certainty, when such things as these are given over, of which we have the clearest Evidence by Sensation and Reflection? For here I make it as impossible to come to certain, clear and distinct Notions of these Things, as to discourse into a blind Man the Ideas of Light and Colours.* Is not this a

rare way of Certainty? *Answ.* What *Things*, my Lord, I beseech you, are *those* which you here tell me *are given over*, of which *we have the clearest Evidence by Sensation or Reflection?* 'Tis likely you will tell me, they are *Extension and Motion*. But, my Lord, I crave the liberty to say, that when you have consider'd again, you will be satisfied, there are no *things given over* in the *Case*, but only the names *Extension and Motion*; and concerning them too, nothing is *given over*, but a power of defining them. When you will be pleas'd to lay by a little the Warmth of those Questions of Triumph, which I meet with in this Passage, and tell me what *Things* your Lordship makes these Names *Extension and Motion* to stand for; you perhaps will not find, that *I make it impossible* for those, who have their Senses, to get the simple *Ideas*, signify'd by these Names, very clear and distinct by their Senses: tho' I do say, that these, as well as all other Names of simple *Ideas*, cannot be defin'd; nor any simple *Ideas* be brought into our Minds by Words, any more than the *Ideas* of Light and Colours can be discours'd into a blind Man: which is all I do say in those Words of mine, which your Lordship quotes, as such wherein I have *given over things, whereof we have the clearest Evidence*. And so from my being of opinion, That the Names of simple *Ideas* cannot be defin'd, nor those *Ideas* got by any Words whatsoever, which is all that I there say; your Lordship very pathetically expresses your self as if in *my way* all were gone, Certainty were lost; and if my Method should be allow'd, there is an end of all Knowledge in the World.

P. 127. The Reason your Lordship gives against my way of Certainty, is, That *I here make it as impossible to come to certain, clear, and distinct Notions of these things, [i. e. Extension and Motion] as to discourse into a blind Man the Idea of Light and Colours.* *Answ.* What *clear and distinct Notions or Ideas* are, I do understand: but what your Lordship means by *certain Notions*, speaking here, as you do, of simple *Ideas*, I must own I do not understand. That for the attaining those simple *Ideas* I *send Men to their Senses*, I shall think I am in the right, till I hear from your Lordship better Arguments to convince me of my Mistake, than

P. 127. these: *Are we not now in the true way to Certainty? Is not this a rare way of Certainty?* And if your Lordship has a better way to get clear and distinct simple *Ideas*, than by the Senses, you will oblige me, and I think the World too, by a Discovery of it. Till then, I shall continue in the same Mind I was of, when

Essay, B. 2. I writ that Passage, viz. That Words can do nothing towards it, and that for
c. 4. §. 5, 6. the Reason which I there promised, and is to be found, *Essay, B. 3. C. 4. §. 7,*

P. 127. &c. And therefore to your Lordship's saying, That *thus you have shew'd, that I have no security against false and uncertain Ideas, no Criterion to judge them by*; I think I may securely reply, that with Submission *thus shewing it*, is no shewing it at all; nor will ever shew, That I have no such *Criterion*, even when we shall

P. 128. add your Lordship's farther Inference, *Now here again our Ideas deceive us*. Which supposing it a good Inference from these words of mine, "That most of our simple *Ideas* are not the Likeness of things without us;" yet it seems to me, to come in here, a little out of season: because the Proposition to be prov'd, is, as I humbly conceive, not that *our Ideas deceive us*, but that *I have not a Criterion to distinguish true from false Ideas*.

If it be brought to prove that I have no *Criterion*, I have this to say, That I neither well understand what it is for our *Ideas to deceive us in the way of Certainty*; nor, in the best Sense that I can give it, do I see how it proves that I have no *Criterion*; nor, lastly, how it follows from my saying that most of our simple *Ideas* are not Resemblances.

P. 128. Your Lordship seems by the following words to mean, That in this way by *Ideas*, which are confess'd not to be Resemblances, Men are hinder'd, and cannot go far in the Knowledge of what *they desire to know of the Nature of those Objects, of which we have the Ideas in our Minds*. If this should be so, what is this, I beseech your Lordship, to your shewing that I have no *Criterion*? But that this is a fault in the way by *Ideas*, I shall be convinc'd, when your Lordship shall be pleas'd to shew me, how in *your way of Certainty by Reason*, we can know more of the *Nature of things without us*; or of *that which causes these Ideas or Perceptions in us*. But, I humbly conceive, 'tis no Objection to the way of *Ideas*, if any one will *deceive himself*, and expect Certainty by *Ideas*, in things where Certainty is not to be had; because he is told how Knowledge or Certainty is got by

by *Ideas*, as far as Men attain to it. And since your Lordship is here comparing the ways of Certainty by *Ideas* and by *Reason*, as two different and inconsistent ways, I humbly crave leave to add, That when you can shew me any one Proposition, which you have attain'd to a Certainty of, in *your way of Certainty by Reason*, which I cannot attain to a Certainty of in *my way of Certainty by Ideas*; I will acknowledg my *Essay* to be guilty of whatever your Lordship pleases.

Your Lordship concludes, *So that these Ideas are really nothing but Names, if they be not Representations.* *Answ.* This does not yet shew, that I have no Criterion to distinguish true from false *Ideas*; the thing that your Lordship is thus shewing. For I may have a Criterion to distinguish true from false *Ideas*, tho' that Criterion concern not *Names* at all. For your Lordship, in this Proposition, allowing none to be *Ideas*, but what are *Representations*; the other, which you say are *nothing but Names*, are not concern'd in the Criterion, that is to distinguish true from false *Ideas*: because it relates to nothing but *Ideas*, and the distinguishing of them one from another; unless *true and false Ideas* can be any thing but *Ideas*, i. e. *Ideas* and not *Ideas* at the same time.

But farther, I crave leave to answer, That your Lordship's Proposition, *viz. That these Ideas are really nothing but Names, if they be not the Representations of things*; seems to me no Consequence from my words, to which it is subjoin'd, tho' introduc'd with *so that*: for, methinks, it carries something like a Contradiction in it. I say, "Most of our simple *Ideas* of Sensation, are not the Likeness of something without us:" Your Lordship infers, if so, *these Ideas are really nothing but Names*; which, as it seems to me, is as much as to say, *These Ideas*, that are *Ideas*, are not *Ideas*, but *Names* only. Methinks they might be allow'd to be *Ideas*, and that is all they pretend to be, tho' they do not resemble that which produces them. I cannot help thinking a Son something really more than a bare *Name*, tho' he has not the luck to resemble his Father, who begot him: And the Black and Blue which I see, I cannot conclude but to be something besides the words *Black* and *Blue* (wherever your Lordship shall place that Something, either in my Perception only, or in my Skin) tho' it resemble not at all the Stone, that with a knock produc'd it.

Should your Lordship put your two Hands, whereof one is hot and the other cold, into lukewarm Water; it would be hard to think, that the *Idea* of Heat produc'd in you by one of your Hands, and the *Idea* of Cold by the other, were the Likenesses and very Resemblances of something in the same Water, since the same Water could not be capable of having at the same time such real Contrarieties. Wherefore since, as 'tis evident, they cannot be Representations of any thing in the Water, it follows by your Lordship's Doctrine here, that if you should declare what you feel, *viz. That you feel Heat and Cold in that Water, viz. Heat by one Hand, and Cold by the other*; you mean nothing by *Heat* and *Cold*: *Heat* and *Cold* in the case are nothing but Names; and your Lordship, in truth, feels nothing but these two Names.

Your Lordship, in the next place, proceeds to examine my way of Demonstration. Whether you do this to shew that I have no Criterion, whereby to distinguish true from false *Ideas*; or to shew, that my way of Certainty by *Ideas* is inconsistent with the Certainty of Deductions by *Reason*; (for these were the things you seem'd to me to have undertaken to shew, and therefore to be upon in this place) does not appear: but this appears by the words wherewith you introduce this Examen, that it is to avoid doing me wrong. P. 129.

Your Lordship, as if you had been sensible that your former Discourse had led you towards doing me wrong, breaks it off of a sudden, and begins this new one of Demonstration, by telling me, *you will do me no wrong.* Can it be thought now, that you forget this Promise, before you get half through your Examen? Or is a mis-citing my Words, and misrepresenting my Sense, no Wrong? Your Lordship, in this very Examen, sets down a long Quotation out of my *Essay*, and in the close you tell me; *These are my own Words which your Lordship has set down at large, that I may not complain that you misrepresent my Sense.* This one would think Guaranty enough in a less Man than your Lordship: And yet, my Lord, I must crave leave to complain, that not only my Sense, but my very Words, are in that Quotation misrepresented. P. 129.

Essay, B. 4.
c. 7. §. 10.
Answ. 2.
P. 132.

To shew that my Complaint is not groundless, give me leave, my Lord, to set down my Words, as I read them in that place of my Book which your Lordship quotes for them, and as I find them here in your second Letter.

" If we add all the self-evident Propositions may be made about all our distinct Ideas, Principles will be almost infinite, at least innumerable, which Men arrive to the knowledge of at different Ages ; and a great many of these innate Principles they never come to know all their lives. But whether they come in view of the Mind earlier or later, this is true of them, that they are all known by their native Evidence, are wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable of any Proof, one from another, &c."

That it is true of our particular distinct Ideas, that they are all known by their native Evidence, are wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable of any proof, one from another, &c.

By their standing thus together, the Reader will without any pains see whether those your Lordship has set down in your Letter are my own Words ; and whether in that place, which speaks only of *self-evident Propositions* or *Principles*, I have any thing in Words or in Sense like this, *That our particular distinct Ideas are known by their native Evidence, &c.* Tho' your Lordship closes the Quotation with that solemn Declaration above-mention'd, *That they are my own Words, which you have set down at large, that I may not complain you misrepresent my Sense.* And yet nothing can more misrepresent my Sense than they do, applying all that to *particular Ideas*, which I speak there only of *self-evident Propositions* or *Principles* ; and that so plainly, that I think I may venture any one's mistaking it in my own words : And upon this Misrepresentation of my Sense, your Lordship raises a Discourse, and manages a Dispute for, I think, a dozen Pages following, against my placing *Demonstration on self-evident Ideas* ; tho' *self-evident Ideas* are things wholly unknown to me, and are no where in my Book, nor were ever in my Thoughts.

P. 133—146.

But let us come to your Exceptions against my way of *Demonstration*, which your Lordship is pleas'd to call *Demonstration without Principles*.
P. 129. *Answ.* If you mean by *Principles* self-evident Propositions, then you know my *Demonstration* is not without *Principles*, in that sense of the term *Principles* : For your Lordship
P. 130. in the next Page blames my way, because I suppose every intermediate *Idea* in *Demonstration* to have a *self-evident Connection* with the other *Idea* ; for two such *Ideas* as have a *self-evident Connection*, join'd together in a Proposition, make a *self-evident Proposition*. If your Lordship means by *Principles*, those which in the place there quoted by your Lordship I mean, viz. *Whatever is, is ; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be ;* and such other general Propositions, as are receiv'd under the name of *Maxims* : I grant, that I do say, That they are not absolutely requisite in every *Demonstration* ; and I think I have shewn, that there be *Demonstrations* which may be made without them : tho' I do not, that I remember, say, That they are excluded, and cannot be made use of in *Demonstration*.
Essay, B. 4.
C. 2. §. 8.

P. 129. Your Lordship's first Argument against my way of *Demonstration*, is, *That it must suppose Self-evidence must be in the Ideas of my Mind ; and that every intermediate Idea, which I take to demonstrate any thing by, must have a self-evident Connection with the others.* *Answ.* Taking *Self-evidence in the Ideas of the Mind*, to mean in the perceiv'd Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* in the Mind ; I grant, I do not only suppose, but say so.

P. 130. To prove it not to be so in *Demonstration*, your Lordship says, *That it is such a way of Demonstration, as the old Philosophers never thought of.* *Answ.* No body, I think, will question, that your Lordship is very well read in the old Philosophers : But he that will answer for what the old Philosophers ever did, or did not think of, must not only understand their extant Writings better than any Man ever did ; but must have ways to know their Thoughts, that other Men have not. For all of them thought more than they writ ; some of them writ not at all, and others writ a great deal more than ever came to us. But if it should happen that any of them placed the Proof of any Proposition in the Agreement of two things

things in a third, as I think some of them did; then it will, I humbly conceive, appear, that they did think of my way of Demonstration; unless your Lordship can shew, that they could see that two things agreed in a third, without perceiving their Agreement with that third: and if they did in every Syllogism of a Demonstration perceive that Agreement, then there was a *self-evident Connection*; which is that which your Lordship says *they never thought of*.

But supposing *they never thought of it*, must we put out our Eyes, and not see whatever they over-look'd? Are all the Discoveries made by *Galileo*, my Lord *Bacon*, Mr. *Boyle*, and Mr. *Newton*, &c. to be rejected as false, because they teach us what *the old Philosophers never thought of*? Mistake me not, my Lord, in thinking that I have the Vanity here to rank my self, on this occasion, with these great Discoverers of Truth, and Advancers of Knowledge. On the contrary, I contend, that my way of Certainty, my way of Demonstration, which your Lordship so often condemns for its Newness, is not *New*; but is the very same that has always been used, both by Antients and Moderns. I am only considering here your Lordship's Argument, of *never having been thought of by the old Philosophers*; which is an Argument, that will make nothing for or against the Truth of any Proposition advanc'd by a modern Writer, till your Lordship has prov'd, that those old Philosophers (let the happy Age of old Philosophers determine where your Lordship pleases) did discover all Truth, or that they had the sole Privilege to search after it, and besides them no body was to study Nature, no body was to think or reason for himself; but every one was to be barely a reading Philosopher, with an implicit Faith.

Your Objection in the next words, *That then every Demonstration carries its own Light with it*, shews that your way by Reason is what I do not understand. For this I thought heretofore was the Property of Demonstration, and not a Proof that it was not a Demonstration, *that it carry'd its own Light with it*: But yet tho' in every Demonstration there is a *self-evident Connection* of the Ideas, by which it is made; yet that it does not follow from thence, as your Lordship here objects, that then every Demonstration would be as clear and unquestionable as that *two and two make four*, your Lordship may see in the same Chapter, and the reason of it. P. 130.
Essay, B. 4.
c. 2. §. 4, 5, 6.

You seem in the following words to allow, that there is such a Connection of the *intermediate Ideas* in *Mathematical Demonstrations*; but say, *You should be glad to see any Demonstration (not about Figures and Numbers) of this kind*. And if that be a good Argument against it, I crave leave to use it too on my side; and to say, *That I would be glad to see any Demonstration (not about Figures and Numbers) not of this kind, i. e. wherein there is not a self-evident Connection of all the intermediate Ideas*. If you have any such, I earnestly beg your Lordship to favour me with it; for I crave liberty to say, *That the Reason, and Form, and Way of Evidence in Demonstration, wherever there is Demonstration, is always the same*. P. 130.

But you say, *THIS is a quite different Case from mine*: I suppose your Lordship means by *THIS*, *Mathematical Demonstration*, the thing mention'd in the preceding Period; and then your Sense will run thus: *Mathematical Demonstrations*, wherein Certainty is to be had by the Intuition of the self-evident Connection of all the intermediate Ideas, are *different from* that Demonstration which I am there treating of. If you mean not so, I must own, I know not what you mean by saying, *THIS is a quite different Case from mine*. And if your Lordship does mean so, I do not see how it can be so as you say: your Words taken all together run thus; *My principal Ground is from Mathematical Demonstrations, and my Examples are brought from them. But this is quite a different Case from mine: i. e. I am speaking in that Chapter of my Essay concerning Demonstration in general, and the Certainty we have by it: The Examples I use, are brought from Mathematicks, and yet you say, Mathematical Demonstrations are quite a different Case from mine*. If I here misunderstand your Lordship's *THIS*, I must beg your pardon for it; it is one of your privileg'd Particles, and I am not Master of it. Misrepresent your Sense, I cannot; for your very Words are set down, and let the Reader judg. P. 130.

But your Lordship gives a Reason for what you had said in these Words subjoin'd, where you say, *I grant that those Ideas, on which Mathematical De-* P. 130.

monstrations proceed, are wholly in the Mind, and do not relate to the Existence of things; but our Debate goes upon a Certainty of Knowledge of things as really existing. In which Words there are these things remarkable:

1. That your Lordship's Exception here, is against what I have said concerning Demonstration in my Essay, and not against any thing I have said in either of my Letters to your Lordship. If therefore your Lordship and I have since, in our Letters, had any *Debate about the Certainty of the Knowledge of things as really existing*; that which was writ before that *Debate*, could have no relation to it, nor be limited by it. If therefore your Lordship makes any Exception (as you do) to my way of Demonstration, as propos'd in my Essay, you must, as I humbly conceive, take it as deliver'd there, comprehending Mathematical Demonstrations; which cannot be excluded, because your Lordship says, *Our Debate now goes upon a Certainty of the Knowledge of things as really existing*, supposing *Mathematical Demonstrations* did not afford a *Certainty of Knowledge of things as really existing*.

2. But in the next place *Mathematical Demonstrations* do afford a Certainty of the Knowledge of things as really existing, as much as any other Demonstrations whatsoever; and therefore they afford your Lordship no Ground upon that account to separate them, as you do here, from Demonstrations in other Subjects.

Your Lordship indeed thinks I have given you sufficient Grounds to charge me with the contrary: For you say, *I grant that those Ideas, on which Mathematical Demonstrations proceed, are wholly in the Mind*; this indeed I grant: *and do not relate to the Existence of things*; but these latter Words I do not remember that I any where say. And I wish you had quoted the place where I grant any such thing; I am sure it is not in that place, where it is likeliest to be found: I mean, where I examine, whether the Knowledge we have of *Mathematical Truths*, be the *Knowledge of Things as really existing*: There

Essay, B. 4.
C. 4. §. 6.

§. 7.

I say (and I think I have prov'd) that it is, tho' it consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of *Ideas* that are only in the Mind; because it takes in all those things, really existing, which answer those *Ideas*. Upon which Ground it was, That I there affirm'd moral Knowledge also capable of Certainty. And pray, my Lord, what other way can your Lordship proceed, in any Demonstration you would make, about any other thing but *Figures and Numbers*, but the same that you do in *Demonstrations about Figures and Numbers*? If you would demonstrate any thing concerning *Man* or *Murder*, must you not first settle in your Mind the *Idea* or *Notion* you have of that *Animal* or that *Action*, and then shew what you would demonstrate necessarily to belong to that *Idea* in your Mind, and to things existing only as they correspond with, and answer that *Idea* in your Mind? How else can you make any general Proposition, that shall contain the Knowledge of thing, as really existing, I that am ignorant should be glad to learn, when your Lordship shall do me the favour to shew me any such.

In the mean time, there is no reason why you should except *Demonstrations about Figures and Numbers* from Demonstrations about other Subjects, upon the account that *I grant, that those Ideas, on which Mathematical Demonstrations proceed, are wholly in the Mind*, when I say the same of all other Demonstrations. For the *Ideas* that other Demonstrations proceed on, are wholly in the Mind: And no Demonstration whatsoever concerns things as really existing, any farther than as they correspond with, and answer those *Ideas in the Mind*, which the *Demonstration proceeds on*. This Distinction therefore here of your Lordship's, between *Mathematical* and other *Demonstrations*,

P. 131. having no Foundation, your Inference founded on it falls with it; viz. *So that altho' we should grant all that I say about the Intuition of Ideas in Mathematical Demonstrations, yet it comes not at all to my Business, unless I can prove, that we have as clear and distinct Ideas of Beings, as we have of Numbers and Figures. Tho' how Beings here and Numbers and Figures come to be oppos'd against one another, I shall not be able to conceive, till I am better instructed than hitherto I am, that Numbers and Figures are no Beings; and that the Mathematicians and Philosophers, old ones and all, have, in all the Pains taken about them, employ'd their Thoughts about nothing. And I would*
be

be glad to know what those *Things* are, which your Lordship says *our Debate goes upon here as really existing*, that are *Beings* more than *Numbers and Figures*.

Your Lordship's next Exception against my way of Demonstration, is, That P. 131. in it I am inconsistent with my self. For Proof of it, you say, *I design to prove Demonstrations without general Principles; and yet every one knows that general Principles are suppos'd in Mathematicks.* Answ. Every one may know that general Principles are supposed in Mathematicks, without knowing, or ever being able to know, that I, who say also that Mathematicians do often make use of them, am inconsistent with my self; tho' I also say, That a Demonstration about Numbers and Figures may be made without them.

To prove me inconsistent with my self, you add; *And that Person would be thought ridiculous, who should go about to prove, That general Principles are of little, or of dangerous Use in Mathematical Demonstrations.* Answ. A Man may make other ridiculous Faults in writing, besides Inconsistency, and there are Instances enough of it: But by good luck I am in this place clear of what would be thought ridiculous, which yet is no Proof of Inconsistency. For I never went about to prove, That general Principles are of little or dangerous Use in Mathematical Demonstrations.

To prove me inconsistent with my self, your Lordship uses one Argument more, and that is, That I confess that the way of Demonstration in Morality, is from Principles, as those of Mathematicks, by necessary Consequences. Answ. With Submission, my Lord, I do not say in the place quoted by your Lordship, That the way of Demonstration in Morality is from Principles, as those of the Mathematicks, by necessary Consequences. But this is that which I say, "That I B. 4. C. 3. §. 18. doubt not but in Morality, from Principles as incontestable as those of the Mathematicks, by necessary Consequences, the measures of Right and "Wrong might be made out." Which Words, I humbly conceive, have no Inconsistency with my saying, there may be Demonstrations without the help of Maxims; whatever Inconsistency the Words which you here set down for mine, may have with it.

My Lord, the Words you bring out of my Book are so often different from those I read in the places which you refer to, that I am sometimes ready to think, you have got some strange Copy of it, whereof I know nothing, since it so seldom agrees with mine. Pardon me, my Lord, if with some care I examine the Objection of *Inconsistency with my self*; that if I find any, I may retract the one part or the other of it. Human Frailty, I grant, and Variety of Thoughts in long Discourses, may make a Man unwittingly advance Inconsistencies. This may consist with Ingenuity, and deserve to be excus'd: But for any one to persist in it, when it is shew'd him, is to give himself the Lye; which cannot but stick closer to him in the Sense of all rational Men, than if he receiv'd it from another.

I own, I have said, in my Essay, That there be Demonstrations, which may be made without those general Maxims, that I there treated of. But I cannot recollect, that I ever said, that those general Maxims could not be made use of in Demonstration: for they are no more shut out of my way of Demonstration, than any other self-evident Propositions. And therefore there is no Inconsistency in those two Propositions, which are mine, viz. *Some Demonstrations may be made without the help of those general Maxims; and Morality, I doubt not, may be demonstrated from Principles; whatever Inconsistency may be in these two following Propositions, which are your Lordship's and not mine, viz. The way of Demonstration in Morality is from Principles, and general Maxims are not the way to proceed on in Demonstration, as to other parts of Knowledge.* For to admit self-evident Propositions, which is what I mean by Principles, in the place of my Essay, which your Lordship quotes for the first of my inconsistent Propositions, and to say (as I do in the other place quoted by your Lordship) "That those magnified Maxims are not the Principles and Foundations of all our other Knowledge;" has no manner of Inconsistency. For tho' I think them not necessary to every Demonstration, so neither do I exclude them any more than other self-evident Propositions out of any Demonstration; wherein any one should make use of them. P. 131, 132. B. 4. C. 3. §. 18. B. 4. C. 7. §. 10.

P. 133. The next Objection against my way of Demonstration, from *my placing Demonstration on the Self-evidence of Ideas*, having been already answer'd, I shall need to say nothing in defence of it; or in answer to any thing rais'd against it, in your twelve or thirteen following Pages upon that Topick. But that your Lordship may not think I do not pay a due respect to all that you say, I shall not wholly pass those Pages over in silence.

P. 134. 1. Your Lordship says, *That I confess that some of the most obvious Ideas are far from being self-evident.* Answ. Supposing I did say so, how, I beseech your Lordship, does it prove, *That it is impossible to come to a Demonstration about real Beings, in this way of Intuition by Ideas?* Which is the Proposition

P. 134. you promise to make appear, and you bring this as the first Reason to make it appear. For should I confess a thousand times over, *That some of the most obvious Ideas are far from being self-evident*; and should I, which I do not, make *self-evident Ideas* necessary to Demonstration: how will it thence follow, *That it is impossible to come to a Demonstration, &c?* Since tho' I should confess *some of the most obvious Ideas not to be self-evident*; yet my Confession being but of *some*, it will not follow from my Confession, but that there may be also *some self-evident*: and so still it might be possible to come to a Demonstration by Intuition, because *some* in my use of the Word never signifies *all*.

In the next place, give me leave to ask, where it is that I confess, *That some Ideas are not self-evident?* Nay, where it is, that I once mention any such thing as a *self-evident Idea*? For self-evident is an Epithet, that I do not remember I ever gave to any *Idea*, or thought belong'd at all to *Ideas*. In all the places you have produc'd out of my Essay, concerning *Matter, Motion, Time, Duration* and *Light*; which are those *Ideas* your Lordship is pleas'd to instance in, to prove, *That I have confess'd it of some*; I crave leave humbly to offer it to your Lordship, that there is not any such Confession. However, you go on to prove it. The Proposition then to be prov'd, is, *That I confess that these are far from being self-evident Ideas.* 'Tis necessary to set it down, and carry it in our Minds; for the Proposition to be prov'd, is, I find, a very slippery thing, and apt to slide out of the way.

P. 134. Your Lordship's Proof is, *That according to me, we can have no Intuition of these Things which are so obvious to us, and consequently we can have no self-evident Ideas of them.* The Force of which Proof, I confess I do not understand. *We have no Intuition of the obvious thing Matter, and the obvious thing Motion*; Ergo, we have no self-evident *Ideas* of them. Granting that they are *obvious Things*, and that *obvious* as they are, we have, as you express it, no *Intuition* of them; it will not follow from thence, that we have no *Intuition* of the *Ideas* we signify by the names *Matter* and *Motion*, and so have no *self-evident Ideas* of them. For whoever has in his Mind an *Idea* which he makes the name *Matter* or *Motion* stand for, has no doubt that *Idea* there, and sees, or has, in your Phrase, an *Intuition* of it there; and so has a *self-evident Idea* of it, if *Intuition*, according to your Lordship, makes a *self-evident Idea* (for of self-evident *Ideas*, as I have before remark'd, I have said nothing, nor made any such distinction as *self-evident* and *not self-evident Ideas*) and if *Intuition* of an *Idea* does not make a *self-evident Idea*, the want of it is in vain brought here to prove the *Idea* of *Matter* or *Motion* not self-evident.

But your Lordship proceeds to Instances, and your first Instance is in *Matter*; and here, for fear of mistaking, let us remember what the Proposition to be prov'd, is, viz. *That according to me, we have no Intuition, as you call it,*

P. 135. *of the Idea of Matter.* Your Lordship begins and tells me, that I give this account of the *Idea* of *Matter*, *That it consists in a solid Substance, every where*

P. 135. *the same.* Whereupon you tell me, *You would be glad to come to a certain Knowledge of these two things*; First, *The manner of the Cohesion of the Parts of Matter,*

P. 137. *and the Demonstration of the Divisibility of it in the way of Ideas.* Answ. It happen'd just as I fear'd, the Proposition to be prov'd is slip'd already quite out of sight: You own that I say *Matter* is a solid Substance, every where the same. This *Idea*, which is the *Idea* I signify by the word *Matter*, I have in my Mind, and have an *Intuition* of it there: How then does this prove, *That according to me, there can be no Intuition of the Idea of Matter!* Leaving therefore this Pro-

P. 135-137. position, which was to be prov'd, you bring places out of my Book to shew, That

That we do not know wherein the Union and Cohesion of the parts of Matter consist; and that the Divisibility of Matter involves us in Difficulties: neither of which either is, or proves, That, according to me, we cannot have an *Intuition of the Idea of Matter*; which was the Proposition to be prov'd, and seems quite forgotten during the three following Pages, wholly imploy'd upon this Instance of Matter. You ask indeed, whether *I can imagine, That* P. 136. *we have Intuition into the Idea of Matter*? But those Words seem to me to signify quite another thing, than having an *Intuition of the Idea of Matter*, as appears by your Explication of them in these Words subjoin'd; *Or that it is* P. 136. *possible to come to a Demonstration about it, by the help of any intervening Ideas*: whereby it seems to me plain, that by *Intuition into it*, your Lordship means *Demonstration about it*, i. e. some Knowledge concerning Matter, and not a bare View or Intuition of the *Idea* you have of it. And that your Lordship speaks of Knowledge concerning some Affection of Matter, in this and the following Question, and not of the bare *Intuition of the Idea of Matter*; is farther evident from the Introduction of your two Questions, wherein you say, *There are* P. 135. *two things concerning Matter, that you would be glad to come to a certain Knowledge of*. So that all that can follow, or in your Sense of them does follow from my Words quoted by you, is, that I own, that the Cohesion of its Parts is an Affection of Matter that is hard to be explain'd; but from them it can neither be infer'd, nor does your Lordship attempt to infer, That any one cannot view or have an *Intuition of the Idea* he has in his own Mind, which he signifies to others by the word *Matter*: and that you did not make any such Inference from them, is farther plain, by your asking, in the place above-quoted, not only whether *I can imagine, That it is possible to come to a Demonstration about it*; but your Lordship also adds, *By the help of intervening Ideas*. For I do not think you demand a *Demonstration by the help of intervening Ideas*, to make you so see, i. e. have an *Intuition of*, your own *Idea of Matter*. It would mis-become me to understand your Lordship in so strange a Sense: for then you might have just Occasion to ask me again, whether *I could think you a Man of so little Sense*. I therefore suppose, as your Words import, That you demand a *Demonstration by the help of intervening Ideas*, to shew you, how the parts of that thing, which you represent to your self by that *Idea*, to which you give the name *Matter*, cohere together; which is nothing to the Question of the *Intuition of the Idea*: tho' to cover the Change of the Question as dexterously as might be, *Intuition of the Idea* is chang'd into *Intuition into the Idea*; as if there were no difference between looking upon a *Watch* and looking into a *Watch*, i. e. between the *Idea* that, taken from an obvious View, I signify by the name *Watch*, and have in my Mind when I use the word *Watch*; and the being able to resolve any Question that may be propos'd to me, concerning the inward Make and Contrivance of a *Watch*. The *Idea* which taken from the outward visible Parts, I give the name *Watch* to, I perceive, or have an *Intuition of*, in my Mind equally, whether or no I know any thing more of a *Watch*, than what is represented in that *Idea*.

Upon this Change of the Question, all that follows to the bottom of the next Page, being to shew, that from what I say it follows, that there be many P. 137. Difficulties concerning Matter, which I cannot resolve; many Questions concerning it, which I think cannot be demonstratively decided; and not to shew, that any one cannot perceive, or have an *Intuition*, as you call it, of his own *Idea of Matter*: I think I need not trouble your Lordship with an Answer to it.

In this one Instance of *Matter*, you have been pleas'd to ask me two hard Questions. To shorten your Trouble concerning this Business of *Intuition of Ideas*, will you, my Lord, give me leave to ask you this one easy Question concerning all your four Instances, *Matter, Motion, Duration and Light*, viz. what you mean by these four Words? That your Lordship may not suspect it to be either capricious or impertinent, I will tell you the use I shall make of it: If your Lordship tell me what you mean by these Names, I shall presently reply, That there then are the *Ideas* that you have of them in your Mind; and 'tis plain you see or have an *Intuition* of them, as they are in your Mind,

Mind, or, as I should have express'd it, perceive them as they are there, because you can tell them to another. And so it is with every one, who can tell what he means by those words; and therefore to all such (amongst which I crave leave to be one) there can be no doubt of the *Intuition of those Ideas*. But if your Lordship will not tell me what you mean by these Terms, I fear you will be thought to use very hard measure in disputing, by demanding to be satisfied concerning Questions put in Terms, which you your self cannot tell the meaning of.

This consider'd, will perhaps serve to shew, that all that you say in the following Paragraphs, to N. 2. p. 141. contains nothing against *Intuition of Ideas*, which is what you are upon, tho' it be no Notion of mine; much less does it contain any thing against my way of *Demonstration by Ideas*, which is the Point under Proof. For,

1. What Your Lordship has said about the *Idea of Matter*, hath been consider'd already.

P. 138. 2. From *Motion*, which is your second Instance, your Argument stands thus, That because I say the Definitions I meet with of *Motion* are insignificant, therefore the *Idea fails us*. This seems to me a strange Consequence; and all one as to say, That a deaf and dumb Man, because he could not understand the words us'd in the Definitions that are given of *Motion*, therefore he could not have the *Idea of Motion*, or the *Idea of Motion fail'd him*. And yet this Consequence, as foreign as it is to that Antecedent, is forc'd from it to no purpose: The Proposition to be infer'd being this, that then *we can have no Intuition of the Idea of Motion*.

3. As to *Time*, tho' the *Intuition of the Idea of Time* be not my way of speaking, yet what your Lordship here infers from my words, granting it to be a right Inference, with Submission, proves nothing against the *Intuition of that Idea*. The Proposition to be prov'd, is, That *we can have no Intuition of the Idea of Time*; and the Proposition which from my words you infer, is, That *we have not the Knowledge of the Idea of Time by Intuition, but by rational Deduction*. What can be more remote than these two Propositions? The one of them signifying (if it signifies any thing) the View the Mind has of it; the other, as I guess, the Original and Rise of it. For what it is to have the *Knowledge of an Idea, not by Intuition, but by Deduction of Reason*, I confess I do not well understand; only I am sure, in Terms it is not the same with *having the Intuition of an Idea*: But if changing of Terms were not some Mens Privilege, perhaps so much Controversy would not be written. The meaning of either of these Propositions I concern not my self about, for neither of them is mine. I only here shew, that you do not prove the Proposition that you your self fram'd, and undertook to prove.

Since, my Lord, you are so favourable to me, as to seem willing to correct whatever you can find any way amiss in my *Essay*: Therefore I shall endeavour to satisfy you concerning the Rise of our *Idea of Duration*, from the *Succession of Ideas* in our Minds. Against this, tho' it be nothing to the matter in hand, P. 139. you object, that *some People reckon'd Succession of Time right by Knots, and Notches, and Figures, without ever thinking of Ideas*. Answ. 'Tis certain that Men, who wanted better ways, might, by *Knots* or *Notches*, keep Accounts of the Numbers of certain stated lengths of Time, as well as of the Numbers of Men in their Country, or of any other Numbers; and that too without ever considering the immediate Objects of their Thoughts under the Name of *Ideas*: but that they should count Time, without ever thinking of something, is very hard to me to conceive; and the things they thought on, or were present in their Minds when they thought, are what I call *Ideas*: thus much in answer to what your Lordship says. But to any one that shall put the Objection stronger, and say, Many have had the *Idea of Time*, who never reflected on the constant Train of *Ideas*, succeeding one another in their Minds, whilst waking, I grant it: but add, that want of Reflection makes not any thing cease to be: if it did, many Mens Actions would have no Cause, nor Rise, nor Manner; because many Men never reflect so far on their own Actions, as to consider what they are bottom'd on, or how they are perform'd. A Man may measure Duration by Motion, of which he has no other *Idea*, but of a constant Succession of
Ideas

Ideas in train; and yet never reflect on that Succession of *Ideas* in his Mind. A Man may guess at the length of his stay by himself in the dark; here is no Succession to measure by, but that of his own Thoughts; and without some Succession, I think there is no Measure of Duration. But tho' in this case he measures the length of the Duration by the Train of his *Ideas*, yet he may never reflect on that, but conclude he does it he knows not how.

You add, *But besides such arbitrary Measures of Time, what need any recourse* P. 140. *to Ideas, when the returns of Days, and Months, and Years, by the Planetary Motions, are so easy and so universal?* Such here, as I suppose, refers to the *Knots*, P. 140. and *Notches*, and *Figures* before-mention'd: If it does not, I know not what it refers to; and if it does, it makes those *Knots* and *Notches* Measures of Time, which I humbly conceive they were not, but only arbitrary ways of recording (as all other ways of recording are) certain Numbers of known lengths of Time: For tho' any one sets down by arbitrary Marks, as *Notches* on a Stick, or *Strokes* of Chalk on a Trenchard, or *Figures* on Paper, the Number of Yards of Cloth, or Pints of Milk that are deliver'd to a Customer; yet I suppose no body thinks, that the Cloth or Milk were measur'd by those *Notches*, *Strokes* of Chalk, or *Figures*, which therefore are by no means the *arbitrary Measures* of those things. But what this is against, I confess I do not see: This, I am sure, it is not against any thing I have said. For, as I remember I have said (tho' not the *planetary Motions*, yet) that the *Motions* of the Sun and the Moon, are the best Measures of Time. But if you mean, That the *Idea* of Duration is rather taken from the *Planetary Motions*, than from the Succession of *Ideas* in our Minds, I crave leave to doubt of that; because Motion no other way discovers it self to us, but by a Succession of *Ideas*.

Your next Argument against my thinking the *Idea* of Time to be deriv'd from the Train of *Ideas* succeeding one another in our Minds, is, That your Lordship *thinks the contrary*. This, I must own, is an Argument by way of Authority, and I humbly submit to it; tho' I think such Arguments produce no *Certainty*, either in my way of *Certainty by Ideas*, or in your way of *Certainty by Reason*.

4. As to your fourth Instance, you having set down my Exceptions to the P. 141. Peripatetick and Cartesian Definitions of *Light*, you subjoin this Question: *And is this a self-evident Idea of Light?* I beg leave to answer in the same way by a Question, And who ever said or thought that it was, or meant that it should be? He must have a strange *Notion of self-evident Ideas*, let them be what they will (for I know them not) who can think, that the shewing others Definitions of *Light* to be unintelligible, is a *self-evident Idea of Light*. But farther, my Lord, what, I beseech you, has a *self-evident Idea of Light to do here?* I thought in this your Instance of *Light*, you were making good what you undertook to prove from my self, that we can have no Intuition of *Light*. But because P. 134. that perhaps would have sounded pretty oddly, you thought fit (which I with all Submission crave leave sometimes to take notice of) to change the Question; but the Misfortune is, that put as it is, not concerning our Intuition, but the self-evidence of the *Idea of Light*, the one is no better prov'd than the other: And yet your Lordship concludes this your first Head according to your usual form; Thus we have seen what Account the Author of the Essay himself has given P. 141. of these self-evident Ideas, which are the Ground-work of Demonstration. With Submission, my Lord, he must have good Eyes, who has seen an Account I have given in my Essay of self evident Ideas, when neither in all that your Lordship has quoted out of it, no nor in my whole Essay, self-evident Ideas are so much as once mention'd. And where the Account I have given of a thing, which I never thought upon, is to be seen, I cannot imagine. What your Lordship farther tells me concerning them, viz. That self-evident Ideas are the Ground-work of Demonstration, I also assure you is perfect News to me, which I never met with any where but in your Lordship: Tho' if I had made them the Ground-work of Demonstration, as you say, I think they might remain so, notwithstanding any thing your Lordship has produc'd to the contrary.

We are now come to your second Head, where I expected to have found this P. 141. Consequence made good, That there may be contradictory Opinions about Ideas, which I account most clear and distinct; Ergo, it is impossible to come to a Demonstration

tion about real Beings in the way of Intuition of Ideas. For this you told me was

P. 134. your second Reason to prove this Proposition. This Consequence your Lordship, it seems, looks upon as so clear, that it needs no Proof; I can find none

P. 141. here where you take it up again. To prove something, you say, *Suppose an Idea happen to be thought by some to be clear and distinct, and others should think the contrary to be so*: In obedience to your Lordship, I do suppose it. But, when it is suppos'd, will that make good the above-mention'd Consequence? You your self, my Lord, do not so much as pretend it; but in this Question subjoin'd, *Ibid.* (*What hopes of Demonstration by clear and distinct Ideas then?*) infer a quite different Proposition. For, *It is impossible to come to a Demonstration about real Beings in the way of Intuition of Ideas*; and, *There is no hopes of Demonstration by clear and distinct Ideas*; appear to me two very different Propositions.

There appears something to me yet more incomprehensible in your way of managing this Argument here. Your Reason is, as we have seen, in these words, *There may be contradictory Opinions about some Ideas, that I account most clear and distinct*: And your Instance of it is in these words, *Suppose an Idea happen to be thought by some to be clear and distinct, and others should think the contrary to be so*. *Ans.* So they may, without having any contradictory Opinions about any Idea, that I account most clear and distinct. A Man may think his Idea of Heat to be clear and distinct, and another may think his Idea of Cold (which I take to be the contrary Idea to that of Heat) to be clear and distinct, and be both in the right, without the least appearance of any contradictory Opinions. All therefore that your Lordship says, in the remaining part of this Paragraph, having nothing in it of contradictory Opinions about Ideas that I think most clear, serves not at all to make good your second Reason. The truth is, all that you say here concerning *Des Cartes's Idea of Space*, and another Man's Idea of Space, amounts to no more but this; That different Men may signify different Ideas by the same Name, and will never fix on me what your Lordship would persuade the World I say, that *both Parts of a Contradiction may be true*. Tho' I do say, that in such a loose use of the Terms *Body* and *Vacuum*, it may be demonstrated both that there is, and is not a *Vacuum*: Which is a Contradiction in words, and is apt to impose, as if it were so in Sense, on those who mistake Words for Things; who are a kind of Reasoners, whereof I perceive there is a greater Number than I thought there had been. All that I have said in that place quoted by your Lordship, is nothing but to shew the Danger of relying upon Maxims, without a careful Guard upon the use of words, without which they will serve to make Demonstrations on both sides. That this is so, I dare appeal to any Reader, should your Lordship press me again, as you do here, with all the force of these Words, *Say you so? What! Demonstrations on both sides? And in the way of Ideas too? This is extraordinary indeed!*

Essay, B. 4.
C. 7. §. 12.

P. 143.

That all the Opposition between *Des Cartes* and *those others*, is only about the naming of Ideas, I think may be made appear from these words of your Lordship in the next Paragraph; *In the Ideas of Space and Body, the Question suppos'd, is, whether they be the same or no*. That this is a Question only about Names, and not about Ideas themselves, is evident from hence, that no body can doubt whether the single Idea of pure Distance, and the two Ideas of Distance and Solidity, are one and the same Idea, or different Ideas, any more than he can doubt whether one and two are different. The Question then in the Case, is not whether *Extension* consider'd separately by it self, or *Extension* and *Solidity* together, be the same Idea or no; but whether the simple Idea of *Extension* alone shall be call'd *Body*, or the complex Idea of *Solidity* and *Extension* together shall be call'd *Body*. For that these Ideas themselves are different, I think I need not go about to prove to any one, who ever thought of *Emptiness* or *Fulness*: for whether in Fact the Bottle in a Man's Hand be empty or no, or can by him be empty'd or no; this, I think, is plain, That his Idea of *Fulness*, and his Idea of *Emptiness*, are not the same. This the very Dispute concerning a *Vacuum* supposes; for if Mens Idea of pure Space were not different from their Idea of *Solidity* and *Space* together, they could never so far separate them in their Thoughts, as to make a Question, whether they did always exist together, any more than they could question, whether the same thing existed with it self. Motion cannot be separated in Existence from Space; and yet no body ever took the

the *Idea* of *Space* and the *Idea* of *Motion* to be the same. *Solidity* likewise cannot exist without *Space*; but will any one from thence say, the *Idea* of *Solidity* and the *Idea* of *Space* are one and the same?

Your Lordship's third Reason, to prove that it is impossible to come to a Demon- P. 134.
stration about real Beings in this way of Intuition of Ideas, is, That granting the Ideas to be true, there is no Self-evidence of the Connection of them, which is necessary to made a Demonstration. This, I must own, is to me as incomprehensible a Con-
sequence as the former; as also is that which your Lordship says to make it P. 143.
out, which I shall set down in your own words, that its Force may be left entire to the Reader: *But granting the Ideas to be true, yet when their Connection is not self-evident, then an intermediate Idea must compleat the Demonstration. But how doth it appear, that this middle Idea is self-evidently connected with them? For 'tis said, if that intermediate Idea be not known by Intuition, that must need a proof; and so there can be no Demonstration: which your Lordship is very apt to believe in this way of Ideas; unless these Ideas get more light by being put between two others.* Whatever there be in these words to prove the Proposition in question, I leave the Reader to find out: but that he may not be led into a Mistake, that there is any thing in my words that may be serviceable to it, I must crave leave to acquaint him, That these words set down by your Lordship, as out of my Essay, are not to be found in that place, nor any where in my Book, or any B. 4. C. 2.
thing to this purpose, *That the intermediate Idea is to be known by Intuition; but* §. 7.
this, *That there must be an intuitive Knowledg or Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the intermediate Idea with those, whose Agreement or Disagreement by its intervention it demonstrates.*

Leaving therefore all that your Lordship brings out of *Gassendus*, the *Cartesians*, *Morinus*, and *Bernier*, in their Argument from *Motion*, for or against a *Vacuum*, as not being at all concern'd in it; I shall only crave leave to observe, that you seem to make use here of the same way of Argumentation, which I think I may call your main, if not only one, it occurs so often, viz. That when I have said any thing to shew wherein *Certainty* or *Demonstration*, &c. consists, you think it sufficiently overthrown, if you can produce any Instance out of my Book, of any thing advanc'd by me, which comes short of *Certainty* or *Demonstration*: Whereas, my Lord, I humbly conceive, it is no proof against my Notion of *Certainty*, or my way of *Demonstration*, that I cannot attain to them in all Cases. I only tell wherein they consist, wherever they are; but if I miss of either of them, either by reason of the Nature of the Subject, or by Inadvertency in my way of Proof, that is no Objection to the Truth of my Notions of them: For I never undertook that my way of *Certainty* or *Demonstration*, if it ought to be call'd my way, should make me or any one Omniscient or Infallible.

That which makes it necessary for me here again to take notice of this your way of Reasoning, is the Question wherewith you wind up the account you have given of the Dispute of the Parties above-named about a *Vacuum*; And is P. 145.
it possible to imagine, that there should be a self-evident Connection in the Case? Answ. It concerns not me to examine, whether, or on which side, in that Dispute, such a self-evident Connection is, or is not possible. But this I take the liberty to say, That wherever it is not, there is no Demonstration, whether it be the *Cartesians* or the *Gassendists* this fail'd in this Point. And I humbly conceive, that to conclude from any one's failing in this, or any other Case, of a self-evident Connection in each step of his Proof, that therefore it is not necessary in Demonstration, is a Conclusion without Grounds, and a way of arguing that proves nothing.

In the next Paragraph you come to wind up the Argument, which you have P. 145.
been so long upon, viz. to make good what you undertook; i. e. To shew the P. 105.
difference of my Method of *Certainty* by Ideas, and the Method of *Certainty* by Reason; in answer to my saying, I can find no Opposition between them: which Opposition, according to the account you give of it, after forty Pages spent in it, amounts at last to this;

(1.) That I affirm, That general Principles and Maxims of Reason are of little P. 146.
or no use; and your Lordship says, they are of very great use, and the only proper Foundation of *Certainty*. To which I crave leave to say, That if by Principles

and *Maxims* your Lordship means all self evident Propositions, our ways are even in this part the same; for as you know, my Lord, I make my self-evident Propositions necessary to Certainty, and found all Certainty only in them. If by *Principles and Maxims* you mean a select number of self-evident Propositions, distinguish'd from the rest by the name *Maxims*, which is the sense in which I use the term *Maxims* in my *Essay*; then to bring it to a Decision, which of us two, in this point, is in the right, it will be necessary for your Lordship to give a List of those *Maxims*; and then to shew, That a Man can be certain of no Truth, without the help of those *Maxims*. For to affirm *Maxims* to be the only *Foundation of Certainty*, and yet not to tell which are those *Maxims*, or how they may be known; is, I humbly conceive, so far from laying any sure Grounds of Certainty, that it leaves even the very Foundations of it uncertain. When your Lordship has thus settled the Grounds of your way of Certainty by Reason, one may be able to examine, whether it be truly the way of Reason, and how far my way of Certainty by Ideas differs from it.

P. 146. The second Difference that you assign, between my way of Certainty by Ideas, and your's by Reason, is, That I say, that *Demonstration is by way of Intuition of Ideas, and that Reason is only the Faculty employ'd in discovering and comparing Ideas with themselves, or with others intervening; and that this is the only way of Certainty.* Whereas your Lordship affirms, and, as you say, have prov'd, That there can be no *Demonstration by Intuition of Ideas; but that all the Certainty we can attain to, is from general Principles of Reason, and necessary Deductions made from them.* Answ. I have said, that *Demonstration* consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the intermediate *Idea*, with those whose Agreement or Disagreement it is to shew, in each step of the *Demonstration*: And if you will say this is different from the way of *Demonstration by Reason*, it will then be to the point above-mention'd, which you have been so long upon. If this be your Meaning here, it seems pretty strangely express'd, and remains to be prov'd: But if any thing else be your Meaning, that Meaning not being the Proposition to be prov'd, it matters not whether you have prov'd it or no.

P. 146. Your Lordship farther says here, *That all the Certainty we can attain to, is from general Principles of Reason, and necessary Deductions made from them.* This, you say, you have prov'd. What has been prov'd, is to be seen in what has been already consider'd. But if your Proof, *That all the Certainty we can attain to, is from general Principles of Reason, and necessary Deductions made from them,* were as clear and cogent, as it seems to me the contrary; this will not reach to the point in debate, till your Lordship has prov'd, that this is opposite to my way of Certainty by Ideas. 'Tis strange (and perhaps to some may be matter of thought) that in an Argument wherein you lay so much stress on *Maxims, general Principles of Reason, and necessary Deductions from them,* you should never once tell us, what, in your account, a *Maxim* or *general Principle of Reason* is, nor the Marks it is to be known by; nor offer to shew what a *necessary Deduction* is, nor how it is to be made, or may be known. For I have seen Men please themselves with *Deductions* upon *Deductions*, and spin Consequences, it matter'd not whether out of their own or other Mens Thoughts; which, when look'd into, were visibly nothing but mere Ropes of Sand.

P. 114. 'Tis true, your Lordship says, *you now come to Certainty of Reason by Deductions.* But when all that truly learn'd Discourse which follows, is read over and over again, I would be glad to be told, what it is your Lordship calls a *necessary Deduction*; and by what *Criterion* you distinguish it from such *Deductions*, as come short of Certainty, or even of Truth it self. I confess I have read over those Pages more than once, and can find no such *Criterion* laid down in them by your Lordship, tho' a *Criterion* be there much talk'd of. But whether it be my want of Capacity for your way of writing, that makes me not find any light given by your Lordship into this matter; or whether in truth you have not shew'd, wherein what you call a *necessary Deduction* consists, and how it may be known from what is not so, the Reader must judg. This I crave leave to say, That when you have shewn what *general Principles of Reason* and *necessary Deductions* are, the world will then see, and not till then, whether this your way of Certainty by Reason, from general Principles and necessary Deductions made from them,

them, be opposite to, or so much as different from, my way of Certainty by Ideas, which was the thing to be shewn.

In the Paragraph under Consideration, you blame me, that in my Chapter P, 145. concerning Reason I have treated it only as a Faculty, and not in the other Senses which I there give of that Word. This Exception to my Book, is, I suppose, only from your Lordship's general Care of letting nothing pass in my Essay, which you think needs an amendment. For any particular Reason, that brings it in here, or ties it on to this part of your Discourse, I confess I do not see. However, to this I answer,

1. The Understanding as a Faculty, being the Subject of my Essay, it carry'd me to treat directly of Reason no otherwise than as a Faculty. But yet Reason as standing for true and clear Principles, and also as standing for clear and fair Deductions from those Principles, I have not wholly omitted; as is manifest from what I have said of self-evident Propositions, intuitive Knowledge, and Demonstration, in other parts of my Essay. So that your Question, *Why in a Chapter of Reason are the two other Senses of the word neglected?* blaming me for no other fault than that I am really guilty of, but want of Order, and not putting every thing in its proper place; does not appear to be of so mighty weight, but that I should have thought it might have been left to the little Nibblers in Controversy, without being made use of by so great a Man as your Lordship. But the putting things out of their proper place, being that which your Lordship thinks fit to except against in my Writings, it so falls out, that to this too I can plead not guilty. For in that very Chapter of Reason, I have not omitted to treat of Principles and Deductions; and what I have said there, I presume is enough to let others see, that I have not neglected to declare my poor Sense about self-evident Propositions, and the Cogency and Evidence of demonstrative or probable Deductions of Reason: Tho' what I have said there, not being back'd with Authorities, nor warranted by the Names of ancient Philosophers, was not worth your Lordship's taking notice of.

I have, I confess, been so unwary to write out of my own Thoughts, which your Lordship has, more than once, with some sort of Reprimand taken notice of. I own it, your Lordship is much in the right: the safer way is, never to declare one's own Sense in any material point. If I had fill'd my Book with Quotations and Collections of other Mens Opinions, it had shewn much more Learning, and had much more security in it; and I my self had been safe from the Attacks of the Men of Arms, in the Commonwealth of Letters: But in writing my Book, I had no Thoughts of War, my Eye was fix'd only on Truth, and that with so sincere and unbiass'd an Endeavour, that I thought I should not have incur'd much blame, even where I had miss'd it. This I perceive, too late, was the wrong way: I should have kept my self still safe upon the reserve. Had I learnt this Wisdom of *Thraso* in *Terence*, and resolv'd with my self, *Hic ego ero post principia*; perhaps I might have deserv'd the Commendation was given him, *Illuc est sapere ut hos instruxit ipse sibi cavet loco*. But I deserv'd to be soundly corrected, for not having profited by Reading, so much as this comes to.

But to return to your Accusation here, which all together stands thus: *Why in a Chapter of Reason are the other two Senses neglected?* We might have expected here full Satisfaction as to the Principles of Reason, as distinct from the Faculty, but the Author of the Essay wholly avoids it. What I guess these words accuse me to have avoided, I think I have shewn already that I did not avoid.

Before you conclude, you say, you must observe that I prove, That Demonstration must be by Intuition, in an extraordinary manner from the sense of the word. He that will be at the pains to read that Paragraph which you quote for it, will see that I do not prove that it must be by Intuition, because it is call'd Demonstration; but that it is call'd Demonstration, because it is by Intuition. And as to the Propriety of it, what your Lordship says in the following words, *It would be most proper for ocular Demonstration or by the Finger*, will not hinder it from being proper also in mental Demonstration, as long as the Perception of the Mind is properly express'd by seeing.

Against my observing, that the Notation of the word imported shewing or making to see, your Lordship farther says, *Demonstration among some Philosophers* signify'd

signify'd only the Conclusion of an Argument, whereby we are brought from something we did perceive, to something we did not; which seems to me to agree with what I say in the case, viz. That by the Agreement of *Ideas* which we do perceive, we are brought to perceive the Agreement of *Ideas* which before we did not perceive. To which no doubt will be answer'd, as in a like case, *Not by a way of Intuition, but by a Deduction of Reason*; i. e. we perceive not in a way that affords us *Intuition* or a Sight, but by *Deductions of Reason*, wherein we see nothing. Whereas, my Lord, I humbly conceive, that the Force of a *Deduction of Reason* consists in this, That in each step of it we see what a Connection it has, i. e. have an *Intuition* of the certain Agreement or Disagreement of the *Ideas*, as in *Demonstration*; or an *Intuition* or Perception, that they have a probable, or not so much as a probable Connection, as in other *Deductions of Reason*.

P. 147. You farther overthrow the necessity of intuitive Knowledge, in every step of a *Demonstration*, by the Authority of *Aristotle*, who says, *Things that are self-evident cannot be demonstrated*. And so I say too, in several places of my *Essay*. When your Lordship can shew any Inconsistency between these two Propositions, viz. *That intuitive Knowledge is necessary in each step of a Demonstration*, and *Things that are self-evident cannot be demonstrated*; then I shall own you have overthrown the necessity of *Intuition* in every step of a *Demonstration* by Reason, as well as by *Aristotle's* Authority.

B. 4. C. 7.
§. 10, 19.
and else-
where.

B. 4. C. 2.

P. 148-150. In the remainder of this Paragraph, I meet with nothing but your Lordship finding fault with some, who, in *this Age*, have made use of *Mathematical Demonstrations* in *Natural Philosophy*. Your Lordship's two Reasons against this way of advancing Knowledge upon the sure Grounds of *Mathematical Demonstration*, are these:

P. 148. (1.) That *Des Cartes*, a *Mathematical Man*, has been guilty of *Mistakes* in his *System*. Answ. When *Mathematical Men* will build *Systems* upon *Fancy*, and not upon *Demonstration*, they are as liable to *Mistakes* as others. And that *Des Cartes* was not led into his *Mistakes* by *Mathematical Demonstrations*, but for want of them, I think has been demonstrated by * some of those *Mathematicians* who seem to be meant here.

*Mr. Newton
Phil. Natur.
Princip. Ma-
themat. l. 2.
§. 9.

(2.) Your second Argument against *accommodating Mathematicks to the nature of material things*, is, *That Mathematicians cannot be certain of the manner and degrees of Force given to Bodies, so far distant as the fix'd Stars; nor of the Laws of Motion in other Systems*. A very good Argument why they should not proceed demonstratively in this our *System* upon *Laws of Motion*, observ'd to be establish'd here: A Reason that may persuade us to put out our Eyes, for fear they should mislead us in what we do see, because there be things out of our sight.

'Tis great pity *Aristotle* had not understood *Mathematicks* as well as *Mr. Newton*, and made use of it in *Natural Philosophy* with as good success: His Example had then authoriz'd the *accommodating of it to material things*. But 'tis not to be ventur'd, by a Man of *this Age*, to go out of the Method which *Aristotle* has prescrib'd, and which your Lordship, out of him, has set down in the following Pages, as that which should be kept to: For it is a dangerous Pre-

P. 150-153.

sumption to go out of a track chalk'd out by that suppos'd Dictator in the Commonwealth of Letters, tho' it led him to the Eternity of the World. I say not this, that I do not think him a very great Man; he made himself so, by not keeping precisely to beaten Tracks: which servile Subjection of the Mind, if we may take my Lord *Bacon's* word for it, kept the little Knowledge the World had from growing greater, for more than a few Ages. That the breaking loose from it in *this Age*, is a Fault, is not directly said; but there is enough said, to shew there is no great Approbation of such a Liberty. *Mathematicks* in gross, 'tis plain, are a Grievance in *Natural Philosophy*, and with reason: For *Mathematical Proofs*, like *Diamonds*, are hard as well as clear, and will be touch'd with nothing but strict Reasoning. *Mathematical Proofs* are out of the reach of topical Arguments, and are not to be attack'd by the equivocal use of Words or Declamation, that make so great a part of other Discourses; nay, even of Controversies. How well you have prov'd my way by *Ideas* guilty of any Tendency to Scepticism, the Reader will see; but this I will crave leave to say, That the secluding *Mathematical Reasoning* from *Philosophy*, and instead thereof

thereof reducing it to *Aristotelian* Rules and Sayings, will not be thought to be much in favour of Knowledge against Scepticism.

Your Lordship indeed says, *You did not by any means take off from the laudable Endeavours of those, who have gone about to reduce Natural Speculations to Mathematical Certainty.* What can we understand by this, but your Lordship's great Complaisance and Moderation? who, notwithstanding you spend four Pages to shew that the Endeavours of *Mathematical Men*, to accommodate the Principles of that Science to the Nature of material things, has been the occasion of great Mistakes in the Philosophy of this Age; and that therefore *Aristotle's* Method is to be follow'd: Yet you make this Compliment to the Mathematicians, That you leave them to their Liberty to go on, if they please, in their laudable Endeavours to reduce *Natural Speculations to Mathematical Certainty.* P. 149;

And thus we are come to the end of your Lordship's clearing this Passage; That you grant that by Sensation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of things; but our Reason [i. e. the Principles of Reason agreed on by Mankind] is satisfy'd, that there must be something beyond these; because it is impossible they should subsist by themselves: So that the Nature of things properly belongs to Reason [i. e. the Principles of Reason agreed on by Mankind] and not to mere Ideas. Which if any one be so lucky as to understand by these your Lordship's fifty Pages spent upon it, better than my Friend did, when he confess'd himself gravell'd by it, as it stands here recited, he ought to enjoy the Advantage of his happy Genius, whilst I miss that Satisfaction by the Dulness of mine; which hinders me also from seeing how the Opposition of the way of Certainty by Ideas, and the way of Certainty by Reason, comes in, in the Explication of this Passage: or at least, if it does belong to it, yet I must own, what is a greater misfortune, That I do not see what the Opposition or Difference is, which your Lordship has so much talk'd of between the way of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reason. For my Excuse, I think others will be as much in the dark as I, since you no where tell wherein you your self, my Lord, place Certainty. So that to talk of a Difference between Certainty by Ideas, and Certainty that is not by Ideas, without declaring in what that other Certainty consists; is like to have no better success, than might be expected from one who would compare two things together, the one whereof is not known.

You now return to your Discourse of Nature and Person, and tell me, That, P. 154. to what you said about the general Nature in distinct Individuals, I object these three things:

(1.) "That I cannot put together one and the same and distinct:" This I own to be my Objection; And consequently there is no Foundation for the Distinction of Nature and Person. This, with Submission, I deny to be any Objection of mine, either in the place quoted by your Lordship, or any where else. There may be foundation enough for Distinction, as there is of these two, and yet they may be treated of in a way so obscure, so confus'd, or perhaps so sublime, that an ordinary Capacity may not from thence get, as your Lordship expresses it, *clear and distinct Apprehensions of them.* This was that which my Friend and I complain'd of in that place, want of Clearness in your Lordship's Discourse, not of want of Distinction in the things themselves.

Let. 2. p. 127.

(2.) "That what your Lordship said about common Nature, and particular Substance in Individuals, was wholly unintelligible to me and my Friends." To which, my Lord, you may add if you please, That it is still so to me.

(3.) That I said, "That to speak truly and precisely of this matter as in reality it is, there is no such thing as one and the same common Nature in several Individuals; for all that in truth is in them, is particular, and nothing but particular, &c." Answ. This was said, to shew how unapt these Expressions, *The same common Nature in several Individuals; and several Individuals being in the same common Nature;* were to give true and clear Notions of Nature. To this your Lordship answers, That other, and those very rational Men, have spoken so: To which I shall say no more, but that it is an Argument, with which any thing may be defended, and all the Jargon of the Schools be justify'd; but, I presume, not strong enough to bring it back again, let Men ever so rational make use of it.

P. 156.

Your

P. 146. Your Lordship adds, *But now, it seems, nothing is intelligible but what suits with the new way of Ideas.* My Lord, the new way of *Ideas*, and the old way of speaking intelligibly, was always, and ever will be the same. And if I may take the liberty to declare my Sense of it, herein it consists: (1.) That a Man use no words but such as he makes the Signs of certain determin'd Objects of his Mind in thinking, which he can make known to another. (2.) Next, that he use the same word steddily for the Sign of the same immediate Object of his Mind in Thinking. (3.) That he join those words together in Propositions, according to the Grammatical Rules of that Language he speaks in. (4.) That he unite those Sentences in a coherent Discourse. Thus, and thus only, I humbly conceive, any one may preserve himself from the Confines and Suspicion of Jargon, whether he pleases to call those immediate Objects of his Mind, which his words do or should stand for, *Ideas* or no.

P. 156. You again accuse the way of *Ideas*, to make a common Nature no more than a common Name. That, my Lord, is not my way by *Ideas*. When your Lordship shews me where I have said so, I promise your Lordship to strike it out: and the like I promise when you shew me where I presume that we are not to judge of things by the general Principles of Reason, which you call my Fundamental Mistake.

P. 157. These Principles of Reason, you say, must be the Standard to Mankind. If they are of such consequence, would it not have been convenient we should have been instructed something more particularly about them, than by barely being told their name; that we might be able to know what are, and what are not Principles of Reason?

But be they what they will, because they must be the Standard to Mankind, your Lordship says, You shall in this Debate proceed upon the following Principles, to make it appear that the Difference between Nature and Person is not imaginary and fictitious, but grounded upon the real Nature of things. With Submission, my Lord, you need not be at the pains to draw up your great Artillery of so many Maxims, where you meet with no Opposition. The thing in Debate, whether in this Debate or no, I know not, but what led into this Debate, was about these Expressions; One common Nature in several Individuals, and several Individuals in one common Nature: and the Question, I thought, was, whether a general or common Nature could be in Particulars, i. e. exist in Individuals? But since your Lordship turns your Artillery against those who deny that there is any Foundation of Distinction between Nature and Person, I am out of Gun-shot; for I am none of those, who ever said or thought there was no Foundation of Distinction between Nature and Person.

P. 158. The Maxims you lay down in the following Paragraph, are to make me understand how one and the same and distinct may consist; I confess, I do not see how your Lordship's words there at all make it out. This, indeed, I do understand, that several particular Beings may have a conformity in them to one general abstract Idea, which may, if you please, be call'd their general or common Nature: But how that Idea or general Nature can be the same and distinct, is still past my Comprehension.

To my saying, That your Lordship had not told me what Nature is, I am told, That if I had a mind to understand you, I could not but see, that by Nature you meant the Subject of essential Properties. A Lady asking a learned Physician what the Spleen was, receiv'd this answer, That it was the Recepracle of the melancholy Humour. She had a mind to understand what the Spleen was, but by this Definition of it found her self not much enlighten'd; and therefore went on to ask, what the melancholy Humour was: and by the Doctor's answer found that the Spleen and the melancholy Humour had a relation one to another; but what the Spleen was, she knew not one jot better than she did before he told her any thing about it. My Lord, relative Definitions of Terms that are not relative, usually do no more than lead us into a Circuit to the same place from whence we set out, and there leave us in the same Ignorance we were in at first. So I fear it would fall out with me here, if I, willing as I am to understand what your Lordship means by Nature, should go on to ask what you mean by essential Properties.

P. 159--161. Lett. 2. The three or four next Pages, I hope, your Lordship does not think contain any serious Answer to what my Friend said concerning Peter, James, and John; and
P. 132--135.

and as for the Pleasantry of your *Countryman*, I shall not pretend to meddle with that, since your Lordship, who knows better than any body his way of *chopping of Logick*, was fain to give it off, because it was growing too rough. What work such a dangerous *Chopper of Logick* would make, with an Argument that suppos'd the names *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, to stand for Men; and then without scruple affirm'd, That the Nature of Man was in them; if he were let loose upon it: who can tell? Especially if he might have the liberty strenuously to use the Phrase *for his Life*, and to observe what a turn the chiming of words, without determin'd *Ideas* annex'd to them, *give to the Understanding*, when they are gone deep into a Man's Head, and pass there for things.

To shew that the *common* or general Nature of Man could not be in *Peter* or *James*, I alledg'd, That whatever existed (as whatever was in *Peter* or *James* did) was particular; and that it confounded my Understanding, to make a General a Particular. In answer, your Lordship tells me, That to make me under- P. 164.

stand this, you had told me in your Answer to my first Letter, *That we are to consider Beings as God had order'd them in their several sorts and ranks, &c.* And thereupon you ask me, *Why it was not answer'd in the proper place for it?* Answ. P. 165.

I own I am not always so fortunate, as to say things in that, which your Lordship thinks the *proper place*; but having been rebuked for Repetitions, I thought your Lordship could not be ignorant, that I had *consider'd Beings as God had order'd them in their several sorts and ranks, &c.* since you could not but have read these words of mine: "I would not here be thought to forget, much less to

Essay, B. 3.

"deny, that Nature in the production of things makes several of them alike. C. 3. §. 13.

"There is nothing more obvious, especially in the Races of Animals, and all "things propagated by Seed, &c." And I have express'd my Sense in this point so fully here, and in other places, particularly B. 3. C. 6. that I dare leave it to my Reader, without any farther Explication.

Your Lordship farther asks, *Is not that a real Nature, which is the Subject of P. 165* *real Properties?* And is not the Nature really in those who have the essential Properties? I answer to both those Questions, Yes; such as is the Reality of the Subject, such is the Reality of its Properties: the abstract general *Idea* is really in the Mind of him that has it, and the Properties that it has are really and inseparably annex'd to it; let this Reality be whatever your Lordship pleases: But this will never prove, that this general Nature exists in *Peter* or *James*. Those Properties, with submission, do not, as your Lordship supposes, exist in *Peter* and *James*: Those Qualities indeed may exist in them, which your Lordship calls Properties; but they are not Properties in either of them, but are Properties only of that specifick abstract Nature, which *Peter* and *James*, for their suppos'd conformity to it, are rank'd under. For example, *Rationality*, as much a Property as it is of a Man, is no Property of *Peter*. He was rational a good part of his Life, could write and read, and was a sharp Fellow at a Bargain; but about Thirty, a knock so alter'd him, that for these twenty Years past he has been able to do none of these things: there is to this day not so much appearance of Reason in him, as in his Horse or Monkey, and yet he is *Peter* still.

Your Lordship asks, *Is not that a real Nature, that is the Subject of real Properties P. 165* *And is not that Nature really in those who have the same essential Properties?* Give me leave, I beseech you, to ask, Are not those distinct real Natures, that are the Subjects of distinct essential Properties? For example, the Nature of an Animal is the Subject of essential Properties of an Animal, with the exclusion of those of a Man or a Horse; for else the Nature of an Animal, and the Nature of a Man, and the Nature of a Horse, would be the same: and so, wherever the Subject of the essential Properties of an Animal is, there also would be the Subject of the essential Properties of a Man, and of a Horse; and so, in effect, whatever is an Animal, would be a Man: the real Nature of an Animal, and the real Nature of a Man, being the same. To avoid this, there is no other way (if this Reality your Lordship builds so much on, be any thing beyond the Reality of two abstract distinct Ideas in the Mind) but that there be one real Nature of an Animal, the Subject of the essential Properties of an Animal; and another real Nature of a Man, the Subject of the essential Properties of a Man: both which real Natures must be in *Peter*, to make him a Man. So that every individual Man or Beast, must, according to this account, have two real Natures in him, to

make him what he is: nay, if this be so, two will not serve the turn. *Bucephalus* must have the *real Natures* of *Ens* or *Being*, and the *real Nature* of *Body*, and the *real Nature* of *Vivens*, and the *real Nature* of *Animal*, and the *real Nature* of a *Horse*, i. e. Five distinct *real Natures* in him, to make him *Bucephalus*: For these are all really distinct *common Natures*, whereof one is not the *Subject* of precisely the same *essential Properties* as the other. This, tho' very hard to my Understanding, must be really so, if every distinct, *common*, or general *Nature*, be a *real Being*, that really exists any where but in the Understanding: *Common*

P. 164. *Nature*, taken in my way of *Ideas*, your Lordship truly says, will not make me understand such a *common Nature* as you speak of, which subsists in several Individuals, because I can have no *Ideas* of *real Substances*, but such as are particular; all others are only abstract *Ideas*, and made only by the *Act* of the *Mind*. But what your Lordship farther promises there, I find, to my sorrow, does not hold, viz. That in your Lordship's way (as far as you have discover'd it) which you call the way of *Reason*, I may come to a better understanding of this matter.

P. 166. Your Lordship in the next Paragraph declares your self really *asham'd* to be put to explain these things, that which you had said being so very plain and easy: And yet I am not *asham'd* to own, that for my Life I cannot understand them, as they are now farther explain'd. Your Lordship thinks it prov'd, That every *common Nature* is a *real Being*: Let it be so, that it is the *Subject* of *real Properties*, and that thereby it is demonstrated to be a *real Being*; this makes it harder for me to conceive, that this *common Nature* of a *Man*, which is a *real Being*, and but one, should yet be really in *Peter*, in *James*, and in *John*. Had *Amphitruo* been able to conceive this, he had not been so much puzzled, or thought *Sofia* to talk idle, when he told him, *Demi ego sum inquam & apud te adsum Sofia idem*. For the *common Nature* of *Man*, is a *real Being* as your Lordship says, and *Sofia* is no more: And he that can conceive any one and the same *real Being* to be in divers places at once, can have no difficulty to conceive it of another *real Being*. And so *Sofia* may at the same time be at home, and with his Master abroad: And *Amphitruo* might have been *asham'd* to demand the Explication of so plain a matter; or at least, if he had stuck a little at *here* and *there* too, ought he not to have been satisfy'd, as soon as *Sofia* had told him, *I am another distinct I here, from the same I that I am there*? Which, no doubt, *Sofia* could have made out: let your Lordship's *Countryman* chop *Logick* with him, and try whether he cannot. *Countryman*. But how is it possible, *Sofia*, that thou the *real same*, as thou say'st, should'st be at home and here too? *Sofia*. Very easily, because I am really the *same*, and yet *distinct*. *Countrym*. How can this be? *Sofia*. By a Trick that I have. *Countrym*. Canst thou teach me the Trick? *Sofia*. Yes: 'tis but for thee to get a *particular Subsistence* proper to thy *real self* at home, and another *particular Subsistence* proper to thy *same real self* abroad, and the business is done: thou wilt then easily be the *same real thing*, and *distinct* from thy self; and thou may'st be in as many places together, as thou canst get *particular Subsistences*, and be still the *same one real Being*. *Countrym*. But what is that *particular Subsistence*? *Sofia*. Hold ye, hold ye, Friend, that's the Secret! I thought once it was *particular Existence*, but that I find is an ineffectual Drug, and will not do: Every one sees it will not make the *same real Being distinct* from it self, nor bring it into two different places at once, and therefore it is laid aside, and *Subsistence* is taken to do the feat. *Countrym*. Existence my Boy's Schoolmaster made me understand, the other day, when my grey Mare foled. For he told me that a Horse, that never was before, began then to exist; and when the poor Fole died, he told me the same Horse ceas'd to exist. *Sofia*. But did he tell thee what became of the *real common Nature* of an Horse that was in it when the Fole died? *Countrym*. No: But this I know, that my *real Horse* was really destroy'd. *Sofia*. There's now thy Ignorance! So much of thy Horse as had a *real Existence*, was really destroy'd, that's true: But there was something in thy Horse, which having a *real particular Subsistence*, was not destroy'd; nay, and the best part of thy Horse too: for it was that, which had in it all those Properties that made thy Horse better than a Broomstick. *Countrym*. Thou tell'st me wonders of this *same Subsistence*; what, I pray thee, is it? *Sofia*. I beg your pardon for that; it is the very Philosopher's Stone: those who are *Adepti*, and can do strange things with it, are wiser than to tell what it is. *Countrym*. Where may

may it be bought then? *Sofia*. That I know not: But I will tell thee where thou mayst meet with it. *Countrym.* Where? *Sofia*. In some of the shady Thickets of the Schoolmen; and 'tis worth the looking after. For if *particular Subsistence* has such a power over a *real Being*, as to make one and the *same real Being* to be *distinct*, and in divers places at once, it may perhaps be able to give thee an Account what becomes of that *real Nature* of thy Horse after thy Horse is dead; and if thou canst but find whither that retires, who knows but thou mayst get as useful a thing as thy Horse again? since to that *real Nature* of thy Horse, inseparably adheres the Shape and Motion, and other Properties of thy Horse.

I hope, my Lord, your *Countryman* will not be displeas'd to have met with *Sofia* to chop *Logick* with, who, I think, has made it as intelligible, how his *real self* might be the *same* and *distinct*, and be really in *distinct* places at once, by the help of a *particular Subsistence proper to him* in each place; as it is intelligible how any *real Being* under the name of a *common Nature*, or under any other name bestow'd upon it, may be the *same* and *distinct*, and really be in divers places at once, by the help of a *particular Subsistence proper to each of those distinct fames*. At least, if I may answer for my self, I understand one as well as the other: And if my Head be turn'd from *common Sense* (as I find your Lordship very apt to think) so that it is *great News to you that I understand a-ny thing*; if in my way of *Ideas* I cannot understand words, that appear to me either to stand for no *Ideas*, or to be so join'd, that they put inconsistent *Ideas* together; I think your Lordship uses me right, to turn me off for desperate, and leave me, as you do, to the Reader's Understanding. P. 169.

To your Lordship's many Questions concerning *Men* and *Drills*, in the Paragraph where you begin to explain what my Friend and I found difficult in your Discourse concerning *Person*; I answer, that these two Names, *Man* and *Drill*, are perfectly *arbitrary*, whether founded on real *distinct Properties* or no: so perfectly *arbitrary*, that, if *Men* had pleas'd, *Drill* might have stood for what *Man* now does, and *vice versa*. I answer farther, That these two Names stand for two abstract *Ideas*, which are (to those who know what they mean by these two Names) the distinct *Essences* of two distinct *Kinds*; and as particular *Existences*, or things existing are found by *Men* (who know what they mean by these Names) to agree to either of those *Ideas* which these Names stand for; these Names respectively are apply'd to those particular things, and the things said to be of that *Kind*. This I have so fully and at large explain'd in my *Essay*, that I should have thought it needless to have said any thing again of it here, had it not been to shew my readiness to answer any Questions you shall be pleas'd to ask concerning any thing I have writ, which your Lordship either finds difficult, or has forgot. P. 169, 170.

In the next place, your Lordship comes to clear what you had said in answer to this Question put by your self, *What is this Distinction of Peter, James, and John founded upon?* To which you answer'd, *That they may be distinguish'd from each other by our Senses, as to Difference of Features, Distance of Place, &c.* But that is not all; for supposing there was no external Difference, yet there is a Difference between them, as several Individuals in the same common Nature. These Words when my Friend and I came to consider, we own'd, as your Lordship here takes notice, that we could understand no more by them but this; "That the Ground of Distinction between several Individuals in the same common Nature, is, "That they are several Individuals in the same common Nature." Hereupon your Lordship tells me, *The Question now is, What this Distinction is founded upon? Whether on our observing the Difference of Features, Distance of Place, &c. or on some antecedent Ground?* P. 171.

Pursuant hereunto, as if this were the Question, you in the next Paragraph (as far as I can understand it) make the Ground of the Distinction between these Individuals, or the *Principium Individuationis*, to be the Union of the Soul and Body. But with Submission, my Lord, the Question is, Whether I and my Friend were to blame, because when your Lordship, in the words above-cited, having remov'd all other Grounds of Distinction, said, *There was yet a Difference between Peter and James, as several Individuals in the same common Nature*; we could understand no more by it, but this, "That the Ground of Distinction

"between several Individuals in the same common Nature, is, that they are several Individuals in the same common Nature."

Let the Ground that your Lordship now assigns of the Distinction of Individuals be what it will, or let what you say be as clear as you please, *viz.* That the Ground of their Distinction is in the Union of Soul and Body; it will, I humbly conceive, be nevertheless true, that what you said before might amount to no more but this, "That the Ground of the Distinction between several Individuals in the same common Nature, is, That they are several Individuals in the same common Nature:" and therefore we might not be to blame for so understanding it. For the words which our Understandings were then employ'd about, were those which you had there said, and not those which you would say five Months after: Tho' I must own, that those which your Lordship

P. 171—173. here says concerning the *Distinction of Individuals*, leave it as much in the dark to me as what you said before. But perhaps I do not understand your Lordship's words right, because I conceive that the *Principium Individuationis* is the same in all the several Species of Creatures, Men as well as others; and therefore if the Union of Soul and Body be that which distinguishes two Individuals in the human Species one from another, I know not how two Cherries, or two Atoms of Matter, can be distinct Individuals; since I think there is in them no Union of a Soul and Body. And upon this ground it will be very hard to tell what made the Soul and the Body Individuals (as certainly they were) before their Union.

But I shall leave what your Lordship says concerning this matter to the Examination of those, whose Health and Leisure allows them more time than I have for this weighty Question, Wherein the Distinction of two Men or two Cherries consists: for fear I should make your Lordship's Countryman a little wonder again, to find a grave Philosopher make a serious Question of it.

P. 173, 174. To your next Paragraph, I answer, That if the true Idea of a Person, or the true Signification of the word Person lies in this, That supposing there was no other Difference in the several Individuals of the same kind, yet there is a Difference between them as several Individuals in the same common Nature; it will follow from hence, that the name Person will agree to Bucephalus and Podargus, as well as to Alexander and Hector. But whether this Consequence will agree with what your Lordship says concerning Person in another place, I am not concern'd; I am only answerable for this Consequence.

P. 173. Your Lordship is pleas'd here to call my Endeavour to find out the meaning of your words, as you had put them together, *trifling Exceptions*. To which I must say, That I am heartily sorry, that either my Understanding, or your Lordship's way of Writing obliges me so often to such trifling. I cannot, as I have said, answer to what I do not understand; and I hope here my trifling, in searching out your Lordship's meaning, was not much out of the way, because I think every one will see by the Steps I took, that the Sense I found out by it was that which your words imply'd; and your Lordship does not disown it, but only replies, That I should not have drawn that which was the natural Consequence from it, because that Consequence would not well consist with what you had said in another Place.

P. 174, 175. What your Lordship adds farther to clear your saying, That an individual intelligent Substance is rather suppos'd to the making of a Person, than the proper Definition of it; tho' in your Definition of Person, you put a compleat intelligent Substance, must have its Effect upon others Understandings; I must suffer under the short-sightedness of my own, who neither understood it as it stood in your first Answer, nor do I now as it is explain'd in your second.

P. 176. Your Lordship being here, as you say, come to the end of this Debate, I should here have ended too; and it was time, my Letter being grown already to too great a Bulk: But I being engag'd by Promise to answer some things in your first Letter, which in my Reply to it I had omitted, I now come to them, and shall endeavour to give your Lordship Satisfaction in those Points; tho' to make room for them, I leave out a great deal that I had writ in answer to this your Lordship's second Letter. And if, after all, my Answer seems too long, I must beg your Lordship and my Reader to excuse it, and impute it to those occasions

occasions of length, which I have mention'd in more places than one, as they have occur'd.

The original and main Question between your Lordship and me, being, whether there were any thing in my Essay repugnant to the Doctrine of the Trinity; I endeavour'd, by examining the Grounds and manner of your Lordship's drawing my Book into that Controversy, to bring that Question to a Decision. And therefore in my Answer to your Lordship's first Letter, I insisted particularly on what had a relation to that point. This Method your Lordship in your second Letter censur'd, as if it contain'd only *Personal Matters*, which were fit to be laid aside. And by mixing new Matter, and charging my Book with new Accusations, before the first was made out, avoided the Decision of what was in Debate between us; a strong Presumption to me, that your Lordship had little to say to support what began the Controversy, which you were so willing to have me let fall; whilst on the other side, my Silence to other Points which I had promis'd an Answer to, was often reflected on, and I rebuk'd for not answering *in the proper Place*.

Your Lordship's calling upon me on this occasion shall not be lost; 'tis fit your Expectation should be satisfy'd, and your Objections consider'd; which, for the Reasons above mention'd, were not examin'd in my former Answer: and which, whether true or false, as I humbly conceive, make nothing for or against the Doctrine of the Trinity. I shall therefore consider them barely as so many philosophical Questions, and endeavour to shew your Lordship where, and upon what Grounds 'tis I stick; and what it is that hinders me from the Satisfaction it would be to me, to be in every one of them of your mind.

Your Lordship tells me, *Whether I do not own Substance or not, is not the point before us; but whether by virtue of these Principles I can come to any Certainty of Reason about it. And your Lordship says, the very Places I produce do prove the contrary; which you shall therefore set down in my own Words, both as to Corporeal and Spiritual Substances.* Answ. 1. p. 7.

Here again, my Lord, I must beg your pardon, that I do not distinctly comprehend your meaning in these Words, viz. *That by virtue of these Principles one cannot come to Certainty of Reason about Substance*: For it is not very clear to me, whether your Lordship means, that we cannot come to Certainty that there is such a thing in the World as Substance; or whether we cannot make any other Proposition about Substance, of which we can be certain; or whether we cannot by my Principles establish any Idea of Substance, of which we can be certain. For to come to Certainty of Reason about Substance may signify either of these, which are far different Propositions: And I shall waste your Lordship's time, my Reader's, and my own (neither of which would I willingly do) by taking it in one Sense, when you mean it in another, lest I should meet with some such Reproof as this; That I misrepresent your meaning, or might have understood it if I had a mind to it, &c. And therefore cannot but wish, that you had so far condescended to the Slowness of my Apprehension, as to have given me your Sense so determin'd, that I might not trouble you with Answers to what was not your precise meaning.

To avoid it in the present Case, and to find in what Sense I was here to take these Words, *come to no Certainty of Reason about Substance*, I look'd into what follow'd, and when I came to the 13th Page, I thought I had there got a clear Explication of your Lordship's Meaning, and that by *no Certainty of Reason about Substance*, your Lordship here meant *no certain Idea of Substance*. Your Lordship's Words are, *I do not charge them (i. e. me as one of the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning) with discarding the Notion of Substance, because they have but an imperfect Idea of it; but because, upon those Principles, there can be no certain Idea at all of it.* Here I thought my self sure, and that these Words plainly interpreted the meaning of your Proposition, p. 7. to be, *That upon my Principles there can be no certain Idea at all of Substance.* But before I came to the end of that Paragraph, I found my self at a loss again; for that Paragraph goes on in these Words: *Whereas your Lordship asserts it to be one of the most natural and certain Ideas in our Minds because it is a Repugnance to our first Conception of things, that Modes or Accidents should subsist by themselves;* Answ. 1. p. 13.

themselves; and therefore you said, the rational Idea of Substance is one of the first Id as in our Minds: and however imperfect and obscure our Notion be, yet we are as certain that Substances are and must be, as that there are any Beings in the World. Here the Certainty, which your Words seem to mean, is Certainty of the Being of Substance.

In this Sense therefore I shall take it, till your Lordship shall determine it otherwise: And the Reason why I take it so, is, because what your Lordship goes on to say, seems to me to look most that way. The Proposition then that your Lordship undertakes to prove, is this; *That by Virtue of my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty of Reason, that there is any such thing as Substance:*
 Answ. 1. p. 7. And your Lordship tells me, *That the very Places I produce do prove the contrary, which you therefore will set down in my own Words, both as to Corporeal and Spiritual Substances.*

Answ. 1. p. 6. The first your Lordship brings, are these Words of mine: "When we talk or think of any particular sort of Corporeal Substances, as Horse, Stones, &c. tho' the Idea we have of either of them be but the Complication or Collection of those several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities, which we use to find united in the thing call'd Horse or Stone; yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common Subject; which Support we denote by the name Substance: tho' it be certain, we have no clear and distinct Idea of that thing we suppose a Support." And again,
 "The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, viz. Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, &c. which we considering not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produc'd by it, we are apt to think these the Actions of some other Substance, which we call Spirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other Idea or Notion of Matter, but something wherein those many sensible Qualities, which affect our Senses, do subsist; by supposing a Substance, wherein Thinking, Knowing, Doubting, and a Power of Moving, &c. do subsist; we have as clear a Notion of the Nature or Substance of Spirit, as we have of Body; the one being suppos'd to be (without knowing what it is) the Substratum to those simple Ideas we have from without; and the other suppos'd (with alike Ignorance of what it is) to be the Substratum to those Operations which we experiment in our selves."

But how these Words prove, *That upon my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty of Reason, that there is any such thing as Substance in the World;* I confess I do not see, nor has your Lordship, as I humbly conceive, shewn. And I think it would be a hard matter from these Words of mine to make a Syllogism, whose Conclusion should be, Ergo, *From my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty of Reason that there is any Substance in the World.*

Answ. 1. p. 9. Your Lordship indeed tells me, that I say, "That these and the like Fashions of speaking, that Substance is always suppos'd something;" and grant that I say over and over, That Substance is suppos'd: but that, your Lordship says, is not what you looked for, but something in the way of Certainty by Reason.

What your Lordship looks for, is not, I find, always easy for me to guess. But what I brought that, and some other Passages to the same purpose for, out of my Essay, that, I think, they prove, viz. That I did not discard, nor almost discard Substance out of the reasonable part of the World. For he that supposes in every Species of material Beings, Substance to be always something, doth not discard or almost discard it out of the World, or deny any such thing to be. The Passages alledg'd, I think, prove this; which was all I brought them for. And if they should happen to prove no more, I think, you can hardly infer from thence, *That therefore upon my Principles we can come to no Certainty that there is any such thing as Substance in the World.*

Answ. 1. p. 9. Your Lordship goes on to insist mightily upon my supposing; and to these Words of mine, "We cannot conceive how these sensible Qualities should subsist alone, and therefore we suppose a Substance to support them," your Lordship replies, *It is but supposing still; because we cannot conceive it otherwise: But what Certainty follows from not being barely able to conceive?* Answ.

The

The same Certainty that follows from the Repugnancy to our first Conceptions of things, upon which your Lordship grounds the relative Idea of Substance. Your words are, *It is a mere Effect of Reason, because it is a Repugnancy to our first Conceptions of things, that Modes or Accidents should subsist by themselves.* Your Lordship then, if I understand your Reasoning here, concludes that there is Substance, because it is a Repugnancy to our Conceptions of things (for whether that Repugnancy be to our first or second Conceptions, I think that's all one) that Modes or Accidents should subsist by themselves; and I conclude the same thing, because we cannot conceive how sensible Qualities should subsist by themselves. Now what the difference of Certainty is from a Repugnancy to our Conceptions, and from our not being able to conceive; I confess, my Lord, I am not acute enough to discern. And therefore it seems to me, that I have laid down the same Certainty of the Being of Substance, that your Lordship has done.

Your Lordship adds, *Are there not multitudes of things which we are not able to conceive? and yet it would not be allow'd us to suppose what we think fit upon that account.* *Answ.* Your Lordship's is certainly a very just Rule; 'tis pity it does not reach the Case. *But because it is not allow'd us to suppose what we think fit in things, which we are not able to conceive; it does not therefore follow, That we may not with certainty suppose or infer, that which is a natural and undeniable Consequence of such an Inability to conceive, as I call it, or Repugnancy to our Conceptions, as you call it.* We cannot conceive the Foundation of Harlem Church to stand upon nothing; but because it is not allow'd us to suppose what we think fit, viz. That it is laid upon a Rock of Diamond, or supported by Fairies; yet I think all the World will allow the infallible Certainty of this Supposition from thence, that it rests upon something. This I take to be the present Case; and therefore your next words, I think, do less concern Mr. L. than my Lord B. of W. I shall set them down, that the Reader may apply them to which of the two he thinks they most belong. They are, *I could hardly conceive that Mr. L. would have brought such Evidence as this against himself; but I must suppose some unknown Substratum in this Case.* For these words, that your Lordship has last quoted of mine, do not only not prove, *That upon my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty, that there is any such thing as Substance in the World;* but prove the contrary, That there must certainly be Substance in the World, and upon the very same Grounds that your Lordship takes it to be certain.

Your next Paragraph, which is to the same purpose, I have read more than once, and can never forbear, as often as I read it, to wish my self young again; or that a Liveliness of Fancy, suitable to that Age, would teach me to sport with words for the Diversion of my Readers. This I find your Lordship thinks so necessary to the quickning of Controversy, that you will not trust the Debate to the Greatness of your Learning, nor the Gravity of your Subject without it, whatever Authority the Dignity of your Character might give to what your Lordship says: For you having quoted these words of mine; "As long as there is any simple Idea, or sensible Quality left, according to my way of arguing, Substance cannot be discarded; because all simple Ideas, all sensible Qualities carry with them a Supposition of a Substratum to exist in, and a Substance wherein they inhere." You add, *What is the meaning of carrying with them a Supposition of a Substratum and a Substance? Have these simple Ideas the Notion of a Substance in them? No, but they carry it with them: How so? Do sensible Qualities carry a Corporeal Substance along with them? Then a Corporeal Substance must be intromitted by the Senses together with them: No, but they carry the Supposition with them; and truly that is burden enough for them. But which way do they carry it? It seems it's only because we cannot conceive it otherwise: What is this Conceiving? It may be said it is an Act of the Mind, not built on simple Ideas, but lies in the comparing the Ideas of Accident and Substance together; and from thence finding that an Accident must carry Substance along with it: But this will not clear it; for the Ideas of Accidents are simple Ideas, and carry nothing along with them, but the Impression made by sensible Objects.*

In this Passage, I conclude, your Lordship had some regard to the Entertainment of that part of your Readers, who would be thought Men, as well by being risible as rational Creatures. For I cannot imagine you meant this for an Argument; if you did, I have this plain simple answer, *That by carrying with them*

them a Supposition, I mean, according to the ordinary Import of the Phrase, that sensible Qualities imply a *Substratum* to exist in. And if your Lordship please to change one of these equivalent Expressions into the other, all the Argument here, I think, will be at an end: What will become of the Sport and Smiling, I will not answer.

Hitherto, I do not see any thing in my words brought by your Lordship that proves, *That upon my Principles we can come to no Certainty of Reason, that there is Substance in the World*; but the contrary.

Answ. I.
p. 11, 12.

B. 2. C. 13.
§. 19.

Answ. I. p. 11.

B. 2. C. 23.
§. 2.

Answ. I. p.
12.

Answ. I. p.
13.

Your Lordship's next words are to tell the World, that my Simile about the Elephant and Tortoise, is to ridicule the Notion of Substance, and the European Philosophers for asserting it. But if your Lordship please to turn again to my Essay, you will find those Passages were not intended to ridicule the Notion of Substance, or those who asserted it, whatever that *It signifies*: But to shew, that tho' Substance did support Accidents, yet Philosophers, who had found such a Support necessary, had no more a clear *Idea* of what that Support was, than the Indian had of that which supported his Tortoise, tho' sure he was it was something. Had your Pen, which quoted so much of the nineteenth Section of the thirteenth Chapter of my second Book, but set down the remaining Line and a half of that Paragraph, you would by these words which follow there, "So that of Substance we have no *Idea* of what it is, but only a confus'd and obscure one of what it does;" have put it past doubt what I meant. But your Lordship was pleas'd to take only those which you thought would serve best to your purpose; and I crave leave to add now these remaining ones, to shew my Reader what was mine.

'Tis to the same purpose I use the same Illustration again in that other place, which you are pleas'd to cite likewise; which your Lordship says you did, *only to shew that it was a deliberate and (as I thought) lucky Similitude*. It was upon serious Consideration, I own, that I entertain'd the Opinion, that we had no clear and distinct *Idea* of Substance. But as to that *Similitude*, I do not remember that it was much deliberated on; such inaccurate Writers as I am, who aim at nothing but Plainness, do not much study Similes: and for the Fault of Repetition, you have been pleas'd to pardon it. But supposing you had prov'd, That that Simile was to ridicule the Notion of Substance, publish'd in the Writings of some European Philosophers; it will by no means follow from thence, *That upon my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty of Reason, that there is any such thing as Substance in the World*. Mens Notions of a thing may be laugh'd at by those, whose Principles establish the Certainty of the thing it self; and one may laugh at Aristotle's Notion of an Orb of Fire under the Sphere of the Moon, without Principles that will make him uncertain whether there be any such thing as Fire. My Simile did perhaps serve to shew, that there were Philosophers, whose Knowledge was not so clear, nor so great as they pretended. If your Lordship thereupon thought, that the Vanity of such a Pretension had something ridiculous in it, I shall not contest your Judgment in the Case: For, as human Nature is fram'd, 'tis not impossible that whoever is discover'd to pretend to know more than really he does, will be in danger to be laugh'd at.

In the next Paragraph, your Lordship bestows the Epithet of Dull on *Burgersdicius* and *Sanderson*, and the Tribe of Logicians. I will not question your Right to call any Body Dull, whom you please: But if your Lordship does it to insinuate that I did so, I hope I may be allow'd to say thus much in my own defence, That I am neither so stupid or ill-natur'd, to discredit those whom I quote, for being of the same Opinion with me. And he that will look into the eleventh and twelfth Pages of my Reply, which your Lordship refers to, will find that I am very far from calling them Dull, or speaking diminishingly of them. But if I had been so ill-bred or foolish, as to have call'd them Dull; I do not see how that does at all serve to prove this Proposition, *That upon my Principles we can come to as Certainty of Reason, that there is any such thing as Substance*; any more than what follows in the next Paragraph.

Your Lordship in it asks me, as if it were of some great importance to the Proposition to be prov'd, whether there be no difference between the bare Being of a thing, and its Subsistence by it self? I answer, Yes; there is a difference, as I understand those Terms: and then I beseech your Lordship to make use of it, to prove

prove the Proposition before us. But because you seem by this Question to conclude, That the *Idea* of a thing that *subsists by it self*, is a clear and distinct *Idea* of *Substance*; I beg leave to ask, Is the *Idea* of the manner of *Subsistence* of a thing, the *Idea* of the thing it self? If it be not, we may have a clear and distinct *Idea* of the manner, and yet have none but a very obscure and confus'd one of the thing. For example, I tell your Lordship, that I know a thing that cannot subsist without a Support, and I know another thing that does subsist without a Support, and say no more of them; can you, by having the clear and distinct *Ideas* of having a Support, and not having a Support, say, that you have a clear and distinct *Idea* of the thing, that I know, which has, and of the thing, that I know, which has not a Support? If your Lordship can, I beseech you to give me the clear and distinct *Ideas* of these, which I only call by the general name *Things*, that have or have not Supports: for such there are, and such I shall give your Lordship clear and distinct *Ideas* of, when you shall please to call upon me for them; tho' I think your Lordship will scarce find them by the general and confus'd *Idea* of *Thing*, nor in the clearer and more distinct *Idea* of having or not having a Support.

To shew a blind Man that he has no clear and distinct *Idea* of Scarlet, I tell him, that his Notion of it, That it is a *Thing* or *Being*, does not prove he has any clear or distinct *Idea* of it; but barely that he takes it to be *something*, he knows not what. He replies, that he knows more than that; v.g. he knows that it subsists or inheres in another thing: *And is there no difference*, says he in your Lordship's words, *between the bare Being of a thing, and its Subsistence in another?* Yes, say I to him, a great deal; they are very different *Ideas*. But for all that, you have no clear and distinct *Idea* of *Scarlet*, not such a one as I have, who see and know it, and have another kind of *Idea* of it besides that of Inherence.

Your Lordship has the *Idea* of *subsisting by it self*, and therefore you conclude you have a clear and distinct *Idea* of the thing that *subsists by it self*; which methinks is all one, as if your Countryman should say, he hath an *Idea* of a Cedar of *Lebanon*, that it is a Tree of a nature to need no Prop to lean on for its Support, therefore he hath a clear and distinct *Idea* of a Cedar of *Lebanon*: which clear and distinct *Idea*, when he comes to examine, is nothing but a general one of a Tree, with which his indetermin'd *Idea* of a Cedar is confounded. Just so is the *Idea* of *Substance*, which, however call'd clear and distinct, is confounded with the general indetermin'd *Idea* of *Something*. But suppose that the manner of subsisting by it self, give us a clear and distinct *Idea* of *Substance*, how does that prove, That upon my Principles we can come to no Certainty of Reason, that there is any such thing as *Substance* in the World? Which is the Proposition to be prov'd.

In what follows, your Lordship says, *You do not charge any one with discarding* Answ. 1.
the Notion of Substance, because he has but an imperfect Idea of it; but because upon p. 13.
those Principles there can be no certain Idea at all of it.

Your Lordship says here *those Principles*, and in other places *these Principles*, without particularly setting them down, that I know. I am sure, without laying down Propositions that are mine, and proving that, those granted, we cannot come to any Certainty that there is any such thing as *Substance*, which is the thing to be prov'd; your Lordship proves nothing in the Case against me. What therefore the certain *Idea*, which I do not understand, or *Idea* of *Substance*, has to do here, is not easy to see. For that which I am charg'd with, is the discarding *Substance*. But the discarding *Substance*, is not the discarding the Notion of *Substance*. Mr. Newton has discarded *Des Cartes's Vortices*, i. e. laid down Principles from which he proves there is no such thing; but he has not thereby discarded the Notion or *Ideas* of those *Vortices*, for that he had when he confuted their Being, and every one who now reads and understands him, will have. But, as I have already observ'd, your Lordship here, I know not upon what ground, nor with what intention, confounds the *Ideas* of *Substance* and *Substance* it self: for to the words above set down, your Lordship subjoins, *That you assert* Answ. 1.
it to be one of the most natural and certain Ideas in our Minds, because it is a Re- p. 13, 14.
pugnance to our first Conception of things, that Modes or Accidents should subsist by themselves; and therefore your Lordship said, the rational Idea of Substance is one of

the first Ideas in our Minds, and however imperfect and obscure our Notion be, yet we are as certain that Substances are and must be, as that there are any Beings in the World. Herein I tell your Lordship that I agree with you, and therefore I hope this is no Objection against the Trinity. Your Lordship says, you never thought it was: but to lay all Foundations of Certainty, as to matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct Ideas, which was the Opinion you oppos'd, does certainly overthrow all Mysteries of Faith, and excludes the Notion of Substance out of rational Discourse; which your Lordship affirms to have been your Meaning.

How these words, *as to matters of Faith*, came in, or what they had to do against me in an Answer only to me, I do not see: neither will I here examine what it is to be one of the most natural and certain Ideas in our Minds. But be it what it will, this I am sure, That neither that, nor any thing else contain'd in this Paragraph, any way proves, that upon my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty that there is any such thing as Substance in the World: Which was the Proposition to be prov'd.

In the next place then, I crave leave to consider how that is prov'd, which tho' nothing to the Proposition to be prov'd, is yet what you here assert; viz. *That the Idea of Substance is one of the most natural and certain Ideas in our Minds*: Your proof of it is this, *because it is a Repugnancy to our first Conception of things, that Modes and Accidents should subsist by themselves, and therefore the rational Idea of Substance is one of the first Ideas in our Minds.* From whence I grant it to be a good Consequence, that to those who find this Repugnance, the Idea of a Support is very necessary; or, if you please to call it so, very rational. But a clear and distinct Idea of the thing it self, which is the Support, will not thence be prov'd to be one of the first Ideas in our Minds; or that any such Idea is ever there at all. He that is satisfy'd that Pendennis-Castle, if it were not supported, would fall into the Sea, must think of a Support that sustains it: But whether the thing that it rests on be Timber, or Brick, or Stone, he has by his bare Idea of the necessity of some Support that props it up, no clear and distinct Idea at all.

In this Paragraph you farther say, *That the laying all Foundation of Certainty as to Matters of Faith on clear and distinct Ideas, does certainly exclude the Notion of Substance out of rational Discourse.* Answ. This is a Proposition that will need a Proof; because every body at first sight will think it hard to be prov'd. For it is obvious, That let Certainty in matters of Faith, or any matters whatsoever, be laid on what it will, it excludes not the Notion of Substance certainly out of rational Discourse; unless it be certainly true, that we can rationally discourse of nothing but what we certainly know. But whether it be a Proposition easy or not easy to be prov'd, this is certain, that it concerns not me; for I lay not all Foundation of Certainty, as to matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct Ideas: and therefore if it does discard Substance out of the reasonable part of the World, as your Lordship phrases it above, or excludes the Notion of Substance out of rational Discourse; whatever havock it makes of Substance, or its Idea, no one jot of the Mischief is to be laid at my door, because that is no Principle of mine.

Answ. 1.
p. 14.

Your Lordship ends this Paragraph with telling me, that *I at length apprehend your Lordship's Meaning.*

Vindic. p.
236.
P. 7.
P. 13, 14.

I wish heartily that I did, because it would be much more for your ease, as well as my own. For in this case of Substance, I find it not easy to know your Meaning, or what it is I am blamed for. For in the beginning of this Dispute, it is the Being of Substance; and here again, it is Substance it self is discarded. And in this very Paragraph, writ as it seems to explain your self, so that in the close of it you tell me that at length I apprehend your Meaning to be that the Notion of Substance is excluded out of rational Discourse; the Explication is such, that it renders your Lordship's Meaning to me more obscure and uncertain than it was before. For in the same Paragraph your Lordship says, *That upon my Principles there can be no certain Idea at all of Substance*; and also that *however imperfect and obscure our Notions be, yet we are as certain that Substances are and must be, as that there are any Beings in the World.* So that supposing I did know (as I do not) what your Lordship means by certain Idea of Substance; yet I must own still, that what your Meaning is by discarding of Substance, whether it be the Idea of Substance, or the Being of Substance, I do not know. But that, I think, need not much trouble me, since your Lordship does not, that I see, shew how

how any Position or Principle of mine overthrows either *Substance* it self, or the *Idea* of it, or excludes either of them out of rational Discourse.

In your next paragraph, you say, *I declare*, p. 35. *That if any one assert that we can have no Ideas but from Sensation and Reflection, it is not my Opinion.* My Lord, I have look'd over that 35th Page, and find no such words of Mine there: but refer my Reader to that and the following Pages, for my Opinion concerning *Ideas* from Sensation and Reflection, how far they are the Foundation and Materials of all our Knowledge. And this I do, because to those Words which your Lordship has set down as mine, out of the 35th Page, but are not there, you subjoin, *That you are very glad of it, and will do me all the right you can in this matter*; which seems to imply, *That it is a matter of great consequence, and therefore I desire my Meaning may be taken in my own words, as they are set down at large.* Answ. I. p. 14.
Answ. I. p. 14.
Lett. 1.
p. 35—38.

The Promise your Lordship makes me, *of doing me all the right you can*, I return my humble Thanks for, because it is a piece of Justice so seldom done in Controversy; and because I suppose you have here made me this Promise, to authorize me to mind you of it, if at any time your haste should make you mistake my Words or Meaning: to have one's Words exactly quoted, and their Meaning interpreted by the plain and visible Design of the Author in his whole Discourse, being a *Right* which every Writer has a just Claim to, and such as a Lover of Truth will be very wary of violating. An instance of some sort of intrenchment on this, I humbly conceive, there is in the next Page but one, where you interpret my Words, as if I excus'd a Mistake I had made; by calling it a Slip of my Pen; whereas, my Lord, I do not own any Slip of my Pen in that place, but say that the Meaning of my Expression there is to be interpreted by other places, and particularly by those where I treat professedly of that Subject: And that in such cases, where an Expression is only incident to the matter in hand, and may seem not exactly to quadrate with the Author's Sense, where he designedly treats of that Subject, it ought rather to be interpreted as a Slip of his Pen, than as his Meaning. I should not have taken so particular a notice of this, but that you, by having up these Words with an Air, that makes me sensible how wary I ought to be, shew what use would be made of it, if ever I had pleaded *the Slip of my Pen*. Answ. I. p. 16.

In the following Pages I find a Discourse drawn up under several Ranks of Numbers; to prove, as I guess, this Proposition, *That in my way of Ideas we cannot come to any Certainty as to the Nature of Substance.* I shall be in a condition to answer to this Accusation, when I shall be told what particular Proposition, *as to the Nature of Substance*, it is, which in my way of Ideas we cannot come to any Certainty of. Because probably it may be such a Proposition concerning the Nature of Substance, as I shall readily own, that in my way of Ideas we can come to no Certainty of; and yet I think the way of Ideas not at all to be blamed, till there can be shewn another way, different from that of Ideas; whereby we may come to a Certainty of it. For 'twas never pretended, that by Ideas we could come to Certainty concerning every Proposition, that could be made concerning Substance or any thing else. Answ. I.
p. 15—19.
Answ. I. p. 20.

Besides the Doubtfulness visible in the Phrase it self, there is another Reason that hinders me from understanding precisely what is meant by these words, *to come to a Certainty as to the Nature of Substance*; viz. Because your Lordship makes Nature and Substance to be the same: so that to come to a Certainty as to the Nature of Substance, is, in your Lordship's sense of Nature, to come to a Certainty as to the Substance of Substance; which, I own, I do not clearly understand. p. 100, 101.

Another thing that hinders me from giving particular Answers to the Arguments that may be suppos'd to be contain'd in so many Pages, is, that I do not see, how what is discours'd in those thirteen or fourteen Pages is brought to prove this Proposition, *That in my way of Ideas we cannot come to any Certainty as to the Nature of Substance*: and it would require too many words, to examine every one of those Heads, Period by Period, to see what they prove; when you your self do not apply them to the direct Probation of any Proposition, that I understand.

Indeed you wind up this Discourse with these words, *That you leave the Reader to judg whether this be a tolerable account of the Idea of Substance by Sensation* Answ. I. p. 29.

and Reflection. *Answ.* That which your Lordship has given in the preceding Pages, *I think is not a very tolerable account of my Idea of Substance*; since the account you give over and over again of my *Idea of Substance*, is, that it is *nothing but a complex Idea of Accidents*. This is your account of my *Idea of Substance*, which you insist so much on, and which you say, you took out of those places, *I my self produc'd* in my first Letter. But if you had been pleas'd to have set down this one, which is to be found there amongst the rest produc'd by me out of *B. 2. Ch. 12. Sect. 6.* of my Essay, *viz.* "That the *Ideas* of Substances are such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which, the suppos'd or confus'd *Idea* of Substance is *always* the *first* and *chief*." This would have been a full Answer to all that I think you have under that variety of Heads objected against my *Idea* of Substance. But your Lordship, in your Representation of my *Idea* of Substance, thought fit to leave this Passage out; tho' you are pleas'd to set down several others produc'd both before and after it in my first Letter: which, I think, gives me a right humbly to return your Lordship your own words; *And now I freely leave the Reader to judg whether this, which your Lordship has given, be a tolerable account of my Idea of Substance.*

Answ. 1. The next Point to be consider'd, is concerning the Immateriality of the Soul; whereof there is a great deal said. The Original of this Controversy, I shall set down in your Lordship's own words: You say, *The only Reason you had to engage in this matter, was this bold Assertion, That the Ideas we have by Sensation or Reflection, are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning, and that our Certainty lies in perceiving the Agreement and Disagreement of Ideas, as express'd in any Proposition: which last, you say, are my own words.*

Answ. 1. p. 68. To overthrow this bold Assertion, you urge my acknowledgment, "That upon *my Principles* it cannot be demonstratively prov'd, That the Soul is immaterial, tho' it be in the highest degree probable:" And then ask, *Is not this the giving up the Cause of Certainty?* *Answ.* Just as much the giving up the Cause of Certainty on my side, as it is on your Lordship's: who, tho' you will not please to tell wherein you place Certainty, yet it is to be suppos'd you do place Certainty in something or other. Now let it be what you will that you place Certainty in, I take the liberty to say, that you cannot certainly prove, *i. e.* demonstrate, that the Soul of Man is immaterial: I am sure you have not so much as offer'd at any such proof, and therefore you give up the Cause of Certainty upon your Principles. Because if the not being able to demonstrate that the Soul is immaterial, upon his Principles who declares wherein he thinks Certainty consists, be the giving up of the Cause of Certainty; the not being able to demonstrate the Immateriality of the Soul, upon his Principles, who does not tell wherein Certainty consists, is no less a giving up of the Cause of Certainty. The only odds between these two, is more Art and Reserve in the one than the other. And therefore, my Lord, you must either upon your Principles of Certainty demonstrate that the Soul is immaterial, or you must allow me to say, that you too give up the Cause of Certainty, and your Principles tend to Scepticism as much as mine. Which of these two your Lordship shall please to do, will to me be advantageous; for by the one I shall get a Demonstration of the Soul's Immateriality, (of which I shall be very glad) and that upon Principles, which reaching farther than mine, I shall embrace, as better than mine, and become your Lordship's professed Convert. Till then, I shall rest satisfy'd that my Principles, be they as weak and fallible as your Lordship please, are no more guilty of any such Tendency, than their's, who talking more of Certainty, cannot attain to it in cases where they condemn the way of Ideas for coming short of it.

Answ. 1. p. 68. You a little lower in the same Page set down these as my words, *That I never offer'd it as a way of Certainty, where we cannot reach Certainty.* I have already told you, that I have been sometimes in doubt what Copy you had got of my Essay; because I often found your Quotations out of it, did not agree with what I read in mine: But by this Instance here, and some others, I know not what to think; since in my Letter, which I did my self the Honour to send your Lordship, I am sure the words are not as they are here set down: For I say not that I offer'd the way of Certainty there spoken of; which looks as if it were

were a new way of Certainty that I pretended to teach the World. Perhaps the Difference in these, from my words, is not so great, that upon another occasion I should take notice of it: But it being to lead People into an Opinion, that I spoke of the way of Certainty by *Ideas*, as something new which I pretended to teach the World, I think it worth while to set down my words themselves; which I think are so pen'd, as to shew a great Caution in me to avoid such an Opinion. My words are, "I think it is a way to bring us to a Certainty in those things, which I have offer'd as certain; but I never thought it a way to Certainty, where we cannot reach Certainty."

Lett. 1.
p. 81.

What use your Lordship makes of the Term *Offer'd*, apply'd to what I apply'd it not, is to be seen in your next words, which you subjoin to those which you set down for mine: *But did you not offer to put us into a way of Certainty? And what is that but to attain Certainty in such things where we could not otherwise do it?* *Ans.* If this your way of Reasoning here carries Certainty in it, I

Ans. 1.
p. 68.

humbly conceive, in your way of Certainty by Reason, Certainty may be attain'd where it could not otherwise be had. I only beg you, my Lord, to shew me the place, where I so offer to put you in a way of Certainty different from what had formerly been the way of Certainty, that Men by it might attain to Certainty in things, which they could not before my Book was writ. No body, who reads my *Essay* with that Indifferency which is proper to a Lover of Truth, can avoid seeing, that what I say of Certainty was not to teach the World a new way of Certainty (tho' that be one great Objection of your's against my Book) but to endeavour to shew wherein the old and only way of Certainty consists. What was the Occasion and Design of my Book, may be seen plainly enough in the Epistle to the Reader, without any need that any thing more should be said of it. And I am too sensible of my own Weakness, not to profess, as I do, "That I pretend not to teach, but to enquire." I cannot but wonder what Service you, my Lord, who are a Teacher of Authority, mean to Truth or Certainty, by condemning the way of Certainty by *Ideas*; because I own by it I cannot demonstrate that the Soul is immaterial. May it not be worth your considering, what advantage this will be to *Scepticism*, when upon the same grounds, your words here shall be turn'd upon you; and it shall be ask'd, *What a strange way of Certainty is this* [your Lordship's way by Reason] *if it fails us in some of the first Foundations of the real Knowledge of our selves?*

Essay, B. 2.
C. 11. §. 17.

Ans. 1.
p. 68.

To avoid this, you undertake to prove from my own Principles, that we may be certain, "That the first eternal Thinking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, cannot if he would, give to certain Systems of created sensible Matter, put together as he sees fit, some degrees of Sense, Perception and Thought." For this, my Lord, is my Proposition, and this the utmost that I have said concerning the Power of Thinking in Matter.

Ans. 1. p.
69.

Essay, B. 4.
C. 3. §. 6.

Your first Argument I take to be this, That, according to me, the Knowledge we have being by our *Ideas*, and our *Idea* of Matter in general being a solid Substance, and our *Idea* of Body a solid extended figur'd Substance; if I admit Matter to be capable of Thinking, I confound the *Idea* of Matter with the *Idea* of a Spirit: To which I answer, No; no more than I confound the *Idea* of Matter with the *Idea* of an Horse, when I say that Matter in general is a solid extended Substance; and that an Horse is a material Animal, or an extended solid Substance with Sense and spontaneous Motion.

Ans. 1.
p. 69—73.

The *Idea* of Matter is an extended solid Substance; wherever there is such a Substance, there is Matter, and the Essence of Matter, whatever other Qualities not contain'd in that Essence, it shall please God to superadd to it. For example, God creates an extended solid Substance, without the superadding any thing else to it, and so we may consider it at rest: To some parts of it he superadds Motion, but it has still the Essence of Matter: Other Parts of it he frames into Plants, with all the Excellencies of Vegetation, Life and Beauty, which is to be found in a Rose or Peach-Tree, &c. above the Essence of Matter in general, but it is still but Matter: To other Parts he adds Sense and spontaneous Motion, and those other Properties that are to be found in an Elephant. Hitherto 'tis not doubted but the Power of God may go, and that the Properties of a Rose, a Peach, or an Elephant, superadded to Matter, change not the Properties of Matter; but Matter is in these things Matter still. But

if

if one venture to go one step further, and say, God may give to Matter, Thought, Reason and Volition, as well as Sense and spontaneous Motion, there are Men ready presently to limit the Power of the Omnipotent Creator, and tell us he cannot do it; because it destroys the Essence, or *changes the essential Properties* of Matter. To make good which Assertion, they have no more to say, but that Thought and Reason are not included in the Essence of Matter. I grant it; but whatever Excellency, not contain'd in its Essence, be superadded to Matter, it does not destroy the Essence of Matter, if it leaves it an extended solid Substance; wherever that is, there is the Essence of Matter: and if every thing of greater Perfection, superadded to such a Substance, destroys the Essence of Matter, what will become of the Essence of Matter in a Plant, or an Animal, whose Properties far exceed those of a mere extended solid Substance?

But 'tis farther urg'd, That we cannot conceive how Matter can think. I grant it; but to argue from thence, that God therefore cannot give to Matter a Faculty of thinking, is to say God's Omnipotency is limited to a narrow Compass, because Man's Understanding is so; and brings down God's infinite Power to the size of our Capacities. If God can give no power to any Parts of Matter, but what Men can account for from the Essence of Matter in general; if all such Qualities and Properties must destroy the Essence, or *change the essential Properties* of Matter, which are to our Conceptions above it, and we cannot conceive to be the natural Consequence of that Essence: it is plain, that the Essence of Matter is destroy'd, and its *essential Properties chang'd* in most of the sensible Parts of this our System. For 'tis visible, that all the Planets have Revolutions about certain remote Centers, which I would have any one explain, or make conceivable by the bare Essence or natural Powers depending on the Essence of Matter in general, without something added to that Essence, which we cannot conceive: for the moving of Matter in a crooked Line, or the Attraction of Matter by Matter, is all that can be said in the Case; either of which, it is above our Reach to derive from the Essence of Matter, or Body in general; tho' one of these two must unavoidably be allow'd to be superadded in this Instance to the Essence of Matter in general. The Omnipotent Creator advis'd not with us in the making of the World, and his ways are not the less excellent, because they are past our finding out.

In the next place, the Vegetable Part of the Creation is not doubted to be wholly material; and yet he that will look into it, will observe Excellencies and Operations in this part of Matter, which he will not find contain'd in the Essence of Matter in general, nor be able to conceive how they can be produc'd by it. And will he therefore say, That the Essence of Matter is destroy'd in them, because they have Properties and Operations not contain'd in the essential Properties of Matter as Matter, nor explicable by the Essence of Matter in general?

Let us advance one Step farther, and we shall, in the Animal World, meet with yet greater Perfections and Properties, no ways explicable by the Essence of Matter in general. If the Omnipotent Creator had not superadded to the Earth, which produc'd the irrational Animals, Qualities far surpassing those of the dull dead Earth out of which they were made, Life, Sense and spontaneous Motion, nobler Qualities than were before in it, it had still remain'd rude senseless Matter; and if to the Individuals of each Species, he had not superadded a Power of Propagation, the Species had perish'd with those Individuals: But by these Essences or Properties of each Species, superadded to the Matter which they were made of, the Essence or Properties of Matter in general were not destroy'd or chang'd, any more than any thing that was in the Individuals before was destroy'd or chang'd by the Power of Generation, superadded to them by the first Benediction of the Almighty.

In all such Cases, the Superinducement of greater Perfections and nobler Qualities, destroys nothing of the Essence or Perfections that were there before, unless there can be shew'd a manifest Repugnancy between them; but all the Proof offer'd for that, is only, that we cannot conceive how Matter, without such superadded Perfections, can produce such Effects; which is, in truth, no more than to say, Matter in general, or every part of Matter, as Matter, has them

them not ; but is no Reason to prove that God, if he pleases, cannot superadd them to some parts of Matter : unless it can be prov'd to be a Contradiction, that God should give to some Parts of Matter Qualities and Perfections, which Matter in general has not ; tho' we cannot conceive how Matter is invested with them, or how it operates by virtue of those new Endowments. Nor is it to be wonder'd that we cannot, whilst we limit all its Operations to those Qualities it had before, and would explain them by the known Properties of Matter in general, without any such superinduc'd Perfections. For if this be a right Rule of Reasoning to deny a thing to be, because we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be ; I shall desire them who use it to stick to this Rule, and see what Work it will make both in Divinity as well as Philosophy ; and whether they can advance any thing more in favour of *Scepticism*.

For to keep within the present Subject of the Power of Thinking and Self-Motion, bestow'd by Omnipotent Power on some Parts of Matter : The Objection to this is, I cannot conceive how Matter should think. What is the Consequence? *Ergo*, God cannot give it a Power to think. Let this stand for a good Reason, and then proceed in other Cases by the same. You cannot conceive how Matter can attract Matter at any distance, much less at the distance of 1000000 Miles ; *ergo*, God cannot give it such a Power. You cannot conceive how Matter should feel, or move it self, or affect an immaterial Being, or be mov'd by it ; *ergo*, God cannot give it such Powers : which is in effect to deny Gravity and the Revolution of the Planets about the Sun ; to make Brutes mere Machines, without Sense or spontaneous Motion ; and to allow Man neither Sense nor voluntary Motion.

Let us apply this Rule one degree farther. You cannot conceive how an extended solid Substance should think, therefore God cannot make it think. Can you conceive how your own Soul, or any Substance thinks? You find indeed, that you do think, and so do I ; but I want to be told how the Action of Thinking is perform'd : This, I confess, is beyond my Conception ; and I would be glad any one, who conceives it, would explain it to me. God, I find, has given me this Faculty ; and since I cannot but be convinc'd of his Power in this Instance, which tho' I every moment experiment in my self, yet I cannot conceive the manner of ; what would it be less than an insolent Absurdity, to deny his Power in other like Cases, only for this Reason, because I cannot conceive the manner how ?

To explain this matter a little farther : God has created a Substance : let it be, for example, a solid extended Substance : Is God bound to give it, besides Being, a Power of Action? that, I think, no body will say. He therefore may leave it in a state of Inactivity, and it will be nevertheless a Substance ; for Action is not necessary to the Being of any Substance that God does create. God has likewise created and made to exist, *de novo*, an immaterial Substance, which will not lose its Being of a Substance, tho' God should bestow on it nothing more but this bare Being, without giving it any Activity at all. Here are now two distinct Substances, the one material, the other immaterial, both in a state of perfect Inactivity. Now, I ask, what Power God can give to one of these Substances (supposing them to retain the same distinct Natures, that they had as Substances in their State of Inactivity) which he cannot give to the other? In that state, 'tis plain, neither of them thinks ; for Thinking being an Action, it cannot be deny'd, that God can put an end to any Action of any created Substance, without annihilating of the Substance whereof it is an Action : and if it be so, he can also create or give Existence to such a Substance, without giving that Substance any Action at all. By the same Reason it is plain, that neither of them can move it self. Now I would ask, why Omnipotency cannot give to either of these Substances, which are equally in a state of perfect Inactivity, the same Power that it can give to the other? Let it be, for example, that of spontaneous or Self-Motion, which is a Power that 'tis suppos'd God can give to an unsolid Substance, but deny'd that he can give to a solid Substance.

If it be ask'd, why they limit the Omnipotency of God, in reference to the one rather than the other of these Substances ; all that can be said to it, is, That they cannot conceive how the solid Substance should ever be able to move it self.

And

And as little, say I, are they able to conceive how a created unsolid Substance should move it self; but there may be something in an immaterial Substance, that you do not know. I grant it; and in a material one too: For example, Gravitation of Matter towards Matter, and in the several Proportions observable, inevitably shews, that there is something in Matter that we do not understand, unless we can conceive Self-Motion in Matter; or an inexplicable and inconceivable Attraction in Matter, at immense and almost incomprehensible Distances: It must therefore be confess'd, that there is something in solid, as well as unsolid Substances, that we do not understand. But this we know, that they may each of them have their distinct Beings, without any Activity superadded to them, unless you will deny, That God can take from any Being its Power of acting, which 'tis probable will be thought too presumptuous for any one to do; and, I say, it is as hard to conceive Self-Motion in a created immaterial, as in a material Being, consider it how you will: And therefore this is no Reason to deny Omnipotency to be able to give a Power of Self-Motion to a material Substance, if he pleases, as well as to an immaterial; since neither of them can have it from themselves, nor can we conceive how it can be in either of them.

The same is visible in the other Operation of Thinking; both these Substances may be made, and exist without Thought; neither of them has, or can have the Power of Thinking from it self: God may give it to either of them, according to the good Pleasure of his Omnipotency; and in which-ever of them it is, it is equally beyond our Capacity to conceive, how either of those Substances thinks. But for that Reason, to deny that God, who had Power enough to give them both a Being out of nothing, can, by the same Omnipotency, give them what other Powers and Perfections he pleases; has no better a Foundation than to deny his Power of Creation, because we cannot conceive how it is perform'd: and there at last this way of Reasoning must terminate.

That Omnipotency cannot make a Substance to be solid and not solid at the same time, I think, with due Reverence, we may say; but that a solid Substance may not have Qualities, Perfections and Powers, which have no natural or visibly necessary Connection with Solidity and Extension, is too much for us (who are but of yesterday, and know nothing) to be positive in. If God cannot join things together by Connections inconceivable to us, we must deny even the Consistency and Being of Matter it self; since every Particle of it having some Bulk, has its Parts connected by ways inconceivable to us. So that all the Difficulties that are rais'd against the Thinking of Matter from our Ignorance or narrow Conceptions, stand not at all in the way of the Power of God, if he pleases to ordain it so; nor prove any thing against his having actually endu'd some Parcels of Matter, so dispos'd as he thinks fit, with a Faculty of Thinking, till it can be shewn that it contains a Contradiction to suppose it.

Tho' to me Sensation be comprehended under Thinking in general, yet in the foregoing Discourse, I have spoke of Sense in Brutes, as distinct from Thinking: Because your Lordship, as I remember, speaks of Sense in Brutes. But here I take liberty to observe, That if your Lordship allows Brutes to have Sensation, it will follow, either that God can and doth give to some Parcels of Matter a Power of Perception and Thinking; or that all Animals have immaterial, and consequently, according to your Lordship, immortal Souls, as well as Men: and to say that Fleas and Mites, &c. have immortal Souls as well as Men, will possibly be look'd on as going a great way to serve an Hypothesis, and it would not very well agree with what your Lordship says, *Answ. 2. p. 64.* to the words of *Solomon*, quoted out of *Eccles. c. 3.*

I have been pretty large in making this matter plain, that they who are so forward to bestow hard Censures or Names on the Opinions of those who differ from them, may consider whether sometimes they are not more due to their own: And that they may be persuaded a little to temper that Heat, which, supposing the Truth in their current Opinions, gives them (as they think) a Right to lay what Imputations they please on those who would fairly examine the Grounds they stand upon. For talking with a Supposition and Insinuations, that Truth and Knowledg, nay, and Religion too, stands and falls with their Systems, is at best but an imperious way of begging the Question, and assuming

to themselves, under the pretence of Zeal for the Cause of God, a Title to Infallibility. It is very becoming that Mens Zeal for Truth should go as far as their Proofs, but not go for Proofs themselves. He that attacks receiv'd Opinions, with any thing but fair Arguments, may, I own, be justly suspected not to mean well, nor to be led by the Love of Truth; but the same may be said of him too, who so defends them. An Error is not the better for being common, nor Truth the worse for having lain neglected: And if it were put to the Vote any where in the World, I doubt, as things are manag'd, whether Truth would have the Majority; at least, whilst the Authority of Men, and not the Examination of things, must be its Measure. The Imputation of *Scepticism*, and those broad Insinuations to render what I have writ suspected, so frequent as if that were the great Business of all this Pains you have been at about me, has made me say thus much, my Lord, rather as my Sense of the way to establish Truth in its full Force and Beauty, than that I think the World will need to have any thing said to it, to make it distinguish between your Lordship's and my Design in writing; which therefore I securely leave to the Judgment of the Reader, and return to the Argument in hand.

What I have above said, I take to be a full Answer to all that your Lordship would infer from my *Idea* of Matter, of Liberty, and of Identity, and from the power of abstracting. You ask, *How can my Idea of Liberty agree with the Idea that Bodies can operate only by Motion and Impulse?* *Answ.* By the Omnipotency of God, who can make all things agree, that involve not a Contradiction. 'Tis true, I say, "That Bodies operate by Impulse, and not by thing else." And so I thought when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of their Operation. But I am since convinc'd by the judicious Mr. Newton's incomparable Book, that 'tis too bold a Presumption to limit God's Power, in this point, by my narrow Conceptions. The Gravitation of Matter towards Matter, by ways unconceivable to me, is not only a Demonstration that God can, if he pleases, put into Bodies, Powers, and Ways of Operation, above what can be deriv'd from our *Idea* of Body, or can be explain'd by what we know of Matter, but also an unquestionable and every where visible Instance, that he has done so. And therefore in the next Edition of my Book, I shall take care to have that Passage rectify'd. *Answ. I. p. 73.*

As to *Self-consciousness*, your Lordship asks, *What is there like Self-consciousness in Matter?* Nothing at all in Matter as Matter. But that God cannot bestow on some Parcels of Matter a Power of thinking, and with it Self-consciousness, will never be prov'd by asking, *How is it possible to apprehend that mere Body should perceive that it doth perceive?* The Weakness of our Apprehension I grant in the Case: I confess as much as you please, that we cannot conceive how a solid, no, nor how an unsolid created Substance thinks; but this Weakness of our Apprehensions reaches not the Power of God, whose Weakness is stronger than any thing in Men. *Essay, B. 2. C. 8. §. 11.*

Your Argument from Abstraction we have in this Question, *If it may be in the power of Matter to think, how comes it to be so impossible for such organiz'd Bodies as the Brutes have, to enlarge their Ideas by Abstraction?* *Answ.* This seems to suppose, that I place Thinking within the natural Power of Matter. If that be your Meaning, my Lord, I neither say, nor suppose, that all Matter has naturally in it a Faculty of Thinking, but the direct contrary. But if you mean that certain Parcels of Matter, order'd by the Divine Power, as seems fit to him, may be made capable of receiving from his Omnipotency the Faculty of Thinking; that indeed I say, and that being granted, the Answer to your Question is easy, since, if Omnipotency can give Thought to any solid Substance, it is not hard to conceive, that God may give that Faculty in an higher or lower Degree, as it pleases him, who knows what Disposition of the Subject is suited to such a particular way or degree of Thinking. *Answ. I. p. 74.*

Another Argument to prove, That God cannot endue any Parcel of Matter with the Faculty of Thinking, is taken from those Words of mine, where I shew by what Connection of *Ideas* we may come to know, That God is an immaterial Substance. They are these: "The *Idea* of an eternal, actual,

“ knowing Being, with the *Idea* of Immateriality, by the intervention of the
 “ *Idea* of Matter, and of its actual Division, Divisibility, and want of Per-
 Answ. 2. p. 77. ception, &c. From whence your Lordship thus argues, *Here the want of*
Perception is own'd to be so essential to Matter, that God is therefore concluded to
be Immaterial. Answ. Perception and Knowledge in that one Eternal Being,
 where it has its Source, 'tis visible, must be essentially inseparable from it;
 therefore the actual want of Perception in so great part of the particular
 Parcels of Matter, is a Demonstration, that the first Being, from whom Per-
 ception and Knowledge is inseparable, is not Matter. How far this makes
 the want of Perception an essential Property of Matter, I will not dispute; it suf-
 fices, that it shews, That Perception is not an essential Property of Matter;
 and therefore Matter cannot be that eternal original Being, to which Percep-
 tion and Knowledge is essential. Matter, I say, naturally is without Percep-
 tion: Ergo, says your Lordship, *Want of Perception is an essential Property of*
Matter, and God doth not change the essential Properties of things, their Nature
remaining. From whence you infer, That God cannot bestow on any Parcel
 of Matter (the Nature of Matter remaining) a Faculty of Thinking. If the
 Rules of Logick, since my days, be not chang'd, I may safely deny this Con-
 sequence. For an Argument that runs thus, *God does not, Ergo, he cannot;*
 I was taught, when I came first to the University, would not hold. For I
 B. 4. C. 3. §. 5. never said *God did;* but “ That I see no Contradiction in it, that he should,
 “ if he pleas'd, give to some Systems of senseless Matter, a Faculty of Think-
 “ ing:” and I know no body, before *Des Cartes*, that ever pretended to shew
 that there was any Contradiction in it. So that at worst, my not being able
 to see in Matter any such Incapacity, as makes it impossible for Omnipotency
 to bestow on it a Faculty of Thinking, makes me opposite only to the *Car-*
tesians. For as far as I have seen or heard, the Fathers of the Christian Church
 never pretended to demonstrate that Matter was incapable to receive a Power
 of Sensation, Perception and Thinking, from the Hand of the omnipotent
 Creator. Let us therefore, if you please, suppose the Form of your Argu-
 mentation right, and that your Lordship means, *God cannot:* And then if your
 Argument be good, it proves, That God could not give to *Baalams* Ass a
 Power to speak to his Master as he did; for the want of rational Discourse,
 being natural to that Species, 'tis but for your Lordship to call it an *essential*
Property, and then God cannot change the *essential Properties of things, their*
Nature remaining: whereby it is prov'd, That God cannot, with all his Om-
 nipotency, give to an Ass a Power to speak as *Baalams* did.

Answ. 1. p. 78. You say, my Lord, *You do not set Bounds to God's Omnipotency:* For he may,
 if he please, change a Body into an immaterial Substance; i. e. take away from a
 Substance the Solidity which it had before, and which made it Matter, and
 then give it a Faculty of Thinking, which it had not before, and which makes
 it a Spirit, the same Substance remaining. For if the same Substance remains
 not, Body is not chang'd into an immaterial Substance, but the solid Substance,
 and all belonging to it, is annihilated, and an immaterial Substance created;
 which is not a change of one thing into another, but the destroying of one,
 and making another *de novo.* In this Change therefore of a Body, or material
 Substance, into an immaterial, let us observe these distinct Considerations:

First, you say, *God may, if he pleases,* take away from a solid Substance
 Solidity, which is that which makes it a material Substance or Body; and
 may make it an immaterial Substance, i. e. a Substance without Solidity. But
 this Privation of one Quality, gives it not another: the bare taking away a
 lower or less noble Quality, does not give it an higher or nobler; that must
 be the Gift of God. For the bare Privation of one, and a meaner Quality,
 cannot be the Position of an higher and better: unless any one will say, that
 Cogitation, or the Power of Thinking, results from the Nature of Substance it
 self; which if it do, then wherever there is Substance, there must be Cogita-
 tion or a Power of thinking. Here then, upon your Lordship's own Prin-
 ciples, is an immaterial Substance without the Faculty of thinking.

In the next place, you will not deny, but God may give to this Substance,
 thus depriv'd of Solidity, a Faculty of thinking; for you suppose it made
 capable of that, by being made immaterial: whereby you allow, that the same
 numerical

numerical Substance may be sometimes wholly incogitative, or without a Power of thinking, and at other times perfectly cogitative, or endu'd with a Power of thinking.

Farther, you will not deny but God can give it Solidity, and make it material again. For I conclude it will not be deny'd, that God can make it again what it was before. Now I crave leave to ask your Lordship, why God having given to this Substance the Faculty of thinking after Solidity was taken from it, cannot restore to it Solidity again, without taking away the Faculty of thinking. When you have resolv'd this, my Lord, you will have prov'd it impossible for God's Omnipotence to give to a solid Substance a Faculty of thinking; but till then, not having prov'd it impossible, and yet denying that God can do it, is to deny that he can do what is in it self possible: which, as I humbly conceive, is visibly to set Bounds to God's Omnipotency; tho' you say here, *You do not set Bounds to God's Omnipotency.* Answ. 1. p. 78.

If I should imitate your Lordship's way of Writing, I should not omit to bring in *Epicurus* here, and take notice that this was his way, *Deum verbis ponere, re tollere*: And then add, that *I am certain you do not think he promoted the great Ends of Morality and Religion.* For 'tis with such candid and kind Insinuations as these, that you bring in both * *Hobbes* and † *Spinoza*, into your Discourse here about God's being able, if he please, to give to some Parcels of Matter, order'd as he thinks fit, a Faculty of thinking: neither of those Authors having, as appears by any Passages you bring out of them, said any thing to this Question, nor having, as it seems, any other business here, but by their Names skilfully to give that Character to my Book, with which you would recommend it to the World. Answ. 1. p. 55. † Ibid. p. 79.

I pretend not to enquire what measure of Zeal, nor for what, guides your Lordship's Pen in such a way of writing, as your's has all along been with me: Only I cannot but consider what Reputation it would give to the Writings of the Fathers of the Church, if they should think Truth requir'd, or Religion allow'd them to imitate such Patterns. But God be thanked there be those amongst them who do not admire such ways of managing the Cause of Truth or Religion: They being sensible, that if every one, who believes or can pretend he has Truth on his side, is thereby authoriz'd without Proof to insinuate whatever may serve to prejudice mens Minds against the other side; there will be great ravage made on Charity and Practice, without any gain to Truth or Knowledge. And that the Liberties frequently taken by Disputants to do so, may have been the cause that the World, in all Ages, has receiv'd so much harm, and so little advantage from Controversies in Religion.

These are the Arguments which your Lordship has brought to confute one Saying in my Book, by other Passages in it; which therefore being all but *Argumenta ad Hominem*, if they did prove what they do not, are of no other use, than to gain a Victory over me: a thing, methinks, so much beneath your Lordship, that it does not deserve one of your Pages. The Question is, whether God can, if he pleases, bestow on any Parcel of Matter order'd as he thinks fit, a Faculty of Preception and Thinking. You say, *You look upon a Mistake herein to be of dangerous Consequence, as to the great Ends of Religion and Morality.* Answ. 1. p. 79. If this be so, My Lord, I think one may well wonder why your Lordship has brought no Arguments to establish the Truth it self, which you look on to be of such dangerous Consequence to be mistaken in; but have spent so many Pages only in a Personal Matter, in endeavouring to shew, that I had Inconsistencies in my Book: which, if any such thing had been shew'd, the Question would be still as far from being decided, and the danger of mistaking about it as little prevented, as if nothing of all this had been said. If therefore your Lordship's Care of the great Ends of Religion and Morality have made you think it necessary to clear this Question, the World has reason to conclude there is little to be said against that Proposition, which is to be found in my Book concerning the Possibility, that some parcels of Matter might be so order'd by Omnipotence, as to be endu'd with a Faculty of thinking, if God so pleas'd;

since your Lordship's Concern for the *promoting the great Ends of Religion and Morality*, has not enabled you to produce one Argument against a Proposition, *that you think of so dangerous consequence to them.*

And here I crave leave to observe, That tho' in your Title-Page you promise to prove, that my *Notion of Ideas is inconsistent with it self* (which if it were, it could hardly be prov'd to be inconsistent with any thing else) *and with the Articles of the Christian Faith*; yet your Attempts all along have been to prove me in some Passages of my Book inconsistent with my self, without having shewn any Proposition in my Book inconsistent with any *Article of the Christian Faith.*

Answ. 1.
p. 54, 55.

I think, your Lordship has indeed made use of one Argument of your own: But it is such an one, that I confess I do not see how it is apt much to promote Religion, especially the Christian Religion founded on Revelation. I shall set down your Lordship's words, that they may be consider'd. You say, *That you are of opinion, that the great Ends of Religion and Morality are best secured by the Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul from its Nature and Properties; and which, you think, proves it immaterial.* Your Lordship does not question whether God can give Immortality to a Material Substance; but you say, it takes off very much from the Evidence of Immortality, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own nature it is not capable of, &c. So likewise you say, *If a Man cannot be certain, but that Matter may think (as I affirm) then what becomes of the Soul's Immateriality (and consequently Immortality) from its Operations?* But for all this, say I, his Assurance of Faith remains on its own Basis. Now you appeal to any Man of Sense, whether the finding the Uncertainty of his own Principles which he went upon in point of Reason, doth not weaken the Credibility of these fundamental Articles, when they are consider'd purely as Matters of Faith? For before, there was a natural Credibility in them on the account of Reason; but by going on wrong Grounds of Certainty, all that is lost; and instead of being certain, he is more doubtful than ever. And if the Evidence of Faith falls so much short of that of Reason, it must needs have less effect upon Mens Minds, when the Subserviency of Reason is taken away; as it must be, when the Grounds of Certainty by Reason are vanish'd. Is it at all probable, that he who finds his Reason deceive him in such fundamental Points, should have his Faith stand firm and unmovable on the account of Revelation? For in matters of Revelation, there must be some antecedent Principles suppos'd, before we can believe any thing on the account of it.

Answ. 2.
p. 28.

Ibid. p. 35.

More to the same purpose we have some Pages farther, where from some of my words your Lordship says, *You cannot but observe, That we have no Certainty upon my grounds, that self-consciousness depends upon an individual immaterial Substance, and consequently that a material Substance may, according to my Principles, have Self-consciousness in it; at least, that I am not certain of the contrary.* Whereupon your Lordship bids me consider, whether this doth not a little affect the whole Article of the Resurrection? What does all this tend to? but to make the World believe, that I have lessen'd the Credibility of the Immortality of the Soul and the Resurrection, by saying, That tho' it be most highly probable, that the Soul is immaterial, yet upon my Principles it cannot be demonstrated; because it is not impossible to God's Omnipotency, if he pleases, to bestow upon some parcels of Matter, dispos'd as he sees fit, a Faculty of Thinking.

This your Accusation of my lessening the Credibility of these Articles of Faith, is founded on this, That the Article of the Immortality of the Soul abates of its Credibility, if it be allow'd, that its Immateriality (which is the suppos'd Proof from Reason and Philosophy of its Immortality) cannot be demonstrated from natural Reason. Which Argument of your Lordship's bottoms, as I humbly conceive, on this, That Divine Revelation abates of its Credibility in all those Articles it proposes, proportionably as human Reason fails to support the Testimony of God. And all that your Lordship in those Passages has said, when examin'd, will I suppose be found to import thus much, viz. Does God propose any thing to Mankind to be believ'd? It is very fit and credible to be believ'd, if Reason can demonstrate it to be true. But if human Reason comes short in the Case, and cannot make it out, its Credibility is thereby lessen'd: which is in effect to say, That the Veracity of God is not a firm and sure Foundation of Faith to rely upon, without the concurrent Testimony of Reason;

i. e.

i. e. with Reverence be it spoken, God is not to be believ'd on his own Word, unless what he reveals be in it self credible, and might be believ'd without him.

If this be a way to promote Religion, the Christian Religion in all its Articles, I am not sorry that it is not a way to be found in any of my Writings; for I imagine any thing like this would (and I should think deserv'd) to have other Titles than bare *Scepticism* bestow'd upon it, and would have rais'd no small Outcry against any one, who is not to be suppos'd to be in the right in all that he says, and so may securely say what he pleases. Such as I, the *Profanum Vulgus*, who take too much upon us, if we would examine, have nothing to do but to hearken and believe, tho' what he said should subvert the very Foundations of the Christian Faith.

What I have above observ'd, is so visibly contain'd in your Lordship's Argument, That when I met with it in your Answer to my first Letter, it seem'd so strange from a man of your Lordship's Character, and in a Dispute in defence of the Doctrine of the Trinity, that I could hardly persuade my self, but it was a Slip of your Pen: But when I found it in your second Letter made use of again, and seriously enlarg'd as an Argument of weight to be insisted upon, I was convinc'd, that it was a Principle that you heartily embrac'd, how little favourable soever it was to the Articles of the Christian Religion, and particularly those which you undertook to defend. Answ. 2. p. 28, 29.

I desire my Reader to peruse the Passages as they stand in your Letters themselves, and see whether what you say in them does not amount to this, That a Revelation from God is more or less credible, according as it has a stronger or weaker Confirmation from human Reason. For,

1. Your Lordship says, *You do not question whether God can give Immortality to a material Substance; but you say it takes off very much from the Evidence of Immortality, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that which of its own nature it is not capable of.* Answ. 1. p. 55.

To which I reply, any one's not being able to demonstrate the Soul to be immaterial, takes off not very much, nor at all from the Evidence of its Immortality, if God has reveal'd that it shall be immortal; because the Veracity of God is a Demonstration of the Truth of what he has reveal'd, and the want of another Demonstration of a Proposition that is demonstratively true, takes not off from the Evidence of it. For where there is a clear Demonstration, there is as much Evidence as any Truth can have, that is not self-evident. God has reveal'd that the Souls of Men shall live for ever: but says your Lordship, from this Evidence it takes off very much, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that which of its own nature it is not capable of; *i. e.* The Revelation and Testimony of God loses much of its Evidence, if this depends wholly upon the good pleasure of God, and cannot be demonstratively made out by natural Reason, that the Soul is immaterial, and consequently in its own nature immortal. For that is all that here is or can be meant by these words, *which of its own nature it is not capable of*, to make them to the purpose. For the whole of your Lordship's Discourse here, is to prove, That the Soul cannot be material, because then the Evidence of its being immortal would be very much lessen'd. Which is to say, That 'tis not as credible upon Divine Revelation, that a material Substance should be immortal, as an immaterial; or which is all one, That God is not equally to be believ'd, when he declares that a material Substance shall be immortal, as when he declares that an immaterial shall be so; because the Immortality of a material Substance cannot be demonstrated from natural Reason.

Let us try this Rule of your Lordship's a little farther. God hath reveal'd, that the Bodies Men shall have after the Resurrection, as well as their Souls, shall live to Eternity: Does your Lordship believe the eternal Life of the one of these more than of the other, because you think you can prove it of one of them by natural Reason, and of the other not? Or can any one, who admits of Divine Revelation in the case, doubt of one of them more than the other? Or think this Proposition less credible, The Bodies of Men, after the Resurrection, shall live for ever; than this, That the Souls of Men shall, after the Resurrection, live for ever? For that he must do, if he thinks either of them is less credible than the other. If this be so, Reason is to be consulted, how far God is to be believ'd, and the Credit of Divine Testimony must receive its force from

from the Evidence of Reason; which is evidently to take away the Credibility of Divine Revelation, in all supernatural Truths wherein the Evidence of Reason fails. And how much such a Principle as this tends to the Support of the Doctrine of the Trinity, or the promoting the Christian Religion, I shall leave it to your Lordship to consider. This I think I may be confident in, that few Christians have founded their Belief of the Immortality of the Soul upon any thing but Revelation: since if they had entertain'd it upon natural and philosophical Reasons, they could not have avoided the believing its Pre-existence before its Union to the Body, as well as its future Existence after its Separation from it. This is justify'd by that Observation of Dr. Cudworth, *B. 1. C. 1. §. 31.* where he affirms, *That there was never any of the Antients before Christianity, that held the Soul's future Permanency after Death, who did not likewise assert its Pre-existence.*

Answ. 1.
p. 65.

I am not so well read in *Hobbes* or *Spinoza*, as to be able to say what were their Opinions in this matter. But possibly there be those, who will think your Lordship's Authority of more use to them in the case than those justly decry'd Names; and be glad to find your Lordship a Patron of the *Oracles of Reason*, so little to the advantage of the *Oracles of Divine Revelation*. This at least, I think, may be subjoin'd to the words at the bottom of the next Page, *That those who have gone about to lessen the Credibility of the Articles of Faith, which evidently they do, who say they are less credible, because they cannot be made out demonstratively by natural Reason; have not been thought to secure several of the Articles of the Christian Faith: especially those of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Resurrection of the Body, which are those upon the account of which I am brought by your Lordship into this Dispute.*

Answ. 1.
p. 55.

I shall not trouble the Reader with your Lordship's Endeavours in the following words, to prove, *That if the Soul be not an immaterial Substance, it can be nothing but Life; your very first words visibly confuting all that you alledg to that purpose. They are, If the Soul be a material Substance, it is really nothing but Life; which is to say, That if the Soul be really a Substance, it is not really a Substance, but really nothing else but an Affection of a Substance: for the Life, whether of a material or immaterial Substance, is not the Substance it self, but an Affection of it.*

Answ. 1.
p. 57.

2. You say, *Altho' we think the Separate State of the Soul after Death, is sufficiently reveal'd in the Scripture; yet it creates a great difficulty in understanding it, if the Soul be nothing but Life, or a material Substance which must be dissolv'd when Life is ended. For if the Soul be a material Substance, it must be made up, as others are, of the Cohesion of solid and separate Parts, how minute and invisible soever they be. And what is it which should keep them together, when Life is gone? So that it is no easy matter to give an account, how the Soul should be capable of Immortality, unless it be an immaterial Substance; and then we know the Solution and Texture of Bodies cannot reach the Soul, being of a different nature.*

Let it be as hard a matter as it will, to give an account what it is that should keep the Parts of a material Soul together, after it is separated from the Body; yet it will be always as easy to give an account of it, as to give an account what it is which shall keep together a material and immaterial Substance: And yet the difficulty that there is to give an account of that, I hope does not, with your Lordship, weaken the Credibility of the inseparable Union of Soul and Body to Eternity: And I persuade my self, that the Men of Sense, to whom your Lordship appeals in the case, do not find their Belief of this fundamental Point much weaken'd by that difficulty. I thought heretofore (and by your Lordship's permission would think so still) that the Union of Parts of Matter one with another, is as much in the hands of God, as the Union of a material and immaterial Substance; and that it does not take off very much, or at all, from the Evidence of Immortality, which depends on that Union, that it is no easy matter to give an account what it is that should keep them together: tho' its depending wholly upon the Gift and Good pleasure of God, where the manner creates great difficulty in the Understanding, and our Reason cannot discover in the Nature of things how it is, be that which your Lordship so positively says, lessens the Credibility of the Fundamental Articles of the Resurrection and Immortality.

But,

But, my Lord, to remove this Objection a little, and to shew, of how small force it is even with your self; give me leave to presume, That your Lordship as firmly believes the Immortality of the Body after the Resurrection, as any other Article of Faith: If so, then it being *no easy matter to give an account what it is that shall keep together the Parts of a material Soul*, to one that believes it is material, can no more *weaken the Credibility of its Immortality*, than the like difficulty *weakens the Credibility of the Immortality of the Body*. For when your Lordship shall find it *an easy matter to give an account, what it is besides the Good-pleasure of God, which shall keep together the Parts of our material Bodies to Eternity, or even Soul and Body*; I doubt not but any one, who shall think the Soul material, will also find it *as easy to give an account, what it is that shall keep those Parts of Matter also together to Eternity*.

Were it not that the Warmth of Controversy is apt to make Men so far forget, as to take up those Principles themselves (when they will serve their turn) which they have highly condemn'd in others, I should wonder to find your Lordship to argue, That because it is a difficulty to *understand what shall keep together the minute Parts of a material Soul, when Life is gone*; and because it is not *an easy matter to give an account how the Soul should be capable of Immortality, unless it be an immaterial Substance*: therefore it is not so credible, as if it were *easy to give an account*, by natural Reason, how it could be. For to this it is, that all this your Discourse tends, as is evident by what is already set down out of Page 55. and will be more fully made out by what your Lordship says in other places, tho' there needs no such Proofs, since it would all be nothing against me in any other sense.

I thought your Lordship had in other places asserted, and insisted on this Truth, That no part of Divine Revelation was the less to be believ'd, because the thing it self *created great difficulty in the Understanding*, and the manner of it was hard to be explain'd, and *it was no easy matter to give an account how it was*. This, as I take it, your Lordship condemn'd in others, as a very unreasonable Principle, and such as would subvert all the Articles of the Christian Religion that were mere matters of Faith, as I think it will: And is it possible, that you should make use of it here your self, against the Article of *Life and Immortality*, that Christ hath brought to light thro' the Gospel; and neither was, nor could be made out by natural Reason or Revelation? But you will say, you speak only of the Soul; and your words are, That *it is no easy matter to give an account how the Soul should be capable of Immortality, unless it be an immaterial Substance*. I grant it; but crave leave to say, That there is not any one of those Difficulties that are, or can be rais'd, about the manner *how* a material Soul can be immortal, which do not as well reach the Immortality of the Body.

But if it were not so, I am sure this Principle of your Lordship's would reach other Articles of Faith, wherein our natural Reason finds it not so easy to give an account *how* those Mysteries are; and which therefore, according to your Principles, must be less credible than other Articles, that *create less difficulty to the Understanding*. For your Lordship says, That *you appeal to any Man of Sense, whether to a Man who thought by his Principles he could from natural Grounds demonstrate the Immortality of the Soul, the finding the Uncertainty of those Principles he went upon in point of Reason, i. e. the finding he could not certainly prove it by natural Reason, doth not weaken the Credibility of that fundamental Article, when it is consider'd purely as a Matter of Faith*. Which in effect, I humbly conceive, amounts to this; That a Proposition divinely reveal'd, that cannot be prov'd by natural Reason, is less credible than one that can: which seems to me to come very little short of this, with due Reverence be it spoken, That God is less to be believ'd when he affirms Proposition a that cannot be prov'd by natural Reason, than when he proposes what can be prov'd by it. The direct contrary to which, is my Opinion; tho' you endeavour to make it good by these following words: *If the Evidence of Faith falls so much short of that of Reason, it must needs have less effect upon Mens Minds, when the Subserviency of Reason is taken away; as it must be, when the Grounds of Certainty by Reason are vanish'd. Is it at all probable, that he who finds his Reason deceive him in such fundamental Points, should have his Faith stand firm and unmovable on the account of Revelation?* Than which, I think, there are hardly plainer words to be found out,

Ans. 2. p. 28.

Ans. 2. p. 29.

out, to declare, that the Credibility of God's Testimony depends on the natural Evidence or Probability of the things we receive from Revelation, and rises and falls with it; and that the Truths of God, or the Articles of mere Faith, lose so much of their *Credibility*, as they want Proof from Reason: which if true, Revelation may come to have no *Credibility* at all. For if in this present case, the Credibility of this Proposition, The Souls of Men shall live for ever, reveal'd in the Scripture, be lessen'd by confessing it cannot be demonstratively prov'd from Reason, tho' it be asserted to be most highly probable; must not, by the same Rule, its Credibility dwindle away to nothing, if natural Reason should not be able to make it out to be so much as probable, or should place the Probability from natural Principles on the other side? For if mere want of Demonstration lessens the Credibility of any Proposition divinely reveal'd, must not want of Probability, or contrary Probability from natural Reason, quite take away its *Credibility*? Here at last it must end, if in any one case the Veracity of God, and the Credibility of the Truths we receive from him by Revelation, be subjected to the Verdicts of human Reason, and be allow'd to receive any accession or diminution from other Proofs, or want of other Proofs of its Certainty or Probability.

If this be your Lordship's way to promote Religion, or defend its Articles, I know not what Argument the greatest Enemies of it could use, more effectual for the Subversion of those you have undertaken to defend; this being to resolve all Revelation perfectly and purely into natural Reason, to bound its *Credibility* by that, and leave no room for Faith in other things, than what can be accounted for by natural Reason without Revelation.

Answ. 1.
p. 48—54.
B. 2. C. 23.

Your Lordship insists much upon it, as if I had contradicted what I had said in my *Essay*, by saying, That upon my Principles it cannot be demonstratively prov'd, that it is an immaterial Substance in us that thinks, however probable it be. He that will be at the pains to read that Chapter of mine, and consider it, will find, that my business there was to shew, that it was no harder to conceive an immaterial than a material Substance; and that from the *Ideas* of Thought, and a Power of moving of Matter, which we experienc'd in our selves (*Ideas* originally not belonging to Matter as Matter) there was no more difficulty to conclude there was an immaterial Substance in us, than that we had material Parts. These *Ideas* of Thinking, and Power of moving of Matter, I in another place shew'd, did demonstratively lead us to the certain knowledge of the Existence of an immaterial thinking Being, in whom we have the *Idea* of Spirit in the strictest sense; in which sense I also apply'd it to the Soul, in that 23d Chapter of my *Essay*: the easily conceivable Possibility, nay, great Probability, that that thinking Substance in us is immaterial, giving me sufficient Ground for it. In which sense, I shall think I may safely attribute it to the thinking Substance in us, till your Lordship shall have better prov'd from my words, that it is impossible it should be immaterial. For I only say, That it is possible, *i. e.* involves no Contradiction, That God the omnipotent immaterial Spirit should, if he pleases, give to some parcels of Matter, dispos'd as he thinks fit, a Power of Thinking and Moving: which parcels of Matter so endu'd with a Power of Thinking and Motion, might properly be call'd Spirits, in contradistinction to unthinking Matter. In all which, I presume, there is no manner of Contradiction.

Answ. 1.
p. 58—60.

I justify'd my use of the word *Spirit* in that sense, from the Authorities of Cicero and Virgil applying the Latin word *Spiritus*, from whence *Spirit* is deriv'd, to a Soul as a thinking thing, without excluding Materiality out of it. To which your Lordship replies, That Cicero, in his *Tusculan Questions*, supposes the Soul not to be a finer sort of Body, but of a different nature from the Body.— That he calls the Body the Prison of the Soul.— And says, That a wise Man's business is to draw off his Soul from his Body. And then your Lordship concludes, as is usual, with a Question, Is it possible now to think so great a Man look'd on the Soul but as a Modification of the Body, which must be at an end with Life? Answ. No; it is impossible that a Man of so good Sense as Tully, when he uses the word *Corpus* or *Body* for the gross and visible parts of a Man, which he acknowledges to be mortal; should look on the Soul to be a Modification of that Body, in a Discourse wherein he was endeavouring to persuade another, that it was immortal.

tal. It is to be acknowledg'd that truly great Men, such as he was, are not wont so manifestly to contradict themselves. He had therefore no thought concerning the *Modification of the Body* of Man in the case, he was not such a Trifler as to examine, whether the *Modification of the Body* of a Man was immortal, when that *Body* it self was mortal: And therefore that which he reports as *Dicæarchus's* Opinion, he dismisses in the beginning without any more ado, c. 11. But *Cicero's* was a direct, plain and sensible Enquiry, viz. What the Soul was; to see whether from thence he could discover its Immortality. But in all that Discourse in his first Book of *Tusculan Questions*, where he lays out so much of his Reading and Reason, there is not one syllable shewing the least thought, that the Soul was an immaterial Substance; but many things directly to the contrary.

Indeed (1) he shuts out the *Body*, taken in the sense he uses *Corpus* all along, Chap. 19, 22, for the sensible organical parts of a Man, and is positive that is not the Soul: 30, 31, &c. And *Body* in this sense, taken for the Human Body, he calls the *Prison of the Soul*; and says a wise man, instanceing in *Socrates* and *Cato*, is glad of a fair opportunity to get out of it. But he nowhere says any such thing of Matter: He calls not Matter in general the *Prison of the Soul*, nor talks a word of being separate from it. *So speaks Ennius; Terra corpus est, at mens ignis est.*

(2.) He concludes, That the Soul is not like other things here below, made up of a Composition of the Elements, c. 27.

(3.) He excludes the two gross Elements, Earth and Water, from being the Soul c. 26.

So far he is clear and positive: but beyond this he is uncertain; beyond this he could not get. For in some places he speaks doubtfully, whether the Soul be not Air or Fire: *Anima sit animus ignisve nescio*, c. 25. And therefore he agrees with *Panætius*, that, if it be at all elementary, it is, as he calls it, *inflammata Anima*, inflamed Air; and for this he gives several Reasons, c. 18, 19. And tho' he thinks it to be of a peculiar nature of its own, yet he is so far from thinking it immaterial, that he says, c. 19. That the admitting it to be of an aerial or igneous nature, would not be inconsistent with any thing he had said.

That which he seems most to incline to, is, That the Soul was not at all elementary, but was of the same Substance with the Heavens: which *Aristotle*, to distinguish from the four Elements and the changeable Bodies here below, which he suppos'd made up of them, call'd *Quanta Essentia*, That this was *Tully's* Opinion, is plain from these words: *Ergo, Animus qui ut ego dico, divinus est, ut Euripides audet dicere Deus; & quidem si Deus, aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis. Nam ut illa natura cælestis & terra vacat & humore; sic utriusque harum rerum humanus animus est expers. Sin autem est quinta quædam natura ab Aristotele inducta; primum hæc & deorum est & animorum. Hanc nos sententiam secuti, his ipsis verbis in consolatione hæc expressimus*; c. 26. And then he goes on, c. 27. to repeat those his own words, which your Lordship has quoted out of him, wherein he had affirm'd, in his *Treatise de Consolatione*, the Soul not to have its Original from the Earth, or to be mix'd or made of any thing earthly; but had said, *Singularis est igitur quædam natura & vis animi sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis*. Whereby, he tells us, he meant nothing but *Aristotle's Quanta Essentia*; which being unmix'd, being that of which the Gods and Souls consisted, he calls it *Divinum*, *Cæleste*, and concludes it eternal; it being as he speaks, *Sejuncta ab omni mortali concretionem*. From which it is clear, That in all his Enquiry about the Substance of the Soul, his Thoughts went not beyond the four Elements, or *Aristotle's Quanta Essentia*, to look for it. In all which there is nothing of Immateriality, but quite the contrary.

He was willing to believe (as good and wise Men have always been) that the Soul was immortal; but for that, 'tis plain, he never thought of its Immateriality, but as the Eastern People do, who believe the Soul to be immortal, but have nevertheless no Thought, no Conception of its Immateriality. It is remarkable, what a very considerable and judicious Author says in the Case: *No Opinion*, says he, *has been so universally receiv'd, as that of the Immortality of the Soul; but its Immateriality is a Truth, the Knowledge whereof has not spread so far.* *Loubere du Royaume de Siam, T. 1. c. 19. §. 4.* And indeed it is extremely difficult, to let into the Mind of a Siamite, the Idea of a pure Spirit. This the Missionaries, who have been longest among them, are positive in: All the Pagans of the East do truly believe, That there remains something of a

Man after his Death, which subsists independently and separately from his Body. But they give Extension and Figure to that which remains, and attribute to it all the same Members, all the same Substances both solid and liquid, which our Bodies are compos'd of. They only suppose that the Souls are of a matter subtle enough to escape being seen or handled.—Such were the Shades and the Manes of the Greeks and the Romans. And 'tis by these Figures of the Souls, answerable to those of the Bodies, that Virgil suppos'd Æneas knew Palinurus, Dido and Anchises, in the other World.

This Gentleman was not a Man that travel'd into those Parts for his Pleasure, and to have the Opportunity to tell strange Stories, collected by Chance, when he return'd; but one chosen on purpose (and he seems well chosen for the purpose) to enquire into the Singularities of Siam. And he has so well acquitted himself of the Commission, which his Epistle Dedicatory tells us he had, to inform himself exactly of what was most remarkable there; that had we but such an Account of other Countries of the East, as he has given us of this Kingdom, which he was an Envoy to, we should be much better acquainted than we are, with the Manners, Notions and Religions of that part of the World, inhabited by civiliz'd Nations, who want neither good Sense nor Acuteness of Reason, tho' not cast into the Mould of the Logick and Philosophy of our Schools.

But to return to Cicero: 'Tis plain, that in his Enquiries about the Soul, his Thoughts went not at all beyond Matter. This the Expressions, that drop from him in several Places of this Book, evidently shew: For example, That the Souls of excellent Men and Women ascended into Heaven; of others, that they remain'd here on Earth, c. 12. That the Soul is hot, and warms the Body: That at its leaving the Body, it penetrates and divides, and breaks thro' our thick, cloudy, moist Air: That it stops in the Region of Fire, and ascends no farther, the Equality of Warmth and Weight making that its proper place, where it is nourish'd and sustain'd with the same things, wherewith the Stars are nourish'd and sustain'd; and that by the convenience of its Neighbourhood, it shall there have a clearer View and fuller Knowledg of the heavenly Bodies, c. 19. That the Soul also from this height shall have a pleasant and fairer Prospect of the Globe of the Earth, the Disposition of whole Parts will then lie before it in one View, c. 20. That it is hard to determine what Conformation, Size and Place the Soul has in the Body: That it is too subtle to be seen: That it is in the human Body as in a House, or a Vessel, or a Receptacle, c. 22. All which are Expressions that sufficiently evidence, that he who used them had not in his Mind separated Materiality from the Idea of the Soul.

It may perhaps be reply'd, That a great part of this, which we find in chap. 19. is said upon the Principles of those who would have the Soul to be *Anima Inflammata, inflamed Air*. I grant it: But it is also to be observ'd, That in this 19th, and the two following Chapters, he does not only not deny, but even admits, that so material a thing as inflam'd Air may think.

The Truth of the Case in short is this: Cicero was willing to believe the Soul immortal, but when he sought in the Nature of the Soul it self something to establish this his Belief into a Certainty of it, he found himself at a loss. He confess'd he knew not what the Soul was; but the not knowing what it was, he argues c. 2. was no Reason to conclude it was not. And thereupon he proceeds to the Repetition of what he had said in his 6th Book *de Repub.* concerning the Soul. The Argument, which borrow'd from Plato he there makes use of, if it have any force in it, not only proves the Soul to be immortal, but more than, I think, your Lordship will allow to be true: For it proves it to be eternal, and without beginning, as well as without end; *Neque nata certe est, & aeterna est*, says he.

Indeed from the Faculties of the Soul he concludes right, That it is of Divine Original: But as to the Substance of the Soul, he at the end of this Discourse concerning its Faculties, c. 25. as well as at the beginning of it, c. 22. is not ashamed to own his Ignorance of what it is; *Anima sit animus, ignisve, nescio; nec me pudet ut istos, fateri nescire quod nesciam. Illud, si ulla alia de re obscura affirmare possum, sive anima, sive ignis sit animus, cum jurarem esse divinum*, c. 25. So that all the Certainty he could attain to about the Soul, was, that he was confident

confident there was something divine in it; *i. e.* there were Faculties in the Soul that could not result from the Nature of Matter, but must have their Original from a Divine Power: but yet those Qualities, as Divine as they were, he acknowledged might be plac'd in Breath or Fire, which I think your Lordship will not deny to be material Substances. So that all those Divine Qualities, which he so much and so justly extols in the Soul, led him not, as appears, so much as to any the least Thought of Immateriality. This is Demonstration, that he built them not upon an Exclusion of Materiality out of the Soul; for he avowedly professes, he does not know but Breath or Fire might be this thinking thing in us: And in all his Considerations about the Substance of the Soul it self, he stuck in *Air and Fire*, or *Aristotle's Quinta Essentia*; for beyond those, 'tis evident, he went not.

But with all his Proofs out of *Plato*, to whose Authority he defers so much, with all the Arguments his vast Reading and great Parts could furnish him with for the Immortality of the Soul, he was so little satisfy'd, so far from being certain, so far from any Thought that he had, or could prove it, that he over and over again professes his Ignorance and Doubt of it. In the beginning he enumerates the several Opinions of the Philosophers, which he had well study'd about it: And then, full of Uncertainty, says, *Harum Sententiarum quæ vera sit, Deus aliquis viderit, quæ veri similima magna quaestio, c. 11.* And towards the latter end having gone them all over again, and one after another examin'd them, he professes himself still at a loss, not knowing on which to pitch, not what to determine: *Mentis acies*, says he, *seipsam intuens nonnunquam hebescit, ob eamque causam contemplandi diligentiam omittimus. Itaque dubitans, circumspiciens, hesitans, multa adversa revertens tanquam in rate in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio, c. 30.* And to conclude this Argument, when the Person he introduces as discoursing with him, tells him he is resolv'd to keep firm to the Belief of Immortality; *Tully* answers, *c. 82. Laudo id quidem, etsi nihil animis oportet credere; movemur enim sæpe aliquo acute concluso, labamur, mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his est enim aliqua obscuritas.*

So unmovable is that Truth deliver'd by the Spirit of Truth, that tho' the Light of Nature gave some obscure Glimmering, some uncertain Hopes of a future State; yet human Reason could attain to no Clearness, no Certainty about it, but that it was JESUS CHRIST alone who had brought Life and Immortality to Light thro' the Gospel. Tho' we are now told, That to own the Inability of Natural Reason to bring Immortality to Light, or, which passes for the same, to own Principles upon which the Immateriality of the Soul (and, as 'tis urg'd, consequently its Immortality) cannot be demonstratively prov'd; does lessen the Belief of this Article of Revelation, which JESUS CHRIST alone has brought to Light, and which consequently the Scripture assures us is establish'd and made certain only by Revelation. This would not perhaps have seem'd strange from those who are justly complain'd of, for slighting the Revelation of the Gospel, and therefore would not be much regarded, if they should contradict so plain a Text of Scripture in favour of their all-sufficient Reason: But what use the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity, in an Age so much suspected by your Lordship, may make of what comes from one of your great Authority and Learning, may deserve your Consideration.

And thus, my Lord, I hope I have satisfy'd you concerning *Cicero's* Opinion about the Soul, in his first Book of *Tusculan Questions*; which tho' I easily believe, as your Lordship says, *you are no Stranger to*, yet I humbly conceive you have not shewn (and upon a careful Perusal of that Treatise again, I think I may boldly say you cannot shew) one word in it, that expresses any thing like a Notion in *Tully* of the Soul's Immateriality, or its being an immaterial Substance.

From what you bring out of *Virgil*, your Lordship concludes, *That he no more than Cicero does me any Kindness in this matter, being both Assertors of the Soul's Immortality.* My Lord, were not the Question of the Soul's Immateriality, according to Custom, chang'd here into that of its Immortality, which I am no less an Assertor of than either of them, *Cicero* and *Virgil*, do me all the kindness I desir'd of them in this matter; and that was to shew, that they attributed

Æneid. 4.
385.

the word *Spiritus* to the Soul of Man, without any thought of it's Immateriality : and this the Verses you your self bring out of *Virgil*,

*Et cum frigida mors animæ seduxerit artus
Omnibus umbra locis adero, dabis improbe pœnas ;*

confirm, as well as those I quoted out of his 6th Book : and for this Monsieur de la Loubere shall be my Witness, in the words above set down out of him ; where he shews, that there be those amongst the Heathens of our days, as well as *Virgil* and others amongst the antient *Greeks* and *Romans*, who thought the Souls or Ghosts of Men departed did not die with the Body, without thinking them to be perfectly immaterial ; the latter being much more incomprehensible to them than the former. And what *Virgil's* Notion of the Soul is, and that *Corpus*, when put in Contra-distinction to the Soul, signifies nothing but the gross Tenement of Flesh and Bones, is evident from this Verse of his *Æneid.* 6. where he calls the Souls which yet were visible,

— *Tennes sine corpore vita.*

Ans. 1.
p. 64, 65.

Your Lordship's Answer concerning what is said, *Eccles.* 13. turns wholly upon *Solomon's* taking the Soul to be immortal, which was not what I question'd : All that I quoted that place for, was to shew, that *Spirit* in *English* might properly be apply'd to the Soul, without any Notion of its Immateriality, as was by *Solomon* ; which whether he thought the Souls of Men to be immaterial, does little appear in that Passage, where he speaks of the Souls of Men and Beasts together, as he does. But farther, what I contended for, is evident from that place, in that the word *Spirit* is there apply'd, by our Translators, to the Souls of Beasts, which your Lordship, I think, does not rank amongst the immaterial, and consequently immortal *Spirits*, tho' they have Sense and Spontaneous Motion.

Ans. 1. p. 65.

But you say, *If the Soul be not of it self a free-thinking Substance, you do not see what Foundation there is in Nature for a Day of Judgment.* Ans. Tho' the *Heathen* World did not of old, nor do to this day, see a Foundation in Nature for a Day of Judgment ; yet in Revelation, if that will satisfy your Lordship, every one may see a Foundation for a Day of Judgment, because God has positively declar'd it ; tho' God has not by that Revelation taught us, what the Substance of the Soul is ; nor has any where said, that the Soul of it self is a free Agent. Whatsoever any created Substance is, it is not of it self, but is by the good pleasure of its Creator : Whatever Degrees of Perfection it has, it has from the bountiful Hand of its Maker. For it is true, in a natural as well as a spiritual Sense, what *St. Paul* says, *Not that we are sufficient of our selves to think any thing as of our selves, but our Sufficiency is of God.*

2 Cor. 3. 5.

But your Lordship, as I guess by your following words, would argue, That a material Substance cannot be a free Agent ; whereby I suppose you only mean, that you cannot see or conceive how a solid Substance should begin, stop, or change its own Motion. To which give me leave to answer, That when you can make it conceivable, how any created, finite, dependent Substance, can move it self, or alter or stop its own Motion, which it must, to be a free Agent ; I suppose you will find it no harder for God to bestow this Power on a solid, than an unsolid created Substance. *Tully*, in the place above quoted, could not conceive this Power to be in any thing, but what was from Eternity ; *Cum pateat igitur æternum id esse quod seipsum moveat, quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget ?* But tho' you cannot see how any created Substance, solid or not solid, can be a free Agent (pardon me, my Lord, if I put in both, till your Lordship please to explain it of either, and shew the manner how either of them can, of it self, move it self or any thing else) yet I do not think you will so far deny Men to be free Agents, from the difficulty there is to see how they are free Agents, as to doubt whether there be Foundation enough for a Day of Judgment.

Tusculan.
Quest. 1. 1.
c. 23.

It is not for me to judg how far your Lordship's Speculations reach : But finding in my self nothing to be truer than what the wise *Solomon* tells me ; As

thou

thou knowest not what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the Bones do grow in the Womb Eccl. 11. 5. of her that is with Child ; even so thou knowest not the Works of God who maketh all things : I gratefully receive and rejoice in the Light of Revelation, which sets me at rest in many things ; the manner whereof my poor Reason can by no means make out to me : Omnipotency, I know, can do any thing that contains in it no Contradiction ; so that I readily believe whatever God has declar'd, tho' my Reason find Difficulties in it which it cannot master. As in the present Case, God having reveal'd that there shall be a Day of Judgment, I think that Foundation enough, to conclude Men are free enough to be made answerable for their Actions, and to receive according to what they have done ; tho' how Man is a free Agent, surpasses my Explication or Comprehension.

In answer to the place I brought out of St. Luke, your Lordship asks, *Whether from these words of our Saviour, it follows that a Spirit is only an Appearance?* Chap. 24. ver. 39. I answer, No ; nor do I know who drew such an Inference from them : But it follows, that in Apparitions there is something that appears, and that that which appears is not wholly immaterial ; and yet this was properly call'd πνεῦμα, and was often look'd upon by those who call'd it πνεῦμα in Greek, and now call it Spirit in English, to be the Ghost or Soul of one departed : which, I humbly conceive, justifies my use of the word Spirit, for a thinking voluntary Agent, whether material or immaterial. Answ. 1. p. 66.

Your Lordship says, *That I grant, that it cannot, upon these Principles, be demonstrated, that the spiritual Substance in us is immaterial : From whence you conclude, That then my Grounds of Certainty from Ideas are plainly given up.* This being a way of arguing that you often make use of, I have often had occasion to consider it, and cannot after all see the force of this Argument. I acknowledge, that this or that Proposition cannot upon my Principles be demonstrated ; ergo, I grant this Proposition to be false, That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas : For that is my Ground of Certainty, and till that be given up, my Grounds of Certainty are not given up. Answ. 1. p. 67.

You farther tell me, *That I say, the Soul's Immateriality may be prov'd probable to the highest degree ; to which your Lordship replies, That is not the Point : For it is not Probability, but Certainty, that you are promis'd in this way of Ideas, and that the Foundation of our Knowledge and real Certainty lies in them ; and is it dwindled into a Probability at last?* This is also what your Lordship has been pleas'd to object to me more than once, that I promis'd Certainty. I would be glad to know in what words this Promise is made, and where it stands, for I love to be a Man of my Word. I have indeed told wherein I think Certainty, real Certainty does consist, as far as any one attains it ; and I do not yet, from any thing your Lordship has said against it, find any reason to change my Opinion therein : But I do not remember that I promis'd Certainty in this Question, concerning the Soul's Immateriality, or in any of those Propositions, wherein you, thinking I come short of Certainty, infer from thence, that my way of Certainty by Ideas is given up. And I am so far from promising Certainty in all things, that I am accus'd by your Lordship of Scepticism, for setting too narrow Bounds to our Knowledge and Certainty. Why therefore your Lordship asks me, *And is the Certainty [of the Soul's being immaterial] dwindled into a Probability at last?* will be hard to see a Reason for, till you can shew that I promis'd to demonstrate that it is immaterial ; or that others, upon their Principles without Ideas, being able to demonstrate it immaterial, it comes to dwindle into bare Probability, upon my Principles by Ideas. Ibid.

One thing more I am oblig'd to take notice of. I had said, " That the Belief of God being the Foundation of all Religion and genuine Morality, I thought no Arguments, that are made use of to work the Persuasion of a God into Mens Minds, should be invalidated, which, I grant, is of ill Consequence." To which words of mine I find, according to your particular Favour to me, this Reply ; *That here I must give your Lordship leave to ask me, what I think of the universal Consent of Mankind, as to the Being of God ? Hath not this been made use of as an Argument, not only by Christians, but by the wisest and greatest Men among the Heathens ? And what then would I think of one who should go about to invalidate this Argument ? And that by proving, that it hath been discover'd* Lett. 1. p. 113. Answ. 1. p. 89.

cover'd in these latter Ages by Navigation, that there are whole Nations at the Bay of Soldania, in Brasil, in the Caribbee-Islands and Paraquaria, among whom there was found no Notion of a God: And even the Author of the Essay of Human Understanding hath done this.

To this your Question, my Lord, I answer, That I think that the universal Consent of Mankind, as to the Being of a God, amounts to thus much, that the vastly greater Majority of Mankind, have, in all Ages of the World, actually believ'd a God; that the Majority of the remaining part have not actually disbeliev'd it, and consequently those who have actually oppos'd the Belief of a God, have truly been very few. So that comparing those that have actually disbeliev'd with those who have actually believ'd a God, their Number is so inconsiderable, that in respect of this incomparably greater Majority of those who have own'd the Belief of a God, it may be said to be the universal Consent of Mankind.

This is all the *universal Consent* which Truth of Matter of Fact will allow, and therefore all that can be made use of to prove a God. But if any one would extend it farther, and speak deceitfully for God; if this Universality should be urg'd in a strict Sense, not for much the Majority, but for a general *Consent* of every one, even to a Man in all Ages and Countries: this would make it either no Argument, or a perfectly useless and unnecessary one. For if any one deny a God, such a perfect Universality of Consent is destroy'd; and if no body does deny a God, what need of Arguments to convince Atheists?

I would crave leave to ask your Lordship, Were there ever in the World any Atheist or no? If there were not, what need is there of raising a Question about the Being of a God, when no body questions it? What need of provisional Arguments against a Fault, from which Mankind are so wholly free; and which, by an universal Consent, they may be presum'd to be secure from? If you say (as I doubt not but you will) that there have been Atheists in the World, then your Lordship's *universal Consent* reduces it self to only a great Majority; and then make that Majority as great as you will, what I have said in the place quoted by your Lordship, leaves it in its full force, and I have not said one word that does in the least *invalidate this Argument* for a God. The Argument I was upon there, was to shew, That the *Idea* of God was not innate; and to my purpose it was sufficient, if there were but a less Number found in the World, who had no *Idea* of God, than your Lordship will allow there have been of profess'd Atheists: for whatsoever is innate, must be universal in the strictest Sense; one Exception is a sufficient Proof against it. So that all that I said, and which was quite to another purpose, did not at all tend, nor can be made use of to *invalidate the Argument* for a Deity, grounded on such an *universal Consent* as your Lordship, and all that build on it must own, which is only a very disproportion'd Majority: Such an *universal Consent* my Argument there neither affirms nor requires to be less, than you will be pleas'd to allow it. Your Lordship therefore might, without any prejudice to those Declarations of Good-will and Favour you have for the Author of the Essay of Human Understanding, have spar'd the mentioning his quoting Authors that are in Print, for Matters of Fact, to quite another purpose, as going about to *invalidate the Argument* for a Deity from the *universal Consent* of Mankind; since he leaves that *universal Consent* as entire, and as large as you your self do, or can own, or suppose it. But here I have no reason to be sorry that your Lordship has given me this occasion for the Vindication of this Passage of my Book, if there should be any one besides your Lordship who should so far mistake it, as to think it in the least *invalidates the Argument* for a God, from the *universal Consent* of Mankind.

But because you question the Credibility of those Authors I have quoted, *Answ. I. p. 89.* which, you say in the next Paragraph, were very ill chosen; I will crave leave to say, That he whom I rely'd on for his Testimony concerning the *Hotentots* of Soldania, was no less a Man than an Ambassador from the King of England to the Great Mogul: Of whose Relation, Monsieur Thevenot, no ill Judg in the Case, had so great an Esteem, that he was at the pains to translate it into French, and publish it in his (which is counted no unjudicious) Collection of Travels. But to intercede with your Lordship for a little more favourable allowance

lowance of Credit to Sir Thomas Roe's Relation, Coore, an Inhabitant of the Country who could speak *English*, assur'd Mr. Terry, That they of *Soldania* had no God. But if he too have the ill luck to find no Credit with you, I hope you will be a little more favourable to a Divine of the Church of *England* now living, and admit of his Testimony in confirmation of Sir Tho. Roe's. This worthy Gentleman, in the Relation of his Voyage to *Surat*, printed but two years since, speaking of the same People, has these words; *They are sunk even below Idolatry, are destitute of both Priest and Temple, and saving a little Shew of Rejoicing, which is made at the full and new Moon, have lost all kind of religious Devotion. Nature has so richly provided for their Convenience in this Life, that they have drown'd all Sense of the God of it, and are grown quite careless of the next.* Terry's Voyage, p. 17, & 23.

But to provide against the clearest Evidence of Atheism in these People, you say, *That the Account given of them makes them not fit to be a Standard for the Sense of Mankind.* This, I think, may pass for nothing, till some body be found, that makes them to be a Standard for the Sense of Mankind: All the use I made of them was to shew, That there were Men in the World that had no innate Idea of a God. But to keep something like an Argument going (for what will not that do?) you go near denying those *Casers* to be Men: what else do these words signify? *A People so strangely bereft of common Sense, that they can hardly be reckon'd among Mankind; as appears by the best Accounts of the Casers of Soldania, &c.* I hope if any of them were call'd *Peter, James* or *John*, it would be past scruple that they were Men; however *Courvee, Wewena, and Cousbeda*, and those others who had Names, that had no place in your Nomenclator, would hardly pass muster with your Lordship. Mr. Ovington p. 489.

My Lord, I should not mention this, but that what you your self say here may be a Motive to you to consider, That what you have laid such stress on, concerning the *general Nature of Man*, as a *real Being*, and the *Subject of Properties*, amounts to nothing for the distinguishing of *Species*; since you your self own that there may be *Individuals*, wherein there is a *common Nature with a particular Subsistence proper to each of them*: whereby you are so little able to know of which of the *Ranks or Sorts* they are, into which you say, *God has order'd Beings*, and which he *bath distinguish'd by essential Properties*, that you are in doubt whether they ought to be reckon'd among Mankind or no. Answ. r. p. 90.

Give me leave now to think, My Lord, that I have given an Answer to all that is any way material in either of the Letters you have honour'd me with. If there be any Argument which you think of weight, that you find omitted, upon the least Intimation from your Lordship where it is, I promise to consider it, and to endeavour to give you Satisfaction concerning it, either by owning my Conviction, or shewing what hinders it. This Respect I shall think due from me to your Lordship: Tho' I know better to employ the little time my Business and Health afford me, than to trouble my self with the little Cavillers, who may either be set on, or be forward (in hope to recommend themselves) to meddle in this Controversy.

Before I conclude, 'tis fit I take notice of the Obligation I have to you, for the Pains you have been at about my *Essay*, which I conclude could not have been any way so effectually recommended to the World, as by your manner of writing against it. And since your Lordship's sharp Sight, so carefully employ'd for its Correction, has, as I humbly conceive, found no Faults in it, which your Lordship's great Endeavours this way have made out to be really there; I hope I may presume it will pass the better in the World, and the Judgment of all considering Men, and make it for the future stand better even in your Lordship's Opinion. I beg your Lordship's Pardon for this long Trouble, and am,

My LORD,

Your Lordship's most Humble, and


Most Obedient Servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Oates, May 4.
1698.



John Lock



T H E
I N D E X
To the First VOLUME.

A.



BBOT of St. Martin, p. 207. §. 26.
Abstraction, p. 59. §. 9.
Puts a perfect Distance between Men and Brutes, 591. §. 10.
What, 186. §. 9.
Abstraction how, 62. §. 1.
Abstract Ideas, why made, 168. §. 6, 7, 8.
Terms cannot be affirm'd one of another, 217. §. 1.
Accident, 126. §. 2.
Actions, the best Evidence of Mens Principles, 14. §. 7.
But two sorts of Actions, 98. §. 4.
Unpleasant may be made pleasant, and how, 118. §. 69. 125. §. 11.
Cannot be the same in different places, 143. §. 2.
Consider'd as Modes, or as Moral, 158. §. 15.
Adequate Ideas, 166. §. 1, 2.
Ideas, we have not of any Species of Substances, 259. §. 26.
Affirmations are only in concrete, 217. §. 1.
Agreement and Disagreement of our Ideas fourfold, 243. §. 3. 262. §. 4, 5, 6, 7.
Algebra, 305. §. 15.
Alteration, 141. §. 2.
Analogy, useful in natural Philosophy, 313. §. 12.
Anger, 96. §. 12, 14.
Antipathy and Sympathy, whence, 178. §. 7.
Arguments of four sorts, 1. *Ad verendum*, 324. §. 19.
2. *Ad ignorantiam*, *ibid.* §. 20.
3. *Ad hominem*, *ibid.* 21.
4. *Ad judicium*, 325. §. 22. This alone right, *ibid.* §. 22.
Vol. I.

Arithmetick: *The Use of Cyphers in Arithmetick*, 256. §. 19.
Artificial things are most of them collective Ideas, 137. §. 3.
Why we are less liable to Confusion about artificial things, than about natural, 212. §. 40.
Have distinct Species, *ibid.* §. 41.
Assent to Maxims, 6. §. 10.
Upon hearing and understanding the Terms, 8. §. 17, 18.
A Mark of Self-Evidence, *ib.* §. 18.
Not of Innate, *ib.* §. 18. 9. §. 19, 20. 28. §. 19.
Is to Propositions, 307. §. 3.
Ought to be proportioned to the Proofs, 330. §. 1.
Association of Ideas, 176.
This Association how made, 177. §. 6.
Ill Effects of it, as to Antipathies, 178. §. 7, 8. p. 179. §. 15.
And this in Sects of Philosophy and Religion, 180. §. 18.
Its ill Influences as to intellectual Habits, 179. §. 17.
Assurance, 312. §. 6.
How it differs from Certainty, 470, 471.
Atheism in the World, 24. §. 8.
Atom, what, 143. §. 3.
Authority; relying on others Opinions, one great Cause of Error, 341. §. 17.
The Author did not this in writing his Essay, 541.

B.

BEINGS, but two sorts, 292. §. 9.
The eternal Being must be cogitative, *ibid.* §. 10.
Belief, what, 308. §. 3.

E e e e

To

The INDEX to

- To be without Reason, is against our Duty,* 325. §. 24.
- Best in our Opinion, not a Rule of God's Actions,* 25. §. 12.
- Blind Man if made to see, would not know which a Globe, which a Cube by his Sight, tho' he knew them by his Touch,* 53. §. 8.
- Blood, how it appears in a Microscope,* 129. §. 11.
- Brutes have no universal Ideas,* 59, 60. §. 10, 11.
- Abstract not,* 59. §. 10.
- Body. We have no more primary Ideas of Body than of Spirit,* 131. §. 16.
- The primary Ideas of Body,* 48. §. 17.
- The Extension or Cohesion of Body as hard to be understood, as the Thinking of Spirit,* 132, 133. §. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27.
- Moving of Body by Body, as hard to be conceiv'd as by Spirit,* 134. §. 28.
- Operates only by Impulse,* 47. §. 11.
- This further explain'd and rectify'd,* 561. *What,* 65. §. 11.
- The Author's Notion of his Body,* 2 Cor. 5. 10. p. 486. *and of his own Body,* 1 Cor. 15. 38. p. 490. *The meaning of the same Body,* p. 492. *Whether the word Body be a simple or complex Term,* p. 526. *This only a Controversy about the Sense of a Word,* p. 538.
- But, its several Significations,* 216. §. 5.
- C:
- C**apacity, p. 63. §. 3.
- Capacities, to know their Extent, useful,* 2. §. 4.
- To cure Scepticism and Idleness,* 3. §. 6.
- Are suited to our present State,* 2. §. 5.
- Cause,* 140. §. 1.
- And Effect,* *ibid.*
- Certainty depends on Intuition,* 246. §. 1.
- Wherein it consists,* 267. §. 18. 355, &c.
- Of Truth,* 267.
- To be had in very few general Propositions concerning Substances,* 275. §. 13.
- Where to be had,* 276. §. 16.
- Verbal,* 272. §. 8.
- Real,* *ibid.*
- Sensible Knowledg, the utmost Certainty we have of Existence,* 296. §. 2.
- The Author makes it not depend on clear and distinct Ideas,* 391, 392, &c.
- His Notion of it not dangerous,* 407, &c. 466. *How opposed by the Bishop of Worcester,* 445. *And vindicated by the Author,* 446. *By Ideas, by Sense, &c. not inconsistent,* 450, &c. *The Author's Notion of it not against the Mysteries of Faith,* 467. *How it differs from Assurance,* 312. §. 6. p. 470, &c. *It may flow from a Divine Testimony.* 474. *The Author's way of Certainty not different from that of Reason,* 514. *tho' it may not convince some,* 519. *Not prov'd different from that of the Antients,* 524.
- Changelings, whether Men or no,* 265. §. 13, 14.
- Clearness alone hinders Confusion of Ideas,* 58. §. 3.
- Clear and obscure Ideas,* 160. §. 2.
- Colours, Modes of Colours,* 92. §. 4.
- Comments upon Law, why infinite,* 220. §. 9.
- Complex Ideas how made,* 59. §. 6. p. 61. §. 1.
- In these the Mind is more than Passive,* 62. §. 2.
- Ideas reducible to Modes, Substances, and Relations,* *ibid.* §. 3.
- Comparing Ideas,* 58. §. 4.
- Herein Men excel Brutes,* *ibid.* §. 5.
- Compounding Ideas,* 59. §. 6.
- In this is a great difference between Men and Brutes,* *ibid.* §. 7.
- Compulsion,* 100. §. 13.
- Confidence.* 312. §. 7.
- Confusion of Ideas, wherein it consists,* 161. §. 5, 6, 7.
- Causes of Confusion in Ideas,* 161. §. 7, 8, 9. p. 163. §. 12.
- Of Ideas grounded on a Reference to Names,* 162. §. 10, 11, 12.
- Its Remedy,* 163. §. 12.
- Confused Ideas,* 161. §. 4.
- Conscience is our own Opinion of our own Actions,* 15. §. 8.
- Consciousness makes the same Person,* 146. §. 10. p. 149. §. 16.
- Consciousness, probably annex'd to the same individual immaterial Substance,* 151. §. 25.
- Necessary to Thinking,* 34. §. 10, 11. p. 37. §. 19.
- What,* *ibid.* §. 19.
- Contemplation,* 54. §. 1.
- Creation,* 141. §. 2.
- Not to be denied, because we cannot conceive the manner how,* 295. §. 19.
- D.
- D**eductions, the Author agrees with Aristotle in the way of making them, 522.

Defini-

the First VOLUME.

Definition, why the Genus is used in Definitions, 186. §. 10.
 Defining of Terms would cut off a great part of Disputes, 22. §. 15.
 Demonstration, 247. §. 3.
 Not so clear as intuitive Knowledge, 247. §. 4, 6, 7.
 Intuitive Knowledge necessary in each Step of a Demonstration, *ibid.* §. 7. p. 530, &c. Yet not always so plain, as that two and two make four, 531.
 Not limited to Quantity, 248. §. 9.
 Why that has been supposed, *ibid.* §. 10.
 Not to be expected in all Cases, 299. §. 10.
 What, 308. §. 1. p. 323. §. 15.
 Desire, 96 §. 6.
 Is a State of Uneasiness, 105. §. 31, 32.
 Is moved only by Happiness, 108. §. 41.
 How far, 109. §. 43.
 How to be raised, 110. §. 46.
 Misled by wrong Judgment, 115. §. 60.
 Dictionaries, how to be made, 241. §. 25.
 Discerning, 57. §. 1.
 The Foundation of some general Maxims, *ibid.*
 Discourse cannot be between two Men, who have different Names for the same Idea, or different Ideas for the same Name, 43. §. 5.
 Despair, 96. §. 11.
 Disposition, 124. §. 10.
 Disputing, The Art of Disputing prejudicial to Knowledge, 227, 228. §. 6, 7, 8, 9.
 Destroys the Use of Language, 228. §. 10. p. 229. §. 15.
 Disputes, whence, 70. §. 28.
 Multiplicity of Disputes, owing to the Abuse of Words, 232. §. 22.
 Are most about the Signification of Words, 236. §. 7.
 The way to lessen Disputes, 289. §. 13.
 Distance, 63. §. 3.
 Distinct Ideas, 161. §. 4.
 Divisibility of Matter incomprehensible, 135. §. 31.
 Dreaming, 94. §. 1.
 Seldom in some Men, 35. §. 14.
 Dreams for the most part irrational, 36. §. 16.
 In Dreams no Ideas but of Sensation or Reflection, *ibid.* §. 17.
 Duration, 70. §. 1, 2.
 Whence we get the Idea of Duration, 71. §. 3, 4, 5.
 Not from Motion, 73. §. 16.
 Its Measure, *ibid.* §. 17, 18.
 Any regular periodical Appearance, 74. §. 19, 20.
 None of its Measures known to be exact, *ib.* §. 21.

We only guess them equal by the Train of our Ideas, *ibid.* §. 21. p. 536.
 Minutes, Days, Years, &c. not necessary to Duration, 75. §. 23. Change of the Measures of Duration, change not the Notion of it, *ibid.* §. 23.
 The Measures of Duration, as the Revolutions of the Sun, may be applied to Duration before the Sun existed, *ib.* §. 25, 26, 29. Duration without beginning, 76. §. 27.
 How we measure Duration, *ibid.* §. 28, 29, 30.
 Recapitulation concerning our Ideas of Duration, Time, and Eternity, 77. §. 32.
 Duration and Expansion compar'd, 78.
 They mutually embrace each other, 82. §. 12.
 Consider'd as a Line, *ib.* §. 11.
 Duration not conceivable by us without Succession, *ibid.* §. 12.

E.

Education, partly Cause of Unreasonableness, 177. §. 3.
 Effect, 140. §. 1.
 Enthusiasm, 330.
 Describ'd, 331. §. 6, 7.
 Its Rise, *ibid.* §. 5.
 Ground of Persuasion must be examin'd, and how, 332. §. 10.
 Firmness of it no sufficient Proof, 333. §. 12, 13.
 Enthusiasm fails of the Evidence it pretends to, 332. §. 11.
 Envy, 96. §. 13, 14.
 Error, what, 335. §. 1.
 Causes of Error, *ibid.*
 1. Want of Proofs, 335. §. 2.
 2. Want of Skill to use them, 336. §. 5.
 3. Want of Will to use them, *ibid.* §. 6.
 4. Wrong Measures of Probability, 337. §. 7.
 Fewer Men assent to Errors than is suppos'd, 341. §. 18.
 Essence, Real and Nominal, 188. §. 15. p. 104. §. 2, 3.
 Supposition of unintelligible real Essences of Species, of no Use, 189. §. 17.
 Real and Nominal Essences in simple Ideas and Modes always the same, in Substances always different, 189. §. 18.
 Essences, how ingenerable and incorruptible, *ibid.* §. 19.
 Specifick Essences of mixed Modes are of Mens making and how, 194, 195.
 Tho' arbitrary, yet not at random, 196. §. 7.
 Of mixed Modes, why call'd Notions, 198. §. 12.
 What, 199. §. 2.

Essences,

The INDEX to

Essences, relate only to Species, 200. § 4.
 Real Essences what, 201. § 6. p. 381.
 We know them not, 202. § 9.
 Our specifick Essences of Substances are nothing but Collections of sensible Ideas, 205. § 21.
 Nominal are made by the Mind, 206. § 26.
 But not altogether arbitrarily 208. § 28. p. 382, 383.
 Different in several Men, *ibid.* § 28.
 Nominal Essences of Substances, how made, *ibid.* § 28, 29. These give more than a Name, 181.
 Are very various, 209. § 30, 31.
 Of Species is the abstract Idea the Name stands for, 187. § 12. p. 183. § 19.
 Is of Man's making, 188. § 14.
 But founded in the Agreement of Things, 187. § 13.
 Real Essences determine not our Species, *ibid.* § 13.
 Every distinct abstract Idea with a Name, is a distinct Essence of a distinct Species, 188. § 14.
 Real Essences of Substances not to be known, 274. § 12. p. 380.
 Essential, what, 199. § 2. p. 200. § 5.
 Nothing Essential to Individuals, *ibid.* § 4.
 But to Species, 201. § 6.
 Essential Difference, what, 200. § 5.
 Eternal Verities, 300. § 14.
 Eternity, in our Disputes and Reasonings about it, why we are apt to blunder, 164. § 15.
 Whence we get its Idea, 76. § 28.
 Evil, what, 108. § 42.
 Existence, an Idea of Sensation and Reflection, 45. § 7.
 Our own Existence we know intuitively, 290. § 2.
 And cannot doubt of it, *ibid.* § 3.
 Of created things knowable only by our Senses, 296. § 1.
 Past Existence known only by Memory, 299. § 11.
 Expansion, boundless, 78. § 2.
 Should be applied to Space in general, 70. § 27.
 Experience often helps us, where we think not it does, 52. § 8.
 Extasy, 94. § 1.
 Extension: we have no distinct Ideas of very great, or very little Extension, 164. § 16.
 Of Body incomprehensible, 132. § 23, &c.
 Denominations from Place and Extension are many of them Relatives, 142. § 5.
 And Body not the same thing, 65. § 11.
 Its Definition insignificant, 66. § 15.
 Of Body and of Space, how distinguish'd, 43. § 5. p. 69. § 27.

F.

Faculties of the Mind first exercised, 60. § 14. p. 99. § 6.
 Are but Powers, 101. § 17.
 Operate not, *ibid.* § 18, 20.
 Faith and Opinion, as distinguish'd from Knowledge, what, 308. § 2, 3.
 And Knowledge, their difference, *ibid.* § 3. p. 410, 411, 471, 482.
 What, 315. § 14.
 Not opposite to Reason, 325. § 24.
 And Reason, 326. As contra distinguish'd to Reason, what, 326. § 2.
 Cannot convince us of any thing contrary to our Reason, 327, &c. § 5, 6, 8.
 Matter of Faith is only Divine Revelation, 328. § 6.
 Things above Reason are only proper Matters of Faith, *ibid.* § 7, 9.
 Fallhood, what 'tis, 269. § 9. And why, 275. § 15.
 Fear, 96. § 10.
 Figure, 64. § 5.
 Figurative Speech, an Abuse of Language, 234. § 34.
 Finite, and Infinite, Modes of Quantity, 85. § 1.
 All positive Ideas of Quantity, finite, 87. § 8.
 Forms, Substantial Forms distinguish not Species, 202. § 10.
 Free, how far a Man is so, 102. § 21.
 A Man not Free to will, or not to will, 103. § 22, 23, 24.
 Freedom belongs only to Agents, 102. § 19.
 Wherein it consists, 104. § 27.
 Free-Will, Liberty belongs not to the Will, 100. § 14.
 Wherein consists that which is called Free-Will, 103. § 24. p. 111. § 47.

G.

General Ideas, how made, 59. § 9.
 Knowledge, what, 261. § 31.
 Propositions cannot be known to be true, without knowing the Essence of the Species, 270. § 4.
 Words how made, 185. § 6, 7, 8.
 Belong only to Signs, 187. § 11.
 Gentlemen should not be ignorant, 336. § 6.
 Genus and Species, what, 186. § 10.
 Are but Latin Names for sorts, 197. § 9.
 Is but a partial Conception of what is in the Species, 209. § 32.
 And Species adjusted to the end of Speech, 210. § 33.
 And Species are made in order to general Names, 211. § 39.
 Generation, 141. § 2.

God

The INDEX to

- Idea; our Complex Idea of God and other Spirits common in every thing, but Infinity, 136. §. 36.
- Clear and obscure, 160. §. 2.
- Distinct and confus'd, 161. §. 4.
- May be clear in one part, and obscure in another, 163. §. 13.
- Real and fantastical, 165. §. 1.
- Simple are all real, 165. §. 2.
- And adequate, 167. §. 2.
- What Idea of mixed Modes are fantastical, 166. §. 4.
- What Idea of Substances are fantastical, 166. §. 5.
- Adequate and Inadequate, 166. §. 1.
- How said to be in things, 167. §. 2.
- Modes are all Adequate Ideas, 167. §. 3.
- Unless as refer'd to Names, 168. §. 4, 5.
- Of Substances Inadequate, 170. §. 11.
1. As refer'd to real Essences, 168. §. 6, 7.
 2. As refer'd to a Collection of Simple Ideas, 169. §. 8.
- Simple Ideas are perfect $\epsilon\lambda\upsilon\pi\alpha$, 170. §. 12.
- Of Substances are perfect $\epsilon\lambda\upsilon\pi\alpha$, 171. §. 13.
- Of Modes are perfect Archetypes, ib. §. 14.
- True or false, 171.
- When false, 175, &c. §. 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.
- As bare Appearances in the Mind, neither true nor false, 172. §. 3.
- As refer'd to other Mens Ideas, or to real Existence, or to real Essences, may be true or false, ibid. §. 4, 5.
- The Reason of such Reference, 172. §. 6, 7, 8.
- Simple Ideas refer'd to other Mens Ideas, least apt to be false, 173. §. 9.
- Complex ones in this respect more apt to be false, especially those of mixed Modes, 173. §. 11.
- Simple Ideas refer'd to Existence are all true, 173. §. 14, 16.
- Tho' they should be different in different Men, 174. §. 15.
- Complex Ideas of Modes are all true, 174. §. 17.
- Of Substances when false, 175. §. 21, &c.
- When right or wrong, 176. §. 26.
- That we are incapable of, 257. §. 23.
- That we cannot attain, because of their Remoteness, 258. §. 24.
- Because of their Minuteness, ibid. §. 25.
- Simple have a real Conformity to things, 262. §. 4.
- And all others but of Substances, ibid. §. 5.
- Simple cannot be got by words of Definitions, 192. §. 11.
- But only by Experience, 193. §. 14.
- Of mixed Modes, why most compounded, 198. §. 13.
- Specifick of mixed Modes, how at first made, Instance in Kinneah and Niouph, 213. §. 44, 45.
- Of Substances: instance in Zahab, 214. §. 47.
- Simple Ideas and Modes have all abstract as well as concrete Names, 217. §. 2.
- Of Substances have scarce any concrete Names, 218. §. 2.
- Different in different Men, 221. §. 13.
- Our Ideas almost all relative, 97. §. 3.
- Particular are first in the Mind, 278. §. 9.
- General are imperfect, ibid.
- How positive Ideas may be from privative Causes, 46. §. 4.
- The Use of this Term not dangerous, 402, &c. 'Tis fitter than the word Notion, 404. Other words as liable to be abus'd as this, ibid. Yet 'tis condemn'd both as new and not new, 406, 437.
- The same with Notion, Sense, Meaning, &c. 503. Their Connection may be clear, tho' they are not wholly so, 524, 525. They are not the things whereof they are Ideas, 525. The Author never speaks of self-evident Ideas, 537.
- Identical Propositions teach nothing, 285. §. 2.
- Identity, not an innate Idea, 23. §. 3, 4, 5.
- And Diversity, 142.
- Of a Plant wherein it consists, 144. §. 4.
- Of Animals, ibid. §. 5.
- Of a Man, 144. §. 6, 8.
- Unity of Substance does not always make the same Idea, ibid. §. 7.
- Personal Idea, 146. §. 9.
- Requires not the same Body, 496, &c.
- Depends on the same Consciousness, ib. §. 10.
- Continued Existence makes Identity, 153. §. 29.
- And Diversity in Ideas the first Perception of the Mind, 243. §. 4.
- Ideots and Madmen, 60. §. 12, 13.
- Ignorance, our Ignorance infinitely exceeds our Knowledge, 257. §. 22.
- Causes of Ignorance, ibid. §. 23.
1. For want of Ideas, ibid.
 2. For want of a discoverable Connection between the Ideas we have, 259. §. 28.
 3. For want of tracing the Ideas we have, 261. §. 30.
- Illation, what, 315. §. 2.
- Immensify, 63. §. 4.
- How this Idea is got, 85. §. 3.
- Immoralities, of whole Nations, 15. §. 9, 10.
- Immortality not annexed to any Shape, 265. §. 15.
- Impenetrability, 41. §. 1.
- Imposition of Opinions unreasonable, 311. §. 4.
- Impossible est Idem esse & non esse, not the first thing known, 11. §. 25.
- Impossibility, not an innate Idea, 23. §. 3.
- Impression on the Mind, what, 4. §. 5.
- Inadequate Ideas, 166. §. 1.

Incom-

the First VOLUME.

Incompatibility, how far knowable, 254.

§ 15.

Individuationis Principium, is Existence, 143. § 3.

Infallible Judg of Controversies, 25. § 12.

Inference, what, 315. § 2, 3, 4.

Infinite, why the Idea of Infinite not applicable to other Ideas, as well as those of Quantity, since they can be as often repeated, 86. § 6.

The Idea of Infinity of Space or Number, and of Space or Number Infinite, must be distinguish'd, 87. § 7.

Our Idea of Infinite very obscure, ib. § 8.

Number furnishes us with the clearest Ideas of Infinite, 88. § 9.

The Idea of Infinite a growing Idea, ib. § 12.

Our Idea of Infinite partly positive, partly comparative, partly negative, 89. § 15.

Why some Men think they have an Idea of infinite Duration, but not of infinite Space, 91. § 20.

Why Disputes about Infinite are usually perplexed, ibid. § 21.

Our Idea of Infinity has its Original in Sensation and Reflection, 92. § 22.

We have no positive Idea of Infinite, 88. § 13, 14. p 90. § 16.

Infinity, why more commonly allowed to Duration, than to Expansion, 79. § 4.

How apply'd to God by us, 85. § 1.

How we get this Idea, ibid. § 2, 3.

The Infinity of Number, Duration, and Space, different ways consider'd, 82. § 10, 11.

Innate Truths must be the first known 11. § 26.

Principles to no purpose, if Men can be ignorant or doubtful of them, 17. § 13.

Principles of my Lord Herbert examin'd, 18. § 15, &c.

Moral Rules to no purpose, if effaceable or alterable, 20. § 20.

Propositions must be distinguish'd from others by their Clearness and Usefulness, 29. § 21.

The Doctrine of Innate Principles of ill Consequence, 31. § 24.

Instant, what, 72. § 10.

And continual Change, 73. § 13, 14, 15.

Intelligibly, how to speak or write so, 544.

Intuitive Knowledge, 246. § 1.

Our highest Certainty, 315. § 14.

Invention, wherein it consists, 56. § 8.

Joy, 96. § 7.

Iron, of what Advantage to Mankind, 304. § 11.

Judgment, wrong Judgments in reference to Good and Evil, 114. § 58.

Right Judgment, ibid.

One Cause of wrong Judgment, 310, § 3.

Wherein it consists, 307.

K:

Knowledge has a great Connection with Words, 233. § 25.

The Author's Definition of it explain'd and defended, 410. How it differs from Faith, ibid. His Definition of it leads not to Scepticism, 509, &c.

What, 243. § 2.

How much our Knowledge depends on our Senses, 241. § 23.

Actual, 244. § 8.

Habitual, 244. § 8.

Habitual twofold, 244. § 9.

Intuitive, 246. § 1.

Intuitive the clearest, ibid.

Intuitive, irresistible, ibid.

Demonstrative, 246. § 2.

Of general Truths, is all either intuitive or demonstrative, 249. § 14.

Of particular Existences is sensitive, ibid.

Clear Ideas do not always produce clear Knowledge, 249. § 15.

What kind of Knowledge we have of Nature, 129. § 12.

Its beginning and progress, 61. § 15, 16, 17. p. 71. § 15, 16.

Given us in the Faculties to attain it, 25. § 12.

Mens Knowledge according to the Employment of their Faculties, 30. § 22.

To be got only by the Application of our own Thought to the Contemplation of things, ibid. § 23.

Extent of Human Knowledge, 250.

Our Knowledge goes not beyond our Ideas, ibid. § 1.

Nor beyond the Perception of their Agreement or Disagreement, ibid. § 2.

Reaches not to all our Ideas, 250. § 3.

Much less to the Reality of things, ib. § 6.

Yet very improvable, if right ways were taken, 230. § 6.

Of Co-existence very narrow, 252, &c. § 9, 10, 11.

And therefore of Substances very narrow, 253, &c. § 14, 15, 16.

Of other Relations indeterminable, 255. § 18.

Of Existence, 257. § 21.

Certain and universal, where to be had, 260. § 29.

Ill use of Words a great hindrance of Knowledge, 261. § 30.

General, where to be got, 261. § 31.

Lies only in our Thoughts, 275. § 13.

Reality of our Knowledge, 261.

Of Mathematical Truths, how real, 263. § 6.

Of Morality real, ibid. § 7.

Knowledge

The INDEX to

Knowledge of Substances, how far real, 264. §. 12.

What makes our Knowledge real, 262. §. 3. p. 263. §. 8.

Considering Things, and not Names, the way to Knowledge, 265. §. 13.

Of Substances, wherein it consists, 272. §. 10.

What required to any tolerable Knowledge of Substances, 275. §. 14.

Self-evident, 276. §. 2.

Of Identity and Diversity, as large as our Ideas, 252. §. 8. p. 277. §. 4.

Wherein it consists, *ibid.*

Of Co-existence very scanty, 278. §. 5.

Of Relations of Modes not so scanty, *ib.* §. 6.

Of real Existence none, *ibid.* §. 7.

Begins in Particulars, 278. §. 9.

Intuitive of our own Existence, 290. §. 2.

Demonstrative of a God, *ibid.* §. 1.

Improvement of Knowledge, 300.

Not improv'd by Maxims, 243. §. 3.

Why so thought, 243. §. 2.

Knowledge improv'd only by perfecting and comparing Ideas, 302. §. 6. p. 305. §. 14.

And finding their Relations, 302. §. 7.

By intermediate Ideas, 305. §. 14.

In Substances how to be improved, 302. §. 7.

Partly necessary, partly voluntary, 306. §. 1, 2.

Why some, and so little, *ibid.* §. 2.

How increased, 312. §. 6.

L.

Languages, why they change, 123. §. 7.
Wherein it consists, 181. §. 1, 2, 3.

Its Use, 196. §. 7.

Its Imperfections, 226. §. 1.

Double Use, 226. §. 1.

The Use of Language destroy'd by the Subtlety of Disputing, 228. §. 10, 11.

Ends of Language, 233. §. 23.

Its Imperfections not easy to be cured, 235. §. 2, 4, 5, 6.

The Cure of them necessary to Philosophy, 235. §. 3.

To use no word without a clear and distinct Idea annex'd to it, is one Remedy of the

Imperfections of Language, 237. §. 8, 9.

Propriety in the Use of Words, another Remedy, 238. §. 11.

Law of Nature generally allow'd, 14. §. 6.

There is, tho' not innate, 17. §. 13.

Its enforcement, 154. §. 6.

Learning, the ill state of Learning in these later Ages, 226, &c.

Of the Schools lies chiefly in the Abuse of Words, 226, &c.

Such Learning of ill Consequence, 228. §. 10, &c.

Liberty, what, 99. §. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. p. 101. §. 15.

Belongs not to the Will, 100. §. 14.

To be determin'd by the Result of our own Deliberation, is no Restraint of Liberty, 111. §. 48, 49, 50.

Founded in a Power of suspending our particular Desires, 110. §. 47, 51, 52.

Light, its absurd Definitions, 191. §. 10.

Light in the Mind, what, 333. §. 13.

Logick has introduc'd Obscurity into Languages, 227. §. 6.

And hinder'd Knowledge, *ibid.* §. 7.

Love, 95. §. 4.

M.

Madness, 60, §. 13. Opposition to Reason deserves that Name, 177. §. 4.

Magisterial. The most knowing are least Magisterial, 311. §. 4.

Making, 141. §. 2.

Man not the Product of blind Chance, 291. §. 6.

The Essence of Man is placed in his Shape, 266. §. 16.

We know not his real Essence, 200. §. 3. p. 205. §. 22. p. 207. §. 27.

The Boundaries of the human Species not determined, *ibid.* §. 27.

What makes the same individual Man, 150. §. 21. p. 153. §. 29.

The same Man may be different Persons, 149. §. 19.

Mathematicks, their Methods, 302. §. 7.

Improvement, 305. §. 15. Of the use of them in Natural Philosophy, 542.

Matter incomprehensible both in its Cohesion and Divisibility, 132. §. 23. p. 134. §. 30, 31.

What, 229. §. 15.

Whether it may think, is not to be known, 251. §. 6. p. 557—564.

The Credibility of Divine Revelation not lessen'd by supposing it possible, 564, 565.

Cannot produce Motion, or any thing else, 292. §. 10.

And Motion cannot produce Thought, *ib.* Not Eternal, 295. §. 18.

Maxims, 276, &c. p. 283. §. 12, 13, 14, 15.

The Author denies not the Certainty of them, 517. He allows them to be of some use, 519.

Not alone self-evident, 276. §. 3.

Are not the Truths first known, 278. §. 9.

Not the Foundation of our Knowledge, 279. §. 10.

Wherein their Evidence consists, *ibid.* §. 10. p. 305. §. 14.

Their Use, 279. §. 11. 12.

Why the most general self-evident Propositions alone pass for Maxims, *ib.* §. 11.

Are commonly Proofs only where there is no need of Proofs, 284. §. 15.

Of little Use with clear Terms, 285. §. 19.

Maxims

the First VOLUME.

Maxims of dangerous Use without doubtful Terms, 283. §. 12, 20.
 When first known, 5. §. 9, 12, 13. p. 7. §. 14, 16.
 How they gain Assent, 19. §. 21, 22.
 Made from particular Observations, *ib.*
 Not in the Understanding, before they are actually known, 9. §. 22.
 Neither their Terms nor Ideas innate, 10. §. 23.
 Least known to Children and illiterate People, 11. §. 27.
 Memory, 55. §. 2.
 Attention, Pleasure, and Pain, settle Ideas in the Memory, *ibid.* §. 3.
 And Repetition, *ibid.* §. 4. p. 56, §. 6.
 Difference of Memory, 55. §. 4, 5.
 In Remembrance, the Mind sometimes active, sometimes passive, 56. §. 7.
 Its Necessity, *ibid.* §. 8.
 Defects, 56. §. 8, 9.
 In Brutes, 57. §. 10.
 Metaphysick, and School Divinity fill'd with uninstruative Propositions, 288. §. 9.
 Method used in Mathematicks, 302. §. 7.
 Mind, the Quickness of its Actions, 53. §. 10.
 Minutes, Hours, Days, not necessary to Duration, 75. §. 23.
 Miracles, the Ground of Assent to Miracles, 314. §. 13.
 Misery, what, 108. §. 42.
 Modes, mixed Modes, 122. §. 1.
 Made by the Mind, *ibid.* §. 2.
 Sometimes got by the Explication of their Names, 123. §. 3.
 Whence a mix'd Mode has its Unity, *ib.* §. 4.
 Occasion of mixed Modes, 123. §. 5.
 Mixed Modes, their Ideas, how got, 124. §. 9.
 Modes Simple and Complex, 62. §. 4.
 Simple Modes, 63. §. 1.
 Of Motion, 92. §. 2.
 Moral Good and Evil, what, 154. §. 5.
 Three Rules whereby Men judg of Moral Rectitude, *ibid.* §. 7.
 Beings, how founded on simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection, 158. §. 14, 15.
 Rules not self-evident, 14. §. 4.
 Variety of Opinions concerning Moral Rules, whence, 14. §. 5, 6.
 Rules, if innate, cannot with publick Allowance be transgressed, 16, &c. §. 11, 12, 13.
 Morality capable of Demonstration, 239. §. 16. p. 255. §. 18. p. 302. §. 8.
 The proper study of Mankind, 304. §. 11.
 Of Actions in their Conformity to a Rule, 158. §. 15.
 Mistakes in Moral Notions owing to Names, *ibid.* §. 16.
 Discourses in Morality, if not clear, 'tis the Fault of the Speaker, 239. §. 17.
 Vol. I.

Hindrances of demonstrative treating of Morality. 1. Want of Marks. 2. Complexedness, 259. §. 19. 3. Interest, 256. §. 20.
 Change of Names in Morality changes not the Nature of things, 263. §. 9.
 And Mechanism hard to be reconciled, 18. §. 14.
 Secur'd amidst Mens wrong Judgments, 119. §. 70.
 Motion, slow or very swift, why not perceiv'd, 72. §. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
 Voluntary, inexplicable, 295. §. 19.
 Its absurd Definitions, 191. §. 8, 9.

N.

Naming of Ideas, 59. §. 8.
 Names, Moral establish'd by Law, are not to be varied from, 264. §. 10.
 Of Substances standing for real Essences, are not capable to convey Certainty to the Understanding, 271. §. 5.
 Standing for nominal Essences, will make some, tho' not many certain Propositions, *ibid.* §. 6.
 Why Men substitute Names for real Essences, which they know not, 231. §. 19.
 Two false Suppositions in such an Use of Names, 232. §. 21.
 A particular Name to every particular thing, impossible, 184. §. 2.
 And useless, *ibid.* §. 3.
 Proper Names where used, 185. §. 4, 5.
 Specifick Names are affixed to the nominal Essence, 189. §. 16.
 Of simple Ideas and Substances, refer to things, 190. §. 2.
 What Names stand for both real and nominal Essence, *ibid.* §. 3.
 Of simple Ideas not capable of Definitions, *ibid.* §. 4.
 Why, 191. §. 7.
 Of least doubtful Signification, 193. §. 15.
 Have few Ascents in linea prædicamentali, 194. §. 16.
 Of complex Ideas may be defined, 193. §. 12.
 Of mixed Modes stand for arbitrary Ideas, 194. §. 2, 3. p. 213. §. 44.
 Tie together the Parts of their complex Ideas, 197. §. 10.
 Stand always for the real Essence, 198. §. 14.
 Why got usually before the Ideas are known, *ibid.* §. 15.
 Of Relations comprehended under those of mixed Modes, 199. §. 16.
 General Names of Substances stand for Sorts, 199. §. 1.
 Necessary to Species, 211. §. 39.
 Proper Names belong only to Substances, 212. §. 42.

G g g g

Names

The INDEX to

Names of Modes in their first Application,
213. §. 44, 45.

Of Substances in their first Application,
214. §. 46, 47.

Specifick Names stand for different things
in different Men, 215. §. 48.

Are put in the place of the thing supposed
to have the real Essence of the Species,
ib. §. 49.

Of mixed Modes doubtful often, because
of the great Composition of the Ideas
they stand for, 219. §. 6.

Because they want Standards in Nature,
ibid. §. 7.

Of Substances doubtful, because refer'd
to Patterns that cannot be known, or
known but imperfectly, 221. §. 11, 12,
13, 14.

In their Philosophical Use hard to have
settled Significations, 222. §. 15.

Instance, Liquor, 223. §. 16. Gold, 221.
§. 13. p. 223. §. 16.

Of simple Ideas, why least doubtful, 224.
§. 18.

Least compounded Ideas have the least
dubious Names, ibid. §. 19.

Nature of Man, what 'tis, 376. The Au-
thor's Notion of Nature and Person de-
fended, 414, &c. Bishop of Worces-
ter's Account of Nature, 416, &c.
Obscurity of it, 419, &c. The Idea of
it made up of Simple ones, 499. No
need to consult Greek or Latin Authors
to understand this English word, 512.
Mr. Boyle makes it not the same with
Substance, 512, 513. The Author's
Reply to the Bishop, saying, 'Tis the
Subject of Essential Properties,
544. Common Nature exists not out
of the Mind, 545.

Natural Philosophy not capable of Science,
259. §. 26. p. 303. §. 10.

Yet very useful, 304. §. 12.

How to be improved, ibid.

What has hinder'd its Improvement, ibid.

Necessity, 100. §. 13.

Negative Terms, 181. §. 4.

Names signify the Absence of positive
Ideas, 46. §. 5.

Newton (Mr.) 280. §. 11.

Nothing, that nothing cannot produce any
thing, is Demonstration, 291. §. 3.

Notions, 122. §. 2.

Number, 83.

Modes of Number the most distinct Ideas,
83. §. 3.

Demonstrations in Numbers the most de-
terminate, ibid. §. 4.

The general Measure, 85. §. 8.

Affords the clearest Idea of Infinity, 88. §. 9.

Numeration, what, 83. §. 5.

Names necessary to it, ibid. §. 5, 6.

And Order, 84. §. 7.

Why not early in Children, and in some
never, ibid.

O.

Obscurity unavoidable in antient Au-
thors, 221. §. 10.

The Cause of it in our Ideas, 161. §. 3.

Obstinate, they are most who have least
examined, 310. §. 3.

Opinion, what, 308. §. 3.

How Opinions grow up to Principles, 20.
§. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26.

Of others, a wrong Ground of Assent,
309. §. 6. p. 341. §. 17.

Organs. Our Organs suited to our State,
129. §. 12, 13.

P.

Pain, present, works presently, 116. §. 64.
Its Use, 44. §. 4.

Parrot mention'd by Sir W. T. 145. §. 8.

Holds a rational Discourse, ibid.

Particles join Parts or whole Sentences toge-
ther, 216. §. 1. What care should
be taken in using them, 441, 462.

In them lies the Beauty of well-speaking,
ibid. §. 2.

How their Use is to be known, ibid. §. 3.

They express some Action or Posture of
the Mind, 216. §. 4.

Pascal, his great Memory, 57. §. 9.

Passion, 125. §. 11.

Passions, how they lead us into Error, 13. §. 11.

Turn on Pleasure and Pain, 95. §. 3.

Passions are seldom single, 108. §. 39.

Perception threefold, 98. §. 5.

In Perception the Mind for the most part
Passive, 51. §. 1.

Is an Impression made on the Mind, ibid.
§. 3, 4.

In the Womb, 52. §. 5.

Difference between it and innate Ideas,
ibid. §. 6.

Puts the difference between the Animal
and Vegetable Kingdom, 53. §. 11.

The several Degrees of it shew the Wis-
dom and Goodness of the Maker, 54. §. 12.

Belongs to all Animals, ib. §. 12, 13, 14.

The first Inlet of Knowledge, 54. §. 15.

Person what, 146. §. 9. How explained by
the Bishop of Worcester, 423, &c.
His Definition of it consider'd, 426.
The Author's Notion of it, 499. no
more against the Trinity than the Bi-
shop's, 500.

A Forensic Term, 152. §. 26.

The same Consciousness alone makes the
same Person, 147. §. 13. p. 151. §. 23.

The same Soul without the same Conscious-
ness makes not the same Person, 148.

§. 14, &c.

Person :

the First VOLUME.

Person: Reward and Punishment follow
 personal Identity, 149. §. 18.
 Phancy, 56. §. 8.
 Phantastical Ideas, 165. §. 1.
 Philosophers, their Authority should not
 determine our Judgment, 531.
 Place, 64. §. 7, 8.
 Use of Place, 65. §. 9.
 Nothing but a relative Position, ib. §. 10.
 Sometime taken for the Space a Body
 fills, 65. §. 10.
 Twofold, 79. §. 6, 7.
 Pleasure and Pain, 95. §. 1. p. 96. §. 15, 16.
 Join themselves to most of our Ideas, 44. §. 2.
 Why join'd to several Actions, 44. §. 3.
 Power, how we come by its Idea, 97. §. 1.
 Active and Passive, ibid. §. 2.
 No passive Power in God, no active Power
 in Matter; both active and passive in
 Spirits, 97. §. 2.
 Our Idea of active Power clearest from
 Reflection, 98. §. 4.
 Powers operate not on Powers, 101. §. 18.
 Make a great part of the Ideas of Sub-
 stances. 127. §. 7.
 Why, 128. §. 8.
 An Idea of Sensation and Reflection, 45. §. 8.
 Practical Principles not innate, 12. §. 1.
 Not universally assented to, 13. §. 2.
 Are for Operation, ibid. §. 3.
 Not agreed, 18. §. 14.
 Different, 20. §. 21.
 Principles not to be receiv'd without strict
 Examination, 301. §. 4. p. 337. §. 8.
 The ill Consequences of wrong Principles,
 338. §. 9, 10.
 None innate, 3.
 None universally assented to, 4. §. 2, 3, 4.
 How ordinarily got, 20. §. 22, &c.
 Are to be examin'd, 21. §. 26, 27.
 Not innate, if the Ideas they are made up
 of are not innate, 22. §. 1.
 Privative Terms, 181. §. 4.
 Probability, what, 308. §. 1, 3.
 The Grounds of Probability, 309. §. 4.
 In Matter of Fact, ibid. §. 6.
 How we are to judg in Probabilities, 309.
 §. 5.
 Difficulties in Probabilities, 312. §. 9.
 Grounds or Probability in Speculation, 313.
 §. 12.
 Wrong Measures of Probability, 337. §. 7.
 How evaded by prejudiced Minds, 339.
 §. 13, 14.
 Proots, 247. §. 3.
 Properties of Specifick Essences not known,
 204. §. 19.
 Of things, very numerous, 170. §. 10.
 p. 176. §. 24.
 Propositions Identical teach nothing 285. §. 2.
 Generical teach nothing, 287. §. 4. p. 289.
 §. 13.
 Wherein a part of the Definition is pre-

dicated of the Subject, teach nothing, 287.
 §. 5, 6.
 But the signification of that word, 288. §. 7.
 Concerning Substances, generally either tri-
 fling or uncertain, 288. §. 9.
 Merely verbal, how to be known, 289. §. 12.
 Abstract Terms predicated one of another,
 produce merely verbal Propositions, ib.
 Or part of a Complex Idea predicated of
 the whole, 289. §. 13.
 More Propositions merely verbal than is
 suspected, ibid. §. 13.
 Universal Propositions concern not Exi-
 stence, 290. §. 1.
 What Propositions concern Existence, ib. §. 1.
 Certain Propositions concerning Existence
 are particular, concerning abstract
 Ideas may be general, 300. §. 13.
 Mental, 267. §. 3. p. 268. §. 5.
 Verbal, 267. §. 3. p. 268. §. 5.
 Mental, hard to be treated, 267. §. 3, 4.
 Punishment, what, 154. §. 5.
 And Reward follow Consciousness, 149.
 §. 18. p. 152. §. 26.
 An unconscious Drunkard, why punish'd,
 150. §. 22.

Qualities, secondary Qualities, their
 Connection or Inconsistence un-
 known, 253. §. 11.
 Of Substances scarce knowable, but by Ex-
 perience, 253. §. 14, 16.
 Of Spiritual Substances less than of Cor-
 poreal, 255. §. 17.
 Secondary have no conceivable Connection
 with the Primary that produce them,
 253. §. 12, 13. p. 259. §. 28.
 Of Substances depend on remote Causes,
 273. §. 11.
 Not to be known by Descriptions, 240. §. 21.
 Secondary, how far capable of Demonstra-
 tion, 248. §. 11, 12, 13.
 What, 47. §. 8. p. 48. §. 16.
 How said to be in things, 167. §. 2.
 Secondary would be other, if we could
 discover the minute parts of Bodies,
 129. §. 11.
 Primary Qualities, 47. §. 9.
 How they produce Ideas in us, 48. §. 12.
 Secondary Qualities, ib. §. 13, 14, 15.
 Primary Qualities resemble our Ideas, se-
 condary not, 48. §. 15, 16, &c.
 Three sorts of Qualities in Bodies, 50. §. 23.
 i. e. Primary, secondary immediately per-
 ceivable, and secondary mediately
 perceivable, ibid. §. 25.
 Secondary Qualities, are bare Powers,
 50. §. 23, 24, 25.
 Secondary Qualities have no discernible
 Connection with the first, ibid. §. 25.
 Quotations, how little to be relied on, 313.
 §. 10.

R.

The INDEX to

- R.
- R** *Real Ideas*, 165.
- Reason, its various Significations*, 315. §. 1. *What*, *ibid.* §. 2.
- Reason is natural Revelation*, 331. §. 4.
- It must judg of Revelation*, 334. §. 14, 15.
- It must be our last Guide in every thing*, *ib.*
- Four parts of Reason*, 316. §. 3.
- Where Reason fails us*, 422. §. 9.
- Necessary in all but Intuition*, 323. §. 15.
- As contra-distinguish'd to Faith, what*, 326. §. 2.
- Helps us not to the Knowledg of innate Truths*, 5. §. 5, 6, 7, 8.
- General Ideas, general Terms, and Reason, usually grow together*, 7. §. 15.
- The Verdict of it not necessary to confirm a known Divine Revelation*, 564—568.
- How the Defect of it is help'd by Revelation*, 572, 573.
- Recollection*, 93. §. 1.
- Reflection*, 32. §. 4.
- Related*, 38. §. 1.
- Relation*, 63. §. 7. p. 138.
- Relation proportional*, 153. §. 1.
- Natural*, *ibid.* §. 2.
- Instituted*, 154. §. 3.
- Moral*, *ibid.* §. 4.
- Numerous*, 159. §. 17.
- Terminate in simple Ideas*, *ibid.* §. 18.
- Our clear Idea of Relation*, *ibid.* §. 19.
- Names of Relations doubtful*, 160. §. 19.
- Without correlative Terms not so commonly observed*, 138. §. 2.
- Different from the things related*, 139. §. 4.
- Changes without any Change in the Subject*, *ibid.* §. 5.
- Always between two*, *ibid.* §. 6.
- All things capable of Relation*, 139. §. 6.
- The Idea of the Relation often clearer than of the things related*, *ibid.* §. 8.
- All terminate in simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection*, 140. §. 9.
- Relative*, 138. §. 1.
- Some Relative Terms taken for external Denominations*, 138. §. 2.
- Some for absolute*, *ibid.* §. 3.
- How to be known*, 140. §. 10.
- Many words, tho' seeming absolute, are Relatives*, 138. §. 3. p. 141. §. 3, 4, 5.
- Religion all Men have time to inquire into*, 335. §. 3.
- But in many Places are hinder'd from inquiring*, 336. §. 4.
- Remembrance of great force in common Life*, 156. §. 8.
- What*, 28. §. 20. p. 56. §. 7.
- Reputation of great force in common Life*, 157. §. 12.
- Restraint*, 100. §. 13.
- Resurrection, The Author's Notion of it*, 484, &c. not necessarily understood of the same Body, 485, &c. *The meaning of his Body*, 2 Cor. 5. 10. p. 486.
- The same Body of Christ arose, and why*, 489. *How the Scripture constantly speaks about it*, 495.
- Revelation, an unquestionable Ground of Assent*, 315. §. 14. p. 565.
- Belief no Proof of it*, 334. §. 15.
- Traditional Revelation cannot convey any new simple Ideas*, 326. §. 3.
- Not so sure as our Reason or Senses*, 327. §. 4.
- In things of Reason no need of Revelation*, 327. §. 5.
- Cannot over-rule our clear Knowledg*, 327. §. 5. p. 329. §. 10.
- Must over-rule Probabilities of Reason*, 328. §. 8, 9.
- Reward, what*, 154. §. 5.
- Rhetorick, an Art of deceiving*, 234. §. 34. §.
- S** *Agacity*, 247. §. 3.
- Same, whether Substance, Mode or Concrete*, 152. §. 28.
- Sand, white to the Eye, pellucid in a Microscope*, 129. §. 11.
- Sceptical, no one so Sceptical as to doubt his own Existence*, 291. §. 2.
- Scepticism, The Author's Definition of Knowledg leads not to it*, 509. *The Bishop of Worcester's arguing rather tends to it*, 511. *Syllogism not necessary to prevent it*, 523.
- Schools, wherein faulty*, 227. §. 6, &c.
- Science divided into a Consideration of Nature, of Operation, and of Signs*, 342.
- No Science of natural Bodies*, 260. §. 29.
- Scripture, Interpretations of Scripture not to be imposed*, 225. §. 23. *The Author's Veneration of it*, 387, 389. *The use of Ideas in understanding it*, 501, 502.
- Self, what makes it*, 149. §. 17. p. 156. §. 20. p. 151. §. 23, 24, 25.
- Self-Love*, 177. §. 2. *partly Cause of Unreasonableness in us*, *ibid.*
- Self-Evident Propositions, where to be had*, 276, &c.
- Neither needed nor admitted Proof*, 285. §. 19.
- Sensation, 32. §. 3. distinguishible from other Perceptions*, 249. §. 14.
- Explain'd*, 49. §. 21.
- What*, 93. §. 1.
- Senses, why we cannot conceive other Qualities than the Objects of our Senses*, 40. §. 3.
- Learn to discern by Exercise*, 240. §. 21.
- Much quicker would not be useful to us*, 129. §. 11.
- Our Organs of Sense suited to our State*, 129. §. 12, 13.
- Sensible Knowledg is as certain as we need*, 298. §. 8.

Sensi-

the First VOLUME.

- Sensible Knowledge goes not beyond the present Act, *ibid.* §. 9.
- Shame, 96. §. 17.
- Simple Ideas, 39. §. 1.
Not made by the Mind, *ibid.* §. 2.
Power of the Mind over them, 61. §. 1.
The Materials of all our Knowledge, 45. §. 10.
All positive, 46. §. 1.
Very different from their Causes, 46. §. 2, 3.
- Sin, with different Men stands for different Actions, 19. §. 19.
- Solidity, 41. §. 1.
Inseparable from Body, 41. §. 1.
By it Body fills Space, *ibid.* §. 2.
This Idea got by Touch, *ibid.*
How distinguish'd from Space, 41. §. 3.
From Hardness, 42. §. 4.
- Something from Eternity demonstrated, 291. §. 3. p. 292. §. 8.
- Sorrow, 96. §. 8.
- Soul thinks not always, 34. §. 9, &c.
Not in sound Sleep, 35. §. 11, &c.
Its Immateriality we know not, 251. §. 6. p. 257, 556.
Religion not concern'd in the Soul's Immateriality, *ibid.* §. 6.
Our Ignorance about it, 152. §. 27.
The Immortality of it not prov'd by Reason, 568. — 571. 'Tis brought to light by Revelation, 571.
- Sound, its Modes, 92. §. 3.
- Space, its Idea got by Sight and Touch, 63. §. 2.
Its Modifications, *ibid.* §. 4.
Not Body, 65. . 11, 12.
Its Parts inseparable, 66. §. 12.
Immovable, 66. §. 14.
Whether Body or Spirit, *ibid.* §. 16.
Whether Substance or Accident, 67. §. 17.
Infinite, 67. §. 21. p. 86. §. 4.
Ideas of Space and Body distinct, 69. §. 24, 25.
Consider'd as a Solid, 82. §. 11.
Hard to conceive any real Being void of Space, 12. §. 11.
- Species, why changing one simple Idea of the Complex one, is thought to change the Species in Modes, but not in Substances, 231. §. 19.
Of Animals and Vegetables, mostly distinguish'd by Figure, 208. §. 29.
Of other things, by Colour, *ibid.*
Made by the Understanding for Communication, 197. §. 9.
No Species of mixed Modes without a Name, *ibid.* §. 11.
Of Substances, are determin'd by the nominal Essence, 201. §. 7, 8, 11, 13. p. 198. §. 13.
Not by substantial Forms, 202. §. 10.
Nor by the real Essence, 204. §. 18. p. 206. §. 35.
- Vol. I.
- Of Spirits, how distinguish'd*, 202. §. 11.
More Species of Creatures above than below us, 203. §. 12.
Of Creatures very gradual, *ibid.* §. 12.
What is necessary to the making of Species by real Essences, 204. §. 14, &c.
Of Animals and Plants, cannot be distinguish'd by Propagation, 206. §. 23.
Of Animals and Vegetables, distinguish'd principally by the Shape and Figure; of other things, by the Colour, 208. §. 29.
Of Man likewise in part, 206. §. 26.
Instance, Abbot of St. Martin, *ibid.*
Is but a partial Conception of what is in the Individuals, 209. §. 32.
'Tis the Complex Idea which the Name stands for, that makes the Species, 211. §. 35.
Man makes the Species or Sorts, *ibid.* §. 36, 37.
But the Foundation of it is in the Similitude found in things, 211. §. 36, 37.
Every distinct abstract Idea makes a different Species, *ibid.* §. 38.
- Speculation, matters of it not prov'd by Votes, 516.
- Speech, its End, 182. §. 1, 2.
Proper Speech, 184. §. 8.
Intelligible, *ibid.*
- Spirits, the Existence of Spirits not knowable, 299. §. 12.
How 'tis prov'd, 357.
Operation of Spirits on Bodies, not conceivable, 259. §. 28.
What Knowledge they have of Bodies, 241. §. 23.
Separate, how their Knowledge may exceed ours, 56. §. 9.
We have as clear a Notion of the Substance of Spirit, as of Body, 127. §. 5.
A Conjecture concerning one way of Knowledge, wherein Spirits excel us, 130. §. 13.
Our Ideas of Spirit, 131. §. 15. *As clear as that of Body*, 132. §. 22.
Primary Ideas belonging to Spirits, 131. §. 18.
Move, 131. §. 19, 20.
Ideas of Spirit and Body compared, 134. §. 30.
The Existence of Spirits as easy to be admitted as that of Bodies, *ibid.* §. 28.
We have no Idea how Spirits communicate their Thought, 136. §. 36.
How far we are ignorant of the Being, Species, and Properties of Spirits, 259. §. 27.
The word Spirit don't necessarily denote Immateriality, 358, 568.
- H h h h
- Spirits :

The INDEX to

- Spirits: *The Scripture speaks of material Spirits*, 358, 573.
 Stupidity, 56. §. 8.
 Substance, 122. §. 1.
 No Idea of it, 28. §. 18.
 Not very knowable, *ibid.*
 Our Certainty concerning Substances, reaches but a little way, 271. §. 7. p. 272. §. 10. p. 275. §. 15.
 The confus'd Idea of Substance in general, makes always a part of the *Essence of the Species of Substances*, 205. §. 21.
 In Substances we must rectify the Signification of their Names by the Things, more than by *Definitions*, 241. §. 24.
 Their Ideas single or collective, 62. §. 6.
 We have no distinct Idea of Substance, 65. §. 18, 19.
 We have no Idea of pure Substance, 126. §. 2.
 Our Ideas of the Sorts of Substances, 126. §. 3, 4, 6.
 Observables in our Ideas of Substances, 136. §. 37.
 Collective Ideas of Substances, 137.
 They are single Ideas, *ibid.* §. 2.
 Three sorts, 143. §. 2.
 The Ideas of Substances have in the Mind a double Reference, 168. §. 6.
 The Properties of Substances numerous, and not at all to be known, 170. §. 9, 10.
 The perfect Ideas of Substances, 127. §. 7.
 Three sorts of Ideas make our Complex one of Substances, 128. §. 9.
 Substance not discarded by the Essay, 344, &c. *The Author's Account of it as clear as that of noted Logicians*, 345, &c. *We talk like Children about it*, 126. §. 2. p. 346. *The Author and the Bishop of Worcester agreed in the Notion of it*, 348, 551. *How the Mind forms the general Idea of it*, 349, 352. *The Author makes not the Being of it depend on the Fancies of Men*, 350. *'Tis used for Essence or Nature*, 353. *Idea of it obscure*, 354, 355, 553. *The Author's Principles consist with the Certainty of its Existence*, 550. *Yea, they prove it equally with the Bishop's*, 551. *The Author ridicul'd not the Notion of it by his Similies of the Elephant and Tortoise*, 552. *The Certainty of the Being of Substance don't suppose a clear Idea of it*, 554.
 Subsistence, a *Dialogue concerning it*, 546.
 Subtilty, what, 228. §. 8.
 Succession, an *Idea got chiefly from the Train of our Ideas*, 45. §. 9. p. 71. §. 6.
 Which Train is the Measure of it, 72. §. 12.
 Summum Bonum, wherein it consists, 113. §. 55.
 Sun, the name of a Species, tho' but one, 199. §. 1.
 Syllogism, no help to Reasoning, 316. §. 4.
 The Use of Syllogism, *ibid.*
 Inconveniencies of Syllogism, *ibid.*
 Of no Use in Probabilities, 321. §. 5.
 Helps not to new Discoveries, 321. §. 6.
 Or the Improvement of our Knowledg, *ibid.* §. 7.
 Whether in Syllogism the Middle Terms may not be better plac'd, 322. §. 8.
 May be about Particulars, *ibid.*
 Certainty not to be placed in it, 523.
 T.
 Taste and Smells, their Modes, 92. §. 5.
 Testimony, how it lessens its Force, 313. §. 10.
 Thinking, 93.
 Modes of Thinking, 93. §. 1, 2.
 Mens ordinary way of Thinking, 268. §. 4.
 An Operation of the Soul, 34. §. 10.
 Without Memory useless, 36. §. 15.
 Time, what, 73. §. 17, 18.
 Not the Measure of Motion, 75. §. 22.
 And Place, distinguishible Portions of infinite Duration and Expansion, 79. §. 5, 6.
 Two-fold, *ibid.* §. 6, 7.
 Denominations from Time are Relatives, 141. §. 3.
 Toleration necessary in our State of Knowledg, 311. §. 4.
 Tradition, the older, the less credible, 328. §. 6.
 Trifling Propositions, 285.
 Discourses, 288. §. 9, 10, 11.
 Trinity, nothing in the *Essay* against it, 343, &c. *The Author complains of being brought into the Controversy*, 390, &c. *How the Doctrine of it is own'd by him*, 434.
 Truth, what, 267. §. 2. p. 268. §. 5. p. 269. §. 9.
 Of Thought, 267. §. 3. p. 269. §. 9.
 Of Words, 267. §. 3.
 Verbal and real, 269. §. 8, 9.
 Moral, 270. §. 11.
 Metaphysical, 171. §. 2.
 General seldom apprehended but in Words, 272. §. 10.
 In what it consists, 175. §. 19.

Truth:

the First VOLUME.

Truth : Love of it necessary, 330. §. 1.
How we may know we love it, *ibid.*
The Author's profess'd Concern for it, 463.

V.

Vacuum possible, 68. §. 22.
Motion proves a Vacuum, *ibid.* §. 23.
We have an Idea of it, 41. §. 3. p. 43. §. 5.
Variety in Mens Pursuits accounted for, 113. §. 54, &c.
Virtue, what in Reality, 19. §. 18.
What in its common Application, 16. §. 10, 11.
Is preferable under a bare Possibility of a future State, 119. §. 70.
How taken, 19. §. 17.
Vice lies in wrong Measures of good, 341. §. 16.
Understanding, what, 98. §. 5, 6.
Like a dark Room, 61. §. 17.
When rightly used, 2. §. 5.
Three sorts of Perception in the Understanding, 98. §. 5.
Wholly passive in the Reception of simple Ideas, 39. §. 25.
Uneasiness alone determines the Will to a new Action, 104. §. 29, 31, 33, &c.
Why it determines the Will, 106. §. 36, 37.
Causes of it, 114. §. 57, &c.
Unity, an Idea both of Sensation and Reflection, 45. §. 7.
Suggested by every thing, 83. §. 1.
Universality is only in Signs, 187. §. 11.
Universals, how made, 59. §. 9.
Volition, what, 98. §. 5. p. 101. §. 15.
Better known by Reflection than Words, 104. §. 30.
Voluntary, what, p. 98. §. 5. p. 100. §. 11. p. 104. §. 28.

W.

What is, is, is not universally assented to, 4. §. 4.
Where and when, 80. §. 8.
Whole bigger than its Parts, its Use, 279. §. 11.
And Part, not innate Ideas, 13. §. 6.
Will, what, 98. §. 5, 6. p. 101. §. 15. p. 104. §. 29.
What determines the Will, *ibid.* §. 29.
Often confounded with Desire, 104. §. 30.
Is conversant only about our own Actions, *ibid.* §. 30.
Terminates in them, 108. §. 40.

Is determined by the greatest present removable Uneasiness, 108. §. 40.
Wit and Judgment, wherein different, 58. §. 2.
Words, an ill Use of Words one great Hindrance of Knowledge, 261. §. 30.
Abuse of Words, 226.
Sects introduce Words without Signification, *ibid.* §. 2.
The Schools have coin'd multitudes of insignificant Words, *ibid.* §. 2.
And render'd others obscure, 227. §. 6.
Often used without Signification, 226. §. 3.
And why, 227. §. 5.
Inconstancy in their Use, an Abuse of Words, *ibid.* §. 5.
Obscurity, an Abuse of Words, 227. §. 6.
Taking them for things, an Abuse of Words, 22. §. 14.
Who most liable to this Abuse of Words, *ibid.*
This Abuse of Words is a Cause of Obstinacy in Error, 230. §. 16.
Making them stand for real Essences, which we know not, is an Abuse of Words, 230. §. 17, 18.
The Supposition of their certain evident Signification, an Abuse of Words, 232. §. 22.
Use of Words is, 1. To communicate Ideas. 2. With Quickness. 3. To convey Knowledge, 233. §. 23, 24.
How they fail in all these, *ibid.* §. 26. &c.
How in Substances, 234. §. 32.
How in Modes and Relations, *ibid.* §. 33.
Misuse of Words a great Cause of Error, 235. §. 4.
Of Obstinacy, 236. §. 5.
And of Wrangling, *ibid.* §. 6.
Signify one thing in Enquiries, and another in Disputes, 236. §. 7.
The Meaning of Words is made known in simple Ideas by shewing, 238. §. 14.
In mixed Modes by defining, *ibid.* §. 15.
In Substances by shewing and defining too, 240. §. 19, 21, 22.
The ill Consequence of learning Words first, and their Meaning afterwards, 241. §. 24.
No Shame to ask Men the Meaning of their Words, where they are doubtful, 241. §. 25.
Are to be used constantly in the same Sense, 242. §. 26.
Or else to be explain'd, where the Context determines it not, *ibid.* §. 27.
Words :

The INDEX, &c.

- Words : *How made general*, 181. §. 3.
Signifying insensible things derived from
Names of sensible Ideas, *ibid.* §. 5.
Have no natural Signification, 182.
 §. 1.
But by Imposition, 184. §. 8.
Stand immediately for the Ideas of the
Speaker, 182. §. 1, 2, 3.
Yet with a double Reference. 1. *To the*
Ideas in the Heaver's Mind, 183.
 §. 4.
 2. *To the Reality of Things*, *ibid.* §. 5.
Apt, by Custom, to excite Ideas, 183.
 §. 6.
Often used without Signification, 184. §. 7.
Most general, *ibid.* §. 1.
Why some Words of one Language can-
not be translated into those of ano-
ther, 196. §. 8.
Why I have been so large on Words, 199.
 §. 16.
- New Words, or in new Significations,*
are cautiously to be used, 215. §. 51.
How these come to be authoriz'd, 472,
 473.
Civil Use of Words, 218. §. 3.
Philosophical Use of Words, *ibid.*
These very different, 222. §. 15.
Miss their End, when they excite not in
the Heaver the same Idea as is in the
Mind of the Speaker, 219. §. 4.
What Words are most doubtful, and why,
ibid. §. 5, &c.
What unintelligible, *ibid.*
Are fitted to the Use of common Life,
 153. §. 2.
Not translatable, 123. §. 6.
Worship, not an innate Idea, 24. §. 7.
Wrangle, when we wrangle about Words,
 289. §. 13.
Writings antient, why hardly to be precisely
understood, 225. §. 23.

F I N I S.



